

Enclosure 6: STP Nuclear Operating
Company Presentation
Meeting Summary of July 28, 2010
Public Meeting with NEI
Dated August 4, 2010

STP Nuclear Operating Company Nuclear Safety Culture Pilot

Tim Bowman,
General Manager, Oversight

David Rencurrel
Site Vice President

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Overview


- ◆ Incorporated NEI 09-07 process into a station specific procedure
- ◆ Binned quantitative and qualitative data against the INPO Nuclear Safety Culture Principles and Attributes
- ◆ NRC cross-cutting aspect findings are one of the data inputs
- ◆ Actions are tracked in the Corrective Action Program
- ◆ Independent oversight built into the process
- ◆ NRC observed meetings from first two panel and SMT assessments
- ◆ Completed three (3) quarterly panel and SMT assessments

Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment

- ◆ Survey performed in December 2009
- ◆ Site assessment in January 2010
- ◆ Survey had 73 questions, completed by 981 site personnel
- ◆ 77 site interviews
- ◆ One strength, 11 positive comments, 4 negative comments and 4 general comments

The Process

Site Nuclear Safety Culture Process



Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel (NSCMP)

- ◆ Consists of department-level managers plus leaders in leadership development and human resources
- ◆ An independent organizational development consultant either participated or provided feedback
- ◆ Met each quarter to review data
- ◆ Made recommendations to the Senior Management Team (SMT) regarding the health of each Principle
- ◆ Developed proposed actions to address areas of concern
- ◆ Reviewed progress of previously identified actions

Senior Management Team

- ◆ Led by the Site Vice President
- ◆ Reviewed and dialogued on the NSCMP recommendations
- ◆ Provided additional insight and clarification
- ◆ Agreed to or modified NSCMP recommended actions
- ◆ Created additional actions as necessary
- ◆ Assigned ownership of actions

Process Improvements

- ◆ Binned process inputs directly to an INPO Nuclear Safety Culture Principle and Attribute.
- ◆ Improved the definitions of observation types.
- ◆ Added members to Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel including member from new build organization.
- ◆ Ensured “positive” process inputs were included and communicated to learn from successes.
- ◆ Development of a communications plan for the process and results.

Results

Improvement Opportunity identified against Principle 3, *Trust Permeates the Organization.*

- ◆ Personnel in some organizations lacked confidence that some concerns would be fully addressed by their supervisors.
- ◆ This issue did not deter individuals from expressing nuclear safety concerns in each organization.
- ◆ Actions were put in place to improve supervisory behaviors that build trust.
- ◆ This issue had the potential to impact the safety culture if not addressed at a low threshold.

Results

- ◆ Communicate more clearly to station personnel the relationship between the STP Incentive Compensation Plan and nuclear safety
- ◆ Improve manager and supervisor visibility in the field
- ◆ Improve strategic benchmarking
- ◆ Resolve relationship issues between organizations that are hindering station performance

Conclusions

- ◆ **The Nuclear Safety Culture process:**
 - ◆ Provides a method to identify nuclear safety culture issues and take action
 - ◆ Provides a forum for perception issues (i.e., faint signals) to be addressed
 - ◆ Is transparent
 - ◆ Is well-defined and repeatable
 - ◆ Promotes management accountability for nuclear safety culture