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EVOLUTION OF SOVIET MILITARY FORCES AND BUDGETS, 1963-1972 (U)

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A WORKING NOTE
prepared for the

DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY

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PREFACE

(U) This Working Note is one of a series being prepared as part of a comprehensive analytical history of the U.S.-Soviet strategic arms competition during the years 1945-1972. The effort was requested by the Secretary of Defense and is being coordinated by the OSD Historian, Dr. Alfred Goldberg. Several DOD components and private research organizations are engaged in various aspects of the history. Under the sponsorship of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Rand was assigned the task of examining the military forces and budgets of the superpowers. This note deals with the USSR for the years 1963-1972 and is preceded by two others by the same authors covering the intervals 1945-1953 and 1952-1964.*

(U) Other Rand studies now in progress for the history will provide the broad historical and strategic conceptual framework for the project and will examine organizational and decisionmaking aspects affecting the forces and budgets of both the United States and the USSR. The ultimate integrative history is to be written by a Final Study Group headed by Professor Ernest R. May of Harvard University, serving as a consultant to the Historical Office, OSD.

* WN(L)-9248-ARPA, The Evolution of Soviet Military Forces and Budgets, 1945-1953, and WN(L)-9266-ARPA, Evolution of Soviet Military Forces and Budgets, 1952-1964.

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I. INTRODUCTION

~~(S)~~ Like the previous installment, "Evolution of Soviet Military Forces and Budgets, 1952-1964, WN(L)-9266-ARPA, this report relies entirely on estimates supplied by CIA's Office of Strategic Research, dating from the spring of 1974. A first set of revisions subsequent to that date are reflected in the last published CIA spending report.¹ Further revisions are in progress but will probably not be published before next spring.

(U) The underlying expenditure values were calculated at 1970 ruble prices. Presumably within an interval of a few years bracketing the weight year, these data at constant prices should not depart too far from a current-price series. To that limited extent, the distributions presented here might also reflect patterns perceived by the Soviet leadership.

(U) The force estimates, as in the previous installment, derive from OSR and DIA materials, and the reader may be referred to WN(L)-9266 for some general comments on these data.

(U) Again we allow for some overlap in time with the previous installment by beginning the estimates with the year 1963, the year before Khrushchev's ouster. The discussion then considers the ten year period (1963-1972) as a whole--i.e., without attempting to construct subperiods in advance.

¹~~(S)~~ CIA, Soviet Defense Spending: Trends in Ruble Expenditures, SR IR 75-5, March 1975 (S).

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(U) In examining the growth and structure of expenditures, we retain the threefold breakdown--by service, mission, and resource.

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II. FORCES AND BUDGETS BY SERVICEA. Military Manpower¹

(S) In the years 1963-1972 total Soviet military manpower strength continued the increase which began in 1961 when there were 2.9 million men in the armed forces. By 1963 the total had risen to 3.1 million and in 1972 amounted to 3.9 million, an increase of about 26 percent. Most of the rise was accounted for by an addition of 444,000 men (40 percent) to the Ground Forces. The Command and General Support, or overhead function of the armed services was the next greatest contributor to the rise in total strength as 143,000 men were added between 1963 and 1972, a 31 percent increase. During this period the Strategic Rocket Forces experienced a 60 percent addition (103,000 men) to its numbers, and PVO Strany, the Air Defense Forces, also gained 57,000 men, which in their case was a 14 percent rise. This occurred despite a drop of 26,000 men in the fighter aviation element of these forces, which was more than compensated for by increases in surface-to-air missile, ABM, and early warning and control manpower. The Navy recorded the smallest manpower rise, 11.5 percent (47,000 men) between 1963 and 1972, while the Security Forces apparently maintained a constant strength level of 225,000 men throughout the period. Annual estimates of military manpower strength for each of the main components of the armed forces appear in Table 1.

¹(U) For definition of service boundaries, see next section on outlays.

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Table 1

ESTIMATED SOVIET MILITARY MANPOWER STRENGTH
BY MAJOR COMPONENT, 1963-1972 (U)
(1,000 men)

| Force | 1963 | 1964 | 1965 | 1966 | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 |
|-----------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Ground Forces | 1113 | 1120 | 1131 | 1164 | 1196 | 1398 | 1311 | 1359 | 1439 | 1557 |
| Naval Forces | 409 | 410 | 423 | 426 | 428 | 432 | 446 | 448 | 454 | 456 |
| Air Forces | 407 | 397 | 384 | 381 | 382 | 389 | 400 | 407 | 416 | 419 |
| Air Defense Fighters | (115) | (111) | (103) | (99) | (97) | (95) | (96) | (96) | (95) | (89) |
| Air Defense Forces | | | | | | | | | | |
| Including Fighters | (416) | (431) | (424) | (421) | (414) | (420) | (449) | (470) | (473) | (473) |
| Excluding Fighters | 301 | 320 | 321 | 322 | 317 | 325 | 353 | 374 | 378 | 384 |
| Rocket Forces | 171 | 213 | 225 | 224 | 239 | 254 | 259 | 271 | 273 | 274 |
| Security Forces | 225 | 225 | 225 | 225 | 225 | 225 | 225 | 225 | 225 | 225 |
| Command and General Support | 465 | 465 | 493 | 525 | 578 | 603 | 608 | 608 | 608 | 608 |
| TOTAL | 3091 | 3150 | 3202 | 3267 | 3365 | 3626 | 3602 | 3692 | 3793 | 3923 |

SOURCE: CIA, Office of Strategic Research.

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B. Outlays

(S) As noted in previous installments, the OSR materials do not provide a direct service breakdown but are arranged instead by mission element. A service distribution was synthesized from the mission elements as follows:

Ground Forces. Ground troops.

Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF). Strategic attack: missiles, intercontinental, and missiles, peripheral.

Air Forces. For some purposes it is useful to break this down further:

Long Range Air Forces (LRA). Strategic attack: bombers, intercontinental, and bombers, peripheral.

Frontal Aviation or Tactical Air. Ground: tactical air.

Military Transport Aviation. Military transport aviation.

PVO Strany. Strategic defense.

Navy. Also subdivided:

Strategic Forces. Strategic attack: missile submarines, intercontinental, and missile submarines, peripheral.

Other. Naval (including naval air).

(S) Joint support outlays in the strategic attack mission were prorated among LRA, Navy (strategic forces), and SRF. As indicated there, RDT&E outlays cannot be assigned to particular services (or missions). Thus, the calculation of the service structure of expenditures excludes RDT&E, as well as DOSAAF support, military security forces, and outlays on reserve and retired personnel (pay and allowances) from the sum of service expenditures. Except for RDT&E, these components

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
are of minor importance, accounting for only 5 percent of all military outlays in both 1963 and 1972. RDT&E expenditures are discussed in a later section.

(S) The structure and growth of Soviet military expenditures by service are shown graphically in Figures 1-2; the computed percentages and indexes are displayed in Part I of the Appendix Table. The decade covered in this installment was one of overall growth in Soviet expenditures on its active military forces (particularly, after 1965) and even greater change in the distribution of these outlays among the services. Ground force costs rose 38 percent between 1963 and 1968 with some falloff thereafter, until 1972, and their share in the total for six services rose from 18 percent in 1963 to 21 percent in 1968 and 22 percent in 1972. This, of course, is a sharp contrast to the persistent downward trend in expenditures on the ground forces in earlier periods.

(S) PVO strany also fared well after 1963, but only until 1969. In that interval outlays on this component jumped 64 percent, and their relative weight in the six-service total increased from 11 percent at the beginning of the period to 15 percent in 1969. Thereafter, PVO expenditures declined by 17 percent in three years.

(S) SRF outlays fluctuated sharply during this decade. Outlays decreased by almost half in 1963-1965, doubled in the next two years, and then declined by 60 percent in 1968-1972. Accordingly, the SRF share swings down from 17 to 10 percent, up to 18 percent, and then down still further to 7 percent.

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Fig.1 Growth of Soviet military expenditures by service, 1961-1972
(Indexes, 1960 = 100)




Fig. 2 Structure of Soviet military expenditures by service, 1963 - 1972 (in percent)

(S) Air Force outlays also experience large changes in relative weight, from 21-22 percent in 1963-1965 to 13 percent in 1969 and then up again to 17 percent in 1972. This reflects a decline in expenditure levels by almost 30 percent between the 1963-1965 average and the 1969 trough. In the next three years outlays rose by one-seventh. LRA and Tactical (or frontal) Aviation are the major contributors to the 1965-1969 decline, and Tactical Aviation and Military Transport Aviation are the major elements of the recovery. Over the whole period, there is therefore a perceptible restructuring of AF outlays among the three components. The share of the LRA is cut almost in half, that of Military Transport Aviation is about the same at the initial and terminal points, while the relative weight of Tactical Aviation is higher at the end than at the beginning of the period.

(S) Naval outlays were generally on a rising trend until 1970, propelled by massive increases in the strategic component. The latter doubled in three years between 1963 and 1966, doubled again in the single year 1968, rose 45 percent in the following year and an additional 15 percent in 1970. The decline in momentum restored the 1969 level by 1972. Strategic force outlays in the navy had accounted for less than 1 percent of the six-service total in 1963, but it jumped to the 4 percent level in 1969-1972. The overall naval share rose slightly as a result.

(S) Command and support outlays rose monotonically throughout the period under review, and were half again as large at the end as at the beginning of the interval. However, the most rapid increments in the series occur in the sixties. Thus, the command and support share

rises from 17 percent in 1963 to 21 percent in 1969 and 23 percent in 1972.

(S) The recent CIA report, *Soviet Defense Spending: Trends in Ruble Expenditures*, SR IR 75-5, March 1975 (S) is based on the same kinds of estimates as those which serve as the source for the present report. There are discrepancies between the data reported in SR IR 75-5 and the series compiled here. With respect to the service distribution, these discrepancies may be judged approximately by percentage deviations of the value estimates underlying this report from the reported CIA figures for 1963 and 1972, as follows:

| | <u>1963</u> | <u>1972</u> |
|---------------------|-------------|-------------|
| Ground Forces | -27 | -24 |
| SRF | -2 | -8 |
| PVO Strany | -11 | -9 |
| Air Forces | -8 | -7 |
| Navy | -8 | -7 |
| Command and Support | +33 | +27 |
| Six Forces | -6 | -6 |

(S) The discrepancies are explained in large part by the following special procedures used in SR IR 75-5: (a) Ground Forces expenditures include outlays on the security forces plus subsistence outlays for reservists; (b) Compensation of civilian employees in the military establishment has been removed from the category of Command and Support and distributed among the other services roughly in proportion to their respective expenditures on military pay; (c) The six-force total includes pensions (added to Command and Support), subsistence outlays for reservists, and expenditures on the security forces. In addition, there have been minor revisions in estimates of individual components of the forces.

III. THE FORCE STRUCTURES

A. The Strategic Attack and Defense Forces (U)

(S) The years 1963-1972 saw an extraordinary growth in the strategic intercontinental forces of the USSR (Table 2). The numbers of deployed ICBMs grew steadily and rapidly from around 109 in 1963 to about 1,520 in 1972. Much of the growth occurred in the SS-11 and secondly in the very large SS-9, both being emplaced in hardened silos. Furthermore, the number of missile-firing submarines more than quadrupled (16 to 76) during the period while the complements of missiles carried rose by more than ten times, from 73 in 1963 to 774 in 1972. In 1963 most of these missiles consisted of the short-range (150-250 nautical mile) SS-N-3s. In 1972, 416 of the 774 total were the SS-N-6 missiles of 1300-1600 nautical mile range, the remainder being principally SS-N-3s. It is now evident that the USSR built its long range strategic offensive forces mainly with land and sea based missiles. The number of heavy bombers peaked at 205 in 1964 and since then has declined slightly. Manned aircraft have thus provided a rather modest long range capability, and when the Bison and Bear were first in service in the mid-1950s, the USSR was already engaged in research and development activities aimed at creating missile forces. The heavy bomber programs were probably carried forward to impress and deter the U.S. and also as a hedge against failure of the ICBM and missile submarine programs.

(S) In 1963 these forces consisted of three basic ICBM designs and three missile submarine designs, all of which were nuclear powered. During the 1963-1972 period three additional ICBM models (SS-9, SS-11, and SS-13) were placed in service and also four additional classes of nuclear missile submarines including especially the Y class, carrying 16 missiles with a

Table 2

ESTIMATED SOVIET STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
ORDER OF BATTLE, 1963-1972 (U)

| Item | 1963 | 1964 | 1965 | 1966 | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 |
|-------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| <u>Intercontinental</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Aircraft | 200 | 205 | 205 | 200 | 200 | 200 | 200 | 195 | 195 | 195 |
| TU-94 (Bear) | 105 | 110 | 110 | 110 | 110 | 110 | 110 | 110 | 110 | 110 |
| M-4 (Bison) | 95 | 95 | 95 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 85 | 85 | 85 |
| ICBMs | 109 | 193 | 224 | 254 | 574 | 850 | 1030 | 1290 | 1499 | 1519 |
| SS-6 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | - | - | - | - | - |
| SS-7 soft | 90 | 128 | 128 | 128 | 128 | 128 | 128 | 128 | 124 | 124 |
| SS-7 hard | 15 | 42 | 69 | 69 | 69 | 69 | 69 | 69 | 66 | 66 |
| SS-8 soft | - | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 10 | 10 |
| SS-8 hard | - | 5 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 |
| SS-9 mod 1 | - | - | - | - | 10 | 20 | 40 | 50 | 50 | 50 |
| mod 2 | - | - | - | 10 | 70 | 110 | 130 | 170 | 200 | 200 |
| mod 3 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 20 | 20 |
| mod 4 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 10 | 10 |
| SS-11 mod 1 | - | - | - | 20 | 270 | 500 | 630 | 830 | 970 | 970 |
| SS-13 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 10 | 20 | 40 | 60 |
| <u>Missile Submarines (a)</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| H-I (SSBN) | 16 | 22 | 25 | 32 | 40 | 44 | 49 | 56 | 67 | 76 |
| H-II (SSBN) | 9 | 8 | 7 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | - | - | - |
| H-III (SSBN) | - | 1 | 2 | 4 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| Y (SSBN) | - | - | - | - | - | 1 | 6 | 13 | 22 | 26 |
| E-I (SSGN) | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| E-II (SSGN) | 2 | 8 | 11 | 18 | 25 | 28 | 28 | 28 | 28 | 28 |
| C (SSGN) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 4 | 6 | 11 |
| P (SSGN) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1 | 1 |
| <u>Peripheral</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Air Force Aircraft | 930 | 925 | 800 | 760 | 740 | 735 | 730 | 725 | 710 | 675 |
| TU-16 (Badger) | 900 | 875 | 725 | 660 | 610 | 580 | 560 | 550 | 535 | 500 |
| TU-22 (Blinder) | 30 | 50 | 75 | 100 | 130 | 155 | 170 | 175 | 175 | 175 |

Table 2 continued

| Item | 1963 | 1964 | 1965 | 1966 | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 |
|------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Naval Aircraft | 375 | 445 | 455 | 485 | 500 | 520 | 520 | 525 | 525 | 520 |
| TU-16 (Badger) | 360 | 400 | 410 | 440 | 450 | 460 | 460 | 465 | 465 | 460 |
| TU-22 (Blinder) | 15 | 45 | 45 | 45 | 50 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 |
| Missile Submarines (b) | 41 | 45 | 48 | 50 | 52 | 53 | 55 | 53 | 53 | 51 |
| G-I (SSB) | 22 | 22 | 22 | 22 | 20 | 17 | 14 | 13 | 11 | 11 |
| G-II (SSB) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 5 | 8 | 9 | 11 | 11 |
| J (SSG) | 2 | 5 | 7 | 9 | 11 | 13 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| W (SSG-Twin Cylinder) | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| W (SSG-Long Bin) | 5 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| Z (SSB-Conversion) | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 1 |
| I/MRBM | 668 | 709 | 709 | 693 | 677 | 673 | 653 | 633 | 594 | 587 |
| SS-3 (soft) | 32 | 32 | 32 | 16 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| SS-4 (soft) | 492 | 492 | 492 | 492 | 492 | 488 | 472 | 452 | 420 | 420 |
| SS-4 (hard) | 76 | 84 | 84 | 84 | 84 | 84 | 84 | 84 | 84 | 80 |
| SS-5 (soft) | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 46 | 46 | 42 | 42 |
| SS-5 (hard) | 18 | 51 | 51 | 51 | 51 | 51 | 51 | 51 | 48 | 45 |

SOURCES: DIA Factbook, Communist World Forces (U), 1 April 1974, Secret Noform, Controlled Dissemination;
DIA S-12, O11/DI-6D, 19 December 1972, (C); CIA, OSR.

(a) Missile complement

H-I 3 x SS-N-4, 300 n. mile ballistic missiles
H-II: 3 x SS-N-5, 700 n. mile ballistic missiles
Y: 16 x SS-N-6, 1300-1600 n. mile ballistic missiles
E-I: 6 x SS-N-3, 150-250 n. mile cruise missiles
E-II: 8 x SS-N-3, 150-250 n. mile cruise missiles
C: 8 x SS-N-7, 30 n. mile cruise missiles
P: 10 x unknown cruise missiles

(b) Missile complement

G-I: 3 x SS-N-4, 300 n. mile ballistic missiles
G-II: 3 x SS-N-5, 700 n. mile ballistic missiles
J: 4 x SS-N-3, 150-250 n. mile cruise missiles
W(TC): 2 x SS-N-3, 150-250 n. mile cruise missiles
W(LB): 4 x SS-N-3, 150-250 n. mile cruise missiles
Z: 2 x SS-N-4, 300 n. mile ballistic missiles

1300-1600 nautical mile range in each boat. By 1972 there were five different types of ICBMs and six different classes of missile submarines in operational status. No new heavy bomber designs appeared, and in 1972, the Bisons and Bears, in gradually declining numbers, still comprised the entire fleet.

(S) Concerning strategic offensive forces with ranges peripheral to its own territory, the USSR has maintained substantial deployments which exhibit varying, but largely downward, trends. The numbers of Air Force TU-16 (Badger) and TU-22 (Blinder) medium bombers declined from 930 in 1963 to 675 in 1972. However, the numbers of these weapons assigned to Naval Aviation increased somewhat, from 375 to 520 in the same period, a continuation of the trend between 1954 and 1964. The numbers of missile submarines ranged from 41 in 1963 to 55 in 1969 before dropping to 51 in 1972. The deployed strength of land based ballistic missiles declined between 1963 and 1972, from 668 to 587, after reaching a peak of 709 in 1965.

(S) In overall terms it appears that during this period the USSR placed diminishing emphasis on its peripheral offensive forces, but simultaneously increased its long range offensive power. In consonance with these changes in force levels, the resources devoted to long range weapons have increased and those devoted to peripheral offensive weapons have decreased.¹ The shift in emphasis may or may not reflect changing Soviet views about the nature of the forces required for deterrence and war fighting. The peripheral forces were still substantial in 1972, but the long range forces were accorded an increasing priority in the 1963-1972 period.

¹See Section IV.

Table 3

ESTIMATED SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE ORDER OF BATTLE, 1963-1972 (U)

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| Item | 1963 | 1964 | 1965 | 1966 | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 |
|--------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| <u>Fighters</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| MIG-17 (Fresco) | 4350 | 4130 | 3810 | 3635 | 3515 | 3430 | 3430 | 3370 | 3275 | 3075 |
| MIG-19 (Farmer) | 2785 | 2400 | 1900 | 1675 | 1550 | 1400 | 1325 | 1100 | 900 | 755 |
| MIG-25 (Foxbat) | 710 | 700 | 675 | 625 | 500 | 425 | 375 | 360 | 345 | 325 |
| SU-7 (Fitter) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 15 | 50 | 65 |
| SU-9/11 (Fishpot) | 35 | 35 | 35 | 35 | 20 | 20 | 10 | - | - | - |
| SU-15 (Flagon) | 520 | 675 | 775 | 775 | 780 | 780 | 780 | 770 | 770 | 770 |
| TU-128 (Fiddler) | - | - | - | - | - | 110 | 220 | 375 | 500 | 530 |
| YAK-25 (Flashlight) | 300 | 290 | 275 | 210 | 200 | 60 | 85 | 125 | 150 | 160 |
| YAK-27 (Mandrake recon) | - | - | 50 | 65 | 65 | 65 | 65 | 200 | 175 | 110 |
| YAK-28 (Firebar) | - | 30 | 100 | 250 | 360 | 370 | 370 | 360 | 360 | 360 |
| <u>Surface-to-Air Missiles</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| SA-1 sites (a) | 56 | 56 | 56 | 56 | 56 | 56 | 56 | 56 | 56 | 56 |
| SA-2 sites (b) | 730 | 780 | 775 | 775 | 775 | 775 | 775 | 775 | 740 | 725 |
| SA-3 sites (c) | 75 | 88 | 96 | 96 | 96 | 101 | 143 | 190 | 210 | 227 |
| SA-5 sites (d) | - | - | - | 4 | 13 | 30 | 96 | 180 | 208 | 227 |

SOURCES: DIA Factbook; DIA S-12, O11/DI-6D; CIA, OSR.

- (a) 60 launchers per site
 (b) 6 launchers per site
 (c) 8 launchers per site
 (d) 6 launchers per site

(S) An interesting mixture of changes occurred during these years with respect to Soviet strategic defensive forces (Table 3). Three new fighter interceptors were introduced into service (MIG-25, SU-15, and TU-128). However, the total size of the interceptor force dropped by nearly 30 percent. At the same time surface-to-air missile launchers, including those of the new SA-5, increased in number by over 30 percent and appeared to be approaching a peak.

B. The General Purpose Forces (U)

(U) 1. Ground Forces. As noted in a previous paper, strength data on the Ground Forces are difficult to deal with because of the complexity and fluidity of their organization and because of the changing perceptions of U.S. intelligence analysts concerning the structure of these forces. The most reliable and consistent data pertain to the divisional structure which includes 60 percent of total ground forces manpower. The remaining personnel are included in other types of organizational units--combined armies, tank armies, military districts and fronts, and corps headquarters, constituting a mixture of combat and administrative units. In Table 4 are presented estimates of the numbers of divisions and of manpower in both divisions and other types of units.

(S) It is notable that the years 1963-1972 brought a steady growth in the Army's divisional strength and a 40 percent increase in its total manpower. The number of airborne divisions remained at 7 throughout the period; the number of tank divisions varied from 49 to 52 and ended up at 50 in 1972. The number of motorized rifle divisions (which do not differ greatly in composition from tank divisions) rose without pause through the entire period, from 84 in 1963 to 111 in 1972. The Army's share of

Table 4

ESTIMATED SOVIET GROUND FORCES DIVISIONS ORDER OF BATTLE
AND MANPOWER STRENGTH IN ALL ORGANIZATIONAL UNITS, 1963-1972 (U)

| Type | 1963 | 1965 | 1966 | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 |
|-----------------------|----------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| | <u>Number of Divisions</u> | | | | | | | | |
| Airborne | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| Motorized Rifle | 84 | 90 | 94 | 100 | 102 | 103 | 106 | 107 | 111 |
| Tank | 51 | 49 | 50 | 51 | 52 | 52 | 52 | 52 | 50 |
| TOTAL DIVISIONS | 142 | 146 | 151 | 158 | 161 | 162 | 165 | 166 | 168 |
| | <u>Manpower (1,000)</u> | | | | | | | | |
| <u>Divisional</u> | | | | | | | | | |
| Airborne | 53 | 53 | 53 | 53 | 53 | 53 | 53 | 53 | 53 |
| Motorized Rifle | 349 | 370 | 386 | 400 | 488 | 450 | 472 | 511 | 564 |
| Tank | 267 | 258 | 262 | 265 | 297 | 280 | 297 | 298 | 319 |
| TOTAL | 668 | 681 | 701 | 718 | 838 | 783 | 822 | 862 | 936 |
| <u>Non-Divisional</u> | | | | | | | | | |
| Combined arms armies | 68 | 68 | 68 | 68 | 84 | 84 | 84 | 88 | 100 |
| Tank armies | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 |
| Front-MIL districts | 317 | 322 | 336 | 347 | 414 | 375 | 385 | 421 | 457 |
| Corps Headquarters | 30 | 30 | 30 | 33 | 33 | 39 | 39 | 39 | 36 |
| TOTAL | 445 | 450 | 464 | 478 | 561 | 528 | 538 | 578 | 623 |
| TOTAL MANPOWER | 1113 | 1131 | 1165 | 1196 | 1399 | 1311 | 1360 | 1440 | 1559 |

SOURCES: CIA, OSR.

total armed forces manpower rose from 36 percent at the start of the period to nearly 40 percent at its close.

(S) Modernization of the Army's weapons appeared to continue at a steady but not over-rapid pace. A new light amphibious vehicle, the type 62, appeared in 1967 and a new medium tank, the M-70, in 1970. In each of these same years a new airborne amphibious combat vehicle (BMD and BMP) entered service. A new 23 mm. anti-aircraft artillery piece, the ZSU-24, was apparently deployed in 1965 and a new 100 mm. field artillery piece, the T-12A, in about 1970.

(S) 2. The Naval Forces. From 1963 through 1972 the Soviet fleet of major surface vessels not only grew in size but acquired several new classes of ships, indicating the USSR's interest in modernization. While the number of submarines declined by 40 percent, several new designs became operational, and the fleet of long range submarines grew by 86 percent. The major new class of surface ship joining the fleet was the guided missile helicopter ship, and the lead ship, the Moskva, was completed in 1967. The new guided missile light cruiser, Kara, was completed in 1972 and was preceded by the Kresta I and Kresta II ships of the same type in 1967 and 1969. In 1968 the guided missile destroyer Kanin appeared, followed by the Krivak class in 1970. Other new arrivals included the Petya II and Petya III destroyer escorts in 1965, the Grisha class coastal escort in 1968, three subchasers in 1967, 1970, and 1972, including one hydrofoil design, a tank landing ship in 1966, plus miscellaneous small vessels. Five new classes of submarines, three of them nuclear-powered, appeared in these years. In 1968 came the medium range Bravo class and the long range nuclear Victor class. In 1969 the lead

Table 5

ESTIMATED SOVIET NAVAL ORDER OF BATTLE, 1963-1972 (U)

| Type | 1963 | 1964 | 1965 | 1966 | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 |
|---|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| <u>Major Surface Ships</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Light cruisers | 15 | 15 | 14 | 18 | 14 | 13 | 13 | 12 | 12 | 10 |
| Command light cruisers | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 2 |
| Guided missile cruisers-SAM | { 4 | 4 } | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Guided missile cruisers-SAM/SSM | | | 4 | 4 | 5 | 7 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 13 |
| Destroyers | 85 | 83 | 78 | 78 | 77 | 72 | 69 | 64 | 65 | 64 |
| Destroyers-SA missiles | { 13 | 13 } | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 6 | 9 | 10 | 12 |
| Destroyers-SS missiles | | | 12 | 11 | 10 | 8 | 8 | 6 | 4 | 3 |
| Frigate-SA missiles | 1 | 2 | 5 | 8 | 12 | 13 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 |
| Destroyers-SA msls & pt defense | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1 | 3 |
| Destroyer escorts | 62 | 58 | 59 | 56 | 56 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 53 |
| Coastal escorts | 19 | 25 | 31 | 39 | 49 | 57 | 61 | 64 | 67 | 67 |
| Guided missile helicopter ship | - | - | - | - | - | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Old heavy cruisers | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Old destroyers | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| TOTAL | 204 | 205 | 208 | 219 | 229 | 233 | 240 | 241 | 247 | 250 |
| <u>Submarines (excluding missile submarines of Table 2)</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Long range | 57 | 63 | 70 | 76 | 83 | 84 | 91 | 98 | 103 | 106 |
| Nuclear | 9 | 11 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 17 | 20 | 22 | 25 | 28 |
| Conventional | 48 | 52 | 57 | 62 | 68 | 67 | 71 | 76 | 78 | 78 |
| Medium range | 244 | 237 | 225 | 205 | 199 | 185 | 174 | 144 | 118 | 102 |
| Short range | 48 | 21 | 15 | 7 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| TOTAL | 349 | 321 | 310 | 288 | 282 | 269 | 265 | 242 | 221 | 208 |

SOURCES: DIA Factbook; CIA, OSR.

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ship of the long range Alfa class SSN was completed, and in 1972 came the long range diesel powered Victor class and the long range nuclear powered Uniform class. The advent of all these new naval designs indicates a considerable R&D and procurement effort and a definite interest of the USSR in possessing a substantial and modern navy. Estimates of Soviet naval strength in this period appear in Table 5, omitting missile submarines already counted in Table 2. Minor surface vessels, numbering in the hundreds, are excluded from consideration.

(U) 3. The Tactical Air Forces. The Soviet Tactical Air Forces added more than 1,100 fighter aircraft between 1963 and 1972. These included small numbers of four new designs, the MIG-23, MIG-25, SU-17, and the YAK-28. While the complement of fighters was increasing by 44 percent and that of recon aircraft more than doubled, the bomber arm of the Tactical Air Forces declined by over 30 percent. This was due mainly to the phasing down of the old IL-28 light bomber while the numbers of the newer YAK-28 were kept at rather low levels. Table 6 contains the force estimates.

(C) 4. Naval Aviation Forces. These forces generally maintained their bomber strength and increased their numbers of medium bombers during the 1963-1972 years. The reconnaissance and ASW aircraft increased in numbers and four new designs for these functions entered deployment. In addition, the complement of helicopters nearly doubled. Many major surface vessels are now equipped with helicopter pads and carry helicopters on board. Strength estimates appear in Table 7.

(C) 5. Military Transport Aviation. We do not possess reliable time series of numbers of aircraft by type for the substantial Soviet MATS. In 1963 this service possessed about 3,500 aircraft of which

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Table 6

ESTIMATED SOVIET TACTICAL AVIATION ORDER OF BATTLE, 1963-1972 (U)

| Type | 1963 | 1964 | 1965 | 1966 | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 |
|---------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| <u>Fighters</u> | 2495 | 2610 | 2595 | 2755 | 2880 | 2965 | 3180 | 3305 | 3485 | 3605 |
| MIG-17 (Fresco) | 1530 | 1380 | 1140 | 1090 | 940 | 910 | 1000 | 1000 | 935 | 935 |
| MIG-19 (Farmer) | 245 | 210 | 200 | 180 | 180 | 170 | 170 | 160 | 155 | 155 |
| MIG-21 (Fishbed) | 390 | 600 | 825 | 1040 | 1255 | 1380 | 1485 | 1600 | 1800 | 1900 |
| MIG-23 (Flogger) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 30 | 50 |
| MIG-25 (Foxbat) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 10 |
| SU-7 (Fitter) A | 275 | 390 | 410 | 420 | 480 | 480 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 450 |
| SU-17 (Fitter) B/C | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 20 | 40 | 80 |
| YAK-25 (Flashlight) | 55 | 30 | 20 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| YAK-28 (Firebar) | - | - | - | 25 | 25 | 25 | 25 | 25 | 25 | 25 |
| <u>Recon</u> | 126 | 138 | 145 | 160 | 175 | 190 | 210 | 230 | 255 | 280 |
| YAK-27 (Mangrove) | 120 | 130 | 135 | 145 | 160 | 180 | 205 | 230 | 255 | 280 |
| YAK-27RV (Mandrake) | 6 | 8 | 10 | 15 | 15 | 10 | 5 | - | - | - |
| <u>Bombers</u> | 760 | 635 | 600 | 585 | 580 | 620 | 640 | 615 | 520 | 515 |
| IL-28 (Beagle) | 705 | 555 | 475 | 435 | 410 | 440 | 450 | 425 | 340 | 340 |
| YAK-28 (Brewer) | 55 | 80 | 125 | 150 | 170 | 180 | 190 | 190 | 180 | 175 |

SOURCES: DIA Factbook; DIA S-12, O11/DI-6D; CIA, OSR.

Table 7

ESTIMATED SOVIET NAVAL AVIATION ORDER OF BATTLE, 1963-1972 (U)

| Type | 1963 | 1964 | 1965 | 1966 | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 |
|--------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| <u>Bombers</u> | 445 | 555 | 560 | 575 | 560 | 580 | 580 | 585 | 585 | 560 |
| IL-28 (Beagle) | 70 | 110 | 105 | 90 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 40 |
| TU-16 (Badger) | 360 | 400 | 410 | 440 | 450 | 460 | 460 | 465 | 465 | 460 |
| TU-22 (Blinder) | 15 | 45 | 45 | 45 | 50 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 |
| <u>Recon/ASW</u> | 80 | 70 | 75 | 85 | 100 | 120 | 135 | 160 | 175 | 210 |
| AN-12 (Cub) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 5 | 10 | 20 |
| BE-6 (Madge) | 75 | 65 | 65 | 60 | 55 | 45 | 30 | 20 | - | - |
| BE-12 (Mail) | - | - | - | 5 | 15 | 30 | 45 | 60 | 75 | 90 |
| IL-38 (May) | - | - | - | - | - | 5 | 15 | 25 | 35 | 45 |
| TU-95 (Bear D) | - | - | 10 | 20 | 30 | 40 | 45 | 50 | 50 | 45 |
| TU-95 (Bear F) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 5 | 10 |
| M-10 (Mallow) | 5 | 5 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| <u>Helicopters</u> | 110 | 115 | 120 | 130 | 140 | 165 | 190 | 215 | 235 | 230 |
| Ka-25 (Hormone) | - | - | - | - | 5 | 30 | 60 | 85 | 105 | 125 |
| MI-4 (Hound) | 110 | 115 | 120 | 130 | 135 | 135 | 130 | 130 | 130 | 105 |

SOURCES: DIA Factbook; CIA, OSR.

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1,800 were very small planes and 1,100 were light transports while only 600 were medium range machines. In the ensuing years there was a great reduction in the extra light category while the fleet of medium range planes increased by 70 percent. The numbers of light transports declined by over 25 percent. Surprisingly, it was not until 1969 that the first long range heavy transports were acquired by MATS, although aircraft of this type had previously been assigned to combat arms, such as Long Range Aviation, for support of their operations. By 1972 MATS had only 25 heavy transports. In addition it possessed 875 very light, 800 light, and 1,020 medium transports, a total of 2,720 machines.

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IV. MANPOWER AND OUTLAYS BY MISSION

A. Military Manpower

(S) A look at the functional distribution of Soviet manpower by military mission (Table 8) shows that between 1963 and 1972 as in earlier years, the general purpose forces possessed the lion's share of the total. In 1972 nearly 55 percent of total manpower was in these forces, with the ground forces comprising the largest component. Although rising in absolute terms, the Naval Forces lost relatively, and by 1972 had declined to 11 percent of the total as opposed to 13 percent in 1963, the decline occurring in surface ships and submarines while naval aviation maintained its relative position. Strategic defensive forces, while dropping slightly from 13-1/2 to 12 percent between 1963 and 1972, remained the second largest element of the combat forces. The relative manpower strength of the inter-continental strategic offensive forces rose from 1.8 to 4.6 percent of the total from 1963 to 1972, due almost entirely to the growth of the Soviet Rocket Forces. Offensive forces of medium or peripheral range lost relatively during this period and possessed 4 percent of the total in 1972, down from 6 percent in 1963. Military Air Transport acquired additional personnel in the course of these years while declining slightly in relative terms. All other military functions--that is, command and general support, security troops, and R&D support--lost slightly in their share of total manpower but still possessed over one-fifth of it in 1972. These overhead functions absorbed more personnel throughout the period than did the strategic offensive and defensive forces combined.

Table 8

DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET MILITARY MANPOWER
BY MISSION, 1963-1972 (U)

| | Number of Men (1,000) | | | | Percentage | | | | | |
|------------------------|-----------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| | 1963 | 1965 | 1968 | 1970 | 1972 | 1963 | 1965 | 1968 | 1970 | 1972 |
| Strategic Attack | <u>241</u> | <u>289</u> | <u>314</u> | <u>332</u> | <u>336</u> | <u>7.8</u> | <u>9.0</u> | <u>8.7</u> | <u>9.1</u> | <u>8.6</u> |
| Long Range | 56 | 100 | 138 | 165 | 177 | 1.8 | 3.1 | 3.8 | 4.5 | 4.6 |
| Bombers | 17 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 16 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.4 |
| Submarines | 2 | 2 | 4 | 6 | 7 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| ICBM | 37 | 81 | 117 | 142 | 154 | 1.2 | 2.5 | 3.2 | 3.8 | 3.9 |
| Peripheral | 185 | 189 | 176 | 167 | 159 | 6.0 | 5.9 | 4.9 | 4.6 | 4.0 |
| Bombers | 46 | 40 | 37 | 36 | 34 | 1.5 | 1.2 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.9 |
| Submarines | 5 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| I/MRBM | 134 | 144 | 136 | 128 | 119 | 4.3 | 4.5 | 3.8 | 3.5 | 3.0 |
| Strategic Defense | <u>416</u> | <u>424</u> | <u>420</u> | <u>470</u> | <u>473</u> | <u>13.5</u> | <u>13.2</u> | <u>11.6</u> | <u>12.7</u> | <u>12.1</u> |
| Fighters | 115 | 103 | 95 | 96 | 89 | 3.7 | 3.2 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.3 |
| SAMS/ABM | 211 | 227 | 230 | 275 | 283 | 6.8 | 7.1 | 6.3 | 7.4 | 7.2 |
| Warning and Control | 90 | 94 | 95 | 99 | 101 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 2.6 |
| General Purpose | <u>1612</u> | <u>1648</u> | <u>1941</u> | <u>1926</u> | <u>2138</u> | <u>52.2</u> | <u>51.5</u> | <u>53.5</u> | <u>52.2</u> | <u>54.5</u> |
| Ground Troops | 1113 | 1131 | 1398 | 1359 | 1557 | 36.0 | 35.3 | 38.5 | 36.8 | 39.7 |
| Tactical Air | 97 | 101 | 117 | 128 | 136 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.5 | 3.5 |
| Naval: aviation | 29 | 33 | 39 | 43 | 44 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.1 |
| : ships | 373 | 383 | 387 | 396 | 401 | 12.1 | 12.0 | 10.7 | 10.7 | 10.2 |
| Military Air Transport | <u>131</u> | <u>123</u> | <u>123</u> | <u>130</u> | <u>143</u> | <u>4.2</u> | <u>3.8</u> | <u>3.4</u> | <u>3.5</u> | <u>3.6</u> |
| All Other | <u>690</u> | <u>718</u> | <u>828</u> | <u>833</u> | <u>833</u> | <u>22.3</u> | <u>22.4</u> | <u>22.8</u> | <u>22.5</u> | <u>21.2</u> |
| TOTAL | 3090 | 3202 | 3626 | 3692 | 3924 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

SOURCE: CIA materials

B. OUTLAYS BY MISSION

(S) Again, as in the previous installment, the growth and structure of outlays by mission are computed directly from the CIA data, and the all-mission total includes all elements; it is identical with the total for resources, too. (Figures 3-4; Appendix Table, Part II)

(S) Expenditures on the strategic attack mission experienced sharp changes in direction during the decade under consideration. They were cut by about one-quarter in 1964-65, jumped 40 percent in 1966-1967, and declined by the same proportion in 1968-1972. On balance, mission outlays in this category by 1972 were about two-fifths lower than in 1963 which was reflected in a 50 percent decline of the mission share, from one-fifth of total military expenditures in 1963 to one-tenth in 1972.

(S) Strategic defense as a mission has been identified with the outlays of PVO strany, which were discussed in the previous section. The six-year increase in these outlays brought their shares up to a level of 11-12 percent from a 1963 mark of 8 percent of total expenditures (not just the six-service total). In 1971-1972 the absolute value and relative weight of strategic defense declined.

(S) As a mission, ground forces differ from the service category by the inclusion of tactical air. Mission outlays grew at a relatively slow but steady pace (with only a slight interruption in 1969), to a level one-third higher in 1972 than in 1963. However, because ground expenditures rose less rapidly than the total in a number of years, the relative weight of ground changed less over the period, remaining within the range 19-22 percent of total outlays.





Fig. 3 Growth of Soviet military expenditures by mission, 1961-1972
(Indexes, 1960 = 100)




Fig. 4 Structure of Soviet military expenditures by mission, 1963 - 1972 (in percent)

(S) Naval expenditures fluctuated within a narrow band in this period, with the peak less than a tenth higher than the trough. The difference between this pattern and that of the service category is explained by the inclusion in the latter of strategic force expenditures, which were very buoyant in this period. As a share of total military expenditures, the naval mission, therefore, declined on balance, from an initial level of 11-12 percent to 9 percent in 1971-1972.

(S) As indicated previously, Military Transport Aviation was on a downward trend until 1966 (minus a fifth) but picked up by one-third between 1966 and 1972. In consequence, the share in total expenditures at the end of the period was about the same as at the beginning, 4 percent.

(S) In discussing service outlays, it was noted that expenditures on forces grew moderately in this period. However, total military expenditures increased more substantially: the 1972 level was 20 percent higher than that of 1963. In the first part of the period, the driving force of this growth was the increase in strategic defense and ground force outlays, with help from outlays on the reserves and the retired (expenditures on reserves and retired personnel rose at an average rate of 2.8 percent per year between 1963 and 1972) and in 1966-1967 from strategic attack. However, the overall growth of 1969-1972 is due primarily to the spurt in military RDT&E outlays, which are estimated by CIA to have increased 62 percent between 1968 and 1972. As a result, the relative importance of military RDT&E is shown as growing 1-1/2 times in this subperiod, from 15-1/2 to 23-1/2 percent.

(S) Unfortunately, the reliability of the RDT&E estimates in the decade under consideration is subject to considerable doubt, especially

in the later years. The difficulty is connected to the important difference in the methodology of estimating RDT&E as compared with the estimates of force outlays. When CIA went over to direct costing of Soviet military forces, it continued to estimate military RDT&E on the basis of Soviet state budget data. This was necessitated by the character of R&D--the difficult of identifying and costing particular programs and the large proportion of R&D activity which cannot be associated with particular systems under development. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, estimation from budget data seemed to be aided by the availability of a 1958 Soviet statistical handbook on social-cultural outlays which appeared to identify (presumably inadvertently) classified R&D within the total all-Union part of the state budget. Extrapolation of this share became the mainstay of CIA estimates of Soviet military RDT&E. Unfortunabely but understandably, there were no further Soviet disclosures of this kind. OSR has continued to use published Soviet data on the financing of "science" outlays as the basis of its estimates of military RDT&E, but the distribution of the aggregate between military and civilian is problematic.

(S) The obvious consequence of this problem is to increase the estimating error attached to the values of total military outlays and to the percentage distribution of the totals by both mission and resource group.

V. OUTLAYS BY RESOURCE GROUP

(8) In distinct contrast to the pattern shown in the 1950's, operating outlays rose without interruption in the decade 1963-1973. The cumulative increase amounted to 35 percent by 1972. Both components of operating outlays--military personnel and O&M--showed the same consistent upward drive; the overall increase in military personnel costs was about one-quarter between 1963 and 1972, while the growth of O&M charges was considerably larger, 45 percent. Because of varying annual growth rates, the changes in the shares of operating outlays are not of a uniform pattern. The relative importance of all operating outlays rose from 45 percent in 1963 to 49-50 percent in 1971-1972 and that of O&M increased from 21 percent in 1963 to 24-25 percent in 1968-1972. However, the share of military personnel remained virtually unchanged at 24-25 percent.

(9) There was greater fluctuation in the growth pattern of investment outlays, which, after a drop of 7 percent in 1964-1965, increased by one-sixth in the next two years. The level held steady in 1968-1969 and then dropped, by about one-quarter to 1972. Procurement expenditures are by far the preponderant part of the investment (the ratio to construction is 10-15:1), and the former showed a generally similar growth pattern: down 4 percent in 1964-1965, up 14 percent in 1966-1968, and down 20 percent in 1969-1972. Thus, by 1972, investment outlays accounted for 27 percent of total military expenditures, against 38 percent in 1963. Over the same interval, procurement's share of the total dropped from 35 percent to 25 percent.





Fig. 5 Growth of Soviet military expenditures by resource group, 1961 - 1972
(Indexes, 1960 = 100)




Fig.6 Structure of Soviet expenditures by resource group, 1963-1972 (in percent)

(S) Viewing total military expenditures in its resource distribution, it appears that the growth of the middle '60's (1965-1968) derives in almost equal measure from increases in investment and operating outlays. On the other hand, from 1968 to 1972, aggregate growth is driven by sharp increases in RDT&E expenditures, with minor assistance from operating outlays, and hindered by the decline in investment. The comments in the previous section on the reliability of the RDT&E estimates apply here as well.

(S) The CIA document cited earlier, SR IR 75-5, also distributes expenditures by resource category. However, the coverage of investment and operating outlays in this document differs somewhat from that of the breakdown employed in this paper. Procurement of spare parts is entered under investment in SR IR 75-5 as is facility repair, both of which are calculated as operating and maintenance outlays in the OSR estimate underlying the present paper. Under operating outlays, military pay is aggregated with civilian pay and allowances, while in the OSR data civilian pay is entered under O&M expenditures. The resource total in SR IR 75-5 also excludes pay of reservists.

VI. THE DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORT

(U) The gradually evolving Soviet force structures described in the preceding pages were the results of substantial research and development efforts generally occurring from three to five years or more before weapons deployment. For this reason, and because technological progress is a major driving element in the arms competition, it is of some interest to examine the extent of Soviet R&D effort and its distribution among military missions and organizations. The results of a rough calculation are presented in Table 9. The calculations are based on dollar costs rather than rubles, which would be much preferable, but it is hoped that dollar costing does not unduly distort the trend and distribution. The computation is based on an examination of over 300 weapon systems deployed by the Soviets during the 1950s and 1960s. The dates at which each system entered service were determined. R&D costs were assigned to each weapon and the outlays were spread back through the years from the time of first deployment. The mission and organizational subordination of each weapon was established and the individual R&D costs were added for each year to arrive at totals for each mission, organization, and weapon. It will be noted that the outlays in 1965-1969 were somewhat less than in the previous period. This decline is not real and simply results from the fact that in the 1965-1969 period outlays were actually being made for systems which had not reached deployment by 1972 and which were thus not recorded in our calculations. If it had been possible to include expenditures on the SS-16, SS-17, SS-18, SS-19 ICBMs, the Delta class FBM submarine, the Backfire strategic bomber, the MIG-25 fighter and other systems, the

Table 9

ESTIMATED SOVIET MILITARY AND SPACE RDT&E OUTLAYS
BY MILITARY FUNCTION AND COMPONENT,
1960-1964 AND 1965-1969

| | Indexes | Percent of Total Outlays | |
|---------------------------------------|--|--------------------------|----------------|
| | <u>1960-64=100</u> <u>1965-1969</u> | <u>1960-64</u> | <u>1965-69</u> |
| <u>By Function</u> | | | |
| <u>Strategic Offensive</u> | <u>87</u> | <u>51</u> | <u>49</u> |
| Aircraft and ASM | 80 | 6 | 5 |
| Missiles, land-based | 74 | 38 | 31 |
| Missiles, sea-based | 162 | 7 | 13 |
| <u>Defensive</u> | <u>40</u> | <u>22</u> | <u>10</u> |
| AAA guns | 13 | b | b |
| SAM/ABM | 177 | 16 | 3 |
| Naval SAM | 51 | 1 | b |
| Fighters/AAM | 104 | 5 | 6 |
| <u>General Purpose</u> | <u>117</u> | <u>12</u> | <u>16</u> |
| Army: rockets | 38 | 1 | b |
| missiles | 7 | 4 | b |
| tank, assault guns | 70 | b | b |
| Navy: surface ship | 102 | 2 | 2 |
| torpedo subs. | 271 | 1 | 4 |
| Air Force: tactical fighters/AAM | 202 | 4 | 9 |
| <u>Support</u> | <u>170</u> | <u>3</u> | <u>6</u> |
| Radar | 83 | b | b |
| Transport & Miscellaneous aircraft | 167 | 3 | 5 |
| Helicopters | 741 | b | b |
| <u>Space Systems</u> | <u>146</u> | <u>12</u> | <u>19</u> |
| Launch systems | 30 | 4 | 1 |
| Vehicles | 70 | 4 | 3 |
| Launch operations | 350 | 4 | 15 |
| All RDT&E | 90 | 100 | 100 |

^aDiscrepancies between totals and sums of components are due to rounding.

^bLess than half of one percent.

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Table 9

| Continued | Indexes | | Percent of Total Outlays of Each Period ^a | |
|----------------------------|-------------|-----------|---|-----------|
| | 1960-64=100 | 1965-1969 | 1960-64 | 1965-69 |
| <u>By Component</u> | | | | |
| <u>Ground Forces</u> | <u>12</u> | | <u>5</u> | <u>1</u> |
| Tanks and assault guns | 70 | | b | b |
| AAA guns | 13 | | b | b |
| Rockets | 38 | | 1 | b |
| Missiles | 7 | | 4 | b |
| <u>Navy</u> | <u>156</u> | | <u>11</u> | <u>19</u> |
| Surface ships | 102 | | 2 | 2 |
| Missile subs. and missiles | 162 | | 7 | 13 |
| Other subs. | 271 | | 1 | 4 |
| SAMs | 51 | | 1 | b |
| <u>Air Force</u> | <u>69</u> | | <u>31</u> | <u>24</u> |
| Long-range air. | 80 | | 6 | 5 |
| Tactical air. | 202 | | 4 | 9 |
| PVO-aircraft | 104 | | 5 | 6 |
| PVO-SAMs | 18 | | 16 | 3 |
| <u>Rocket Forces</u> | <u>74</u> | | <u>38</u> | <u>31</u> |
| <u>Space Ministries</u> | <u>146</u> | | <u>12</u> | <u>19</u> |
| <u>Other</u> | <u>170</u> | | <u>3</u> | <u>6</u> |
| All RDT&E | 90 | | 100 | 100 |

^aDiscrepancies between totals and sums of components are due to rounding.

^bLess than half of one percent.

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1965-1969 totals (particularly for strategic systems) would have exceeded those of the previous period.

(U) However, some conclusions of interest emerge. Strategic offensive weapons still received the greatest share of R&D resources. Although this share has apparently declined since the early years, it was nevertheless nearly 50 percent of the total in 1965-1969, even without accounting for the effects of the four new ICBM systems now in and approaching deployment. Aircraft and ASM systems, accounting for the bulk of the outlays on strategic systems in the early years, declined steadily in resource use and at the end represented a minor element. As aircraft systems declined, emphasis shifted to missile systems; and between 1960-1964 and the final 1965-1969 period, sea-based missiles assumed more importance relative to those based on land. The figures on defensive systems are influenced substantially by the expensive ABM system. The USSR appears to have maintained a considerable R&D effort on defensive fighters and their air-to-air missiles. Nevertheless, the share of total R&D on the defensive mission seems to have declined significantly in the more recent years. Also notable is the moderate increase of funding for the general purpose forces weapon systems in the late 1960s, reaching 16 percent of the total. While outlays for ground force weapons seem to have declined, those for tactical aviation and attack submarines increased. The Soviet space effort has absorbed an increasing share of all R&D. In the 1965-1969 period the rise was primarily due to the large scale of launch operations, including interplanetary probes.

(U) With respect to the organizational distribution of R&D outlays, the substantial decline in the shares given to the Ground and Air Forces

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is notable, although there was a growing emphasis on tactical aviation. R&D for the Soviet Navy increased sharply, due to renewed emphasis on submarine development. The data also show that the Soviet Rocket Forces retained a preeminent place in the distribution of R&D resources in the 1960s, although seeming to decline in the last half of the decade.

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VII. CONCLUSION

(S) In contrast to the 1950s, the decade of the 60s is one of growing Soviet forces and of the outlays thereon. The long decline of the Ground Forces was ended and reversed while growth was also apparent in other components of the total. Strategic offensive forces were built up in spurts, particularly in the years 1966-68, which reflected itself in sharp changes in the direction of growth of absolute and relative outlays. In the process, the intercontinental elements clearly benefited at the expense of the peripheral ones. Strategic defensive forces, organized in the PVO strany, experienced rapid growth in the mid and late sixties but declined in 1970-72. There were gains in the general purpose forces too, apparent in the slow but steady growth of outlays on ground and tactical air. It is evident, also, that R&D outlays rose at a rapid rate, although the indicated magnitudes may have a substantial estimating error. In the distribution of R&D resources, strategic offensive weapons received the lion's share, with a noteworthy shift in emphasis from aircraft and ASM system to missiles and especially sea-based missiles.

Appendix Table

STRUCTURE AND GROWTH OF SOVIET MILITARY EXPENDITURES, 1963-1972

I. Distribution By Service

| | A. In Percent of Total Outlays in Each Year ^a | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------|--|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | 1963 | 1964 | 1965 | 1966 | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 |
| 1. Ground Forces | 17.8 | 18.8 | 20.2 | 20.0 | 19.5 | 21.1 | 19.8 | 19.9 | 20.9 | 22.4 |
| 2. SRF | 17.2 | 12.9 | 9.8 | 15.5 | 18.0 | 15.2 | 14.3 | 13.4 | 10.1 | 7.3 |
| 3. PVO Strany | 10.9 | 12.7 | 12.5 | 11.9 | 11.8 | 13.4 | 15.1 | 14.2 | 14.3 | 13.4 |
| 4. Air Forces | | | | | | | | | | |
| a. LRA | 7.9 | 8.7 | 8.4 | 6.4 | 5.2 | 4.6 | 3.7 | 3.1 | 3.0 | 3.5 |
| b. Tactical Aviation | 7.5 | 8.0 | 8.0 | 7.1 | 6.1 | 5.5 | 5.0 | 6.7 | 7.2 | 8.0 |
| c. Military Transport Aviation | 5.7 | 5.0 | 4.8 | 4.4 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 4.3 | 4.7 | 5.2 | 5.6 |
| d. TOTAL | 21.2 | 21.7 | 21.2 | 17.9 | 15.5 | 14.3 | 13.1 | 14.6 | 15.4 | 17.1 |
| 5. Navy | | | | | | | | | | |
| a. Strategic Forces | .7 | .9 | 1.1 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 2.4 | 3.5 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 3.7 |
| b. Other | 14.9 | 14.5 | 15.3 | 13.8 | 14.1 | 13.1 | 13.1 | 12.6 | 12.7 | 12.9 |
| c. TOTAL | 15.7 | 15.3 | 16.4 | 15.2 | 15.4 | 15.6 | 16.6 | 16.6 | 16.6 | 16.6 |
| 6. Command & Support | 17.2 | 18.6 | 19.8 | 19.5 | 19.8 | 20.4 | 21.1 | 21.4 | 22.6 | 23.4 |
| TOTAL SIX SERVICES ^b | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| | B. Index Numbers, 1960 = 100 | | | | | | | | | |
| 1. Ground Forces | 102.3 | 108.1 | 117.4 | 122.4 | 125.5 | 140.9 | 133.6 | 134.4 | 137.1 | 142.9 |
| 2. SRF | 128.8 | 97.0 | 74.7 | 123.7 | 151.5 | 132.3 | 126.8 | 118.2 | 86.9 | 60.6 |
| 3. PVO Strany | 72.0 | 83.6 | 83.6 | 84.0 | 87.6 | 103.1 | 117.8 | 110.2 | 107.6 | 98.2 |
| 4. Air Forces | | | | | | | | | | |
| a. LRA | 120.4 | 131.6 | 128.6 | 104.1 | 87.8 | 81.6 | 66.3 | 56.1 | 52.0 | 59.2 |
| b. Tactical Aviation | 101.8 | 108.2 | 109.1 | 102.7 | 92.7 | 86.4 | 80.0 | 106.4 | 110.9 | 120.9 |
| c. Military Transport Aviation | 100.0 | 87.1 | 84.7 | 81.2 | 82.4 | 85.9 | 89.4 | 97.6 | 103.5 | 108.2 |
| d. TOTAL | 107.5 | 109.9 | 108.5 | 96.9 | 88.1 | 84.6 | 78.2 | 87.0 | 89.1 | 96.6 |
| 5. Navy | | | | | | | | | | |
| a. Strategic Forces | 32.4 | 38.2 | 50.0 | 64.7 | 61.8 | 123.5 | 179.4 | 205.9 | 197.1 | 179.4 |
| b. Other | 105.7 | 102.3 | 109.5 | 104.3 | 111.9 | 108.1 | 109.0 | 105.2 | 102.4 | 101.4 |
| c. TOTAL | 95.5 | 93.4 | 101.2 | 98.8 | 104.9 | 110.2 | 118.9 | 119.3 | 115.6 | 112.3 |
| 6. Command & Support | 116.9 | 126.0 | 136.1 | 141.1 | 150.7 | 161.2 | 168.5 | 171.2 | 175.3 | 176.7 |
| TOTAL SIX SERVICES | 103.3 | 103.5 | 104.6 | 110.3 | 115.9 | 120.3 | 121.8 | 121.9 | 118.0 | 115.2 |

^aExcluding military RDT&E, DOSAAF support, military security forces, reserve and retired personnel.

^bDiscrepancies between totals and sums of components are due to rounding.

Appendix Table

STRUCTURE AND GROWTH OF SOVIET MILITARY EXPENDITURES, 1963-1972

II. Distribution By Mission

| | A. In Percent of Total Outlays in Each Year | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|---|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | 1963 | 1964 | 1965 | 1966 | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 |
| 1. Strategic Attack | 20.0 | 17.4 | 15.0 | 18.2 | 19.2 | 17.7 | 16.9 | 15.4 | 12.5 | 10.3 |
| 2. Strategic Defense | 8.4 | 9.8 | 9.7 | 9.3 | 9.3 | 10.7 | 11.9 | 10.7 | 10.4 | 9.6 |
| 3. Ground | 19.6 | 20.7 | 21.9 | 21.2 | 20.2 | 21.2 | 19.4 | 20.0 | 20.6 | 21.8 |
| 4. Naval | 11.5 | 11.2 | 11.9 | 10.8 | 11.1 | 10.5 | 10.2 | 9.5 | 9.2 | 9.2 |
| 5. Military Transport Aviation | 4.4 | 3.8 | 3.7 | 3.4 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 4.0 |
| 6. Military RDT&E | 17.7 | 17.7 | 17.3 | 17.0 | 16.2 | 15.5 | 17.0 | 20.1 | 22.3 | 23.5 |
| 7. Command & Support | 13.3 | 14.3 | 15.4 | 15.2 | 15.6 | 16.3 | 16.5 | 16.1 | 16.5 | 16.8 |
| 8. DOSAAF | .3 | .3 | .3 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 | .2 |
| 9. Military Security Forces | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 |
| 10. Reserve & Retired | 2.8 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 3.0 |
| 11. Czech Invasion | - | - | - | - | - | .1 | - | - | - | - |
| ALL MISSIONS ^a | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| | B. Index Numbers, 1960 = 100 | | | | | | | | | |
| 1. Strategic Attack | 117.0 | 101.5 | 88.4 | 112.5 | 123.4 | 116.7 | 114.9 | 109.1 | 88.1 | 72.6 |
| 2. Strategic Defense | 72.0 | 83.6 | 83.6 | 84.0 | 87.6 | 103.1 | 103.1 | 117.8 | 110.2 | 98.2 |
| 3. Ground | 102.2 | 107.9 | 114.9 | 116.5 | 115.7 | 124.7 | 117.3 | 126.0 | 129.5 | 136.3 |
| 4. Naval | 105.7 | 102.4 | 109.5 | 104.3 | 111.9 | 108.1 | 109.0 | 105.2 | 102.4 | 101.4 |
| 5. Military Transport Aviation | 100.0 | 87.1 | 84.7 | 81.2 | 82.4 | 85.9 | 89.4 | 97.6 | 103.5 | 108.2 |
| 6. Military RDT&E | 140.5 | 140.9 | 138.8 | 142.6 | 141.7 | 138.8 | 157.0 | 193.0 | 214.0 | 224.8 |
| 7. Command & Support | 116.9 | 126.0 | 136.1 | 141.1 | 150.7 | 161.2 | 168.5 | 171.2 | 175.3 | 176.7 |
| 8. DOSAAF | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| 9. Military Security Forces | 82.6 | 82.6 | 82.6 | 82.6 | 82.6 | 82.6 | 82.6 | 82.6 | 82.6 | 82.6 |
| 10. Reserve & Retired | 105.9 | 107.8 | 107.8 | 111.8 | 115.7 | 119.6 | 123.5 | 127.5 | 131.3 | 135.3 |
| ALL MISSIONS ^b | 108.1 | 108.1 | 108.9 | 114.2 | 118.6 | 122.0 | 125.6 | 130.7 | 130.7 | 129.8 |

^aDiscrepancies between totals and sum of components are due to rounding.

^bIncluding, in 1968, Czech invasion.

Appendix Table

STRUCTURE AND GROWTH OF SOVIET MILITARY EXPENDITURES, 1963-1972

III. DISTRIBUTION BY RESOURCE CATEGORY

| | A. In Percent of Total Outlays in Each Year | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|---|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | 1963 | 1964 | 1965 | 1966 | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 |
| 1. Military Personnel | 23.7 | 24.2 | 24.4 | 23.8 | 23.6 | 24.5 | 23.7 | 23.4 | 24.0 | 24.9 |
| 2. Operations and Maintenance | 20.9 | 22.3 | 23.3 | 22.8 | 23.0 | 23.8 | 23.8 | 23.6 | 24.5 | 25.2 |
| ALL OPERATING OUTLAYS | 44.7 | 46.5 | 47.7 | 46.6 | 46.6 | 48.3 | 47.6 | 47.0 | 48.5 | 50.1 |
| 3. Procurement | 35.1 | 34.1 | 33.4 | 34.2 | 34.9 | 34.0 | 33.0 | 30.8 | 27.9 | 25.3 |
| 4. Construction | 3.1 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 3.0 | 2.6 | 1.8 | 1.5 |
| ALL INVESTMENT OUTLAYS | 38.2 | 36.2 | 35.4 | 37.0 | 37.7 | 36.8 | 35.9 | 33.4 | 29.7 | 26.8 |
| 5. Military RDT&E | 17.1 | 17.3 | 16.8 | 16.5 | 15.7 | 15.0 | 16.5 | 19.6 | 21.8 | 23.1 |
| TOTAL OUTLAYS ^a | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| | B. Index Numbers, 1960 = 100 | | | | | | | | | |
| 1. Military Personnel | 105.5 | 107.6 | 109.2 | 111.5 | 115.0 | 122.9 | 122.6 | 125.6 | 129.1 | 133.0 |
| 2. Operations and Maintenance | 118.6 | 126.5 | 133.3 | 136.9 | 143.1 | 152.5 | 157.2 | 162.2 | 167.8 | 171.7 |
| ALL OPERATING OUTLAYS | 111.4 | 115.9 | 119.8 | 122.7 | 127.3 | 135.8 | 137.8 | 141.7 | 146.1 | 150.0 |
| 3. Procurement | 95.3 | 92.7 | 91.5 | 98.2 | 104.0 | 104.4 | 104.2 | 101.1 | 91.5 | 82.6 |
| 4. Construction | 88.1 | 62.7 | 58.2 | 83.6 | 89.6 | 89.6 | 98.5 | 91.0 | 62.7 | 52.2 |
| ALL INVESTMENT OUTLAYS | 94.8 | 89.9 | 88.6 | 96.9 | 102.7 | 103.1 | 103.6 | 100.3 | 89.0 | 79.9 |
| 5. Military RDT&E | 141.6 | 142.5 | 139.9 | 143.8 | 142.5 | 139.5 | 158.4 | 195.7 | 217.6 | 228.8 |
| TOTAL OUTLAYS | 108.1 | 108.1 | 108.9 | 114.2 | 118.6 | 122.0 | 125.6 | 130.7 | 130.7 | 129.8 |

^aDiscrepancies between totals and sums of components are due to rounding.

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September 1975

THE EVOLUTION OF SOVIET MILITARY FORCES AND BUDGETS, 1945-1953 (U)

Abraham S. Becker, Edmund D. Brunner

A WORKING NOTE
prepared for the

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PREFACE

(U) This paper is one of a series being prepared as part of a comprehensive analytical history of the U.S.-Soviet strategic arms competition during the years 1945-1972. The effort was requested by the Secretary of Defense, is being coordinated by the OSD Historian, Dr. Alfred Goldberg, and is financed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Several DOD components and private research organizations are engaged in various aspects of the history. Rand was assigned the task of examining the military forces and budgets of the superpowers. This Working Note deals with the USSR for the years 1945-1953 and will be followed by two additional documents treating the remainder of the period.

(U) Other Rand studies now in progress for the history will provide the broad historical and strategic conceptual framework for the project and will examine the organizational and decisionmaking aspects affecting the forces and budgets of both the United States and the USSR. The ultimate integrative history is to be written by a Final Study Group headed by Professor Ernest R. May of Harvard University, serving as a consultant to the Historical Office, OSD.

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I. INTRODUCTION

(U) This paper is the first of three presenting a history of Soviet military forces and budgets from the end of World War II to the signing of SALT I. The scheme of periodization is essentially that of major leadership changes: the first period covers the last years of Stalin's reign, until the beginning of 1953, the second extends through 1964, the date of Khrushchev's overthrow, and the third is coextensive with the Brezhnev regime until 1972.

(S) The basic data source for the period from 1951 on is SCAM, CIA's Strategic Cost Analysis Model, in its mid-1974 run. This data base has since undergone some revision and will continue to do so in the future, but such changes are not taken into account in our discussion, here or in the forthcoming installments.

(S) It must be reported, with great regret, that there is no reliable source or set of sources for the middle and late 1940s. There has not been any attempt in recent years to develop a retrospective series before 1951, and there are no contemporary estimates for these years which inspire confidence. The CIA was created in 1947, but our literature search has not uncovered material on military outlays before the early 1950s. Developed in a period where both methodology and information left much to be desired, the documents of the early 1950s provide little detail on Soviet military expenditures and much of the material that is provided is now obsolete. As for data on forces, the picture is broadly similar. Sources differ widely in their estimates of major components and documentation is at a minimum. We will indicate below some of the sharp discrepancies between various sets of force data.

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(S) In the late 1950s, apparently, CIA began to develop an elaborate and more sophisticated framework for analysis of Soviet military costs. The methodology of this system was laid out in a document that has been made available.¹ A published version of the detailed estimates emerging from this system has not been found. However, a set of data brought to Rand in late 1959 and made available for internal use in a limited distribution document, designated SOVOY-39, may be supposed to belong to this CIA system of estimates.² Unfortunately, SOVOY-39 begins with the year 1947, although it runs through 1959. No reliable classified estimates have been found for the years 1945-1947.

(S) As a consequence, our estimates for this first period of the arms competition history are a loosely linked chain, whose links are derived from sharply different estimating procedures. The first link, for 1945-1947, is based to a large extent on official and semi-official Soviet data. The expenditure side takes off from data on wartime outlays, published relatively recently.³ For expenditures, the second link, covering 1947-1951, is SOVOY-39. This is a building-block costing model like SCAM but much less sophisticated and articulated in structure than SCAM, which is the outcome of the rapid development of technical intelligence collection in the past 15 years.

(U) Given the nature of our information for period one, we cannot hope to escape large errors in estimating particular components. This is particularly true for the late 1940s. We can only hope that trends in major aggregates are not unrecognizably distorted by the crude information available.

¹(S) CIA/RR ER SC 60/6, SC #05938/60, Methodology for Estimating Soviet Military Expenditures, TS Codeword, 26 August 1960.

²(S) SOVOY-39 figures are clearly from the same system as the CIA contribution to NIE 11-4-58 and 11-4-59, minor variants of which are reproduced in CIA RR EM 60-19, The Relationship Between Announced Soviet Military Manpower, Budgetary Allocations for Defense, and Total Military Expenditures 1955-1962, 15 September 1960 (S).

³(U) See the Appendix to this paper.

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II. FORCES

A. Manpower

(U) As suggested in the introduction, detailed and reliable estimates are lacking for much of the early postwar period. Nor is there a consensus among the available estimates. Some of the difficulties for manpower statistics are illustrated in Table 1, which combines a 1948 source with later CIA data along with a few official Soviet totals and estimates that have been developed from the latter and other Soviet sources.

(S) Some two years before the outbreak of World War II, in 1937, the Soviet armed forces numbered about 1 1/2 million men, with the overwhelming bulk, perhaps 1.3 million men, in the ground forces. The air forces, including naval aviation, were estimated to number 140,000 and the navy only 60,000. Internal security forces are indicated as equal to the size of the air and naval forces combined.

(S) By May 1945, the Soviet military had grown to an all time peak strength of some 12 millions, including security forces, with roughly 10 million in the ground forces. Judging from Soviet data on force structure at the German fronts alone (but including GHQ reserves and excluding air defense), naval strength should have been closer to 600 thousand (the NIS figure) than to 300 (the SID figure), while the air force might have been up to a million men. Security forces are put at 700 thousand in both classified estimates.

(U) The Soviets claim to have rapidly demobilized the vast forces they disposed at the end of the war. In January 1960, Khrushchev claimed a reduction in military manpower of 75 percent in 2 1/2 years, from 11,365,00 at the close of the European war, to 2,874,000 at the beginning

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Table 1

ESTIMATES OF SOVIET MILITARY MANPOWER, 1937-1953 (U)
(Thousand Men)

| Date | Source | Active Regular Service | | | | Total | Security Troops | Total Active Military Personnel |
|------------------------|----------|------------------------|------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------|---------|-----------------|---------------------------------|
| | | Ground | Naval | Air and Naval Air | Command and General Support | | | |
| July 1937 | SID-48 | 1,300 | 60 | 140 | n.a. | 1,500 | 200 | 1,700 |
| 1937 | Soviet | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1,433 | .. | .. |
| Jan. 1945 ^a | Soviet | (6,313 ^b) | (329) | (467) | n.a. | (7,109) | .. | .. |
| May 1945 | SID-48 | 10,236 | 300 | 1,155 | n.a. | 11,691 | 700 | 12,390 |
| May 1945 | NIS-74 | 10,000 | 600 | 1,100 | n.a. | 11,600 | 700 | 12,300 |
| May 1945 | Soviet | .. | .. | .. | .. | 11,365 | .. | .. |
| Jan. 1946 | SID-48 | 4,600 | 300 | 800 | n.a. | 5,700 | 700 | 6,400 |
| Jan. 1946 | NIS-74 | 5,000 | 695 ^c | 705 ^d | n.a. | 6,400 | 600 | 7,000 |
| Jan. 1946 | Estimate | .. | .. | .. | .. | 5,250 | .. | .. |
| Jan. 1947 | NIS-74 | 2,800 | 695 ^c | 555 ^d | n.a. | 4,050 | 500 | 4,550 |
| Jan. 1947 | Estimate | .. | .. | .. | .. | 3,750 | .. | .. |
| July 1947 | SID-48 | 2,600 | 300 | 450 | n.a. | 3,350 | 400 | 3,750 |
| July 1947 | SOVOY | 2,800 | 600 | 600 | n.a. | 4,000 | 550 | 4,550 |
| July 1947 | Estimate | .. | .. | .. | .. | 3,300 | .. | .. |
| Jan. 1948 | NIS-74 | 2,600 | 695 ^c | 505 ^d | n.a. | 3,800 | 400 | 4,200 |
| Jan. 1948 | Soviet | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2,874 | .. | .. |
| July 1948 | SOVOY | 2,550 | 600 | 650 | n.a. | 3,800 | 550 | 4,350 |
| July 1949 | SOVOY | 3,450 | 600 | 650 | n.a. | 4,700 | 550 | 5,250 |
| Jan. 1950 | NIS-74 | 2,650 | 695 ^c | 555 ^d | n.a. | 3,900 | 400 | 4,300 |
| July 1950 | SOVOY | 3,737 | 600 | 663 | n.a. | 5,000 | 550 | 5,550 |
| Jan. 1951 | NIS-74 | 3,400 | 695 ^c | 605 ^d | n.a. | 4,700 | 400 | 5,100 |
| July 1951 | SOVOY | 4,340 | 675 | 685 | n.a. | 5,700 | 550 | 6,250 |
| July 1951 | SCAM | 4,118 | 586 | 676 | 533 | 5,913 | 490 | 6,403 |
| July 1952 | SOVOY | 4,600 | 675 | 725 | n.a. | 6,000 | 550 | 6,550 |
| July 1952 | SCAM | 4,312 | 613 | 759 | 613 | 6,297 | 542 | 6,839 |
| Jan. 1953 | NIS-74 | 3,400 | 745 ^c | 655 ^d | n.a. | 4,800 | ? | ? |
| July 1953 | SOVOY | 4,350 | 676 | 775 | n.a. | 5,800 | 550 | 6,350 |
| July 1953 | SCAM | 3,731 | 625 | 787 | 573 | 5,716 | 478 | 6,194 |

^a.. means not available.

^b.. means not applicable.

^cSoviet-German fronts only, excluding air defense personnel, but including High Command reserves. Classification of naval air not indicated.

^dIncluding 24,000 airborne troops

^eIncluding naval air

^fExcluding naval air

SOURCES: SID-48: CIA, Strategic Intelligence Digest, USSR, III, March 1948, (S), p. 1 (The estimates themselves are dated 1 July 1947). NIS-74: National Intelligence Survey, USSR, April 1974, (S), "Armed Forces," p. 8. SOVOY: Sovoy-39, CIA estimates c. 1959 (S), (see text above, p.). Soviet: January 1945 estimate from Institut Marksizma-Leninizma pri TsK KPSS, *Istoriia Velikoi otechestvennoi voyny Sovetskogo Soiuza*, Voennoe izdatel'stvo, V, 1963, p. 27. Others from Khrushchev in Pravda, 15 January 1960. Estimates: Based on Khrushchev figures and description of the postwar demobilization in V.N. Donchenko "Demobilizatsiia Sovetskoi armii i reshenie problemy kadrov v pervye poslevoennye gody," *Istoriia SSSR*, 1970, No. 3, pp. 97-98. (See text, pp.).

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of 1948. A recent Soviet source fills in a very few of the details of this picture:¹

(U) 1. On June 22, 1945, the Supreme Soviet ordered demobilization during the second half of 1945 of the 13 oldest age classes. With the defeat of the Japanese, a September 7 decree extended the language of the June action to troops on the Far Eastern fronts. This first phase of the demobilization was accomplished by the end of September and involved over 3.3 million men.

(U) 2. A second phase was inaugurated with a decree of September 25, ordering the release of the 10 next senior age classes of enlisted men, as well as specialists (in the civilian economy) with middle or higher education, students of second and third courses, teachers and instructors, soldiers who had received three or more wounds or had served seven or more years, and all female enlisted personnel.

(U) 3. A third phase, said to involve considerably fewer people than the first two, took place during the period May-September 1946. In Odessa oblast, the number released in 1946 was less than two-fifths of the total for 1945-1946. In a number of other provinces, the proportion was considerably smaller, between 6-12 percent.

(U) 4. The fourth and final phase was from the end of 1946 through the beginning of 1948.

(U) On the basis of this information, total force levels excluding security troops may be estimated as about 8 million on October 1, 1945,

(U) ¹V. N. Donchenko, "Demobilizatsiia Sovetskoi armii i reshenie problemy kadrov v pervye poslevoennye gody", Istoriia SSSR, 1970, No. 3, pp. 97-98.

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perhaps 5 1/4 million at the beginning of 1946 and 3 3/4 million at the end of the year. These figures take no account of annual intake--or, more accurately, they assume that if intake occurred, the gross number of men released was even higher than the numbers indicated. In any case, these are the bracketing data points of Khrushchev's 1960 announcement (11,365,000 in May 1945 and 2,874,000 at the beginning of 1948), which, if accepted, provide the basis for approximate judgments in intermediate years.

(S) From this point of view, the NIS estimates appear high for 1946 but perhaps not for January 1947, the SOVOY total for mid-1947 also seems high, and the January 1948 NIS total is one million men above Khrushchev's announced figure.

(U) However, Khrushchev's figure for 1948 has aroused some skepticism on account of the doubling of the Soviet armed forces implied by the numbers for 1945, also cited by Khrushchev. Such a rearmament effort seems "of far greater magnitude than suggested either by Soviet policy pronouncements or by Western estimates during the period concerned."¹ It has been suggested that the 1948 figure was deliberately understated "to underscore the Soviet contribution to disarmament immediately after war."²

(S) We have no Soviet benchmarks after 1948 other than Khrushchev's 1955 figure. However, there is no dispute about the fact of a buildup

(U) ¹Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe: The Evolution of a Political-Military Posture, 1945-1964, RM-5838-PR, The Rand Corporation, November 1968, (U), page 321.

(U) ²Ibid. Also, pages 420 and 421.

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after 1947; it is the pace and magnitude that are still not fully known. Thus, the Sovoy estimates (of 1959 vintage) begin the buildup after mid-1948, the NIS only from 1949 or 1950 (1949 data are lacking). Soviet budgets show an increase in the overt "defense" allocation by 19 percent in 1949, followed by another 5 percent in 1950.¹

(U) There is an additional piece of evidence that points to 1949 as the year in which the buildup began. The following data on planned and actual number of trained apprentices entering employment in industry, construction, and transport (i.e., the main branches of the non-agricultural economy) were compiled by the UN's Economic Commission for Europe (thousands):²

| | <u>Annual targets of</u> <u>Fourth Five Year Plan</u> | <u>Actual numbers</u> |
|------|--|-----------------------|
| 1946 | 380 | 382 |
| 1947 | 790 | 790 |
| 1948 | 980 | 1000 |
| 1949 | 1090 | 723 |
| 1950 | 1250 | 494 |

(U) The indicated shortfall of about one million apprentices may well have been the result largely of stepped-up conscription rates. Presumably, the total call-up was considerably larger, including recruits from the villages (not entering the non-agricultural labor force). By the end of 1950, therefore, active regular service forces could have been as high as 4 1/2-5 million men.

(U) ¹K. N. Plotnikov, Ocherki istorii buidzheta sovetskogo gosudarstva, Gosfinizdat, 1954, p. 433.

(U) ²Economic Survey of Europe in 1950, Geneva, 1951, p. 41.

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(S) With Khrushchev's 1948 figure as base, growth of the armed forces by 1 1/2 - 2 million men means an increase of one-half to two-thirds. In the NIS view, the buildup extends perhaps to 1953 (1952 data are lacking) and amounts to growth by not quite one-quarter in all regular forces. The SOVOY numbers show a larger growth, almost three-fifths, between 1948 and 1952. According to SOVOY, increases take place in all three forces but particularly sharply in the ground forces (80 percent). The NIS-estimated increase is also largest for the ground forces, but amounts to only 30 percent.

(S) The SCAM series, which, because of its continuity and link to the expenditure data, will serve as the basis for estimates of the 2nd and 3rd periods, begins with 1951. At this point, the SOVOY and SCAM figures are not far apart.¹ Moreover, the two series behave comparably between 1951 and 1952. However, for the 1952-1953 change, SCAM shows a sharper decline in ground force personnel, as well as a decrease in command and general support troops and, therefore, a large drop in the overall size of the regular forces.

B. Ground Forces

(S) The following description of changes in Soviet army structure in 1945-1947 (Table 2) is drawn from a 1948 classified source whose estimates for the armed forces as a whole and the three service components were discussed in the previous section. According to this source,

(S) ¹ Possibly the correspondence would be even closer after distribution of SCAM's command and general support personnel among the three main forces. Command and general support includes service schools, headquarters forces, and service central supply and maintenance.

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in July 1945 the ground forces consisted of 590 divisions and 1965 separate brigades (Table 2). There were 510 rifle divisions, 30 cavalry, and 50 artillery, but no tank or mechanized divisions. In addition, there were 150 separate tank regiments. The 195 brigades, however, included 45 mechanized and 125 tank brigades, the remainder being rifle. One year later, the ground force structure had been reduced to 225 divisions and 95 brigades of an altered composition, plus 60 separate tank regiments. For the first time mechanized and tank forces appeared in the divisional structure with 15 of the former and 10 of the latter. The 159 rifle divisions represented 70 percent of the total number compared with over 85 percent a year earlier. Cavalry divisions declined to 21, and artillery to 20. Concerning the separate brigades, tank and mechanized strength rose in proportional terms while declining in absolute numbers, and separate tank regiments were reduced to 60. By July 1947 the emphasis on mechanized and tank forces had further increased to the detriment of rifle forces.

(S) Unfortunately, no information is currently at hand concerning the composition of the Soviet ground forces in the years 1948-1950. However, SCAM data imply a resurgence in the strength of rifle divisions by 1951 which had become increasingly motorized. In addition, the number of mechanized divisions had doubled, while mechanized separate brigades had disappeared, as had separate tank regiments. A new type of force, the airborne division, had entered service by 1951, while cavalry divisions no longer existed. Among the new types of separate brigades were those with artillery and anti-aircraft functions. New types of separate regiments had also entered service by 1951.

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Table 2

SOVIET ARMY STRUCTURE BY ORGANIZATIONAL UNIT,
SELECTED YEARS, 1945-1953 (U)

| Unit | 1945 | 1946 | 1947 | 1951 | 1952 | 1953 |
|------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| <u>DIVISIONS</u> | 590 | 225 | 173 | 229 | 231 | 211 |
| Rifle | 510 | 159 | 83 | 130 | 132 | 111 |
| Mechanized | | 15 | 25 | 50 | 50 | 50 |
| Tank | | 10 | 25 | 25 | 25 | 24 |
| Artillery | 50 | 20 | 20 | 19 | 19 | 16 |
| Airborne | | | | 5 | 5 | 6 |
| Cavalry | 30 | 21 | 20 | | | |
| <u>BRIGADES</u> | 195 | 95 | 15 | 223 | 229 | 192 |
| Rifle | 25 | 10 | 10 | 13 | 12 | 11 |
| Mechanized | 45 | 30 | | | | |
| Tank | 125 | 55 | 5 | | | |
| Anti-Aircraft | | | | 50 | 55 | 59 |
| Artillery | | | | 54 | 54 | 41 |
| Corps Artillery | | | | 106 | 108 | 81 |
| <u>REGIMENTS</u> | 150 | 60 | 40 | 116 | 119 | 101 |
| Tank | 150 | 60 | 40 | | | |
| Rocket Artillery | | | | 6 | 7 | 7 |
| Breakthrough Artillery | | | | 24 | 24 | 19 |
| Reconnaissance | | | | 34 | 31 | 30 |
| Engineering | | | | 52 | 57 | 45 |

Sources: 1945-1947: CIA, Strategic Intelligence Digest, USSR, March 1948. 1951-1953: CIA, SCAM.

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(S) It is probable that the growing Soviet ground forces were well equipped, as large scale production of weapons continued throughout the early post-war years. Several thousand tanks and self-propelled guns were turned out each year (compared to zero and near zero in the U.S.), and two new vehicles, an armored personnel carrier and an amphibious carrier, went into production in 1949. Artillery and anti-aircraft artillery output amounted to thousands of pieces annually. Substantial but declining numbers of mortars were produced, while rocket launchers, infantry anti-tank weapons, and small arms were turned out in increasing numbers. Most of the equipment being produced was not of new design. This situation was to change with a process of research and development and subsequent modernization that had its beginnings in the 1946-1953 period.

C. The Navy

(S) During World War II, the Soviet Navy was the waif of the military establishment.¹ In 1946 it possessed only about 100 major surface combatant surface ships, and at least one-fifth of these, including all four battleships, were classed as "old" ships (Table 3).² The Navy did have in service about 240 submarines, 70 of which were of the range ocean patrol type. In the same year, the U.S. Navy had 1,035 major combat surface ships and 80 submarines in the active fleet plus 1,675 surface ships and 106 submarines in the reserve fleet.

(U) ¹See the Appendix to this paper.

(U) ²Ships over 20 years in age are by definition "old" and those under 15 are "modern." The classification of those between 15 and 20 is a matter of analyst judgement.

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Table 3

SOVIET NAVAL FORCES AT MIDYEAR, 1946-1953 (U)
(Number of Vessels)

| Type | 1946 | 1947 | 1948 | 1949 | 1950 | 1951 | 1952 | 1953 |
|-----------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| <u>MODERN MAJOR SURFACE SHIPS</u> | 74 | 108 | 127 | 149 | 171 | 167 | 195 | 182 |
| Heavy cruiser | 1 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Light cruiser | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 7 | 12 | 14 |
| Destroyer | 20 | 43 | 45 | 50 | 57 | 87 | 110 | 118 |
| Destroyer escort | 24 | 28 | 32 | 37 | 40 | 1 | 4 | 7 |
| Frigate | 25 | 28 | 40 | 50 | 61 | 71 | 68 | 42 |
| Coastal defense | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| <u>OLD MAJOR SURFACE SHIPS</u> | 21 | 20 | 17 | 15 | 25 | 27 | 21 | 35 |
| Battleships | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Heavy cruiser | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| Light cruiser | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Destroyer | 15 | 15 | 13 | 11 | 10 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| Destroyer escort | .. | .. | .. | .. | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Frigate | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 5 | 1 | 16 |
| Coastal defense | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 6 | 4 | 3 |
| <u>TOTAL SURFACE SHIPS</u> | 95 | 128 | 144 | 164 | 196 | 194 | 216 | 217 |
| <u>MODERN SUBMARINES</u> | 159 | 176 | 197 | 206 | 222 | 260 | 246 | 235 |
| Long range | 70 | 74 | 76 | 77 | 73 | 72 | 68 | 55 |
| Medium range | 39 | 40 | 42 | 41 | 39 | 48 | 55 | 75 |
| Short range | 50 | 62 | 79 | 88 | 110 | 140 | 123 | 105 |
| <u>OLD SUBMARINES</u> | 81 | 77 | 71 | 61 | 57 | 54 | 73 | 110 |
| Long range | 10 | 10 | 10 | 9 | 8 | 10 | 13 | 30 |
| Medium range | 37 | 33 | 28 | 21 | 19 | 15 | 18 | 20 |
| Short range | 34 | 34 | 33 | 31 | 30 | 29 | 42 | 60 |
| <u>TOTAL SUBMARINES</u> | 240 | 253 | 268 | 267 | 279 | 314 | 319 | 345 |

Sources: 1946-1950, Office of Naval Intelligence, A Survey of Soviet Naval Construction, May 1953. 1951-1953, CIA, SCAM.

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(S) From 1946 to 1953, the Soviet Navy increased its strength, the fleet of modern major surface ships rising from about 75 to about 182, and the number of submarines going up from 159 to 235. The aggregate of vessels classed as "old" also increased, and the total complement of all vessels rose from around 335 to 562. Ships of new post-war design entered service. These included the "W" and "Z" class long range submarines, which comprised nearly three-fourths of the modern submarine fleet by 1953. Also deployed were two new classes of light cruisers (Chapayev and Sverdlov), the Skoryy class destroyer, and the Kola and Riga classes destroyer escorts.

(S) The naval construction program benefited from a thorough exploitation of German technology and talent, particularly in the case of submarines. This program does not appear to have reflected deep thought about the emerging post-war strategic naval situation, except that no new battleships were constructed. No aircraft carriers were constructed either, as plans for acquiring these vessels were apparently shelved. Ships entering the fleet were largely of limited range capability unable to project the USSR's naval strength any significant distance from Soviet shores. In addition to the introduction of new post-war designs, fleet modernization was aided in that only the most advanced designs of ships under construction during the war were completed. Other uncompleted units, including a battleship, were scrapped. Little adaptation of prizes of war was accomplished except in the case of a few Italian vessels. Emphasis was given to the construction of destroyers and light cruisers and, in the earlier years, of heavy cruisers. Minor surface ships such as subchasers, mine layers, and mine sweepers

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received emphasis as did short range coastal submarines. In general, according to the ONI, the Soviet program reflected a preference for quantity over quality, and a preference for general purpose rather than specialized characteristics. However, R&D activities were in train which were later to affect the configuration of the Soviet Navy in profound ways.

D. Air and Naval Air Forces

(S) At the peak war level, in 1944, Soviet military industry produced 40,000 aircraft and 53,000 aviation engines.¹ By June 1946 there were something less than 15,000 aircraft in operational combat units, (Table 4), plus unknown but large numbers of second line and reserve machines.

(S) The period between the close of World War II and 1953 was one of extensive reshaping of Soviet military aviation. One notable event was the appearance of the TU-4, a rather exact copy of the USB-29, in large numbers. With this plane, the Long Range Air Army, organized in 1946, acquired for the first time the capability to deliver weapons nearly anywhere in Western Europe and the Far East and the theoretical potentiality for one-way missions against the U.S. Whether or not there was any serious danger of such missions, the possession by the USSR of the TU-4 and, beginning in 1949, of the atom bomb, caused genuine concern among the U.S. military. In addition, the large scale conversion from piston to jet engined fighters and light bombers progressed steadily, beginning essentially in 1948 with the advent of the MIG-15.

(U) ¹G. S. Kravchenko, Ekonomika SSSR v gody Velikoi otechestvennoi voiny (1941-1945 gg), 2nd ed., Ekonomika, 1970, p. 297.

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Table 4

SOVIET AIR AND NAVAL AIR COMBAT FORCES AT MIDYEAR, 1946-1953 (U)
(Numbers of Aircraft)

| Item | 1946 | 1947 | 1948 | 1949 | 1950 | 1951 | 1952 | 1953 |
|-----------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Long Range Aviation | 205 | 195 | 255 | 415 | 600 | 725 | 900 | 1075 |
| TU-4 | | 15 | 105 | 290 | 500 | 650 | 850 | 1050 |
| B-25 | 205 | 180 | 150 | 125 | 100 | 75 | 50 | 25 |
| Strategic Defense-Fighters | 3675 | 3690 | 3455 | 3220 | 3305 | 4130 | 5555 | 6945 |
| LA-5/7 | 700 | 650 | 575 | 400 | 150 | 80 | 65 | 10 |
| LA-9/11 | | 135 | 380 | 460 | 500 | 500 | 400 | 320 |
| MIG-9 | | 130 | 180 | 180 | 160 | 150 | 70 | |
| MIG-15/17 | | | 15 | 270 | 1185 | 2775 | 4300 | 6050 |
| YAK-3/9 | 2025 | 2000 | 1700 | 1475 | 1000 | 410 | 250 | 165 |
| YAK-23 | | | | | .55 | 115 | 420 | 390 |
| F-39 | 485 | 390 | 300 | 205 | 110 | 35 | 10 | |
| F-40 | 210 | 165 | 125 | 85 | 40 | | | |
| F-63 | 255 | 220 | 180 | 145 | 105 | 65 | 40 | 10 |
| Tactical Aviation Fighters | 3710 | 3680 | 3950 | 3860 | 4290 | 5000 | 5615 | 5575 |
| LA-5/7 | 700 | 400 | 200 | 75 | | | | |
| LA-9/11 | | 410 | 1140 | 1380 | 1500 | 1450 | 1200 | 935 |
| MIG-9 | | 65 | 90 | 90 | 80 | 75 | 35 | |
| MIG-15/17 | | | 15 | 180 | 790 | 1850 | 2900 | 3800 |
| YAK-3/9 | 2060 | 2030 | 1900 | 1700 | 1625 | 1475 | 1175 | 840 |
| YAK-23 | | | | | 40 | 75 | 280 | |
| F-39 | 485 | 390 | 300 | 205 | 110 | | | |
| F-40 | 210 | 165 | 125 | 85 | 40 | | | |
| F-63 | 255 | 220 | 180 | 145 | 105 | 75 | 25 | |
| Tactical Aviation-Bombers | 6770 | 6825 | 7310 | 7460 | 6815 | 6340 | 6130 | 5455 |
| IL-2/10 | 2420 | 2210 | 2330 | 2500 | 2450 | 2350 | 2150 | 1900 |
| IL-4 | 300 | 290 | 260 | 220 | 190 | 175 | | |
| IL-28 | | | | | 70 | 200 | 900 | 1750 |
| PE-2 | 1840 | 1715 | 1660 | 1510 | 1360 | 1250 | 675 | |
| TU-2 | 530 | 1200 | 1950 | 2400 | 2200 | 2100 | 2100 | 1350 |
| TU-14 | | | | | | | 100 | 250 |
| BE-6 | | | | | | | | 10 |
| PEY-5/6 | 200 | 200 | 200 | 195 | 195 | 190 | 180 | 170 |
| A-20 | 1280 | 1030 | 760 | 510 | 250 | | | |
| B-25 | 200 | 180 | 150 | 125 | 100 | 75 | 25 | 25 |
| TOTAL COMBAT AIRCRAFT | 14360 | 14390 | 14970 | 14955 | 15010 | 16195 | 18200 | 19050 |
| SUMMARY BY SERVICE | | | | | | | | |
| Air Force | 13225 | 13060 | 13435 | 13280 | 13155 | 13915 | 15395 | 15605 |
| Long Range Air | 205 | 195 | 255 | 415 | 600 | 725 | 900 | 1075 |
| Defensive Fighters (PVO) | 3675 | 3625 | 3365 | 3040 | 2805 | 3090 | 3980 | 4655 |
| Tactical Aviation | 9345 | 9240 | 9815 | 9825 | 9750 | 10100 | 10515 | 9875 |
| Fighters | 3710 | 3680 | 3950 | 3860 | 4290 | 5000 | 5615 | 5575 |
| Bombers | 5635 | 5560 | 5865 | 5965 | 5460 | 5100 | 4900 | 4300 |
| Navy | 1135 | 1330 | 1535 | 1675 | 1855 | 2280 | 2805 | 3445 |
| Defensive Fighters | | 65 | 90 | 180 | 500 | 1040 | 1575 | 2290 |
| Bombers | 1135 | 1265 | 1445 | 1495 | 1355 | 1240 | 1230 | 1155 |
| TOTAL COMBAT AIRCRAFT | 14360 | 14390 | 14970 | 14955 | 15010 | 16195 | 18200 | 19050 |

Sources: Edmund D. Brunner, Jr., *Soviet Air Armaments and Their Cost, 1946-61*, RM-3508-PR, The Rand Corporation, May 1963 (S); CIA, *Strategic Intelligence Digest, USSR*, March 1948; JIB, *British Intelligence Survey, USSR, 1951*; and miscellaneous intelligence sources.

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This program was materially aided by the acquisition from Britain of the Nene jet engine and Nimonic 80 nickel alloy for jet engine turbine blades. Further, the Soviets benefited from the importation of German aeronautical engineers, equipment, and aircraft. A substantial production program was implemented, and the numbers of aircraft in service increased by one-third between 1946 and 1953 from about 14,400 to around 19,000 planes.

(S) In 1946 apparently the only bomber in the newly created Long Range Air Army was the U.S. B-25 supplied under lend-lease, except for a few miscellaneous IL-4's, PE-8's, and possibly others. The B-25, also used in Naval Aviation, was still in service in token numbers in 1953. The mainstay of the LRA was the TU-4, a copy of and externally indistinguishable from the U.S. B-29. During the war Stalin had tried unsuccessfully to obtain the B-29. In 1944 three U.S. B-29's landed in the USSR due to fuel shortage, and the Soviets at once proceeded to copy the design. Three of the largest aircraft plants in the Soviet Union were tooled up for assembly. The first Soviet-produced machines came off the lines in 1947, and it is likely that small numbers entered service in that year. Total production was to reach 2,000 planes, of which 1,200 were in combat units in 1954. The rapidity and scale of the TU-4 effort was remarkable, and represented a major allocation of resources considering the economic burdens which the Soviet Union was carrying in those years.

(S) In terms of sheer numbers, Tactical (or Frontal) Aviation of the Air Force was the favored air arm, as would be expected in terms of the Soviet doctrine, which regarded aviation as an adjunct to the ground

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forces. In 1946 Tactical Aviation apparently possessed over 9,000 planes, 70 percent of the strength of the entire air force, of which about 5,600 were bombers and the remainder were fighters. Nearly 40 percent of the bombers were the Ilyushin Stormoviks, which were effective ground attack machines. Large numbers of these were still in service in 1953 and beyond, and the IL-10 remained in production into the 1960s. Other piston engine bombers of World War II design were the PE-2 and the TU-2; the former continued in deployment status until 1952 and the latter until after 1953. In 1950 the first jet bomber, the IL-28, entered service, and its numbers increased very rapidly as four large assembly plants were in the program. While the Tactical Aviation's bomber force declined in size from 5,600 planes to 4,300 planes between 1946 and 1953, it was a much more modern force in the latter years. Further, the number of Tactical Aviation fighters rose rapidly from about 3,700 in 1946 to around 5,600 in 1953. In 1953 nearly 70 percent of the planes were the excellent MIG 15's and 17's, as many old piston fighters, including the U.S. lend-lease P-39, P-40, and P-63, were phased out of service.

(S) It appears that Naval Aviation tripled in size during the 1946-1953 period, the increase taking place in the fighter force rather than in the bomber force. However, the available data probably overstate the extent of the increase, since in the early years our figures for the Navy do not include piston engine fighters such as the YAK and LA models, some of which were most likely assigned to the Navy. The 1951-1953 figures are relatively reliable and indicate that

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Naval Aviation provided a substantial adjunct to the tactical air element of the general purpose forces.

(U) It also contributed to the strengthening of the air defense program upon which the USSR placed much emphasis. Naval Aviation fighters were essentially a part of the shore based air defense forces, and in fact were later (1959) to be transferred to the Air Defense Forces (PVO). The strength of the combined fighter defense aviation declined somewhat from 1946 to 1949, then rose steadily and rapidly thereafter as the shift to the MIG jets progressed. In spite of its large size, the air defense force in these early years was very deficient in warning and control and in all-weather capability. The fighter force was supplemented by thousands of anti-aircraft guns with inadequate fire control. Surface-to-air missiles had yet to appear.

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III. BUDGETS

A. THE 1945-1947 LINK

(U) Table 5 provides the scanty information that can be set out presently with any confidence for the years 1945-1947. Apart from the official figures for the explicit "defense" appropriation, which is believed to exclude outlays on internal security forces, and the 1945 breakdown, which is obtained from material explained in the Appendix, the data are derived as follows:

(U) Military pay and allowances. These figures are obtained as the product of estimated average annual force levels and remuneration per man. The former are based on an interpretation of the four-phase demobilization, as recounted by Donchenko.¹ Average annual regular-service force levels are estimated as 3.5 million in 1946 and 3.3 million in 1947, compared with an average in 1945 of 9.8 million. Compensation per man averaged about 5000 rubles (49 billion rubles divided by 9.8 million men), but this was significantly affected by demobilization bonuses. Probably a more reliable base for estimating postwar pay is the 1944 average, although that too is distorted by increases in field allowances for service outside Soviet borders.² The 1944 force level is estimated as 10.75 million, based on the 1945 figures (Table 5) and the indication that there were 9.8 million men in the armed forces in

(U) ¹See above, p. 5, note 1.

(U) ²V. N. Dutov, ed., Finansovaya sluzhba Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR v period voyny, Voenizdat, 1967, p. 215.

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Table 5

**SOVIET "DEFENSE" EXPENDITURES AT CURRENT PRICES
BY MAJOR RESOURCE COMPONENT, 1945-1947
(Billion Rubles)**

| | 1945 | 1946 | 1947 |
|---|------|------|------|
| Total "Defense" | 128 | 74 | 66 |
| of which | | | |
| Military pay and allowances | 49 | 18 | 13 |
| Procurement | 36 | 18 | (18) |
| Construction | 7 | { 38 | { 35 |
| Operations and maintenance; other outlays | 36 | | |
| NKO | 34 | | |
| NKVMF | 2 | | |

SOURCES: 1945: Appendix Tables 1 and 8. Military pay and allowances are the sum of 45 billion rubles from NKO (Appendix Table 4) and 4 billion from NKVMF (computed from the index in Appendix Table 7 and the assumption that pay and allowances accounted for half of "maintenance" expenditures in 1940). NKO construction is a rough guess, based on the discussion on p. 54 and the index of Appendix Table 6.

1946-1947. Total "defense." K.N. Plotnikov, Ocherki istorii biudzheta Sovetskogo gosudarstva, Gosfinizdat, 1954, p. 433. Other figures: see text.

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May 1942.¹ Thus, average pay was about 3300-3400 rubles (36 BR ÷ 10.75 million men). In September 1946 civilian wages were increased in connection with an increase of ration prices (a first stage to derationing). It is assumed that military pay scales were raised at the same time. Moreover, it seems likely that the cadre-conscript ratio rose, with a concomitant increase in the average pay and allowance per man. Therefore, the average for 1946 is assumed to be somewhat higher than the 1944 level, or 4000 rubles per man.² This figure is assumed unchanged in 1947. This compares to an average wage and salary rate in the civilian economy in 1946 of 5700 rubles,³ which may have risen to perhaps 6500 in 1947.

(U) Procurement. Soviet sources indicate that civilian industrial output increased 20 percent in 1946, while military production was cut sharply. As a result, total industrial production in that year declined by almost 17 percent relative to 1945.⁴ Military production is said to

(U) ¹ Sovetskoe voennoe iskusstvo v Velikoi otechestvennoi voine 1941-1945 gg., 1962, I, p. 702, cited in Finansovaia sluzhba . . ., p. 176.

(S) ² Estimates of this component differ widely in the literature. SOVOY-39, compiled by service, implies an average for the active regular service of 5540 rubles per man in 1947 at 1955 pay rates. JIB estimated 1650 rubles throughout World War II (JIC, Germany, APPLE PIE Papers, DRS (53) 85, Analysis of Soviet Military Expenditures, 1953, (S), Part 1, p. 7, cited in CIA, SC RR 122--see above p. note). Hans Heymann, Jr. (The Magnitude of Russia's Military Effort, RM-746, 18 December 1951, FOUO, p. 56) estimated 3500 rubles per man for 1951 from sources that probably related to at least a year or two earlier. Without more information on the course of military pay changes, it is not possible to determine the mutual consistency of these estimates.

(U) ³ TsSU SSSR, Trud v SSSR, Statistika, 1968, p. 137.

(U) ⁴ E. Iu. Lokshin, Promyshlennost' SSSR 1940-1963, "Mysl'," 1964, pp. 121-122.

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have accounted for 41 percent of the gross value of all industrial output in 1945.¹ These figures imply a reduction of military production by 70 percent in 1946. Conservatively, the decline in hardware procurement is set at 50 percent in 1946. The 1946 level is assumed unchanged in 1947 on the basis of information previously cited, indicating a significant increase in naval strength, relative stability in the air order of battle, and decline in the number of ground force units.

(U) Construction; operations and maintenance; other outlays.

Calculated as a residual. Major categories of O&M expenditures should have declined tangibly with the end of combat operations and the demobilization of (an estimated) 55 percent of the force in 1946 followed by further cuts in 1947. Thus, the calculated residuals in Table 5 may imply increases in construction or other outlays. Possibly, expenditures on other activities rose sharply (R&D? atomic energy?); possibly too, the declines in pay and allowances or procurement have been overestimated.

(S) There is no question about the fact of a substantial cut in Soviet outlays in 1945-1947. The issue is only of the precise scale and structure. Regrettably, on this issue, the CIA documents of the early and mid-fifties cannot provide much help. Since their basic procedure involved addition of allowances for such elements as internal security forces and nuclear energy to the explicit "defense" allocation, there is no independent check on the magnitude of the predominant element

(U) ¹ Institut Marksizma-Leninizma, Istorija Velikoi otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soivza, V., p. 425.

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of Soviet military outlays. The manpower figures in these CIA estimates differ from the ones employed here, but they do not appear to have a greater claim to reliability.

B. THE 1947-1951 LINK: SOVOY-39

(S) The expenditure estimates of SOVOY-39 derive from a costing framework that is of the pre-McNamara era. Thus, the blocks are built up in terms of resource costs rather than programs or missions. Moreover, no organizational breakdown was presented either. Therefore, the following exposition begins with the summary data provided by resource component and then proceeds to a crude reworking by organization. A mission distribution can be compiled only for procurement.

(S) The SOVOY data will be presented in two forms, with and without adjustment for different manpower estimates. As indicated in Section IIA, there is considerable variance between the SOVOY military manpower estimates and those which are derived from Soviet figures on the postwar demobilization and subsequent buildup. It has also been noted that there is considerable doubt about the validity of the 1948 and 1955 benchmarks reported by Khrushchev. Therefore, the 1947-1951 link will be presented in two variants, as required: variant A, SOVOY unadjusted; variant B, SOVOY adjusted. Under variant B, forces are set at the following levels (thousands):¹

(S) ¹The 1947 figures are adjustments of the SID-48 numbers in Table 1 for underestimation of the size of the Navy; the presumed decrease in 1948 is deducted largely from the ground forces; 1949-1950 figures are interpolations between 1948 and 1951; the 1951 figures are original SOVOY-39 estimates.

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| <u>Middle of</u> | <u>Ground Forces</u> | <u>Navy</u> | <u>Air Force, Including Naval Air</u> | <u>Total Active Regular Service</u> |
|------------------|----------------------|-------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 1947 | 2400 | 450 | 450 | 3300 |
| 1948 | 2150 | 450 | 400 | 3000 |
| 1949 | 2700 | 500 | 500 | 3700 |
| 1950 | 3500 | 600 | 600 | 4700 |
| 1951 | 4340 | 675 | 685 | 5700 |

(S) The adjustment is to military personnel costs alone.¹ All other resource elements are estimated independently of manpower in SOVOY-39 and are therefore unaffected by the adjustment. However, because total outlays are changed, the adjustment also changes the resource distribution of these outlays. Since manpower costs are an element of service outlays, the adjustment also affects the growth and structure of expenditures by service.

(S) Tables 6 and 7 in their unadjusted variants are computed directly from a source summary table without any adaptation. According to these data, total Soviet military expenditures, including outlays on militarized internal security forces, increased 55 percent between 1947 and 1951. This aggregate increase is equivalent to an average annual rate of 11.6 percent. Thus, the SOVOY estimates picture a sharp buildup between 1947 and 1951, with a peak increase in 1949. Among the components of the total, the most rapid growth was exhibited

(S) ¹The adjustment for 1947-1950 is effected by service where annual payrates are the implicit average rates of each year in the original SOVOY estimates. For the ground forces these range between 3800 and 5100 rubles per man in 1947-1950, depending on the estimated number of "mobilization troops" (which affects the officer/recruit ratio). The rates are constant in the air force and navy--9600 and 5250 rubles per man--where naval air is included with the air force. When naval air is lumped with navy in calculations to be discussed, personnel costs are computed separately for naval air (pay rate 9600 rubles per man) and other navy (5250 rubles per man).

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Table 6

GROWTH OF SOVIET MILITARY RESOURCE COMPONENTS
AT 1955 RUBLES, 1947-1951 (U)
(Index numbers, 1947 = 100)

| | 1948 | 1949 | 1950 | 1951 |
|---------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Military personnel | | | | |
| A. Unadjusted | 99.6 | 111.0 | 114.3 | 124.9 |
| B. Adjusted | 97.9 | 108.5 | 127.0 | 145.5 |
| O&M | 102.5 | 114.8 | 124.6 | 136.9 |
| Procurement | 126.4 | 159.3 | 205.7 | 250.0 |
| Construction | 100.0 | 105.0 | 120.0 | 145.0 |
| R&D | 110.5 | 122.4 | 135.5 | 140.8 |
| Nuclear energy | 300.0 | 400.0 | 600.0 | 700.0 |
| All outlays | | | | |
| A. Unadjusted | 107.5 | 123.3 | 137.8 | 154.9 |
| B. Adjusted | 107.3 | 123.1 | 146.8 | 168.8 |

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Table 7
STRUCTURE OF SOVIET MILITARY OUTLAYS AT 1955 RUBLES
BY RESOURCE CATEGORY, 1947-1951 (U)
(Percent of total)

| | 1947 | 1948 | 1949 | 1950 | 1951 |
|----------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| <u>A. Unadjusted</u> | | | | | |
| Military personnel | 58.1 | 53.8 | 52.3 | 48.2 | 46.8 |
| O&M | 13.8 | 13.2 | 12.9 | 12.6 | 12.3 |
| Procurement | 15.9 | 18.8 | 20.6 | 23.8 | 25.7 |
| Military construction | 2.3 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.1 |
| R&D | 8.7 | 8.9 | 8.6 | 8.5 | 7.9 |
| Nuclear energy | 1.1 | 3.2 | 3.7 | 5.0 | 5.1 |
| Total ^a | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| <u>B. With manpower adjusted</u> | | | | | |
| Military personnel | 54.3 | 49.5 | 47.8 | 46.9 | 46.8 |
| O&M | 15.2 | 14.5 | 14.1 | 12.9 | 12.3 |
| Procurement | 17.4 | 20.5 | 22.5 | 24.4 | 25.7 |
| Military construction | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.1 |
| R&D | 9.4 | 9.7 | 9.4 | 8.7 | 7.9 |
| Nuclear energy | 1.2 | 3.5 | 4.0 | 5.1 | 5.1 |
| Total ^a | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

^aDiscrepancies between totals and sums of components are due to rounding.

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by outlays on nuclear energy, with procurement a distant second. Expenditures on R&D, construction and O&M are pictured as developing at a less hectic pace--8-10 percent per year until 1951, rather than the more than 25 percent per year of procurement or the even more dizzying sevenfold increase of nuclear energy in four years. Personnel outlays rose by only one-quarter until 1951, equivalent to an annual rate of 5.7 percent.

(9) As a consequence, the resource structure of Soviet military outlays was substantially altered in these years (Table 7, part A). The share of personnel expenditures declined by a fifth, and the shares of O&M, construction, and R&D also fell, by varying small margins. However, the relative importance of nuclear energy and procurement outlays shot up, and in 1951, according to these data, procurement accounted for a quarter of the total, against only a sixth in 1947.

(8) How much difference do the manpower adjustments make? Military personnel costs grow more rapidly in 1950-1951 than in the unadjusted variant, substantially raising the average annual rate of growth from 5.7 to 9.8 percent. The adjustment lifts the index of total military outlays by 9 points in 1950 and 14 points in 1951, boosting the implied average rate of growth from 11.6 to 14 percent per year. In the structural calculation, the adjustment reduces the share of military personnel costs in each year of the period 1947-1950, particularly the first three (by 4-5 points), and raises those of all other components. The direction of change in resource element shares is not altered, but the magnitude of change is: the fall in the relative weight of military personnel costs between 1947 and 1951 is

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reduced, as is the increase in procurement's share, but the decline in O&M's relative importance is somewhat enlarged.

(U) The next step is to rearrange the data in an organizational breakdown, by grouping together relevant components of the four major resource categories--personnel, O&M, procurement, and construction. Some special problems are noted in the following listing by resource category:

(S) Personnel. "Ground forces" in the unadjusted variant include outlays on the "mobilization troops." The precise nature of this element is not clear, for the source explanation (with respect to a manpower distribution) is somewhat cryptic: "The mobilization category is taken as the difference between the sum of the strengths for the separate forces [i.e., ground, navy, air--A.S.B.] and the total figure for the Ministry of Defense [i.e., excluding militarized internal security forces--A.S.B.] as the strength of personnel on active regular service." In turn, it is said: "The strength of personnel on active regular service is not official but is an attempt to quantify expressions relating to the possibility of a mobilization of forces in the Soviet Union during the period of the Korean conflict. The quantification reflects, primarily, information on class size and call-up schedule." Internal evidence suggests that the source associates mobilization troops entirely with the ground forces.

(S) O&M. For some reason, maintenance of facilities is not indicated under O&M but is separately identified in a breakdown of military construction. Maintenance of air field and of naval facilities are assigned to the respective services. For the calculation

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including naval air with the navy, a notional 10 percent of air force maintenance is added each year to the navy total to allow for maintenance of naval air facilities. Half of all outlays on maintenance of communications, barracks, hospitals, and administrative-warehouse, are assigned to the ground forces, with the other half divided evenly among the navy and the air force. In the case of POL storage, half the maintenance costs are charged to the navy and the other half shared by air force and ground forces.

(S) Procurement. Naval air procurement is included with that of the air force in the original. The same procedure (as with maintenance costs) is used to estimate naval air procurement for inclusion with other naval procurement.

(S) Construction. Construction of communications, barracks, hospitals, and administrative-warehouse facilities, as well as POL storage, is allocated in the same way as maintenance of these facilities. Naval air construction is estimated in the same way as naval air procurement and maintenance.

(S) Tables 8 and 9 provide the growth and structural calculations for the organizational regrouping just described. There is substantial ground for the belief that the security forces, military R&D, and nuclear energy activities were responsibilities largely outside the defense and navy ministries; therefore, the corresponding outlays are set forth separately. For the most part, the bundle of miscellaneous expenditures--other personnel, O&M, and procurement costs--may also be associated with the Ministry of Defense (or Defense and Navy) budget,

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Table 8

GROWTH OF ORGANIZATIONAL COMPONENTS OF SOVIET MILITARY OUTLAYS
AT 1955 RUBLES, 1947-1951 (U)
(Indexes, 1947 = 100)

| | 1948 | 1949 | 1950 | 1951 |
|---|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Ground forces | | | | |
| A. Unadjusted ^a | 96.4 | 113.4 | 118.4 | 131.2 |
| B. Adjusted | 96.2 | 107.3 | 126.8 | 147.6 |
| Navy, including naval air | | | | |
| A. Unadjusted | 114.7 | 146.1 | 175.5 | 193.1 |
| B. Adjusted | 114.8 | 161.4 | 206.8 | 223.9 |
| Air (excluding naval air) force | | | | |
| A. Unadjusted | 121.9 | 125.2 | 152.3 | 187.1 |
| B. Adjusted | 120.9 | 128.4 | 167.2 | 216.4 |
| Subtotal, three services | | | | |
| A. Unadjusted | 105.8 | 121.8 | 136.4 | 155.5 |
| B. Adjusted | 105.4 | 121.3 | 149.9 | 177.2 |
| Other personnel, O&M, and procurement costs ^b | 102.9 | 120.6 | 131.4 | 146.1 |
| Security forces, pay and subsistence | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| R&D | 110.5 | 122.4 | 135.5 | 140.8 |
| Nuclear energy | 300.0 | 400.0 | 600.0 | 700-0 |
| Total | | | | |
| A. Unadjusted ^c | 107.6 | 123.0 | 137.8 | 154.5 |
| B. Adjusted | 107.4 | 122.7 | 147.2 | 169.0 |

^aIncluding "mobilization troops."

^bMilitary pensions, pay and subsistence for reserves, pay and allowances of civilian personnel, miscellaneous O&M (maintenance of fixed communications facilities, maintenance of radar equipment, transportation, medical care, printing and publishing) and nonallocated electronic procurement (electronics for fixed communications facilities; ground radar).

^cThese index numbers are slightly different from those of Table 6 because of rounding errors in the allocation of resource components to particular services.

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Table 9

STRUCTURE OF SOVIET MILITARY OUTLAYS AT 1955 RUBLES
BY ORGANIZATION, 1947-1951 (U)
(Percent of Total)

| | 1947 | 1948 | 1949 | 1950 | 1951 |
|---|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| A. Unadjusted | | | | | |
| Ground forces ^a | 40.8 | 36.5 | 37.6 | 35.0 | 34.6 |
| Navy, including naval air | 11.6 | 12.4 | 13.8 | 14.8 | 14.5 |
| Air (excluding naval air) force | <u>17.6</u> | <u>20.0</u> | <u>17.9</u> | <u>19.5</u> | <u>21.3</u> |
| Subtotal, three services ^b | 70.0 | 68.8 | 69.3 | 69.2 | 70.4 |
| Other personnel, O&M, and procurement costs ^c | 11.6 | 11.1 | 11.4 | 11.0 | 11.0 |
| Security forces, pay and subsistence | 8.6 | 8.0 | 7.0 | 6.3 | 5.6 |
| R&D | 8.6 | 8.9 | 8.6 | 8.5 | 7.9 |
| Nuclear energy | <u>1.1</u> | <u>3.2</u> | <u>3.7</u> | <u>4.9</u> | <u>5.1</u> |
| Total ^b | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| B. Adjusted | | | | | |
| Ground forces | 39.5 | 35.3 | 34.5 | 34.0 | 34.6 |
| Navy, excluding naval air | 11.0 | 11.7 | 14.4 | 15.4 | 14.5 |
| Air (including naval air) force | <u>16.7</u> | <u>18.8</u> | <u>17.4</u> | <u>19.0</u> | <u>21.3</u> |
| Subtotal, three services ^b | 67.1 | 65.8 | 66.3 | 68.4 | 70.4 |
| Other personnel, O&M, and procurement costs ^c | 12.7 | 12.2 | 12.5 | 11.3 | 11.0 |
| Security forces, pay and subsistence | 9.5 | 8.8 | 7.7 | 6.4 | 5.6 |
| R&D | 9.5 | 9.7 | 9.4 | 8.7 | 7.9 |
| Nuclear energy | <u>1.2</u> | <u>3.5</u> | <u>4.1</u> | <u>5.1</u> | <u>5.1</u> |
| Total ^b | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

^aIncluding "mobilization troops."

^bDiscrepancies between totals and sums of components are due to rounding.

^cSee note (b), Table 8.

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but are either not integral to the costs of the main forces or not allocable to them with existing information.

(5) Since outlays other than on the three main services account for only a third or less of the total, the trend of growth for the three forces and that of aggregate military outlays is essentially the same. Within the three-force total it is clear (ignoring minor fluctuations) that the navy and air force gained substantially at the expense of the ground forces. This is only slightly magnified by the manpower adjustments. The relative importance in total outlays of the ground forces fell, and that of the other two forces increased, by five or six percentage points between 1947 and 1951 (depending on the variant), reflecting the difference between rates of growth of outlays of 7 percent for the ground forces (10.2 percent in the adjusted variant), on one hand, and 17.9 (22.3) and 17.0 (21.3) percent, respectively, for the navy and air forces, on the other. While growth for the navy and air forces was strong in all years, the naval buildup was particularly rapid in 1949 and 1950 and that of the air force was sharpest in 1950-1951.

(6) The structure of outlays by the three main forces is shown in Table 10 in a resource component breakdown. In the unadjusted variant, it appears that the resource structure of ground force expenditures remained relatively constant over the period shown, in contrast to the pattern of the other two forces, where the share of personnel outlays declined sharply. Among components of naval outlays, procurement's share mushroomed by 1950, at the expense of the shares of all

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Table 10

STRUCTURE OF SOVIET MILITARY OUTLAYS AT 1955 RUBLES
BY SERVICE AND RESOURCE ELEMENT, 1947-1951 (U)
(Percent of total outlays on each service)

| | 1947 | 1948 | 1949 | 1950 | 1951 |
|----------------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| <u>Ground forces</u> | | | | | |
| A. Unadjusted ^a | | | | | |
| Military personnel | 69.6 | 68.5 | 70.8 | 70.4 | 72.0 |
| O&M | 8.9 | 10.1 | 8.6 | 8.5 | 7.4 |
| Procurement | 18.1 | 18.2 | 17.9 | 18.6 | 18.3 |
| Construction | <u>3.3</u> | <u>3.2</u> | <u>2.7</u> | <u>2.6</u> | <u>2.3</u> |
| Total ^b | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| B. Adjusted | | | | | |
| Military personnel | 67.2 | 65.6 | 66.5 | 69.7 | 72.6 |
| O&M | 9.5 | 10.8 | 9.7 | 8.7 | 7.3 |
| Procurement | 20.5 | 21.0 | 21.5 | 19.7 | 18.4 |
| Construction | <u>2.8</u> | <u>2.6</u> | <u>2.4</u> | <u>2.0</u> | <u>1.7</u> |
| Total ^b | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| <u>Navy, including naval air</u> | | | | | |
| A. Unadjusted | | | | | |
| Military personnel | 61.8 | 55.6 | 43.6 | 37.4 | 39.1 |
| O&M | 14.7 | 13.7 | 11.4 | 11.2 | 11.7 |
| Procurement | 17.6 | 25.6 | 40.9 | 48.0 | 45.7 |
| Construction | <u>5.9</u> | <u>5.1</u> | <u>4.0</u> | <u>3.4</u> | <u>3.6</u> |
| Total ^b | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| B. Adjusted | | | | | |
| Military personnel | 55.7 | 48.5 | 40.8 | 38.5 | 39.1 |
| O&M | 17.0 | 15.8 | 12.0 | 11.0 | 11.7 |
| Procurement | 20.5 | 29.7 | 43.0 | 47.3 | 45.7 |
| Construction | <u>6.8</u> | <u>5.9</u> | <u>4.2</u> | <u>3.3</u> | <u>3.6</u> |
| Total ^b | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| <u>Air, excluding naval air</u> | | | | | |
| A. Unadjusted | | | | | |
| Military personnel | 49.0 | 43.4 | 41.8 | 34.3 | 28.6 |
| O&M | 11.6 | 10.1 | 11.3 | 11.0 | 10.0 |
| Procurement | 36.1 | 43.4 | 43.3 | 50.4 | 56.6 |
| Construction | <u>3.2</u> | <u>3.2</u> | <u>3.6</u> | <u>4.2</u> | <u>4.8</u> |
| Total ^b | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| B. Adjusted | | | | | |
| Military personnel | 41.0 | 34.0 | 34.3 | 30.8 | 28.6 |
| O&M | 13.4 | 11.7 | 12.8 | 11.6 | 10.0 |
| Procurement | 41.8 | 50.6 | 48.8 | 53.1 | 56.6 |
| Construction | <u>3.7</u> | <u>3.7</u> | <u>4.1</u> | <u>4.5</u> | <u>4.8</u> |
| Total ^b | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

^aIncluding "mobilization troops."

^bDiscrepancies between totals and sums of components are due to rounding.

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other elements. The relative importance of air force procurement also increased, although somewhat less dramatically.

(S) The manpower adjustment magnifies the increase in relative weight of personnel costs in the ground forces between 1948 and 1951 and reduces the share of procurement in that service's total. On the other hand, with respect to the naval and air force structure, the adjustment damps the reduction in the personnel share and the relative growth of procurement; however, the decline in the relative importance of O&M is heightened, relative to the unadjusted variant.

(S) Given the costing framework of the SOVOY data, a mission distribution for the 1947-1951 period cannot be computed for the entire range of outlays. Table 11 indicates the mission structure of procurement alone. The expected large jump in strategic-offense outlays appears dramatically in Table 11 and is shown as bunched in the years 1948-1950. Naval procurement excluding aircraft and long-range submarines also grew strongly; in absolute terms outlays of this group exceeded those on strategic offense in 1951 by more than 50 percent. Procurement of ground equipment and material was the largest single claimant in 1947 at 46 percent of the total. By 1951, ground force procurement had fallen to less than a quarter of the total, not much larger than the naval share and considerably less than that of air defense, tacair, and navalair.

(S) I noted earlier that SOVOY estimates were derived from building block costing and were therefore independent of Soviet official budget data. Table 12 compares the SOVOY figures net of various outlay

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Table 11

SOVIET MILITARY PROCUREMENT AT 1955 RUBLES BY MISSION, 1947-1951 (U)

| | 1947 | 1948 | 1949 | 1950 | 1951 |
|---|------|------|------|------|------|
| <u>Billion rubles</u> | | | | | |
| 1. Strategic offense ^a | .2 | 1.6 | 3.1 | 4.0 | 4.3 |
| 2. Air defense, tacair and navalair | 4.5 | 5.7 | 5.0 | 8.9 | 14.1 |
| 3. Ground ^b | 6.4 | 6.2 | 7.1 | 7.5 | 8.1 |
| 4. Naval ^c | 1.2 | 2.1 | 5.2 | 7.1 | 6.6 |
| 5. Other air | 1.6 | 2.0 | 1.5 | .8 | 1.0 |
| 6. Other procurement ^d | .1 | .1 | .3 | .5 | .9 |
| Total procurement ^e | 14.0 | 17.8 | 22.2 | 28.9 | 34.9 |
| <u>Percent distribution (excluding other procurement)^e</u> | | | | | |
| 1. Strategic offense ^a | 1.5 | 9.0 | 14.0 | 14.2 | 12.6 |
| 2. Air defense, tacair and navalair | 32.5 | 32.3 | 22.7 | 31.5 | 41.4 |
| 3. Ground ^b | 45.8 | 35.3 | 32.4 | 26.5 | 23.8 |
| 4. Naval ^c | 8.4 | 12.1 | 23.9 | 25.1 | 19.3 |
| 5. Other air | 11.8 | 11.3 | 6.9 | 2.7 | 2.8 |
| <u>Indexes of growth, 1947 = 100</u> | | | | | |
| 1. Strategic offense ^a | 100 | 762 | 1462 | 1914 | 2038 |
| 2. Air defense, tacair and navalair | 100 | 125 | 109 | 196 | 311 |
| 3. Ground ^b | 100 | 98 | 111 | 118 | 127 |
| 4. Naval ^c | 100 | 182 | 447 | 609 | 562 |
| 5. Other air | 100 | 121 | 92 | 46 | 59 |
| 6. Other procurement ^d | 100 | 138 | 363 | 663 | 1113 |
| Total procurement ^e | 100 | 127 | 158 | 206 | 249 |

^aMedium and heavy bombers plus long range submarines.

^bExcluding anti-aircraft artillery (included in air defense).

^cExcluding aircraft and long range submarines.

^dFixed communication and ground radar equipment.

^eCalculated from unrounded data.

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Table 12

COMPARISON OF SOVOY MILITARY OUTLAYS AT 1955 RUBLES
AND SOVIET OFFICIAL "DEFENSE" AT CURRENT RUBLES, 1947-1951 (U)

| | 1947 | 1948 | 1949 | 1950 | 1951 |
|---|------|------|------|-------|-------|
| <u>Billion rubles</u> | | | | | |
| A. SOVOY, excluding | | | | | |
| 1. Security forces and reserve pay | 70.3 | 75.4 | 90.0 | 110.4 | 125.3 |
| 2. Security forces, reserve pay, and nuclear energy | 69.3 | 72.4 | 86.0 | 104.0 | 118.3 |
| 3. Security forces, reserve pay, nuclear energy, and R&D | 61.7 | 64.0 | 76.7 | 93.7 | 107.6 |
| B. Official "defense" | 66.3 | 66.3 | 79.2 | 82.9 | 93.9 |
| C. Official "defense" plus half of "science" ^a | 70.6 | 70.6 | 83.7 | 86.9 | 98 |
| <u>Indexes, 1947 = 100</u> | | | | | |
| A. SOVOY, excluding | | | | | |
| 1. Security forces and reserve pay | 100 | 107 | 128 | 157 | 178 |
| 2. Security forces, reserve pay, and nuclear energy | 100 | 104 | 124 | 150 | 171 |
| 3. Security forces, reserve pay, nuclear energy, and R&D | 100 | 104 | 124 | 152 | 174 |
| B. Official "defense" | 100 | 100 | 119 | 125 | 142 |
| C. Official "defense" plus half of "science" ^a | 100 | 100 | 119 | 123 | 138 |

^a"Science": total outlays from all sources ("old series"). See Nancy Nimitz, Soviet Expenditures on Scientific Research, RM-3384-PR, January 1963, pp. 40-41.

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categories--reserve pay, security forces, nuclear energy, and R&D¹--with official "defense", with and without an allowance for the military R&D portion of "science" appropriations, which are charged under a separate budget category. The correspondence between SOVOY and official series is not especially close after 1949, a fact which could be due to price differences (whereas the official figures are in current rubles, the SOVOY data are declared to be at constant 1955 prices) or to accounting transfers of outlays between explicit "defense" and other categories of the state budget, as well as to error in the SOVOY estimates.

C. THE 1951-1953 LINK: SCAM

(S) As indicated, the data source for all years after 1950 is CIA's Strategic Cost Analysis Model, developed by the Office of Strategic Research. This is a building-block model whose 1974 version, utilized in the present series of reports, employs 1970 ruble prices as weights.

(S) Table 13 compares SCAM and SOVOY estimates for the two years of the period of the present paper in which the two sets of estimates overlap. Since there is no independent interest here in comparing the two models, the comparison is not extended beyond 1953. Considering first the resource half of Table 13, it is apparent that there are serious divergences between the two sets of data. To cite but two examples, SOVOY estimates a 3 percent increase in total military outlays in 1953 whereas the SCAM entry shows a 3 percent decline. Construction

(U) ¹On the ground that these outlays are financed outside of the "defense" budget--reserve pay by the reservists' employers, and the other three components from other parts of the state budget.

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Table 13

COMPARISON OF SCAM AND SOVOY-39 ESTIMATES, 1951-1953 (U)

| | 1951 | | 1952 | | 1953 | |
|--|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | SCAM | SOVOY | SCAM | SOVOY | SCAM | SOVOY |
| I. RESOURCES^a | | | | | | |
| <u>Growth, annual % increases</u> | | | | | | |
| Military personnel | | | 7.3 | 2.2 | -7.7 | 0.3 |
| O&M | | | 8.1 | 11.4 | 3.3 | 5.6 |
| Procurement | | | -2.9 | -1.4 | -2.8 | 4.1 |
| Construction | | | 6.3 | 34.5 | -6.0 | -7.7 |
| R&D | | | 3.2 | 7.5 | 15.4 | 7.8 |
| Total outlays | | | 4.1 | 4.2 | -3.3 | 3.0 |
| <u>Structure, percent of total</u> | | | | | | |
| Military personnel | 40.8 | 46.8 | 42.2 | 46.0 | 40.3 | 44.8 |
| O&M | 18.1 | 12.3 | 18.9 | 13.1 | 20.1 | 13.4 |
| Procurement | 33.9 | 25.7 | 31.7 | 24.4 | 31.9 | 24.6 |
| Construction | 3.4 | 2.1 | 3.5 | 2.8 | 3.4 | 2.5 |
| R&D | 3.4 | 7.9 | 3.4 | 8.1 | 4.1 | 8.5 |
| Other ^b | .3 | 5.1 | .3 | 5.6 | .3 | 6.2 |
| Total outlays | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| II. SERVICE | | | | | | |
| <u>Growth, ^c annual % increases</u> | | | | | | |
| Ground force | | | 6.7 | 5.1 | -11.7 | -4.0 |
| Navy, including naval air | | | 16.0 | -3.6 | -1.9 | 8.4 |
| Air force, excluding naval air | | | -8.0 | 4.5 | 5.0 | 1.3 |
| Three services | | | 3.1 | 3.1 | -4.7 | 1.8 |
| Security forces | | | 10.0 | 0 | -11.4 | 0 |
| <u>Structure, percent of total</u> | | | | | | |
| Ground force | 37.9 | 34.6 | 38.9 | 34.9 | 35.5 | 33.8 |
| Navy, including naval air | 12.6 | 14.5 | 14.0 | 13.4 | 14.2 | 14.1 |
| Air force, excluding naval air | 27.2 | 21.3 | 24.0 | 21.4 | 26.1 | 21.1 |
| Three services | 77.7 | 70.4 | 76.9 | 69.7 | 75.9 | 69.0 |
| Security forces | 4.4 | 5.6 | 4.6 | 5.4 | 4.2 | 5.2 |
| R&D | 3.4 | 7.9 | 3.4 | 8.1 | 4.1 | 8.5 |
| Other ^d | 14.6 | 16.1 | 15.1 | 16.9 | 15.8 | 17.2 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

^a Command and support costs of SCAM are distributed by resource component.

^b SCAM: DOSAAF support. SOVOY: nuclear energy.

^c SCAM: excluding command and support costs.

^d SCAM: command and support, DOSAAF support, reserve pay and subsistence, pensions.
SOVOY: nuclear energy, civilian pay, miscellaneous O&M, nonallocated electronics procurement, DOSAAF, reserve pay and subsistence, pensions.

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is shown as increasing by more than a third in the single year 1952 according to SOVOY but only by 6 percent in the later CIA series. Structural differences are also marked.

(S) The SCAM data appear in the source in a mission-resource breakdown. The following scheme has been used to provide a service distribution:

| <u>SCAM Distribution</u> | <u>Service Assignment</u> |
|--|---------------------------------------|
| Strategic attack (bombers and joint support) | Air force |
| Strategic defense | |
| Fighters | Air force |
| AAA | Ground force |
| Control and warning | 70% to air force; 30% to ground force |
| Ground | |
| Ground troops | Ground force |
| Tacair | Air force |
| Naval | Navy |
| Military transport aviation | Air force |

(S) Again there are significant divergences between the SCAM and SOVOY data, particularly with respect to the growth of air force outlays.¹ The more recent CIA costing indicates a sharp growth in naval forces in 1952 but a decline in the air force. SOVOY estimates indicate a reverse pattern. SCAM shows a decline in navy expenditures in 1953, SOVOY a significant increase. And so forth.

(S) ¹ In SOVOY-39, it should be noted, pay and allowances of the security forces are assumed constant throughout the estimating period.

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(S) The two series differ in the price weights used, 1955 prices for SOVOY and 1970 prices for SCAM. In a letter to the author, CIA has supplied a list of conversion coefficients for a number of elements of the cost model, to enable transformation of 1955 ruble values first to 1968 and then to 1970 prices. The 1968-to-1955 price ratios range from 0.91 to 1.52 but cluster around 1.1-1.2; transition to 1970 prices in most cases seems to involve an additional increase of no more than 8 percent. Thus, the average linked change from 1955 to 1970 prices would seem to be on the order of 20-30 percent. It cannot be determined at this point whether differential price change can help account for the sharp divergences between the SOVOY-39 and SCAM data series.

D. A Note on R&D

(U) In the discussion in Part II, we noted that all the Soviet military services acquired some new weapons of post-war design. For example, the Army deployed the PT-76 amphibious vehicle and the S-60 anti-aircraft gun. The Navy commissioned the "W" and "Z" class long-range submarines, the Chapayev and Sverdlov light cruisers and various other vessels. The Air Force acquired the MIG-9, the MIG-15 A and B, the MIG-17A, and the IL-28. And, of course, the USSR obtained the atom bomb.

(U) Besides having developed the weapons actually deployed in the 1946-1953 period, the Soviet research and development establishment was simultaneously at work on weapons which were to appear in the years beyond 1953. Perhaps most startling to the Western world in terms of immediate threat was the appearance of the large BISON and BEAR inter-continental bombers in 1954 and 1955. R&D activities on these planes,

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deployed in the mid-1950s, must necessarily have begun soon after the end of World War II. Also in progress during the period was work on the diesel powered "C" class ballistic missile submarine, the "H" class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine, and the missiles with which they were to be equipped. New fighter interceptors, air-to-air missiles, and early warning systems were receiving attention. A substantial R&D effort on space vehicles and launchers was in progress, as evidenced by the appearance of Sputnik in 1957 with effects on the world which are familiar to all. Irrespective of the traditionalist military doctrine proclaimed in the early postwar period, it is obvious that the Soviet leadership was looking to the future.

(U) It is of some interest to note how the USSR was allocating its R&D effort among military missions and organizations. There has been no opportunity to analyze the situation for the years 1946-1949, but some estimates are available for the period 1950-1954. These are based on an examination of the dates at which all identifiable new Soviet weapons were first deployed. R&D dollar costs were assigned to each weapon and the outlays were spread back through the years from the time of first deployment. The mission and organizational subordination of each weapon was established and the individual R&D costs were added for each year to arrive at totals for each mission, organization, and class of weapon. The absolute levels of these totals in dollars or rubles alone would have little meaning, but their distribution, even if based on dollar costs, may be interesting. The distribution is shown in Table 14.

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Table 14
ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET R&D EFFORT 1950-1954
(Percentages)

| Mission | Organization | | | | | | Total |
|-------------------------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|-------------------|-------------------------|------------|--------------|
| | Army | Navy | Air Force | Rocket Forces (a) | Space Organizations (b) | Other | |
| <u>Strategic Offensive</u> | <u>0.0</u> | <u>15.0</u> | <u>38.3</u> | <u>12.5</u> | <u>0.0</u> | <u>0.0</u> | <u>65.8</u> |
| A/C and Air-Surface Missiles | | | <u>38.3</u> | | | | <u>38.3</u> |
| Land Based Missiles | | | | <u>12.5</u> | | | <u>12.5</u> |
| Sea Based Missiles | | <u>15.0</u> | | | | | <u>15.0</u> |
| <u>Defensive</u> | <u>0.1</u> | <u>0.0</u> | <u>13.0</u> | <u>0.0</u> | <u>0.0</u> | <u>0.0</u> | <u>13.1</u> |
| Anti-Aircraft Artillery | <u>0.1</u> | | | | | | <u>0.1</u> |
| Surface-Air Missiles | | | <u>3.0</u> | | | | <u>3.0</u> |
| Fighters and Air-Air Missiles | | | <u>10.0</u> | | | | <u>10.0</u> |
| <u>General Purpose</u> | <u>1.4</u> | <u>10.7</u> | <u>3.9</u> | <u>0.0</u> | <u>0.0</u> | <u>0.0</u> | <u>16.0</u> |
| Army Rockets | <u>0.2</u> | | | | | | <u>0.2</u> |
| Army Missiles | <u>0.9</u> | | | | | | <u>0.9</u> |
| Army Tanks | <u>0.3</u> | | | | | | <u>0.3</u> |
| Navy-Surface Ships | | <u>2.2</u> | | | | | <u>2.2</u> |
| Navy-Torpedo Subs | | <u>8.5</u> | | | | | <u>8.5</u> |
| Air Force-Attack A/C | | | <u>3.9</u> | | | | <u>3.9</u> |
| <u>Support</u> | <u>0.0</u> | <u>0.0</u> | <u>0.0</u> | <u>0.0</u> | <u>0.0</u> | <u>2.3</u> | <u>2.3</u> |
| Radar | | | | | | <u>0.7</u> | <u>0.7</u> |
| Transport A/C | | | | | | <u>1.0</u> | <u>1.0</u> |
| Helicopters | | | | | | <u>0.6</u> | <u>0.6</u> |
| <u>Space Systems</u> | <u>0.0</u> | <u>0.0</u> | <u>0.0</u> | <u>0.0</u> | <u>2.8</u> | <u>0.0</u> | <u>2.8</u> |
| Launch Systems | | | | | <u>1.7</u> | | <u>1.7</u> |
| Vehicles | | | | | <u>1.0</u> | | <u>1.0</u> |
| TOTALS | 1.6 | 25.7 | 55.1 | 12.5 | 2.8 | 2.3 | 100.0 |

Discrepancies between totals and sums of components are due to rounding.

^aNot organized as a separate entity until 1960.

^bMinistries of Communications and Defense, and Academy of Sciences.

Source: Edmund D. Brunner, Jr., "U.S. and Soviet RDT&E: Economic and Structural Considerations," WN-7870-1, The Rand Corporation, July 1972.

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(U) It can be observed that during these years, the USSR placed considerable emphasis on R&D for the strategic offensive mission, as it apparently absorbed around two-thirds of the total R&D budget, costed in dollars. The Air Force was the largest single beneficiary, as at this time there were large outlays for developing the BADGER medium bomber, the BISON and BEAR intercontinental bombers, and associated air-to-surface missiles. However, the Navy and the precursor organizations of the rocket forces received substantial amounts for work on the first ballistic missile submarines and the ICBM. The effort to strengthen the air defense system was almost entirely an Air Force activity, and 13 percent of total outlays were for this purpose. The strategic and air defense missions, together with smaller expenditures for tactical aviation R&D, combined to give the Air Force about 55 percent of all R&D funding. The Army, with much less complex weapons, apparently spent less than 2 percent of the total. The general purpose forces mission, with 16 percent of all R&D, ranked a poor second to the strategic mission, but somewhat higher than air defense. Navy involvement in both the strategic and general purpose missions combined to give that Service about one-fourth of total R&D outlays. The early R&D efforts on space activities amount to about 3 percent of the total, and these activities were destined to absorb rapidly increasing shares of the overall budget. The Strategic Rocket Forces, already a substantial claimant (12.5 percent), were in later years to assume first place in the R&D hierarchy. To what extent these patterns would be altered by ruble costing cannot be determined.

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IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

(S) Following the end of World War II, a substantial demobilization of Soviet forces took place, lasting through 1947 and perhaps into the first part of 1948. A subsequent buildup, which is likely to have begun seriously in 1949, brought a growth in the size of all the services to 1952. Between 1952 and 1953, the Ground Forces decreased in size, while the Air Force and Navy continued to grow. Overwhelmingly preponderant in the force and budget structure at the end of the war, the Ground Forces declined tangibly in relative weight in favor of the other two services.

(U) With respect to forces in being, the USSR concentrated its strength in the homeland and in Europe, and these forces were not of a nature to apply military might over remote areas of the world. The increasingly mechanized ground troops possessed the bulk of the manpower and established their first airborne divisions. Much attention was given to developing and improving tactical aviation for the support of the ground troops. The air defense system grew rapidly and was given priority in the acquisition of new jet fighter aircraft. The Navy's growing fleet was modernized, but the bulk of it consisted of ships and submarines with limited range capabilities. Europe was indeed held hostage while the Soviet Union took its first steps toward acquiring strategic air power. The Long Range Air Force was established and equipped with the TU-4, and doubtless with some numbers of atomic weapons. This force could have heavily damaged Western Europe, but at best it had only marginal capacity against the U.S.

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(U) While the nature of the forces in being during the 1946-1953 period seemed generally consonant with traditional Soviet military doctrine, the USSR implemented in these years a substantial research and development program with the objective of establishing a truly intercontinental strategic nuclear capability. This R&D effort was to result in a limited long range air force, but very powerful nuclear ICBM and fleet ballistic missile forces comprising the Soviet portion of "the balance of terror."

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Appendix

SOVIET MILITARY OUTLAYS DURING WORLD WAR II

For the purpose of developing estimates of Soviet military expenditures in the early postwar years, as well as for the purpose of serving as a base of comparison with such estimates, it would be useful to develop estimates for World War II. This Appendix is intended to help meet that objective. It is made possible by the appearance in the U.S. of a Soviet work on World War II finance that was previously unobtainable.¹

The first step is to split "defense" expenditures in the Soviet state budget between the two military users--the Commissariats of Defense (NKO) and Navy (NKVMF). Total defense expenditures, 1940-1945, and NKO expenditures, 1941-1945, are given in absolute terms (FS, pp. 29 and 57). NKO outlays in 1940 may be calculated from the 1941 figure and index numbers for 1941-1945 shown on p. 66 of the source. The same page also shows the index numbers for total defense (which are, incidentally, consistent with the absolute figures provided on p. 57). Comparable index numbers for NKVMF outlays are cited on p. 334. The three sets of index numbers are shown below, along with the 1940 base figures for the shares of NKO and NKVMF outlays in total defense which the index numbers imply:²

¹Col. (Reserve) V. N. Dutov, ed., Finansovaya sluzhba Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR v period voyny, Voenizdat, 1967, hereafter abbreviated to FS. Translated in JPRS 622294-1 and -2, 21 June, 1974, as Finance Service of the Soviet Armed Forces During the War. Page references below are to the Russian text.

²It seems clear that the indexes refer to current-price, not constant-price magnitudes.

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| | <u>1941</u> | <u>1942</u> | <u>1943</u> | <u>1944</u> | <u>1945</u> |
|--|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| <u>Indexes, 1940 = 100</u> | | | | | |
| Total defense | 146.1 | 190.8 | 220.1 | 242.6 | 225.7 |
| NKO | 155.1 | 216.5 | 250.4 | 274.5 | 252.8 |
| NKVMF | 102.0 | 80.6 | 81.8 | 93.7 | 109.9 |
| <u>Implied 1940 shares in total defense, percent</u> | | | | | |
| NKO | 83.1 | 81.1 | 82.0 | 82.4 | 81.0 |
| NKVMF | 16.9 | 18.9 | 18.0 | 17.6 | 19.0 |

The differences in the implied 1940 shares are too large to be attributed solely to rounding of the index numbers. Therefore, it is possible that there is a third component of the total "defense" series other than NKO and NKVMF outlays. It seems useless to speculate on the identity of this component, but it is surely small in size. If NKO outlays in 1940 are subtracted from total defense in that year, the difference is 10.2 billion rubles. Arbitrarily, it is assumed that NKVMF expenditures in 1940 were 10 BR, and the figure is extended in time by the NKVMF index cited above. The resulting estimates are shown in Appendix Table 1.

We can now establish the values of NKO procurement¹ of arms, ammunition, vehicles, and other equipment, by type (Appendix Table 2). The figures in Appendix Table 2 are calculated from annual shares of all NKO procurement in total NKO outlays and from the annual structure of NKO procurement. FS also provides indexes of procurement outlays and annual percentage increases. These may be compared with corresponding figures calculated from Appendix Table 2, as in Appendix Table 3.

¹Procurement may include major hardware repair, in full or in part. It seems likely that minor repair--what the Soviets call "current" repair--is a component of maintenance outlays (see p.54 below).

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Appendix Table 1

SOVIET DEFENSE OUTLAYS, 1940-1945
(Billion rubles, prices of each year)

| | Defense | Of which | | |
|------|---------|----------|-------|--------------|
| | | NKO | NKVMF | Unidentified |
| 1940 | 56.8 | 46.6 | 10.0 | .2 |
| 1941 | 83.0 | 72.3 | 10.2 | .5 |
| 1942 | 108.4 | 100.9 | 8.1 | -.6 |
| 1943 | 125.0 | 116.7 | 8.2 | .2 |
| 1944 | 137.8 | 127.8 | 9.4 | .6 |
| 1945 | 128.2 | 117.8 | 11.0 | -.6 |

Source:

See text.

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Appendix Table 2

NKO Procurement Outlays by Type, 1940-1945
(Billion rubles)

| | 1940 | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
|--|------|------------------|------------------|------|------|------|
| Total NKO procurement ^a of which | 14.6 | 24.2 | 34.0 | 39.6 | 44.3 | 31.6 |
| Artillery, infantry weapons, and ammunition | 6.1 | 10.1 | 15.2 | 17.0 | 19.4 | 13.0 |
| Air force armament | 5.5 | 8.5 | 9.5 | 12.6 | 12.0 | 9.5 |
| Armored equipment | 1.0 | 3.7 ^c | 7.1 ^c | 4.6 | 5.7 | 5.4 |
| Motor vehicles and tractors | 1.1 | d | d | 3.3 | 5.5 | 2.6 |
| Other armament and supplies ^b | .8 | 1.8 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 1.7 | 1.1 |

^aTotals do not necessarily equal sums of components due to rounding.

^bProchie vooruzhenie i imushchestvo. Including "technical and chemical equipment (imushchestvo), communications equipment and many other items of military equipment and supplies" (voennaia tekhnika i imushchestvo), FS, p. 68.

^cIncluding motor vehicles.

^dIncluded with armored equipment.

Source:

Computed from NKO totals in Appendix Table 1 and data in FS giving annual shares of all procurement in the NKO totals and the structure of NKO procurement (pp. 66-68).

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Appendix Table 3

Comparisons of Reported and Calculated Indexes (1940 = 100)
and Annual Percentage Increases of
NKO Procurement, 1941-1945

| | | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
|---|------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| All NKO procurement | | | | | | |
| Indexes: | Reported | 165.7 | 232.7 | 270.9 | 303.2 | 216.1 |
| | Calculated | 165.8 | 232.9 | 271.2 | 303.4 | 216.4 |
| % increases: | Reported | 65.7 | 40.5 | 16.4 | 11.9 | -28.7 |
| | Calculated | 65.8 | 40.5 | 16.5 | 11.9 | -28.7 |
| Artillery, etc. | | | | | | |
| Indexes: | Reported | 165.0 | 247.2 | 276.9 | 314.8 | 211.3 |
| | Calculated | 165.6 | 249.2 | 278.7 | 318.0 | 213.1 |
| % increases: | Reported | 65.0 | 49.8 | 12.0 | 13.7 | -32.9 |
| | Calculated | 65.6 | 50.5 | 11.8 | 14.1 | -33.0 |
| Air force armament | | | | | | |
| Indexes: | Reported | 155.5 | 173.0 | 228.8 | 218.7 | 174.1 |
| | Calculated | 154.5 | 172.7 | 229.1 | 218.2 | 172.7 |
| % increases: | Reported | 55.5 | 11.3 | 32.3 | -4.4 | -22.4 |
| | Calculated | 54.5 | 11.8 | 32.6 | -4.8 | -20.8 |
| Armored equipment, vehicles and tractors | | | | | | |
| Indexes: | Reported | 173.3 | 334.8 | 373.0 | 523.9 | 371.7 |
| | Calculated | 176.2 | 338.1 | 376.2 | 533.3 | 381.0 |
| % increases: | Reported | 73.3 | 93.2 | 11.4 | 22.8 | -5.9 |
| | Calculated | 76.2 | 91.9 | 11.1 | 41.8 | -28.6 |
| Other armament and supplies | | | | | | |
| Indexes: | Reported | 217.1 | 257.0 | 242.9 | 208.9 | 129.7 |
| | Calculated | 225.0 | 275.0 | 262.5 | 212.5 | 137.5 |
| % increases: | Reported | 117.1 | 18.4 | -5.5 | -14.0 | -37.9 |
| | Calculated | 125.0 | 22.2 | -4.5 | -19.0 | -35.3 |

Source:

FS, pp. 68-69, and Appendix Table 2.

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Appendix Table 3 indicates that the values of Appendix Table 2, computed from source data on annual shares, are reasonably consistent with source data on indexes and percentage increases, with the possible exception of the series for "other armament and supplies" and the figures for "armored equipment, vehicles and tractors" in 1944-1945. In the latter cases, the difficulty seems easily resolved: reported index numbers and reported percentage increases are inconsistent. Calculated from the reported index numbers, the percentage increases are close to ones I have computed directly from the absolute values:

| | <u>Armored equipment, etc.</u> | |
|--|--------------------------------|-------------|
| | <u>1944</u> | <u>1945</u> |
| Calculated percentage increase, based on Appendix Table 2 | 41.8 | -28.6 |
| Reported percentage increase | 22.8 | -5.9 |
| Percentage increase computed from reported index numbers, Appendix Table 3 | 40.5 | -29.1 |

Apparently, the source computed the percentage increases in 1944 and 1945 from values of armored equipment alone, without motor vehicles and tractors; the values in Appendix Table 2 for armored equipment alone imply changes of 23.9 and -5.3 percent in 1944 and 1945 respectively--i.e., close to the percentage increases reported in the source.

The relative divergences of calculated from reported percentage changes in Appendix Table 3 for "other armament and supplies" are particularly marked in 1942-1944. This series is vulnerable to error, because the 1940 entry contains a single significant digit and because of the small size of the values in other years. However, the absolute error is not likely to be large for any of the members of the series in Appendix Table 2.

Again, it seems evident that the source indexes are computed from current rather than constant-price series.

Pay and money allowances as well as transportation expenditures in the NKO allocation may also be computed for each of the years in this period, as shown in Appendix Tables 4 and 5. For their SNIP accounts,

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Appendix Table 4

Pay and Money Allowances, NKO, 1940-1945
(Billion rubles)

| | 1940 | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
|-----------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Servicemen | 8.2 | 13.6 | 24.6 | 30.2 | 32.6 | 45 |
| Workers and Employees | .. | .7 | 1.1 | 1.6 | 2.0 | 2 |
| Total | .. | 24.3 | 25.7 | 31.8 | 34.6 | 47 |

".." means not available.

Source:

Calculated from percentage shares in total NKO outlays for 1941-1945 reported by FS, p. 214, and absolute NKO totals from Appendix Table 1. FS, p. 215 also provides index numbers on a 1940 base for servicemen pay and allowances. The annual percentage increases implied by the reported index numbers are very close to those calculated from the absolute values of the first row in this table. Therefore, the index numbers are used to calculate a 1940 value of servicemen pay and allowances.

Appendix Table 5

Transportation Outlays, NKO, 1940-1945
(Million rubles)

| | 1940 | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
|--|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Expenditures on military shipments | | | | | | |
| Freight | 559 | 793 | 1039 | 2763 | 4143 | 2907 |
| Troops (Eshelonnie perevozki) | 199 | 270 | 284 | 629 | 459 | 692 |
| Passengers | 486 | 533 | 710 | 938 | 803 | 1178 |
| Shipments by water ^a | 62 | 48 | 133 | 155 | 70 | 129 |
| Unidentified | 21 | 24 | 27 | 2 | 7 | 14 |
| Total | 1327 | 1667 | 2193 | 4488 | 5482 | 4920 |
| Maintenance and repair of spur lines and rolling stock | 18 | 14 | 7 | 11 | 13 | 20 |

^aIncludes value of passenger and freight shipments completed on waterways.

Source:

FS, pp. 157, 158.

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compiled more than 20 years ago, Bergson and Heymann estimated total military pay as 4.1 billion rubles in 1940 and 14.2 billion in 1944, on the basis of fragmentary indications.¹ Judging from Appendix Table 4, the absolute and relative error of the Bergson-Heymann estimates in either year is substantial, but the implied relative growth between the benchmarks was reasonably accurate.

Finally, we are also told that outlays on (a) baths and laundries came to 196 million rubles in 1940, 258 million in 1941, 333 million in 1942 and 358 million in 1945; (b) "current" repair of military buildings and equipment was over 175 million rubles in 1940 but was cut sharply to 58 million in 1943.²

Further direct breakdown of the NKO totals is not possible. Appendix Table 6 displays available data on relative financing of construction and hardware repair: these data too are at current prices. The source asserts that because of the availability of materials and services requiring no budget outlay and because of decreases in cost, substantial savings were achieved (FS, p. 116). We are also told (FS, p. 117) that after 1 May 1942 the pay of staff military personnel of military construction organizations was paid from funds covering general military pay and allowances (paragraph 1, article 1 of the NKO estimate). Thus, changes in the real volume of construction were different from the pattern indicated by the index in Appendix Table 5. There may be a similar understatement of the real volume of repair in Appendix Table 6 in view of the widespread use of soldiers in repair enterprises (FS, p. 109). This should also be true of the procurement time series in view of Soviet claims of substantial cost and price decreases during the war.

¹Abram Bergson and Hans Heymann, Jr., Soviet National Income and Product 1940 through 1948, R-253, June 1953, Table 3.

²FS, pp. 175-176, 183. In addition to the indicated outlays on baths and laundries financed from article 11 of the NKO "estimate" (smeta), there were expenditures for the same purposes scattered among other articles of the estimate (pp. 176-177).

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Appendix Table 6
Relative Outlays on Construction and Hardware Repair,
NKO, 1940-1945

| | 1940 | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
|---|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| <u>Percent distribution of annual NKO outlays on construction</u> | | | | | | |
| Defensive (<u>oboronitel'noe</u>) | 18.2 | 54.4 | 65.5 | 58.1 | 52.1 | 12.9 |
| General military (<u>obshchev voiskovoe</u>) | 69.7 | 36.8 | 23.5 | 29.2 | 40.7 | 62.3 |
| Airfield | 4.4 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 6.2 | 5.4 | 4.8 |
| Other | 7.7 | 3.6 | 5.8 | 6.5 | 1.8 | 20.0 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| <u>Index, 1940 = 100</u> | | | | | | |
| Financing construction | 100.0 | 110.0 | 90.0 | 51.0 | 66.5 | 75.9 |
| Financing hardware repair | 100 | 228 | 223 | 281 | 317 | 410 |

Source:

FS, pp. 105, 114, 116. Outlays are identified as those financed from paragraphs 6 (construction) and 21 (hardware repair) of the NKO estimate.

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NKVMF Outlays

The Navy's expenditures--in total and by component, as available--are compiled in Appendix Table 7. Maintenance accounted for 38 percent of the total in the last prewar year but about three-fifths during the war. Procurement outlays were more than half of the total in 1940 but less than two-fifths during the war. Construction was cut way back.

The source's chapter on Navy outlays provides two different indexes for total construction. However, it seems clear that the second (p. 355) identified as the "volume (ob"em) of capital construction" refers to the physical volume rather than to the financing of naval construction. The first is therefore used in the development of Appendix Table 7.

Summary, NKO and NKVMF

Appendix Table 8 summarizes the estimates of expenditures by NKO and NKVMF, developed on the basis of FS. The NKO residual accounts for almost half of all NKO outlays in 1940 but falls to about 35 percent in 1943-1944 and less than 30 in 1945. Most of this residual is probably O&M outlays--primarily on POL and troop subsistence; construction is probably a relatively minor element.¹ The residual may or may not cover some pensions and family allowances.²

The Structure of Cumulative Defense Outlays

On p. 132, FS states that the aggregate cost of fuel, food, and clothing used by both NKVMF and NKO during the war was 150.3 billion rubles, or 25.8 percent of State Budget outlays on defense. Presumably,

¹See also below, p. 60 of this Appendix.

²Inclusion is implied by chapter 16 of FS. However, Zverev, the long-time Minister of Finance, asserts the contrary. A. Zverev, "Sovetskie finansy v period Velikoi otechestvennoi voyny," Finansy SSSR, 1967, No. 5, p. 24.

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Appendix Table 7

Indexes of NKVMF Outlays, 1941-1945
(Billion rubles, except as indicated)

| | 1940 | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
|---|------|------|-------------------|------|-----------------|------------------|
| Procurement | 5.3 | .. | 3.0 | 3.2 | 3.5 | 4.3 ^e |
| Construction, total | .9 | .. | .3 | .2 | .4 ^e | .5 |
| Coastal and base | .5 | ... | .2 ^c | .. | .. | .. |
| Barracks and associated personnel construction ^a | .2 | .. | - ^c | .. | .. | .. |
| Fuel, arms, ammo and equipment depots | .1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Aviation ^b | .1 | .2 | .1 | .2 | .4 | .4 |
| "Maintenance," total | 3.8 | .. | 4.8 ^d | | 5.5 | 6.2 |
| components: Indexes, 1940 = 100 | | | | | | |
| Pay (par. 1, art. 1) | 100 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 200+ |
| Subsistence | 100 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 172 |
| Transportation | 100 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 191 |
| Combat and physical training | 100 | .. | c.33 ^d | | .. | .. |
| Housing and medical service | 100 | .. | c.67 ^d | | .. | .. |
| Hydrographic service | 100 | 88.3 | 36.1 | 30.9 | .. | .. |
| Floating equipment and harbors | 100 | .. | 42.4 | .. | 48.8 | .. |
| All NKVMF outlays | 10.0 | 10.2 | 8.1 | 8.2 | 9.4 | 11.0 |

"-" means less than 50 million rubles

^a Kazarmennoe i kul'turno-bytovoe stroitel'stvo

^b By the Airfield Construction Administration of the Navy

^c Figures refer to the "volume" (ob'em) rather than to the financing of construction.

^d In 1942 and in 1943.

^e Computed as a residual, total NKVMF outlays less the other two major components.

Source:

Indexes of procurement, construction and maintenance (which are indicated as comprising all of Navy expenditures) in 1942 and 1943, along with indexes of total Navy outlays, all on a 1940 base (FS, pp. 334-335), imply the following shares in total Navy outlays in 1940: procurement 53 percent, maintenance 38 percent, construction 9 percent. This calculation is crude because the index number for maintenance is stated as approximately 125 in both 1942 and 1943. However, when the index numbers are translated to absolute values on the basis of these computed shares and the absolute totals given in Appendix Table 1, the results are in

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Source: (contd.)

rough conformity with a statement in the source that on the average during the war, maintenance accounted for 60 percent of all Navy allocations (FS, p. 334).

Indexes of maintenance components are taken from pp. 335-337. Values for construction components are the product of 1940 shares and index numbers for other years, from pp. 354. The indicated construction components accounted for 97.6 percent of all construction outlays in 1940.

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Appendix Table 8

Summary of NKO and NKVMF Military Expenditures, 1940-1945
(Billion rubles)

| | 1940 | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
|---|------|------|------------------|-------|-------|-------|
| NKO, total | 46.6 | 72.3 | 100.9 | 116.7 | 127.8 | 117.8 |
| Pay and allowances | 9 | 24.3 | 25.7 | 31.8 | 34.6 | 47 |
| Procurement of hardware | 14.6 | 24.2 | 34.0 | 39.6 | 44.3 | 31.6 |
| Operations and Maintenance | | | | | | |
| Transportation outlays | 1.3 | 1.7 | 2.2 | 4.5 | 5.5 | 4.9 |
| Current repair, buildings and equipment | .2 | .. | .. | .1 | .. | .. |
| Other: other O&M, construction and unidentified | 22 | 22.1 | 39.0 | 40.7 | 43.4 | 34 |
| NKVMF, total | 10.0 | 10.2 | 8.1 | 8.2 | 9.4 | 11.0 |
| Maintenance | 3.8 | .. | 4.8 ^a | | 5.5 | 6.2 |
| Procurement | 5.3 | .. | 3.0 | 3.2 | 3.5 | 4.3 |
| Construction | .9 | .. | .3 | .2 | .4 | .5 |

^aIn both 1942 and 1943.

Source:

Appendix Tables 1, 2, 4, 5 and 7, and p. 54 of this Appendix.

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the statement refers to the years 1941-1945. Thus, we may establish the following breakdown:

| <u>Total defense, 1941-1945</u> | | <u>583 billion rubles</u> |
|---|--------------------|---------------------------|
| Procurement | NKO | 174 |
| | NKVMF | c. 16 |
| Pay and allowances | NKO | 163 |
| | NKVMF ¹ | c. 16 |
| Fuel, food, clothing total | | 150 |
| Construction, NKVMF | | 2 |
| Remainder: NKO construction, other O&M and miscellaneous for both commissariats | | 62 |

The remainder is 11 percent of the aggregate total, which suggests that construction in the NKO accounted for considerably under 10 percent of both the defense and NKO totals.

¹ Assuming that pay accounted for half of navy maintenance in 1940 and grew at a steady rate until 1945.

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