Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Estimates Cooperative Threat Reduction Program



February 2012

(This page intentionally left blank.)

Cooperative Threat Reduction: (\$ in Thousands):

	FY 2011	Price	Program	FY 2012	Price	Program	FY 2013
	Actuals	Change	Change	Estimate	Change	Change	Estimate
CTR	520,833	9,375	-21,989	508,219	8,639	2,253	519,111

I. <u>Description of Operations Financed</u>: The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program's overarching mission is to partner with willing countries to reduce the threat from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related materials, technologies, and expertise. The CTR Program focuses on eliminating, securing, or consolidating WMD, related materials, and associated delivery systems and infrastructure at their source in partner countries. The CTR Program also focuses on building partner capacity to prevent the proliferation of WMD materials across borders or in transit across international borders. The Department of Defense's (DoD) approach to this set of activities includes:

- Supporting a layered defense approach to countering weapons of mass destruction;
- Building strategic relationships with key international partners that enhance threat reduction on a global scale;
- Supporting the resilience of the global nonproliferation framework by building partner capacities to enforce the tenants of that framework.

In 2010, and in accordance with the authorities of the FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, the CTR program began expanding to address emerging security challenges and urgent threats in regions of the world beyond the former Soviet Union (FSU). The CTR program is currently authorized to operate in the FSU, Afghanistan, Africa, China, India, Pakistan, and Iraq.

I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

The CTR program areas and related assistance are:

<u>\$</u>	in thousar	nds
FY 2011*	FY 2012	FY 2013
Actuals	Estimate	Estimate

A. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE): 23,532 63,221 68,271

*The FY 2011 funding reflects a restructured baseline that includes the formerly titled Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination (SNAE).

The potential proliferation of WMD, delivery systems, and related technologies is a serious threat to U.S. and international security. The DoD, through the CTR Program, assists Russia in the elimination of strategic offensive arms in a manner consistent with the New START Treaty (NST). The CTR Program will support additional measures beyond the NST that are appropriate and support shared nonproliferation objectives.

The DoD has identified nonproliferation value in assisting Russia to dismantle intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); ICBM silo launchers and road-mobile ICBM launchers; submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), SLBM launchers, and associated strategic nuclear submarines; and infrastructure related to these systems. Separately, the DoD also assists Ukraine with the storage and elimination of rocket motors from dismantled SS-24 ICBMs.

I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

В.

	\$ in thousands		
	FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2		
	Actuals	<u>Estimate</u>	Estimate
. Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD):	12,000	9,804	14,630

Russia, as a State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, agreed to eliminate its stockpile of over 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons. The United States, Russia, and other international partners funded construction of the Shchuch'ye Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility (CWDF) for organophosphorus (nerve) agent-filled artillery munitions. This CWDF is located near the Planovy chemical weapons storage facility, which contained approximately 47 percent of Russia's nerve agent-filled artillery munitions, estimated at 5,460 metric tons in over two million rocket and tube artillery warheads/projectiles. Russia began chemical weapons destruction operations at Shchuch'ye in March 2009 and, as of September 2011, has completed the elimination of over 2,365.2 metric tons of nerve agent. The DoD is providing technical support for the destruction operations at the Shchuch'ye CWDF.

The Kizner CWDF, a Russian built facility similar to Shchuch'ye, will begin to destroy approximately 5,645 metric tons of chemical agent after construction is complete, estimated to be late 2012. The DoD has agreed to provide the Kizner CWDF with technical support similar to that provided at Shchuch'ye.

I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

<u>\$</u>	in thousar	nds
FY 2011*	FY 2012	FY 2013
Actuals	Estimate	Estimate

C. Global Nuclear Security (GNS):

164,460 121,143 99,789

*FY 2011 funding reflects a restructured baseline that includes the formerly titled Nuclear Weapons Storage Security (NWSS) program, the formerly titled Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security (NWTS) program, and the Fissile Material Proliferation Prevention project.

This program area includes all the DoD CTR activities related to nuclear material security, including security for nuclear warheads, weapons-usable nuclear material, and other nuclear material. These efforts provide enhanced security by maintaining physical security system upgrades, increasing inventory management capacity, enhancing security training support, improving transport security, developing emergency response capacity, and maintaining personnel reliability support for strategic and non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons and fissile materials. The program also improves security for at-risk nuclear material. In addition, the CTR Program assists in the secure transport of nuclear warheads and other qualifying nuclear material to dismantlement facilities, consolidated secure storage areas, or processing facilities for disposition. This program also helps establish Centers of Excellence with partner countries to enhance training capability, consistent with international best practices, for nuclear security, material control, and inventory management. The CTR Program partners and coordinates closely with other related efforts within the U.S. Government and international governmental and non-governmental organizations.

I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

	\$ in thousands		
	FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 202		FY 2013
	Actuals	Estimate	Estimate
D. Cooperative Biological Engagement (CBE):	255,855	259,470	276,399

This program counters the threat of state and non-state actors acquiring biological materials and expertise that could be used to develop or deploy a biological weapon. The program destroys or secures especially dangerous pathogens (EDPs) at their source, builds partner capacity to sustain a safe, secure disease surveillance system to detect, diagnose, and report EDP outbreaks, and to work collaboratively with partner country scientists in engagements that support the ethical application of biotechnology to a better understanding of endemic EDPS and their control/prevention.

The program collaborates closely with other U.S. Government departments and agencies, international partners, and the private sector. The program delivers tailored approaches that recognize, build upon, and enhance regional and partner countries' indigenous capacities. The CBE mission is achieved through the integration of three key product lines: 1) Biological Safety & Security (BS&S) capacity building, 2) Cooperative Biological Research and Engagement (CBR), and 3) Disease Surveillance, Detection, Diagnosis, Reporting, and Response (DSDDRR), formerly referred to as Threat Agent Detection and Response (TADR).

The CBE program activities directly support the National Security Staff (NSS) directed FY 2013 policy priorities for Countering Biological Threats. The policy priorities spell out three major focus areas executed by the CBE program: 1) Improve global access to the

I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

life sciences to counter infectious disease, by focusing on international efforts to advance human and agricultural disease surveillance, strengthen human and agricultural disease laboratory capacities, and further research programs and education, in order to reduce biological risks. 2) Establish and reinforce norms against the misuse of the life sciences, by focusing on efforts to engage relevant communities on issues of biological security, biosafety, and responsible conduct and promote appropriate legislation and oversight internationally; and ensuring effective implementation of outcomes from the Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference. 3) Influence, identify, inhibit, or interdict those engaged in biological weapons proliferation or terrorism, by focusing on international and domestic programs in the following areas: securing dangerous pathogens, to include optimizing under the Select Agent Program; strengthening interagency biosurveillance and situational awareness, particularly among the health, security, and life sciences communities. All three NSS priorities are addressed in the three key CBE product lines discussed above. In addition, the CBE program executes the major tenants of Presidential Policy Directive-2 "National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats." Details on CBE activities are provided in Section IV of this document.

\$	in thousan	lds
FY 2011*	FY 2012	FY 2013
Actuals	Estimate	Estimate

E. Proliferation Prevention (PP):

36,946 28,080 32,402

* FY 2011 funding reflects the restructured baseline that consolidates the Fissile Material Proliferation Prevention project to the GNS Program.

The Proliferation Prevention program enhances the capability of non-Russian FSU states and other partner countries to deter, detect, report, and interdict illicit trafficking of WMD and related materials across international borders. The DoD provides assessments,

Ι. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

equipment, infrastructure, logistics support and related training to enhance national and regional capabilities that prevent the proliferation of WMD, its components, and related materials to terrorists, roque states, or organized crime groups. This program is coordinated with the DoD International Counterproliferation Program and other U.S. Government border security programs, and furthers inter-agency collaborations that contribute to a holistic approach to export control, border security, and law enforcement-related capacity building efforts.

	<u>\$ in thousands</u>		
		2012 FY 2013	
	Actuals Esti	<u>mate</u> <u>Estimate</u>	
F. Threat Reduction Engagement (TRE): Previously titled Defense Military Contacts	5,000 2,	500 2 , 375	

Previously titled Defense Military Contacts

This program supports relationship-building engagements intended to advance the CTR mission. The name change is intended to reflect increased program support for engagement with civilian agencies and entities, important for building relationships in key areas like countering biological threats and border security. Engagements will continue with the FSU states, but will also include new geographic areas to support the CTR Program expansion, in accordance with existing authorities and determinations. The TRE program supports the following WMD related activities: non-proliferation or counter-proliferation symposia or workshops; bilateral or regional CTR-related symposia; high level exchanges or planning activities; and tabletop exercises.

I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

	\$ in thousands		
	FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2		
	Actuals	<u>Estimate</u>	Estimate
G. Other Assessments/Administrative Support (OA):	23,040	24,001	25,245

The OA funds the Audits and Examinations (A&Es) Program provided for in the CTR agreements with partner countries and overall program management and organizational costs. The A&E program is a means to ensure the DoD-provided equipment, services, and related training are fully accounted for and used effectively and efficiently for their intended purpose. Other activities include the CTR Program travel, translator/interpreter support, and other agency support services to include organizational costs. The CTR Program personnel assigned to U.S. Embassy offices in partner countries are also supported with these funds.

I. Description of Operations Financed (cont.)

A restructured program baseline is presented for FY 2011 to ensure an appropriate comparison with the FY 2012/ FY 2013 estimate under the new CTR program structure.

The CTR efforts have been restructured to consolidate funding and related activity to better track the DoD's support for the President's effort to secure all vulnerable weapons-usable nuclear materials. This restructuring will:

- Clearly link to established national security strategies
- Gain efficiencies among related project efforts; and
- Enable/promote expansion of the program beyond historical boundaries.

BA Sub-activities	*FY 2011 Base	FY 2011 Restructured
Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE) 1	16,732	23,532
Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination(SNAE) ¹	6,800	0
Chemical Weapons Destruction(CWD) Nuclear Weapons Transportation	12,000	12,000
Security (NWTS) ²	37,500	0
Nuclear Weapons Storage Security(NWSS) ²	9,614	0
Global Nuclear Security(GNS) ²	74,471	164,460
Cooperative Biological Engagement(CBE)	255,855	255,855
Proliferation Prevention(PP) ²	79,821	36,946
Threat Reduction Engagement(TRE)	5,000	5,000
Other Assessments/Administrative Support(OA)	23,040	23,040
Total	520,833	520,833

 $^{\scriptscriptstyle 1}$ FY 11, added SNAE (6,800) to SOAE (16,732)

² FY 11, added NWSS (9,614), NWTS (37,500), a line from PP (42,875) to GNS (74,471)

*For information purposes only.

II. Force Structure Summary:

This section is aligned to the revised program areas established in FY 2012.

A. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination:

The DoD provides equipment and services, and oversees destruction of strategic weapons delivery systems consistent with relevant implementing and arms control agreements. The DoD contracts to destroy or dismantle intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarinelaunched ballistic missiles, ICBM silo launchers, ICBM road-mobile launchers, SLBM launchers, and infrastructure related to these systems in Russia and Ukraine.

Solid Propellant ICBM/SLBM and Mobile Launcher Elimination - Russia

This project shares costs with Russia to eliminate the SS-25 Solid Propellant Missile System. Activities include operating and maintaining missile disassembly and elimination facilities, operating and maintaining mobile launcher elimination facilities, destroying treaty-limited and proliferation risk components, and transporting solid rocket motors into and out of a temporary storage facility.

Liquid Propellant ICBM/SLBM and Silo Elimination - Russia

This project deactivates, dismantles, and eliminates SS-18 and SS-19 ICBM silos and associated launch control center (LCC) silos; it also destroys SS-18 ICBMs, SS-19 ICBMs, and SS-N-18 SLBMs.

SLBM Launcher Elimination/SSBN Dismantlement - Russia

This project shares costs with Canada and Russia to eliminate SLBM launchers from *Delta*class and *Typhoon*-class Russian nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). In addition, this project provides the infrastructure required to defuel SSBNs at the Zvyozdochka and Zvezda naval facilities. The U.S. eliminates the launcher section,

II. Force Structure Summary (cont.)

removes the reactor section, and places the spent nuclear fuel in casks for long-term storage; Canada defuels the reactors; and Russia destroys the bows, sterns, and sails.

SS-24 Missile Disassembly, Storage, and Elimination - Ukraine

This project assists Ukraine with storing and removing propellant from SS-24 solid rocket motors. The DoD will also support the construction of the Empty Motor Case Elimination and Incineration Facility, including the procurement of an incinerator in partnership with the Department of State (DOS). This facility will permit safe, ecologically sound incineration of residual propellant and empty motor cases.

B. Chemical Weapons Destruction:

This program supports destruction of chemical weapons and reduces the risk of their proliferation to rogue states and terrorist groups.

Chemical Weapons Destruction Technical Support - Russia

This project will provide technical assistance and spare parts to two Chemical Weapons Destruction Facilities (near Shchuch'ye, Kurgan Oblast and Kizner, Udmurt Republic) for the elimination of organophosphorous (nerve) agent-filled, man-portable artillery munitions.

C. Global Nuclear Security:

This program enhances the security, control, and accountability of partner countries' nuclear weapons and/or nuclear material.

II. Force Structure Summary (cont.)

Spent Naval Fuel/Fissile Material Disposition - Russia

The DoD provides assistance and technical expertise to improve physical security and to securely transport spent naval fuel that is potentially vulnerable and meets the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) definition for weapons-usable material.

Nuclear Security Enhancements - Russia

The DoD and Department Of Energy (DOE) have provided comprehensive physical security enhancements and the ability to sustain those enhancements at Russian nuclear weapons storage sites. These sites include both national stockpile sites and operational storage sites administered by the 12th Main Directorate at the Navy, Air Force, and Strategic Rocket Forces bases as well as temporary storage locations at road-to-rail transfer points. The DoD and DOE are assisting the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) to sustain this installed equipment and infrastructure during a transition period while the MOD builds the capacity to assume full responsibility.

Automated Inventory Control and Management System - Russia

This project installs automated inventory systems at the MOD-controlled Strategic Rocket Forces sites for tracking and cataloging nuclear weapons to be eliminated.

Security Assessment and Training Center (SATC) - Russia

This project expands the existing DoD-provided SATC facility at Abramovo Base to serve as a regional training and sustainment center. The SATC expansion will complement the Far East Training Center (FETC) and the DOE provided Kola and Siberian Technical Centers to provide training, depot-level maintenance and repair, and spare parts storage for the Russian WMD security. Specifically the project will provide a classroom building, student dormitory, maintenance and repair workshop, warehouse, garage, and associated equipment.

II. Force Structure Summary (cont.)

Nuclear Weapons Transportation - Russia

This project assists Russia in transporting nuclear warheads safely and securely to consolidated secure storage and dismantlement facilities.

<u>Fissile and Radioactive Material Proliferation Prevention - Kazakhstan</u> This project secures radiological materials.

Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence

This program helps establish Centers of Excellence with partner countries to enhance training capability, consistent with international best practices, for nuclear security, material control, inventory management, transport security, and other activities important to improving nuclear material security. The program will facilitate training course development and delivery, and will provide equipment to enhance nuclear security, material control, and inventory management.

II. Force Structure Summary (cont.)

D. Cooperative Biological Engagement:

The CBE program is functionally organized and implements through partner countries including: Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Burundi, Djibouti, Georgia, India, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Pakistan, Russia, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, as well as other regional engagements. The DoD's efforts in Russia and Uzbekistan are limited due to both countries reluctance to cooperate with the DoD on biological threat reduction. Additional details on planned project activities are provided in Section IV.

E. Proliferation Prevention:

This program enhances the capability of partner countries to prevent, deter, detect, report, and interdict illicit trafficking in WMD and related materials. The DoD support includes equipment, infrastructure and operations and maintenance training for border guards, customs officials, and maritime military forces with defined roles in WMD proliferation prevention. This program complements ongoing United States Government and international counterproliferation assistance provided by the DOE's Second Line of Defense program, the DOS's Export Control and related Border Security program, and the DoD's International Counterproliferation program, and all programmatic efforts will be closely coordinated across these Departments.

Land Border and Maritime Proliferation Prevention - Ukraine

This project assists development of a comprehensive capability to detect and interdict WMD and related materials transiting the Moldovan, Polish and Russian land borders, along Ukraine's maritime border, adjacent coastal waters of the Black Sea and Sea of Azov, and at key seaports.

II. Force Structure Summary (cont.)

Land Border Proliferation Prevention - Armenia

This project will enhance the capability to detect and interdict WMD and related materials transiting the Georgia land border.

Land Border Proliferation Prevention - Moldova

This project will enhance the capability to detect and interdict WMD and related materials transiting the Ukrainian and region of Transniestria's land borders.

Maritime and Land Border Proliferation Prevention - Southeast Asia

This project will enhance the capabilities of partner countries within the Southeast Asia region to detect and interdict WMD and related materials transiting the Strait of Malacca and in other regional waters and conduct assessments for future maritime and land border efforts.

F. Threat Reduction Engagement:

This program supports specific relationship-building opportunities, which could lead to the CTR Program developments in new geographic areas and achieve other CTR Program benefits.

G. Other Assessments/Administrative Support:

Audits and Examinations

This project enables the U.S. Government to examine the serviceability of the CTR Program-provided equipment and evaluate whether the provided equipment, services, and training are being used for the intended purposes.

II. Force Structure Summary (cont.)

Program Management/Administration

This project provides program administrative and general support, project development costs, an advisory and assistance services contract, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency infrastructure support, and travel. This project funds permanent full-time Defense Threat Reduction Offices (DTROs) in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Additional DTROs may be opened as CTR projects expand into new countries.

III. Financial Summary (\$ in thousands)

				FY 2012				_
			Congressional Action				-	
A. BA Subactivities 1. Strategic Offensive Arms	FY 2011 Actuals 23,532	Budget Request 63,221	Amount	P e	ercent App 0.0	oropriated 63,221	Current Estimate 63,221	FY 2013 Estimate 68,271
Elimination								
2. Chemical Weapons Destruction	12,000	9,804		0	0.0	9,804	9,804	14,630
3. Global Nuclear Security	164,460	121,143		0	0.0	121,143	121,143	99 , 789
4. Cooperative Biological	255 , 855	259,470		0	0.0	259 , 470	259,470	276,399
Engagement								
5. Proliferation Prevention	36,946	28,080		0	0.0	28,080	28,080	32,402
6. Threat Reduction Engagement	5,000	2,500		0	0.0	2,500	2,500	2,375
7. Other Assessments/	23,040	24,001		0	0.0	24,001	24,001	25,245
Administrative Support								
Total	520,833	508,219		0	0.0	508,219	508,219	519,111
A restructured program baseline is present	ed for FY 2011	to ensure an a	approriate	compa	rison with	the FY 2012/	FY 2013 estim	nate under

the new CTR program structure.

B. <u>Reconciliation Summary</u>	Change FY 2012/FY 2012	Change FY 2012/FY 2013
Baseline Funding	508,219	508,219
Congressional Adjustments (Distributed)		
Congressional Adjustments (Undistributed)		
Adjustments to Meet Congressional Intent		
Congressional Adjustments (General Provisions)		
Subtotal Appropriated Amount	508,219	
Fact-of-Life Changes (2012 to 2012 Only)		
Subtotal Baseline Funding	508,219	
Supplemental		
Reprogrammings		
Price Changes		8,639
Functional Transfers		
Program Changes		2,253
Current Estimate	508,219	519,111
Less: Wartime Supplemental		
Normalized Current Estimate	508,219	

C. Reconciliation of Increases and Decreases FY 2012 President's Budget Request (Amended, if applicable)	Amount Totals 508,219
1. Congressional Adjustments	
a. Distributed Adjustments	
b. Undistributed Adjustments	
c. Adjustments to Meet Congressional Intent	
d. General Provisions	
FY 2012 Appropriated Amount	508,219
2. War-Related and Disaster Supplemental Appropriations	
3. Fact-of-Life Changes	
FY 2012 Baseline Funding	508,219
4. Reprogrammings (Requiring 1415 Actions)	
Revised FY 2012 Estimate	508,219
5. Less: Item 2, War-Related and Disaster Supplemental	
Appropriations and Item 4, Reprogrammings	
FY 2012 Normalized Current Estimate	508,219
6. Price Change	8,639
7. Functional Transfers	
8. Program Increases	25,834
a. Annualization of New FY 2012 Program	
b. One-Time FY 2013 Increases	
c. Program Growth in FY 2013	
1) Cooperative Biological Engagement (CBE):	12,518
This increase reflects increased bio-engagement in new	W
countries (Rwanda, Burundi and other Regional	
Engagements), and will initiate or expand activities :	
select areas of Asia and Africa, including projects to	
improve biosecurity and biosafety in Afghanistan, Arme	enia,
Pakistan, East Africa, and disease detection,	
surveillance, reporting and response systems in Asia a	
Africa. It will also support construction of the Cen	tral

C.	Recor	ciliation of Increases and Decreases	Amount	Totals
		Reference Laboratory (CRL) in Kazakhstan, Central Diagnostic Facility in Ukraine and equipage of the CRL in Azerbaijan. Funding increase will provide for additional required contractual support, and technical services. (FY		
	2)	2012 Base: \$259,470).		
	2)	Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD): This increase supports technical assistance to the Russian chemical weapons elimination program to ensure safe and reliable agent destruction operations at two chemical weapons destruction facilities (Shchuch'ye and Kizner) involving approximately 11,110 metric tons of nerve agent- filled artillery munitions. This effort will achieve an economy of scale (and about \$14,000 in tangible savings) by sharing the logistics and procurement staff support costs between the two destruction sites. Funding increase will provide for additional required contractual support, and technical services. (FY 2012 Base: \$9,804).	4,659	
	3)	Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE): This program provides for the elimination of strategic weapons and delivery systems in Russia in support of the New START Treaty (NST). Funding increase will provide for additional required contractual support, and technical services. (FY 2012 Base: \$63,221)	3,976	
	4)	Proliferation Prevention (PP): This increase represents expanded land border and maritime proliferation prevention efforts in extended regional areas within South East Asia. Efforts may include the development of surveillance, detection, and interdiction capabilities to prevent the proliferation of materials, components, and technologies. Funding increase will	3,845	

c.	Reconciliation of Increases and Decreases provide for additional required contractual support. (FY 2012 Base: \$28,080).	Amount	Totals
	5) Other Assessments/Administrative Support (OA): This increase funds additional support costs associated with the Defense Threat Reduction Embassy Offices in partner countries. (FY 2012 Base: \$24,001).	836	
9.	Program Decreases a. Annualization of FY 2012 Program Decreases b. One-Time FY 2012 Increases c. Program Decreases in FY 2013		-23,581
	1) Global Nuclear Security (GNS): This decrease represents the completion of current fissile material security efforts in Kazakhstan and reduced efforts as sustainment responsibilities for security upgrades are transferred to Russia MOD. This decrease reduces contractual support associated with the completion of efforts in Kazakhstan and the transfer of responsibilities to the Russia MOD. (FY 2012 Base: \$121,143).	-23,413	
	2) Threat Reduction Engagement (TRE): This decrease represents up to 3 fewer threat reduction engagement opportunities within existing FSU countries. This decrease reduces travel. (FY 2012 Base: \$2,500)	-168	
FY	2013 Budget Request		519,111

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

A. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE):

FY 2011 funds executed over three years will:

- Eliminate 32 SS-18 ICBM silo launchers and launch control centers (LCC);
- Eliminate 12 SS-19 ICBMs;
- Eliminate 7 SS-25 ICBMs;
- Eliminate 9 SS-25 road-mobile launchers;
- Transport SS-24 solid rocket motors (SRM) to the propellant removal facility;
- Assist Ukraine by making payments for 30 empty SRM cases;
- Store remaining SRMs;
- Continue maintenance and repair of SRM storage facilities;
- Complete infrastructure improvements in Ukraine for incineration of excess washed-out propellant and for the delivery of SS-24 empty motor cases (EMC); and
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

FY 2012 funds executed over three years will:

- Eliminate 16 SS-18 silo launchers and LCCs;
- Dismantle 11 and eliminate 22 SS-19 silo launchers and LCCs;
- Eliminate 5 SS-25 ICBMs;
- Eliminate 5 SS-25 road-mobile launchers;
- Eliminate 4 SS-N-18 SLBMs;
- Dismantle nuclear reactor cores and launcher sections of 1 Delta III-class SSBN and eliminate 16 SLBM launchers;

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Initiate dismantlement of nuclear reactor cores and launcher sections of 1 Typhoon-class SSBN and eliminate 20 SLBM launchers;
- Assist Ukraine by making payments for 60 empty SRM cases;
- Store Ukraine's remaining SRMs;
- Continue maintenance and repair of SRM storage facilities; and
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

FY 2013 funds executed over three years will:

- Eliminate 4 SS-18 ICBMs;
- Eliminate 11 SS-19 ICBMs;
- Eliminate 15 SS-18 silo launchers and LCCs;
- Dismantle and eliminate 11 SS-19 silo launchers and LCCs;
- Eliminate 24 SS-25 ICBMs;
- Eliminate 27 SS-25 road-mobile launchers;
- Decommission 2 SS-25 regiments;
- Eliminate 4 SS-N-18 SLBMs;
- Dismantle nuclear reactor cores and launcher sections of 1 Delta III-class SSBN and eliminate 16 SLBM launchers;
- Continue dismantlement of nuclear reactor cores and launcher sections of 1 Typhoon-class SSBN and eliminate 20 SLBM launchers;
- Assist Ukraine by making payments for 25 empty SRM cases;
- Store Ukraine's remaining SRMs;
- Continue maintenance and repair of SRM storage facilities; and
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

B. Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD):

FY 2011 funds executed over three years will:

- Provide technical support for the Shchuch'ye Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility (CWDF), responding to process and equipment failure; conducting root cause analysis and developing corrective actions; providing advice and assistance to maintain and repair equipment; procuring spares, repair parts, and materials; training operations and maintenance workforce; and
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

FY 2012 funds executed over three years will:

- Provide technical support for the Shchuch'ye CWDF and initial support for the Kizner CWDF, responding to process and equipment failure; conducting root cause analysis and developing corrective actions; providing advice and assistance to maintain and repair equipment; procuring spares, repair parts, and materials; training operations and maintenance workforce; and
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

FY 2013 funds executed over three years will:

 Provide technical support for the Shchuch'ye CWDF and full support for the Kizner CWDF, responding to process and equipment failure; conducting root cause analysis and developing corrective actions; providing advice and

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

assistance to maintain and repair equipment; procuring spares, repair parts, and materials; training operations and maintenance workforce; and

Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

C. Global Nuclear Security (GNS):

FY 2011 funds executed over three years will:

- Continue Russia Nuclear Security Enhancements and Sustainment Initiatives to include: vendor service contracts at rail transfer points, Small Arms Training Systems, Personnel Reliability Programs, live fire ranges, Mobile Repair Vehicles, a Centralized Maintenance Management System, a Unified Operation Center, and On-Site Repair Points;
- Transport approximately 48 trainloads of deactivated nuclear warheads (1,000 to 1,500) from deployed locations to enhanced security storage sites or dismantlement and from storage to dismantlement facilities;
- Complete the Automated Inventory Control and Management hardware and software expansion to Strategic Rocket Force (SRF) sites;
- Provide for nuclear security Centers of Excellence outside the FSU in coordination with the U.S. interagency;
- Secure spent naval fuel (SNF);
- Continue building Russian capacity to sustain security upgrades at 18 nuclear weapons storage sites, and sustainment for 5 rail transfer points and 2 regional centers (SATC and FETC) including training, maintenance, repair, and limited spare parts;

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Kazakhstan: Install additional security measures for radiological material;
- Complete construction to enhance capabilities at SATC; and
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

FY 2012 funds executed over three years will:

- Continue building Russian capacity to sustain (to include training, maintenance, and repair) 18 nuclear weapons storage sites, and sustainment of 5 rail transfer points and 2 regional centers (SATC and FETC), vendor service contracts at rail transfer points, Small Arms Training Systems and live fire ranges, Personnel Reliability Programs, Mobile Repair Vehicles, Centralized Maintenance Management System, Unified Operation Centers, and On-Site Repair Points;
- Transport approximately 48 trainloads of deactivated nuclear warheads (1,000 to 1,500) from deployed locations to enhanced security storage sites or dismantlement and from storage to dismantlement facilities;
- Continue support for Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence;
- Complete additional security measures for radiological material;
- Support shipments of SNF; and
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

FY 2013 funds executed over three years will:

 Continue building Russian capacity to sustain (to include training, maintenance, and repair) 18 nuclear weapons storage sites, and sustainment of 5 rail transfer points and 2 regional centers (SATC and FETC), vendor service

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

contracts at rail transfer points, Small Arms Training Systems and live fire ranges, Personnel Reliability Programs, Mobile Repair Vehicles, Centralized Maintenance Management System, Unified Operation Centers, and On-Site Repair Points;

- Transport approximately 48 trainloads of deactivated nuclear warheads (1,000 to 1,500) from deployed locations to enhanced security storage sites or dismantlement and from storage to dismantlement facilities;
- Continue support for Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence;
- Support future shipments of SNF that meet the IAEA criteria;
- Provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

D. Cooperative Biological Engagement (CBE):

FY 2011 funds executed over three years will:

- Initiate bio-engagement in Afghanistan, Djibouti, India, Iraq, Kenya, Pakistan, South Africa, and Uganda;
- Initiate design for a National Public Health Laboratory (NPHL) and upgrades to a Central Public Health Laboratory (CPHL) in Afghanistan and engage in disease detection, surveillance, reporting and response;
- Initiate design of a Biological Medical Research Center (BMRC) in Pakistan;
- Initiate cooperative bilateral research projects between U.S. and Russian universities, and through the Civilian Research and Development Fund (CRDF);
- Initiate construction and equipment installation for a secure pathogen repository in Kazakhstan;
- Continue activities to include delivery, operational testing, and training of Mobile Diagnostic Units (MDUs) in Pakistan;
- Improve BS&S and capacity for disease detection, surveillance, reporting and response across the veterinary and health systems in Pakistan, in conjunction with the U.S. interagency;
- Continue cooperative bilateral research between U.S. and Pakistani universities;

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Continue to implement integrated electronic disease reporting in CBE-engaged countries, including through the Electronic Integrated Disease Surveillance System (EIDSS);
- Continue construction and equipment installation of Secured Pathogen Repositories to include: construction oversight of 1 Central Reference Laboratory (CRL) in Azerbaijan, and construction of 1 CRL in Kazakhstan;
- Continue to provide for 12 CBR projects (2 in Armenia, 2 in Azerbaijan, 2 in Georgia, 3 in Kazakhstan, and 3 in Ukraine);
- Continue to provide training in laboratory diagnostic techniques, epidemiology, clinical sample collection, outbreak surveillance, laboratory and health system management, and biosafety, biosecurity, and bioethics in CBE-engaged countries;
- Continue sustainment of 36 Diagnostic Labs (DLs) (11 in Azerbaijan, 6 in Georgia, 4 in Kazakhstan, 5 in Ukraine, and limited support for 10 in Uzbekistan), 1 Central Public Health Reference Laboratory (CPHRL) in Georgia and 1 Human CRL in Ukraine;

Complete 16 DLs (10 in Azerbaijan, 4 in Ukraine and 2 in Uzbekistan);

- Complete biorisk assessments in select areas Asia and Africa;
- Continue to provide for bio-related conference support; and
- Continue to provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

FY 2012 funds executed over three years will:

- Initiate bio-engagement in Tanzania, additional East African countries and West Africa;
- Initiate construction for a NPHL in Afghanistan;
- Initiate construction of the BMRC in Pakistan;

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Initiate construction and equipment installation for secure pathogen repositories in Ukraine to include: 1 pathogen repository and 1 Veterinary Central Diagnostic Facility;
- Continue activities to include delivery, operational testing, and training of MDUs in Pakistan;
- Continue activities to improve BS&S and capacity for disease detection, surveillance, reporting and response across the veterinary and health systems in Pakistan, in conjunction with the U.S. interagency;
- Continue cooperative research projects in CBE-engaged countries;
- Continue to implement EIDSS in CBE-engaged countries;
- Continue construction and equipment installation of secure pathogen repositories to include: construction oversight of 1 CRL in Azerbaijan, and construction of 1 CRL in Kazakhstan, and 1 repository upgrade in Kazakhstan;
- Continue cooperative biological research (CBR) projects in Afghanistan, Africa, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 3 in Kazakhstan, Pakistan, and 3 in Ukraine and other countries as projects qualify for funding);
- Continue to provide training in laboratory diagnostic techniques, epidemiology, clinical sample collection, outbreak surveillance, laboratory and health system management, and biosafety, biosecurity, and bioethics in CBE-engaged countries;
- Continue sustainment of 41 DLs (11 in Azerbaijan, 6 in Georgia, 4 in Kazakhstan, 10 in Ukraine, and limited support for 10 in Uzbekistan), 1 CPHRL in Georgia, and 1 human CRL in Ukraine;
- Complete upgrades to a CPHL in Afghanistan;
- Complete 11 DLs (2 in Armenia, 7 in Ukraine, 1 in Afghanistan and 1 in Pakistan);
- Complete biorisk assessments in select areas of Asia and Africa;

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Continue to provide for bio-related conference support; and
- Continue to provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

FY 2013 funds executed over three years will:

- Initiate bio-engagement in Burundi, Rwanda, and other regional engagements;
- Continue cooperative research projects in CBE-engaged countries;
- Continue to implement EIDSS in CBE-engaged countries;
- Continue construction and equipment installation of Secured Pathogen Repositories to include: 1 CRL in Kazakhstan and 1 secured pathogen repository in Kazakhstan;
- Continue CBR projects in Afghanistan, Africa, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 2 in Pakistan, Ukraine, and other CBE-countries as valuable projects are approved;
- Continue to provide training in laboratory diagnostic techniques, epidemiology, clinical sample collection, outbreak surveillance, laboratory and health system management, and biosafety, biosecurity, and bioethics in CBE-engaged countries;
- Continue sustainment of 42 DLs (1 in Armenia, 11 in Azerbaijan, 6 in Georgia, 4 in Kazakhstan, 10 in Ukraine, and 10 in Uzbekistan), 1 CPHRL in Georgia, and 1 human CRL in Ukraine;
- Continue construction for an NPHL in Afghanistan;
- Continue construction of Veterinary Central Diagnostic Facility in Ukraine;
- Complete construction and equipment installation for Secured Pathogen Repositories to include: construction oversight of 1 CRL in Azerbaijan and 1 pathogen repository in Ukraine;
- Complete the BMRC in Pakistan;

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Complete 11 DLs in Kenya, Uganda, Ukraine, and other countries to fill gaps in analytical bio-surveillance capacity;
- Complete biorisk assessments in select areas of Asia and Africa;
- Continue to provide for bio-related conference support; and
- Continue to provide logistical, administrative, and advisory support.

E. Proliferation Prevention (PP):

FY 2011 funds executed over three years will:

- Ukraine: Increase WMD command and control, communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment along the Moldova/Transnistria, Poland and Russia borders, continue project assessments and support efforts to upgrade international and state ports of entry (POE) and inland clearing stations (ICS);
- Enhance WMD command and control, communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment on the Black Sea and Sea of Azov maritime borders;
- Azerbaijan: Enhance WMD command and control, communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment on the Caspian Sea maritime border;
- Armenia: Increase WMD command and control, communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment along the Georgia border, continue project assessments and support efforts to upgrade

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

international and state ports of entry (POE) and inland clearing stations (ICS);

- Moldova: Begin initial engagement to increase WMD command and control, communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment;
- Georgia: Initiate enhancement of WMD interdiction, and sustainment capabilities on the Black Sea maritime border;
- Southeast Asia: Begin initial engagement to assess and derive requirements for WMD command and control, communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment along the Strait of Malacca and in other regional waters; and
- Provide logistical and operational support.

FY 2012 funds executed over three years will:

- Ukraine: Continue to increase WMD command and control, communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment along the Moldova/Transnistria, Poland and Russia borders, continue project assessments and support efforts to upgrade international and state POE and ICS;
- Enhance WMD command and control, communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment on the Black Sea and Sea of Azov maritime borders;
- Armenia: Continue to increase WMD command and control, communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment along the Georgia border, continue project assessments and support efforts to upgrade

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

international and state ports of entry (POE) and inland clearing stations (ICS);

- Moldova: Continue to increase WMD command and control, communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment;
- Georgia: Continue enhancements of WMD interdiction, and sustainment capabilities on the Black Sea maritime border;
- Southeast Asia: Begin implementation of identified requirements for WMD command and control, communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment in initial countries along the Strait of Malacca and in other regional waters and on land borders, and continue project assessments; and
- Provide logistical and operational support.

FY 2013 funds executed over three years will:

- Armenia: Continue to increase WMD command and control, communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment along the Georgia border, continue project assessments and support efforts to upgrade international and state ports of entry (POE) and inland clearing stations (ICS);
- Moldova: Continue to increase WMD command and control, communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment along the Ukraine border, continue project assessments and support efforts to upgrade international and state ports of entry (POE) and inland clearing stations (ICS);

IV. Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary:

- Southeast Asia: Continue to increase WMD command and control, communications, surveillance, detection and interdiction capabilities, and sustainment in initial countries and begin implementation in additional countries along the Strait of Malacca and in other regional waters and on land borders, and continue project assessments; and
- Provide logistical and operational support.

F. Threat Reduction Engagement (TRE):

• FY 2011 through FY 2013 funds will continue to support specific relationshipbuilding opportunities with existing FSU countries while also shifting towards engagements with partners in new geographical areas including cooperation and coordination with cognizant Unified Combatant Commands (UCCs).

G. Other Assessments/Administrative Cost (OA):

 FY 2011 through FY 2013 funds support approximately 8-12 Audits and Examinations per year and provide agency support services as well as contractor administrative and advisory support. Funds also provide U.S. Embassy support for current and emerging DTRA/CTR offices in partner countries.

V. <u>Personnel Summary</u>	<u>FY 2011</u>	<u>FY 2012</u>	<u>FY 2013</u>	Change FY 2011/ FY 2012	Change FY 2012/ FY 2013
Contractor FTEs (Total)	<u>1,188</u>	1,138	<u>1,139</u>	-50	<u>1</u>

Beginning October 1, 2011, DTRA has initiated a phased approach to modify contracts as new contracts are issued or bilateral modifications are made to existing contracts. These modifications will direct private sector firms to report actual direct labor hours and direct labor costs for the previous fiscal year. At the earliest, reporting will be required for modified contracts (or task orders) at the end of fiscal year 2012, i.e., report due October 2012. The statement of work modification will require that direct labor hours/costs be reported directly to DTRA for incorporation into the agency's annual inventory of services contracts until such time that this data can be reported directly into a DoD-wide contractor manpower reporting system.

VI. OP 32 Line Items as Applicable (Dollars in thousands):

	Change		Change				
	FY 2011	FY 2011/FY 2012		FY 2012	FY 2012/FY 2013		FY 2013
OP 32 Line	Actuals	Price	Program	Estimate	Price	Program	Estimate
308 Travel of Persons	3,713	67	-450	3,330	57	-158	3,229
399 Total Travel	3,713	67	-450	3,330	57	-158	3,229
932 Mgt Prof Support Svcs	10,089	182	1,050	11,321	192	-4,527	6,986
934 Engineering & Tech Svcs	27,638	497	-4,602	23,533	400	979	24,912
987 Other IntraGovt Purch	41,606	749	7,359	49,714	845	9 , 555	60,114
989 Other Services	437,787	7,880	-25,346	420,321	7,145	-3,596	423,870
999 Total Other Purchases	517,120	9,308	-21,539	504,889	8,582	2,411	515,882
Total	520,833	9,375	-21,989	508,219	8,639	2,253	519,111

The above represents the total obligation authority plan for the CTR program. These figures will differ from the object class report stating FY 2011 actuals and unobligated balances carried forward due to the multi-year nature of the account.

(This page intentionally left blank.)