

**Panel V:  
Assessment of effectiveness and  
impact of practices for  
strengthening personnel reliability  
and culture of responsibility**

**A Biosafety Professional's Perspective**

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# New PRP measures need to be evaluated

- *Any personnel reliability measures that are implemented **should be evaluated** for effectiveness and impact on the research enterprise.*
- *Measures aimed at enhancing personnel reliability **should be periodically evaluated** both for effectiveness and impact on the research enterprise.*
  - May 2009 NSABB report “Enhancing Personnel Reliability Among Individuals with Access to Select Agents.”

# New PRP measures need to be evaluated

- *...it was also noted repeatedly that PRPs and their assessment measures or instruments need to be monitored for the impact, **effectiveness**, and unintended consequences.*
  - Appendix C of NSABB May 2009 report, summary of comments from public consultation meeting of April 3, 2009.

# Evaluation is challenging

- *Assessing the effectiveness of personnel reliability measures is **challenging** since it cannot usually be known what was prevented due to the implementation of personnel reliability measures.*
  - May 2009 NSABB report “Enhancing Personnel Reliability Among Individuals with Access to Select Agents.”

# Biosafety perspective

- Extreme caution needs to be exercised when considering new PRP measures
- Scientists are not likely to embrace more restrictions when there is no way to evaluate their effectiveness
- Scientists may be driven away from infectious disease research by additional administrative burdens

# Biosafety perspective

- It is challenging, if not impossible, to measure effectiveness of PRP practices
- There is no evidence that the current Security Risk Assessment requirements in the Select Agent program have reduced insider threat, or that more measures are needed
- Risk cannot be totally eliminated
- Additional PRP measures are not needed for the Select Agent program

# Benefits of enhancing Culture of Responsibility

- Shifts responsibility to the scientists
- Avoids negative impact of additional PRP measures and additional administrative burden
- Unlikely to drive scientists away from select agent research

# Culture of Responsibility

- Hypothetical examples
  - Lack of honesty in other areas
  - Carelessness in inventory



# Conclusions

- Effectiveness of additional PRP measures cannot easily be measured.
- Additional PRP measures are not needed in the Select Agent Program.
- Enhancing the Culture of Responsibility will do more to decrease the insider threat than implementing additional PRP measures.