PEKING'S SUPPORT OF INSURGENCIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This study establishes the facts and examines the purposes of China's
support of insurgencies in Southeast Asia.
It is a fact that, despite China's overall policy of friendly relations,
and despite the passage of some four years since the general ending of
Cultural Revolution militancy, China continues to sponsor and support
insurgencies against certain governments in Southeast Asia. Furthermore,
in the cases of Burma and Thailand, such covert assistance has
significantly expanded: high-ranking officers from the PLA's 11th Army
perform command roles in insurgent headquarters; PLA officers and
non-coms help fill out the ranks of insurgent combat forces; PLA units
in nearby Yunnan Province train and supply the rebels; and China-based
"insurgent" radio stations beam operational guidance and antigovernment
propaganda support into Burma and Thailand. These remote insurgencies
are not likely to threaten the Rangoon or Bangkok governments, but the
fact remains that China's covert sponsorship of these insurrections is
clearly impeding China's diplomatic attempts to elicit further
responsiveness from these same governments.
This study examines various possible purposes behind this self-defeating
course — "two faced," as the Burmese call it. Is the Chinese purpose
essentially that of attempting to exert added pressure on certain of
China's small neighbors? Or a concern not to be up-staged by any new
Soviet presence in Southeast Asia and in the support of revolutionary
movements? Or an unwillingness or inability to cease supporting
insurgencies once begun? Or bureaucratic disarray in the conduct of
Chinese foreign relations? Or, a reflection of Maoist impulses? The
study concludes that it is the latter of these purposes which carries
the greatest force: China supports certain insurgencies in Southeast
Asia largely because that's the way the boss, Mao Tse-tung, wants it —
for his own mix of stubbornly-held ideological and personal reasons.
This study has received constructive assistance from a number of CIA
offices. The study's interpretations are those of its author, Arthur A.
Cohen, and of this Staff.
Hal Ford Chief, DD/I Special Research Staff
1 Source: Central
Intelligence Agency, OPI 16 (Office of Current Intelligence), Job
80T00039A, Box 4, Item Number 13. Secret; No Foreign Dissem;
Background use only.