


reflecting on my own experiences as I read these pages. This is an immensely important text for those responsible for operational planning and execution in today's military. It is even more compelling for our small unit leaders and noncommissioned officers. **JFQ**

**James P. Terry is Chairman of the Board of Veterans Appeals. He is a retired Marine colonel and holds a doctorate from The George Washington University.**



**Power & Responsibility:  
Building International Order in  
an Era of Transnational Threats**

By Bruce Jones, Carlos Pascual,  
and Stephen John Stedman  
Washington, DC: Brookings  
Institution Press, 2009  
360 pp. \$32.95  
ISBN: 978-0-8157-4706-2

Reviewed by  
JOHN W. SUTHERLIN

**T**his book is the second of two products from the Managing Global Insecurity (MGI) project, the ambitious purpose of which was to determine how to best organize the globalized world to manage pressing issues that no single nation has the power, credibility, or will to tackle unilaterally. The collective experiences of the authors (all international consultants) at the United Nations (UN) coupled with years in dialogue with diplomats, academics, and policymakers from every major nation provided a perspective that is both distinctive and accessible. In many ways, Jones, Pascual, and

Stedman amalgamate well-known multilateralist and neo-idealist works (for example, those of Robert Axelrod, Robert Keohane, and Hedley Bull) with their collective practices. But this book is not a highly theoretical one. It is probably not going to find its way into any undergraduate courses on American foreign policy. Rather, it is a convenient guide for foreign policymakers. But those looking for a justification for abandoning American-led institutional reform will not find it here. The authors are clear about the type of world they see: one in which “American leadership has been shallow and sometimes misguided, but is greatly needed” (p. 3).

An important assumption permeates this book: the line between national and global security has all but been erased. Consider that “most Americans would agree on most of the threats to their national security: transnational terrorism, proliferation of nuclear weapons, a pandemic of a new deadly disease, global warming, and economic instability and crisis” (p. 4). Could these threats be managed through unilateral action alone? The United States and its allies may have developed the global system after World War II, but much has changed since 1945. National interests alone have not ensured global security.

The authors offer the concept of “responsible sovereignty” as the centerpiece of their blueprint for ensuring global security, arguing that “all states [have] to be accountable for their actions that have impacts beyond their borders, and make such reciprocity a core principle in restoring international order and for providing the welfare of one’s own citizens” (p. 9). In short, they declare, “International order in an age of transnational threats requires power in the service of responsibility” (p. 15). Related to responsible sovereignty would be the creation of a Group of 16 (G-16), representing

“the smallest (and therefore most efficient) number of states that includes all major powers and rising and key regional states” (p. 16).

The book is neatly divided into three sections: “Power,” “Responsibility,” and “Order.” In part one, “Power,” the authors articulate what they call an “effective international architecture” by employing “nine lessons of institutional innovation” (pp. 47–51), which can be summarized as the requirement to build a system with U.S. and other G-16 support on a platform through improving the credibility of the process and the institutional support of the globalized system. The authors use their constructs to answer their own questions. How will this be done? The G-16 will be formed and based on the concept of responsible sovereignty. Why should the United States take the lead? In their view, the United States is too weak or lacks the credibility to act unilaterally but is essential to a multilateral policy approach. Such a dichotomy may indeed be false because world affairs are often more complex than either/or scenarios. By the close of the first part, the authors have made their case that something has to be done if global security will be managed.

The second part is titled “Responsibility,” but it reads like a litany of failings that the present system has produced. Climate change is discussed in a matter-of-fact manner that exacerbates an often teleological approach to the entire subject. If, as the authors state, “close to 90 percent of all carbon emissions” will come from rising powers, then it begs the question: what good is the G-16 in setting and enforcing policy? If the authors stopped there, they would have stumbled badly. But they link climate change to nuclear policy and expand the surface area of diplomacy to approach a multilateral and possible successful regime (a word


they do not actually use, but one that applies). This is significant because it could allow many states to forge an agreement across multiple issues instead of only pursuing bilateral agreements.

Perhaps the most relevant chapters are the ones on terrorism and economic security because of where the United States and its allies rank such issues among all others today. The authors’ mindset is apparent from statements such as: “If the United States took a lead role in reshaping the institutional counterterrorism architecture, it would go a long way toward reassuring other countries that its commitment to rebuilding international order is real” (p. 232). On the other hand, it could fuel the fires of terrorism by justifying a fear of American hegemony.

In the third section, “Order,” the Middle East is the focus. The authors show insight as they lament the failings of most efforts to establish order by the United States and the UN. But they appear to ignore one of the most pressing undercurrents for the region: how can you rely upon responsible sovereignty when many regional players lack sovereignty in the first place or when Israel’s sovereignty is being threatened? One suggestion was to bring together the UN and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (p. 287) for security and force all parties to become more “responsible.”

In all fairness to the authors, it is easy to point out mistakes or misjudgments for a book with such a sweeping agenda as reformulating the global security system. Even as the book ends, the authors make note of their “substantive and political difficulties” (p. 314) in formulating a central thesis that would be acceptable to all states. Yet they may have assembled the best argument for moving into a new direction: America’s (and hence the world’s) security demands that a new trail be blazed. **JFQ**

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**American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era**

Edited by Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider  
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009  
409 pp. \$34.95  
ISBN: 978-0-8018-9288-2

Reviewed by  
ROBERT DANIEL WALLACE

Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* identified the critical importance of civil-military relations at the early stages of the Cold War while discussing how to balance national security requirements within the context of democratic society. He identified influencers that shape the military's role in society and that require the military to remain capable of defending the Nation while staying subordinate to civilian authorities and to conform to societal norms and ideologies. Huntington also identified two means of civilian control over the military: *subjective control*, which includes an integration of the military into civilian political spheres, and *objective control*, characterized by an apolitical and separate professional military. Over 50 years after *The Soldier and the State* was published, West Point professors Suzanne Nielsen and

Don Snider have compiled a number of essays that discuss both the relevance and shortfalls of Huntington's concepts.

This book was the result of a research project focused on creating an updated resource for civil-military relations classes at West Point and includes chapters from a number of well-known scholars. The text lends support to Huntington's contention that the relations between the armed forces and society must be examined objectively through both theoretical and pragmatic frameworks. In the first chapter, Nielsen and Snider contend that Huntington's concepts provide the basis for an examination of the relationship between America's military and political institutions that "follows the trail that Huntington blazed" (p. 2).

The first section examines Huntington's theories from a historical perspective and how his views helped shaped civil-military relations discourse over the past 50 years. Included are a chapter by Richard Betts on the state of American civil-military relations since 9/11, Matthew Moten's in-depth analysis of the Donald Rumsfeld–Eric Shinseki conflicts in 2002, and Peter Feaver and Erika Seeler's assessment of civil-military relations literature both before and after *The Soldier and the State*.

The next portion discusses Huntington's concepts of the societal and functional characteristics (imperatives) that shape the military as an institution. Michael Desch discusses Huntington's contention that the overall ideological views of the military (conservative) and those of American society (liberal) are often incompatible, while Williamson Murray discusses the need for military officer education reform. In the third part of the book, the civil-military partnership is examined from the perspective of the military's

participation and responsibilities. James Burk discusses the requirements of officers to obey civilian orders and the concept of "blind versus responsible obedience" (p. 154), while David Segal and Karin De Angelis examine the definition of the military as a profession and how it has evolved since Huntington wrote *The Soldier and the State*.

The final section includes a discussion by Risa Brooks on the hazards of military participation in politics, and Richard Kohn examines the importance of personalities and relationships in civil-military relations. The editors conclude the text with a number of overarching observations from their research and the contributing authors and clearly articulate that while there may be disagreements on the theoretical details in *The Soldier and the State*, Huntington's work remains relevant and a viable framework to consider modern American civil-military relationships.

The strengths of this book include a frank discussion of the difficulties inherent in civil-military relations. While the overall text argues that Huntington's theories and observations remain relevant, the chapters contain candid and well-supported arguments that incorporate other contending theorists, to include Morris Janowitz and Eliot Cohen, and do not hesitate to criticize the concepts presented in *The Soldier and the State*. Moten's detailed discussion of Rumsfeld's dismal relations with military leaders provides an excellent narrative of the civil-military difficulties during America's current overseas conflicts. Another excellent, albeit controversial, discussion is Brooks's logical analysis of the benefits and risks of military participation in civilian political affairs and the conclusion in favor of limiting political activities by active and retired military

personnel. Finally, Richard Kohn contributes the most important chapter, which provides detailed guidance on how senior military and civilian leaders should participate in efforts to ensure America's national security. Kohn notes that the military is the institution with the most continuity (elected leaders will come and go) and thus the most responsibility to maintain positive relations.

At the same time, this book does suffer from a few flaws. Many of the chapters rehash the same background information on Huntington as the introduction, and the book gives the impression of a collection of distinct journal articles rather than a coherent discussion of civil-military issues. The most significant problem is Williamson Murray's critique of officer education, which is both dated and anecdotal; he describes, for example, the Joint Forces Staff College as having a "high school curriculum" without providing citation or evidence (p. 346). Murray's analysis fails to recognize that the post-9/11 American military has made significant strides in improving both its education system and combat doctrine in response to the current security environment.

Yet these issues are minor and do not diminish the overall value of this book to a wide audience of scholars, military and civilian leaders, and even the general public. While Huntington's text began as an effort to provide a resource for teaching civil-military relations at the university level, it resulted in a useful examination of the enduring relationship between the American political and defense institutions. For decades, his theories have been central to scholarly discussions of civil-military issues; this book clearly demonstrates that the concepts presented in *The Soldier and the*