

# Leavenworth Papers

No. 3

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*“Not War But Like War”:  
The American Intervention in Lebanon*

by Roger J. Spiller

**Combat Studies Institute**  
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**JANUARY 1981**

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## FOREWORD

The *Leavenworth Papers* is a series of historical studies undertaken by the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College's Combat Studies Institute that examines subjects of concern to the Army.

This latest *Leavenworth Paper* examines the U.S. military intervention in the 1958 Lebanese political crisis. By focusing on a relatively recent Army experience in planning and conducting a major contingency operation, the study illuminates the complexity of military planning and the incongruity between plans and performance. This focus promotes the value of the historical perspective in dealing with contemporary military subjects and provides a timely opportunity to apply the lessons of the past.

"Not War, But Like War" offers insights that are readily applicable to today's military planners at all levels. The disparity between the political purpose and the military objective of intervention will illustrate why national and service level planners must carefully describe what is to be accomplished by theater military forces. Theater and tactical level commanders and planners will be reminded that the nature of joint operations demands detailed preparation of command and logistical arrangements and concerted operations. Finally, the study demonstrates that responsive contingency planning also depends upon a process that promotes both participant dialogue and repetitive review in order to lessen the dangers of "provisionalism."

The Lebanese contingency operation represents a gauge to measure the effectiveness of our planning doctrine for the 1980s. Future contingencies will likely involve more demanding requirements and confront more hostile environments than those of Lebanon in 1958. This study allows us to measure and to reflect upon the doctrinal implications of contingency planning down through the tactical unit level. It can contribute directly to more effective deployment as well as employment of land combat power.



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
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# INTRODUCTION

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The study that follows began in August 1979 as a series of notes for a lecture on the employment of contingency forces at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. The lecture was intended to serve as a historical introduction to the subject, using the 1958 American intervention in Lebanon as a case in point. It was thought that by analyzing the Lebanon intervention one could demonstrate several important lessons: how political and diplomatic objectives directly affect the character of modern military operations; how an operational military plan is conceived and what evolutions it endures before it is executed; how such plans, though they appear to anticipate every operational problem, are usually unequal to the realities of operational practice; and, finally, how valuable a quality mental agility can be when put to use by a military commander and his subordinates.

An examination of the available literature on this subject revealed little that was helpful. Monographs dealing with Lebanon during this period focus for the most part upon the diplomatic or political aspects of the crisis, legitimate topics all, and important for setting the American intervention into the context of international and regional affairs; but when it came to specific details of the military operation itself, there were few to be found. Several short articles written by participants revealed more about what happened to American troops during the intervention, but as such articles go, they were mainly memoirs. Some were faintly, others vagrantly, self-congratulatory. They were period pieces, really, best seen as historical artifacts than as reliable sources. More important, their fields of vision were limited to their experiences only.

Interestingly, most of the literature dealt with the Marines if it took notice of military operations at all. In the service journals, the Marines and the Navy had much to say about their part in the operation. There is some justice in this: the Marines were the first Americans to arrive in Lebanon and the U.S. Sixth Fleet put them there. The task force was commanded by an admiral. And by the time the Army arrived, the crisis had subsided (although no one would have dared to predict it at the time). Eventually, there were more soldiers than marines in Lebanon. They stayed longer, and they were the last to leave. Their deployment covered a longer distance and was a much more complicated affair, and they were less practiced at such operations. But no one wrote of the Army's participation in any depth.

There was a considerable body of information which had gone unnoticed, however—the official records. These consisted of recently declassified reports, made at nearly every echelon, dealing with unit operations. Only one published study had made effective use of these records: Mr. Jack Schulimson's "The Marines in Lebanon," an official work of the U.S. Marine Corps' Historical Office. This study was far and away the best available operational accounting and did for Marine Corps operations that which I wanted to find for Army operations. That work was not to be found.

As it so often happens, what began as a minor, brief foray into a particular subject became the makings of an article.

About that time, in the fall of 1979, the Combat Studies Institute was being established at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. In the main, this institute was to act as the new history department for the College, but it was charged also to undertake original historical research in military history for the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command on subjects of interest to the modern Army. When it was proposed that the study on Lebanon become a part of the institute's official research program, I was not convinced that the Army was much interested in contingency force operations. During the previous summer, there had been a flurry of interest in whether the American defense establishment was capable of meeting military challenges in the Middle East, and indeed, planning had begun for a "Rapid Deployment Force" within the Army. But the interest of the summer had waned by fall to cast an uneasy shadow over American military policy.

A few weeks later, Iranian revolutionaries stormed the American embassy in Tehran and took its occupants hostage. As time passed, the Iranian crisis deepened. And although this study was about an intervention which occurred twenty-two years earlier, the current crisis gave a peculiar and ironic edge to my work. While I wrote about the planning for the Lebanon intervention, I wondered how the planning for this new crisis was proceeding. One can always count on planning, not so actual execution.

When the American rescue mission—and its failure—became known, the dismay among my students was palpable. They expressed wonderment at how the operation could have misfired, and they looked for reasons. The study on Lebanon had taught me that such military operations usually stand an excellent chance of failure and that the ingenuity of ill fortune is sometimes beyond our powers to predict. To say that neither the mission nor its failure came as a surprise because I had been studying contingency operations of the past was small comfort. What I most wondered was whether the planners of that mission had respected sufficiently the play of chance.

If there is any general theme to the analysis here, it is how great the distance can be between planning and action, and that is how the study proceeds. It begins at the broadest consideration of policy and attempts to trace a military idea—the projection of an emergency force to the Middle East—from its



inception to its execution at the lowest tactical level. The focus of the study throughout is upon the U.S. Army, although the Army's activities are only occasionally seen in isolation. The intervention was a joint operation, after all.

Finally, this study is offered in the hope that it may be of some relevance to modern soldiers by illuminating one incident in their profession's past.

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# *“Not War, But Like War”: The American Intervention in Lebanon*

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For the past few years, the political and military leaders of the United States have become less circumspect about defining the stability of the Middle East in terms of American national security. Accelerated by recent events, this trend bespeaks a willingness to consider openly the possibility, however remote, of the deployment of a military force to this region. The inauguration of planning during the past few months of an American “unilateral corps” of 110,000 men designed to undertake contingency operations has imparted an air of reality to this trend as well. Yet, as the authors of a recent report sponsored by the Congressional Research Service argue—and argue forcefully—such an operation today would be fraught with danger and of extremely dubious utility. The difficulties of mounting a contingency operation in which sizable military forces figure, never inconsiderable, have been compounded by a host of political, diplomatic, and military problems.<sup>1</sup>

Once before in the recent past, the United States dispatched military forces to the Middle East. On 15 July 1958 elements of the U.S. Sixth Fleet landed several battalions of marines on the shores of Lebanon. The marines were quickly reinforced by other American troops taken from the Army’s European commands. Simultaneously, a powerful Composite Air Strike Force was sent from the United States and established an operational command at Adana Air Base, Incirlik, Turkey, during the early hours of the intervention. After serving for 102 days as a peace-keeping force, during which time one American soldier was killed by hostile fire, these intervention forces withdrew.<sup>2</sup>


The American intervention in Lebanon, code-named BLUEBAT, has since been hailed as one of the most successful operations of its kind, and with some justice. But it was by no means a perfect operation; many of the problems which attended Operation BLUEBAT doubtless would present themselves again today. Other problems were peculiar to the time and the situation, but in any case those who planned and executed BLUEBAT did so under conditions all too familiar to military commanders throughout history. When blithe assumptions are being made about the ease with which a similar operation could be mounted today, a look back at the intervention in Lebanon is instructive: it displays vividly the difficulties of such operations in general, and it reminds us of some of the special problems of operations in this region, problems which our current military and political planners might well bear in mind.

In the aftermath of the Suez crisis of 1956, the influence of the Western powers in the Middle East declined almost beyond precedent. The Anglo-French invasion of Egypt had in fact contributed to the growing alienation between the former colonial powers and the new forces of Arab nationalism, whose chief patron was Egypt's president, Gamal Abdul Nasser. Although not directly involved in this adventure, the United States' prestige nevertheless suffered both by association and by its own recent dealings with Egypt. Shortly before Suez, the United States had withdrawn its support of the Aswan High Dam project, and Nasser had turned to the Soviet Union for the economic and military aid that the West was now withholding.<sup>3</sup> Thus the *Economist* reported, "the Americans . . . have inherited not so much the British position as the animosity which it left behind." This new order of international relations was felt quickly, and American diplomats were treated on occasion to a confusing hostility. One American official returning from Egypt shortly after the crisis had subsided was heard to exclaim frustratedly, "Anyway, who *did* invade Egypt?"<sup>4</sup>

The consequent Soviet association with Egypt was a signal event in the recent history of the Middle East. Hitherto little interested in the region, the Soviets now came forward—as they had promised at the Bandung conference of non-aligned nations the previous year—with aid for countries with which they had little ideological affinity. At a time in the Cold War when the West was acutely sensitive to any gesture which might be construed as pro-Soviet, Nasser's acceptance of Soviet aid, and his increasingly strident pronouncements in support of nationalism and "positive neutralism" misled the West. When even non-aligned nations were held in suspicion, a country which actually accepted assistance from a communist state appeared to be little more than a cat's-paw for the Soviet Union.<sup>5</sup>

With the reputation of the former colonial powers irreparably damaged by the Suez invasion and that of Pan-Arabism improved thereby, the United States initiated a diplomatic counteroffensive in the Middle East. In early 1957 Congress approved the "Eisenhower Doctrine," which was in the main a geographical and diplomatic extension of the older Truman Doctrine. Like its predecessor, this new doctrine offered military and economic assistance to nations believed to be in danger from communist-sponsored invasion or subversion. In 1957 the regional members of the Baghdad Pact—Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan—were of particular concern to American policymakers because of their ties to the West; but, as the new doctrine made clear, any nation in the general area was eligible for aid. To that end, President Eisenhower sent a special envoy, James P. Richards, to the Middle East in search of subscribers even before Congress had taken final action on the policy.<sup>6</sup>

But the Suez invasion was still too vividly remembered for most leading Middle Easterners to consider the possibility of having Western troops on their soil again, even by invitation. Pan-Arabism was now so widespread even in the pro-Western nations that any regime that accepted the promise of American military protection was sure to elicit severe criticism from the nationalists



Map 1. The Eastern Mediterranean in 1956.

among its own citizens. This was certainly the case in Jordan and Iraq, where nationalists were already quite restive. In the event, only the Republic of Lebanon agreed publicly to be a party to the new policy.<sup>7</sup>

Yet, even Lebanon's acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine was not so straightforward as it appeared to some at the time. Lebanon's president, Camille Chamoun, had taken up the American offer despite considerable political opposition. It was believed by Chamoun's opponents that his real motive in subscribing to the Eisenhower Doctrine had more to do with his determination to succeed himself as president for another six-year term (a succession forbidden by the Lebanese constitution) than it did with any real foreign dangers to Lebanon. This was a question that had troubled the peace of Lebanon before Bishārah al-Khūrī began a second presidential term in 1948 with the aid of a constitutional amendment, but by 1952 he had been forced to step down, two years before the expiration of his term, by political opposition and popular resistance. One of the leaders of the "Rose Water Revolution," as this episode was called, was Camille Chamoun. And now in 1957 it appeared that Chamoun contemplated a constitutional amendment of the kind passed in 1948. Thus, quite apart from the disapproval that Chamoun might well have expected after having made an agreement with a Western power at this time, the president's own political fortunes became entangled with those of American foreign policy.<sup>8</sup>

More broadly, however, the outbreak of political controversy that followed in the spring of 1957 was merely the latest in a series of disputes turning about the religious and ethnic divisions which had so long animated Lebanese politics. When Lebanon won her independence in 1943, the republic's new leaders had thought to accommodate these diverse sectarian interests by founding a government under the terms of a "National Covenant." An unwritten agreement of honor among the major Muslim and Christian leaders, the Covenant set the new republic upon a neutralist course of foreign policy designed to make Lebanon the "Switzerland" of the Middle East, and created a parliamentary system of government wherein popular representation was calculated along religious lines. Higher executive and judicial offices were filled according to the same rule: it was understood, for instance, that the president would be a Maronite Christian, that the prime minister would be a Sunni Muslim, and that the president of the Chamber of Deputies would be a Shi'a Muslim. But within the seemingly equitable "confessional system," as this arrangement was known, there existed a considerable imbalance of power in favor of the Christians. Representation was based upon a census that dated from the days of the old French protectorate before World War II and so did not reflect increases in Muslim population that would have made those confessing that religion the majority. Because of this, the confessional system perpetuated the imbalance of power by maintaining the legal fiction of the old sectarian percentages. Political parties which in theory might have diminished the power of the confessional system did exist, but they were ill developed, usually extreme, and sometimes illegal. Being an affair largely of clan rather than program, Lebanese politics by their very structure required that any sitting government serve at the pleasure of the major factions.<sup>9</sup>



The Chamoun government began to fail of its already tenuous support in the months following its agreement with the Eisenhower administration. In a move reminiscent of the days before the Rose Water Revolution, several deputies of parliament resigned in protest and helped establish a "National Union Front (NUF)," dedicated to setting aright what was seen as Chamoun's corruption of the old National Covenant.<sup>10</sup> Campaigning for summer parliamentary elections was especially heated and produced a serious, bloody clash on the streets of Beirut between government forces and NUF strikers. From other towns and the outlying districts of the Lebanese transmontane, the Chouf, came word of similar outbreaks. The Chamoun government survived the elections handily, but it was a campaign in which all sides showed little compunction about resorting to violence and fraud.<sup>11</sup> Such tactics were not of themselves unusual where it was said that "though a Lebanese does not have to carry a gun to the polls, it helps."<sup>12</sup> It was recognized too that elections were commonly "a procedural fiction rather than a constitutional reality," but the National Union Front's claims that Chamoun's government had used "pressure and intimidation" in winning the contest encouraged popular disaffection. Far from being weakened by their loss at the polls, the NUF, according to one observer, "grew in strength until it virtually became another government, existing side-by-side with the legally constituted authorities."<sup>13</sup>

The Army of Lebanon, six thousand men strong, was caught in the same web as the society it defended. Christians dominated the officer corps (about 80 percent), while in the ranks the proportion of Christians to Muslims and other sects was closer to that in the country generally. Yet the commander of the army, General Fu'ād Shehāb, was a Maronite Christian patrician, a descendant of a family of *amira* who had once ruled Lebanon for 150 years. As an aristocrat, he had much in common with several leaders of the opposition, many of whom were his friends. By comparison, it was said, President Chamoun, once removed from office, "would pale into a middle class nonentity, except for such glamour and prestige as go with having been a president."<sup>14</sup> Though small, Shehāb's army was well equipped with American, British, and French weapons, was well disciplined, and was equal to putting down any civil disturbance. Once before, in 1952, General Shehāb had been faced with a similar situation.<sup>15</sup> Fearing that his army would disintegrate under the pressures of enforcing political and sectarian peace, Shehāb had kept his army above the dispute, and so he planned to do again in 1958.<sup>16</sup> His greater concern was reserved for the very fate of Lebanon, however. On the eve of the crisis that summer, the general explained his policy to a foreign reporter:

Solutions by force are impossible in a country like this, founded on compromise and the need for mutual tolerance. If the army moved against the rebels, it would have little difficulty in reestablishing order, even without the tanks and other equipment which the United States continues to supply with what seems needless generosity. But if it cleared the Muslim quarters of Beirut and Tripoli, knocking down a few houses in the process, the army—which is predominantly Christian—would in fact be destroying the structure of Lebanon as a political entity. The memories of 1860, when the Druzes massacred the Christians and the Muslims joined in, are still alive today, dimly amid the vulgar cosmopolitanism of Beirut, but vividly in the mountain villages beyond. The present opposition is principally, though not entirely, Muslim, especially in its lower ranks. If it were to be suppressed by force, the memories of 1958 would still be green in fifty years' time, and Lebanon would have ceased to exist.<sup>17</sup>

Thus, the Army of Lebanon and its commander were to take no sides during the crisis of 1958, acting instead as a passive sort of constabulary. And while this was confusing to the Americans when they first arrived (even the most politically sophisticated among them were mystified that President Chamoun had little power over the general or his army), the stance taken early on by the army of Lebanon was in essence the same eventually adopted by the American forces during their stay.<sup>18</sup>

Increasingly, daily life in Lebanon in 1957 was punctuated by explosions and gunfire as members of all the factions armed themselves. Charges of official terrorism were leveled against the Chamoun government.<sup>19</sup> The government's supporters replied that the opposition groups had been penetrated by *agents provocateurs* from Egypt and Syria and so were only pawns in the hands of Arab extremists.<sup>20</sup> Amid the histrionics, a group of "non-aligned politicians" perhaps characterized the crisis most accurately:

We are witnessing a political struggle which in the beginning might have disguised itself in the shape of a conflict over the foreign policy of Lebanon but which is, at the moment, only a pretext for settling old accounts.<sup>21</sup>

American military planners had begun to apply themselves to intervention contingencies for the Middle East well before the crisis developed in Lebanon. The Army's Continental Army Command was directed in January 1956 to create "a family of war plans for contingency operations."<sup>22</sup> Within five months, the command was distributing a trial plan called **SWAGGERSTICK**, which envisioned the landing of two divisions at one of several places in the Levant and was intended to put down an outbreak of war by interposing American troops between the belligerents.<sup>23</sup> Seen in the context of recent events, **SWAGGERSTICK**'s purpose was evident. Only a month before the plan appeared, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen had agreed to a military pact for common defense which was clearly aimed at Israel. This alliance, following as it did a recent and unprecedented Czechoslovakian arms shipment to Egypt, made the affairs of the Middle East even more ominous.<sup>24</sup> The "first draft" of **SWAGGERSTICK** explicitly, if disingenuously, reflected American concerns over this turn of events: the plan assumed, for instance, that one of the prospective belligerents would "permit entry and operations of US military forces." The possible entryways for the American forces were given as Port Said, Tel Aviv, Haifa, or Beirut, although it might have been thought at the time that Port Said would have been the last place in the Middle East to witness an unopposed landing of American troops.<sup>25</sup>

**SWAGGERSTICK** became more fanciful as it evolved during the rest of 1956 and into the following year. The plan was unable to rise above its origin: it was being formulated wholly within the Army. Only the most informal approaches had been made to the other services. There also seemed to be no disposition to lay **SWAGGERSTICK** before the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and for good reason: such a plan would not have received a very sympathetic hearing from a JCS whose strategic doctrine was founded squarely upon the idea of "massive retaliation." But only the JCS could make of **SWAGGERSTICK** something



more than a staff appreciation, for only they could guarantee priorities for surface and air transportation, dedicate monies for the required stockpiling of supplies, and authorize the creation of specially structured units to carry out the mission. SWAGGERSTICK had units deploying from the United States to the Middle East, but no less a figure than the Army's own Chief of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor, doubted that units marked for contingency deployment would be ready without essential reforms in their design and equipment. In this regard, the plan was instructive: it made manifest the Army's deficiencies and it provided General Taylor with an important argument in his campaign to prepare the Army for limited war.<sup>26</sup>

When a nation requested assistance under the provisions of the Eisenhower Doctrine, outright military intervention was obviously just one of several courses of action available to the president, but the text of the doctrine made plain that the United States was "prepared to use armed forces."<sup>27</sup> Two years earlier, the retiring Army Chief of Staff, General Matthew Ridgway, had bluntly informed Eisenhower's Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson, that the Army could not support America's diplomatic objectives without "a fast-moving, hard-hitting, joint force in which the versatility of the whole is emphasized."<sup>28</sup> But since Ridgway's warning it had been the habit of the Eisenhower administration to make commitments around the world without insuring first that the military aspects of those commitments could be honored, and so it remained after the passage of the Eisenhower Doctrine. As if to underscore the fact that the Army need not plan on any more money to upgrade the units necessary to enforce the doctrine, Secretary Wilson prepared during the spring of 1957 a 200,000-man reduction and an elimination of two divisions from the Army. The Air Force and the Navy were to suffer reductions as well.<sup>29</sup>

Faced with these significant limitations, Army staffers continued to work on both contingency plans and new designs for contingency forces during the summer of 1957. By September, General Taylor had decided to move as far as possible toward the creation of the light strike force he and General Ridgway believed was necessary. This force, the Strategic Army Corps, was to be composed of two divisions for limited war and other circumstances not requiring the declaration of a national emergency. For general war, an expanded version of four reinforced divisions was contemplated. Subsequent planning focused upon the two-division corps for the simple reason that this could be done, like SWAGGERSTICK planning, within the Army alone. To have gone further would have required the involvement of the JCS. The units making up this corps were the 101st Airborne Division and the 4th Infantry Division. The Continental Army Command had the responsibility of insuring their operational readiness, while the XVIII Airborne Corps was to see to the logistical planning. General Taylor's September directive further required that this corps be capable of arriving at its objective within one month of receiving its orders.

The Strategic Army Corps was to encounter many problems during its development, but one of the most critical had to do with its need for mobility.

Units could be designated and even redesignated, provided that such reforms accorded with the Army's current budget and force levels, but a corps of this sort, once given a mission, would obviously outrun the Army's own transportation resources. Airlift services available to American forces had been predicated upon the outbreak of a general war in Europe. The Military Air Transport Service could deliver up to 188 million ton-miles of mobility under the general war scenario, and it was calculated that the Army's part would come to 80 million ton-miles of the total. From these figures, the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Maj. Gen. Earle Wheeler, made the assumption that "if the general war requirement could be met, it would seem likely that the limited war requirement of the Army could be met in most circumstances." This may have been true in strictly mathematical terms, but the fact of the matter was that the deployment of contingency forces from the United States to the Middle East would consume 143 million ton-miles of the Military Air Transport Service's capacity. Without the declaration of a national emergency by the president, it was highly unlikely that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would release such a large proportion of the nation's strategic airlift. Such problems as these would not be solved by the Army's planners before the intervention in Lebanon. The Strategic Army Corps would have no part to play in the largest American troop deployment since the Korean War.<sup>30</sup>

Events in the Middle East followed a course quite without reference to military deliberations in the United States. Within one month of its being approved by Congress, the Eisenhower Doctrine had been invoked. On 13 April 1957 King Hussein of Jordan foiled an attempted pro-Nasser coup d'état. Jordan was not a party to the doctrine, but the United States quickly agreed to a request from Hussein for aid: the Sixth Fleet was ordered to the Eastern Mediterranean as a demonstration of American concern and 10 million dollars were sent as the first installment of a new military and economic aid program.<sup>31</sup> If there had been any doubt that the doctrine would actually be used, the Jordanian crisis educated official Washington once more to the speed with which upheavals were possible in the Middle East. No doubt this latest crisis moved the JCS to assess more carefully the military dimensions of the Eisenhower Doctrine.

Naturally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in a position to add the degree of realism to their plans which was so lacking in the Army's. Unlike the Army, the JCS had no interest in altering the prevailing strategic wisdom: if anything, the Chairman of the JCS, Admiral Arthur Radford, was more intent than Secretary Wilson on finding ways to live within current defense policies.<sup>32</sup> Furthermore, the JCS could reckon on the participation of all the military services to an extent that the Army could not. If necessary, specific binding requirements could be set for logistical preparations. Plausible allocations could be made for airlift and sealift requirements by taking a different view of

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the problem of mobility: contingency forces could be deployed from Europe rather than the United States if the JCS were willing to run the risk of temporarily weakening NATO defenses.

The tempo of JCS planning was also quicker than the Army's. While the Army was still discussing the main features of the Strategic Army Corps in late 1957, the JCS began making arrangements to insure the operational readiness of the U.S. European forces for contingencies in the Middle East. As early as September, exploratory discussions were held in London between Admiral James Holloway, then Commander in Chief, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, and representatives of the Army's 11th Airborne Division (later the 24th Infantry Division).<sup>33</sup> Two months later the JCS, apprehensive of the "distinct possibilities of an overthrow of the Jordanian government or a coup d'etat in Lebanon," directed Admiral Holloway to establish a "Specified Command" which could be activated upon their order. In the event of a crisis in the Middle East, Holloway was to transfer his flag from London to the Mediterranean as the Commander in Chief, Specified Command, Middle East, or CINCSPECOMME. The actual dimensions of any deployed force depended to a degree upon the magnitude of the crisis, but evidence suggests that from the beginning it was assumed at the highest level that any such operation would be a joint action.<sup>34</sup>

Theater-level contingency planning began soon after Admiral Holloway received his charge from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when in November a joint planning session was convened in London with representatives from the Army, Navy, and Air Force.<sup>35</sup> Whether the outlines of what came to be known as Operation BLUEBAT were established here or earlier in Washington by the JCS is unknown, but two basic plans were ready by the time of the actual intervention. The first, CINCAMBRITFOR OPLAN 1-58, was code-named BLUEBAT and envisioned two courses of action: one in which British and American ground forces would cooperate; the second version substituted Marines for the British contingent. While shortly before the emergency broke out in Lebanon, the British did participate in what their official accounts call "unobtrusive planning" with the Americans, exactly at what point the British entered these negotiations is uncertain. Available documents are silent on the question of whether British representatives attended the meeting. However, the second plan called for an exclusively American contingency force; this was CINCSPECOMME 215-58, encompassing eight different courses of action, each of which in all likelihood differed in the composition of American forces to be deployed. In the actual event, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed Admiral Holloway to execute only "the US portion of BLUEBAT."<sup>36</sup>

At least two important commitments were made by service representatives attending the London meeting. The 11th Airborne Division had already been detailed—since 1956—for any contingency operation which might be launched by the U.S. Army in Europe. Here, as many as two airborne battle

groups from the division were placed at the disposal of the Specified Command. In support of these deployments, the Air Force agreed to supply up to 110 C-119 cargo aircraft (or their equivalent).<sup>37</sup> Similar commitments would have had to be made, either then or later, by the Air Force for tactical air support, and by the Navy, both for sealift support and for what proportions of the U.S. Sixth Fleet would be used.

The plans made by each of the military services following this meeting can in some cases be detailed, in others only surmised. The Air Force, for instance, still classifies its records concerning this operation. In the light of subsequent events, however, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that Air Force planners assumed that general arrangements made earlier would suffice in this situation also. Little thought seems to have been given, for example, to the sequence in which various types of aircraft would arrive at their destinations, and one of the more fundamental decisions which should have been made in contingency planning—how much of the airlift would come from the United States and how much would come from European locations—was not made until the day of the alert to deploy, 14 July. The real explanation lies, perhaps, in the mood of the Air Force's high command at the time. For several years, the Tactical Air Command had, in the words of one observer, "aspired to become USAF's primary local-war force," but had not proved to skeptics that it was capable of such a mission. TAC's answer had been to create a Composite Air Strike Force (CASF), a "package" of air power composed of fighters, bombers, reconnaissance, and support aircraft capable of independent action for a month without resupply. And although by the time of the Lebanon intervention such a force was ready to deploy from the United States to the Middle East—CASF Bravo—no effort appears to have been made to stage these aircraft at clusters of airbases near the east coast of the United States. Instead, elements of CASF Bravo were located as far west as New Mexico: these were the fighters of the strike force which by the canons of air strategy should have been the first units to arrive on any scene to insure air superiority.<sup>38</sup> Thus, the emergency in Lebanon seems to have been regarded as an operational test of a concept settled upon by the Air Force well in advance of the JCS's new-found interest in Middle Eastern affairs.

In the Mediterranean, the U.S. Sixth Fleet mounted a formidable seventy-seven vessels in all, including three aircraft carriers, two battle cruisers, and twenty-two destroyers, under the command of Vice Adm. Charles R. Brown. The fleet was divided into three task forces: TF 60, the Fast Carrier Strike Force; TF 61, Amphibious Group IV, which was made up of Amphibious Transport Squadrons 2, 4, and 6; and TF 62, the Fleet Marines.<sup>39</sup> How this naval array was disposed throughout the Mediterranean when an emergency was declared was obviously an important consideration, but to have arranged for the fleet to be within striking distance of the Levant for long periods of time would have been both impolitic and militarily unwise. Admiral Brown could only hope to arrange his forces so that a convergence of the necessary vessels would not be too long delayed to accomplish the mission at hand.

Ordinarily, the Marine contingent of the Sixth Fleet amounted only to one reinforced battalion landing team, but after the JCS's November directive to Admiral Holloway, the Marine Corps began augmenting what would surely be the first American units in Lebanon. Brig. Gen. Sidney S. Wade organized the 2d Provisional Marine Force headquarters at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, in January 1958 to oversee a combined exercise with the British Royal Marines in Sardinia later that year. This headquarters staff could of course be used also to direct Marine participation in any contingency operation in the general area. At the same time, the landing team actually on station with the fleet, the 1st Battalion of the 8th Marine Regiment, commanded by Lt. Col. John H. Brickley, began making its own preparations. At some time in early 1958, the battalion operations officer, Maj. Victor Stolyanov, had traveled to Beirut in mufti and examined the beaches around the city—certainly not an arduous task, considering Beirut's reputation at the time as the Riviera of the Middle East. When the marines went ashore in July, their intelligence would be based upon Major Stolyanov's observations. As the situation in the Middle East grew more tense during the spring of 1958, it was decided that the 1st Battalion would not return to the United States as planned. Instead, Lt. Col. Harry Hadd's 2d Battalion of the 2d Marine Regiment joined the fleet in May. At the same time, yet another battalion landing team, the 3d of the 6th, was held in readiness in the United States. Eventually, all three battalions would see duty in Lebanon.<sup>40</sup>

Following the November meeting with CINCSPECOMME in London, the Army began considering its part in Operation BLUEBAT. Early in December, the 24th Infantry Division (formerly the 11th Airborne Division) held a three-day war game at its headquarters in Augsburg, Germany, with joint planning representatives in attendance. For the first time, logistical requirements were analyzed and, according to the division's command report, "all aspects of an operation to drop on an airfield and secure a populated area was [*sic*] examined." What emerged from these deliberations was another provisional organization, considerably more elaborate than the kind the Marines were then assembling. The organization was designated Army Task Force 201, and the plan—Emergency Plan 201 (EP 201)—ostensibly was prepared under the aegis of the U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR). ATF 201 was composed of five "forces": Force Alpha, including ATF headquarters and one airborne battle group from the 24th Infantry Division; Force Bravo, a second airborne battle group from the 24th, to be deployed as circumstances warranted; Force Charlie, support units drawn from bases in Germany and France and styled the 201st Logistics Command; Force Delta, other support units which were to be sealifted; and Force Echo, a medium tank battalion which was to be sealifted from Bremerhaven, Germany. Each of these forces had its own operational plans; for instance, the 24th Infantry Division had Plan GRANDIOS, which saw chiefly to the deployment of Forces Alpha and Bravo. GRANDIOS had a series of graduated alerts—AMBER, AZURE, GREEN, and PURPLE—by which the airborne battle group could be readied, marshalled at local airfields, and deployed. It was expected that the battle groups would leave Germany ready for a parachute assault and use Adana Air Base, Incirlik, Turkey, as a forward staging

area. As time passed and these contingency plans took shape, Army planners had become convinced that there was "a better than even chance" that EP 201 would amount to something more than an exercise, but the evolution of planning also meant that security requirements increased to the degree that coordination between the elements of the Army Task Force was made more difficult. The same may be said of the coordination between the planners from the various military services. Whether at some juncture in the joint planning scheme for Operation BLUEBAT sufficient liaison existed between the many parts of the contingency force is unknown, but subsequent events imply that it did not.<sup>41</sup>

All of the services had created provisional or temporary organizations to deal with Middle Eastern contingencies. Air and naval forces were more adept than the Army at forming and working with such organizations, however; their styles of operation and equipment permitted them to do so more readily. But aside from very good operational reasons why the Army was uncomfortable with the task force concept, there was another. The Army was at that moment attempting to create a permanent organization in the United States specially designed to undertake the very kind of mission which had been assigned to Army Task Force 201. But only the headquarters of such a force—the XVIII Airborne Corps—existed as yet. That a special task force had to be established in the European Command in lieu of something more permanent in the United States told much about how far the Army had to go before it convinced the JCS that it had created an organization as flexible as the Air Force's Composite Air Strike Force was supposed to be.

Very gradually over a period of several months, a powerful and complex military organization had been built for use in the Middle East. Beyond that, little attention had been paid to what specific missions the force might be called upon to accomplish. All the plans made the assumption that deployment meant combat, but early in the year, Admiral Holloway was asking his planners to consider something decidedly less—the restoration or maintenance of governments. Political judgments on whether a government could—or should—be sustained by the deployment of an American task force were quite beyond Admiral Holloway's purview, even though some judgments might conceivably have affected both the composition and the mission of his force. The cast of military planning thus far had been in the direction of a sizable force, capable of quick dispatch, and innocent of the political nuances of the region where it might be employed. The opportunity to fashion a military force which corresponded closely to the demands such nuances might make upon it was in any case long past by early 1958. The convoluted birth of Operation BLUEBAT seems to accord with Walter LaFeber's more general view concerning this period of American foreign policy:

The problem would always be less a proper choice of the military means than a wise understanding of the objectives. In postwar American foreign policy, the debate over the nature of the Communist threat usually lagged behind the debate over which weapons to use against the threat.<sup>42</sup>

On 1 February 1958 Presidents Nasser of Egypt and al-Quwwatī of Syria announced the merger of their two countries with Yemen to form the United Arab Republic. For the Western powers and their friends in the Middle East, this was ominous news; for the advocates of Arab nationalism, it was a god-send. Throughout Lebanon, popular demonstrations filled the streets. In the predominantly Muslim cities of Tripoli, Sidon, and Tyre, shops were closed for the day. In Beirut, the Maqasid society, which supervised the education of local Muslim children, declared a celebratory strike which released fifteen thousand students for the day. Little more than a week had passed before a delegation from the National Union Front had traveled to Damascus to congratulate the Syrian government on the formation of the UAR. This was the beginning of a pilgrimage of Lebanese to Damascus during the spring which one account places at more than three hundred thousand people. This outpouring of jubilation was increased when, on 24 February, President Nasser himself arrived unexpectedly in Damascus. Among the throngs of admirers who gathered to see the Egyptian president were Sā'ib Salām, Kamāl Junblāṭ, and several other prominent figures in the anti-Chamoun movement.

This series of events could only have served to hearten the opposition in Lebanon: the formation of the UAR lent an air of authenticity to Pan-Arabism which had been lacking and so also made opposition claims against the Chamoun government more importunate. The government's answer to the now increasing demonstrations and opposition manifestos calling for Chamoun's resignation was intransigence. A ban was placed on demonstrations; it was widely ignored. Chamoun's Council of Ministers asked the Chamber of Deputies for authority to suppress foreign propaganda deemed harmful to the interests of the state. In reaction to the papering of the city streets with pictures of President Nasser, similar posters of President Chamoun appeared, with the explanation that these were the work of his supporters. Chamoun himself refused to make any statement disavowing an intent to seek another presidential term; on the contrary, the president's supporters in the Chamber of Deputies began lobbying for the long-expected constitutional amendment which would allow Chamoun to continue in office.

The popular demonstrations of February grew into riots during March and April. In Tyre more than 150 people were arrested in less than a week, and by the end of March that city was in the hands of the army. The government accused Syria of assisting the insurrectionaries with arms and technical advice, and protested Cairo's nearly constant barrage of what Robert McClintock, the American ambassador to Lebanon, called "audio-visual aggression." President Chamoun, meanwhile, was reported to have told the American, British, and French ambassadors of his desire to seek another term. And on 10 April an ardent Chamoun member of the Chamber of Deputies announced his intention to move soon for a constitutional amendment on presidential succession.<sup>43</sup>

It is difficult to see at this distance how the tragedy that followed could have been averted: its causes were long-standing and deeply ingrained in

Lebanon's modern history. The civil war was also partly a reflection of turmoil in a region which had for the greater part of the century been merely an appendage of one great power or another. The forces inside Lebanon felt themselves to some degree to be part of this larger controversy and, indeed, activist extensions of it. Each group saw itself as possessing strength greater than its own actual power inside Lebanon, and by the same token, external powers viewed the fortunes of their Lebanese supporters as their own. Such complications, along with subsequent events, gave the outbreak of general violence an air of inevitability. Observers close to the scene later agreed that by the beginning of May 1958 there existed in Lebanon a climate in which the most dangerous strife was about to appear; all that was needed was an act of some "symbolic significance." Such an act occurred in the early hours of 8 May, when a popular, anti-Chamoun editor of the newspaper *al-Telegraph*, Nasīb al-Matnī, was assassinated in Beirut.<sup>44</sup>

Matnī's assassination incited an immediate convulsion of violence more severe than Lebanon had yet seen. In Tripoli's first three days of rioting there were more than 120 casualties. Strikes and counterstrikes, both local and general, were called by various groups. In the streets of Beirut the army, the gendarmerie, and the armed members of the pro-Chamoun *Parti Populaire Syrien* all contested NUF street fighters for possession of numerous barricades. Both the government and the opposition attempted to take control of events. The government imposed censorship and curfews in the disputed areas and made plans for the deportation of potentially seditious foreigners—mostly Syrians. After hearing of the casualties in Tripoli on 9 May, the leaders of the NUF agreed that the time had come to mount an insurrection. In fact, events had overtaken leaders on both sides, and their decisions merely ratified those already taken by their supporters in the streets.<sup>45</sup>

Three days after the now-celebrated murder, President Chamoun hinted to American Ambassador Robert McClintock that the government might ask for the Marines. When Kamāl Junblāt's Druze followers attacked the president's palace at Bayt al-Din on 13 May, Chamoun summoned the American, British, and French ambassadors and put them on notice that a request for foreign military assistance might be forthcoming. By the next day, McClintock had been empowered to tell Chamoun that the United States would entertain such a request, provided certain conditions were met. Lebanon was to file a complaint "against external interference in its internal affairs" with the United Nations Security Council. Further, Lebanon was to seek public support from the governments of "at least some Arab states," and finally, in the event of American intervention, the government of Lebanon should understand that it had nothing to do with the presidential succession question.<sup>46</sup>

Doubtless Ambassador McClintock was obliged to stand by the Chamoun government in any case, but his cables to Washington likely had been colored by an attack on the U.S. Information Service Library the previous day. According to one witness, demonstrators ravaged the contents of the building, but took care to first remove them to the street before they were set afire. No



damage was done either to the building or to people in it. Yet, this benign account by an NUF sympathizer would not have been so convincing to an American ambassador at the time (had he known of it), to his superiors at the Department of State, or to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The attack on the USIS, when considered along with the Tripoli riots, the new fighting in Beirut, and President Chamoun's assessment of the situation, must have painted a dark picture indeed in official Washington. There was a noticeable, immediate response.<sup>47</sup>

On the same day as this latest conversation between Chamoun and McClintock, Brigadier General Wade received orders from the Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, to transfer his headquarters of the 2d Provisional Marine Force from Camp Lejeune to the Mediterranean. General Wade was on his way by the next day, 14 May, and within a week he was on board the *Mount McKinley* off the coast of Crete with the Sixth Fleet's amphibious task force commander, Rear Adm. Robert W. Cavenagh. Here they were joined on 21 May by Brigadier J. W. C. Williams of the staff of the British Middle East Land Forces, and on the following day, by Brig. Gen. David Gray of the 24th Infantry Division. In the staff meetings that ensued it was decided that one of several variations of CINCSPECOMME OPLAN 1-58 would be used in the event of actual deployment.<sup>48</sup>

While General Wade moved his staff to the Mediterranean, the United States had already begun to send anti-riot arms and ammunition into Beirut aboard U.S. Air Force transport aircraft, and on 17 May the State Department announced that tanks were also being sent to Lebanon. At the same time, according to one press report, a U.S. cargo ship (presumably from the Sixth Fleet) had picked up fourteen American citizens from the city of Tripoli, where serious rioting continued.<sup>49</sup> And in Germany, major elements of Army Task Force 201 were placed on alert. Forces Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie all were put on notice. Force Alpha, then the 1st Battle Group, 503d Airborne Infantry, marshalled and deployed to Erding and Fürstenfeldbruck airfields, went so far as to rig for a heavy drop and fully load transport aircraft. After a week-long alert, the 503d made an exercise drop near Munich.<sup>50</sup> These military activities gave substance to Ambassador McClintock's announcement on 14 May, that "We are determined to help this government to maintain internal security."<sup>51</sup>

Even as these moves were being made, Lebanon's foreign minister, Dr. Charles Malik, was preparing to press charges of subversion against the United Arab Republic before the United Nations Security Council. Another official complaint was lodged simultaneously before the Arab League, but Dr. Malik and his government appeared to have little faith in the ability of that regional body to settle Lebanon's difficulties. Malik did not attend the League meeting, but went instead directly to New York; and when the League proposed a compromise settlement, Lebanon rejected it summarily.<sup>52</sup> President Chamoun and Foreign Minister Malik apparently were more interested in seeing the question come before the United Nations; quite apart from what course of action the Security Council might decide upon, this action also satisfied one of the pre-

conditions for American military support earlier described to Chamoun by Ambassador McClintock. The Security Council addressed the Lebanon question in early June and quickly resolved to dispatch observers to the scene. By 19 June the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) was in place, charged "to insure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other material across the Lebanese border."<sup>53</sup>

These developments were important, not only for obvious diplomatic reasons, but also because if UNOGIL's mission failed, the United States would be less reluctant to intervene. But while the Chairman of the JCS, Air Force Gen. Nathan Twining, announced 1 July that "we are prepared for any eventuality—all out war or limited war, right now," the dispatch of UNOGIL and its subsequent reports minimized the seriousness of the crisis.<sup>54</sup> UNOGIL's first report on 1 July, for instance, detailed the results of an inspection of a large opposition camp in the Chouf. Only light arms of various nationalities were observed. As to the insurrectionaries themselves, UNOGIL reported that it was impossible "to establish if any of the armed men had infiltrated from the outside; there is little doubt, however, that the vast majority were in any case Lebanese."<sup>55</sup> Whether the United States government was unsure about the "competency" of UNOGIL, as one author has claimed, the group's work did seem to contribute to a dissipation of the high tensions of May.<sup>56</sup>


In contrast to Lebanon, neighboring Iraq posed no anxieties for the United States. Iraq was squarely in the Western camp at this time, so that when trouble came from this country, the surprise was all the greater. There, in the early hours of 14 July, King Faisal and Crown Prince Abdul Illah were assassinated in a coup d'état led by Brig. Gen. Abdul Karim al'Kassim, a nationalist and UAR sympathizer. At the same time, rumors were heard that another coup was in the making against King Hussein of Jordan.<sup>57</sup> As the news spread throughout Lebanon, there was a palpable heightening of tensions: the opposition celebrated, and President Chamoun became fearful that he might be the next head of state to be deposed. He lost no time in summoning Ambassador McClintock to ask for military intervention—and this time he insisted that it arrive within forty-eight hours.<sup>58</sup>

News of the Iraqi coup reached Washington shortly after midnight, 14 July, and by 0200 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been alerted by Pentagon duty officers. McClintock's cable, transmitting Chamoun's invocation of the Eisenhower Doctrine, arrived later but was on hand for the day-long round of meetings between President Eisenhower and his advisors. At 0930 Admiral Burke, as executive agent for the JCS, warned Admiral Holloway in London that the Specified Command might soon be activated. As the meetings in the White House wore on, participants seemed little disposed toward any action other than unilateral intervention. Secretary of State Dulles elevated the immediate problem to a matter of national strategic principle, insisting that the time had come for the United States to meet head-on the challenges of the new Middle East. During the day, a worldwide American military alert had been declared, and the JCS Chairman, General Twining, was confident that the Soviet Union

would not dare risk interfering with the coming operation. "The Russians aren't going to jump us," Twining told Eisenhower, "if they do jump us, if they do come in, they couldn't pick a better time, because we've got them over the whing whang and they know it." With this kind of advice prevailing, few other options of American policy were discussed. When Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn suggested that the crisis might be only a civil war in which the United States had little business, it became obvious that such a notion irritated Eisenhower.<sup>59</sup> At 1823, 14 July, Eisenhower directed that the first echelons of the American intervention force arrive at Beirut by 0900 on the following day, when he planned to announce the action on national television. At 1830 Admiral Burke conveyed the president's order to Admiral Holloway. The Specified Command had been given less than fifteen hours to establish a beachhead at Beirut.<sup>60</sup>

The dispositions of the U.S. Sixth Fleet at this time reflect well how unexpected these events were. Although Chamoun wanted troops within forty-eight hours, decisions later taken in Washington called for the first American echelons to arrive in Lebanon much earlier. In fact, the fleet was steaming away from the Levant toward Athens and Nice for shore leave, and several elements were more than twenty hours away from Beirut. Of the three Marine battalion landing teams earmarked for the operation, only Lieutenant Colonel Hadd's 2d Battalion of the 2d Marine Regiment was sufficiently close to Beirut, and Capt. Victor McCrea's Amphibious Transport Squadron 6, of which Hadd's unit was a part, was lacking the LSD *Plymouth Rock*. The LSD contained the battalion's artillery battery, its heavy equipment, two of the battalion's normal complement of five M-48 tanks, shore party detachments, and an underwater demolitions team; it was on the way to Malta for repairs. Another vessel of this kind with the same load, the LSD *Fort Snelling*, normally served the 3d Battalion of the 6th Regiment as part of Amphibious Squadron 2. The *Fort Snelling* was near Rhodes, but even at flank speed the ship could not catch up to Hadd's marines in time for a coordinated landing.<sup>61</sup> Political requirements and the dislocations of the fleet meant, therefore, that the original Marine plan for BLUEBAT could not be effected. It was meant that three battalion landing teams should arrive at Beirut simultaneously, two along the Khalde beach, south of the city, and one other northeast of the city at Hollywood Beach, in order to take up blocking positions to seal the city off from any external threat. Obviously, now the Marine contingent would be committed piecemeal into an altogether confused—and therefore very dangerous—situation.

When the order to execute BLUEBAT reached McCrea's transport squadron from CINCSPECOMME at 0400, the squadron lay 120 miles off the Lebanese coast. The five vessels of the squadron quickly began to make for their objective. Two LSTs in the squadron, the *Traverse County* and the *Walworth County*, were forced to run at maximum speed to make the deadline. The rest of the vessels, including McCrea's command ship, the attack transport *Taconic*, made flank speed. As the force closed on its objective, Lieutenant Colonel Hadd's marines made their preparations. Rations, ammunition, and body armor were passed out to the men, and maps of the area were ferried from one




Map 3. Dispositions of Marine Units 14 July 1958.

vessel to another by helicopter. By these expedients, the squadron arrived in time to put the advance parties of marines ashore while President Eisenhower spoke nearly six thousand miles away.

It is instructive to consider just how little Lieutenant Colonel Hadd knew about what awaited him when he led the 2d Battalion into Lebanon. Clearly, his uncertainty had demanded that he plan for the worst: had he not expected opposition, it is doubtful that he would have issued ammunition and body armor to his men. He knew well enough that he was required to establish a beachhead, move several hundred yards inshore and seize the international airport. Later, circumstances permitting, he was to take his battalion northward in armored column six miles to the Port of Beirut and establish control there also. But he surely did not know how the Army of Lebanon would react to these proceedings: perhaps Hadd assumed that the Lebanese Army would support—or at least not hinder—his operation, but neither the president of Lebanon, nor the commander in chief of the Lebanese Army, General Shehāb, nor the American ambassador could have told Hadd that. Immediately before the landing, General Shehāb told Ambassador McClintock that while he was confident that the opposition would take no steps to prevent the American landing, he could not be so sure about the Lebanese Army. Hours before, some of Shehāb's officers had proposed taking over the government and resisting the landing of American troops. Hadd knew nothing of this, nor could he. McClintock had tried to radio the Sixth Fleet but failed to make contact. And because radio silence was being observed, it would have been difficult to pass news to the battalion commander anyway. Later communications passing between Hadd and others had to be conveyed by local phone. As to the opposition—Hadd called them the “rebels”—there was little chance of identifying them. Even native Lebanese had difficulty discovering the allegiances of the many armed civilians in and around Beirut at that time. Nor could Hadd have been very well informed of the positions known to be in opposition hands at this early stage in the intervention. The road Hadd was scheduled to take toward his secondary objective at the port cut directly through the main opposition stronghold in Beirut, the Arab quarter known as the Basta. Furthermore, judging from original plans, the notion of defending the city by blocking off the main roads seemed to imply that the real threat was going to reveal itself in the rather conventional form of a foreign, communist-dominated army, probably from Syria, marching from Damascus to invest Beirut. But what is finally more startling is the impression that no one, either in the Lebanese or American high commands, was much better informed than Lieutenant Colonel Hadd.<sup>61</sup>

Within twenty minutes of the first landing, all four rifle companies of the 2d Battalion had come ashore. Company F had landed first in tracked craft; Companies G and H landed next, followed by the reserve, Company E. Their supplies remained in their LSTs, however, for these had run aground on a sandbar a short distance from the waterline. The presence of this obstacle, in addition to the very loose beach sand which made wheeled traffic nearly impossible, testified to the poor quality of beach intelligence available to the




Map 4. Beirut and environs. The landing of 2/2. (First day.)

landing force. Even so, the problems on Red Beach, as the landing site was now called, would not have been insurmountable had the squadron had its normal complement of heavy equipment. As it was, the LSD *Fort Snelling* did not arrive off the beach until 2000, and it was not until the next morning that supplies began to move ashore smoothly. By that time, a great deal had happened.<sup>62</sup>

As Hadd was seeing the last of his battalion get ashore, the local American naval attache arrived at Red Beach with word that the American ambassador was asking the marines to re-embark and land instead at the Port of Beirut. This unusual request had been inspired by General Shehāb, who feared that Lebanon was "on the brink of disaster."<sup>63</sup> Disaster or not, Lieutenant Colonel Hadd had no brief to change his own orders and saw to it instead that the naval attache met with Captain McCrea aboard the *Taconic*. McCrea refused to alter the landing at all, and shortly thereafter he was upheld by a signal from Admiral Brown, Sixth Fleet commander. Only thirty minutes after this exchange, yet another emissary arrived from the American embassy with a different request. President Chamoun had received word that an attempt was about to be made on his life by the Lebanese Army, and he was now demanding that marines and tanks be sent immediately to guard the presidential palace. Hadd was having none of this. As he later wrote, "the beachhead perimeter for the BLT was extended for over 9,500 yards, whereas a normal battalion frontage is usually 600 to 1,500 yards. In my judgment, the BLT was extended to the maximum and the situation was still too obscure to risk fragmenting the command."<sup>64</sup> Ambassador McClintock was disappointed, as no doubt was President Chamoun. McClintock later scored the marines for their "extremely inflexible orders," but it is doubtful that Hadd would have agreed to guard the president even if he had had flexible orders.<sup>65</sup> What is more certain, though, is that the sudden appearance of marines around the presidential palace would have caused an outbreak of fighting, because the palace was very close to the edge of the Basta.

By 1600 Hadd's Company G had moved to the international airport and taken control, evicting civilians from the terminal and halting air traffic. Here the marines first encountered troops from the Lebanese Army, who offered no resistance. At 1640 the American air attache arrived with Col. Toufic Salem, the chief of staff of the Lebanese Army, and with Hadd agreed that the local airport guards would cooperate with the marines in cordoning off the area. Air traffic was restored but remained under Marine control for the time being.<sup>66</sup>

The lack of opposition to the American landings was a promising sign, and the 2d Battalion, after posting perimeter guards and sending out local patrols, passed a calm night at the airport. But the battalion was still alone in Lebanon: no reinforcements would arrive before early the next morning, when the 3d Battalion of the 6th Regiment, commanded by Lt. Col. Robert M. Jenkins, would land at Red Beach. Perhaps the placid scene was merely an illusion: no American force had actually entered the city, and although General Shehāb, Captain McCrea, and Lieutenant Colonel Hadd discussed the situa-



Map 5. Beirut. (Second day.)



tion later that evening at the embassy, the question of the Lebanese Army's response was still unresolved. These talks seemed to indicate that Lebanese and American military officials were moving toward a *modus vivendi*, but the opposition had taken no action beyond the occasional bellicose public announcement. Sā'ib Salām, a leading and highly respected National Union Front member in the Basta, had already called on his supporters to "drive any Americans landing in Lebanon back into the sea."<sup>67</sup> Nothing had happened yet to say that this was impossible. Indeed, the only aspect of the intervention clear so far was that this was not at all a typical military operation. The government of Lebanon spoke with too many voices: while the president favored the American presence, his armed civilian supporters seemed more committed to Chamoun's continuance in office than did the army and so, presumably, more amenable to the landing of the marines. The opposition was also less than conventional: no lines of resistance manned by uniformed soldiers appeared to face the marines. Instead, the countryside and the cities were dotted with enclaves of lightly-armed, poorly organized insurrectionaries who so far had shown no disposition to expand, and nowhere did the level of violence speak of the kind of emergency which President Chamoun had declared implicitly when he invoked the Eisenhower Doctrine. The situation, in all its ambiguity, was summed up when a Pentagon spokesman told reporters after the first day that the situation in Lebanon was "not war, but like war."<sup>68</sup>

Perhaps these uncertainties accounted in some way for what transpired on the second day of the intervention, 16 July, which began with the arrival at the airport of Admiral Holloway at 0400. The presence of CINCSPECOMME with the forward element of his contingency force testified to the unique direction the operation had taken, and it set the tone for the rest of the day: the most dramatic—not to say critical—events would involve the most senior task force officers. As Lt. Col. Robert Jenkins brought his battalion (the 3d of the 6th) ashore at 0730, the main business now at hand was to get Hadd's battalion to the Port of Beirut. General Wade came ashore at 0800 and before leaving for the embassy alerted Hadd that he would start his column northward by 0930. Upon arriving at the embassy, however, General Wade found that General Shehāb was still resisting the idea of moving the marines into the city proper and was still anxious that his soldiers might try to stop the marines. Shehāb's fears seemed realized when, as General Wade returned to Hadd's position at the airport, he saw several Lebanese tanks forming a roadblock. Soldiers there told Wade they had orders to prevent the Americans from entering the city, though they were unsure as to whether they would actually open fire. Wade sped on to the airport, where Admirals Holloway and Yeager (the commander of the Fast Carrier Strike Force) arrived shortly. As Hadd's battalion finally began moving toward the city, the two admirals and the Marine general decided to go to the embassy. Unknown to them, Ambassador McClintock and General Shehāb were on their way to the airport themselves, and the two official cars passed each other en route. The ambassador's car gave chase and caught up just at the roadblock, where Hadd's battalion now faced the Lebanese tanks. There ensued an impromptu conference, where arrangements were made to have the Lebanese Army escort the marines into town (stu-

diously avoiding any contact with the Basta) and thereafter to insure that the American and Lebanese military forces cooperated as much as possible in their operations. This done, Hadd's battalion moved out once more, but this time with Lebanese jeeps at intervals in the American column, the whole being led by two official cars containing the American ambassador to Lebanon, the general in chief of the Lebanese Army, the American task force commander, the commander of the Fast Carrier Strike Force, and the commander of the Marine task force. It was one of the more unusual politico-military processions in American history, and its progress marked the passing of the crisis of the American intervention in Lebanon.<sup>69</sup>

With two Marine battalion landing teams already ashore and two more due to arrive by 19 July, the dimensions of the U.S. intervention were becoming clearer to observers in Lebanon but its objectives were not. President Eisenhower had said that he wanted no "further sizable increases" in forces, but the four BLTs amounted to six thousand men alone and a good part of the U.S. Sixth Fleet lay offshore.<sup>70</sup> The Army contingents had yet to arrive. Local circumstances certainly warranted no more ground troops. The joint Lebanese-American jeep patrols that began on the evening of 16 July had calmed the city.<sup>71</sup> There had been a few instances of harassing fire around the airport, but only once had the marines been obliged to open fire themselves. And after two marines had lost their way and been taken captive in the Basta, they were released unharmed after a lecture on American imperialism. Their arms were returned a little later.<sup>72</sup> The leaders of the National Union Front took stock of the general situation: the presidential elections were little more than a week away, and for one leader, this fact alone explained the presence of the Americans. "The opposition has always maintained that President Chamoun would play every card in the pack to stay in power," he told a Western reporter. As he pointed toward Red Beach, he added, "There is the proof." Whatever the ultimate aims of the opposition had been, it was evident by 18 July that it would be impossible to achieve those aims without the approval of the Americans. As for the Americans themselves, one correspondent commented, "Now that [they] have established their bridgehead in Lebanon—and effectively secured the country from a Syrian invasion that never was—the best course might be to sit down with some ice packs and think out a realistic objective for the operation."<sup>73</sup> There is no evidence that this advice was heeded.

The call from the Chief of Naval Operations on the afternoon of 14 July to Admiral Holloway in London (where it was nearly midnight), activating the Specified Command, was also the signal for the Army elements of Operation BLUEBAT to prepare for deployment to the Middle East. At the same time, the CNO, still acting as the JCS' executive agent, promptly made another call to General Lauris Norstad, the United States Commander in Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR), ordering him to

bring one battle group and airlift therefor to a state of readiness to enable their arrival within 24 hours of execution order on Beirut airfield assuming it is safely held, or within 36 hours if airdrop is required and to be prepared to follow with second battle group.<sup>74</sup>

The putting together of a special military force which existed only on paper a few hours before is a business with its own peculiar complications. Between the planning and execution of any military operation there lie opportunities for miscarriage which often have little to do with the plans. Less than perfect plans embody risks in addition to the play of ill fortune, however, while many times plans are considered perfect until they prove otherwise. Such was the Chief of Naval Operations' assumption when he sent the terse message to General Norstad. It was a message that concealed a host of practical difficulties.

After receiving the admiral's message, General Norstad notified his immediate subordinates in the European theater, Generals Frank Everest of U.S. Air Forces Europe (USAFE) and Henry Hodes of U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR). General Hodes had already put the 24th Infantry Division on notice that an alert might be in the offing because of the revolt in Iraq. Hodes' warning caught all the divisional staff officers who were to make up the staff for the task force preparing to go on a field exercise near Bad Tölz. Moreover, the battle group of the 503d Airborne Infantry which was to act as Force Alpha was getting ready for the same exercise and so was in no condition to reconstitute itself in time to go to Lebanon. Thus, a decision was made to substitute a sister unit, the 1st Battle Group of the 187th Airborne Infantry, as a new Force Alpha in the event of an actual alert order.<sup>75</sup>

Shortly after midnight, the division received another call from USAREUR headquarters which relayed enough information to cause the declaration of a higher state of division readiness—code-named **AMBER**—at 0200, 15 July. Until that time, warnings from USAREUR were merely rumors. Now, **AMBER** required the division's staff officers to dust off their plans, find key officers (most of whom probably were close at hand already), and begin assessing the state of the division's equipment.<sup>76</sup>

For several hours after his first hint that Operation **BLUEBAT** might be ordered, it was the business of Brig. Gen. David Gray, the assistant division commander of the 24th and the commander now of Army Task Force 201, to make his task force operational as quickly as prudence allowed. Perhaps even before **AMBER** alert was declared, the procedures for marshalling and deploying the task force which looked sufficient on paper were beginning to seem superficial. There was first the problem of actually assembling the force. The battle group for Force Alpha was to be augmented to 110 percent of its full strength. Because the battle groups were maintained usually at less than their authorized strength, the disruption caused by rapid reinforcement at the expense of the rest of the division was all the greater.<sup>77</sup> In search of the best available officers, for instance, General Gray was given the dossiers of all the division's officers and told to take his pick, both to fill out his officer complement and to build his brigade-size staff.<sup>78</sup> No doubt the same rule was followed with regard to the most experienced noncommissioned officers. By this method, a later report calculated, the staff of the 24th Infantry Division was "rendered almost inoperative until replacements could be secured and trained."<sup>79</sup>

The replacement question was a crucial one, because for the men of Army Task Force 201 the move to the Middle East was to be a "permanent change of station," meaning that there was every possibility that they would not return to their old assignments once they had completed their missions. Still, the haste to deploy was such that some officers and men actually went to Lebanon without orders.<sup>80</sup>

The marshalling of all Alpha forces at their stations became official with the receipt of another call from USAREUR headquarters at 0430 which directed an increase in the division's readiness—this time to a status known as AZURE. While not technically an alert, AZURE did nevertheless require the cancellation of passes and leaves and begin the process of bringing task force units up to deployment strength through transfers of men and equipment from other units in the division. After inspections, for instance, the 187th principally drew upon the 1st Battle Group, 21st Airborne Infantry, for any extra men or equipment.<sup>81</sup>

Shortly after AZURE was declared, a division muster alert was sounded. So much of the division was now involved in some way with the launching of the task force, this was just as well. For example, during the alert in May, when the task force had marshalled and moved to Fürstenfeldbruck airfield, it was found that the task force ought to be relieved from certain duties associated with the mobilization. Immediately after that alert was cancelled, a series of critiques within the command recommended certain revisions in Plan GRANDIOS, and one of these was the establishment of a provisional support force. The force was to be commanded by the division's artillery commander, Brig. Gen. George S. Speidel. "Support Force Speidel," so called, was charged with seeing to the marshalling and loading of Task Force 201, including the establishment of operation and control centers at the assembly areas and the airfields, and to coordinate the traffic in between. Forty-five minutes after this newest division muster alert was announced, General Speidel was briefing his "Departure Airfield Control Group," which had been taken out of the 1st Battle Group, 21st Infantry. This battle group, with a Heavy Drop Platoon attached, was to work out of Fürstenfeldbruck airfield for the remainder of the operation. Speidel's "Marshalling Area Control Group" was to be taken from another unit not scheduled to go on the operation, the 1st Howitzer Battalion of the 13th Field Artillery. In sum, the creation of Army Task Force 201 required the 24th Infantry Division to cannibalize itself. The shock to combat effectiveness was immediate, considerable, and long-lasting. By one estimate, the division's capability to carry out its primary mission was diminished by as much as 60 percent during this operation. Neither was it possible to recover very quickly from such a shock: two months after the operation began, the division still had not recouped.<sup>82</sup>

The subsequent declaration of a GREEN alert at 0545 hardly took the division off its guard. Having been in some state of readiness since at least midnight, the division had anticipated the time when the GREEN alert would be declared. Under GREEN, the Alpha element of the task force was to execute all

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of its plan short of actually going to Fürstenfeldbruck. So there was perhaps a natural tendency of the division's leaders to get slightly ahead of themselves. The advanced elements of Support Force Speidel were not to move to Fürstenfeldbruck until the GREEN alert, for instance, but General Speidel already had seen the Heavy Drop Platoon off for the airfield a good forty-five minutes before the alert order arrived.<sup>83</sup>

USAREUR headquarters had instructed the division that it had twenty-four hours to get the task force to Lebanon after the final alert—called PURPLE was declared. PURPLE required "all aspects of Plan GRANDIOS to be executed," and so while the task force may have been ready to move to the airfield early on the morning of 15 July, the division was told to hold the task force at the marshalling area to insure that the operation remained covert until the marines had made good their landing later that day. Apparently, a successful Marine landing at Beirut was to be the signal for higher headquarters to declare PURPLE. At 1415, PURPLE was declared for the Alpha element of the task force, the 1st Battle Group of the 187th, and the program of deployment began.<sup>84</sup>


It is in the execution of this part of Operation BLUEBAT that the difficulties of joint operations—especially joint contingency operations which usually are hastily mounted—can best be seen. For a time early in the sequence of notification not only the Joint Chiefs were involved in issuing directions to the various commands, but also the Chiefs of Staff of both the Army and the Air Force and the U.S. European Command. Even as the Specified Command was being activated, the JCS had to take action to see that the U.S. National Military Representative at SHAPE was kept abreast of military developments in the theater.<sup>85</sup> Inasmuch as it was estimated that the Army's only deployable European division was reduced in effectiveness by 60 percent by the move into Lebanon, it is interesting to note that contingency procedures did not demand that the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe, be automatically informed of deployment details.<sup>86</sup> At lower echelons the situation was different: high security classifications on such plans as BLUEBAT and GRANDIOS prevented most people from knowing enough about what they contained actually to make the plans work when the time came. Several staff officers later complained that these restrictions impeded planning and made execution even more vexatious than it would have been otherwise.<sup>87</sup>

When Force Alpha left Gablingen Kaserne near Augsburg for Fürstenfeldbruck airfield, the battle group entered the realm of joint operations. What had been up until that time a smooth operation for the 187th quickly became confused. Despite a long period of preparation under the aegis of CINCSPECOMME which included several joint conferences, the coordination between the Army and the Air Force left a great deal to be desired. The general

structure of the Army Task Force had been known at least since the previous May and probably was discussed by joint planners as early as February. Yet, on the day of the actual emergency two significant shortcomings in preparation were discovered: first, the "configuration" of the task force—the dimensions and number of loads to be carried by the Air Force—had not been determined; and second, USAFE had not informed the task force of the number and type of aircraft actually available for the movement.<sup>88</sup> This last piece of information was not conveyed to the task force until 1430 on the day of the deployment, when Col. C. W. McCafferty arrived at Fürstenfeldbruck for a conference at the Army Command Post.<sup>89</sup> It was at Fürstenfeldbruck airfield that the configurations for loading the task force were first calculated, although not with finality: nearly every element of the task force had underestimated its load.<sup>90</sup> The truck convoy from Gablingen had been loaded in reverse, and because there was much re-rigging to be done, the Parachute Maintenance Company which had actually left for the airfield quite early could not begin its operations until the last truck arrived. Complicating matters further, the make-up of the airlift kept changing, forcing the task force to change its loading schemes.<sup>91</sup> Finally, there does not seem to have been any thought given to how the dimensions of the airlift might affect aircraft availability. At the time, just how long it would take aircraft to get to Turkey, unload, and return to Germany for subsequent loads had not been estimated.<sup>92</sup>

Even the most sophisticated planning could not have anticipated every problem, however. That is why it was important to have provided for joint consultations at every critical juncture of the operation. At Fürstenfeldbruck airfield on the afternoon of 15 July, there was no such thing. Colonel McCafferty was the senior air liaison officer present.<sup>93</sup> As early as 24 June, division planners had asked the Air Force for a full-time liaison officer from the 322d Air Division, the combat cargo unit that had been assigned the airlift mission. In a compromise, the Air Force had promised to make monthly liaison visits to the division; but by the time of the emergency, no liaison officers had yet appeared.<sup>94</sup> Perhaps even more important, no aerial port team to assist in the loading operation had been assigned.<sup>95</sup> The soldiers of the 187th were pressed into service; those not "re-configuring," rigging, or loading aircraft spent a damp night on the tarmac near the aircraft.<sup>96</sup> The entire force had arrived at the airfield by 1705, but the loading operation took until 0300 the following morning to complete.<sup>97</sup>

At 0100 on the morning of 16 July, Force Alpha encountered yet another obstacle. A question arose as to whether U.S. military aircraft carrying combat troops to the Middle East would be allowed to fly over certain countries en route. <sup>98</sup> Once again, available documents suggest that this was the first time that this problem had been considered. According to one report, "previous guidance from the JCS on foreign overflight and clearance rights for the deployment of forces allocated to CINCSPECOMME has repeatedly indicated that *wherein such privileges were not obtained, they would be ignored.*" [My italics]<sup>99</sup> But in fact prohibitions were forthcoming from some governments and in fact were not ignored. The first echelons of Force Alpha had been



Map 6. Deployment of Army Task Force 201 on 16 July 1958 and after.

airborne for about three hours en route to Turkey when it was learned that Greece had denied overflight permission. Greece's action immediately added two hours to the flying time of the C-119s and required different refueling stops—mostly at Marseilles, Rome, and Naples. During the evening of 17 July, the government of Austria also denied the use of its airspace.<sup>100</sup>

The "airstream" bearing ATF 201's Force Alpha to Turkey began with the take-off of a C-119 at 0817 on 16 July, nearly eighteen hours after the PURPLE alert had been declared. At 0930 the first C-130 took off from Fürstenfeldbruck with the task force command group on board, including the ATF commander, Brig. Gen. David Gray (the assistant division commander of the 24th), and, strangely, Colonel McCafferty of the air liaison staff. This group arrived at Adana around 1500 the same day, and by 2300 all of the newer, faster C-130s had landed. As for the aging C-119s, the last of their number did not get to Adana until 1420 the following day.<sup>101</sup>

With Force Bravo (the 1st Battle Group, 503d Infantry) still being held in GREEN alert, Force Charlie was the next group scheduled to leave. Force Charlie was a congeries of support units which had been cast into a provisional structure, styled for Operation BLUEBAT the "201st Logistics Command." Elements of Force Charlie were synchronized with the whole sequence of the task force's deployment; thus, in Force Charlie there were Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, Delta, and Echo elements. These elements were scattered around Europe and were to deploy from Fürstenfeldbruck, Rhein Main Air Base near Frankfurt, and Châteauroux and Evreux Air Bases in France.<sup>102</sup> The Alpha element of Force Charlie, composed of a small command group led by Col. A. W. Meetze, arrived in Turkey on 17 July from France. On the same day, after the Bravo and Charlie elements had been integrated, a bus carrying the officers and enlisted men attached to this group from Orléans had a serious crash at Olivet (Loiret). Three men were killed and others were hospitalized. Substitutes for the killed and injured men were gathered up, however, and by the end of the day a newly-constituted Bravo/Charlie element of the command had been deployed from Châteauroux.<sup>103</sup>

On 16 and 17 July literally hundreds of aircraft were closing on Adana Air Base. Three hours after all the C-130s had landed, the slower C-124s began arriving and for the next six hours the C-124s continued to unload tons of equipment and thousands of men at an airfield ill equipped to handle either.<sup>104</sup> During the first two days, the congestion was so great that some incoming aircraft had to be put in a holding pattern aloft until ramp space had been cleared for them. Apart from that, Adana had no suitable port facilities and was virtually isolated by a poor ground transportation network. And despite the fact that alerts for deployment of forces to the Middle East had been called three times during the previous two years, there had been no improvements in the ground facilities nor had any stockpiling of supplies been attempted. Finally, Adana was to serve a dual purpose as a forward staging base both for the Army Task Force (meaning that a sufficient number of transport aircraft would have to remain for the subsequent move to Beirut),



and the Composite Air Strike Force which the Tactical Air Command was dispatching at that moment from the United States.<sup>105</sup>

Composite Air Strike Force Bravo was composed of a command group, commanded by Maj. Gen. Henry Viccellio at Headquarters, 19th Air Force, stationed at Foster Air Force Base, Texas; twenty-four F-100s at Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico; six RF-101s, six RB-66s, and three WB-66s, all at Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina; and twelve B-57s at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia.<sup>106</sup> The Tactical Air Command also had received its orders from the JCS around midnight, 14 July, but as in the case of the Army Task Force those orders required a delay in execution until the marines were safely ashore. Under its general plans for deployment to the Middle East (there was no specific plan correlated with Operation BLUEBAT), CASF Bravo was to have arrived at Adana within forty-eight hours.<sup>107</sup> But events proved that a schedule of this kind was most unrealistic.

The order to delay take-off until the morning of the 15th, and an obstruction on the runway at Cannon Air Force Base combined to cause a substitution of the two F-100 squadrons there by two others at Myrtle Beach Air Force Base, South Carolina. At 0900 the commander of the 354th Tactical Fighter Wing was told to launch two of his squadrons within the next seven hours, and the fact that these units had no deployment experience, were only partially qualified in aerial refueling, and had incomplete "flyaway kits" (one of which was described in one report as "nothing more than 5,000 pounds of random items") did not prevent the mission's being assigned. The hasty reassignment of this mission to a green squadron had its cost: of the first squadron of twelve aircraft the 354th launched, one crashed, seven landed en route, and four actually completed their journeys in one uninterrupted leg. The second squadron arrived without mishap, but far behind its schedule. The rest of CASF Bravo duplicated this performance. By the forty-eighth hour after the first take-offs, fifteen of the twenty-six tactical fighters, ten of the twelve tactical bombers, none of the reconnaissance aircraft, and twenty-three of forty-three transport aircraft had landed in Turkey. The command group aboard a C-130 had actually arrived well in advance of most of the fighters.<sup>108</sup> How much the congestion at Adana had to do with the piecemeal and poorly synchronized execution of CASF Bravo's mission—as has been claimed—is not entirely clear, but there is no question that the single staging base for Operation BLUEBAT had no less than 165 aircraft of all types parked on its ramps by the end of 17 July.<sup>109</sup> Moreover, those watching the air operation unfold were treated to the spectacle of unarmed, fully loaded transport aircraft closing at an area of potential combat before fighter squadrons had established air superiority, certainly a violation of the most basic canon of air strategy.

Perhaps this was just as well, for it was later found by a visiting TAC staff officer that few of the F-100 pilots had any strafing experience, nor had any of them launched rockets or delivered conventional bombs. The B-57 crews were reported as being "incapable of performing efficient conventional weapon delivery." Instead, CASF units were quite skilled in a form of air warfare

utterly unsuited to the mission at hand: the delivery of nuclear strikes. Of course, CASF Bravo was far more powerful than any opposition in the general area, and despite these shortcomings Bravo doubtless would have overwhelmed any enemy by sheer weight. Had it been required to do so, CASF Bravo would have been entirely in keeping with American military traditions—substituting materiel superiority for technique. But to argue, as has one author, that “no opposition appeared, so who can say it was wrong?” does not entirely absolve those in charge of this operation.<sup>110</sup> One cannot help observing that about 18 July, Adana Air Base would have made a wonderful target for anyone who wished to take advantage of it.


By the end of the third day of the intervention in Lebanon, the airlifted elements of the Army Task Force had finished their movement to Adana. Lt. Col. T. W. Sharkey, the commander of the 187th, arrived on the last C-124 from Germany that morning and by the afternoon even the last of the C-119s had landed.<sup>111</sup> With the task force now at the forward staging base, it was the proper time for Admiral Holloway to consider whether he needed more ground troops in Lebanon. The Admiral wrote later that although little outright opposition had been encountered he still considered the situation to be very sensitive.<sup>112</sup> But before very long there would be more marines ashore than the total force of the Lebanese Army. A problem more insistent than opposition in Beirut was the nearly critical overloading of Adana Air Base: members of CINCSPECOMME’s staff would have recognized a need to relieve the pressures on that airfield by moving the Army elsewhere—perhaps. A less charitable interpretation would be that now that the Army had moved a task force 2,100 miles, it had to have a part to play in the intervention. Whatever the cause, Admiral Holloway summoned General Gray and Air Force Gen. James Roberts (the Commander, U.S. Air Forces at Adana) to the command ship, *Taconic*, at Beirut. There, Holloway asked the two generals to plan for an air assault on Kleiat airfield at Tripoli.<sup>113</sup> Exactly why Holloway wanted such an operation is not known. It is true that Tripoli had been the scene of some very serious rioting and that the National Union Front was very strong there, but what an air drop would have accomplished remained unspoken. What is known is that Generals Gray and Roberts actually set to work on the plan but found quickly that intelligence on that city was poor. No photographs of the drop zone existed, and none were possible because the reconnaissance aircraft at Adana did not have the proper equipment to take any.<sup>114</sup> This may have caused Admiral Holloway to change his mind: he ordered Force Alpha to move instead to Beirut on 19 July, where it would land “administratively.” Now the congestion at Adana would also be moved to Beirut, but in this case it would be more severe and of longer duration and to even less obvious purpose.

As ATF 201 made ready to leave Adana, Marine troop movements initiated on the day the crisis broke out were continuing. Late on 15 July Admiral Burke had directed the reinforcement of the 2d Provisional Marine Force by yet another battalion, which was to be airlifted directly from North Carolina to Lebanon. The first planes carrying the 2d Battalion of the 8th Marine Regiment touched down at Beirut International on 18 July after a fifty-four-hour

flight, at the very time an advance party from Force Alpha was puzzling out where the bivouac for their battle group would be. On 16 July, a regimental landing team *and* a Marine air group were being readied in North Carolina for the Middle East as well, while on Okinawa still another Marine battalion landing team was due to be shipped to the Persian Gulf.<sup>115</sup> Fortunately, by 20 July reason triumphed and it was decided not to commit this many more troops to the contingency. The landing on 18 July of the 2d Battalion from North Carolina had already put a strain on local resources; so much so, that they were quartered aboard the USS *Chilton* as a floating reserve. And there was still the Army Task Force to be brought into the area.<sup>116</sup>

This occurred on the morning of 19 July when the lead elements of the battle group began taking off at Adana. Force Alpha completed its movement at 2230 the same day. As expeditious as this move was, it was not without some problems. With an airstream of C-119s, C-124s, and C-130s (all fully loaded) behind them, the command group of the ATF found upon landing that no spaces had been prepared for what was about to be a vast armada of aircraft looking for a place to land. Moreover, the transports had to be squeezed into the ordinary air patterns at Beirut. Despite the absence of an aerial port team, the military aircraft were offloaded rapidly (at four-minute intervals in the case of the C-119s) and sent on their way. But, as no decision had been taken on whether there was to be an airdrop in the near future, the heavy loads were not broken apart.<sup>117</sup> Instead, these were lined up along the runways by a detail of officers and men from the 187th. Lacking even a fork lift at first, these troops made offloading aircraft their main business for the next week, for at 0730 the following morning the airloaded elements of Force Charlie began arriving at Beirut and 170 sorties were unloaded before all the supplies had arrived. Now the concentration of American military men and their supplies dominated the scene at Beirut International Airport. Official photographs show that all manner of equipment was positioned along the main runway. Just to the east of the airport, the olive groves burgeoned with Force Alpha and its various support units.<sup>118</sup> Five days after the initial landings there were upwards of 10,000 men and their accouterments concentrated in less than four square miles south of Beirut.

As the size of the American force in Lebanon grew during the last part of July, new obligations of the Specified Command began to assert themselves. With the deployment of the various forces either complete or in train, and with the crisis inside Lebanon assuming an aspect of routine (if sometimes violent routine), questions which had been obscured during the exertions of getting some kind of force into the country now took on a certain importance. After the Army came to Beirut, the soldiers came to outnumber the marines and what had been until then a naval operation in Lebanon was transformed into a multiservice, joint undertaking. The assignment of ATF 201 of course complicated the activities of the CINCSPECOMME, mainly because a need now arose to coordinate the doings of disparate military units trying to carry out a common mission. Admiral Holloway first had augmented his own staff by drawing upon local U.S. naval units. When only one Marine battalion had



Map 7. Dispositions as of ATF 201's arrival 20 July 1958.

been ashore the question of a ground force commander had been inconsiderable—indeed, during the early hours of the intervention it seemed that there were altogether too many potential commanders ashore. Brigadier Generals Wade and later Gray dealt directly with Admiral Holloway during the early operations, but the complications and requirements arising from this business were such that on 21 July the Admiral asked the Joint Chiefs to appoint an American Land Force Commander (AMLANFOR). Why such a request was made at this peculiar time is very simple: during nine months of joint planning, no provisions had been made in the contingency plans for such a command. A matter which should have been settled long in advance of any operation had been left unattended. Now the commander of the contingency force had to deal with a matter which should not have been his burden. The marines hoped that Lt. Gen. Edwin Pollock, then commanding the Atlantic Fleet Marines, would win the appointment and were “disappointed” (the word their official history used) when Army Maj. Gen. Paul D. Adams was given the job.<sup>119</sup> Adams’ arrival on 24 July with virtually no staff did not exactly help matters, for the ATF was immediately stripped of all the staff officers it could spare to serve under the new CINCAMLANFOR. In effect, this meant that those staff officers were serving two masters, the new joint ground commander and the Army Task Force itself, whose command for administrative and logistical matters General Adams had appropriated. Finally, although the new AMLANFOR Chief of Staff was a Marine, and although “a number” of other Marine staff officers were brought into the headquarters, the composition of the new staff made ground operations in Lebanon henceforth an “Army show.”<sup>120</sup>

Despite the dislocations and shortages in staff officers caused by the creation of the new command, certain benefits attended the structuring of the contingency force along more orthodox lines. At the very least, the creation of AMLANFOR drew attention to the need for close coordination between the various elements of this polyglot force. At the same time, the appointment of an Army general from USAREUR helped Admiral Holloway deal more effectively with what could be called his “Army factor.” Long-standing traditions made naval operations run quite smoothly, but for operations between naval and Army forces this was not the case. Because the decision had been taken early on to launch Army contingency forces into the Middle East from Europe rather than the United States, the exact delineation of how much support the Specified Command could expect from USAREUR was very important. The proximity and ease of communications with USAREUR made it easy for the contingency force to depend more on the Army in Europe than it would have done had the Army contribution come from the United States.

Both CINSPECOMME OPLAN 215-58 and USAREUR Emergency Plan 201 made clear that operational control of Army forces coming from Europe passed to the Specified Commander “upon arrival of units concerned at Middle

East aerial or sea ports of debarkation," but in fact there was confusion on this point alone.<sup>121</sup> One of the elements of the Delta Force in ATF 201 was an "Honest John" rocket battery which was to be sealifted from Bremerhaven, Germany. Admiral Holloway had asked that this battery be sent with conventional warheads. To this, USAREUR strongly objected on the grounds that "the few available were already committed to other purposes and because the lethal radius of this type warhead hardly warrants the expenditure of the rocket." The real question seems to have been, however, whether the battery would be deployed with nuclear or conventional warheads.<sup>122</sup> When, at a joint critique much later, it was recommended that such weapons not be deployed at all unless they were specifically requested by the Specified Commander, representatives of USAREUR insisted that batteries with both nuclear and conventional warheads be deployed unless they were deleted from the troop list by the Specified or higher commands.<sup>123</sup> USAREUR's confusion on what the policy would be with regard to the use of "Honest Johns" was merely a reflection of the confusion about such things at much higher levels. In one of its own assessments of the Lebanon operation, the Department of the Army complained forthrightly that, concerning the rockets, there had been an absence of "proper policy guidance" on what was chiefly "a political issue."<sup>124</sup> The resolution of this issue was finally made by the Joint Chiefs, who directed that the battery not be landed in Lebanon at all, types of warhead notwithstanding. The battery was already at sea, however, and General Adams had concluded that there was no need for the battery anyway. When Battery D, 34th Artillery, reached Beirut, its personnel were returned to Europe by air. As a kind of concession, General Adams asked USAREUR to have another battery stand by for airlift if one proved necessary.<sup>125</sup> The dispute over the dispatch of the "Honest John" was merely the most dramatic of several such questions to confront the task force command. The BLUEBAT plan required USAREUR to provide logistical support to Army contingents for as much as forty-five days after deployment, but the degree to which this dependency upon USAREUR extended to other kinds of support such as personnel replacements was unknown. Even the question of whether USAREUR would eventually get back the forces it had lost was left unanswered until the withdrawal of forces began. And, naturally, one of the reasons the new AMLANFOR headquarters was forced to absorb the Army Task Force staff was because the headquarters had not been anticipated by the planners.<sup>126</sup>

Predictably, the pressures of joint operations were most acute—or at least more immediate—within the Specified Command itself. None of the service elements had much trouble in conducting its own affairs; it was when the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine operations coalesced that procedures were put to the test. Admiral Holloway had of course established a joint operations center aboard the *Taconic*, but this alone did not insure cooperation. Taken together, all the units of the American intervention forces mounted a considerable potential in firepower, for instance; but, the presence of Army and Marine artillery ashore, the naval fire support afloat, and the air supports aloft did not mean that these capabilities were linked together automatically. The Air Force at Adana and the Sixth Fleet's naval air elements were launching sorties over

Lebanon and were responsible for the cover of forces there, but their operations in such a confined space were made all the more dangerous because there was no doctrine for joint operations to call upon. Failure to use common radio frequencies only heightened the problem.<sup>127</sup> Beyond that, "panel codes," by which ground forces would mark their positions, and target and frontline markings had not been agreed upon. Neither had agreement been reached as to how artillery and naval gunfire would be coordinated with airstrikes. All these matters were finally taken up at a joint conference held in Beirut—on 4 August, twenty days after the marines came ashore and long after even the military commanders realized that they had overestimated the magnitude of their opposition.<sup>128</sup>

Shortly after Force Alpha reached Beirut, General Gray called the men of the 187th together for a talk. He wanted to tell them why they were in Lebanon and what they were supposed to do while they were there. He began by implying that communists were responsible for the troubles besetting Lebanon. Exactly how Force Alpha's enemy would manifest itself, General Gray did not—perhaps could not—say. He was confident that in acting promptly and forcefully the United States had prevented the collapse of "the government we wish to support," but as for "what our future mission may be," he said, "I cannot tell you exactly."<sup>129</sup>

In all likelihood, the general was not just being coy: the realities of service in Lebanon did not live up to military expectations and so the force which had come to the Middle East to fight a conventional enemy had to make accommodations. American patrols still reached out as much as twenty miles from Beirut, as though a foreign army threatened the city, but by the end of the month the views of the U.S. high command about the threat had changed so much that these patrols were mere exercises. By 29 July Army troops began relieving the marines sector by sector around the city. Now, according to one report, "it was believed that the major threat facing U.S. Forces was from possible small groups [*sic*] infiltration into the area with the view of causing some minor incident."<sup>130</sup>

The reason it was taking so long for the Americans to understand the real military situation in Lebanon is not hard to find: intelligence available before the operation began was either poor or nonexistent. As far as American military authorities were concerned Operation BLUEBAT was a military operation, and so one might charitably grant that their only concern was to gather intelligence useful to that end, but even that was not done. During the May crisis, it was found that the only maps of Lebanon available through the Army Map Service were based upon 1941 and 1945 French productions. Immediately, the British began drawing new maps based upon a 1957 survey of the area. CINCSPECOMME and the Sixth Fleet did have a few of these available by the time the real emergency occurred, but USAREUR and USAFE got theirs *after* deployment. The situation was so confused at first that Admiral Holloway held off deciding what the standard map for his task force would be until the operation was well advanced.<sup>131</sup> This problem charac-

terized the general intelligence situation. A J-2 analysis of the information on hand for the Army Task Force is eloquent. Army Col. Stewart McKenney wrote that there was an

absence of current knowledge of the situation existing in Beirut specifically, and in Lebanon in general while the assault elements were at ADANA. Although the situation was known to be noncombat in nature in BEIRUT through reports of Marine activities, the deployment of the Lebanese Army in the city, the exact location of rebel controlled areas, extent and nature of barriers and rebel defensive capabilities on the major airfields throughout Lebanon were unknown. When liaison was effected with CINCPACOMME in BEIRUT, answers to these EEI [Essential Elements of Information] were so nebulous that it was necessary to plan to meet resistance in strength in any operations considered outside BEIRUT and environs.<sup>132</sup>

This was only part of what one report called “voids in intelligence”;<sup>133</sup> as we have seen, the marines suffered from poor beach information, and planning for the airdrop at Tripoli was cancelled at least in part because there was no reliable photographic intelligence.

The general misunderstanding that Operation BLUEBAT was to be a “purely military operation” naturally worked against the production of accurate political intelligence for use by the contingency force. In anticipation of combat, the niceties of political intelligence seemed hardly to matter. But when the operation revealed its true shape, political intelligence was all important: the American commanders were forced to assess the situation on the spot and quickly. To make up for the earlier deficiencies in political intelligence, American military forces relied heavily upon the American embassy for information “as to the disposition of rebel forces, biographical sketches of rebel leaders, [and] personnel to contact in order to obtain information concerning rebel forces . . . .” It is to be wondered how objective much of this support was: a good deal of the fighting in Beirut and elsewhere before the landing had been the result of clashes between gunmen of the National Union Front and the *Parti Populaire Syrien*. Interestingly, local officers of the Central Intelligence Agency put their military counterparts in touch with PPS leaders, whose right-wing group was pro-government but still at that time quite illegal. Force Alpha’s intelligence officers made “immediate contact” with PPS headquarters in the town of Chimlane just south of Beirut, where PPS militiamen—it was said—“cooperated superbly with this headquarters.”<sup>134</sup>

That such contacts were thought necessary says much about how the character of Operation BLUEBAT had changed between planning and execution. Now the business at hand was every bit as political as military and the remaining distinctions blurred as time went by. In changing the tenor of their operations, the Americans were reacting realistically to the situation they had found: after all, it had been the militarization of Lebanese politics which had brought them to the Middle East in the first place. What this meant in practical terms was that the American military presence had to be largely a passive one, had to assume a stance of impartiality in the political struggle



before the election of the new president. The most that the Americans could hope for was that the Chamoun government would be succeeded in accordance with local political practices instead of the gun.

The tactical reflection of this change in American objectives in Lebanon was of course substantially different from what had been expected when all planning had been "predicated upon a combat situation."<sup>135</sup> As they later wrote their reports, staff officers understood that the military character of the intervention had come to depend upon the peculiarities of Lebanese politics. Every now and then, a note of disappointment creeps into these reports; what promised to be a military operation had all of a sudden become too political. Col. Lynn Smith, the J-3 for the American Land Forces Command, went so far as to speculate how the operation would have gone had political expediency not overruled the possibility of ordinary military action. Smith wrote:

The tactical element would not be confined to the restricted beachhead actually occupied due to political reasons. Instead, the tactical elements would have fanned out to cover the critical routes of approach into Beirut, and would have conducted patrol operations along the frontier of Lebanon.<sup>136</sup>

Smith's speculations did correspond nicely to the early Marine operations, however. Not yet knowing the political turn the operation would take, the presumption was that this would be a conventional military operation against conventional enemies. Within their limitations, the marines initially acted as they would have in any case, with the exception that frontier patrols were not established. Hadd's battalion moved to the Port of Beirut after having been relieved at the airport by another battalion. This battalion, the 3d of the 6th Marine Regiment, took up positions south and east of the airport on the high ground commanding the original Red Beach, where men and equipment were still landing. Another battalion, the 1st of the 8th, landing north-east of the city at Yellow Beach, assumed responsibility for the defense of what Smith later called "the critical approaches" to Beirut, the bridges which carried the Damascus road into the city proper. It was these battalions, not Hadd's, which were said to be in "forward positions," because they were assumed to be the first units to stand the chance of meeting a conventional enemy closing on the city. But no enemy came from that quarter, nor would one.

Instead, Hadd's battalion was really in the most demanding position of all. The 2d was in control of the port facilities, and when the Specified Command headquarters aboard the USS *Taconic* tied up at the Beirut docks, the responsibility for the security of the command group fell into the battalion's hands. Quite soon after the battalion had taken control of the docks, it was also ordered to provide a rifle squad to protect the British ambassador's residence nearby. During the night of 21 July, the American Community School took some small arms fire, and as it was in the area, the 2d was charged to protect it as well.<sup>137</sup> But then most of the points which the Americans were first interested in defending were in the extreme north and northwestern parts of

the city, and it could be fairly said that Hadd's battalion was the principal security force for this district. All these areas were quite close to the Basta, and more hostile fire came from there than any other quarter in the city during the critical first days of the operation. In an operation where there were no front lines or forward positions, Hadd's battalion was as close to potential military action as any other unit.

Still, these operational realities had not yet taken hold of the American command. On 23 July, more than a week after the first landings, the 1st of the 8th Marines began making patrols as far as twenty miles from the city. Each of these patrols was made up of a reinforced rifle platoon with a forward air controller, an artillery forward observer, and a communications officer attached. These heavy patrols were borne by three 2½-ton trucks and three jeeps, and were supported overhead by helicopters from the carrier *Wasp*.<sup>138</sup> Aside from the little psychological value they might have had in impressing the natives of the rural areas, these military processions were wholly unimportant to the business at hand. No resistance was ever encountered on these patrols.

What was always more important to the Lebanese, and what eventually became important to the American command, was the establishment of peace in the city of Beirut. For the Americans, the question that became uppermost was how to maintain peace without disturbing the Basta, which General Shehāb had declared off limits to Americans, and also how to cope with the enormous influx of men and materiel.<sup>139</sup> At first, because the chances for an accident's causing a renewed outbreak of fighting were very great, the tendency of the American command was to stay where it was, to consolidate its positions at the airport and the port area, and to exercise restraint in dealing with all Lebanese. A standing order was issued to the troops soon after the intervention began not to return fire unless they had a clear target. Lieutenant Colonel Hadd expressed the individual marine's dilemma very well. He wrote later:

When a youngster lands all prepared and eager to fight and finds himself restricted from firing at a known rebel who he sees periodically fire in his direction and in every instance restrains himself from returning the fire, it is felt that this is outstanding and indicates good small unit discipline.<sup>140</sup>

Early in the intervention, the Specified Command exercised as much tactical control as possible over the troops of the task force. The uncertainty of the situation demanded concentrated bivouacs with constant guards. Where positions allowed, there was a good deal of digging in; a few random shots in the direction of an American position was enough to encourage the troops to protect themselves. The 1st of the 8th Marines alone prepared 108 different emplacements before the end of the month. The tactical dispositions of the American troops had become a matter for compromise between General Shehāb and the principals of the Specified Command. Shehāb's army had created a buffer zone between the opposition forces and American positions, and any adjustment required prior consultation with the general. Reflecting the larger situation, specific tactical dispositions also took on a political

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complexion which tested the presence of mind of the small unit commanders. When Delta Company of the 187th began to establish a position athwart the Damascus road, Lebanese army officers argued that the Americans might be more comfortable closer to the beach. After some time, the Americans won the argument, but with words rather than combat. That the Americans, clearly negotiating from a position of superior military strength, would countenance these restrictions on their activities says much about how sensitive they had become in the time since their arrival. In essence, for them the situation in Lebanon had been a quick education in the politics of military action.<sup>141</sup>

Clearly, however, there was a limit to how much American force needed to be put ashore in Lebanon, and General Gray thought that the command had reached the saturation point by 22 July. Discussing the impending arrival of the 3d Medium Tank Battalion by sealift from Bremerhaven, Gray doubted that this battalion was needed at all. The marines had brought 15 medium tanks along, plus 31 LVTPs and 10 Ontos (self-propelled, multibarrelled, recoilless rifles). In Gray's opinion, 72 additional medium tanks were too much. But Holloway's staff disagreed, especially since motorized patrolling had begun in the city and the surrounding area, and asked that at least a company of tanks be sent by USAREUR. However, USAREUR insisted upon sending the entire battalion anyway, on the grounds that the battalion was already loaded and that the "tactical integrity of the unit would be destroyed." After calculating how best to crowd a new armored battalion into the already crowded olive groves near the airport, Gray relented. The armor was coming, whether he needed it, wanted it, or not.<sup>142</sup>

With the end of July and the arrival of most of the ground troops, there was a realignment of tactical responsibilities between the Marines and the Army. Admiral Holloway recommended, and General Adams accepted, a plan whereby the Marines would provide security for the city while the Army would focus its operations south of the Damascus road. Connecting the two forces was the "Main Supply Route," the road between the port area and the airport. So far, American patrols and outposts in the city and its environs were devoted more to "showing force" than to actually using it, for despite the occasional hostile fire there were no serious incidents involving Americans and the task force's commanders felt confident in turning their thoughts to settling down in Lebanon. There was no question whatever that by the end of July there was more than enough American military force on hand to meet any threat, however constituted.

No doubt on occasion it was difficult for the Americans to hold to their mode of operations. General Shehāb was elected president of Lebanon on 31 July as the only candidate whose election gave some hope of national reconciliation, and indeed efforts did get underway to settle grievances before his inauguration on 23 September. In early August a cease-fire was declared in Tripoli, the scene of some of the most desperate fighting early in the summer.

A few days later Lebanese security forces were directed to confiscate all weapons carried by civilians in central Beirut. Shehāb meanwhile met with opposition leaders in order to reach a political settlement, and with some success.<sup>143</sup> But such was the character of the strife in Lebanon that even after the politicians had shown some signs of making their peace, the violence went on without sanction and assumed aspects of brigandage, revenge, and sheer hooliganism. There had been sporadic incidents of harassing fire upon all security forces, including Americans, but it was not until 1 August that Sgt. James Nettles was killed by a sniper's bullet near the Basta. There was no military reaction to the killing, and the city remained calm for the next two weeks. But as the warring elements of Lebanese society became accustomed to the presence of the Americans, violent outbreaks occurred with more regularity, particularly near the Basta. On 21 August the French vice consul was wounded while driving into town along the main road from the airport, and an Army trooper was wounded in the back close by the Basta. On the next day, employees from the American embassy were pinned down by machine gun fire from the same part of the city, but no one was hurt. Still, there was no overt American reaction to these incidents.<sup>144</sup>

Thus civil violence continued, in search only of a new political reason. Four days before General Shehāb was to take up his new office, an assistant editor of the newspaper *al-'Amal* was kidnapped. *Al-'Amal* was a publication of the Phalange, a right-wing Maronite Christian militia organization with strong ties to the PPS and President Chamoun. The Phalange declared a general strike on 20 September to protest the kidnapping, and politically-inspired street fighting began anew. As the demonstrations grew, the Phalangists and their supporters took the opportunity to make known their dissatisfaction with the new Shehāb government. Particularly galling to the Phalangist leader, Pierre Jumayyil, was the new cabinet under the leadership of the former opposition chief in Tripoli, Rashīd Kāramī. Jumayyil pointed out that all but one member of the cabinet came from various opposition groups. "We cannot but oppose this government," Jumayyil announced. The demonstration continued for the rest of the month, as General Shehāb tried to form a different cabinet acceptable to all factions. In some ways, the period immediately following Shehāb's inauguration was the most dangerous since the arrival of the Americans. For the first eight days of October, the Phalangists demonstrated against the government.<sup>145</sup> Then, near the Basta, several American soldiers were captured and relieved of their weapons, but later were released. No source identifies who their captors were, but hearing of the incident General Adams apparently decided that a pointed "show of force" was called for and sent armored vehicles to the very edge of the Basta. There was no fighting. Some said that the tension in the city diminished after that.<sup>146</sup>

The origins of what came to be known as the "counterrevolution" of September and October are important to note: the new agitation began with the militant, right-wing, predominantly Christian supporters of the old government and was leveled against the new. The presence of the Americans was not an issue: had their conduct and operations followed a different line, it well

could have been. No doubt, the American intervention was objectionable on many counts to those who wished for a Lebanon more closely aligned with the powerful new forces abroad in the Middle East of 1958, and doubtless, too, the intervention violated sentiments within Lebanon for a strict neutrality amid all the passions of the region; but the Americans showed no inclination to stay very long in Lebanon and so gave hope to all that their influence would be fleeting. It did not take very long for the American intervention to end: the Marines had already begun their withdrawal during the last days of August, and elements of the Army Task Force began their preparations to leave not long thereafter. By 15 October, the remainder of the American troops had departed. They left behind them a government presided over by a military man, but one who was far more conciliatory toward his opposition than his predecessor. The government proper was so constituted as to contain many members whom the Americans would have earlier called "rebels." This was only a beginning for Lebanon, and no one could say then whether its promises would be fulfilled. From the perspective of more than twenty years, it is difficult to see how the American action affected the subsequent history of Lebanon. Beirut now lies in waste, and Lebanon is a country occupied by a congeries of armies, its society torn into many more directions than in 1958.


What happened during the summer of 1958 was not an early American experiment in "counterinsurgency," a strategy which only became current a few years later in American military thinking. It was the largest American troop deployment between the Korean and Vietnam wars, and it was designed and mounted to contest what was believed to be a rather traditional military threat to a country friendly to the United States. That the real nature of the crisis was not all that simple may be easy to see at this remove, but it was not so obvious at the time. The Americans adjusted very well to the peculiarities of their mission. Subtleties were unwelcome in the idiom of Cold War thinking, but Lebanon served as a powerful reproach to the dominance of "nuclear thinking" in American defense policies. At a time when the American Army was struggling to transform itself into a force capable of operating in a nuclear war, the operation in Lebanon was an anomaly. Lebanon's troubles were beyond the power of nuclear weapons to solve.

The intervention in Lebanon was one of 215 separate instances of American contingency force operations between 1945 and 1976, by one count;<sup>147</sup> but for all this experience—in which more than one service often participated—the American military establishment in 1958 was still not very well practiced in joint operations and the deployment of forces over long distances. Looking back at the preparations for contingencies in the Middle East after the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive in November 1957, one is impressed by the wave of "provisionalism" which dominated military planning as well as by a certain parochialism in the services. The vision of what was really three separate provisional military organizations—the Marines, the Army Task Force, and the Composite Air Strike Force—descending upon Beirut may have been unnerving to the hapless "rebel" in the Basta, but it would have been welcomed by a determined and professional enemy. Arrangements left unmade

until the crisis broke out were not merely important for the sake of organizational elegance. Virtually every official report opens with the caveat that had Operation BLUEBAT been opposed, disasters would have occurred, and argues that problems encountered during the operation's course could have been solved well before the order to execute was given. Some of the reports at higher echelons sounded hopeful notes: future reforms would prevent such problems, should an operation of this kind be launched again. Modern soldiers are in the best position to consider whether such predictions have come true.

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Appendix 1. Specified Command, Middle East



## Appendix 2. AMLANFOR Task Organization as of 19 August 1958

### Headquarters AMLANFOR

Headquarters and Headquarters Company  
 585th Signal Support Company (-)  
 320th ASA Detachment

### 24th Airborne Brigade

Brigade Headquarters  
 Combat Team, 187th Infantry (Reinforced)  
 1st Airborne Battle Group, 187th Infantry  
 Battery A, 1st Howitzer Battalion, 13th Artillery  
 Battery A, 23d AAA AW Battalion (Self-Propelled)  
 Ambulance Platoon  
 Clearing Platoon  
 Headquarters, Flight Section  
 3d Medium Tank Battalion, 35th Armor  
 Troop C, 17th Armored Cavalry  
 Company E, 3d Engineer Battalion  
 Detachment, 11th PS & M Company  
 Detachment, 24th Aviation Company  
 Detachment, 24th Quartermaster Company  
 Detachment, 24th Signal Battalion

### 2d Provisional Marine Force

Provisional Marine Force Headquarters  
 3d Battalion, 6th Marines (Reinforced)  
 1st Battalion, 8th Marines (-)  
 2d Battalion, 8th Marines (-)  
 Detachment HLR 262 (Helicopter)  
 2d Battalion, 2d Marines (Reinforced), Floating Reserve

### 201st Logistical Command

Headquarters and Headquarters Company  
 38th Transportation Truck Battalion (HHC)  
 533d Truck Company (Light)  
 583d Truck Company (Light)  
 299th Engineer Battalion (Construction) (Combat)  
 79th Engineer Battalion (Construction) (-)  
 22d Ordnance Direct Support Company  
 570th Terminal Service Company  
 Provisional Chemical Company  
 Provisional Quartermaster Company  
 285th Military Police Company (-)  
 58th Evacuation Hospital (-) (semi-mobile)  
 583d Ambulance Company (-)  
 4th Mobile Surgical Army Hospital

### Adana Sub-Command

201st Logistical Command Provisional Headquarters  
 78th Medium Truck Company (S/P)  
 Company B, 79th Engineer Battalion (Construction)



## Appendix 3. Army Task Force 201 Airlift Configuration

<b>Force Alpha (Fürstenfeldbruck airfield)</b>						
UNITS	PERSONNEL	STONS	C-119	C-124	C-130	
Bde Hq	167	60.8				8
187th Inf	1356	292.3	19	7		24
Resupply	3	142.3		9		
USAF (USAF Equip. & Maint. AC)				3		
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>1526</b>	<b>495.4</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>16</b>		<b>32</b>
<i>Alpha Supplemental (6 aircraft of Force Charlie taken to carry Alpha equipment):</i>						
	32	96.5		6		
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1558</b>	<b>591.9</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>22</b>		<b>32</b>
<b>Force Charlie (Fürstenfeldbruck airfield)</b>						
TF HQ	171	137.3		3		13
533d Truck Plt	37	107.4				15
Air Land element (187th)	27	34.7				4
Bravo Adv	11					
Det 724th Ord	73	67.4		1		5
Det 24th QM Co	36	21.9				3
Amb Plt	29	23.4				3
Sig Sup 545th	28	11.6				1
Trp "C" 9th Cav.	214	120.1		4		11
Btry "A" 13th FA Bn	121	127.3				11
Arty HQ "E" Co 3d Engr	75	133.6		2		12
ASA Det	85	103.5		5		4
187th Area Comm Cen	27	32.3				3
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>964</b>	<b>939.8</b>		<b>15</b>		<b>87</b>
NOTE: Aircraft listed carried an additional 173 short tons of supply. Two aircraft were used to transport elements of the 17th Signal Battalion on a special mission.						
<b>Force Charlie (Rhein Main airfield)</b>						
Supply Team	19	28.6		2		
POL Sup Det	54	130.5		9		
Unit Mess Tm	4	12.5		1		
Bath Plt	28	30.7		4		
MP Co (-)	99	69		5		
Mag Plt Ammo	47	54.8		4		
Evac Hosp	169	36.5		4		
Engr Co	179	306.7		22		4
ASA Det	17	41.2		3		
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>616</b>	<b>710.5</b>		<b>54</b>		<b>4</b>
<b>Force Charlie (Châteauroux airfield)</b>						
Aerial Sup Team	78	28		1		2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>28</b>		<b>1</b>		<b>2</b>
<b>Force Charlie (Evreux airfield)</b>						
Sup Cmdr HQ & Prov Port Sup Det	18	40		2		1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>40</b>		<b>2</b>		<b>1</b>
<b>Alpha and Charlie total</b>	<b>3234</b>	<b>2310.2</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>94</b>		<b>126</b>

## NOTES



<sup>1</sup>On his last day as the Army's Chief of Staff, General Bernard Rogers announced the formation of a 110,000-man joint force "for contingencies in the Middle East and developing countries." See the *New York Times*, 22 June 1979, p. 3. See also, John M. Collins and Clyde R. Mark, "Petroleum Imports from the Persian Gulf: Use of U.S. Armed Forces to insure supplies," *Congressional Research Service Issue Brief Number IB 79046* (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1979), passim. An excellent analysis of U.S. intervention operations since World War II may be found in Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978).

<sup>2</sup>Useful works, including reminiscences by participants, on various aspects of military operations in Lebanon are: H. A. Hadd, "Who's a Rebel? The Lesson Lebanon Taught," *Marine Corps Gazette* 46, no. 3 (March 1962): 50—53; and by the same author, "Orders Firm but Flexible," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* 88, no. 10 (October 1962): 81—89; J. L. Holloway, "Comment on 'The American Landing in Lebanon' and 'Orders Firm but Flexible,'" *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* 89, no. 9 (September 1963): 96—97; Robert McClintock, "The American Landing in Lebanon," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* 88, no. 10 (October 1962): 65—79; Guy S. Meloy III, "A Look Back at Lebanon," *Infantry* 50, no. 1 (January 1960): 20—25; Jack Schulimson, "Marines in Lebanon," *Marine Corps Historical Reference Pamphlet* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 1966); Albert P. Sights, Jr., "Lessons of Lebanon: A Study in Air Strategy," *Air University Review* 16, no. 5 (July—August 1965): 28—43; and S. S. Wade, "Operation Bluebat," *Marine Corps Gazette* 43, no. 7 (July 1959): 10—23.

<sup>3</sup>For the impact of the Suez intervention upon American foreign policy, see Chester L. Cooper's memoir, *The Lion's Last Roar: Suez, 1956* (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), pp. 263, 92—99, on the withdrawal of American aid to Egypt. See also Patrick Seale, *The Struggle for Syria* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 283—89; Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945—66* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1968), pp. 173—200, 205—6; as well as Richard J. Barnet, *Intervention and Revolution: America's Confrontation with Insurgent Movements Around the World* (New York: World Publishing Company, 1968), pp. 132—52. Albert Hourani, *A Vision of History: Near Eastern and Other Essays* (Beirut: KHAYATS, 1961), pp. 117—44, is also an excellent corrective to contemporary Western views of the event.

<sup>4</sup>This unnamed American official is quoted in "Britain and the Arabs," *Economist*, 8 February 1958, p. 493. See also Hourani, *Vision of History*, p. 122.

<sup>5</sup>See LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War*, pp. 194—200, for an accounting of American thinking during this period.

<sup>6</sup>The text of the "Joint Resolution of Congress, 9 March 1957," approving the Eisenhower Doctrine, is in M. S. Agwani, ed., *The Lebanese Crisis, 1958: A Documentary Study* (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1965), pp. 15—16. See also LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War*, pp. 157, 188.

<sup>7</sup>"Communique on the talks between Mr. Richards and the Government of Lebanon, Beirut, 16 March 1957," in Agwani, *The Lebanese Crisis*, pp. 16—18.

<sup>8</sup>Fahim I. Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1961), pp. 22—25. Indeed, so great are the similarities between the "Rose Water Revolution" of 1952 and the events leading up to the American intervention six years later that one wonders at first why the

West took the trouble to notice this latest evolution in the politics of Lebanon. The answer lies in the fact that the Middle East had not yet become a pawn in the Cold War.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., pp. 17—21. See also Don Peretz, *The Middle East Today*, 2d ed. (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press, 1971), pp. 328—35.

<sup>10</sup>"The United National Front's Memorandum to the President of Lebanon, 1 April 1957," in Agwani, *The Lebanese Crisis*, pp. 33—34.

<sup>11</sup>Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon*, pp. 52—58.

<sup>12</sup>Peretz, *The Middle East Today*, p. 329.

<sup>13</sup>Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon*, pp. 55, 58.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., pp. 81—82.

<sup>15</sup>S. H. Steinberg, ed., *The Statesman's Year-Book: Statistical and Historical Annual of the States of the World for the Year 1959* (London: Macmillan & Co, 1959), p. 1200.

<sup>16</sup>Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon*, p. 83.

<sup>17</sup>Michael Adams, "A Little Trip?" *The Spectator* (London), 6 June 1958, p. 721, quoted in M. H. S. Mustafa, "The United States and Lebanon Before and During the Crisis of 1958" (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1976), p. 126.

<sup>18</sup>See Robert Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors* (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1964), pp. 400—401.

<sup>19</sup>"The United National Front's policy statement, 8 July 1957," in Agwani, *The Lebanese Crisis*, pp. 35—36.

<sup>20</sup>At the very least, both Egypt and Syria had been lending moral support to the Muslim opposition in Lebanon throughout 1957. The Chamoun government had banned the sale of newspapers from either country at various times during the year. The loss of support in this form was more than compensated for by Radio Cairo, however; its broadcasts were consistently anti-Chamoun and, after the fashion of political rhetoric in the Middle East, strident and polemical. Such broadcasts hardly conduced to still the controversies inside Lebanon, and, perhaps even more important, did much to convince outside observers that the allegations of foreign subversion inside Lebanon were true. See, for instance, the reaction of the Western press as represented in *Time*, 26 May 1958, p. 3. See also Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon*, pp. 58—60.

<sup>21</sup>"Manifesto issued by a group of 'non-aligned' politicians, 2 October 1957," in Agwani, *The Lebanese Crisis*, p. 37.

<sup>22</sup>"STRAC Briefing: Tactical and Strategic Mobility in the US Army," (Lecture before a panel on the Strategic Army Corps, March 1959), typescript, U.S. Army War College, p. 9.

<sup>23</sup>An explanation of the first SWAGGERSTICK plan may be found in H. B. Yoshpe and J. Bykofsky, comps., "Lebanon: A Test of Army Contingency Planning," bound typescript, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Transportation, 25 November 1958), pp. 13—15.

<sup>24</sup>LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War*, pp. 176, 189—200.

<sup>25</sup>Yoshpe and Bykofsky, "Lebanon: A Test of Army Contingency Planning," p. 13.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., pp. 14—15. While it is true that both General Taylor and the Chief of Naval Operations, Arleigh Burke, were dissatisfied with the "New Look" as the Eisenhower administration's defense policy was called, it is also true that President Eisenhower demanded public consensus from the service chiefs on matters concerning the strategic doctrines of the United States. Eisenhower personally interviewed General Taylor before his appointment as Army Chief of Staff to insure that this public consensus among the chiefs would obtain. By far the most ardent supporter of the "New Look" on the JCS was the chairman, Admiral Arthur Radford. Radford retired in the summer of 1957 and was replaced by Air Force General Nathan Twining. Useful works discussing the debate over American strategic doctrine occurring for the most part beyond public view at the time are: Russell Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1973), pp. 418—21; Douglas Kinnard, *President Eisenhower and Strategy Management: A Study in Defense Politics* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1977), pp. 37—65; Lawrence J. Korb, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First Twenty-Five Years* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), pp. 106—10; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), pp. 91—95; and Edward A. Kolodziej, *The Uncommon Defense and Congress* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966), pp. 225—31. See General Taylor's views expressed at length in his *The Uncertain Trumpet* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), passim.

<sup>27</sup>See n.6, *supra*.

<sup>28</sup>Matthew Ridgway, *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway*, as told to Harold H. Martin (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), pp. 327–28.

<sup>29</sup>Weigley, *American Way of War*, p. 421.

<sup>30</sup>Yoshpe and Bykofsky, "Lebanon: A Test of Army Contingency Planning," pp. 4–9. General Wheeler is quoted on p. 8.

<sup>31</sup>Peretz, *The Middle East Today*, pp. 312–13. Hussein's government, led by Prime Minister Sulaiman Nabulsi, had rejected the Eisenhower Doctrine out of hand when it had been first approached. Earlier Nabulsi's National Socialist Party had been responsible for the cancellation of the long-standing Anglo-Jordanian Treaty and its attendant British subsidy and was known to favor rapprochement with Egypt and Syria.

<sup>32</sup>Huntington, *The Common Defense*, pp. 93–94.

<sup>33</sup>Headquarters, 24th Infantry Division, "After Action Report on Operation Grandios, 15–31 July," Command Report, 13 August 1958, bound typescript, p. 1 (hereafter cited as 24th Inf. Div., AAR).

<sup>34</sup>Schulimson, "Marines in Lebanon," p. 7.

<sup>35</sup>Command Report, 13 August 1958, p. 1, 24th Inf. Div., AAR.

<sup>36</sup>Headquarters, U.S. European Command, "Final Report on Critique on USCINCEUR Participation in CINCSPECOMME OPLAN 215–58," Agenda Item 2, Requirement for senior Ground Force Commander and Joint Staff over USA and USMC troops when used jointly, bound typescript, p. 3 (hereafter cited as "CINCEUR Critique"). See also W. B. R. Neave-Hill, "British Assistance to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 1958," bound typescript (London: The Historical Section, Ministry of Defense Library, January 1969).

<sup>37</sup>Command Report, 13 August 1958, p. 1, 24th Inf. Div., AAR.

<sup>38</sup>Sights, "Lessons of Lebanon," pp. 29–32.

<sup>39</sup>Schulimson, "Marines in Lebanon," pp. 7–9.

<sup>40</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>41</sup>Command Report, 13 August 1958, p. 1, 24th Inf. Div., AAR. See also "CINCEUR Critique," p. 3. See also Headquarters, Department of the Army, "Lessons Learned from Lebanon," memorandum from the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations to Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, n.d., typescript, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (hereafter cited as "DCSOPS Lessons Learned").

<sup>42</sup>LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War*, p. 179.

<sup>43</sup>The foregoing account is based upon Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon*, pp. 60–66, and official documents reproduced therein, viz.: app. I, "The Lebanese Presentation at the Security Council [of the United Nations], Speech of Dr. Malik (Lebanon) on June 6, 1958," pp. 181–96; and Desmond Stewart, *Turmoil in Beirut: A Personal Account* (London: Allan Wingate, 1958), pp. 1–23. Both authors were in Lebanon at the time of the crisis, Stewart as the Inspector of English for the Maqasid Society. Stewart appears to have been one of the few Westerners allowed safe transit of *al-Basta* during the troubles. See also Robert McClintock, "The American Landing in Lebanon," p. 66, for his remarks on "audio-visual aggression," and pp. 65–79, for an abbreviated account of the crisis.

<sup>44</sup>*Ibid.* Qubain's assessment of the circumstances surrounding the act of "symbolic significance" is in his *Crisis in Lebanon*, p. 68. Concerning the regional situation, see Albert Hourani's *Vision of History*, pp. 117–20, 124, for a respected view.

<sup>45</sup>Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon*, pp. 72–73.

<sup>46</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 73; and McClintock, "American Landing in Lebanon," pp. 66–67.

<sup>47</sup>Stewart, *Turmoil in Beirut*, p. 29.

<sup>48</sup>Schulimson, "Marines in Lebanon," pp. 7–8.

<sup>49</sup>Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon*, p. 113; *Time*, 26 May 1958, p. 33. Seventeen M41 tanks were sent from the United States in May and when the Army's 3d Medium Tank Battalion arrived in August, the M41s had not been broken out of their shipping crates. William B. Wallace, "Activities of the 3d Medium Tank Battalion, 35th Armor, while in Lebanon August–October 1958," typescript (Fort Knox, Ky.: U.S. Army Armor School, n.d.), p. 8.

<sup>50</sup>Command Report, 13 August 1958, p. 2, 24th Inf. Div., AAR.

<sup>51</sup>Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon*, p. 113.

<sup>52</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 89–91.

<sup>53</sup>"Resolution of the United Nations Security Council, 11 June 1958," in Agwani, *The Lebanese Crisis*, p. 198; and "First Report by the Secretary-General on the implementation of the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 11 June 1958, 16 June 1958," *ibid.*, pp. 198—99.

<sup>54</sup>Twining is quoted in Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon*, p. 114.

<sup>55</sup>"Extracts from first report of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon, 1 July 1958," in Agwani, *The Lebanese Crisis*, p. 214.

<sup>56</sup>Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon*, p. 115. *Time* magazine in its 14 July 1958 issue reported, "Lebanon's odd little sporadic war did not end last week, but some of the international tension over it abated." Ironically, on this very day the coup in Iraq that triggered American intervention occurred.

<sup>57</sup>*Time*, 28 July 1958, pp. 22—25.

<sup>58</sup>McClintock, "American Landing in Lebanon," p. 69.

<sup>59</sup>The foregoing summary of events is based upon Schulimson, "Marines in Lebanon," pp. 9—10; *New York Times*, 16 July 1958, pp. 1—3; *Time*, 28 July 1958, pp. 10—13; Dulles and Twining are quoted in LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War*, p. 205; and for Eisenhower's reaction to Rayburn's comment, see "Lebanon Landing," *Economist*, 19 July 1958, p. 206. All times given are local, unless otherwise noted.

<sup>60</sup>Schulimson, "Marines in Lebanon," p. 9.

<sup>61</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 8—12; Hadd, "Orders Firm But Flexible," pp. 82—86.

<sup>62</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>63</sup>*Ibid.*; McClintock, "The American Landing in Lebanon," p. 70.

<sup>64</sup>Hadd, "Orders Firm But Flexible," p. 84.

<sup>65</sup>McClintock, "The American Landing in Lebanon," p. 70.

<sup>66</sup>There is a discrepancy in the time given for the arrival of the air attache at the airport. Schulimson, "Marines in Lebanon," p. 14, says this occurred at 1640. Hadd, "Orders Firm But Flexible," p. 84, says 1700.

<sup>67</sup>See Hadd, "Orders Firm But Flexible," p. 82. For a sampling of opposition reaction, see "Address by Mr. Sā'ib Salām, the opposition leader, to the Lebanese people on the eve of the landing of US troops in Lebanon, 15 July 1958," and "Statement by Mr. Sā'ib Salām, the opposition leader condemning the US intervention in Lebanon, 16 July 1958," in Agwani, *The Lebanese Crisis*, pp. 293—94, 295. In the last noted speech, Salām styled himself the "Commander in chief of the people's forces."

A less strident condemnation of the American intervention was delivered by the Speaker of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies, Adil Usayran, in a letter to the United Nations Secretary General the day after the landings. Usayran called for the immediate withdrawal of American troops from Lebanese soil, which he called an "attack on the sovereignty and independence of Lebanon" and a "threat to the peace and security of the Middle East." Clearly, not only the opposition was disturbed by Chamoun's invocation of the Eisenhower Doctrine. See *ibid.*, p. 284.

<sup>68</sup>Quoted in *New York Times*, 16 July 1958, p. 1.

<sup>69</sup>This summary of events is drawn from Wade, "Operation Bluebat," pp. 13—14; Hadd, "Orders Firm But Flexible," pp. 85—86; McClintock, "The American Landing in Lebanon," p. 71; and Schulimson, "Marines in Lebanon," pp. 18—19. All items noted here, with the exception of the last, are accounts of participants and agree in their particulars.

<sup>70</sup>Schulimson, "Marines in Lebanon," p. 25.

<sup>71</sup>McClintock, "The American Landing in Lebanon," pp. 71—72.

<sup>72</sup>Schulimson, "Marines in Lebanon," p. 22.

<sup>73</sup>*Economist*, 19 July 1958, p. 218.

<sup>74</sup>"DCSOPS, Lessons Learned," p. 3.

<sup>75</sup>Command Report, 13 August 1958, pp. 2—3, 24th Inf. Div., AAR.

<sup>76</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 3; see also Annex A (Alerts) to Operation Plan GRANDIOS, 1 July 1958, 24th Inf. Div., AAR.

<sup>77</sup>Chronology, p. 12, 24th Inf. Div., AAR.

<sup>78</sup>Interview with Col. Gerald Carlson, August 1979, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (hereafter cited as Carlson interview).

<sup>79</sup>Chronology, p. 13, 24th Inf. Div., AAR.

<sup>80</sup>*Ibid.*; see also Headquarters, U.S. Specified Command, Middle East, American Land Force, "After Action Report, 15 July—25 October 1958," J-1 [Administration] Analysis, pt. II, sec. II, sub-sec.

B, bound typescript, pp. 1–7 (hereafter cited as AMLANFOR AAR).

<sup>81</sup>Chronology, p. 2, and Annex A (Alerts) to Operation Plan GRANDIOS, 24th Inf. Div., AAR.

<sup>82</sup>Ibid., and Command Report, 13 August 1958, p. 3. See also Support Force Speidel AAR, 9 August 1958, pp. 1–4, 24th Inf. Div., AAR; and “DCSOPS Lessons Learned,” p. 9.

<sup>83</sup>Command Report, 13 August 1958, p. 3, 24th Inf. Div., AAR.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid.

<sup>85</sup>Agenda Item 6, Command Channel for Alert and Implementing Instructions, “CINCEUR Critique,” p. 9.

<sup>86</sup>“DCSOPS Lessons Learned,” p. 9.

<sup>87</sup>See Agenda Item 45, Security, “CINCEUR Critique,” p. 71; Chronology, 13 August 1958, pp. 12–13, 24th Inf. Div., AAR; Problem Areas, Operation GRANDIOS, *ibid.*, p. 5; J-2 [Intelligence] analysis, pt. II, sec. II, p. 6, AMLANFOR AAR; and J-3 [Operations] analysis, *ibid.*, p. 2.

<sup>88</sup>Agenda Item 5, Requirement for Mutual Exchange of Information Regarding Activities of Participating Forces, “CINCEUR Critique,” p. 8. See also Command Report, 13 August 1958, p. 2, 24th Inf. Div., AAR, in which it is revealed that an agreement between Army and Air Force planners on this very subject had been reached—again—at Ramstein AFB, Germany, only the week before the emergency.

<sup>89</sup>Command Report, 13 August 1958, p. 3, 24th Inf. Div., AAR.

<sup>90</sup>After Action Report, Operation GRANDIOS, 9 August 1958, p. 4, 24th Inf. Div., AAR. Ultimately, low estimates of TF 201 Alpha Forces tonnage required an additional six C-124s for the airlift. These were taken from Force Charlie’s airlift allocation.

<sup>91</sup>Command Report, 13 August 1958, p. 3, 24th Inf. Div., AAR.

<sup>92</sup>Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe, “Lessons Learned from the Lebanon Operation,” Memorandum from the Office of the Chief of Staff to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Department of the Army, n. d. [early 1959?], Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (hereafter cited as “USAREUR Lessons Learned”), p. 2.

<sup>93</sup>Command Report, 13 August 1958, p. 3, 24th Inf. Div., AAR.

<sup>94</sup>Agenda Item 8, Liaison Requirements, “CINCEUR Critique,” p. 12.

<sup>95</sup>Command Report, 13 August 1958, p. 4, 24th Inf. Div., AAR.

<sup>96</sup>Carlson interview.

<sup>97</sup>After Action Report, Operation GRANDIOS, 9 August 1958, p. 5, 24th Inf. Div., AAR.

<sup>98</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>99</sup>Agenda Item 27, Foreign Overflight Rights and Clearances, “CINCEUR Critique,” p. 42.

<sup>100</sup>After Action Report, Operation GRANDIOS, 9 August 1958, p. 5, 24th Inf. Div., AAR.

<sup>101</sup>Ibid., pp. 3–4.

<sup>102</sup>After Action Report, Operation GRANDIOS, 9 August 1958, pp. 2–4, 24th Inf. Div., AAR.

<sup>103</sup>Chronology, pt. I, p. 5, AMLANFOR AAR.

<sup>104</sup>Command Report, 13 August 1958, p. 4, 24th Inf. Div., AAR.

<sup>105</sup>Agenda Item 1, Saturation of Staging Base, “CINCEUR Critique,” p. 1.

<sup>106</sup>Albert P. Sights, Jr., “Lessons of Lebanon: A Study in Air Strategy,” *Air University Review* 16, no. 5 (July–August 1965): 30 (hereafter cited as Sights, “Lebanon Air Strategy”).

<sup>107</sup>Ibid., pp. 38, 31.

<sup>108</sup>Ibid., pp. 39, 41.

<sup>109</sup>Command Report, 13 August 1958, p. 4, 24th Inf. Div., AAR.

<sup>110</sup>Sights, “Lebanon Air Strategy,” pp. 41–42.

<sup>111</sup>Command Report, 13 August 1958, p. 4, 24th Inf. Div., AAR.

<sup>112</sup>Quoted in Schulimson, “Marines in Lebanon,” p. 26.

<sup>113</sup>Command Report, 13 August 1958, p. 4, 24th Inf. Div., AAR.

<sup>114</sup>J-2 [Intelligence] Analysis, pt. II, sec. II, pp. 2–4, AMLANFOR AAR.

<sup>115</sup>Command Report, 13 August 1958, p. 5, 24th Inf. Div., AAR.

<sup>116</sup>Ibid. See also, Schulimson, “Marines in Lebanon,” pp. 25–26.

<sup>117</sup>Command Report, 13 August 1958, p. 8, 24th Inf. Div., AAR.

<sup>118</sup>Ibid., pp. 5–6; Carlson interview.

<sup>119</sup>Schulimson, “Marines in Lebanon,” p. 26.

<sup>120</sup>Chronology, pt. 1, p. 9, AMLANFOR AAR. See also Command Report, 13 August 1958, p. 7, 24th Inf. Div., AAR; and “Staff Representation on Joint Staffs” in “USAREUR Lessons Learned,” n. p.

<sup>121</sup>Agenda Item 10, Relationship of USAREUR and Deployed Forces under CINCSPECOMME Control, "CINCEUR Critique," p. 14.

<sup>122</sup>"Adequacy of Command Arrangements," in "USAREUR Lessons Learned," n. p.

<sup>123</sup>Agenda Item 7, Deployment of USAREUR Atomic Delivery Units, "CINCEUR Critique," p. 11.

<sup>124</sup>"DCSOPS Lessons Learned," p. 11.

<sup>125</sup>Chronology, pt. I, p. 9, AMLANFOR AAR.

<sup>126</sup>"Adequacy of Command Arrangements," in "USAREUR Lessons Learned," n. p.; see also, Agenda Item 10, Relationship of USAREUR and Deployed Forces under CINCSPECOMME Control, "CINCEUR Critique," p. 14. General Adams' original table of distribution for AMLANFOR was based upon a headquarters of corps size. The new headquarters took 28 officers and 66 enlisted men from the Army Task Force staff, but because even this fell far short of what General Adams felt he needed, he made a further request of USAREUR for 88 officers and 203 enlisted men. USAREUR gave Adams only 32 officers and 42 enlisted men on TDY. See J-1 Analysis, Unified Command Phase, pt. II, sec. I, sub-sec. B, p. 1, AMLANFOR AAR.

<sup>127</sup>"DCSOPS Lesson Learned," p. 8. Sights, "Lebanon Air Strategy," p. 41.

<sup>128</sup>Chronology, pt. I, p. 11, AMLANFOR AAR.

<sup>129</sup>Commanding General's Speech, Inclosure I, p. 1, Command Report, 13 August 1958, 24th Inf. Div., AAR.

<sup>130</sup>Ibid, p. 8.

<sup>131</sup>Agenda Item 42, Maps, "CINCEUR Critique," p. 66.

<sup>132</sup>J-2 Analysis, pt. II, sec. II, p. 2, AMLANFOR AAR.

<sup>133</sup>Agenda Item 41, Voids in Intelligence, "CINCEUR Critique," p. 63.

<sup>134</sup>Command Report, 13 August 1958, p. 2, 24th Inf. Div., AAR.

<sup>135</sup>Chronology, pt. I, p. 1, AMLANFOR AAR.

<sup>136</sup>J-3 [Operations] Analysis, sec. III, p. 3, *ibid.*

<sup>137</sup>Schulimson, "Marines in Lebanon," pp. 27-29; Chronology, pt. I, p. 5, AMLANFOR AAR.

<sup>138</sup>Schulimson, "Marines in Lebanon," pp. 27-28.

<sup>139</sup>Chronology, pt. I, p. 6, AMLANFOR AAR.

<sup>140</sup>Quoted in Schulimson, "Marines in Lebanon," p. 32.

<sup>141</sup>Ibid., pp. 31, 27; Command Report, 13 August 1958, p. 6, 24th Inf. Div., AAR.

<sup>142</sup>Ibid.

<sup>143</sup>Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon*, pp. 156-58.

<sup>144</sup>Chronology, pt. I, pp. 12-14, AMLANFOR AAR.

<sup>145</sup>Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon*, pp. 156-58.

<sup>146</sup>Chronology, pt. I, pp. 25-31, AMLANFOR AAR.

<sup>147</sup>Blechman and Kaplan, *Force without War*, p. 16.

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3. Act as the proponent agency for development and coordination of an integrated, progressive program of military history instruction in the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command service school system.





### *SYNOPSIS OF LEAVENWORTH PAPER 3*

At the height of the Cold War, the United States intervened in Lebanon, a country whose sovereignty U.S. leaders believed was threatened by communist forces. This perception led President Eisenhower to order unilateral military intervention to forestall Lebanon's falling under the influence of forces alienated from U.S. and Western interests in the eastern Mediterranean. The strategic paradigm of the times directly influenced the planning and execution of this intervention, even to the point of the tactical dispositions of American troops. At a cost of more than \$200 million, nearly 15,000 American troops from the U.S. and European commands were sent to Lebanon, where they remained as an urban security force for 102 days. During this period, one casualty was lost to hostile fire. In many respects, the American intervention in Lebanon was a model of what a unilateral, joint military intervention should be. American commands around the world were affected by this operation and several contributed to it. Planning (even though based upon several misconceptions) generally was timely and thoughtful. Execution, the responsibility of several commands and echelons, was on the whole solidly professional. Once inside Lebanon, commanders and troops displayed a remarkable flexibility of mind and purpose, once they discovered that the local situation was considerably different from what they had been led to expect. For these reasons, the American intervention in Lebanon stands as a useful object of study today, when the interests of the United States in some respects parallel those of twenty-two years ago.

