May 8, 2003

Mr. Theodore Sullivan
Vice President - Operations
Entergy Nuclear Northeast
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant
Post Office Box 110
Lycoming, NY 13093

SUBJECT: JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-333/03-03

Dear Mr. Sullivan:

On March 29, 2003, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on April 24, 2003 with Mr. O'Grady and other members of your staff.

The inspections examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.

Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2002, the NRC has issued five Orders (dated February 25, 2002, January 7, 2003, and April 29, 2003) and several threat advisories to licensees of commercial power reactors to strengthen licensee capabilities, improve security force readiness, and enhance controls over personnel access authorization. The NRC also issued Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/148 on August 28, 2002, that provided guidance to inspectors to audit and inspect licensee implementation of the interim compensatory measures (ICMs) required by the February 25 Order. Phase 1 of TI 2515/148 was completed at all commercial nuclear power plants during calendar year (CY) '02, and the remaining inspections are scheduled for completion in CY '03. Additionally, table top security drills were conducted at several licensees to evaluate licensee protection and mitigative strategies. Information gained and discrepancies identified during the audits and drills were reviewed and dispositioned by the Office of Nuclear Safety and Incident Response. For CY '03, the NRC will continue to monitor overall safeguards and security controls, conduct inspections, and perform force-on-force exercises at selected power plants to pilot a long-term program that will test the adequacy of licensee security and safeguards strategies. Should threat conditions change, the NRC may issue additional Orders, advisories, and temporary instructions to ensure adequate safety is being maintained at all commercial power reactors.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web Site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Glenn W. Meyer, Chief
Projects Branch 3
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No.: 50-333
License No.: DPR-59

Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-333/03-03
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/encl:
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Docket No.:	50-333
License No.:	DPR-59
Report No.:	50-333/03-03
Licensee:	Entergy Nuclear Northeast
Facility:	James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant
Location:	268 Lake Road Scriba, New York 13093
Dates:	December 29, 2002 to March 29, 2003
Inspectors:	L. M. Cline, Senior Resident Inspector D. A. Dempsey, Resident Inspector J. C. Jang, Senior Health Physicist
Approved by:	Glenn W. Meyer, Chief Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000333-03-03; Entergy Nuclear Northeast; on 12/29/2002-03/29/2003; James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. Routine Integrated Report.

The report covered a 13-week period of inspection by resident inspectors and an inspection by a regional senior health physicist. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000.

A. Inspector Identified and Self- Revealing Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

B. Licensee Identified Violations

None.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

The reactor began the inspection period operating at full power. On January 28, 2003, power was reduced to approximately 55% for planned reactor feedwater pump (RFP) maintenance. Full power was restored on January 30. On February 19 power was reduced to 55% for planned seal replacement on the A RFP. Because the A RFP could not be isolated, the unit turbine was taken off line on February 21. The turbine was placed back into service on February 23 and full power operation was achieved on February 25. On February 25 power was again reduced to 55% for planned maintenance on the B RFP. Full power operation was restored on March 9. On March 19, an unplanned reactor shutdown occurred due to a steam leak in the feedwater system. On March 24 reactor startup commenced but was interrupted by high vibration on the B RFP. Following repairs the reactor was restarted on March 26, and full power was achieved on March 27. FitzPatrick continued to operate at or near rated power for the rest of the inspection period.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

Partial System Walkdowns

The inspectors performed four partial system walkdowns. To evaluate the operability of the redundant train for the selected systems while the affected train was inoperable, the inspectors compared system lineups to system operating procedures, system drawings, and the applicable chapters in the Final Safety Analysis Report. The inspectors also verified the operability of critical system components by observing component material condition during the system walkdown and conducting a review of the maintenance history for each component. The inspectors performed the partial walkdowns on the following systems:

- Reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) inspected on February 7, while high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) was out of service for HPCI steam supply isolation valve 23MOV-14 seat repairs.
- Emergency service water (ESW) loop A cable tunnel and electric bay unit coolers inspected on January 29, while ESW loop B cable tunnel and electric bay unit coolers were out of service for check valve maintenance.
- Train B emergency diesel generators (EDGs) and associated electrical and mechanical support systems during surveillance of the A train EDGs on January 1.
- Train A low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) system and motor-operated valve independent power supply during planned maintenance on LPCI system train B on February 26.

The inspectors reviewed the following Entergy documentation:

- Operating procedure (OP) 19, “RCIC”
- OP-21, “ESW”
- DBD-046, Design basis document (DBD) for normal, emergency and residual heat removal service water systems
- DBD-013, DBD for the RCIC system
- OP-13A, “Residual Heat Removal - LPCI”
- OP-22, “Diesel Generator Emergency Power”

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

1. Routine Area Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed areas important to reactor safety to evaluate conditions related to: (1) control of transient combustibles and ignition sources; (2) the material condition, operational status, and operational lineup of fire protection systems, equipment and features; and (3) the fire barriers used to prevent fire damage or fire propagation. The inspectors reviewed administrative procedure AP-14.01, “Fire Protection Program,” the technical requirements manual, the pre-fire plans and DBD-076, the DBD for the fire protection system, to determine fire protection system design features, fire area boundaries, and combustible loading requirements.

The areas inspected included:

- East electric bay, turbine building, fire area 02/zone SW-2
- West electric bay, turbine building, fire area 1C/zone SW-1
- Cable spreading room, fire area 07/zone CS-1
- Battery room complex, fire areas 03, 04, 16/zones BR-1 through 5
- North turbine building, elevation 272 feet, fire area 1E/zone TB-1
- Administration building ventilation equipment room, elevation 300 feet, fire area 1A/zone AD-6

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program

a. Inspection Scope

On March 3, 2003, the inspectors observed licensed operator simulator training to assess operator performance during a scenario involving loss of the A train 4160 volt

emergency bus and a HPCI unisolable steam leak. The inspectors evaluated the performance of risk significant operator actions including the use of emergency operating procedures (EOPs), EOP-2, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Control" and EOP-5, "Secondary Containment Control." The inspectors assessed the clarity and effectiveness of communications, the implementation of appropriate actions in response to alarms, the performance of timely control board operation and manipulation, and the oversight and direction provided by the shift manager. The inspector also reviewed simulator fidelity to evaluate the degree of similarity to the actual control room.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed performance-based problems involving selected in-scope structures, systems, or components (SSCs) to assess the effectiveness of the maintenance program. Reviews focused on: (1) proper maintenance rule scoping, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65; (2) characterization of failed SSCs; (3) safety significance classifications; (4) 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) and (a)(2) classifications; and (5) the appropriateness of performance criteria for SSCs classified as (a)(2), and goals and corrective actions for SSCs classified as (a)(1). The inspectors reviewed the most recent system health reports, condition reports, and system functional failure determinations of the last two years. The following SSCs were reviewed:

- Reactor building ventilation, system 66
- Drywell ventilation, system 68

The inspectors reviewed the following Entergy documentation:

- Maintenance rule basis document for system 66
- JENG-APL-02-013, Reactor building ventilation system maintenance rule (a)(1) action plan
- DBD-066, DBD for reactor building heating and ventilation systems
- Maintenance rule basis document for system 68
- DBD-068, DBD for drywell ventilation and cooling system
- OP-53, "Drywell Ventilation and Cooling"
- OP-51A, "Reactor Building Ventilation and Cooling System"

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

For the selected work listed below, the inspectors verified: (1) risk assessments were performed in accordance with administrative procedure AP-10.10, “On-line Risk Assessment;" (2) risk of scheduled work was managed through the use of compensatory actions; and (3) applicable contingency plans were properly identified in the integrated work schedule. During the maintenance the inspectors toured the work areas to assure that the scope of the work was consistent with the maintenance plans and that no additional systems were adversely impacted.

- West crescent unit cooler 66UC-22E preventive maintenance, and A and B reactor feed pump maintenance performed between January 27 and 31.
- HPCI steam supply isolation valve 23MOV-14 emergent repairs performed between February 7 and 9.
- Standby liquid control pump repair and ammeter replacement on January 17.
- A reactor feed pump seal replacement between February 19 and 21.
- Repairs to traversing in-core probe containment isolation ball valve 02-SOV-104A and inboard main stream isolation valve 29AOV-80D during the week of March 22.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operability determinations to assess the correctness of the evaluations, the use and control of compensatory measures if needed, and compliance with technical specifications (TSs). The review included a verification that the operability determinations were made as specified by Entergy’s administrative procedure AP-03.11, "Operability Determinations." The technical adequacy of the determinations was reviewed and compared to TSs, the final safety analysis report, and associated design basis documents. Entergy’s evaluations for the following conditions were reviewed:

- Untimely corrective actions for safety-related circuits identified by the New York Power Authority’s evaluation of NRC Information Notice 94-68, “Safety-Related Equipment Failures Caused By Faulted Indicating Lamps.”
- Inability to perform a surveillance test (ST) of B traversing incore probe containment isolation valve 02SOV-104B.
- Failure to provide engineering justification for deferral of the emergency diesel generator jacket water heat exchanger eddy current inspection.
- 10 CFR Part 21 notification regarding General Electric Marathon control rod blades

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed post-maintenance test procedures and associated testing activities for selected risk significant mitigating systems to assess whether: (1) the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed by control room and engineering personnel; (2) testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; (3) acceptance criteria were clear and adequately demonstrated operational readiness, consistent with design and licensing basis documents; (4) test instrumentation had current calibrations, range, and accuracy for the application; (5) tests were performed, as written, with applicable prerequisites satisfied; and (6) that equipment was returned to the status required to perform its safety function. The following post maintenance testing items were reviewed:

- Surveillance procedure ST-39D, “Secondary Containment Leak Test,” following replacement of the reactor building inner track bay door seal per work request (WR) 02-07292-04.
- Surveillance procedure ST-6HA, “Standby Liquid Control (SLC) A Side Quarterly Operability Test (IST),” following repairs to A SLC pump 11P-2A per WR 02-05261-01, WR 00-03765-01, and WR 02-08686-00.
- Cycling and stroke timing of shutdown cooling isolation valve 10MOV-15B following motor-operated valve repairs per WR 02-02259-02.
- Temporary surveillance procedure TST-104, “Testing of ESW Loop A (IST),” and ST-8Q, “Testing of the ESW System,” following replacement of portions of west crescent area unit cooler piping per WR 02-06623-06 and WR 01-14160-08.
- Surveillance procedure ST-4N, “HPCI Quick-Start, Inservice, And Transient Monitoring Test (IST),” following overhaul of HPCI turbine steam admission valve 23MOV-14 per work requests WR 03-01314-01 and WR 02-02818-04.
- Surveillance procedure ST-1M, “Main Steam Leakage Collection System Valve Exercise (IST),” following repairs to main steam leakage collection valve 29MOV-204A per WR 02-05656-00.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed and reviewed the following activities during FitzPatrick forced outage 161 from March 19 to March 27, 2003.

- The inspectors reviewed outage schedules and procedures, and verified that technical specification required safety system availability was maintained, shutdown risk was considered, and contingency plans existed to restore key safety functions such as electrical power and containment integrity.

- The inspectors observed portions of the plant shutdown and cooldown and verified the technical specification cooldown rate limits were not exceeded.

- The inspectors periodically verified the proper alignment and operation of the shutdown cooling and reactor coolant makeup systems.

- The inspectors observed portions of the reactor startup following the outage, and verified through plant walkdowns, control room observations, and ST reviews that safety-related equipment required for mode change was operable, that containment integrity was set, and that reactor coolant boundary leakage was within technical specification limits.

- The inspectors reviewed Entergy's extent of condition review for condition report 2003-01354, which documented the failure of inboard main steam isolation valve 29AOV-80D to close during the performance of surveillance procedure ST-1B, "Main Steam Isolation Valve Fast Closure Test."

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors witnessed performance of ST procedures and reviewed test data of selected risk-significant systems, structures, and components (SSCs) to assess whether the SSCs satisfied TSs, updated final safety analysis report, technical requirements manual, and procedure requirements. The inspectors assessed whether the testing appropriately demonstrated that the SSCs were operationally ready and capable of performing their intended safety functions in accordance with their licensing and design bases. The following tests were witnessed:

- Surveillance procedure ST-2XB, "Residual Heat Removal Service Water Loop B Quarterly Operability Test (IST)"
- Surveillance procedure ST-24J, "RCIC Flow Rate and Inservice Test (IST)"
- Surveillance procedure ST-34A, "Primary Containment Isolation System Group 2 Functional And Simulated Automatic Actuation Test"
- Surveillance procedure ST-3J, "Core Spray Initiation Logic System Functional Test While In Run Mode"
- Reactor analyst procedure 7.4.01, "Control Rod Scram Time Evaluation (IST)"

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed temporary modification 03-003 that installed an adapter plate and hydraulic ram to reactor feedwater pump isolation valve 34FW-3A. The modification was designed to facilitate isolation of the pump for seal replacement. The inspectors assessed: (1) the adequacy of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation; (2) that the installation was consistent with the modification documentation; (3) that drawings and procedures were updated as applicable; and (4) the adequacy of the post-installation testing.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed simulator activities associated with the site's emergency planning drill on January 14, 2003. The inspectors verified that emergency classification declarations and notification activities were properly completed in accordance with the emergency plan.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2. RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety

2PS1 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment and Monitoring Systems

a. Inspection Scope

The following is a list of documentation and processes the inspector reviewed during his assessment of the effectiveness of Entergy's radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent control programs at FitzPatrick. The requirements for radioactive effluent controls are specified in the TSs and the offsite dose calculation manual (ODCM).

- 2001 and 2002 radiological semi-annual effluent release reports, including projected public radiation dose assessments
- ODCM Revision 7, dated November 16, 2001, including technical justifications for ODCM changes
- Technical review process for upgrading revision 8 of the ODCM, including LO-JAFLO-2003-00108, NUREG-1302 requirements for gaseous effluent flow monitoring in the ODCM
- Analytical results for charcoal cartridge, particulate filter, and noble gas samples.
- Quantification techniques for gaseous effluent releases
- Implementation of the compensatory sampling and analysis program when the effluent radiation monitoring system (RMS) is out of service
- Tracking and trending of effluent RMS availability
- 2002 gamma spectroscopy calibration records for all geometries
- Implementation of measurement laboratory quality control program, including intra- and interlaboratory comparisons
- 2002 and 2003 Nuclear Quality Assurance audit report nos. A02-04J and A03-01J concerning implementation of radioactive liquid and gaseous effluent controls and the ODCM
- Quality assurance report no. 2328, covering November 20 to December 4, 2002.
- 2002 quarterly chemistry self-assessments
- Selected radioactive liquid and gaseous release permits
- Effluent control procedures
- Recent results of surveillance testing required by Section 5.5.8 of the TSs for the following air treatment systems:
  - Standby gas treatment system
  - Main control room ventilation
- The results of the most recent channel calibrations required by ODCM Tables 2.1-2 and 3.1-2 for the following radioactive liquid and gaseous effluent radiation monitoring systems, and liquid effluent flow rate measurement devices:

  <u>Radiation Monitoring Systems (RMS)</u>
  - Liquid radwaste effluent line RMS
  - Service water effluent line RMS
  - Main stack exhaust noble gas monitors
  - Refuel area exhaust noble gas monitor
  - Reactor building area exhaust noble gas monitor
  - Turbine building area exhaust noble gas monitor
  - Radwaste building area exhaust noble gas monitor

  <u>Flow Rate Measurement Devices</u>
  - Liquid radwaste effluent line flow rate measurement device
  - Main stack flow rate measurement device
  - Reactor building exhaust flow rate measurement device
  - Refuel area exhaust flow rate measurement device
  - Turbine and radwaste buildings exhaust flow rate

The inspector also completed the following walkdowns and observations during the inspection:

- Verified by walkdown the availability of radioactive liquid/gaseous effluent radiation monitoring systems.
- Observed calibration techniques for the gaseous effluent monitoring system.
- Verified maintenance of a negative pressure in the reactor building.
- Observed measurement techniques at the counting laboratory.
- Verified by walkdown the operability of air cleaning systems.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

40A1 Performance Indicator Verification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed performance indicator (PI) data listed below for the period from July to December 2002. The inspector used Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guidance," to verify individual PI accuracy and completeness.

Mitigating Systems

- RCIC unavailability.

The inspectors reviewed operator log entries, condition reports and the system engineer's PI data sheets to determine whether Entergy had correctly identified the number of unavailable hours for the RCIC system. This number was then compared to the number reported for RCIC unavailability on the NRC web site. The inspectors verified the accuracy of the reported number of hours the RCIC system was required to be available by reviewing the number of critical hours reported by Entergy for the given period. The inspectors also interviewed the system engineer responsible for the collection of the performance indicator data.

Barrier Integrity

- Reactor coolant system leakage

The inspectors reviewed operator logs, plant computer data, and surveillance procedure ST-40D, "Daily Surveillance and Channel Check," to verify the accuracy of Entergy's reported maximum reactor coolant system identified leakage for the applicable quarters.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a detailed review of 17 corrective action program items selected across the initiating events, mitigating systems, and barrier integrity cornerstones to evaluate the effectiveness of Entergy's corrective action program. The inspectors assessed Entergy's threshold for problem identification, the adequacy of its cause analyses and extent of condition reviews, and the timeliness of the corrective actions required by reviewing pertinent operators logs, WRs, engineering evaluations, ST results, and self-assessments, interviewing operators, engineers and maintenance department personnel, and when possible, attending screening committee and review board meetings. Fifteen condition reports were reviewed and are noted in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Management Meetings

.1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. O'Grady and members of his staff on April 24, 2003. Entergy identified some of the material reviewed by the inspectors during this period as proprietary; however, the content of this report contains no proprietary information.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

T. Sullivan, Vice President, Operations
B. O'Grady, General Manager, Plant Operations
B. Maguire, Director, Nuclear Safety
P. Berry, Manager, Training
J. Haley, Manager, Security
A. Halliday, Manager, Licensing
D. Johnson, Manager, Scheduling and Outages
O. Limpias, Director, Engineering
P. Russell, Manager, Operations
N. Avrakatos, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
D. Ruddy, Manager, CA&A

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 2PS1, Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment and Monitoring Systems

Condition Reports for Routine Effluent controls

CR-2003-01245, CR-2003-01248,CR-2003-00301,CR-2003-00747, CR-2003-01418, CR-2002-03726, CR-2002-05137, CR-2002-05282

Condition Reports for Air Cleaning Systems

CR-2003-00679, CR-2003-00968, CR-2003-00944, CR-2003-00745, CR-2003-00747, CR-2003-00889, CR-2003-00890, CR-2003-00892, CR-2003-00893

Condition Reports for Radiation Monitoring Systems

CR-2002-00324, CR-2002-00241, CR-2002-00857,CR-2002-01712, CR-2002-05021, CR-2002-05282, CR-2002-03412, CR-2003-00610, CR-2003-00913, CR-2003-00994

Section 4OA2, Reactor Safety Condition Reports

CR-2003-00144, Incorrectly stored nitrogen bottles in the screenwell
CR-2003-00146, Surveillance procedure ST-34A, "Primary Containment Isolation System Group
2 Functional and Simulated Automatic Actuation Test" failure due to inoperable traversing in-core probe ball valve
CR-2003-00150, Ventilation damper 67AOD-140 found out of position
CR-2003-00202, B traversing in-core probe ball valve inoperable
CR-2003-00322, Non-conservative anticipated transient without scram overpressure analysis

CR-2003-00346, Spurious turbine bypass valve operation
CR-2003-00438, Main transformer dissolved gas analysis results
CR-2003-00461, Inability to isolate A reactor feedwater pump
CR-2003-00534, HPCI steam admission valve leakage following surveillance procedure ST-4N, "HPCI Quick Start, In-service and Transient Monitoring Test"
CR-2003-00351, Excessive reactor building component cooling system makeup
CR-2003-00773, 10CFR Part 21 notification regarding General Electric Marathon control rod blades
CR-2003-00794, Unexpected reactor pressure vessel water level transient
CR-2003-01626, Safety-related unit cooler 66UC-22C did not meet ESW target flow rate
CR-2003-01628, Emergency sirens out of service due to ice storm
CR-2003-00260, Corrective action identified by evaluation of NRC Information notice 94-68, "Safety-Related Equipment Failures Caused by Faulted Indicating Lamps," has not been resolved in a timely manner.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AOV	Air Operated Valve
CR	Condition Report
DBD	Design basis document
EDG	Emergency diesel generator
EOPs	Emergency operating procedures
ESW	Emergency service water
HPCI	High pressure coolant injection
IST	Inservice test
LPCI	Low pressure coolant injection
NEI	Nuclear Energy Institute
ODCM	Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
OP	Operating procedure
PI	Performance Indicator
RCIC	Reactor core isolation cooling
RFP	Reactor feedwater pump
RMS	Radiation monitoring system
SLC	Standby liquid control
SOV	Solenoid operated valve
SSCs	Structures, systems or components
ST	Surveillance test
TS	Technical specifications
WR	Work request