1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
2	x
3	UNITED STATES, :
4	Petitioner : No. 11-192
5	v. :
б	JAMES X. BORMES :
7	x
8	Washington, D.C.
9	Tuesday, October 2, 2012
10	
11	The above-entitled matter came on for oral
12	argument before the Supreme Court of the United States
13	at 11:02 a.m.
14	APPEARANCES:
15	SRI SRINIVASAN, ESQ., Deputy Solicitor General,
16	Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on
17	behalf of Petitioner.
18	JOHN G. JACOBS, ESQ., Chicago, Illinois; on behalf of
19	Respondent.
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1 PROCEEDINGS 2 (11:02 a.m.) CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We will now hear 3 4 argument in Case 11-192, United States v. Bormes. 5 Mr. Srinivasan. б ORAL ARGUMENT OF SRI SRINIVASAN 7 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER 8 MR. SRINIVASAN: Thank you, 9 Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This Court's decisions have long established 10 that Congress will be deemed to have waived the 11 12 government's sovereign immunity only if it unequivocally 13 expresses its intent to do so. 14 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Under your view, is 15 there any situation today where the Tucker Act would be applied to a statute? Because if we start with the 16 17 statute, which always seems to be where you're pointing us to, and we're only looking for a clear waiver of 18 19 sovereign immunity, then there will never be another 20 Tucker Act action in the future. 21 MR. SRINIVASAN: There are such statutes, Justice Sotomayor. Of course --22 23 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: What would they look 24 like to be able to get around our clear statement rule? 25 MR. SRINIVASAN: Well, they would have two

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1 features consistent with this Court's decisions that 2 have found the Tucker Act to be applicable. One would be that the statute does not contain its own remedial 3 4 mechanism, and the second would be that the substantive 5 obligations in the statute run against the United б States, and the United States alone. 7 And an example of that type of statute is the one that this Court found to be supported by the 8 9 Tucker Act in White Mountain Apache Tribe or in Mitchell Those are the kinds of statutes as to which I think 10 II. 11 the Tucker Act was meant to apply. 12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So basically -- I'm not 13 sure why we're even addressing the issue of Tucker Act 14 jurisdiction. We should have really just been briefing 15 the issue of whether the statute at issue here waives sovereign immunity --16 17 MR. SRINIVASAN: Well, of course --JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- because that becomes, 18 19 to you, the operative question. 20 MR. SRINIVASAN: It does when they're 21 dealing with the statute like this. 22 And, of course, the reason that we are 23 addressing Tucker Act immunity is because Tucker Act immunity is the basis for jurisdiction in this case 24

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according to the reasoning of the Federal circuit.

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1	And the problem with the reasoning of the
2	Federal circuit is it allows the litigant to readily
3	circumvent the Court's strict test for sovereign
4	immunity waivers by the straight forward device of
5	adding the Tucker Act as a jurisdictional basis in the
6	complaint.
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7 And it's not at all clear why a plaintiff 8 couldn't do that for any claim under any statute, 9 including a statute as to which this Court would have 10 already concluded that the unequivocal expression test, 11 the standard test applied for waivers of sovereign 12 immunity, was not satisfied.

13 Now, to give the Court a concrete example of 14 this, in Lane v. Pena, the court concluded that for Rehabilitation Act claims under Section 504 of the 15 16 Rehabilitation Act, there was no unequivocal expression 17 of an intent to waive sovereign immunity by Congress for purposes of the damages claims; and, therefore, a 18 19 damages claim can't be brought against the United States 20 under Section 504.

But under the Federal circuit's approach, there is no apparent reason why a plaintiff couldn't bring a damages claim against the United States for a violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by adding the Tucker Act to the jurisdictional bases in the

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complaint. Because if the plaintiff were able to do that, notwithstanding this Court's decision in Lane V. Pena, the result would be that the plaintiff could say, the Federal circuit, you should look at the statute and ask the question whether it can be fairly interpreted to mandate the payment of money by the government.

8 There is no unequivocal expression of an 9 intent to waive sovereign immunity, but that doesn't 10 detract from the ability of the Federal circuit to 11 conclude that the statute, nonetheless, can be fairly 12 interpreted to mandate the payment of money.

13 Now, of course, if that issue were to arise, 14 we would make the argument that the statute can't be so 15 But the possibility that a plaintiff could make read. that argument, notwithstanding this Court's decision in 16 17 Lane V. Pena, we think reinforces the need to conclude -- to conclude that the Tucker Act can't be 18 19 applied in the way that the Federal circuit sought to 20 apply it here. 21 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Could I ask you --22 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Srinivasan -- I'm 23 sorry. 24 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I was going to

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ask -- following up on my question --

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1 MR. SRINIVASAN: Sure. 2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- many courts have held that the FLSA has an express waiver of sovereign 3 immunity. And many of them have recognized, if not all, 4 5 a Tucker Act remedy. б Under your new approach, that holding is incorrect, I presume --7 MR. SRINIVASAN: Well, the --8 9 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- because the FLSA has 10 its own remedial scheme? MR. SRINIVASAN: I think one -- one way to 11 12 look at the FLSA, if we're looking at it in the first 13 instance, would be to conclude that the FLSA itself has 14 a waiver of sovereign immunity. And so you wouldn't look to the Tucker Act as the basis for the waiver of 15 sovereign immunity, and you would look at FLSA in the 16 17 way that we think you should look at FCRA -- excuse me, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, or FCRA. 18 19 Now, Your Honor is correct that there is a 20 body of court of claims jurisprudence that doesn't 21 necessarily view the statute in that way. But if you apply the framework that we think is the correct one to 22 23 apply, as we set forth in our brief, you might reach the 24 same conclusion under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 25 although under a slightly different route.

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1	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But then the Federal
2	circuit has no jurisdiction over those claims, according
3	to you, because the waiver is in the FLSA, it has its
4	own judicial remedy. They are not authorized, then, to
5	go to
6	MR. SRINIVASAN: Well, it would depend.
7	There is a little bit of an anomaly in the FLSA because
8	the FLSA doesn't necessarily point to any particular
9	court as the basis of jurisdiction.
10	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: It has the same language
11	as here, in you can bring your suit in any Federal or
12	state court of competent jurisdiction.
13	MR. SRINIVASAN: Right. \It says: "In any
14	Federal or state court of competent jurisdiction," but
15	this statute specifically allows for claims to be
16	brought in district courts and a court of competent
17	jurisdiction.
18	So one way
19	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I don't know I don't
20	see the difference between
21	MR. SRINIVASAN: Well, I think one way to
22	potentially see the difference and I'm not going to
23	quibble with with what Your Honor's saying, but one
24	way to potentially see a difference is because the FLSA
25	only refers to courts of competent jurisdiction it

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1 doesn't have a free-standing provision that reversed the 2 district courts -- it's possible to read that statute as 3 essentially incorporating the Tucker Act as setting 4 forth what the court of competent jurisdiction would be. 5 Here, 1681(p), which is set forth at 13(a) and 14(a) of the appendix to the government's brief, 6 speaks specifically about actions being brought under 7 FCRA in any appropriate United States District Court, 8 9 and then only, it goes on to talk about, or in any other 10 court of competent jurisdiction. 11 So that's a potential basis for drawing a 12 distinction between the two. 13 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Srinivasan, what you say 14 has a good deal to recommend it, and it's basically, you 15 know, why should we read the Tucker Act to reverse 16 everything that we know about sovereign immunity, but 17 it's really hard to get that from the text of this --18 the Tucker Act. In fact -- I mean, I guess my question is: 19 20 Do you have any textual argument for the result that you 21 are asking us to reach? 22 MR. SRINIVASAN: Sure. I do, Your Honor. The text of the Tucker Act, it's true, if you read the 23 24 text to apply to its full potential reach, then the 25 argument would be more difficult; but, the text of the

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1 Tucker Act has never been read that way, including by 2 this Court itself, starting with Nichols v. United States --3 4 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, that's not really a 5 textual argument. That's an argument about how we've sensibly limited the reach of the Tucker Act. But the б 7 Tucker Act does seem to include what your friend there says it includes --8 9 MR. SRINIVASAN: Well, I guess --10 JUSTICE KAGAN: -- against any statute. Not 11 any statute except the ones with remedial provisions, 12 but just any statute. 13 MR. SRINIVASAN: Sure. I quess you -- if 14 you read the Tucker Act to its full textual reach, I 15 think we would have a more difficult case. But our 16 argument is that when the statute refers to claims 17 founded on any act of Congress, it was never intended to 18 apply literally to any conceivable act of Congress. 19 And, in fact, this Court's own test for money 20 mandating -- the money mandating test that applies to 21 the Tucker Act embodies that understanding because --22 JUSTICE SCALIA: I assume you are appealing 23 to the textual principle that the specific governs the 24 general. Isn't that what's going on here? 25 MR. SRINIVASAN: We're appealing --

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1 JUSTICE SCALIA: That the Tucker Act is a more general provision, and you are saying it's -- it's 2 overcome by a more specific provision that provides for 3 4 compensation but excludes the federal government. 5 MR. SRINIVASAN: We're certainly relying on that, Justice Scalia, when you're asking whether the 6 Tucker Act can be used as the basis for waiving 7 sovereign immunity for claims under the Fair Credit 8 9 Reporting Act. So when you bring the Fair Credit 10 Reporting Act into play, yes, we're absolutely relying 11 on the specific versus the general proposition, as this 12 Court has relied on in any number of cases. 13 I quess I understood Justice Kagan's 14 question to be talking about the Tucker Act and the 15 Tucker Act alone, without bringing into play any other 16 statute. Now, I take Your Honor's point that it's hard 17 to conceive of the Tucker Act in that kind of isolated fashion, because usually you'll be asking a question 18 whether a claim can be brought against the United States 19 20 under some other statutory regime. 21 And so if that statutory regime includes its 22 own remedial mechanism, as FCRA does, it's hard to avoid 23 resort to the specific control as a general proposition. 24 But the other point about construing the

text of the Tucker Act alone is that the Tucker Act is a

25

1 waiver of sovereign immunity. So the canon that we 2 construe waivers of sovereign immunity strictly comes into play when we construe the terms of the Tucker Act 3 4 itself. And I think it stands to reason that when you 5 apply that canon, you wouldn't read the Tucker Act to encompass fully any act of Congress, because the 6 implications for waivers of sovereign immunity would be 7 quite substantial. 8

9 And so the Court has never construed the 10 Tucker Act that way, and it shouldn't countenance that 11 kind of construction now, which is effectively what the 12 Federal Circuit's interpretation allows, because, rather 13 than applying the strict standard under which Congress 14 would have to be seen to have unequivocally expressed an 15 intent to waive the Government's sovereign immunity in the terms of FCRA, it allows a plaintiff to avoid that 16 17 by simply resorting to the Tucker Act in the jurisdictional basis of a complaint, and getting the 18 19 real act by the Federal Circuit's own description 20 standard that applies to the Tucker Act. 21 JUSTICE GINSBURG: The United States is 22 governed by the substance of the Credit Reporting Act.

The Act applies to the Government, but your point is that there's no sanction for noncompliance, even though the United States, a Government system, is supposed to

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conform to the standards in the Act.

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MR. SRINIVASAN: Well, I quess a few 2 3 responses, Justice Ginsburg. First, on the question of 4 whether the United States is subject to the substantive 5 obligations in FCRA, I don't know that's there's a one б size fits all answer. I think you'd have to go provision by provision and make an assessment. 7 8 And the reason I would say that is that, 9 with respect to certain provisions at least, there are 10 other statutes that, depending on the provision, have a specific obligation against the Government. And I'm 11 12 thinking in particular of the Debt Collection 13 Improvements Act, the Privacy Act in certain contexts. 14 As so you have -- you have to ask the question whether, 15 with respect to the particular FCRA provision that's alleged to run against the United States, would the 16 17 better basis for finding the United States' obligations 18 be some other statute that speaks more specifically to 19 the question. 20 So I'm resisting the notion that FCRA's

21 references to "person" in all of its substantive 22 obligations would necessarily encompass the Government. 23 Now, there's at least one provision as to which we don't 24 deny that the Government is covered, and that's 25 1681b(b), and that provision is set forth at pages -- at

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1	page 7a of the appendix to the Government's brief.
2	And with respect to the particular provision
3	at issue in this case, the truncation provision, I guess
4	we don't have to confront the question of whether the
5	government is bound by that provision. It might well
6	be, but we don't have to confront that question, because
7	the Government acts as if it's in compliance with that
8	provision because it has to.
9	There's a series of network agreements that
10	the Government has entered into with credit card
11	companies that allow the Government to participate in
12	the credit card system. As a condition
13	JUSTICE SCALIA: Excuse me. 1681b(b)(B),
14	you said? Where is that case?
15	MR. SRINIVASAN: 1681b(b). If you look
16	at
17	JUSTICE SCALIA: You said 7a.
18	MR. SRINIVASAN: Well, I'm sorry. It starts
19	at 4a. And the 4a, permissible purposes of
20	Government reports; the conditions for furnishing. And
21	then if you go to 7a that's also part of b(b)
22	b(b)4 has an exception for national security
23	investigations. And it talks at b(b)(4)(A) about "in
24	the case of an agency or department of the United States
25	Government which seeks to obtain and use." And because

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there's a reference to the United States Government in 2 that provision --3 JUSTICE SCALIA: Right. MR. SRINIVASAN: -- it stands to reason that 4 5 the term "person" in b(b) -- which starts at 4a; excuse me -- encompass the United States Government. 6 7 I quess the short answer, Justice Ginsburg, is I don't think that there is a one size fits all 8 9 But the other part of your question is, are we answer. 10 taking the position that even if substantive obligations 11 run against the United States, there still wouldn't be a remedy, at least a remedy in damages against the United 12 13 States? And the answer to that is yes. 14 But that's not at all atypical under this 15 Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence, and it's not 16 at all atypical for Congress to have fashioned a scheme 17 that runs in that way. And the Privacy Act at least is 18 one example, where in the Privacy Act, which applies to 19 the Government and the Government alone, there are 20 certain obligations that the Government has to comply with in that statute. 21

22 But Congress is very careful to cabin the 23 circumstances in which the Government would be subject 24 to liability and money damages.

25 JUSTICE SCALIA: Still in all, your argument

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1 is -- is not just a straightforward specific governs the 2 general argument. I mean, that be would the case if the 3 other statute which the plaintiff is trying to run around through the Tucker Act specifically -- it clearly 4 5 prohibits suit against the Government. Then you would say, you know, the specific governs the general even 6 7 though the govern -- the Tucker Act permits it; the statute prohibits it. 8

9 But you're saying this other statute here 10 does not really prohibit it. You're just saying this 11 other statute does not permit it under our usual rules 12 about waiver of sovereign immunity being strictly 13 construed. So, you know, it's a -- it's a -- it's a 14 difference -- it's an odd sort of a specific governs the 15 general argument.

16 MR. SRINIVASAN: I think, with respect, 17 Justice Scalia, I think that's a distinction that ultimately doesn't make a difference in the context of 18 19 this case. In the prior cases in which this Court has 20 applied the specific over the general canon in related contexts, it's true that the statutes in some situations 21 22 contemplated liability against the United States, but it 23 had -- that statute would have certain limitations. 24 And I'm thinking, for example, of Hinck, of

25 Erika, of Brown v. General Services Administration,

cases like that, and Sheehan. And what the Court said
 was, where a statute provides for liability against the
 United States, but in certain situations, you don't look
 to a different statute, the Tucker Act, to circumvent
 those kinds of limitations.

JUSTICE SCALIA: No, but that's -- that's
because the negative implication of that statute is -affirms that there is no liability of the United States.
Okay? But here, you don't have -- you don't have that
negative implication at all, do you?

MR. SRINIVASAN: Well, I quess -- I don't 11 12 think we need to have that negative implication to that 13 full extent in order to invoke the specific versus the 14 general canon, because the question at the end of the 15 day is what did Congress intend? And where Congress 16 enacts a specific remedial scheme that sets out the 17 extent to which liability will be imposed under, in this case, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, it stands to reason 18 19 that Congress would have expected courts to look to the 20 remedial scheme that it established to determine to metes and bounds of liability, not to some other general 21 22 default provision.

JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Srinivasan - MR. SRINIVASAN: And therefore in that
 sense, the specific remedial scheme that's in the

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statute should control over some other general scheme that Congress might well not have had in mind at all when it set forward the terms under which claims can be brought under FCRA.

5 JUSTICE KAGAN: How specific does the other 6 statute have to be? Suppose there were another statute 7 that just said any party can bring suits to enforce any 8 rights against any persons under this statute.

9 Would you be making the same argument? 10 MR. SRINIVASAN: If the statute were that 11 general?

JUSTICE KAGAN: Yes. If that's all the statute says. It just says any party can bring suit to enforce rights under this statute. So there is nor a lot of hoopla and a lot of detail about a remedial scheme. Would you still say that this controls over the Tucker Act?

18 MR. SRINIVASAN: I think I would, because I 19 think in that context, Congress would have made a 20 determination on the scope of liability for claims under 21 that statute. It would have given thought to that issue, and it would have set forth in a very general 22 23 provision the metes and bounds of the liability. And 24 Congress I think in that instance wouldn't have expected 25 anyone to look to the Tucker Act, because Congress gave

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1 no indication that it was thinking about the Tucker Act. 2 Now, in Your Honor's hypothetical, if you 3 had a statute that spoke in those kinds of general terms, of course, we'd have I think a very good argument 4 5 that there would have been no contemplation of a waiver of sovereign immunity. So we would strongly resist the б 7 notion that the United States might fall within the compass of that general provision. 8 9 But on the question of whether you'd look to 10 that general provision as opposed to the Tucker Act, I 11 think you would look to that general provision, because 12 Congress in the context of enacting that statute told 13 everybody: We're defining the extent to which liability 14 can be asserted in court by reference to this general 15 provision; this is where you ought to look, not 16 somewhere else. 17 Now, one other --18 JUSTICE SCALIA: Isn't it really -- doesn't 19 the question come down to as you're putting it 20 whether -- whether the Tucker Act eliminates for all other statutes the presumption against liability on the 21 22 part of the United States? 23 MR. SRINIVASAN: It does. I think it does.

24 And I think that's quite a breathtaking proposition, and 25 not one that Congress would have intended by virtue of

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1 the Tucker Act --CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, then it's 2 3 really the specific governing the general, but the other way around, right? The Tucker Act discusses 4 5 specifically the liability and the sovereign immunity of the United States, and if the statute just generally б 7 doesn't address it then the Tucker Act is the specific one and the other statute is the general one. 8 9 MR. SRINIVASAN: Well, it would be hard to 10 square that understanding with the way -- with the 11 series of this Court's cases that apply the specific 12 versus general canon, because I think the same argument 13 could have been made in Brown v. General Services 14 Administration, in Erika, in Hinck, that if you thought 15 that the subject --CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You'd win under this 16 17 argument, too, right? 18 MR. SRINIVASAN: I'm sorry? 19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You win under this argument, too. It just seems to me that it's not quite 20 21 right to say that FCRA -- FCRA does not specifically 22 address the liability of the United States. 23 MR. SRINIVASAN: Right. 24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: The Tucker Act does. 25 So the Tucker Act is the one that's specific, and it

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1 applies instead of the general language in the -- in 2 FCRA. MR. SRINIVASAN: It -- well, you can look at 3 4 it that way, Mr. Chief Justice, but I quess my only 5 response -б JUSTICE SCALIA: In which case you would 7 lose, not win. MR. SRINIVASAN: Well, that's the question 8 9 because it depends on --10 JUSTICE SCALIA: Yes -- we have known 11 existed. 12 MR. SRINIVASAN: -- it depends on how you 13 construe the Tucker Act. 14 I mean, I think Your Honor is correctly 15 construing the Tucker Act's waiver of sovereign immunity 16 only to apply to a certain limited subset of acts of 17 Congress. And if you construed it in a sufficiently limited way, I suppose we could live with that result. 18 19 But I think the better way to approach the 20 question is to look at the particular remedial scheme 21 that Congress enacted in the scope of the statute 22 itself. And for purposes of questions of sovereign 23 immunity, you'd look to that particular remedial scheme and ask the age-old question, countenanced by this 24 25 Court's decisions, of whether there is an unequivocal

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1 expression of an intent to waive sovereign immunity in 2 the scope of that statute itself. JUSTICE SCALIA: So what is covered by the 3 Tucker Act? I mean, every -- every basis for suit 4 5 against the government, every claim that the government owes you money rests upon some statutory text, doesn't 6 7 it? MR. SRINIVASAN: There -- well --8 9 JUSTICE SCALIA: So what --10 MR. SRINIVASAN: -- not claims in contract, 11 for example. Obviously, if there is an expressed 12 contract with the United States, I don't know that that 13 comes under a statute, necessarily, but --14 JUSTICE SCALIA: Okay. Express contracts 15 with the United States. Anything else? 16 MR. SRINIVASAN: The just compensation 17 That doesn't come under a statute, it comes clause. under the Constitution, but the Tucker Act can be used. 18 19 JUSTICE SCALIA: Okay. But anything that 20 comes under a statute, you would look to the other statute to see whether there is sovereign immunity under 21 that statute; and, if there is under that statute, then 22 23 the Tucker Act does not overcome it. 24 MR. SRINIVASAN: If that statute -- at least 25 if that statute has its own remedial scheme, then you'd

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1 look to the remedial scheme in that statute. 2 But I think this is where I started off with 3 Justice Sotomayor. 4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: That's exactly what I 5 started with. That's what I started with: Is there anything left to the Tucker Act? 6 7 MR. SRINIVASAN: Right. And I think there I think the -- statutes like the one that this 8 is. 9 Court had before it in White Mountain Apache Tribe are 10 one. Another example that I could give the Court 11 12 is there is a statute that dealt with payment of 13 compensation to prisoners of war. This was the statute 14 that was at issue in Bell v. The United States. I think 15 it's cited in footnote 42 of the Court's opinion in 16 Bowen v. Massachusetts. 17 But that statute specifically set forth that compensation would be owed to prisoners of war held in 18 19 captivity. That statute did not have its own remedial 20 scheme. Its substantive obligation ran against the 21 United States, and the United States alone, by nature. 22 And the Tucker Act, I think, in that context 23 would step in to supply a waiver of sovereign immunity 24 and jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims. And 25 the reason is that that statute has the two predicate

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1 conditions that we think have to be met in order to even 2 raise the question whether the Tucker Act steps in. JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So the new rule is if a 3 4 statute is written to impose obligations only on the 5 government, then the Tucker Act is implicated б immediately. If the rule says the government and any 7 party who contracts with it -- a Medicaid provider -must do X, Y, and Z, and the government and the Medicaid 8 9 provider have the burdens of accomplishing Y, unless 10 there is an express waiver of sovereign immunity, the 11 Tucker Act doesn't come into play. 12 MR. SRINIVASAN: I think that's --13 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: That's your position. 14 MR. SRINIVASAN: I think that's right, Your 15 Honor, but I'd qualify it in one respect, which is that if the statute contains its own remedial scheme, that's 16 17 an independent reason for not looking at the Tucker Act. 18 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, you are not going 19 to suggest that if the scheme I just described says X, 20 Y, and Z, have to do all these things, and someone to 21 whom they owe that obligation can sue the Medicaid 22 provider, for example, for breach of that obligation, 23 presumably -- I'm putting in a lot of hypotheticals 24 given our case law -- but you're saying they can't sue 25 the government under the Tucker Act --

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1 MR. SRINIVASAN: Right. 2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- unless there is an 3 express waiver. 4 MR. SRINIVASAN: That's right. I think you 5 would look to the question of whether there has been a б sufficiently expressed waiver in the terms of the 7 statute itself, which is the traditional test that this Court has applied. 8 9 JUSTICE KAGAN: How about if a statute has 10 no remedial provision at all; it just lists a set of 11 legal obligations, but it is a generally applicable 12 statute, it doesn't concern only the United States? 13 Would your argument still apply that the Tucker Act has 14 no force? 15 MR. SRINIVASAN: Yes, it would. I think 16 it's easier where you have a remedial scheme, obviously, 17 but I think it's also the case that where the 18 substantive obligation is a generally applicable one and 19 doesn't run against the United States alone, you'd still, I think, want to --20 21 JUSTICE KAGAN: So then your argument really 22 isn't about another statute having a remedial scheme. 23 In the briefs, you present it as another statute has a 24 remedial scheme, of course you should look to that more 25 particular remedial scheme. But you would take the

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a remedial scheme, we don't look to the Tucker Act; we just think of the Tucker Act as having a limitation that is not in the Tucker Act's test -- text in order to make the Tucker Act consistent with everything we thought we knew about principles of sovereign immunity?

7 MR. SRINIVASAN: That's true. I mean, but I 8 guess -- you don't have to reach the question of whether 9 the Tucker Act applies or the statute doesn't have its 10 own remedial scheme, obviously, in this case, because 11 FCRA does have its own remedial scheme. Our argument 12 would still apply.

13 And on the question of whether we're reading 14 the Tucker Act in one particular way to a subsets of 15 acts of Congress, I guess one point I'd make is that the 16 money mandating test that this Court has always applied 17 where the Tucker Act does apply already presupposes that 18 it doesn't apply to just any act of Congress, because 19 the act of Congress has to be a money-mandating one. 20 JUSTICE SCALIA: Say it again. I lost it.

21 Give me the last sentence again.

MR. SRINIVASAN: The last sentence, the last thought at least -- maybe I should try to rephrase it, but the last thought is that this Court's jurisprudence already presupposes that the Tucker Act doesn't apply to

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1	every act of Congress because the Court's jurisprudence
2	requires that the act of Congress be money mandated.
3	So we are already in a zone in which the
4	Tucker Act's reference to acts of Congress doesn't
5	literally extend to every conceivable act of Congress.
6	It only extends to certain acts of Congress. And I
7	JUSTICE KENNEDY: But is this a
8	money-mandated statute?
9	MR. SRINIVASAN: If you didn't
10	have that's that's I guess if you didn't
11	have the remedial scheme.
12	We don't get to that question,
13	Justice Kennedy, because you only get to the
14	money-mandating question if there is not the remedial
15	scheme in the text of the statute itself and the
16	substantive obligation runs against the United States,
17	and the United States alone, which this one doesn't
18	because it's generally applicable.
19	And it's hard to conceive of that question
20	in the abstract because the question is whether the
21	statute is money mandating in that it specifically
22	contemplates the payment of money by the United States;
23	and, precisely because the statute is generally
24	applicable, I think we would say that under this statute
25	it's not money mandating, because it's not money

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1 mandating in that it doesn't contemplate payment by the 2 United States with relevant specificity because the 3 substantive obligation is generally applicable. 4 You only get to that question in a context 5 like White Mountain Apache Tribe or Mitchell II, where б the substantive obligation runs against the United States, and the United States alone, and where there is 7 no remedial scheme embedded within the statute itself. 8 9 And then you ask the question whether is that kind of 10 substantive obligation that runs against the United 11 States, is that one that's naturally conceived as a

12 money mandating.

13 And on that, I think you would look at a 14 couple of considerations consistent with this Court's 15 decisions. One is, is the obligation one that 16 necessarily deals with compensation? So, for example, 17 the statute I was referring to earlier that has to do with compensation for imprisoned prisoners of war, that 18 19 one naturally has to do with compensation, so it might 20 be money mandating.

In White Mountain Apache Tribe and the other trust cases that arise under the Indian Tucker Act, the Court concluded that because background principles of trust law would necessarily contemplate the payment of money, that those statutes are money mandating.

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1 But the principal point here --2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counsel, this sort of begs the guestion --3 4 MR. SRINIVASAN: -- is you only get to that 5 question if you get past that hurdle. б JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- the statute awards 7 damages for breach of the obligation, so it's money mandating. The issue is not whether it's money 8 9 mandating; the question is who is it mandating. 10 MR. SRINIVASAN: Well, right, but --JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But there is not an 11 12 issue of whether it contemplates the payment of damages. 13 It expressly awards --14 MR. SRINIVASAN: But I think the 15 money-mandating test, Justice Sotomayor, is whether it 16 contemplates the payment of damages by the 17 United States. And I quess that's why I'm having a hard time addressing that question in the abstract, because 18 19 there is a predicate condition that hasn't been 20 satisfied. 21 That question only naturally arises where the substantive obligation runs against the 22 United States and the United States alone. I think 23 24 precisely for the reason that Your Honor says, where the 25 substantive obligation is generally applicable in that

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1 it applies to parties beyond the United States, it's 2 hard to ask the question whether the statute is money 3 mandating in the relevant sense. 4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I -- it is -- there is 5 some difficulty with your argument, which is, going back б to my simplified hypothetical, government and 7 Medicaid -- X providers have to do X, Y, and Z; if those persons, being defined as government and providers, 8 9 doesn't do what they have to do, they have to pay these 10 damages. 11 MR. SRINIVASAN: That -- I will grant --12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I mean, that's pretty 13 clear. 14 MR. SRINIVASAN: Well, I will grant you, 15 Justice Sotomayor, that that hypo is more difficult than 16 this case because, although I would construe that to be 17 generally applicable, it does talk about the government. It specifically references the government, and I think, 18 19 by Your Honor's hypothetical, the United States alone. 20 It's not an undifferentiated reference to persons, which 21 is what you have in FCRA. 22 I still think I would call that generally 23 applicable such that the Tucker Act wouldn't come into 24 play, but I don't deny that it would be a closer case 25

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than what you have here.

1	If the Court has no further questions, I
2	would like to reserve the balance of my time.
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, Counsel.
4	Mr. Jacobs.
5	ORAL ARGUMENT OF JOHN G. JACOBS
6	ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
7	MR. JACOBS: Mr. Chief Justice and may it
8	please the Court:
9	If I may, I should like to begin with
10	Justice Kennedy's question: Is this a money- mandating
11	statute?
12	Section 1681(a) defines "persons" and it
13	defines "persons" as, inter alia, "any government or
14	government body or agency." That, it would seem to me,
15	would be extraordinarily clear that the Government is
16	subject to this act and subject to money mandating.
17	JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, you wouldn't you
18	wouldn't need the Tucker Act now, would you?
19	MR. JACOBS: We
20	JUSTICE SCALIA: Just sue under the statute.
21	MR. JACOBS: We could. We believe we should
22	be able to recover simply under FCRA itself, yes, Your
23	Honor. But if there were any question as to whether the
24	Government is in fact covered, that would seem to me to
25	be answered by 1681b(b)(4).

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1 JUSTICE SCALIA: So are you splitting your 2 claim? I mean, if you have both a cause of action under 3 FCRA and under the Tucker Act, the one has to go to the Federal Circuit and the other elsewhere, or the Court of 4 5 Claims and then the Federal Circuit? What do you do? б MR. JACOBS: Your Honor, that was -- that 7 was the subject of some debate in the court below. We took the appeal to the Federal Circuit because the claim 8 9 was based in whole or in part on the Tucker Act. 10 JUSTICE SCALIA: You also claimed under 11 FCRA, under the statute, right? 12 MR. JACOBS: Yes, we do, Your Honor. 13 JUSTICE SCALIA: Okay. • 14 JUSTICE BREYER: So why do you care? I 15 mean, you're in the Northern District of Illinois, you 16 bring a case under this Act. I guess you lost because 17 you wanted to appeal. And so -- so what is the big 18 deal? Appeal to the Seventh Circuit. Who cares. Why 19 do you care which circuit you go to? You said you think -- well, why do you care? 20 21 MR. JACOBS: We don't particularly care, 22 Your Honor, but we believe that we are required by the 23 statute to appeal to the Federal Circuit if the claim is 24 based in whole or in part on the Tucker Act. 25 JUSTICE BREYER: I guess you and the

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1 Government could have stipulated, we agree it goes to 2 the Seventh Circuit, and nobody would have opposed you 3 on that. 4 MR. JACOBS: I -- I -- I do not know, Your 5 Honor. б JUSTICE BREYER: This case is about you want 7 to go to -- you want to go the Federal Circuit, they 8 want you to go to the Seventh Circuit? 9 MR. JACOBS: Right. 10 JUSTICE BREYER: Okay. 11 MR. JACOBS: And in 1681b(b)(4), the statute 12 said --13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I'm sorry. Before 14 you get --15 MR. JACOBS: Yes. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But if you -- their 16 17 argument is if you go to the Seventh Circuit, you don't 18 get any money, right? Because if you're getting money from the United States, don't you have to go to the 19 Court of Claims in a case like this? 20 21 MR. JACOBS: I don't believe so, Your Honor. 22 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: No? 23 MR. JACOBS: I mean, 1681p says you can sue 24 either in district court or any other court of competent 25 jurisdiction. And in that regard, there's been a lot of

1 talk about the remedial scheme, and with respect, Your Honor, I would submit that this is -- this is not some 2 reticulated, remedial scheme where you have to file a 3 claim and have a hearing and those kinds of things where 4 5 this Court has enforced that against people. б Here, it's just a typical statute that says you have to do A, B, and C, and if you don't you can be 7 sued in Federal court. 8 9 JUSTICE SCALIA: Do you know any other 10 statutes offhand -- I can't think of any, but maybe you 11 know some -- in which you can get money out of the 12 United States but don't have to go through the Court of 13 Federal Claims and the Federal circuit? What other 14 statutes are there? And if there are none, the reason I 15 ask the question, it becomes less and less plausible 16 that FCRA was meant to allow suit against the Federal 17 Government. MR. JACOBS: The Privacy Act, Your Honor, 18 19 allows you to sue the government in the district court. 20 JUSTICE SCALIA: For money damages. 21 MR. JACOBS: I believe so, Your Honor. 22 JUSTICE BREYER: Not in tort. This seems an 23 awful lot like a tort, or tell me why it isn't. I mean, 24 what you are saying is there's a statute that says you 25 can't print more than the last five digits of a card or

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1 the date, the expiration date, and they did both and you 2 want to say "or" means one or the other, it doesn't mean 3 and/or. That's what the case is about fundamentally, 4 right? 5 MR. JACOBS: The case is about printing the expiration date, Your Honor. 6 7 JUSTICE BREYER: Yeah, can you do and/or or or. All right, got it. Now, if you print -- in your 8 9 view of it, they printed too much about a person's 10 credit card. 11 MR. JACOBS: Yes. 12 JUSTICE BREYER: It sounds like an -- sort 13 of like an invasion of privacy, which is normally a 14 tort. 15 MR. JACOBS: It is like it, but I believe 16 this Court's jurisprudence has been for a long while 17 now, at least since Jacobs and I would submit even earlier, Dooley onward, that it doesn't make any 18 19 difference whether -- if you're suing under a statute of the United States or a contract or anything else, if 20 there's any element of tort in it, it doesn't matter. 21 22 JUSTICE BREYER: What do you mean? You can 23 sue for -- in other words, if the statute were to say, 24 if Smith, a government employee, assaults a person, he 25 gets damages. Federal statute. Now he brings a

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1 claim -- I don't know this law; I'm asking, I'm not 2 arguing. The plaintiff sues the United States for 3 assault. And you're saying that they can bring that in 4 the Court of Claims because it's a statute. 5 I don't know how this law works. I just read that and I know the language doesn't totally tell 6 7 It's about liquid, illiquid. I didn't get that vou. part exactly. But as I've understood, you can't bring a 8 9 tort suit in the Court of Claims. Now, that's what I 10 would like you to elaborate, because this sounds rather 11 like a tort suit, not sort of. That's why I am asking. 12 MR. JACOBS: As no doubt intended, Your 13 Honor posed a very difficult question. I would submit 14 that if the statute says that you may not do A, B, and 15 C, that you could then sue in the Court of Claims. 16 JUSTICE BREYER: Even if it says you may not 17 assault someone. 18 MR. JACOBS: Yes. Even though 19 traditionally, you could think of that as a tort, I 20 believe that's this Court's jurisprudence. 21 JUSTICE BREYER: And the case I should look 22 at to show that is what? That's all right if you don't 23 have it. 24 MR. JACOBS: I think Daly -- Dooley, I think, Your Honor, in 1901 said: "Regardless of whether 25

the exactions of taxes were tortious or not, we think this case is within one of the first class of cases specified in the Tucker Act of claims based upon a law of Congress."

5 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But your argument --6 your answer is a little more complicated, because the 7 statute doesn't say tort claims, it says claims sounding 8 in tort, which means cases that aren't torts, but are 9 like torts. And it seems to me the case you -- you --10 you have here is like tort, an invasion of privacy or 11 something like that.

MR. JACOBS: Your Honor, I believe, again, that this Court has not interpreted the cases that way. There is a debate as to whether a breach of fiduciary duty is a tort or something else, and yet this Court in White Mountain and other cases has not found that to be a bar.

18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, your friend 19 says that that's a fiduciary -- that's a trust breach, 20 which has been regarded as different than a tort. 21 MR. JACOBS: That's what the Government 22 says, but it is also a breach of fiduciary duty, and 23 that is often regarded as a tort, Your Honor. 16 --24 JUSTICE GINSBURG: May I ask you, Mr. 25 Jacobs --

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1	MR. JACOBS: I'm sorry.
2	JUSTICE GINSBURG: whether you think
3	Congress ever honed in on the issue whether the United
4	States, given the multitude of financial transactions in
5	which it engages, ever thought that sovereign immunity
6	would be waived? I mean, if you're right about this,
7	the consequences are enormous for the Federal fisc. And
8	we the statute developed in a peculiar way.
9	First, there was the definition of person
10	when there was no civil liability, and then some years
11	later the prohibition of having both the credit card
12	number and the expiration date. In all of it, is there
13	any hint that Congress envisioned a waiver of sovereign
14	immunity in the Fair Credit Reporting Act?
15	MR. JACOBS: Your Honor, I would submit yes,
16	there is no explicit to my knowledge, there is no
17	explicit knowledge in the Congressional Record to
18	whether this was going to impact the government or not.
19	However, what they talked about was the almost epidemic
20	proportion of identity theft going on, and in response
21	to that this bill was passed.
22	Knowing that the Government is one of the
23	largest issuers of credit card receipts, one would have
24	to wonder why they would want to exclude the Government
25	in terms of protecting the public. That would not make

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sense. It doesn't make any difference where the

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2 credit --JUSTICE SCALIA: For the same reason that 3 you have the principle of sovereign immunity. They're 4 5 -- they are perfectly willing to subject corporations to б immense liability, but they are not willing to subject the Federal government to immense liability. That's 7 what the doctrine of sovereign immunity is all about, 8 9 isn't it? 10 MR. JACOBS: That's exactly correct, Your Honor. But that's why I said in terms of 11 12 protecting the public, you wouldn't want to exclude such 13 a large -- such a large thing. 14 And when they wanted to protect the 15 government, as they did in 1681b(b)(4), when they wanted to exclude them, they explicitly did so --16 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Jacobs --17 18 MR. JACOBS: -- the next year. 19 JUSTICE KAGAN: -- the -- the import of the 20 government's argument is that if your interpretation governed, we would be facing, really, a guite massive 21 22 change in the law of sovereign immunity as we've known it until this time. 23 24 So I will give you an -- Congress decides to 25 pass a statute, and the statute has a cause of action in

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1 it. And the drafters say to each other, do we have to 2 say that the government retains sovereign immunity? And 3 everybody says, no, the rules are that if we say nothing 4 at all, the government does retain sovereign immunity. 5 Now, under your world, the next time б Congress passes such a statute and that question comes 7 up, you would say, oh, we have to say that the government waives -- retains its sovereign immunity, 8 9 because if we don't say that, somebody's going to bring an action under the Tucker Act. 10 So for every statute, both the ones that 11 12 have been written under the old rules and the new ones 13 to come, we have completely flipped the presumption. 14 Now, Congress is going to have to say when it wants to 15 retain sovereign immunity, and if it doesn't -- if it doesn't, the Tucker Act applies, and you get to be in 16 17 court. 18 MR. JACOBS: With respect, Justice Kagan, I 19 don't think that's true at all. They went out of their 20 way to define person to include the government. And

21 that's significant in this respect, Your Honor. We cite 22 the Moore case, Moore v. The Department of Agriculture, 23 an almost identically worded statute, where it said, a 24 government --

25 JUSTICE KAGAN: I don't think that quite

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answers the question. That's a -- that's a question 1 about what FCRA means and whether under any standard, 2 3 whether the fairly arguable standard or the express 4 standard, you should win. And that's a different 5 question. б The question is what standard are we going 7 to hold you to. Are we going to say, all you need to show is that it's fairly arguable, or are we going to 8 9 say, no, unless there's an express statement that the 10 government has waived its sovereign immunity, the 11 government retains it? 12 And as to that, you're asking us to flip the 13 presumption from now on. 14 MR. JACOBS: I don't believe so, Your Honor. 15 I think they went out of their way to say this applies. 16 It's not some general statute that says if a credit card 17 is printed improperly. 18 JUSTICE GINSBURG: When the definition of 19 persons was put into the statute, there was no civil 20 liability; isn't that right? So they didn't -- they could not have been thinking about civil liability. 21 22 MR. JACOBS: Well, when they amended FCRA in 23 1996 to add the -- to change the word from credit reporting agency to person, I would submit that had to 24 25 be a conscious step.

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1	And proof of that is found, I think, in two
2	subsequent amendments. One, the next year, 1681b(b)(4),
3	saying, but this does not apply to the government if
4	there is a national security issue. And then the
5	Government pointed to 1681u(i), that talked about if the
6	FBI improperly disclosed information, what liability it
7	would have.
8	Now, in the appendix to the government's
9	brief, it stops there. But in the government's petition
10	for cert at page 78a, it also has 1681u(l) which says
11	any other provision of this section notwithstanding,
12	people are limited to this remedy against the
13	government. Why would Congress say that if there were
14	not other liability for Congress for the
15	United States.
16	So, I believe the Congress was about as
17	clear as it could be that it knew this applied to the
18	United States, and when it wanted to carve something
19	out, it did so, twice.
20	Now
21	JUSTICE SCALIA: I I really have I
22	haven't followed this argument. You say (1)
23	MR. JACOBS: (1).
24	JUSTICE SCALIA: shows that they had
25	liability by the government in mind?

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1 MR. JACOBS: Yes, Your Honor. I believe 2 that --JUSTICE SCALIA: I mean, why anybody --3 notwithstanding any other provision, the remedies and 4 5 sanctions set forth in this section shall be the only judicial remedies and sanctions for violation of this 6 7 section. MR. JACOBS: I believe, Your Honor, that --8 9 JUSTICE SCALIA: Why does that bear upon whether the United States is liable or not? 10 11 MR. JACOBS: This u only applies to 12 United States, the FBI. 1681u is explicitly passed with 13 regard to the FBI getting information and improperly 14 disclosing it. 15 JUSTICE SCALIA: I see. 16 MR. JACOBS: And this would say, notwithstanding any other provisions, and it wouldn't do 17 18 that if there weren't other provisions applicable. And that, Your Honor, takes me back to the 19 20 Moore case, which we discussed many times in our brief, a similarly, almost identical statute, the Equal Credit 21 22 Opportunity Act. 23 The Truth in Lending Act, the equal 24 opportunity -- the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and FCRA 25 were all part of the Consumer Credit Protection Act,

different parts of it. And the Equal Credit Opportunity
 Act had the same, almost the same definition with one
 word difference of importance.

And then the -- the Fifth Circuit said, there is no exception in here, once it says that, for any person -- it doesn't have an exception for the United States, unlike the Truth in Lending Act which had a specific provision exempting the United States.

9 This is identical except for one word 10 different. This says any, the most emphatic word it 11 could use. The other two statutes say, a government or 12 government entity. This statute says, any government or 13 government entity.

And the United States makes no response to that interpretation that is throughout our judicial system. And, indeed, it would be difficult to because throughout the United States now, the -- the United States no longer even attempts to argue that ECOA does not provide for waiver of sovereign immunity.

JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, if you are right about that, I guess we could write a very narrow opinion saying the Tucker Act applies where there is a cause of action under the original statute anyway, in which case we would not have made much new law, would we?

MR. JACOBS: Well, I'm hoping we won't make

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much new law, Your Honor --JUSTICE SCALIA: Yes. MR. JACOBS: -- because I believe this is consistent with this Court's longstanding jurisprudence. And, indeed, the -- the cases where the Court says, no, we're not going to let you bring this under the Tucker Act, is where the party is trying to escape, to get around a limitation in the substantive act, where they're trying to avoid a statute of limitations, avoid the requirement to file a -- a claim, as in Elkhorn Mining, as -- to get around -- get away from a court as in Hinck, where it says the tax court will have jurisdiction of this. And then they are trying to get around --That's not going on here. We're -- the Plaintiff in this case is not trying to evade any Congressional intent or statutory provision of FCRA. And the government points to nothing -- no violence that would be done to the FCRA by allowing this. The -- the reason that this statute was passed was to protect consumers. The Congress was clear that if any government violates the statute, it has this liability. I do not know how you could have a clearer

24 money-mandating statute.

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25 And, Justice Scalia, you asked, well, would

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we just win under the -- under the statute? My answer

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2 to that would be unequivocally yes, we should. It's an unequivocal waiver. 3 4 And that's the irony here. I think you have 5 a -- a more unequivocal waiver in this statute than you do almost any other where the Court has found that yeah, 6 7 that's a fair inference of a money-mandating situation. JUSTICE BREYER: Well, I mean, the -- a lot 8 9 of these provisions are technical, like the one I think 10 is fairly technical, the one you are talking about, the government -- it provides for treble damages -- treble 11 12 damages, does it? 13 MR. JACOBS: No. 14 JUSTICE BREYER: Minimum damage, punitive 15 damages, a fairly lengthy statute of limitations 16 compared to the court of claims. 17 MR. JACOBS: 2 years. 18 JUSTICE BREYER: 2 years. And they have 6 in the other? 19 20 MR. JACOBS: 2 years or 6 years -- 2 years 21 from discovery, 5 years --22 JUSTICE BREYER: My -- my impression was 23 there are several differences. And normally, these 24 things you, at least arguably, are not appropriate 25 against the Government, because the Government when it

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1 knows the law will follow it, we hope. And, therefore, 2 you don't need brow-beating mechanisms to make sure they follow it once it's clarified. So, therefore, it -- I 3 4 mean, I can imagine arguments. 5 At the same time, there are differences between the relief scheme in this statute and the normal б one you have in the Court of Claims. And they're 7 arguing that that means that they didn't want this 8 9 Tucker Act and these other things to apply. 10 I just want to know what your reply is to They are different. 11 that. 12 MR. JACOBS: They -- they are different, 13 Your Honor, but, with respect, I see nothing about 14 saying, this is what you must do, and if you don't do, 15 this is what you have to pay -- I see nothing unusual 16 about saying that can be in the Court of Claims; that 17 that's a Tucker Act claim. That doesn't seem -- that's not some reticulated statute unlike the Civil Service 18 19 Review Act or something like that, where you have to do all these steps, have this hearing first, have that 20 21 hearing --22 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So are you happy with

the circuit's suggestion that the specific does govern the general insofar as it will adopt whatever FCRA's limitations are?

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MR. JACOBS: Yes. And that's --1 2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And into its own 3 processes? 4 MR. JACOBS: Yes. 5 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Your position is that's perfectly okay. 6 7 MR. JACOBS: Yes. And I think that is consistent with this Court's jurisprudence. 8 9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Now, it does seem --10 I mean, Justice Breyer's point. It does seem a little 11 ad hoc. In other words, they don't fit quite together, 12 and your answer is: Well, we'll just take whatever, you 13 know, whatever we have to, to make it fit. It would go 14 under the least imposing on the Government. 15 It suggests that Congress did not expect the 16 Tucker Act to apply if you've got to change the remedial 17 provisions in FCRA to get it to fit under the Tucker 18 Act. 19 MR. JACOBS: Well, Your Honor, if I 20 understand your question correctly, I -- I don't believe 21 I agree with the premise. 22 This Court has consistently said, as Your 23 Honor said, that the Tucker Act only provides an outer 24 limit for filing, but we'll use the shorter time period. 25 In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, the Court said: No, no, no,

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you've got -- because Monsanto didn't want there to be a 1 2 Tucker Act claim. It wanted to be able to argue: We have no relief available to us for having to disclose 3 4 the components of our insecticides. And they wanted to 5 arque: There is no relief available to us. б And this Court said: No, you've got a --7 you've got a Tucker Act claim. You do have relief available to you. And the Court said: Yes, you didn't 8 9 file a claim. There is a procedure where you could file 10 a claim saying: This is a trade secret, and the -- you then would have arbitration. And the Court said: You 11 12 haven't done that; go ahead and do that and then let's 13 see what happens. But you've got a Tucker Act claim. 14 And incidentally, in that regard, in 15 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, the Court discussed extensively the Restatement of Torts as to whether a trade secret --16 17 a listed trade secret under the Restatement of Torts, 18 and then went ahead and said: No. You've got a Tucker 19 Act claim here. 20 JUSTICE BREYER: Right. So is -- are you 21 also saying, FCRA, the underlying statute, clearly 22 waives sovereign immunity, so we don't have to worry

23 about whether the standard is a weak standard or a tough

24 standard, doesn't matter. We win anyway.

25 MR. JACOBS: Absolutely.

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1	JUSTICE BREYER: So what you want us to say
2	is, okay. We will apply the tough standard. There's
3	still there's still sovereign immunity is waived
4	in FCRA. And since sovereign immunity is clearly waived
5	there, then you can bring this under the Tucker Act, and
6	the only differences are the remedial schemes are
7	slightly different, but that doesn't matter.
8	Am I correctly stating what you are now
9	telling us?
10	MR. JACOBS: I'm telling Your Honor that we
11	win under such a test. We don't believe such a test is
12	called for, but if if such a test were used, we still
13	win because you do have such a clear waiver.
14	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: One of the purposes of
15	the Tucker Act was to provide a remedy, where none
16	existed, to get rid of the private bills. What's wrong
17	with the government's basic proposition which is where
18	you have a remedy you have to pursue that remedy. And I
19	think that, at bottom, that's their argument.
20	What's wrong with that scheme? Instead of
21	permitting two remedies with potentially conflicting
22	commands, whether it's on the amount of damages or the
23	nature of the recovery or the statute of limitations,
24	why isn't their vision of what the Tucker Act the
25	role the Tucker Act should play one that should be given

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1 voice? One that should be followed? MR. JACOBS: Your Honor, I would submit that 2 that would be a substantial change in this Court's 3 4 jurisprudence. Congress passed the Tucker Act, and this 5 court, for years now, has said, "If you meet these requirements, you may sue under the Tucker Act." 6 7 JUSTICE SCALIA: The Government doesn't concede that you have a cause of action under FCRA at 8 9 all. 10 MR. JACOBS: No. 11 JUSTICE SCALIA: They say -- they say just 12 the opposite. And so what I find peculiar is that there 13 should be two causes of action for the same thing. You 14 can proceed either under FCRA or under the Tucker Act or 15 both. I mean, that's very strange to me. It seems to 16 me, one or the other, and it would normally be the 17 specific governing the general. 18 So if you say there is one under FCRA, why 19 do we need the Tucker Act? 20 MR. JACOBS: Your Honor, the Tucker Act, as made available by Congress, could we proceed only under 21 22 FCRA? Yes, we could, but the Tucker Act is available, 23 the statute 1295 says what it says, and we have appealed to the Court of Appeals. But there is --24 25 JUSTICE SCALIA: Do you have any other case

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1 where -- where you -- somebody's been allowed to proceed 2 under the Tucker Act where there is clear ability to 3 proceed under some other statute? 4 MR. JACOBS: Your Honor, I cannot name you a 5 case off the top of my head. As I said, I believe the б Privacy Act allows you to do either. The -- all --7 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: The FSLA as well. 8 MR. JACOBS: I'm sorry? 9 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: The FSLA as well. MR. JACOBS: Yes. The FSLA -- I was going 10 11 to tell you, as Your Honor said earlier. But the cases 12 where a Tucker Act remedy has been denied, as I've said, 13 are where a person was trying to evade a limitation of 14 the substantive act. That's not this case. This case 15 is four-square within the court's jurisprudence. The 16 government argues now for a new -- and it's not clear to 17 me exactly what test, but it's a limiting one. Ιt 18 would -- it would cut back the Tucker Act. 19 JUSTICE KAGAN: But Mr. Jacobs, you are 20 trying to evade a certain kind of limitation. The 21 limitation that you are trying to evade is the rule that 22 waivers of sovereign immunity have to be express. And 23 that's the rule you are trying to evade by going under 24 the Tucker Act. 25

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MR. JACOBS: No, Your Honor. We believe,

1 and we've maintained throughout, that we do have an 2 express waiver, 1681(a) --

3 JUSTICE KAGAN: But then you wouldn't need to go under the Tucker Act. The difference between 4 5 going under the Tucker Act and going under the statute is the difference between, you know, what -- what 6 standard is a court going to hold you to, to decide 7 whether there has been a waiver of sovereign immunity. 8 9 MR. JACOBS: The standard, I would submit, 10 Your Honor, is that the Tucker Act is always available 11 unless a -- the substantive statute provides a 12 limitation on that ability; either saying it shall be --13 shall be litigated in the Tax Court, it can only be 14 litigated if it is preceded by a claim, an administrative claim, some limitation like that. 15 If --16 if there's something that says it has to be in another forum, then you would be evading it. But otherwise, the 17 Tucker Act remedy is available and it's appropriate and 18 19 it's precisely, I would submit, that what do you do --20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You can finish your 21 sentence. 22 MR. JACOBS: -- what do you do when you say, 23 eh, we think this is -- you know, is this express 24 enough? And that's the Tucker Act saying, well, it's

25 clearly a fair inference.

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CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, Counsel. 1 2 MR. JACOBS: Thank you. 3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. Srinivasan, you 4 have three minutes left. 5 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF SRI SRINIVASAN б ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT 7 JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Srinivasan, I hate to eat up any of your time, but do you acknowledge that 8 9 there are other statutes under which a person can 10 proceed, either under the statute or under the Tucker 11 Act? 12 MR. SRINIVASAN: No, I'm not aware of that 13 situation, and I think that's why you look to this 14 remedial provision that Congress enacted to determine the metes and bounds. 15 16 JUSTICE SCALIA: What about the Privacy Act? 17 MR. SRINIVASAN: The Privacy Act has its own 18 remedial mechanism within it typically. 19 JUSTICE SCALIA: So you'd say you either 20 proceed under the Privacy Act and you're covered there, 21 or you don't --22 MR. SRINIVASAN: Or you don't proceed at all, yeah. 23 24 JUSTICE SCALIA: And what about -- what is 25 it? FSLA was the other one?

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1	MR. SRINIVASAN: Well, FLSA is a bit
2	complicated, for the reasons I was adverting to earlier.
3	It's this Court has never confronted the question of
4	how exactly you go forward under the FLSA. And I think,
5	because of the ambiguity in the courts to which the FLSA
6	refers, for the reasons I was discussing with Justice
7	Sotomayor earlier, I think you could see that statute as
8	incorporating the Tucker Act itself, but that would be
9	something that Congress did.
10	JUSTICE SCALIA: What about u(l), that your
11	friend raised?
12	MR. SRINIVASAN: u(i). I think there's
13	several answers to u(i). First of all, I'm not sure
14	which way that cuts because the fact it may be u(l),
15	it may be u(i), but you I'm not sure which way that
16	cuts because, on one hand, the fact that Congress
17	specifically provided for the United States to be liable
18	in certain situations I think cuts in favor of our
19	understanding, not against it.
20	But there's a more fundamental point about
21	the argument that my friend makes on the other side,
22	which is that that statute was enacted, I think, before
23	the civil remedies provisions were expanded to encompass
24	all persons. So it's hard to conclude that that
25	notwithstanding any other provision would have referred

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1 to something that came along later. 2 Now, I have two points that I'd like to make 3 in rebuttal, one of which, there's been some questions today about which is the specific statute and which is 4 5 the general statute. Now, one, I think, clear indication that the б specific statute for present purposes should be FCRA is 7 to look at what the Plaintiffs allege. 8 9 The Plaintiffs are bringing a FCRA claim, 10 and there's no mistake about that, because the Plaintiffs seek the FCRA advantage of statutory damages 11 12 of at least \$100. And so they're grounding their claim 13 in the FCRA cause of action. And I think, therefore, 14 you should look at FCRA to determine whether the 15 government is liable. And you don't have a situation in which you 16 17 can mix and match under both; you should look to FCRA to determine whether there's been a clear and express 18 19 waiver of sovereign immunity. The other point I would like to discuss is 20 something that -- references something Justice Breyer 21 22 was adverting to earlier, which is even if there was 23 some universe in which you could contemplate a 24 hybridization where you apply the Tucker Act, even 25 though there's a cause of action already in the statute,

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1	you wouldn't do so in the context of this case because
2	there are clear indications that Congress wouldn't have
3	contemplated a resort to the Tucker Act.
4	The Tucker Act doesn't apply to torts. This
5	claim is a tort claim. We know this because the Court
6	in Safeco a few terms ago this is at 551 U.S. 69
7	specifically referred to the Restatement of Torts as a
8	means of interpreting the term willfulness, which is the
9	linchpin for the claim here.
10	I see my time has expired.
11	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, Counsel.
12	The case is submitted.
13	(Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the case in the
14	above-entitled matter was submitted.)
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