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Statement of  
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before the

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,  
House Armed Services Committee

on

Afghan National Security Forces and Security Lead Transition:  
The Assessment Process, Metrics and Efforts to Build Capability

Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Cooper, and distinguished members of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss Department of Defense (DoD) Office of Inspector General (DoD IG) oversight regarding the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and the Assessment Process, Metrics and Efforts to Build Capability.

Between now and the end of 2014, NATO and U.S. military strategy to develop the ANSF is focused on setting the conditions for transfer of full security responsibility to the army and police, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA). The implementation of this strategy is occurring simultaneously with a phased drawdown of U.S. and NATO combat forces amidst continued engagement with elements of the Taliban and other insurgent forces.

The strategy includes:

- Providing continued army and police unit training, equipping, partnering and mentoring to enable the ANSF to progressively assume the leading security operations role;
- Shifting primary focus from growth to improving ANSF quality and professionalization, sustainability, and preparedness to transition;
- Assisting provinces, districts, and municipalities through the progressive stages of transitioning to GIROA security lead over the territory of Afghanistan.

In addition, institutional capacity building of the security ministries—Defense and Interior—are vital to effectiveness and sustainability of ANSF and are a significant focus of the advisory effort. So is development of ANSF “enablers” in priority capability areas such as air support, logistics and the health care system, among others.

Without effective ANSF command and control processes and procedures, its forces cannot operationally achieve their potential. This, too, necessitates Command advisory attention. Finally, the Command has made leadership development of army and police officers and NCO’s, conceivably the most critical ANSF personnel resource capability, one of its highest priorities.

Many of these NATO and U.S. forces’ security objectives with respect to ANSF development have been addressed in previous DoD IG assessments. A summary of the conclusions, observations and recommendations from selected reports initiated over the past year are addressed in this testimony. They are not intended to provide a fully comprehensive picture of the current status and capability of the ANSF.

## **U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan Air Force**

In August 2011, the DoD IG conducted the site visit for an assessment<sup>1</sup> of U.S. and Coalition efforts to train, equip, and field a viable and sustainable Afghan Air Force (AAF).

AAF long-term strategy is to build a force by 2016 capable of supporting ANSF operations with air mobility, rotary and fixed-wing close air support, casualty evacuation, and aerial reconnaissance and to provide Presidential airlift.

The AAF was and still is in a nascent stage of development. Although an air advisor effort had existed since 2005, the NATO Air Training Command-Afghanistan (NATC-A) development of the AAF began in earnest in 2010. As of February 2012, the AAF had grown to over 5,300 personnel and 88 aircraft assigned to three Air Wings, including the continuing development of the AAF training wing.

DoD IG noted several systemic issues during its assessment including the need for a common vision for the roles, missions and capabilities of the AAF and enhanced command and control of air assets. These issues were considered NATC-A command priorities.

Additional challenges included: ineffective maintenance, supply, and performance of the G-222/C-27A medium cargo aircraft; shortages of ground and air support equipment; and difficulty recruiting sufficient personnel to meet the technical requirements of a modern air force. In addition, the fleet still does not have the aircraft to provide a more robust close air support capability.

AAF development lagged ANSF ground forces and will require continued U.S. and Coalition resource and advisor support in order to transition the AAF to an operational, independent, and self-sustaining force by the Command's target date of 2016.

## **U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Afghan Local Police**

In October 2011, the DoD IG conducted an assessment<sup>2</sup> to determine the effectiveness of U.S. and Coalition planning and operational implementation efforts to train, advise and assist in the development of the Afghan Local Police (ALP).

The ALP consists of Afghan personnel recruited, trained and assigned to provide protection and stability in local villages/areas where the ANSF is insufficiently strong

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<sup>1</sup> "Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan Air Force," Project No. D2011-D00SPO-0234. The final report is scheduled to be released final in August 2012.

<sup>2</sup> "Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Afghan Local Police," released July 9, 2012 (Report No. DODIG-2012-109).

to prevent armed insurgent infiltration and activities. The ALP supports the Village Stability Operations program which is designed to enhance governance and development, enabling communities to stand up for themselves, and links the local villages/areas to the GIRoA. It employs local Afghans, who are hired with the advice and consent of village elders, and is intended to be primarily defensive in nature.

The strategy implemented by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has achieved progress in developing the ALP. The goal is to expand to a force of 30,000 by the end of 2014. As of April 2012, ISAF reported ALP strength as approximately 12,900. According to this assessment and ISAF reporting, ALP forces have had success in denying rural intervention and movement by insurgent forces and are considered important by ISAF to the long-term effectiveness of Afghan security and governance.

The DoD IG assessment identified several critical issues that must be addressed to enable the ALP program to reach its full potential.

There is a lack of sufficient and trained Coalition personnel, in particular U.S. Special Operations Forces, which puts the expansion of the program to 30,000 ALP at risk. ISAF has added some conventional battalions to the ALP development effort to mitigate this risk.

To reduce the current uncertainty regarding the long-term viability of the ALP program, ISAF, in coordination with the Afghan Ministry of Interior, needs to determine whether the ALP program should endure beyond the currently planned timeframe of two to five years. Indecision on this point could diminish the current effectiveness of the program and result in inefficiency and wasted resources.

Further, the Afghan Ministry of Interior's logistics and administrative systems have not provided timely and necessary support to the ALP program. ALP personnel were graduating from training and being assigned to units without all of their required equipment. In addition, administrative support requirements were incomplete. Consequently, the Afghan Ministry of Interior did not provide some ALP members with pay and benefits.

Former Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3)<sup>3</sup> personnel in at least one province were being "re-branded" at the provincial level as ALP and assigned against district ALP authorizations, but without the knowledge/approval of district Afghan Uniformed Police leaders, village elders, or U.S. Special Operations Forces personnel. This resulted in police personnel from one district or village within a province claiming

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<sup>3</sup> AP3 was an Afghan Ministry of Interior security program that preceded the ALP program, supported and equipped by ISAF. However, AP3 personnel were not approved/vetted by village elders/shuras and did not provide security at the village level. They often worked outside of their home districts, performing missions such as route and site security.

to be ALP and performing security-related duties in another district or village, in violation of the intent and procedures of the ALP program. ISAF reports that this unit of former AP3 guards rebranded as ALP has been disbanded, with those personnel being incorporated into their home district ALP programs, as appropriate.

### **U.S. Efforts to Develop the ANA Command and Control System**

In April 2012, the DoD IG conducted an assessment<sup>4</sup> to determine whether DoD will complete the development of an effective Command and Control (C2) system for the Afghan National Army (ANA) by the end of 2014.

While the ANA has demonstrated an improving capability to independently conduct counterinsurgency missions, and its units can orchestrate basic C2 with other elements of the ANSF, we determined that their C2 capability is still marginal because it is acutely dependent upon enabler support provided by the U.S. and Coalition.

There are a number of resource-intensive, high risk areas that could become critical if not properly addressed, and therefore could degrade ANA C2 effectiveness. These include the difficult challenge of adapting to evolving organizational structures, excessive complexity of some technology and automation being introduced, limited command authority related to removal of ineffective senior officers and other continuing personnel challenges, logistics impediments, and the significant reliance on U.S. and Coalition enablers.

Evolving and emerging ANSF organizational constructs pose significant challenges to the development of the ANA C2 system. For example there are four key C2 nodes currently being established or undergoing significant change in their organizational mission and structure: the ANA Ground Forces Command, the National Military Command Center, the ANA Special Operations Command, and the Air Command and Control Center.

In addition, 40 regional and provincial operational coordination centers are at different stages of maturity in terms of manning, leadership and equipment with varying levels of ability to interact with their regional, provincial, and national level command centers.

The ANSF continues to struggle with improving the capacity and effectiveness of its logistical system. Efforts to enable ANSF development and implementation of what represents a complex and confusing logistics organizational structure and related processes have resulted in a requisition system that requires an average of 22 signatures from multiple management levels for the supply of routine items. Major challenges in obtaining parts resupply for equipment continues. The ANA currently lacks sufficient

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<sup>4</sup> "Assessment of U.S. Efforts to Develop the Afghan National Security Forces Command and Control System," Project No. D2012-DOOSPO-0085.000. This report is projected to be final in October 2012.

logistics leadership and the specific education/training in how to plan and execute operational force sustainment for more than a few days. These limitations present significant impediments to developing and sustaining an effective C2 system.

Members of the ANA expressed concern about their inability to cope with the complexity of computer automation and technology provided by the Coalition intended to enhance ANSF command, control, and communication capabilities. Currently, the ANSF does not have sufficient capacity to operate, and effectively maintain the level of information technology and automated systems provided.

Illiteracy and low education levels reduce the number of qualified applicants for IT positions, and those who do succeed in being trained and gaining experience in complex systems ultimately can find great demand for their skills in the private sector at higher salaries. This places continuous recruiting and training requirements upon the ANSF to replenish required technical skills from a limited human resource pool.

The ANSF is also highly dependent upon specialized enablers provided by the U.S. and Coalition to inform and enhance C2 capability, these include: Military Intelligence Companies, Signal Intelligence, and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Assets.

### **U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Develop Leaders in the Afghan National Army**

In June 2012, the DoD IG conducted an assessment<sup>5</sup> of U.S. and Coalition efforts to develop leaders – officers and non-commissioned officers (NCO) – within the ANA. Building leader capacity within the ANSF is a top priority of the ISAF and U.S. commands.

The ANA lacks leaders in sufficient numbers with the requisite skills to manage complex organizational and technology-based systems, reflecting the Afghanistan-wide human capital shortage. However, significant progress has been made in the development of officer and NCO training programs and, with additional infrastructure under construction, the ANA will have the capability to provide career-long professional education and training. Commanders and trainers were predominantly ANA personnel, and the programs were well on the way to transition to Afghan lead.

Worth noting, the National Military Academy, modeled along the lines of West Point, just graduated its largest student class yet of 640, versus its first class of 84 that matriculated in 2007. In addition, the National Army Officers Academy is introducing a year-long training course based on the U.K. Sandhurst Military Academy to improve the professionalism of junior officers.

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<sup>5</sup> “Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Develop Leaders in the Afghan National Army,” Project No. D2012-D00SPO-0090. This project was announced on February 28, 2012.

The ANA has several personnel issues impacting the viability of a sustainable system for producing and advancing a new generation of leaders. These issues detract from the goal of establishing a true merit based personnel system and the infrastructure to support one.

Personnel assignment and promotion is often conducted using considerations other than skill or merit. The lack of a viable retirement system for senior ANA officials also impedes upward mobility and long-term retention.

In addition, the ANA officer corps consists of personnel with different leadership models based on their training and/or experience with either the Soviet Army, Mujahideen or with the Coalition. As a consequence, there is not a common set of officer leadership views and values, especially as they relate to the role of an NCO.

The ongoing success of the ANA literacy program remains essential to improving nearly all aspects of ANA capability and is specifically critical to leader development. Literacy is an enabler for soldier, NCO and officer functions and has societal value in that it creates a more discerning citizen.

### **U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Improve Health Care Conditions at the Dawood National Military Hospital**

During the last week of June 2012, a DoD IG team inspected<sup>6</sup> the Dawood National Military Hospital (NMH) to review the status of U.S., Coalition and ANA efforts to improve the management and health care services provided at the facility, including the medical logistics processes and accountability and control of medical supplies.

For the ANSF to become fully independent and sustainably effective in conducting combat operations, the ANSF health care delivery system will need to provide essential field-level combat casualty care, evacuation of casualties, restorative surgery and rehabilitation, and long-term care for disabled personnel.

In its preliminary observations the team noted that progress had been made at NMH since the February 2011 inspection by DoD IG in a number of key areas, including:

- Significant progress in the joint effort between ISAF and the Afghan Ministries to develop and implement an overarching ANSF health care system plan.
- Medical standards clearly defined as goals for the ANSF medical care system, including NMH, giving focus and direction to joint development efforts.
- No complaints or evidence of patient maltreatment.

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<sup>6</sup> “Oversight of U.S. Military and Coalition Efforts to Improve Health care Conditions and to Develop Sustainable ANSF Medical Logistics at the Dawood National Military Hospital,” Project No. D2012-D00SPO-0163.000. This project was announced on April 25, 2012.



- Nutritionist oversight capability established.
- Improved cleanliness, sanitary conditions and general appearance.
- New processes and procedures to improve personnel accountability and patient care.
- Improved medical logistics system performance, including accountability for medical supplies; fully operational NMH medical warehouse.
- Focused medical advisor training added to pre-deployment Program of Instruction for medical mentors.
- New management of the ANA Medical Command and NMH providing effective leadership.

However, there are still challenges that need to be addressed.

Although there have been improvements in overall staffing levels at the NMH, the pharmacy and nursing departments continue to experience personnel shortages. These shortages may hinder the ability of the NMH pharmacy to perform quality control measures and the hospital to continue to improve delivery of safe and effective patient care.

The NMH also lacked administrative procedures to transfer equipment from clinical areas that had more than a sufficient supply to areas in need of the same medical equipment. In addition, there was limited medical equipment repair capability at the NMH.

Furthermore, the security of controlled pharmaceutical substances in the bulk storage area and the accountability of medication in the pharmacy dispensary were insufficient.

Finally, we found that the plan for the medical mentoring mission beyond NMH's scheduled date in 2013 was unclear and needed to be refined and communicated to medical mentors and ANSF medical system staff.

### **Metrics Reports**

The DoD IG has issued two reports presenting metrics that measure the development of the ANSF. These metric reports<sup>7</sup> issued successively on the Afghan army and police were undertaken to fill a perceived information gap among senior leaders in OSD and relevant Congressional Committees. The DoD IG selects,

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<sup>7</sup> "Assessment of Afghan National Security Forces Metrics—Quarterly, Afghan National Army (Sept 2011 – Feb 2012," released May 15, 2012 (DODIG-2012-034.2) and "Assessment of Afghan National Security Forces Metrics—Quarterly," released January 20, 2012 (DODIG-2012-034.1). The data is generated by NATO as UNCLASSIFIED with Restricted Release; the caveat requires DOD IG to classify the products CONFIDENTIAL in accordance with U.S. policy.



summarizes, and concisely presents six months of quantitative and qualitative metrics deemed indicative of progress toward the goal of developing a sustainable Afghan National Security Force for transition to Afghan lead responsibility by 2014.

The reports have two primary sections: a narrative section describing trends, explaining anomalies, and providing overall context, a four-page graphic section consisting of a summary chart in “stop-light” format (green-amber-red), plus three pages of graphs illustrating significant metrics. The broad areas of focus are progress with respect to ANA and ANP improvements in force quality and professionalization, sustainment, and transition. The next report, to be issued shortly, concerns the ANP.

### **Future**

NATO/U.S. strategy beyond 2014 is still being formulated in terms of ANSF personnel strength and force structure, and the precise focus and force strength of NATO and U.S. trainers and advisors. DoD IG oversight efforts will continue through 2014 and beyond, as appropriate, with respect to the continued development of the ANSF and its sustainment.

I look forward to answering any questions you may have.