MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER FROM: W.R.
Smyser [WRS initialed]
SUBJECT: Domestic Dissent in Asia and U.S. Policy
We must recognize that the recent increase in domestic tension that has
developed in South Korea will not be the only instance of that kind in
Asia during the coming year.
Similar crises can occur at any time in at least four different
countries:
—In Thailand, where the present centrist caretaker government may be
unable to find a path to constitutionalism that will be acceptable to
the military on the one hand and to the students and their supporters on
the other. If elections are held within the next three months as
promised, the resulting government is likely to be more responsive to
student and intellectual pressures — which could sharpen its problems
with the Thai military leadership and perhaps even lead to a coup.
—In Indonesia, where the small but growing student protest that began
late last year against official corruption, government shortcomings in
economic development, and foreign investment (particularly Japanese)
poses the first significant protest movement that the Suharto Government has had to
face.
—In the Philippines, where President Marcos' disorganized
opposition has recently begun a more earnest effort to mount effective
pressure against his political controls.
—In South Vietnam, where President Thieu is about to ask for a
constitutional amendment permitting him to run again. You know what the
reaction will be, here and in Vietnam.
We are supplying aid to all these governments, and the opposition is well
aware of how to make an impact among sympathetic American journalists as
well as on the Hill. We could have some problems this spring, when all
the school terms begin again in Asia and when the opposition figures
begin granting interviews and staging various forms of protest.
As I noted in my memo of last week regarding Korea, I understand that the
President and you believe we must maintain our distance from these
domestic disputes, even though we will pay a certain price.
The EA bureaucracy, however, often still
wants and tries to instruct its posts, whenever such incidents occur, to
go in and give advice to our allies, usually put in terms of western
political value judgments — whether or not that advice is sound. They do
this partly out of honest sentiment and partly because it enables them
to tell our press and our Congress that they are doing their best to
promote progress toward democracy. If they do it on any single case, it
will be harder to dissuade them on others.
We can try to control these pressures from here, if you wish to do so. We
can stop cables and try to get a deeper understanding of your
reservations about involvement in other nations' domestic affairs. But
it would also be helpful if you could either talk to Mr. Ingersoll about
this yourself or ask me to talk to him about it. Our approach would be
more consistent if the relevant EA offices
know what you want in advance.
Options
1. That you authorize us to continue blocking State messages that lead to
our involvement in the domestic problems of our allies in Asia.
Approve Disapprove
2. That you authorize me to discuss this with Mr. Ingersoll along the
above lines. Approve Disapprove
3. That you speak to Mr. Ingersoll yourself (we can give you talking points, if
you wish). Approve Disapprove
1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential
Materials, NSC Files, Box 1338,
Unfiled Material, 1974, 5 of 9. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent
for action. Kissinger did not approve or disapprove any of the
recommendations on the last page but, near the top of the first
page, Scowcroft
wrote, “HAK has seen. Just watch the
outgoing traffic carefully.”