

CORRECTIONS INFORMATION SERIES:

Prison Hostage Situations

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1

HOSTAGE RESPONSE AND NEGOTIATION 2

 I. Types of Hostage Takers in Correctional Settings 2

 II. Response Choices 3

 III. Primary Reactions: The Three Priorities 5

 IV. The Media 7

 v. Background Factors To Be Aware Of In Hostage Situations 8

 VI. Negotiation 9

 VII. Some Tips on Mounting an Assault 18

 VIII. Surrender 18

 IX. Preparation for Prosecution 19

 x. Post-Incident 21

GUIDELINES FOR HOSTAGES 23

 I. Do's and Don'ts for the Hostage 23

 II. Psychological Responses of Hostages and Hostage Takers 25

DEBRIEFING IN HOSTAGE SITUATIONS 26

POST-HOSTAGE TREATMENT 29

SAMPLE POLICY FOR RESPONDING TO HOSTAGE SITUATIONS IN THE CORRECTIONAL SETTING.....	35
Tactical Plan.....	37
I. Locate.....	37
II. Isolate and Contain the Situation.....	38
III. Set Up the Command Post (CP).....	38
IV. Set Up the Operations Post (OP).....	39
V. Evacuate.....	40
VI. Intelligence Gathering.....	40
VII. Resolve.....	41
VIII. Deactivate.....	44
APPENDIX.....	46
Sample Debriefing Form.....	46
Endnotes.....	50

INTRODUCTION

Western Penitentiary, Pennsylvania, April 1983; Ossining State Correctional Facility, New York; Waupun Correctional Institution, Wisconsin, January 1983; Walpole State Prison, Massachusetts, December 1982; Eastern State Correctional Institution, Pennsylvania, October 1981; and Archambault Prison in Montreal, Canada, July 1981--these are just a few of the prisons that have recently had to respond to situations in which inmates have taken hostages.

Although no contingency plan can guarantee a successful outcome in dealing with a hostage situation, an informed response can improve the chances of resolving one without injury or loss of life.

This publication is designed to provide the corrections practitioner with informative background materials relating to hostage situations. In preparing it, LISI contract staff at the NIC Information Center have excerpted and adapted from a number of existing materials. The report provides general information and recommendations for responding to hostage situations in correctional institutions, including a discussion of how to handle negotiations with hostage takers; suggestions for maximizing one's safety if one is ever taken hostage; and debriefing and counseling procedures for an institution to follow after a hostage situation has been resolved. In addition, this document provides a sample policy, including guidelines, for responding to hostage situations, delegating authority and for using resources, which can be adapted to a variety of settings. No part of this document is meant to indicate a single, precise course of action to follow during a hostage situation.

HOSTAGE RESPONSE AND NEGOTIATION

The material in this section was excerpted and adapted by the LISI contract staff at the NIC Information Center from a training program developed by Richard J. O'Connell of the Washington Crime News Service.¹

I. TYPES OF HOSTAGE TAKERS SITUATIONS IN CORRECTIONAL SETTINGS

A. The Psycho

This is an individual who may or may not make sense regarding plans or grievances. In most instances, a true psycho operates alone. There are several factors to consider in dealing with a "psycho":

- The inmate may have had a recent negative experience or may feel that in order to speed up the action, it pays to act "crazy." You have the advantage of prison record files to see if and what kind of psychiatric history this individual presents, in addition to staff/inmate input as to whether an event has happened which could be pushing this person over the edge.
- If the taker is in fact a psycho, the tendency is to "write off" this person rather than to keep the dialogue going through a negotiation process. Underestimation is as dangerous as over-reaction. Whatever his purpose and rationale for this action, it makes sense to him. Even if he does not appear to be responding, continue calm, non-provocative open communication. Do not talk down to, moralize, or antagonize him.
- Be aware of this individual's medical needs, particularly a possibility of over-ingestion or a lack of prescribed medication. Your medics can produce and interpret all medical charts and advise the hostage management team of time/stress/diet/fatigue/anxiety variables.

Most psycho incidents are resolved through wearing/talking the person down.

B. Situational

This is the act of a usually normal person prompted by a rash impulse to solve a problem or get out of a situation by taking a hostage. This is seldom a planned act, which is, of course, to your advantage. The hostage is used to "buy time" and intimidate you while the taker figures out how he can get out of the situation with or without the hostage. The hostage is the taker's temporary insurance. As prison staff, we know examples

of situational hostage takers: The guy who gets turned down by the Parole Board and acts irrationally. The guy who finds out in the Visiting Room that his marriage is finished. The inmate who is caught in some form of negative activity and over-reacts. Successful resolutions of incidents involving this type of individual are almost always possible through dialogue and containment.

C. Grievance Ainer

A more difficult person or group to deal with are the Grievance Ainers. Their incidents are usually well-planned or are adjuncts to a riot or disturbance, with the plan being: "we want to talk to somebody other than staff (media, governor, attorneys, etc.)." These circumstances usually involve multiple hostage takers and multiple hostages. If well-planned and not an emotional side product of a disturbance, the inmates' plan will probably (despite all threats and oaths to the contrary) include measures to protect their legal tender in this situation.

D. Escape Plan (Single or multiple hostages/takers)

Certainly in this instance the hostage(s) can be viewed as legal tender. In most instances, escape plans are thought through, and the perpetrator has scheduled some sequence of steps to the plan. Since most, if not all, jurisdictions have an "Iron Law" that hostages will not be recognized for escape purposes, you must formulate plans for neutralizing this situation short of allowing escape.

E. Riot-related

The taking of 'hostages' as a spontaneous adjunct to a riot or disturbance adds volatility to an already danger-charged incident. You must determine immediately if you have a true hostage/bargaining situation or if you are dealing with one or several staff being held "captive" for purposes of abuse, assault or "get-back". Your response to this situation will be based on your intelligence regarding conditions, treatment of "captives," and tactical advantage.

F. Terrorist

In correctional annals, this is the least likely hostage confrontation situation in terms of frequency of occurrence. This is the most difficult type of encounter to deal with for several reasons:

- o In cases of political terrorist activity, there is usually a total commitment on the part of the perpetrator(s) to be

successful-- to the point of self and group annihilation, if necessary.

- The "cause" and the demands usually relate to issues over which correctional administrators have no control, such as international politics or the release of so-called "political prisoners."
- Terrorists are usually well-trained in all aspects of hostage management psychology and dynamics. They are not likely to respond to the negotiating process.
- This situation has a high likelihood of forcing staff to use force as a method of resolution.

However, terrorist activity usually involves a group of perpetrators, which, over time, may be involved in intra-group conflict and leadership deterioration that will allow for successful resolution.

II. RESPONSE CHOICES

At the moment of discovery or announcement of a hostage situation, you must decide on an initial response. The response choices generally available in a correctional setting are:

- A. Armed Assault (Firearms)
- B. Sniper Assault (Single shooter)
- C. Non-Lethal Assault (Use of teargas, nightsticks, water/hoses, etc.)
- D. Containment and Dialogue

The first three choices are irreversible. Execution must be rapid and precise. The outcome will be a success or a failure within a matter of seconds/minutes.

The first three choices are violent. Injury to someone is a near certainty; loss of life is very probable.

Rand Corporation's research of hostage incidents occurring in 1967-77 (prison and otherwise) reveals that 78% of all hostages killed are killed in rescue attempts.

Another fact to be considered is that in many multiple hostage situations, even if a hostage has been killed, the others may still be and have been successfully negotiated out. In some situations, a hostage has been found to bring his death upon himself by design or by accident. At one time, the New York City Police Department operated under the policy that if a hostage were killed, immediate

assault would be mounted. Upon, studying the success in other jurisdictions of continued negotiations, they have now adopted the policy of considering the continuation of negotiation efforts.

In using containment and dialogue as the first approach, you have the other three options available at any time if necessary, and you have not opened by escalating the situation.

Caution: When a decision to initiate a dialogue is made, the following conditions must be present:

- A. The area is sealed and contained.
- B. The hostage taker is talking and demanding something.
- C. There is no other negative/serious behavior among the inmate population. In the institutional setting, defense against a sucker play is an ever-present concern.

Remember that even under the best of circumstances, an armed assault plan cannot be initiated, with any degree of planning or probability of success during the first half hour. A rash, uncoordinated, and unplanned assault will certainly endanger the lives of the hostage(s) and will probably increase the risk of injury to staff.

III. PRIMARY REACTIONS : THE THREE PRIORITIES

Following is a general outline of the Do's and Don'ts in managing a hostage situation:

If the inmate's purpose is to hold a captive to get something, he's going to make an announcement. He wants to bargain for something. He's got to announce his wares. So, in some form--telephoning, face-to-face, or yelling--he's going to get in touch with you. The person contacted may be selected by the perpetrator as the individual with whom he wishes to bargain, or, as is usually the case, the first to hear about it will be a random (staff) passerby or intermediary who answers the telephone. Whoever it is needs to be trained, prepared, and invested with some common sense in order that the Primary Three Responses may be put into action:

- A. Keep the dialogue going: The opening moments of any hostage incident are critical. In most if not all situations, the hostage taker has not had any similar experience and isn't sure how it is going to go. Most individuals upset, disturbed, unbalanced or angry enough to take hostages, are excited enough to do anything. In addition to keeping the dialog going, the staff member receiving the announcement should keep calm and, by his behavior, calm down the taker, and then alert appropriate staff.

The role of the person receiving the announcement is that of concerned listener. This is a difficult role for many reasons :

- Lack of training for this situation.
- Even if the individual is trained, this is an "out of the blue" life and death situation.
- The ugliness and the emphasis of threats. Inmate hostage takers are demanding, threatening, intimidating, or vulgar because :
 - they are upset;
 - they must convince you or the administration of their intent and seriousness.
- The taker(s) may be incoherent or otherwise difficult to understand or maintain dialogue with.

It cannot be overemphasized that the key goal of this initial encounter is to keep the dialogue going, without falling into responses of threats or promises. It takes a fairly level-headed person to pick up a life/death situation without (a) panicking and promising anything, or (b) threatening, moralizing , delegating , or just plain -"hanging up".

B. Contain and Seal

While the "dialogue" is being carried on by the first staff made aware of the situation, the Watch Commander initiates the second immediate response: Containing and Sealing the area. Hostage areas tend to attract non-post assigned staff and non-locked up inmates.

All excess staff, inmates, civilians and visitors must be removed from the area to make proceedings manageable and to establish the inner perimeter. Visitors, vendors, visitors of inmates--all civilians--should be removed from the area and the institution grounds as rapidly as possible.

Once the area is cleared, only personnel directly involved in the hostage management effort should have access.

C. Assault Force - Sniper Capability

The third immediate response priority is the deployment of Assault Force - Sniper Capability.

An emergency assault capability should be mobilized immediately* The initial behavior of the hostage taker(s) is highly unpredictable, and you may have no choice but the use of force. For a variety of reasons, staff should be prepared and able to mount an assault rapidly.

With the first three response/reactions out of the way, we come to another priority in dealing with the situation.

To aid in containment and sealing and to speed up the hostage and hostage taker identification process, it may be advisable to take an institution count. Although the need for and timing of this count is a matter of judgment, there are many benefits in doing so:

- The count gives people something to do.
- A count gets people, staff and inmates, out of the way and clears the area.
- A count reveals the number of inmate participants in the hostage incident by name and bed number.
- A count may abort the diversionary possibilities of concomitant escapes, assaults, executions or other negative activity.

IV. THE MEDIA

Hostage situations are newsworthy events, some resulting in nationwide and worldwide press coverage.

It is not practical to contemplate delaying or denying press information regarding a hostage incident in your facility. Recognize that a hostage incident is big news of indeterminate headline potential and duration. A press vigil will evolve.

Experience suggests that press/media relations provisions should be included in your Emergency Response Plan. Following are important considerations in dealing with the media in hostage situations:

- A. Appoint a single staff representative to deal with all media. This person will be the only official cleared to make press announcements.
- B. As soon as a hostage situation is declared, the area sealed, and a Command Post operation established, the public information officer should notify the press.
- C. In notifying the press/media of the emergency situation, the following information should be provided:
 - a brief, positive but honest summary of the situation; and
 - an assessment of conditions regarding communications equipment available (e.g., bring your own communication equip-

ment, we have no extra telephone trunk lines, it is foggy/snowing/whatever, here).

- D. As press/media personnel arrive, they should be provided with working space well out of the way. The press should not be allowed into the hostage situation institution area as observers or negotiators.

A snack bar with coffee, sandwiches, donuts, cold drinks, etc., should be established if such items are not available.

As there is no allegiance in the business of headlines, frequent, brief, positive-but-truthful updates are to your advantage. An experienced public information officer should have slough files of on-site background shots and local color information to enrich the media's reports so that they will have something to report between updates. The public information officer's reports should always be cleared by the facility administrator.

A critical consideration in your concern about press reportage is the fact that the perpetrator may well be listening to/reading the press reports. For the taker, this reporting is of great self-interest. If your negotiator is buying time with one strategy and the TV is announcing a sneak assault, you have lost credibility and perhaps the life of a hostage. In this type of circumstance, once credibility is lost between perpetrator and negotiator, particularly in a prison setting, it cannot be regained. This needs to be stressed to the press. Give them frequent updates. Do not leave them to their own imagination.

V. BACKGROUND FACTORS TO BE AWARE OF IN HOSTAGE SITUATIONS

Hostage situations that extend over a period of time--a few hours or days--include important factors or syndromes which the hostage management staff should be aware of and use to their advantage.

A. Stockholm Factor

It has long been known that a strong emotional bond develops between persons who share a life-threatening experience (i.e., combat in war, natural disaster) and perhaps this bond develops more rapidly in the hostage situation because the taker and the hostage have only each other for face-to-face interaction. The bond that develops results in the hostage wanting and, in effect, understanding the "rightness" of the taker's action. Conversely, the taker's perception of the hostage will change to the point where as this bond becomes stronger, the likelihood that he will harm the hostage lessens or diminishes entirely.

The best evidence that the Stockholm Syndrome is a likely phenomenon in hostage situations is the practice of professional

terrorists, who place hoods on all hostages to avoid personal interaction'.

B. The Reality Syndrome

At some point the inmate hostage taker arrives at the realization that he may not get his demands, and invariably will think of possible alternatives. Remember that he is in a life-threatening situation--his life. This process is activated--if a few hours have elapsed--by immediate needs such as bodily functions, hunger, thirst, and inability to move.

In the correctional setting, a prisoner taking hostages has been conditioned to his status as a prisoner. He is locked up, the staff have a variety of weapons, and they are able to use them. Time and his loneliness will start him in the direction of thinking, verbalizing, and eventually exploring with the negotiator other alternatives (known as the "what if" development) which, if handled with patience and clear thinking, will result in the release of the hostage(s) unharmed.

VI. NEGOTIATION

A. The Role of the Negotiator

The role of the negotiator is to serve as a single lifeline to the hostage taker(s). The negotiator's immediate object is to build dependence and stall for time. Thus, the perpetrator should be required to go through the negotiator for cigarettes, food, medication, the time of day, conversation, conditions assessment, message bearing, incoming communication, etc. To help establish this dependence, the negotiator **uses** trust-building skills:

- The negotiator is a good listener.
- The negotiator lets the perpetrator "tell his story," rather than telling him he "knows how he feels."
- The negotiator focuses all attention on the perpetrator (seemingly) as the star of this "drama."
- The negotiator seeks multiple opportunities to establish trust and demonstrate good faith to the hostage taker. Example: If the perpetrator needs cigarettes, negotiator, even if overloaded with cigarettes on his own person, exhibits great efforts in going to get cigarettes for the hostage taker. He creates continuing opportunities to be a "good guy" by not giving the taker all the cigarettes at once so that he can again and again (giving a few at a time) demon-

strate his efforts on behalf of the perpetrator. (See Negotiating Ploys, page 13.)

The hostage negotiator should not be a decision maker within the facility or departmental structure. This, however, is who the perpetrator will want to have as his negotiator. The whole process of stalling to build dependence would be enormously difficult if the perpetrator were dealing with the Superintendent, the Director, or with any other person who could not plausibly stall on producing any results or demands. The hostage taker should have to deal with the negotiator only and receive responses to demands/requests from decision makers only through the negotiator.

Ideally, the negotiator should be a person unknown to the perpetrator, although this may not always be possible in a correctional facility. In staff/inmate prison relationships, no matter how positive, the staff member always knows some negative information about the inmate. It may be information about the commitment offense, it may concern problems with family members, it may involve work, educational or sexual failures, or any other negative information volunteered by the inmate or made available through casework/prison records. Under the pressures of having taken a hostage, it is normal for a hostage taker to become "paranoid" about trust and consequences of the incident. In a crisis situation, the perpetrator will be more trusting in dealing with a "significant unknown" than with someone whom he knows.

B. Negotiator Qualities

Many personal qualities and characteristics constitute both "natural" and trained negotiators :

- Calmness. This includes personal calmness under pressure and the quality of having a calming effect on others (hostage taker, hostage(s) and co-workers).
- Ability to work under pressure. Few other correctional situations will exert this type of life/death pressure on an employee. Pressure will come from "knowing the consequences," from fatigue, from varying advice and support from co-workers and supervisors during the incident, baiting from the hostage taker, and the pressure of having to come out of role from normal assignment and handle this type of situation.
- Good voice qualities. The negotiator must be understood by the hostage taker. His voice and communication style must not aggravate and escalate the situation. The tone- must be comfortable, the speaking pace/cadence clear. Anger, frustration and anxiety must not show.

- Lack of ego involvement. The negotiator must be able to give and take orders. He is responsible to the Command Post Commander, and in turn, the Warden/Superintendent/Jail Commander. He is not a "star." It is possible for him to fail, and he may have to deal with that. A hostage situation does not "belong" to anyone.
- Ability to perceive and exploit power. The negotiator must be able to recognize progress and know when to shift gears. He must be able to recognize fear, fatigue, anxiety in his adversary and use it to advantage.
- High tolerance for ambiguity. There is no blueprint for dealing with a "Type A" or "Type B" hostage situation. All sorts of variables, game rule changes, supervisory twists, and plain fate come into play. The negotiator must be able to survive for periods without structure or precedent. He must have confidence in his skills and decisions.
- Language trained. The negotiator must be unusually sensitive to use of words and word pictures. He/she must know what words and phrases are red flags to people already upset. (Example : the words "surrender" or "give up"). The negotiator must also be sensitive to cultural words and phrases that would inhibit the negotiation process.
- Sensitive to turf and human behavior. In the event that negotiations go from voice-voice communication to face-to-face, it is imperative that the negotiator have sensitivity regarding getting too close, intruding on non-neutral turf, and on all aspects of body language in general.

C. The Back-Up Negotiator

As might be expected, a hostage episode can run for moments, hours, or days. The Emergency Response Plan for this type of crisis must, of course, provide for some relief for the negotiator.

The opening negotiator, or the person to whom the hostage taker makes his announcement, may end up negotiating the whole crisis. If the recipient of the announcement is incapable, untrained, or unacceptable in this role, the negotiation process is taken over by an on-scene person. This individual then becomes the "primary negotiator."

Negotiators cannot work in a vacuum. The pressures, details, tasks, physical strain and anxieties are monumental, including:

- physical exhaustion, which is geometrically increased under life/death situations. Even if the negotiator is functioning on pure adrenalin, the physiological costs are great.

- psychological exhaustion;
- voice strain;
- difficulty of taking notes while talking;
- a need for creature comforts of food, rest, restroom, or "breather ;" and
- a need to consult with the Command Post Commander, higher officials, or other resource staff.

A back-up or secondary negotiator should be stationed with the primary negotiator to provide the following services and support:

- To take notes. "The log" should include statements, requests, time notations, and any information volunteered' by the perpetrator. Even if the dialogue is being recorded, notes should still be taken for analysis (of progress, regression, repetition, patterns, stress signs, etc.) by the negotiators. Tapes cannot be played back in a hurry for this purpose, nor are they of any use to the negotiators for instant play back if within earshot of the perpetrator(s). Another consideration is that mechanical equipment may fail, and raw notes may become your only history. Even under ideal taping conditions, the notes serve to explain the action on the tape (time notations, for example).
- To run errands. These missions may include messages to and from the Command Post or other areas. Legwork may also include getting food, cigarettes, and coffee.
- To serve as therapist to negotiator. The negotiator is working under tremendous stress and pressure. His choice of words, actions, or suggestions could result in the deaths of co-workers. Time can increase that pressure. The negotiator needs to be reassured that he is doing okay and that he is okay. If he is getting frustrated, tired, or angry, the back-up negotiator summarizes progress, suggests another task, or provides a little relief. Decisions are discussed and reinforced and objectivity is maintained.
- To provide relief for negotiator. In a long siege (8-10 hours) the primary negotiator will need some physical relief. It may be to your advantage (in wearing/ talking down) that the hostage taker not get any physical rest/relief. If things are going well (no escalation of incident) between negotiator and hostage taker, the primary negotiator will phase the relief transition into the dialogue: ". . .Joe, I'm going to see about your request for some aspirins. Harry here will keep you posted about any changes out here. Joe,

...this is Harry. I'll be back..." Then "Harry" talks and builds an acceptance relationship with the hostage taker.

- To act as substitute negotiator. Should credibility be lost for whatever reason, or should the rapport break down between negotiator and hostage taker, the secondary negotiator takes over and the primary negotiator becomes the silent back-up, performing support service functions.

CAUTION

Substitute negotiators only when it is determined to be absolutely necessary to the process. Too much switching around may confuse and antagonize the hostage taker.

D. Negotiating Ploys

As time passes for the hostage taker in his sealed/contained area, he is going to need things. What he needs will depend on the duration of the incident and the location in which you have him confined. Water, food, cigarettes, coffee, medication, hygiene facilities, news and conversation may become trade-off items for such things as information on how the hostage(s) are doing, an opportunity to be shown or to talk to the hostage(s) or, in the case of multiple hostages, a chance to bargain one or more of them out.

The skilled negotiator always tries to get something for something, doesn't give all he's going to give right away, and gives the appearance of having gone to great lengths to get what he does offer to the hostage taker.

The "payoff" in the few-cigarettes-at-a-time ploy is the opportunity to build a momentum of trade-offs--i.e., "I got you this and this and this (through great effort), now it's your turn to demonstrate good faith".

CAUTION

The trade-off or stalling ploys can be overplayed. Remember, if the hostage taker is hungry, without cigarettes or water, the hostages are also.

E. Amnesty

The hostage negotiator cannot offer, suggest, or grant amnesty from prosecution. The inmate hostage taker is well aware of this.

The hostage negotiator can, however, "paint the picture" of improved circumstances should the perpetrator release and not harm the hostage(s). In the event that some injury has already been suffered by the hostage(s), it is still to the perpetra-

tar's advantage to cease and desist for as many reasons as can be described by the negotiator (Less drastic consequences, perpetrator's family will be relieved, etc.).

F. The Issue of Rape

The issue of rape, threatened or actual, usually comes up in discussions of hostage trauma possibilities. This is a concern of both women and men. Although it is a less-than-death possible eventuality, rape appears to be highly feared. It seldom actually occurs, however. The available data supporting its unlikelihood suggests that the majority of hostage takers have other needs, priorities, and concerns occupying their attention.

G. Dealing With Deadlines

Deadlines usually accompany demands. Hostage taking is an aggressive act in which threats, ultimatums and deadlines are to be expected. Some considerations for the negotiator about deadlines :

- Don't set deadlines on yourself. You are under enough pressure. Don't put specific timetables on when you will return to the telephone or the scene. You may not be able to make it. Don't promise a response to a demand by a certain time. Use terms such as "shortly," "as soon as I can," "I'll hurry," or "that will take a little time." Try to avoid commitments such as "I'll have an answer for you by 2: 50 p.m."
- "Appear" to ignore adversary deadlines. If the demand is that you produce a Lear jet by 3:30 or blood flows, talk about the Lear jet or anything else. Don't count down the time; don't remind him it's 3:25. Many threats are made in the opening moments of a hostage incident in the name of demanding attention, emphasis, and throwing weight around. As time passes and the reality syndrome has a chance to germinate, the perpetrator may welcome the chance to de-escalate in a face-saving way. One way is to re-contact the hostage taker just before the established deadline and get him talking about something else. This gives him a chance to "forget ," or in the case of multiple hostage takers, to give the appearance of being involved with progress in another area.
- Synchronize watches. When dealing with threatened deadlines, be sure to synchronize watches with the perpetrator. Yours or his may be wrong!
- Deadlines come - Deadlines go. Of the multitude of hostage situations on a worldwide basis, in only two situations have the initial threatened deadlines been kept (Tunis in 1974

and the South Moluccan train hijacking in the Netherlands). Once a deadline passes, other deadlines more easily come and go.

H. "Ignore the Hostage(s)"

The objective of any hostage negotiation effort is to save lives . To accomplish this, the negotiator often has to talk in one vein and think in another. This process is further complicated in a prison setting, where the hostage may be a fellow staff member.

The tack that the negotiator must pursue is seemingly to ignore and downplay the value/existence/needs of the hostage(s) and focus on the perpetrator. If too much attention (in the eyes of the hostage taker) is shown the hostage(s), this concern escalates the value of the hostages to the taker and increases his sense of power and expectation of victory.

Remembering that the name of the game is stalling, wearing down, and allowing time for the Stockholm and reality syndromes to take effect, the ploy of getting the perpetrator to talk about himself and his problems has merit. It also gives him the feeling that the negotiator is interested in him and his situation (hence resolution). In dealing with a psychotic, this attention to the "real star" of the drama is very effective.

I. Wounded or Sick Hostages

In any hostage situation, you may be faced with the circumstance of a wounded or sick hostage . The hostage taker will, of course, try to use this as leverage against you. It is advantageous for the negotiator to turn this pressure around and put the onus back on the perpetrator. This can be done in a low-keyed manner by having the negotiator point out that "yes, we know that Mr. X has a heart condition. We are very concerned about that. If he should die, he will be of little use to you, and the circumstances you are in will become much more serious ." Make the decision/responsibility that of the hostage taker. Let the pressure build against the taker.

If you are aware of a special medical condition of a hostage, do advise the perpetrator of this condition and do allow the appropriate medication to be sent in. DO send in medical supplies to a wounded hostage.

Don't offer to or agree to exchange hostages. A life is a life. If you buy into the exchange process, you are placing more value on one person's life than another. The mission of the negotiation recovery process is to save lives, not to swap or trade up or down.

In the event that a wounded or sick hostage is released (in a multiple hostage situation), be sure that this individual is debriefed as soon as medically possible. Such a release is a signal from the hostage taker that there is some regard for human life and improves the chances for successful negotiation and release of the others.

J. Requests for "Significant Others"

A request to have a relative, wife, or special person (usually a civilian from the hostage taker's "outside life") brought to the negotiations may crop up as a threshold demand or it may surface during some phase of the 'reality syndrome'. Many factors argue against granting this sort of request:

- You cannot guarantee the safety of this person in a prison hostage incident.
- You want the negotiator to be the single lifeline of communication.
- You may not know the real reason behind this request. The requested individual may be the cause of the hostage taker's frustration or be part of his problem. The hidden agenda of the perpetrator may be to kill or be killed in front of this person.
- The person may throw in his/her lot with the hostage taker and add to the on-scene problems.

The negotiator might offer to meet the demand (if possible) as part of the surrender package, i.e., once the hostage is released, the weapon retrieved, etc., arrangements will be made for communication/contact at the jail, hospital or wherever the hostage taker will be quartered. Do not promise this, however, if there is no intent to follow through.

K. "Trickeration"

There are many hostage "war stories" depicting clever schemes by which hostage incidents were successfully resolved through trickery. Many of these involve drugging food or drink.

Drugged food or drink is often suggested as a non-violent plan to neutralize all participants, hostage takers and hostages, to effect recovery. The unknown factor, of course, is the effect this drug may have on the hostages, who may be forced to consume/imbibe all of the substance.

The problems accompanying trickery as contrasted with negotiation efforts include the possibility of backfire. Once a scheme has backfired, particularly in a prison hostage situation, negotiation credibility is gone, and the situation is esca-

lated. Even the hostages may turn against you if the trick has increased their peril.

L. Going Face-to-Face

The majority of hostage incidents do not involve face-to-face negotiator/perpetrator dialogue. Contact is usually initiated and maintained by telephone or by yelling/talking through doors, walls or windows. In rare instances, however, the negotiator may decide it is advantageous to move from voice/voice to a face-to-face encounter.

The dangers in this situation are **obvious**:

- The negotiator may be taken hostage.
- The negotiator may be injured or killed.
- Either of these possibilities may result in escalation of the incident to the degree that hostages and rescuing personnel are injured or killed.

Should face-to-face contact be considered advantageous during any phase of the incident, the following precautions should be taken :

1. Have the hostage taker's "permission."
2. Make certain that the hostage taker is aware of when the negotiator is coming, from what direction he is approaching, through what door, etc. The negotiator should "talk" his way along.
3. The negotiator should extract a verbal promise from the hostage taker that he/they will not harm him. (This may feel awkward, but do so for reinforcement purposes).
4. The negotiator should be certain that the sniper-assault team and Command Post Commander know what he is wearing.
5. The negotiator should "earn" and announce his progress into the area. He must be very sensitive about intruding into perpetrator's turf.
6. No sudden movements or shouting should occur during this re-positioning.
7. Once in the area, the negotiator should try to position himself near an exit or some type of escape route.

8. The negotiator should not get within grabbing distance of the perpetrator(s).
9. If dialogue goes sour, get out!

VII. SOME TIPS ON MOUNTING AN ASSAULT

This material is primarily aimed at resolution of the hostage episode through containment and dialogue. If, however, the determination is made to mount any type of assault in a correctional setting, a few considerations are offered:

- A. The optimum time to assault the adversary at his psycho/physiological weakest is between the hours of 4:00 and 6:00 a.m.
- B. The most effective staffing of an assault mounted during these hours consists of staff persons used to working/being alert during those pre-dawn hours (first watch staff).
- C. Medical personnel and their equipment should be stationed near the site ready to provide medical services.
- D. Staff involved in an assault vigil (including the negotiator throughout) should not be pumped with coffee or other caffeine agents, but should coat their stomachs and temper their nerves with milk or other bland substances.

VIII. SURRENDER

Other than the opening moments of a hostage situation, there is probably no more dangerous a period than the surrender phase.

If the negotiator is successful in talking the perpetrator into releasing the hostage, immediate consideration must be given to the order and manner in which hostage(s), weapon(s) and perpetrator(s) will be recovered.

The following factors complicate these decisions:

- A. For any of a million reasons, the hostage taker may change his mind midstream. Because of this possibility, it is best to get the hostage(s) and the weapon(s) out first.
- B. The hostage taker may have a surprise in store for you. The hidden agenda may be to:
 - have you kill him in a shootout scene
 - kill the hostages, himself, and as many personnel as possible.

- C. In a multiple hostage taker situation there may be dissension among the perpetrators as to individual commitment to the surrender.
- D. The hostage(s) may be injured, necessitating sending in medical transport to the area of captivity.

If possible, the ideal order of recovery is:

- Hostage(s)
- Weapon(s)
- Perpetrator(s)

The method of recovery will depend upon terrain, numbers involved and tactical advantage. The Negotiator, Command Post Commander, and Sniper Team must be clear on signals, sequence and game plan.

In recovering the hostage taker, it is important to apprehend the person in such a manner that he does not suddenly see overwhelming force while coming out and seize an opportunity to rush back in or re-take the hostage(s). This is why it is best to get the hostages out first, as you can always out-wait the taker. The press should be kept away from this stage of the action. Only the minimum staff required should be witness to the surrender.

IX. PREPARATION FOR PROSECUTION

Preparation for prosecution begins the moment a hostage situation is announced. It is the responsibility of the Command Post Commander to oversee report gathering and to preserve the crime scene.

A. Reports

The following should submit reports before leaving the facility:

- Person to whom the hostage situation is announced
- Watch Commander
- Command Post Commander
- Officer-of-the-Day
- Medical O.D. and Medical staff on scene of the incident. This includes any medical or psychological staff examining or treating hostage(s), perpetrator(s) or staff after resolution of situation.
- Negotiator(s)
- Tactical Team (covering anything fired or thrown)

- Commander of mutual assistance agencies if brought on site
- Hostage(s)
- Civilian witnesses (if any)
- Facility staff involved within the inner perimeter hostage activity
- Any facility staff involved in assault order

Persons preparing reports, particularly hostages and persons involved in assault efforts, should be separated from each other while preparing these reports.

B. Preserving The Crime Scene

Resolution of the hostage incident may come through surrender or assault. Either way, the weapon(s) must be retrieved by staff and processed as pre-trial evidence, employing all precautions of handling, marking, and storing evidence.

The area in which the hostage incident occurred should be photographed and significant measurements noted for later use in court.

The hostage(s) should be photographed if there is any chance, charge, or evidence of injury, bruise or physical trauma. Medical statements should accompany such photographs for court use.

The perpetrator should be photographed if any type of **assault/** force was utilized during the incident. Medical statements should accompany these photographs.

- Should negotiations be filmed or videotaped?

Aside from being difficult to set up and impractical in this setting, filming may inhibit the negotiations process. The negotiator in a life/death situation does not need the added stress of being immortalized on film for later use. This is one of the reasons for keeping the press out of the area.

- What about tape recording?

If battery-operated recorder and tapes are available, tapes of the incident may be of some use later provided that:

-- notes taken by the negotiator(s) and information logged at the Command Post explain the action on the tape.

- recordings result in any intelligible transcription at all (given background noise, competing radio noise, etc.).
- negotiators have any time to deal with turning recorder on/off.

X. POST-INCIDENT

The hostage situation may end in surrender, assault, or a combination.

The following areas will need attention before the situation can be considered concluded:

A. Debriefing

- Of Hostage(s)

The hostage has just been through an unfamiliar Life-threatening ordeal which may have lasted moments, hours, or even days. Your concern with the hostage goes beyond getting an incident report with which to prosecute the hostage taker. If the hostage is a custody employee, consideration should be given to time off and a possible temporary change of assignment.

People who have been hostages should be provided access to friends, family, and or therapist to "tell their stories" and work out the residue of feelings and reactions. (For a complete discussion of follow-up treatment of hostages, see material from "Debriefing In Hostage Situations," page 26 and "Stressors On Correction Officers Held Hostage," page 29.)

- Of Negotiator(s)

The negotiator, particularly the amateur or one-timer pressed into service in a correctional hostage situation, needs reassurance when it is all over. This individual may need some time off or, depending on the outcome of the incident, access to therapy. In some hostage episodes, loss of life is beyond all control of the negotiator and he/she should not be burdened with post-incident guilt.

B. Suicide Watch

A suicide watch should be placed on the hostage taker immediately and continuously after the incident. In more than one instance, the perpetrator has committed suicide right in the lap of the agency charged with protecting him against himself.

C. Clarify Situation with the Press

The Public Information Officer should ensure to the greatest degree possible that the press has a clear understanding of how the situation was concluded and how the facility is handling the wrap-up details.

D. Explain Situation to Oncoming Staff

Oncoming staff who have a need to know should be apprised of chronology and events concluding the hostage situation.

E. Calm Down Rest of Facility

Reassure non-involved inmates and staff that routine has been restored and that movement/routine/program will resume or continue.

F. Critique Incident

As soon as convenient after the hostage situation is over, staff involved (Command Post Commander, Negotiator(s), Watch Commander, Sniper-Assault Team, etc.) should meet with the Superintendent/Warden/Jail Commander or designee, to review:

1. Why the incident happened (if known)
2. How the incident was handled
3. Prevention possibilities

Ideally, this is not a blamecasting session, but is a team-building experience.

GUIDELINES FOR HOSTAGES

All corrections personnel should be prepared for the possibility that they will be taken hostage. They should also recognize that the attitudes and psychological condition of hostage(s) affect their chances of survival and recovery from the incident. This section is designed to inform corrections personnel of the conditions they may encounter as hostages and to prepare them to respond in a manner that will promote their own safety. The material was excerpted and adapted by the staff of the NIC Information Center from Richard O'Connell's materials for a training workshop on "Hostage Response and Negotiation"² and from Michael T. Scott, "Hostage Negotiation,"³ prepared for an annual conference of the Indiana Correctional Association.

I. DO'S AND DON'TS FOR THE HOSTAGE

Although a myriad of variables determine the outcome of any hostage situation, one factor regarding the hostages themselves remains constant: The longer the hostage lives during the takeover, the better the chances become of living even longer.

Certain behaviors affect these chances, both positively and negatively .

Some do's for the hostage:

- A. Be a good listener. Use all the listening skills of demonstrating and conveying interest and concern.
- B. Let the hostage taker tell his story. Work to establish the Stockholm bond. The hostage(s) may be the first to really hear this person out. This process is aborted by interjecting statements such as, "I know exactly how you feel. You don't need to tell me, Jack", etc.
- C. Do maintain eye contact. (As much as possible under the circumstances)
- D. Do follow orders to the best of your ability.
- E. Do rest as much as possible. It is important that the hostage relax and rest to keep up strength for the rescue/recovery phase.
- F. Do remain alert. The hostage needs to be acutely aware of circumstances within the area of captivity as well as remaining alert to outside cues signaling rescue plans or clear opportunities for escape.

- G. Do be a calming agent. The hostage needs to remain calm and, ideally, have a calming effect on the perpetrator(s) and other hostages.

Some don'ts for the hostage:

- A. Don't be hostile. This is not the time to complain, be sarcastic; or co berate the hostage taker.
- B. Don't moralize or threaten. The hostage taker will be only further agitated if threats of consequences and moralizations come from the hostage(s).
- C. Don't be obnoxious. This is a situation of compressed nervousness for hostage(s) and taker(s). The hostage who chatters, jokes, whimpers, cries or loses control over body functions is difficult to tolerate. In some instances of multiple hostages, the hostages have turned on a member who has alienated the group by vomiting or becoming hysterical.
- D. Don't stare at the hostage taker. There is a difference between maintaining eye contact and staring. Staring, particularly in dealing with a psychotic, agitates the perpetrator.
- E. Don't be a hero. The hostage should not try to be the rescuer or the negotiator. Others are trained and are working for the hostage's safe release.
- F. Don't be a "go-fer". Although the hostage should try to comply with orders as much as possible, he should not come completely out of character and feign joining the side of the perpetrator. The correctional employee is a non-neutral hostage to begin with in the eyes of the hostage taker, and undue suspicion might be aroused if an immediate or obvious about-face occurs.
- G. Don't plant ideas or worry out loud. The expressed fears of the hostage may add to his problems, e.g., "You aren't going to rape me. . .are you? You aren't going to start a fire. . .are you?"
- H. Don't make suggestions. The hostage may think of some tactical solutions to get both hostage(s) and taker(s) out of the dilemma. Offering these ideas as suggestions can backfire with disastrous consequences to the hostage should they fail. When though some Stockholm bonding may have formed, the non-neutral correctional employee hostage will lose ground and never re-establish the bond if the perpetrator believes he has been led into a trap via the hostage's suggestion.

Remember : Many hostages who end up getting killed bring their deaths upon themselves.

II. PSYCHOLOGICAL RESPONSES OF HOSTAGES AND HOSTAGE TAKERS

The psychological condition of hostages and hostage-takers is difficult to control or predict. However, it is possible to outline a general psychological profile of both. The following psychological conditions will probably be present in the hostage(s) as well as the holder(s). If hostages can recognize these conditions **and** control their mental attitudes, they can improve their chances for survival.

A. Frustration

Usually caused by being deprived of personal freedom.

B. Anxiety

A direct result due to frustration. This condition varies from mild to severe, at which point the anxious individual reacts irrationally to attempt to alleviate the anxiety (i.e., for the holder, harming a hostage; and for the hostage, engaging in a foolish act which may result in losing one's life.)

C. Fear

A primary cause of conflict in most hostage situations. The fear of death is considered the most powerful of the fear-induced motivational drives.

D. Fantasy

Quite often people use daydreams or fantasize to release tension and escape from the reality of the situation.

E. Repression

An ego defense that suppresses memories which may be harmful to individuals during the crisis situation.

DEBRIEFING IN HOSTAGE SITUATIONS

Both during and after a hostage situation, it is important to gather factual information as soon as possible from released hostages, hostage-takers, and witnesses. The following material on debriefing in hostage situations was excerpted from "Debriefing in Hostage Situations" by Joseph Marchese.⁴

Hostage situations in correctional institutions differ widely from outside situations. Debriefers are in fact at an advantage in planning their strategy during a hostage situation at a correctional facility. For instance, the layout of the jail or prison is known; the number of persons (hostages) is usually known; the background of the perpetrator(s) and hostages should also be known. More general and specific information is immediately available even before debriefing starts. In outside situations, all of this information is not always known or easily obtained.

The first consideration in debriefing is to determine what information should be obtained during the interview: only information that is needed at the moment (priority information) or additional auxiliary information? The next problem is to overcome the dynamics of a hostage situation and try to determine if the information that has been supplied is accurate.

What to Ask

The usual method of determining what information is needed is to respond to requests by those who are in command. However, this process results in delays in the debriefing and can cause numerous interruptions as more informational needs arise. It does not take into account needs that may arise after the subject is released from the debriefing.

To establish a means of maximizing debriefing information, a briefing form, was developed at a meeting with several negotiators. A brainstorming session produced information that will be common to all hostage situations. It was designed to answer specific questions, thereby obtaining priority and auxiliary information from the subject in one session. The form serves to keep the interrogator on track by requiring him or her to check off questions as they are asked. (For a copy of the debriefing form, see Appendix, page 46.)

Prior to the debriefing session, the interrogator can circle priority questions and obtain critical information first. For example, if there is reason to believe that a hostage has been injured, the interrogator can circle questions pertaining to injuries, types of weapons, perpetrator responsible, etc. After this priority information is obtained, the debriefer can gather auxiliary information that may be needed later.

There are several reasons for getting as much information as possible during the initial debriefing session. First, the time lapse between the

incident and debriefing is minimal. Second, a thorough debriefing eliminates the problem of having to recall the subject after he/she is reunited with family. The reunion and time may alter the subject's concerns. Third, the information obtained is on hand not only for the needs of the negotiation, but for later on when paperwork is processed for criminal charges.

The questionnaire presented should be used only as a guide for a brainstorming session at individual facilities. To establish specific criteria to be used universally would be impossible without examining every facility and situation. Therefore, it is up to individual facilities to tailor their own debriefing questionnaire.

Dynamics of a Debriefing

Of all the factors that come into play in a hostage debriefing, the selection of debriefers is the most important. If skilled criminal interrogators are chosen, can they adapt or soften their skills to meet the demands of a highly charged and emotional situation? Interrogators must understand the emotions of the situation and be ready to vary their strategy to compensate for the emotional factors at play. The interrogators should also be aware that many hostages are mentally and physically abused during captivity and may suffer damaging psychological effects.

In addition to sensitivity, interrogators must be able to suppress any reactions--even facial expressions--to any atrocities the subject describes.

The interrogator must also be able to determine if the subject is telling the truth. Obviously, if the subject is either a surrendering or captured perpetrator, there is a good reason to question the subject's credibility. On the other hand, will released hostages or witnesses always relate accurate or at least true information? As mentioned before, there are several reasons for distortion in a released hostage's or witness' story. Even trained observers are hampered by such perceptual distorters as lighting, heat, and emotions. The only way an interrogator can hope to overcome these distortions is to make the subject aware of them, and hope the subject weeds out the facts.

Evaluating Information

A good interrogator will make use of every tool available to verify information. The first available tool involves physical impediments to accurate perceptions. For instance, can the subject accurately describe an incident if there was a solid brick wall between the subject and the incident? Was there light enough in the room for the clear observation of what the subject is relating in great detail? Was the subject relating what he/she heard or saw? Are other senses (smell, hearing) being used to compensate for what the subject believes happened? Answers to such questions help in determining the value of the information.

The most useful method of verifying information is to test the subject's story against predetermined facts. Such information can be obtained from what is observed through binoculars or what is already known (building plans, control of the physical plant, head counts, etc.). Additional facts may be revealed through the work of tactical teams, which can be used throughout the debriefing process.

By formulating "control questions" (ones for which the answers are already known), a questionnaire can determine whether the subject is lying, exaggerating, or simply not a good witness. For example, a released hostage tells a debriefer that a specific inmate has no part in the taking hostages or the negotiations. However, the facility's intelligence has stated that every time the perpetrators meet, the inmate in question is among them and apparently speaking. The debriefer, therefore, may have reason to suspect the witness and weigh very carefully what the subject relates. At the same time, the debriefer might want to search for a motive for deception by the subject.

Other ways of gathering intelligence can be used to verify information developed during debriefing. Sophisticated methods such as lie detectors and stress evaluators may be of assistance if such devices are available and time permits their use.

Debriefing persons during a hostage situation requires the same degree of planning as the tactical maneuvers. Every attempt must be made to obtain adequate, accurate information.

POST HOSTAGE TREATMENT

This section was adapted from "Stressors on Correction Officers Held Hostage: A Model for Developing Post-Hostage Treatment Programs in Corrections Departments." an unpublished paper by Robin E. Inwald, Ph.D.⁵

The increasing frequency of hostage situations, including the prolonged hostage seige in Iran, has prompted much to be written in the press about the potential psychological trauma and recovery of hostage victims. Psychologists have noted debilitating symptoms of stress which may appear while an individual is held hostage, as well as several months or even years later. Perhaps the most threatening occupational hazard of working as a correction officer is the possibility of someday being taken hostage by inmates.

The following factors are related to corrections officers' special vulnerability and response to being held hostage by inmates. They should be considered in designing pre-or post-hostage treatment programs in correctional facilities:

1. A correction officer is a law enforcement officer, hired with the responsibility of looking after the welfare of other individuals. It is often within correction officer's authority to make arrests whenever others' lives are endangered and/or the law is broken. Thus, when a CO is taken hostage, he/she is not only stripped of individual control, but of an authority role as well. Since that authority image is often the strongest weapon carried by an officer surrounded by inmates on the job, the loss of it (even temporarily) may seriously affect an officer's perceived and actual future job performance.

Officers interviewed in one facility pointed out that most ex-hostages they knew had not been able to return to work successfully after their hostage experience, but had eventually taken sick leaves and left the system. Although there are many reasons for this, it was the officer's perception that "once you've lost face with the inmates, you can never go back."

2. A second factor affecting CO's held hostage may be the general personality characteristics of many CO's, which may cause counter-productive behavior and difficulty accepting hostage status. For instance, candidates who apply for CO positions tend to demonstrate on written personality tests (such as the MMPI) a generally high level of activity and restlessness and a need to deny even the hint of psychological difficulties. This tendency to maintain a strong appearance of control may be necessary for successful performance as a CO vis-a-vis inmates. However, this characteristic may also negatively affect the officers' amenability to preliminary training in hostage response techniques as well as their receptivity to treatment should they actually be taken hostage. Training and treatment programs must therefore be geared to

handling officers' anxieties in ways that will not erode or threaten their occupation or personal needs for authority and self-control.

3. CO's perceive the real threat of potential hostage incidents throughout their careers. They also experience vicariously other officers' negative experiences on the job. Whenever a fellow officer is attacked and/or wounded, officers anticipate their own reactions, and perhaps in self-defense, often fantasize that they would have handled themselves differently.

For example, 40 out of 60 officers who had volunteered to serve on a special tactical team to handle hostage situations stated they would never allow themselves to be taken hostage, and that they would rather fight to the death than be victimized. As a group, they asserted that from what they had observed of their peers who had been taken hostage, there was no hope for emerging physically or psychologically intact. Although one ex-hostage refuted their claims, the discussion indicated the strength of many officers' preconceived notions of how they will behave in facing potential hostage events. Eventual actions contrary to such plans may provide unusual psychological disorganization for CO'S.

4. Severe psychological traumas may be experienced by correction officers who helplessly watch hostage events from a relatively close range.

Officers at the perimeter of a hostage taking do not have the authority to act or shoot at will, thereby resolving their own sense of control as well as feeling they have tried to aid peers. It is necessary to include these officers--as well as ex-hostages--in post-hostage treatment programs.

5. CO's often feel that administrators will not be supportive of them, either during or following an episode in which they are taken hostage.

One anxiety frequently expressed by officers is the anticipation that if they were to be taken hostage, they would be left to their fates while administrators played politics: "Hey, I'm in here while they're out there negotiating." Past feelings of neglect and knowledge of the slow workings of bureaucracy add to officers' anxieties about what could happen to them if taken hostage. Incidents in which ex-hostages were immediately disciplined for infractions of departmental rules were cited as additional evidence of administrative insensitivity and tendency towards scapegoating when a crisis occurs.

Following a hostage situation, there are pressures on administrators from the media, politicians, and other outside groups to find a guilty party and to assure the public that another hostage incident will not take place. This is translated by line officers as a lack of support for the condition of ex-hostages.

One ex-hostage reported that the most dangerous time in his hostage experience took place after he was released by the inmates. After being rushed to a debriefing room and asked to recount every detail

into a tape recorder, he found himself driving home alone. When he reached his house, he woke up from a trance-like state unable to remember how he got home. He then panicked, suffering dizziness, shakes, and profuse sweating, at the thought that he had been driving in shock and only marginally attending to the road. Such oversights and apparent apathy on the part of administrators to the officer's psychological condition contribute to officers' tendency to blame their bosses for indifference.

6. Families of correction officers held hostage may react in ways that create difficulties for ex-hostages. Correction officers often report that they do not feel comfortable discussing their jobs with family members, since such discussions tend to increase already-present fears for the CO's safety. Being taken hostage may serve to validate family concerns and reinforce efforts on the part of families to see CO's change their working place.

Due to the conflicting pressures of allaying family fears and returning to the prison for their livelihood, correction officers are forced to deal with an environment that is not conducive to resolving the psychological after-effects of being held hostage.

7. Correction Officers fear that they will bear the brunt of inmates' anger and frustration at the system responsible for their incarceration. Since witnesses, prosecutors, and judges cannot be touched in jail, correction officers serve as the most obvious targets for displaced aggressive actions.

Generalized negative feelings most often characterize inmate-officer relationships, and the possibility of inmate retaliation against society being focused on a Correction Officer is part of an officer's daily occupation risk. The Stockholm Syndrome, frequently used to characterize the development of positive feelings on the part of hostages towards their captors, may not be operative in the inmate-CO hostage situation. While attachments may become stronger between officers and inmates who have had previous positive interactions (one inmate actually helped an officer to safety during a hostage seige in New Jersey), there is increased danger of attacks by inmates seeking revenge on officers for past treatment. When hoods are placed over hostages' faces, as was done in Attica, any positive benefits to be gained by hostages from the Stockholm Syndrome are effectively neutralized.

8. In' addition to fears of being physically harmed and losing face with inmates and peers, officers expressed the most alarm about the possibility of being sexually attacked. Among their concerns was that if this were to happen to them, all inmates and officers would suspect they were weak and even, potentially, homosexuals themselves. Perhaps the need for these officers to identify with the more "macho," invulnerable, and heterosexual "tough" image predisposed 2/3 of them to express feelings that death is preferable to homosexual rape.

Taking the above background factors into consideration, following are suggestions for developing pre- and post-hostage treatment programs in correctional facilities:

1. As part of any stress training program, especially those developed for experienced officers, include a segment geared to a discussion of officers' preconceived ideas and fears about being taken hostage by inmates. Utilize staff members who have been held or attacked by inmates in the past and can provide evidence that continued functioning on the job is possible after such an event.
2. Utilize psychologists in stress training programs to introduce relaxation techniques and general discussions of the efficacy of desensitization schedules for treating officers traumatized by experiences on the job.
3. Develop departmental guidelines on appropriate behaviors for officers to follow should they ever be taken hostage by inmates (one program of this sort has been initiated by the New York State Commission for Corrections).
4. Provide explanations of the stages an officer may experience after being held hostage, including symptoms and final resolution of the after-effects. One such model of post-hostage stages might include:
 - a. Shock - Temporary -disbelief and confusion. Officer should not be left alone during this period. It may last from a few hours or minutes to days.
 - b. Denial - Reaction of some individuals to deny the event by refusing to speak of it, or to recognize its effect. Some officers may adopt this as their primary coping mechanism. This stage may last until the individual is persuaded to analyze and reintegrate the experience to alleviate annoying symptoms. Such symptoms may include nightmares, insomnia, panic attacks with accompanying palpitations, dizziness, sweating, and difficulty breathing, lack of sexual interest, substance abuse, and other stress-related maladies.
 - c. Realization - This is the "Why me?" stage where victims may experience overwhelming self-pity, depression, and even guilt over having survived. An officer may blame him/herself for not reacting differently regardless of his/her actual helplessness in the situation. If an officer appears to be focusing on such issues, a post-hostage team of officers may be most useful in helping to set the experience in perspective.
 - d. Resolution - Temporary or permanent problem solving stage with three general options: 1) Projection - resolving personal anxieties by blaming others for causing or exacerbating events. One officer blamed his peers for not caning to his aid. When he had the opportunity, several officers were fired or put on probation due to his formal accusations. Others focus upon administrators,

individuals. 2) Personalization - resolving anxieties by blaming oneself. Officers employing this option may be those with little self-confidence, who may turn to alcohol or drugs to avoid negative self-evaluations. 3) Neutralization - This option involves using rationalization and intellectualization to put events in perspective and provide for the possibility of continuing to function without potentially ineffectual revenge-seeking or self-destructive behavior. Post-hostage teams may be able to provide the framework for ex-hostages to neutralize any extreme reactions that may lead to harmful consequences.

- e. Adaptation - The behavioral responses resulting from attempts to resolve feelings about a hostage incident. While an individual may go through one or more of the above stages, it is the final readaptation to the correctional environment that is the goal of any post-hostage treatment program. Intervention, including medical and psychological aid, may be necessary when there is evidence of maladaptive behavior.
5. A team of officers, including ex-hostages, might be organized to provide the following services during and after a hostage went:
- a. Contact a hostage's family, bring them to a central location and provide crisis counseling and information services.
 - b. Meet with all hostages who have been released and are no longer in need of acute medical care in order to show departmental support and to assess psychological conditions.
 - c. Provide supportive counseling to recently-released officers including validating feelings, assuring ex-hostages they are not alone, getting rid of the idea that speaking with mental health specialists means an individual is crazy.
 - d. Provide a confidential/nonjudgmental forum for discussion of individual reactions.
 - e. Provide an opportunity for a released hostage to shower, clean up, and relax before detailed departmental briefings take place.
 - f. Escort officers home if they do not have family members with them.

This team might also be able to meet with ex-hostages for a series of 4 to 6 discussion sessions so that common reactions can be discussed and individuals in need of more professional attention can be identified.

6. Departments might set up mandatory meetings with a psychologist for any officer held hostage. This policy would serve to remove the stigma attached to those who need additional follow-up, since everyone would receive some treatment.
7. Group debriefing procedures for all department members would enable the administration to demystify events and provide an outlet for those who

have witnessed frightening events from the sidelines. Rumors can be quelled if there are frequent departmental briefings available to all officers.

8. Finally, although hostage-takings may occur infrequently, the existence of contingency plans for dealing with them may help to increase the morale of officers who risk the possibility of being attacked or held hostage by inmates.

SAMPLE POLICY FOR RESPONDING TO
HOSTAGE SITUATIONS IN THE CORRECTIONAL SETTING

This policy is designed- to prepare staff to handle hostage situations as safely as possible for all concerned. It has been compiled from several sources and is not meant to serve as a recommended policy, but only to provide information to assist institutions in designing their own policies.

The "Iron Laws" that cannot be broken in responding to hostage situations are:

- No hostage will be exchanged for the freedom or change in sentence of any prisoner.
- No weapons will be supplied to hostage takers.
- No hostages will be exchanged for a different hostage.

The basic methods for neutralizing a hostage situation are to be attempted according to the following priority:

- negotiation
- non-lethal assault
- lethal assault

DEFINITIONS

Alpha Team: A team of individuals assigned by the on duty watch commander whose main function is to respond to an emergency when an alpha alert is announced, duties then to be assigned by watch commander or acting watch commander.

Bravo Tactical Unit: A tactical team of individuals trained as a unit should use of force be necessary. (Held in reserve)

Transfer of Command: A process occurring only when agreed upon by the person presently in command and the person assuming command, and then only after a thorough status briefing.

Negotiating: Process of arriving at agreement with the hostage takers which leads to release of hostages and/or surrender of hostage taker(s).

Status Briefing: A concise verbal report given with enough detail so that a transfer of command can be made.

Hostage Situation: Situation where inmate(s) take hostages either to protect themselves or to attempt to force some action on the part of the institution staff.

Hostage Taker: Any person exacting demands by threatening harm or death to another person.

Hostage: Any person being held against his will by a hostage taker.

Cover Group: Known as Alpha. These are the people who isolate the situation.

Hostage Management: A system used to save lives by isolation and containment of the situation and resolution without the use of force.

Hostage Situation Kit: A prepackaged kit of equipment utilized in hostage situations containing: 2 cassette tape decks with AC/DC power; extra tapes; head phones for cassette decks; suction cup phone jack; field glasses; mirror; writing materials; field phones with batteries; bullhorn; closed channel walkie talkies (2); telephone directories; roll of tape; blue prints of jail; roll of acetate for use as map overlay; grease pencils; flashlight with extra batteries.

Command Post: Consists of commander and his staff. The commander will be the watch commander in absence of normal duty hours personnel. The command post will be responsible for critical decisions and strategy concerning the situation; i.e., whether and when to assault.

Outside Perimeter Control Group: Charged with maintaining control of those entering and leaving the building. Normally the function of the Local police department and deputies from the field.

Inside Perimeter Control Group: Maintains a safe perimeter behind the cover group and prevents unauthorized people from entering the situation and endangering themselves or others.

Call-Up Personnel: A prioritized list of personnel to be notified of a state of emergency (hostage situation, riot, etc.).

Negotiating Team: Staff members designated to communicate with the hostage taker(s) as ordered by the command post commander.

Operations Post: Provides Logistical support to the command post and maintains continued operation of the rest of the institution.

Public Information Officer: Person assigned to have contact with the media and surrounding community. Reports to operations officer.

Operations Communicator: Serves as record keeper and coordinator of communications.

Equipment Control Officer: Responsible for making sure all necessary supplies and equipment are issued to appropriate personnel and to account for all issued equipment. Reports to Operations Officer.

Intelligence Officer: Reports to Operations Officer. In charge of interviews and interrogations, compiling data on hostages, hostage taker(s) and other involved parties. Usually an investigator from the field division.

Personnel Officer: Reports to Operations Officer. Responsible for personnel assignment, accounting for all personnel within the building, call ups, etc.

TACTICAL PLAN

The following tactical plan was designed to resolve hostage situations without loss of life.

I. LOCATE

- A. The primary function of the first staff member discovering a hostage situation is to notify Master Control by the quickest and safest means available. Do not jeopardize your own safety.
- B. Even if the staff member feels he can resolve the issue and secure the release of the hostage(s), whether by force or by verbal methods, it is an absolute rule to report prior to taking action.
- C. The following information will be reported as factually as possible:
 - Name and location of reporting staff member
 - Location of incident
 - Nature of situation
 - Weapon(s) (if known)
 - Number of hostage takers and hostages
 - Injuries
- D. Upon receipt of information, Master Control will notify the Watch Commander, announce an alpha alert, and have the alpha team report to Master Control.
- E. If the hostage taker(s) initiate contact, all staff must be prepared to respond. Keep dialog going and set a constructive tone until the commander is on the scene and adequately briefed. Do not attempt contact with hostage takers.
- F. The Watch Commander, upon notification of a hostage situation in progress, will :
 - Report to Master Control and assume command until transfer of command is initiated,
 - Deploy the alpha team as a cover group to isolate and contain the situation.

II. ISOLATE AND CONTAIN THE SITUATION

- A. As a priority, the alpha team will isolate the hostage taker(s) from other people.
- B. Hostage takers will not be allowed movement unless it is to the tactical advantage of staff, and only with the expressed permission of the commander.
- C. Other inmates will be prevented from joining or helping the hostage taker(s) by locking down all inmates in their present positions.
- D. The commander will secure the building by notifying dispatch of the situation, advising police department and the field division of the situation, and requesting all ingress and egress be control Led and Limited. Only those persons cleared by the administration should be allowed onto prison property.
- E. The commander will initiate the call-up of personnel.

III. SET UP THE COMMAND POST (CP)

- A. The commander will establish the CP, to be chosen according to the following criteria: privacy; types of communication available; space; and restroom facilities.
- B. The commander will do the following:
 - Have the hostage situation kit brought to the CP.
 - Make a formal, repeated announcement to all staff that he has assumed command.
 - Order a curtailment of all non-emergency communications.
 - Appoint a command communicator whose responsibilities will be to:
 - Maintain communications between the CP and Operations Command Post .
 - Maintain a log of all activities, such as personnel, Location, communications, etc.
 - Establish contact with the bravo unit commander and determine if the situation is "red Light", e.g., no deadly force used unless there is an imminent threat to the hostage or other persons, or "green light", e.g., a shot may be taken at any opportunity.

- Establish communications with the alpha team cover group.
 - Establish an inside perimeter group (as staff are available) who will be positioned behind the cover group.
- C. No command officer will come within view of the hostage taker(s) or anyone who is likely to divulge the presence of the officer to the hostage taker(s).
- D. The commander will appoint a temporary operations post commander (see procedures for operations post).
- E. The commander will place all medical personnel on alert.
- F. Staffing of the Command Post:
- Operations Communicator - Will serve as a record keeper and coordinator of communications.
 - Equipment Control Officer - Is responsible for making sure that all necessary equipment and supplies are issued to the appropriate individuals.
 - Public Information Officer - In charge of press and other media relations (such as assigning a briefing area for media people and providing current information to staff).
 - Intelligence Officer - Usually an investigator from the field division. He is in charge of interviews, interrogations, and gathering information on the suspects, hostages, and incidents.
 - Officer-In-Charge of the Rest of the Institution (OICRI) - Although the OICRI will not be permanently assigned to the operations post, he will maintain contact with and be under the command of the operations post commander.

Personnel who are not directly assigned to the operations post will remain out of the operations post.

IV. SET UP THE OPERATIONS POST (OP)

- A. The OP Commander will be responsible for the following functions:
- Personnel assignments, to include relief of cover and inside perimeter groups
 - Coordination of outside perimeter group security
 - Equipment control
 - Intelligence gathering
 - Liaison with other agencies

- Press relations
 - Other logistical issues
- B. The OP commander will assign personnel as needed to fulfill the preceding functions.
- C. The OP will be established in Master Control. If another location must be used, the OP will be set up as close as possible to the command post to allow for ease in communications.

V. EVACUATE

- A. As soon as the alpha cover group, inside perimeter group, and command post are in operation, evacuation of the area inside the perimeter group should begin.
- B. All people in danger zones should be evacuated. First priority is to people in the Line of fire of the hostage taker(s) or inside the alpha cover group line. Second priority is to others in exposed areas. Third priority is to those in non-exposed areas but still within the security perimeter. No one should be moved unless safety can be assured.
- C. All inmate evacuees should be brought to a secure, designated spot near the OP to debrief and identify them.
- D. Evacuated inmates should be considered as suspects until proven otherwise by interviews and other intelligence.
- E. When possible, give inmates in the affected area or unit a chance to get out if they are not involved.

VI. INTELLIGENCE GATHERING

- A. Hostage Takers
- Determine number of hostage takers and weapons
 - Develop profile of hostage takers. Sources: criminal history file, medical records, psychological records, staff, inmates, unit records of mood and influences over the Last 24 hours.
- B. Hostages
- Identification and number involved
 - Physical condition
 - Medical history of hostages

VII. RESOLVE

- A. The Command Post (CP) commander or his designee will brief the Bravo Tactical Unit (BTU).
- The BTU should be located in a secure area as close as possible to the hostage taker(s).
 - The BTU will be given detailed descriptions or photos of all hostage taker(s) and hostages, as well as floor plans, type and number of weapons, and other pertinent information concerning the situation.
 - The BTU will continue to plan for an assault and be available for use by the CP commander as quickly as possible.
 - The BTU will not be used to relieve the alpha cover group unless absolutely necessary as it will lessen the BTU's effectiveness should it need to assault.
- B. Establish Communications with the Hostage Taker(s).
- Communicating with the hostage taker(s) is the responsibility of the negotiating team in the command post, unless it has already occurred earlier at the operations post.
 - Attempt to talk with the hostages themselves in order to calm them and to assess their condition.
 - Communications should be as private and controlled as possible.
 - Verify information regarding identity and condition of hostage taker(s) and hostages.
 - The earliest communication with the hostage taker(s) should emphasize that the situation is under control; that staff do not want anyone hurt; that no one is going to attack the hostage taker(s); and that staff want to talk to the hostage taker(s).
 - As a general rule, contact should be delayed until a designated commander and negotiator are on the scene and some stability has been achieved. However, if the hostage taker(s) ask for or try to establish contact at any time, then they should be responded to. Further, once contact has been made, it must be maintained.
- C. Talk the Hostage Taker(s) Out.
- An attempt should be made to have the hostages released and to have the hostage taker(s) surrender.

- Even if the hostage takers do not respond to talk, it should be continued frequently, unless it is obviously upsetting the hostage taker(s). DO NOT stop trying to talk them out just because it doesn't work quickly.

D. Negotiate

- If attempts to talk the hostage taker(s) out fail, then begin negotiations in earnest.
- No time limit should be placed on the negotiations phase.
- If there is more than one hostage taker, the negotiation team should deal with the decision maker, if possible.
- Negotiators should never give the hostage taker(s) something for nothing.
- Non-negotiable items under any circumstances are:
 - Weapons
 - Escape
 - Additional hostages
 - Release of other inmates
 - Drugs and large amounts of any form of alcohol
- Keep the hostage taker(s) in a decision-making status, e.g., if he asks for a sandwich, he should decide what kind of bread, Lunchmeat, spread, etc.
- The negotiator will not make decisions. He will check out decisions to be made with the CP commander.
- As our policy is to use non-lethal methods first, the negotiator will stall for time whenever possible.
- The negotiator will only use face-to-face talk as a Last resort.
- Do not "trap" the hostage taker(s). Make him feel he still has an option or alternative.

E. Use of Force - Decision To Use

- No weapons, chemical agents or pyrotechnic devices are to be brought into the facility without permission of command post commander.
- No weapons, chemical agents or pyrotechnic devices are to be utilized without permission of command post commander.

- Nothing should preclude the use of necessary force when the life of a hostage or others is in clear and immediate danger.

F. Use of Non-Lethal Force

- Tear Gas

Pepper fogger or mini-fogger. This piece of equipment needs direct contact with the building. The fogger is a non-contaminating device and does not cause fires.

- Canisters

This weapon can be very effective to gas an area. However, remember that all canisters are contaminating and can cause fires. Even the non-burners will heat up to 500 degrees which is enough to start paper or bedding on fire. Another limitation is its delivery system. These weapons either have to be thrown or fired from a launching device attached to a 12-gauge shotgun. Neither of these delivery systems is as accurate as a 37mm gas gun.

- 37mm or 1.5 Caliber Gas Gun

This weapon has great advantage when the area under seige is at a distance from the closest launching point. Again, the disadvantages are that the projectiles can cause fires or contaminate, and they should be fired only by a trained marksman. This marksman must be aware of the capabilities of each type of projectile, some of which will penetrate wooden walls, doors, etc.

- Shot Gun

This weapon, at greater distances than 20 feet, loaded with birdshot can be utilized as non-lethal force. Also, snake loads for revolvers using birdshot are available as non-lethal force. Limitations are its reloading and its lack of accuracy.

G. Use of Lethal Force

- Assault Teams - The use of this method should be a last resort. The basic components of an assault team are three men: (1) lead officer; (2) cover or back-up man, and (3) communications and equipment officer. Most assault teams have five men with the addition of two cover officers:
 - a. Lead Officer - He is armed with a hand gun to keep his hands as free as possible. This officer should wear a

bullet-proof vest and a gas mask. He does all the searching and entering first.

- b. Cover or Back-Up Man - He is armed with a sawed-off shot gun. He is protected with a bullet-proof vest and a gas mask. He provides cover for the lead officer.
 - c. Communications and Equipment Officer - He handles the communications and equipment.
 - d. Cover Officers - They are armed with rifles or shot guns. They cover entries and exits and secure all previously searched areas.
 - e. The potential of a non-lethal (stun gun) weapon being used by the assault team must be a judgment made by the commander. However, the problem is that a stun gun is a two-handed weapon that is not appropriate for a lead officer and thus can create problems in assaulting a building.
- Sniper - The sniper has to be a well-trained marksman with the ability to make a "head shot" at 100 yards into a two inch circle over the right or left eye. This shot causes an instant paralysis on the opposite side extremities (such as a weapon hand). The decision to fire should only be made by the commander after all other alternatives have been exhausted. The only exception to this is the firing by a sniper to preserve a life (his own or others).
 - Fire Control - The use of firearms is to be controlled by the verbal or written signals of red light and green light.
 - a. Red Light - A decision made by the commander and distributed verbally or in writing to all participating staff that they will not fire even if a target of opportunity presents itself. The only exception is in the defense of himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the imminent use of deadly force.
 - b. Green Light - A last resort. The decision to go to a green light status will only be made by the command post commander. A green light means targets of opportunity may be fired upon at the discretion of the shooter. But remember, hostage taker(s) frequently change clothes with hostages. Therefore, know who your targets are.
 - c. Only the cover group sealing the area may fire until the assault team enters, then only they may fire.

- d. Strict fire control will be maintained without a confirmed target. Remember, in many cases a hostage taker(s) exchanges clothing with a hostage.

VIII. DEACTIVATE

- A. The command post commander will see that all staff are accounted for.
- B. The command post and operations post will **be** deactivated.
- C. Notify all uninvolved staff and inmates that the **situation is** over.
- D. Prepare and release a statement to the press.
- E. Begin to check hostages for medical and psychiatric emergency care needs . Hostage taker(s) should also be medically checked.
- F. Debrief all involved staff. This should occur prior to any involved staff member going off duty.
- G. Begin to interview and interrogate witnesses, suspects, and released hostages.

APPENDIX

HOSTAGE DEBRIEFING FORM

I. LIFE-THREATENING/MEDICAL CONDITIONS

- A. Has anyone been killed? _____
- B. Has anyone been injured? _____
How seriously? _____
- C. Is anyone being mistreated? _____
How? _____
- D. Have they threatened to kill anyone? _____
Whom? _____
- E. Have they threatened to injure anyone? _____
Whom? _____
- F. If they have threatened to kill or injure, who is first? _____
Who is last? _____
Why in that order? _____

II. WEAPONS

- A. What is the most lethal weapon in the perpetrator's possession
(gun, knife, pipe...)? _____
- B. Who has the weapon(s)? _____
- C. How many weapons have you actually seen? _____
- D. Who else has seen weapons (other hostages)? _____

III. HOSTAGES

- A. How many hostages are being held? _____
- B. Are you sure that you have them all accounted for? _____
- C. Who are they? _____
- D. Are the hostages calm or nervous? _____

- E. Who is calm? _____

 Who is nervous? _____

- F. Are the hostages giving out information? _____
- G. Are the hostages planning an escape or other action? _____

- H. Are the hostages negotiating for their own release? _____
- I. What are they giving? _____
- J. Are the hostages afraid of any assault on the area? _____
- K. Can the correctional employees (hostages) be easily identified from the perpetrators in the event of an **assault**? _____

IV. PERPETRATORS

- A. How many perpetrators are there? _____
- B. Are you **sure** of the number? (state degree of sureness in terms of a percentage) _____

- C. Who are the perpetrators? (names and descriptions) _____

- D. Are you sure about your I.D. of the perpetrators? _____
- E. Are the perpetrators arguing among themselves? _____
- F. Is there one leader? _____ who? _____
- G. Is there more than one group involved? _____

- H. Are the perpetrators planning an escape? _____
- I. What are the perpetrators talking about (demands)? _____

- J. Are the perpetrators united in their demands? _____
- K. Which perpetrators, if any, are making threats or abusing hostages? _____

- L. Do the perpetrators know what we are doing? _____
- M. Do the perpetrators have food or some sort of supplies, indicating that the incident was planned? If so, what supplies? _____

- N. Are the perpetrators moving around freely? _____
- O. Who is moving around freely? _____

- P. Are the perpetrators planning a long siege? _____
If yes, why? _____
- Q. Are the perpetrators patient or nervous about the negotiations and the overall situation? _____
- R. Which perpetrator is most likely to hurt someone? _____

- S. Which perpetrator is most likely to surrender first? _____

- T. Do the perpetrators have information regarding the families of the hostages, and does there seem to be outside coordination with the perpetrators? _____

- U. Are the perpetrators worried about an assault? _____
- V. What do you think they would do if an assault is mounted? _____

- W. Have the perpetrators changed clothes with the hostages? _____

V. PHYSICAL ASPECTS

- A. What is the exact location of the incident? _____

- B. What access to other areas do perpetrators have? _____

- C. What equipment is within the control of perpetrators (i.e., lights, water, TV, radio...)? _____

- C. What equipment is within the control of perpetrators (i.e., lights, water, TV, radio...)?
- D. What is the layout of the area at present (what barriers, etc. ... are there)? _____

- E. Are there any barriers or booby traps set up to injure or block an assault party? _____

- F. Could we get to the hostages immediately if we assaulted? _____
What percentage of risk would we run? _____
- G. Can you identify hostages from perpetrators? _____

Is there anything you would like **to** add that we may have not asked? _____

ENDNOTES

1. Richard J. O'Connell, "Hostage Response and Negotiation," prepared a training workshop by the Washington Crime News Service.
2. Ibid.
3. Michael T. Scott, "Hostage Negotiation," (prepared for a training workshop of the Indiana Correctional Association.)
4. Joseph Marchese, "Debriefing in Hostage Situations," Corrections Today (July/Aug 1981): 96-97.
5. Robin E. Inwald, "Stressors on Correction Officers Held Hostage: A Model for Developing Post-Hostage Treatment Program in Corrections Departments ."