



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931

July 30, 2001

EA 01-176

Virginia Electric and Power Company
ATTN: Mr. David A. Christian
Senior Vice President and
Chief Nuclear Officer
Innsbrook Technical Center - 2SW
5000 Dominion Boulevard
Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711

SUBJECT: NORTH ANNA POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT NOS. 50-338/01-02, 50-339/01-02 AND OFFICE OF
INVESTIGATIONS REPORT NO. 2-2000-016

Dear Mr. Christian:

On June 30, 2001, the NRC completed an inspection at your North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on July 13, 2001, with Mr. D. Heacock and other members of your staff and on July 19, 2001, with Mr. J. Davis.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selective procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, the inspectors identified one issue which was evaluated as No-Color. This issue was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements, and is based on the NRC's review of the Office of Investigations (OI) Report No. 2-2000-016. The synopsis to this OI report is included as Enclosure 2. Because of its safety significance and because it had been entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this issue as a non-cited violation, in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. We plan no further action with regard to this matter. If you deny this non-cited violation you should provide a response with the basis for your denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the North Anna Power Station.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system

(ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Kerry D. Landis, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.: 50-338, 50-339
License Nos.: NPF-4, NPF-7

Enclosures: 1. NRC Integrated Inspection Reports
Nos. 50-338/01-02 and 50-339/01-02
2. OI Report 2-2000-016 Synopsis

Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/encls.:

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos.: 50-338, 50-339
License Nos.: NPF-4, NPF-7

Report Nos.: 50-338/01-02, 50-339/01-02

Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO)

Facilities: North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2

Location: 1022 Haley Drive
Mineral, Virginia 23117

Dates: April 1 through June 30, 2001

Inspectors: M. Morgan, Senior Resident Inspector
J. Canady, Resident Inspector
J. Wallo, Physical Security Inspector (Sections 3PP1, 3PP2 and 4OA1)

Approved by: K. Landis, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000338-01-02, IR 05000339-01-02, on 04/01-06/30/2001, Virginia Electric and Power Co., North Anna Power Station Units 1 & 2. Cross-Cutting Issues

The inspection was conducted by the resident inspectors and a regional security inspector. In addition, an in-office review was performed by Region II personnel. This inspection identified one No-Color finding, which was a non-cited violation. The significance of issues is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609 "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html>. Findings for which the SDP does not apply are indicated by "No Color" or by the severity level of the applicable violation.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Inspector Identified Finding

- No-Color. A non-cited violation was identified for a senior reactor operator (SRO) not being attentive to licensed duties as required 10 CFR 50.54(k) and Technical Specifications 6.8.1.a. The SRO was inattentive and sleeping while on licensed duty in the control room during 1999.

Failure of a SRO to be attentive to licensed duties while in the control room could have credible impact on safety since he may not be able to immediately respond to plant conditions or events. The safety significance was lessened due to the small amount of time the SRO was not attentive during the year and the licensee typically staffed the shift with one more SRO than the minimum number required by Technical Specifications. (Section 4OA4).

Report Details

Unit 1 operated at or near full power during the entire reporting period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period in a shutdown condition and in a scheduled refueling outage condition. On April 9, the unit began startup activities and reached criticality conditions. On April 10, the unit generator was synchronized to the grid and full power operation was attained on April 13. On May 26, the unit was shutdown and placed in turbine bypass operation in order to re-balance the main turbine shaft due to high turbine shaft vibration conditions. On May 28, the unit was returned to service and full power operation was attained on May 29. The inspection period ended with Unit 2 operating at or near full power.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the systems or components identified below to determine if they were correctly aligned in accordance with the referenced document:

- Unit 1A Charging Pump Lube Oil Heat Exchanger Service Water Alignment, (0-OP-49.1A, "Valve Checkoff - Service Water," Revision 32-P4),
- Unit 1C Charging Pump Lube Oil Heat Exchanger Service Water Alignment, (0-OP-49.1A, "Valve Checkoff - Service Water," Revision 32-P4),
- Unit 1B Instrument Air Compressor Alignment, (1-OP-46.1B, "Valve Checkoff - Instrument Air, Safeguards," Revision 11),
- Unit 2B Quench Spray Chemical Addition Tank Alignment, (2-OP-7.8B, "Valve Checkoff - NOAH Chemical Addition," Revision 6), and
- Unit 1H Emergency Diesel Generator Support System Alignments, (1-OP-6.7A, "Valve Checkoff - Diesel Air," Revision 2; 1-OP-6.3A, "Valve Checkoff - 1H Diesel Engine Lube Oil System," Revision 6; and 1-OP-6.1A, "Valve Checkoff - 1H Diesel Engine Cooling Water," Revision 7).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the implementation of the fire protection program using "NAPS Appendix R Report," Revision 18, and Virginia Power Administrative Procedure (VPAP)-

2401, "Fire Protection Program," Revision 15. The inspectors checked the control of transient combustibles and the material condition of the fire detection and fire suppression systems for the following areas:

- Unit 1 and Unit 2 Fuel Oil Pump House,
- Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator Rooms 1H and 1J,
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 294 Foot Elevation Cable Spreading Rooms,
- Unit 1 Mechanical Equipment Area Battery Rooms 1-I and 1-III,
- Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Rooms 2H and 2J, and
- Unit 2 Service Building Emergency Switchgear Room/Spaces.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

No resident inspector observations this quarter due to a one-time approved reduction in effort based upon the Operational Safety Review Team inspection performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed implementation of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) using VPAP 0815, "Maintenance Rule Program," Revision 11, and Engineering Transmittal (ET) CEP-97-0018, "North Anna Maintenance Rule Scoping and Performance Criteria Matrix," Revision 12. The reviews focused on the characterization of failures, the appropriateness of the associated a(1) or a(2) classification, and the appropriateness of either the associated a(2) performance criteria or the associated a(1) goals and corrective actions. The plant issues and associated equipment issues reviewed were:

- N-2001-1119 - Unit 1 F Transfer Bus Function (EP007) Unavailability,
- N-2001-0122 - Unit 2 C Loop Bypass Packing Failure - Status of a(2) Update,
- N-2000-1341 - Unit 2 Steam Dump Unreliability - Placement Into a(1) Status,
- N-1999-2838 - Units 1/2 PORV Handwheel Failures - Removal From a(1) Status,
- N-1997-3208 - Units 1/2 480 VAC Load Center ABB-600 Breaker Unreliability, and

- N-1997-0085 - Units 1/2 Service Water Piping Replacement With AL6XN.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's scheduled or emergent work activities to assess the management of plant risk. The inspectors evaluated if the assessments of risk were performed in accordance with requirements of 10CFR50.65 (a)(4) and plant procedures. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions to minimize the probability of initiating events, maintain the functional capability of mitigating systems, and maintain barrier integrity. The risk impact of performing the following work activities was assessed:

- Work Order 00435432-01; High Capacity Service Water Blowdown - Inadvertent Opening of Overboard Valve, Associated Risk Assessment,
- Work Order 00448224-01; Station Blackout Diesel Testing - Associated Risk,
- Periodic Test (PT) 2-PT-41.2.5; Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Instrumentation Calibration (CN-L-200B)- Allowed Configuration Time, Related Risk Assessment,
- 2-PT-77.11C; HV-E-4C, Control Room Air Handling Unit Testing - Associated Risk Assessment,
- Calibration Test 2-ICP-CNL-200B; Unit 2 Condensate Storage Tank (CST) Level (L-CN-200B) Calibrations - Associated Risk Assessment, and
- Plant Issue N-2001-1326; Inaccurate Steam Dump Unavailability Assessment - Inaccuracy with Risk Assessment Noted By Licensee Prior To Maintenance.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Nonroutine Plant Evolutions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed Unit 2 shutdown activities and reviewed related plant issue N-2001-1291 documentation dealing with licensee efforts related to a May 26 to May 28 turbine-generator shaft balancing effort. Balancing was required due to the unit

experiencing higher than expected shaft vibrations following a startup from an April refueling outage.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of operability evaluations to ensure that operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The reviewed operability evaluations were described in plant issues:

- N-2001-1223 - 2-II Inverter High Noise (Transformer Laminate Issue),
- N-2001-1126 - 2B Steam Generator PORV Leakage (PORV Inoperability),
- N-2001-1350 - Non-Conservative Calculation For Decay Heat (Actinide Addition),
- N-2001-1322 - Detached Fuel Handling Building HVAC Damper Arm,
- N-2001-1029 - Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Manifold Insulation Fires, and
- N-2001-1501 - 1J EDG Timing Sprocket Gear Defects.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Work-Arounds (OWAs)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operator work-around (OWA) 01-OWA-B02, Recurring Tag-Out on the Service Water Instrument Air System. The inspectors reviewed associated licensee engineering documentation for resolution of OWA - Request for Assistance (R1999-054).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed design change package (DCP) 01-124. The DCP involved the installation of ambient monitoring RTDs in the Unit 1 and 2 Safeguard Building. These RTDs are to be used to enhance the performance of the primary ventilation system.

The inspectors reviewed the associated 10 CFR 50.59 documentation for the DCP and assessed impact on the plant primary ventilation systems.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following post-maintenance test (PMT) procedures / activities associated with repair / replacement of the following components to determine that the procedures and test activities were adequate to verify operability and functional capability of the equipment:

- Unit 2 2-II Inverter Testing, (0-ECM-2501-01, "Troubleshooting and Repair of Single Phase Static Inverters," Revision 10),
- Unit 1 1H Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Testing, (1-PT-82.2, "Simulated Loss of Off-Site Power," Revision 25),
- Unit 2 Control Room Chiller Testing, (2-PT-77.11B, "Control Room Chiller 2-HV-E-4B Pump and Valve Test," Revision 20),
- Unit 1 1H EDG Testing, (1-PT-82.2A, "EDG Start by ESF Actuation," Revision 23),
- Unit 1 Component Cooling (CC) Pump Testing, (1-PT-74.2A, "Component Cooling Pump 1-CC-P-1A," Revision 25), and
- Unit 1 CC Water Heat Exchanger Valve Testing, (1-PT-147.1I, "Valve Inservice Inspection of Farris Class 2 and 3 Safety Valves Model No. 2740," Revision 1).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the startup assessments provided by the following licensee's departments: Outage and Planning, Operations, nuclear site services, safety and loss prevention, radiation protection, site engineering, and maintenance. Additionally, meetings were attended wherein the departmental heads discussed the startup assessments.

On April 7, the inspectors performed an independent walk down of the Unit 2 containment prior to the final walkdown by licensee personnel. Licensee's procedure 2-OP-1B, "Containment Checklist," Revision 25, was used as guidance for the inspectors' walk down. The licensee was previously aware of the minor containment material condition issues identified by the inspectors.

On April 9, the inspectors observed the control room startup of Unit 2 following the refueling outage. Specifically, the pulling of the "D" control bank to the full out position and the dilution to criticality was observed. The generator was synchronized to the grid on April 10 and 100% rated thermal power was obtained on April 13.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

For the surveillance tests listed below, the inspectors examined the test procedure and either witnessed the testing and/or reviewed test records to determine whether the scope of testing adequately demonstrated that the affected equipment was functional and operable:

- 2-PT-47.6, "AFW Turbine Overspeed Trip Valve Test and Alarm Verification", Revision 8,
- 2-PT-77.17, "Safeguards Exhaust Blowout Damper (2-HV-AOD-300) Functional Test," Revision 0,
- 2-PT-57.1B, "Emergency Core Cooling Subsystem - Low Head Safety Injection Pump (2-SI-P-1B)," Revision 36,
- 2-PT-82.3A, "2H EDG Test - Simulated Loss of Off-Site Power in Conjunction with an ESF Actuation Signal," Revision 43,
- 1-PT-82J, "Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 1J Slow Start Test", Revision 22, and

- 1-PT-57.1B, "Emergency Core Cooling Subsystem - Low Head Safety Injection Pump (1-SI-P-1B)," Revision 37.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the safety evaluation for the temporary modification associated with the temporary replacement of the orifice in each turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump full flow recirculation line. The temporary replacement orifice will be used to gather data for the design of a permanent replacement orifice that can be installed to permit performing response time testing with the recirculation valve full open. Replacing the orifice with the newer design from gathered data will eliminate the need for throttling the recirculation during the initial portion of surveillance tests. This temporary modification is installed on both Units 1 and 2.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

On April 24, the inspectors observed an emergency preparedness drill which the licensee used for emergency preparedness performance indicator (PI) data. Activities in the technical support center, the local emergency operation facility, and the simulator control room were evaluated. The evaluation included communication effectiveness, implementation of the emergency plan, emergency action level determinations and protective action recommendations. The inspectors attended the drill critique to determine its adequacy for identifying deficiencies and weaknesses. The inspectors observed that several minor deficiencies were discussed at the post drill critique and were placed in the corrective action program with plant issues N-2001-1267, 1268, and 1269.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

3. SAFEGUARDS

Cornerstone: Physical Protection

3PP1 Access Authorization (Behavior Observation Program)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector evaluated licensee procedures, Fitness For Duty (FFD) reports, and licensee audits. Additionally, the inspector interviewed five representatives of licensee management and five escort personnel concerning their understanding of the behavior observation portion of the personnel screening and FFD program. In interviewing these personnel, the inspector evaluated the effectiveness of their training and abilities to recognize aberrant behavioral traits, physiological indications of narcotic and alcohol use, and work call-out reporting procedures. Licensee compliance was evaluated against requirements in the North Anna Nuclear Plant Physical Security Plan and associated procedures, and 10 CFR Part 26, Fitness For Duty Programs.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

3PP2 Access Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector observed access control activities and search/access control equipment testing. In observing the access control activities, the inspector assessed whether officers could detect contraband prior to it being introduced into the protected area. The protective barriers for the Final Access Control facility were inspected to ensure compliance with protection standards in the Physical Security Plan. Additionally, the inspector assessed whether the officers were conducting access control equipment testing in accordance with regulatory requirements through observation, review of procedures and log entries. Preventative and post maintenance procedures were evaluated and observed as performed. Lock, combination, and key control procedures were evaluated, as well as, aspects of the site access authorization program. Licensee compliance was evaluated against requirements in the North Anna Nuclear Plant Physical Security Plan and associated procedures, and 10 CFR Part 73.55, Requirements for Physical Protection of Licensed Activities in Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiological Sabotage, and Part 73.56, Personnel Access Authorization Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector evaluated the licensee's programs for gathering and submitting data for the "Protected Area Security Equipment Performance Index," "Personnel Screening Program Performance" and "Fitness-For-Duty / Personnel Reliability Program Performance" PIs. The evaluation included the licensee's tracking and trending reports and security event reports for the PI data submitted from the first quarter 2000 to the first quarter of 2001. Licensee performance was evaluated against guidance in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Revision 0, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline."

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA4 Cross-Cutting Issues

a. Inspection Scope

NRC personnel reviewed the Office of Investigations (OI) Report No. 2-2000-016, "North Anna Power Station: Sleeping On Duty By Control Room Supervisor," and associated documentation and applicable plant records and procedures. Results from these reviews were evaluated against the requirements in 10 CFR 50.54(k) and TS 6.8.1.a. as implemented by operations Departmental Administrative Procedure OPAP-0007, "Control Room Activities," Revision 7. The OI report synopsis is included as Enclosure 2 to the cover letter transmitting this inspection report.

b. Findings

A No-Color non-cited violation (NCV) was identified for violating 10 CFR 50.54(k) and failure to implement OPAP-0007 as required by TS 6.8.1.a. due to a unit shift supervisor, licensed as a senior reactor operator (SRO), being inattentive to licensed duties.

OI report 2-2000-016 concluded that a unit shift supervisor was inattentive and sleeping while on duty in the control room during 1999. The OI report also concluded that the inattentiveness was not due to willfulness on the part of the SRO or licensee.

Failure of a senior licensed operator to be attentive while on licensed duty had a credible impact on safety since he may not have been immediately able to respond to plant conditions as required by his operating license. This finding could not be processed through the Significance Determination Process. The safety significance was evaluated by reviewing the circumstances and conditions surrounding the finding. Although being inattentive while on licensed duty is clearly unacceptable, the safety significance was

lessened by the following: (1) the control room shift typically was comprised of an additional SRO over TS requirements, (2) the SRO would typically respond when approached or would become attentive when an alarm annunciated, (3) the total time he was inattentive was small, i.e., the cumulative exposure time was a few minutes out of approximately 8,000 hours in a year, and (4) no plant problems or events were attributed to the SRO's inattentiveness.

10 CFR 50.54(k) requires "An operator or senior operator licensed pursuant to part 55 of this chapter shall be present at the controls at all times during operation of the facility." Furthermore, Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires that written procedures be implemented covering the activities referenced in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, dated February 1978. Appendix A item 1.b requires administrative procedures be written covering authorization and responsibilities of safe operation and shutdown. Responsibilities of safe operation and shutdown are contained in OPAP-0007. OPAP-0007 Step 6.3.1 requires "Control Room Shift Team members should be alert and attentive to control board indications and alarms." During 1999, a SRO while on duty in the control room was observed not to be attentive to control board indications and alarms as described above. The SRO not being attentive is a violation of 10 CFR 50.54(k) and TS 6.8.1.a. The violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy and is identified as NCV 50-338, 339/01002-01. The licensee implemented corrective actions based upon their own internal investigation.

4OA6 Management Meetings

.1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. D. Heacock, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee's staff on July 13, 2001. On July 19, 2001, Mr. K. Landis of the NRC contacted Mr. J. Davis, Manager of Station Nuclear Safety and Licensing, to discuss the NCV regarding the inattentive operator (see Section 4OA4).

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

.2 Other Meetings

The NRC Senior Resident Inspector and the Division of Reactor Projects Branch Chief assigned to the North Anna Power Station met on June 26 with Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO) to discuss the NRC's Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) annual assessment of safety performance for North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2, for the period of April 2, 2000 - March 31, 2001. The major topics addressed were: the NRC's assessment program, the results of the North Anna Power Station assessment, and the NRC's Agency Action Matrix. Attendees included VEPCO management and plant staff members.

A meeting with State and local officials was scheduled after the assessment meeting; however, no officials or members of the public were in attendance.

Both meetings were open to the public. Information used for the discussions of the ROP is available from the NRC's document system (ADAMS) as accession number ML011980088. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

ATTACHMENT

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

D. Christian, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer
K. Barnette, Superintendent, Site Industrial Safety/Fire Protection
J. Davis, Manager, Station Nuclear Safety and Licensing
C. Funderburk, Manager, Station Operations and Maintenance
D. Heacock, Site Vice President
E. Hendrixson, Superintendent, Station Engineering
P. Kemp, Director, Nuclear Oversight
L. Lane, Superintendent, Operations
T. Maddy, Superintendent, Station Security
W. Renz, Director, Security and Emergency Preparedness
H. Royal, Superintendent, Nuclear Training
D. Schappell, Superintendent, Site Services
J. Schleser, ALARA Coordinator
R. Shears, Superintendent, Maintenance
A. Stafford, Superintendent, Radiological Protection

ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED

Opened and Closed

50-338, 339/01002-01	NCV	Violation of 10 CFR 50.54(k) and Technical Specification 6.8.1.a due to a senior reactor operator being inattentive while on licensed duty (Section 4OA4)
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LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following list includes documents and records reviewed during the inspection that are not identified in the body of the report for Sections 3PP1, 3PP2 and 4OA1:

Plant Issue N-2001-1458, Fitness For Duty Program
Plant Issue N-2001-1247, Fire Protection Panel
Plant Issue, Security Metal and Explosive Detector Vulnerability
Plant Issue N-2001-0920, Special Nuclear Material Control
Confidential Report of Investigation, 5/11/01, Case # JALT-010511-4WMLGU
North Anna Performance Indicators, 2000
North Anna Physical Security Plan
SPIP-015, Revision 8, Inspection and Test of Security Equipment
SPIP-006, Revision 4, Personnel Access Control
SPIP-008, Revision 6, Vehicle and Material Access Control

VEPCO Nuclear Access Requirements for Vendors
Fitness for Duty Semi-Annual Reports, January through December, 2000
Safeguard Event Logs, 2000/2001
Fitness-for-Duty/Continual Behavior Observation General Employee Training
Key and Lock Daily and Annual Inventory Logs

SYNOPSIS

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II, Office of Investigations initiated this investigation on July 3, 2000, to determine if a Virginia Electric and Power Corporation control room assistant shift supervisor was sleeping on duty in the control room and management was aware of this behavior and ignored it.

The evidence developed during this investigation determined that the control room assistant shift supervisor was inattentive and sleeping while on duty in the control room due to a medical condition. Since the control room assistant shift supervisor's inattentiveness was not willful, no wrongdoing was substantiated.

Approved for release on 7/16/01
Enclosure 2

**~~NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE WITHOUT APPROVAL OF
FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, REGION II~~**

Case No. 2-2000-016