Clinical Issues and Research in Respiratory Failure
from Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
Report of a National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute/Centers for Disease Control and Prevention/National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases Workshop
Published in Am J Respir Crit Care Med Vol 171. pp 518-526, 2005 Internet
address www.atsjournals.org
Mitchell M. Levy, Melisse S. Baylor, Gordon R. Bernard, Rob Fowler, Teri J. Franks, Frederick G. Hayden, Rita Helfand, Stephen E. Lapinsky, Thomas R. Martin, Michael S. Niederman, Gordon D. Rubenfeld, Arthur S. Slutsky, Thomas E. Stewart, Barbara A. Styrt, B. Taylor Thompson, and Andrea L. Harabin
From the Department of Medicine, Brown University/Rhode Island Hospital, Providence, Rhode Island; Division of Antiviral Drug Products, Food and
Drug Administration, Rockville, Maryland; Department of Medicine, Vanderbilt University School of Medicine, Nashville, Tennessee;
Department of Pulmonary and Mediastinal Pathology, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, Washington, DC; Department of Internal Medicine,
University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia; Respiratory and Enteric Viruses Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta,
Georgia; Division of Pulmonary and Critical Care Medicine, VA Puget Sound Medical Center, Seattle, Washington; Department of Medicine,
Winthrop University Hospital, Mineola, New York; Department of Pulmonary and Critical Care Medicine, University of Washington at
Harborview Medical Center, Seattle, Washington; Pulmonary and Critical Care Unit, Department of Medicine, Massachusetts General Hospital,
Boston, Massachusetts; Division of Lung Diseases, NHLBI/NIH, Bethesda, Maryland; Interdepartmental Division of Critical Care Medicine,
Sunnybrook & Women’s College Health Sciences Centre, Toronto, Ontario, Canada; Department of Medicine, Mount Sinai Hospital, Toronto,
Ontario, Canada; Department of Critical Care Medicine, Mount Sinai Hospital and University Health Network, Toronto, Ontario, Canada;
Departments of Medicine and Critical Care, St. Michael’s Hospital, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
This workshop, sponsored by the Division of Lung Diseases, National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute, National Institutes of Health, was held
in Bethesda, Md., October 15, 2003.
The National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute, along with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the National Institute
of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, convened a panel to develop
recommendations for treatment, prevention, and research for respiratory
failure from severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and
other newly emerging infections. The clinical and pathological features
of acute lung injury (ALI) from SARS appear indistinguishable
from ALI from other causes. The mainstay of treatments for ALI
remains supportive. Patients with ALI from SARS who require mechanical
ventilation should receive a lung protective, low tidal volume strategy. Adjuvant treatments recommended include prevention of venous thromboembolism, stress ulcer prophylaxis, and
semirecumbent positioning during ventilation. Based on previous experience in Canada, infection control resources and protocols
were recommended. Leadership structure, communication, training, and morale are an essential aspect of SARS management. A
multicenter, placebo-controlled trial of corticosteroids for late SARS
is justified because of widespread clinical use and uncertainties
about relative risks and benefits. Studies of combined pathophysiologic endpoints were recommended, with mortality as a secondary
endpoint. The group recommended preparation for studies, including protocols, ethical considerations, Web-based registries, and data
entry systems.
Keywords: acute lung injury; acute respiratory distress syndrome;
infectious disease
This report summarizes the findings of a panel convened by the
Division of Lung Diseases of the National Heart, Lung, and
Blood Institute in cooperation with the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) and the National Institute of
Allergy and Infectious Diseases to discuss clinical issues related
to the treatment and study of respiratory failure in critically ill
patients from a potential outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS). It is recognized that there could be a reemergence
of illness from the novel virus named the SARSAssociated
Coronavirus or other potential agents that could also
cause acute lung injury (ALI) and respiratory failure. The goals
of the conference were stated at the outset:
- To develop recommendations for the treatment of patients
that progress to critical illness, especially ALI and acute
respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) from SARS and
other emerging viral diseases.
- To determine if most patients with hypoxemic respiratory
failure due to SARS admitted to the intensive care unit
meet criteria for ALI/ARDS, and to establish a global
protocol for its management.
- To develop a potential clinical research agenda for the
investigation of SARS.
- To incorporate lessons from the Canadian experience with
SARS into the overall recommendations of the panel.
The group included pulmonary and critical care clinician scientists
knowledgeable in the treatment and pathogenesis of ALI
and ARDS, as well as infectious and pulmonary disease experts
experienced in the treatment of patients with respiratory failure
from SARS, antiviral experts, and representatives of government
agencies. Each participating organization or panel member contributed
a section to this manuscript according to its particular
expertise. The information and recommendations included in
the manuscript are based on previous evidence-based reviews and current studies, published elsewhere and referenced in this
manuscript (1).
SARS—BACKGROUND AND CLINICAL EXPERIENCE
SARS is a newly recognized infectious illness that rapidly spread
throughout many parts of Asia, North America, and Europe. Between November 1, 2002 and August 7, 2003, 8,098 people
in 29 countries developed probable SARS, with the heaviest
burden of illness felt in China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore,
Viet Nam, and Canada (2, 3). The morbidity, mortality, and
apparent speed and ease of transmission associated with SARS
have led to international concern. The recent documentation of additional cases related to laboratory acquisition and infection
presumably transmitted from an animal reservoir highlight the
continuing threat posed by SARS and related viruses (4).
Approximately 23 to 32% of patients with SARS become
critically ill (5–7). ALI is the most common severe organ dysfunction
and occurs in approximately 16% of all patients with SARS
and in 80% of critically ill patients with SARS (6, 7). Nearly all
patients with ALI require mechanical ventilation. The worldwide
case fatality rate among all SARS outbreaks is about 9.6% (3).
Among those with SARS-related critical illness, 50% of patients
will die (6, 7). Mortality is increased among older patients and
may be increased among those with certain comorbidities such as
diabetes mellitus (5). Worldwide, children have been relatively
protected from severe illness. There have been very few cases
of documented transmission from children to adults, and virtually
no evidence of transmission among school children (3).
Among pregnant women with SARS, there has been no documented
vertical transmission (8).
The most common presenting symptom of SARS is fever
(5, 9). Other common presenting symptoms include malaise,
myalgias, or headache and nonproductive cough or dyspnea.
Lower respiratory symptoms such as cough and shortness of
breath typically begin 2 to 7 days after symptom onset, although
they are among the initial symptoms in up to 30% of patients.
Gastrointestinal symptoms, including nausea, diarrhea, and vomiting,
occur with variable frequency. Upper respiratory symptoms
such as rhinorrhea are less common, occurring in only 5
to 25% of patients. The median time from exposure to symptom
onset is approximately one week, with an interquartile range of
4 to 10 days for most common symptoms (3, 5). Tachycardia
and tachypnea have been among the most common signs at
presentation (5). Chest radiograph infiltrates also occur in up to
two thirds of patients upon presentation to hospital and in virtually
all patients by one week into illness. Laboratory abnormalities
include moderate lymphopenia and elevations in lactate
dehydrogenase (5, 10, 11). Antemortem confirmatory laboratory
testing has thus far involved viral serology and/or detection of
viral RNA by nucleic acid amplification from samples of serum,
nasopharyngeal or respiratory secretions, urine, or stool. Of
note, although the number and quality of these tests continue
to improve, none of the tests are sufficiently sensitive early in
the illness. Negative test results cannot reliably exclude the
SARS virus until more than 28 days after symptom onset. Because
of the concern of false positive results, especially when
the disease incidence is low, positive tests should be confirmed
in reference laboratories using validated assays. This requirement
may become more challenging as commercial tests become
available which have not been validated. Given these caveats of
laboratory diagnosis early in the course of the disease, epidemiologic
evidence is essential for diagnosing SARS (9).
Nosocomial transmission from patients to healthcare workers
has been a prominent and worrisome feature of SARS outbreaks.
In Singapore and Toronto, healthcare workers have accounted
for half of all SARS cases and about 20% of critically ill SARS cases (5, 7). Concerns that specific ventilation strategies may
place healthcare workers at greater risk of contracting SARS,
have influenced recommendations for the management of patients
with SARS.
LUNG PATHOLOGY IN SARS
The predominant pathology in the lung of patients infected with
SARS virus is diffuse alveolar damage with varying degrees of
organization (12, 13). In the acute phase, hyaline membranes,
interstitial and intraalveolar edema, mild interstitial infiltrates
of inflammatory cells, and vascular congestion were present. In
the organizing phase, interstitial and airspace fibroblast proliferation
and type II cell hyperplasia occurred. In the organizing
phase, the bulk of fibroblast proliferation is within alveolar septa.
It is important to note that the airspace fibroblast proliferation
can easily be misinterpreted as organizing pneumonia. It is essential
to separate organizing alveolar damage from organizing
pneumonia because the clinical and radiographic features, therapy,
and prognosis are quite different. Microscopic examination
also revealed injury to both bronchiolar and alveolar epithelial
cells in SARS (12, 13).
SPECIFIC TREATMENTS FOR SARS
Antiviral Agents for SARS
An urgent need exists for effective antiviral drugs to prevent
and treat SARS. During the first global outbreak, various interventions
were used in management, including antivirals like ribavirin,
IFN, and protease inhibitors, as well as host immunomodulatory
agents, particularly systemic corticosteroids. However,
the uncontrolled nature of these observations and the uncertain
natural history of untreated SARS mean that no drug interventions
of proven therapeutic or prophylactic value have been
established to date. Although the search for new antivirals continues,
it is noteworthy that there is now documentation regarding
in vitro antiviral activity of some potential therapeutic agents
against the SARS virus (14–26). Furthermore, there is a lack of standardized in vitro susceptibility testing methods and of data on correlations between in vitro and in vivo antiviral activities.
Discussion of the different cell types (e.g., Vero, fetal rhesus
monkey kidney), inhibitory endpoints (e.g., reductions in viral
cytopathic effect, protein expression, infectious virus yield, or
viral RNA levels), and assay conditions used in published reports
are beyond the scope of this article, and the reader is referred to publications that detail the specific methodologies used. The main point is that predictive correlations between in vitro activity
and antiviral effects in relevant animal models or SARS-infected
humans have not been validated as yet (14–26). There have been several reports of in vitro activity of IFN preparations, and there
are enough safety data for these products to support a controlled
study of IFN therapy if SARS reappears (19–23). Anumber of compounds inhibit replication of SARS or other
coronaviruses in vitro have, but few of these agents have been
administered to patients with SARS. The nucleoside analog ribavirin
has a broad spectrum of antiviral activity in vitro, encompassing
many RNA viruses including human metapneumovirus
and some coronaviruses (27), although the clinical relevance is
not well established. Oral and intravenous ribavirin in various
regimens was used widely for treating patients with SARS. Some
evidence indicates that early nasopharyngeal viral RNA positivity
is associated with a worse prognosis (28). However, cell
culture–based assays have found no evidence for a selective
antiviral activity of ribavirin against the SARS virus in vitro
(14, 29). Patients treated with combinations of ribavirin and
corticosteroids showed a marked increase in viral load in their
upper respiratory tract during therapy (30), consistent with ribavirin’s lack of in vitro antiviral effects and the confounding effect
of systemic glucocorticoids on viral replication. Furthermore, in
patients treated with ribavirin who died, high viral RNA levels
were observed in postmortem lung tissues (31). In Toronto, highdose
intravenous ribavirin treatment tended to be associated
with poor outcomes (5) and high rates of side effects (32).
Several reports suggest activity of other compounds including
small interfering RNAs, glycyrrhizin, lopinavir/ritonavir, niclosamide,
fusion inhibitors, neutralizing monoclonal antibodies,
and cystein protease inhibitors (14–18). Of the non-IFN molecules
described to date, neutralizing polyclonal and human
monoclonal antibodies have been shown to have activity in vitro
and in animals (33, 34). These would also be appropriate candidates
for studies of prophylaxis and early treatment of SARS.
Type I IFN inhibit a wide range of RNA and DNA viruses,
including human respiratory CoVs and SARS-CoV in vitro (19–23).
IFN-alpha modifies coronavirus disease in animals (35), and in humans,
intranasal IFN-alpha-2 partially protected against experimental
human respiratory coronaviral infections (36, 37). Limited clinical
experience with systemic IFN-alfacon-1 in combination with
corticosteroids in patients hospitalized with SARS suggested that
it is acceptably tolerated and may have improved clinical outcomes
compared with historical outcomes in patients treated
with systemic corticosteroids alone (38). However, in late-stage
disease, four of six critically ill patients in this cohort died despite
combination therapy (38), raising the possibility that early treatment
is important. In Guangzhou a treatment regimen involving
3 million units of IFN-alpha daily without corticosteroids for the
first 14 days was associated with need for mechanical ventilation
in 2 of 30 patients, whereas in another cohort none of 60 patients
given high-dose corticosteroids, 75% of whom also received IFN,
required mechanical ventilation or died (39).
The experience with drug treatments during the first SARS
outbreak has lead the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases’ sponsored Collaborative Antiviral Study Group
to develop a placebo-controlled clinical treatment protocol of
IFN-alfacon-1 in patients with early SARS.
RECOMMENDATION
- Treatment with antivirals is not of proven value and should be studied within the context of controlled clinical trials.
- Active antivirals identified in the laboratory should be subjected
to careful testing of their activity and pharmacology
in one or more of the animal models that support SARS
viral replication.
- Animal studies are warranted of putative SARS antiviral
agents for which there is conflicting evidence.
Community Acquired Pneumonia and SARS
Initially, all patients suspected of SARS who have a new lung infiltrate should receive antibiotic therapy, consistent with published guidelines (40) for community-acquired pneumonia. In the intensive care unit, all individuals should be treated
for drug-resistant and atypical pathogens, but only those with
appropriate risk factors (recent hospitalization, recent antibiotics,
high dose steroids, malnutrition, structural lung disease)
should have coverage for Pseudomonas aeruginosa (40, 41).
For inpatients with community acquired pneumonia, timely
and accurate therapy is essential to reduce mortality. The current
Medicare and Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations standard requires the first dose of therapy within
4 hours of arrival to the hospital (42).
Recommendation
- Initially, all patients suspected of SARS who have a new
lung infiltrate should receive antibiotic therapy, consistent
with published guidelines for community acquired pneumonia.
- The first antibiotic dose should be administered within 4
hours of arrival to the hospital.
CLINICAL MANAGEMENT OF SEVERE SARS
The 16% (6, 7) of patients with SARS who develop hypoxemic
respiratory failure meet the current definition of ALI and ARDS
(43). These include refractory hypoxemia, diffuse, bilateral infiltrates
on chest X-ray, and a PaO2/FiO2 ratio less than 300.
Because the clinical and pathologic manifestations of lung
injury in patients with severe SARS are indistinguishable from
ALI/ARDS, until further studies are available, the recommended
clinical management of severe SARS is the same as for patients
with ALI/ARDS.
Mechanical Ventilation For Severe SARS
Ventilation with a low tidal volume strategy (6 ml/kg predicted
body weight) has been shown to improve survival in patients
with ALI/ARDS (44). There remains controversy within the
international community regarding the optimal mode of ventilation
for patients with respiratory failure from SARS. Some physicians
strongly believe that the risks of intubation for nosocomial transmission are substantial and recommend noninvasive ventilation, whereas others favor early intubation. Canadian experience
suggests that elective intubation under controlled conditions is
preferable and that noninvasive ventilation may be associated
with SARS transmission to healthcare workers (45). Furthermore,
although noninvasive ventilation might be considered for
patients with the expectation of near term improvement, observational
studies of critically ill patients with SARS report that this form of lung injury is generally not rapidly reversible. The
efficacy of noninvasive ventilation versus endotracheal intubation
and low tidal volume ventilation for ALI from SARS has
not been compared in randomized controlled studies. Recommendation
- Patients with SARS that progress to ARDS should be
treated with a lung protective ventilatory strategy until
further direct information on patients with SARS becomes
available.
- The ARDS Network lower tidal volume strategy is recommended.
Details of the protocol are widely available (44, 46).
Corticosteroids in Severe SARS
Pulse dose or high dose steroids do not appear to improve survival
in patients with early ALI/ARDS or sepsis (47-50) and
are not recommended (51). One small study had suggested that steroids for late or unresolving ALI or ARDS might be beneficial (52), but a much larger study by the ARDS Clinical Trials Network
does not suggest such a benefit (46). There is increasing
evidence of long-term morbidity, including disabling muscle weakness and neuropathy associated with steroid use (48, 50, 53, 54). Several small studies have been reported in which patients
with SARS were treated with corticosteroids (5, 30, 39, 55-58).
Indications varied, but glucocorticoids were generally reserved
for patients with suspected SARS and persistent fever, worsening
hypoxemia, worsening dyspnea, or signs of radiographic progression.
Pulse doses similar to those used to prevent transplant rejection (500-1,000 mg of methylprednisolone intravenously
each day for 2-3 days), low doses similar to those studied for
late ARDS (2 mg/kg of methylprednisolone per day in divided
doses), as well as intermediate doses (8 mg/kg of methylprednisolone
per day in divided doses) were used. Initial intravenous
therapy was followed by tapering doses of oral prednisone in
most reports, with pulse dosing used for salvage therapy in patients
whose condition worsened on lower doses or during tapering.
In almost all of these series, ribavirin was used early in the
outbreak and some included co-administration of IFN-alpha.
One case series took advantage of differences in practice
patterns among clinicians at two Hong Kong hospitals to compare
initial pulse dose methylprednisolone to a divided dose
regimen that reserved pulse doses for rescue (58). Blinded review
of chest radiographs showed more rapid clearing with pulse
dosing. A group of investigators in the Guangdong province of
China randomized patients into four treatment strategies that
varied from steroid use as rescue treatment to initial pulse dosing.
More rapid resolution of fever, respiratory symptoms, and radiographic
opacities occurred with pulse dosing but no differences
in survival or length of hospital stay were noted (30).
None of the above reports included randomized placebocontrolled
trials. Because of the rapid spread of SARS in a
relatively short time period, this is not surprising. Nearly all the
authors reporting clinical experiences with SARS and the use
of steroids comment that a clinical trial of steroids for severe
SARS is needed.
Recommendation
- A placebo-controlled clinical trial of corticosteroids is
needed for patients with SARS with progression to respiratory
failure because of the wide clinical use of steroids.
- Corticosteroids are not indicated for the routine care of
patients with uncomplicated SARS.
- Because of the uncertainty surrounding the effectiveness
of steroids for severe SARS, pulse-dose steroid therapy
could be used for patients with clinical deterioration manifest
by persistent fever, worsening radiographic opacities,
and hypoxemic respiratory failure (59, 60).
- The decision to use corticosteroids should be based on a
careful evaluation of the possible benefits compared with
the risks.
Adjuvant Strategies for Severe SARS
Several adjuvant strategies have been proven to decrease morbidity and mortality in critically ill patients. Although none of these recommendations have been tested specifically on groups of patients with ARDS or SARS, all were conducted in the intensive care populations that included large numbers of these patients (1). Until studies are completed in patients with ARDS or SARS, the group recommended the following. Recommendations
- Deep vein thombosis prophylaxis should generally be used.
This can be pharmacologic or physical depending on risk
factors present (61–64).
- Stress ulcer prophylaxis is recommended (65, 66).H2 receptor
inhibitors are more efficacious than sucralfate and are
preferred.
- Sedation protocols should be used for critically ill mechanically
ventilated patients. The recommended methods include
(1) intermittent bolus sedation or (2) continuous
infusion sedation to predetermined endpoints (e.g., sedation
scales) or daily interruption/lightening of sedation with
awakening and retitration, if necessary (67–69). Low tidal
volume ventilation does not appear to require additional
sedative or neuromuscular blocker use (75).
- Neuromuscular blockers should be avoided, if possible because
of risks of prolonged muscle weakness and paralysis
(70, 71), especially with concomitant steroids (72). If neuromuscular
blockade is used, monitoring of depth of block
is recommended (73, 74).
- Semirecumbant position (head of bed elevated 45 degrees)
should be routinely used in patients receiving mechanical
ventilation (76–79).
PREPARATION OF THE HEALTHCARE WORKER
AND THE HEALTHCARE SYSTEM
Several documents describe in detail the experience and conclusions
of the outbreak of SARS in Canada (5, 6, 80–82, 84–86).
Key issues and some specific recommendations follow from the
Canadian experience and CDC guidance (83).
Organizational Planning
Several important issues that require advance organizational planning were identified during the SARS outbreak in Canada. Many of these issues are similar to planning for an influenza
pandemic or responding to a bioterrorism event. There will be a need for a leadership structure to deal with
the problems that arise in providing intensive care. This is true
for the hospital at large, and the CDC has provided guidance
(83) to help healthcare facilities plan for SARS. Ideally a command
set-up should be established with identified leadership
and delegation of responsibility for a number of key areas that
include sustaining the work force, access controls, communication,
education, infection control procedures, psychosocial support,
data collection, and clinical management.
Local planning groups will need to consider whether patients
with SARS will be cared for in one or several institutions. Although
usual medical care needs to continue, it is not always
easy to distinguish SARS from other illnesses. Thus, every facility
needs to have the expertise needed to recognize and handle
patients under investigation for SARS. The same issue applies
to SARS patients who require intensive care. However, because
intensive care has been associated with an increased risk for
SARS transmission, use of dedicated intensive care units may
be appropriate. In Singapore, for example, patients were restricted
to a single unit where less spread was noted (7). Consideration
should be given to moving priority patients (i.e., trauma,
cardiac surgery) to places where staff is not at increased risk for
SARS exposure. In addition, advance planning for safe transport
of potentially contagious SARS patients is required.
During a SARS crisis, staffing shortages may develop. Critical
care team members may be lost due to fear, quarantine, and
illness. It is important, therefore, to consider methods for finding
people to work with patients with SARS. For example, can staff
from other units in the facility be reassigned to the intensive
care unit or can critical care teams from other institutions be
recruited to work in another facility? If so, what are the legal
and training implications and how can these be addressed in
advance? In addition to staffing, consumable and durable materials
and equipment needs should be identified and plans developed
for dealing with shortages.
Preplanning for clinical and infection training is critical. A
description of a training program used in Canada is available
(81) and the CDC provides guidance as well as educational
videos (83).
The stress, confusion, and urgency that can accompany hospitalization
of a patient with SARS require planning for internal
and external communication. Critical care leadership will need
to have a system for communicating with the hospital administration,
infectious disease specialists, infection control teams, SARS
ward physicians, emergency room specialists, SARS clinic physicians,
the clinical laboratory, public health officials, and transportation
teams. Existing communication infrastructures should be
used, but others may need to be developed (83). Teleconferences
may play an important role in facilitating communication.
Identifying psychosocial support is another element of SARS
planning. Despair, depression, and a sense of isolation are common
reactions in healthcare workers during a SARS outbreak
(84, 85). Some providers have had the experience of being viewed
as high-risk to the health of others because of their work with
patients with SARS. Maintaining staff morale is essential to
ongoing patient care during an outbreak. Attention must be
given to encourage and commend staff about the work being
accomplished. In addition, healthcare workers caring for patients
with SARS may have family concerns that need to be addressed
(e.g., childcare, economic support, temporary housing).
Infection Control Precautions in the Intensive Care Unit
An essential component of an infection control strategy is the
development of clear protocols and staff training. In the intensive
care unit, the risk of transmission is high as viral shedding peaks
during the second week of illness (30), when admission is usually
required. Droplet spread may be increased by aerosol-generating
interventions, including the use of nebulizers and procedures
such as intubation and bronchoscopy; airborne transmission
through small aerosol spread cannot be ruled out.
Infection control measures for healthcare workers in contact
with patients with SARS in the intensive care unit involve five
key strategies: (1) dilution and removal of airborne contaminants
through use of negative pressure isolation rooms; (2) use of personal
protective equipment, e.g., gowns, gloves, eye, face, and respiratory
protection; (3) hand hygiene; (4) environmental cleaning
and disinfection; and (5) source control measures aimed at containing
the patient’s secretions. In addition, administrative
measures to limit contact with patients are necessary. Table 1
summarizes the detailed recommendations.
Aerosol-generating procedures should be limited to those
essential for patient care. Other high-risk procedures, including
endotracheal intubation and bronchoscopy, also require special
precautions. Bronchodilators can be delivered using a metereddose
inhaler and aerochamber but must be used with caution
(83). Intubation should be considered sooner than is customary
to give sufficient time for appropriate infection control precautions
(86). This should be performed by the most experienced
airway practitioner available, using sedation and possibly neuromuscular
blockade, as appropriate for individual patients. Intubation
in awake patients may be associated with patient agitation
and coughing, which can severely compromise infection control
precautions (86). Mechanical ventilation should be performed
with the use of a submicron filter on the expiratory port. Procedures
that break the integrity of the circuit, such as suctioning
and tube changes, should be limited. As discussed above, there
is some disagreement about the advisability of noninvasive ventilation
as it may increase aerosolization of droplets that could
promote airborne spread of SARS.
Respiratory protection should be worn while performing
these high-risk procedures. Eye protection is also an important
feature of personal protection. The CDC provides guidance on
infection control during high-risk procedures (83) and these are
included in Table 1.
TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF INFECTION CONTROL PRECAUTIONS FOR SARS IN THE INTENSIVE CARE
UNIT (80–86).
Airborne infection isolation room
Monitored negative pressure isolation rooms preferably with antechamber equipped with:
- sinks with antibacterial soap and/or alcohol-based hand rub
- sufficient stock of personal protective equipment (PPE)
- containers for disposable PPE, soiled laundry, and equipment that must be reprocessed
Avoid disruption of negative pressure barrier:
- Stock individual rooms with supplies including modified cardiac arrest carts
- Time blood work and therapies to minimize entrance of staff into rooms
PPE
Basic: Gown, gloves, eye protection (i.e., goggles or face shield), and respiratory protection (i.e., N95 mask)
During aerosol generating procedures:
Canadian Group recommends Powered Air Purification Respirator (PAPR) hoods for all members of the team
CDC guidance states disposable particulate respirators (e.g., N-95, N-99, or N-100) are the minimum level of
respiratory protection and requires that healthcare workers are fit-tested and trained in the use of the respirator
Provide instruction sheet to staff on how to don and remove PPE
Pagers and watches left outside or carefully covered
Avoid touching face and environmental surfaces
Consider monitoring PPE use
Hand hygiene
- Ensure easy availability of hand hygiene products (i.e., sinks with antibacterial soap and disposable towels and alcohol-based hand rub) in and outside the room Environmental cleaning and disinfection
- Assign trained personnel to clean SARS patient rooms
- Clean horizontal and frequently touched surfaces at least daily and more frequently if needed
- Use an EPA-registered hospital-grade detergent/disinfectant
Equipment and procedures
Oxygen therapy
- Avoid nebulized humidity: Venturi mask without humidification is recommended
- Use mask that permits filtration of exhaled gas (e.g., Hi-Ox80; Viasys Healthcare, Conshohocken, PA)
Avoid bag-valve mask ventilation. If required:
- Use two-person technique to ensure a tight seal at the face
- Use submicron filter on the exhalation port
- Use adequate sedation
Intubation
- Performed by the most skilled clinician available
- Use adequate sedation. If awake intubation is performed, be prepared for patient agitation and coughing
Mechanical ventilators
- Submicron filters on exhalation outlet of mechanical ventilators may prevent release of contaminated aerosols The effectiveness of this measure is unknown, but use is prudent, particularly during high-frequency ventilation
- Disposable circuits and humidifiers
- Closed (in-line) suction system
- Turn ventilator to standby and turn PEEP off when disconnecting the circuit
Noninvasive ventilation (e.g., BiPAP) not recommended
High frequency ventilation may be acceptable
Bronchoscopy—avoid if possible
- Use good sedation or paralysis to minimize coughing
- Plan for the careful containment of specimens for transport
Patient transportation
Transportation should be avoided unless essential
Consult Infection control before moving
Visitors and personnel
Limit to those essential for patient care and support
Staff education
Provide training on infection control procedures, including practical instruction on donning and removal of PPE,
particularly with PAPR hoods
Emphasize importance of vigilance to all infection control precautions
Emphasize importance of alerting supervisors and infection control immediately when breaches occur
SARS RESEARCH: PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE
Designing Clinical Studies in SARS
Clinical studies could be designed for critically ill patients with
SARS that evaluate the ability of an intervention (drug or treatment)
to reduce (1) the mortality in patients that develop ALI/ARDS, (2) the progression to critical illness, or (3) the severity
of established ALI/ARDS.
With ALI/ARDS mortality estimated at 30 to 40%, detecting
mortality differences of 10% or so requires studies of at least
1,000 patients. Studies to evaluate progression to critical illness
would also be difficult, as existing reports suggest that approximately
16% of patients progress to ALI/ARDS. Large samples
sizes would also be required and might not be feasible given the
size of the first SARS outbreak.
Clinical studies would be more feasible in terms of sample
size that would address whether the severity of ALI/ARDS was
affected by treatment. Patients with SARS who develop ALI/ARDS experience substantial morbidity and there are several
physiologic abnormalities that could be proposed as alternative
endpoints suggestive of ultimate benefit. Combinations of end
points could be considered. Surrogate variables could include
static lung compliance, indices of oxygenation (e.g., PaO2/FiO2),
time of critical illness such as ventilator-free days, days without
shock, days to discharge alive from the intensive care unit, or
biochemical markers of inflammation or injury. The disadvantage
of such a study is that the relationship of these markers to
mortality is not clear. Nevertheless, smaller studies using combined
or composite clinical endpoints could provide a rationale
for larger studies that test clinical efficacy and mortality. Initial
studies should include mortality as a major secondary endpoint.
Recommendation
- Prospective randomized controlled studies rather than retrospective
studies are desirable.
- Studies of treatments for SARS would be possible in a
large epidemic but will require a multicenter approach.
- Although studies of mortality are the most desirable, the
most feasible trial would be a smaller study using combined
physiologic or biochemical endpoints in the lungs or systemic
circulation that could aid in future refinements of
study designs.
- Potential interactions between the effects of steroids and
antivirals may need to be considered in study design and
interpretation.
Challenges of Conducting Clinical Research in SARS
The practical challenges facing clinical investigation of ARDS
in the intensive care unit are considerable, even without the
added concerns brought on by an emergent, highly infectious
cause. Proxy consent, short time window for study enrollment,
lack of valid surrogate endpoints, inadequate understanding of
complex disease mechanisms, and patient heterogeneity due to
unreliable case definitions are all well recognized barriers to
clinical investigation of ARDS in intensive care. An outbreak
of SARS or another other emerging infection would present
additional challenges to clinical investigation in this environment.
Experience with SARS suggests that simply providing
clinical care to patients, some of whom may be coworkers, with
a staff depleted by infection or fear of infection will leave little
time for clinical research. Furthermore, there is no way to predict
where, or if, the next outbreak will occur, and no way to guarantee
that it will occur near a center with expertise in clinical
research.
A collaboration of investigators called the Canadian SARS
Research Network (87) has formed to improve the understanding
of the previous outbreak and develop plans for any future
outbreak. There are five research themes including diagnostics,
clinical science, epidemiology, modeling, and immunology. Plans
are being developed for archiving of biological specimens and
for prospective study of patients in another outbreak. Also being
developed are new rapid diagnostics, animal studies of pathogenesis,
mathematical modeling of transmission and capacity of
cities to respond to another outbreak, and retrospective studies
of drug treatments in patients and transmission of infection to
healthcare workers. There are also sources of information for
activities outside of North America, mainly Asia and the UK (88).
Recommendation
- Develop emergeny clinical research infrastructure including
Web-based protocols and forms and IRB applications.
- Develop a registry for every patient with SARS. These
should permit real-time entry of anonymized data.
- Prepare for collection and storage of biological samples
from patients. The value of these samples depends on standardizing the methods and time of collection during
the course of illness. Ideally, samples should be collected
from patients as well as exposed but unaffected patients
and from comparison populations (e.g., those with non-SARS, viral community acquired pneumonia).
- Collaborate with ongoing SARS investigations throughout
the world.
CONCLUSIONS
International experts in infectious disease and epidemiology consider
it likely that there will be a recurrent outbreak of SARS
or other newly emerging and serious transmissible respiratory
pathogen. Clinicians, hospital administrators, and government
officials across the globe were unprepared for the last outbreak,
leading to confusion, heightened public concern, and increased
transmission rates. The purpose of this panel was to develop
general recommendations for the management of severe SARS
in the intensive care unit and to establish a SARS research
agenda. A series of recommendations concerning the care and
treatment of patients with SARS was developed based on previous
experience with SARS, and experience with studies in ARDS
and more general intensive care unit populations that are likely
to be applicable to SARS. Organizational issues concerning the
healthcare system and the healthcare worker are of paramount
importance. Further research is needed to better understand the
etiology of SARS and establish more specific treatment options.
Clinical studies in severe SARS will require prior planning, multi-center collaboration, and a rapid response.
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Conflict of Interest Statement: M.M.L. does not have a financial relationship with
a commercial entity that has an interest in the subject of this manuscript; M.S.B.
does not have a financial relationship with a commercial entity that has an interest
in the subject of this manuscript; G.R.B. does not have a financial relationship
with a commercial entity that has an interest in the subject of this manuscript;
R.F. does not have a financial relationship with a commercial entity that has an
interest in the subject of this manuscript; T.J.F. does not have a financial relationship
with a commercial entity that has an interest in the subject of this manuscript;
F.G.H. does not have a financial relationship with a commercial entity that has
an interest in the subject of this manuscript; R.H. does not have a financial relationship
with a commercial entity that has an interest in the subject of this manuscript;
S.E.L. does not have a financial relationship with a commercial entity that has an
interest in the subject of this manuscript; T.R.M. does not have a financial relationship
with a commercial entity that has an interest in the subject of this manuscript;
M.S.N. has been a consultant, served on an Advisory Board, and been paid lecture
fees in the past three years related to community-acquired pneumonia for Pfizer,
Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Aventis, and GlaxoSmithKline; G.D.R. does not have
a financial relationship with a commercial entity that has an interest in the subject
of this manuscript; T.E.S. does not have a financial relationship with a commercial
entity that has an interest in the subject of this manuscript; B.A.S. does not have
a financial relationship with a commercial entity that has an interest in the subject
of this manuscript; B.T.T. does not have a financial relationship with a commercial
entity that has an interest in the subject of this manuscript; A.L.H. does not have
a financial relationship with a commercial entity that has an interest in the subject
of this manuscript.
Acknowledgment:
The authors are grateful to Linda Chiarello, MS, RN, Epidemiologist, Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion, National Center for Infectious
Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and Ms. Barbara M. Shott
for help in preparation of this manuscript. No official support or endorsement of
this article by the Food and Drug Administration is intended or should be inferred. Correspondence and requests for reprints should be addressed to:
Andrea L.
Harabin, Ph.D.
Division of Lung Diseases, NHLBI/NIH
6701 Rockledge Drive,
Room 10018
Bethesda, MD 20892-7952
E-mail: harabin@nih.gov
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