

Art of War Papers

Operations at the Border Efforts to Disrupt Insurgent Safe-Havens



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The cover photo courtesy of the Library of Congress is that of General Dwight Eisenhower giving orders to American paratroopers in England.

**Operations at the Border
Efforts to Disrupt Insurgent Safe-Havens**

**A thesis presented to the Faculty of the US Army
Command and General Staff College**

by

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Abstract
Operations at the Border
Efforts to Disrupt Insurgent Safe-Havens

by

Major Eric Hunter Haas

Disrupting an insurgent's access to sanctuary and safe-haven is a critical aspect of operational planning for counterinsurgent forces. By denying an insurgent's access to safe-havens early in the conflict, the counterinsurgent will gain a marked advantage over the initially weaker force. Only through a deep understanding of how the insurgent is using international, tribal, or cultural borders to evade the counterinsurgent force can the counterinsurgent disrupt the insurgent operations. In order to accomplish this, the counterinsurgent must understand the physical terrain and cultural demographics, nest border operations into the overarching strategy, and employ security forces to reinforce success. Through the examination of the British experience in the North-West Frontier, 1849-1947 and the counterinsurgent efforts in the Sultanate of Oman's Dhofar Rebellion, 1962-1975, one can develop techniques for applying border control operations to disrupt insurgent safe-havens. Border control efforts are not the decisive effort within a counterinsurgency, but they are critical to defeating the insurgent's ability to maintain their ability to conduct operations.

Objectives of the Art of War Scholars Program

The Art of War Scholars Program is a laboratory for critical thinking. It offers a select group of students a range of accelerated, academically rigorous graduate level courses that promote analysis, stimulate the desire for life-long learning, and reinforce academic research skills. Art of War graduates will not be satisfied with facile arguments; they understand the complexities inherent in almost any endeavor and develop the tools and fortitude to confront such complexities, analyze challenges, and independently seek nuanced solutions in the face of those who would opt for cruder alternatives. Through the pursuit of these outcomes, the Art of War Scholars Program seeks to improve and deepen professional military education.

The Art of War Program places contemporary operations (such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan) in a historical framework by examining earlier military campaigns. Case studies and readings have been selected to show the consistent level of complexity posed by military campaigns throughout the modern era. Coursework emphasizes the importance of understanding previous engagements in order to formulate policy and doctrinal response to current and future campaigns.

One unintended consequence of military history education is the phenomenon of commanders and policy makers “cherry picking” history—that is, pointing to isolated examples from past campaigns to bolster a particular position in a debate, without a comprehensive understanding of the context in which such incidents occurred. This trend of oversimplification leaves many historians wary of introducing these topics into broader, more general discussion. The Art of War program seeks to avoid this pitfall by a thorough examination of context. As one former student stated: “The insights gained have left me with more questions than answers but have increased my ability to understand greater complexities of war rather than the rhetorical narrative that accompanies cursory study of any topic.”

Professor Michael Howard, writing “The Use and Abuse of Military History” in 1961, proposed a framework for educating military officers in the art of war that remains unmatched in its clarity, simplicity, and totality. The Art of War program endeavors to model his plan:

Three general rules of study must therefore be borne in mind by the officer who studies military history as a guide to his profession and who wishes to avoid pitfalls. First, he must study in **width**. He must observe the way in which warfare has developed over a long historical period. Only by seeing what does change can one deduce what does not; and as much as can be learnt from the great discontinuities of military history as from

the apparent similarities of the techniques employed by the great captains through the ages....Next he must study in **depth**. He should take a single campaign and explore it thoroughly, not simply from official histories, but from memoirs, letters, diaries. . . until the tidy outlines dissolve and he catches a glimpse of the confusion and horror of real experience... and, lastly, he must study in **context**. Campaigns and battles are not like games of chess or football matches, conducted in total detachment from their environment according to strictly defined rules. Wars are not tactical exercises writ large. They are...conflicts of societies, and they can be fully understood only if one understands the nature of the society fighting them. The roots of victory and defeat often have to be sought far from the battlefield, in political, social, and economic factors which explain why armies are constituted as they are, and why their leaders conduct them in the way they do....

It must not be forgotten that the true use of history, military or civil... is not to make men clever for the next time; it is to make them wise forever.

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Deputy Commanding General
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Acronyms

BATT	British Advisory Training Team
CAT	Civil Aid Team
CSAF	Commander, Sultan's Armed Forces
DFL	Dhofar Liberation Front
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FCR	Frontier Criminal Regulations
FLN	<i>Front de Libération Nationale</i>
IRA	Irish Republican Army
PDRY	People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
PF	Punjab Frontier Force
PFLOAG	Popular Front for the Liberation of the Arabian Gulf
PIF	Punjab Irregular Force
PIRA	Provincial Irish Republican Army
RIC	Royal Irish Constabulary
SAF	Sultan's Armed Forces
SAS	Special Air Services
SEP	Surrendered Enemy Personnel
SOAF	Sultan of Oman's Air Force
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union

Chapter 1

Introduction

The role of geography, a large one in an ordinary war, may be overriding in a revolutionary war. If the insurgent, with his initial weakness, cannot get any help from geography, he may well be condemned to failure before he starts.

— David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*

Ever since the United States military entered a state of protracted conflict following the attacks by Al Qaeda in 2001, the study of counterinsurgency and limited war theory has come to the forefront of military thought. US military personnel reexamined theories of how to conduct counterinsurgency operations written in the 1950s and 1960s by British and French practitioners operating in Malaya, Algeria, and Vietnam. One of the ideas addressed in these writings was the denial of external support to an insurgent group. David Galula's seminal work *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, published in 1964, noted the importance of isolating an insurgency from its outside support to weaken an insurgent's material, political, and financial support.¹

The US Army Field Manual 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, published in 2006, further reinforces this idea by stating, "access to external resources and sanctuaries has always influenced the effectiveness of insurgencies."²

At the start of an insurgency, the counterinsurgent force, whether the host-nation or an interventionist power, has a distinct advantage over the insurgents.³ The counterinsurgent has the resources, bureaucracy, and institutions of a nation-state, while an insurgency is struggling to amass assets, control a population base, and build a capability to match the counterinsurgent. This initial weakness on the insurgent's part makes the insurgent dependent on outside support during the conflict for funding, equipment, and moral support. If the counterinsurgent force can focus its efforts to isolate the insurgent force from accessing their external support, the counterinsurgent force may be able to contain an insurgency during its early stages.⁴

External support is a broad term that includes any form of support provided to an insurgent force from outside the political boundaries of the insurgency.⁵ Examples of support include monetary funding for the insurgency, weapons, and equipment. A specific subset of external support is external sanctuary.

External sanctuary is a term normally used by the counterinsurgent force to describe an area outside of their political boundaries or ability to control. For this study, the author will use the term external sanctuary to describe the physical terrain outside the political national boundary of the host nation, recognized through international treaty or negotiation, which the insurgent force uses to conduct recruitment, financing, equipping, and training for the conduct of insurgent activities. The external sanctuary does not require the neighboring country to support or approve of the areas used by insurgents. This sanctuary is more than a source of moral or financial support, which an outside organization could provide through a global communication network, like the internet or global banking networks.⁶

The idea of external sanctuary is usually a limitation imposed by the counterinsurgent force on its own operations. Generally, when a counterinsurgent force is attempting to disrupt an insurgent force access to this safe haven it results from the counterinsurgent lacking the will for an expansion of the conflict into the territory of another sovereign government. This lack of will to expand the conflict may stem from a number of reasons, which include a desire by the counterinsurgent force to limit the cost of the conflict, a lack of political will for risking a larger conflict with another sovereign nation, or a desire to avoid potential international condemnation for this expansion.⁷

Also for this thesis, the term denial requires clarification. Denial is to hinder or prevent an enemy's use of specific terrain, locations, or facilities. Most practitioners and border control theorists acknowledge the near impossibility to prevent all movement across a border without prohibitive cost or effort. The use of "hinder" ensures a broad enough definition to provide solutions that another counterinsurgent force may consider for a similar situation. If a counterinsurgent force can hinder the movement of insurgents to or from their external sanctuary, this hindrance may either force insurgents to change locations or abandon the safe haven. By forcing an insurgent organization to change how and where it conducts operations, the counterinsurgent force may make the insurgents more vulnerable to targeting and defeat.⁸

A number of factors can determine the effectiveness of an external sanctuary for an insurgent force. A major factor is the physical terrain that comprises the avenues of approach to and from the external sanctuary. In 1962, the RAND Corporation hosted a Counterinsurgency Symposium in Washington DC, in which the organization brought in twelve experienced practitioners from previous counterinsurgency campaigns to analyze lessons to develop a way for addressing the expanding US involvement

in South Vietnam. During the five days of discussion, the practitioners discussed at length the effect of terrain on border control. The consensus that emerged was the more difficult the terrain, the more difficult it was for counterinsurgent forces to deny access for movement across the border.⁹

Another factor that affects an external sanctuary is the cultural demographics of the insurgent force and the population present in the external sanctuary. Most of the international boundaries across the world cross some type of cultural boundary, and an insurgent group may find sympathy and support from a similar group across that boundary.¹⁰

Missing from the writings of the practitioners, as well as the US Army's own doctrine, are effective tools to defeat insurgent groups' access to external support. How should the counterinsurgent force address the insurgent's use of the border issues? What factors should influence how counterinsurgents disrupt insurgent access to its external support?

In order to disrupt an insurgent force access to its external support, the counterinsurgent should consider the physical terrain, cultural demographics, the role of border control operations within the strategic plan, and the allocation of security forces to border operations. By formulating a unified plan, which addresses these factors, a counterinsurgent force may be able to disrupt an insurgent force's access to their external sanctuaries. Within the plan, there should be consideration for the recruitment and employment of local security forces, building and maintaining physical barriers along likely insurgent avenues to the external sanctuary, and development of border policies addressing issues exploited by the insurgents along the border if these factors support the strategic end state desired by the counterinsurgent.

The border has two or more governments that can influence it. The counterinsurgent government can work through the adjacent government to restrict access to insurgent safe havens, in theory, but in actuality, it is up to the counterinsurgent to deny the insurgent access from the external safe haven to the population centers. Beyond disrupting insurgent access to external sanctuaries, these border efforts can demonstrate to the population the government's capability to protect its citizens.¹¹

The denial of access to external sanctuaries has been and will continue to be a critical aspect of military operations. Counterinsurgent forces must apply a solution that hinders the insurgent access without causing a further escalation of the conflict. Failing to address the border and external sanctuary support an insurgent group receives will only prolong the conflict, as the insurgent group is able to rearm, re-equip, and re-man

its formations for continued violence against the counterinsurgent. This outside influence could potentially undermine government efforts to demonstrate capability to its population.

This paper examines the concepts for disrupting insurgent access to external sanctuary through examination of two historical case studies. The first case study examines the British experience in the North-West Frontier of India from 1849 until 1947. British experiences in the North-West Frontier demonstrate success and failures for the roles played by physical terrain, cultural demographics, strategic goals, and security force allocation to control a border region and support operations.

The second case study examines counterinsurgency operations in the Dhofar Province, Oman from 1965 to 1975. The operations in Oman demonstrated the defeat of a communist-backed insurgency with a secure external sanctuary, by a counterinsurgent force. The Sultan's Armed Forces and British advisors incorporated locally raised security forces, a series of defensive lines, and a unified foreign and internal policy to defeat a well-funded and inspired insurgency. The defeat of the *adoo* was never assured during the campaign and may provide lessons for future operations.

The research methodology used for this thesis involved archival historical research in the United Kingdom and interviews with practitioners from these campaigns. Through the Art of War Scholars Program, there are a number of oral history interviews conducted with surviving participants of the Dhofar campaign. Due to the sensitive nature of some of the interviews, this paper will not reference the names of interviewees but rather will provide contextual data, such as job title and theater of operations, for the background of the subject.

Notes

1. David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishing, 2005), 39-40. David Galula based this work on his experiences as a company-grade officer serving in the French Army during the Algeria War. The paper examines these ideas of Galula in greater detail in Chapter 2.

2. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 1-16. Field Manual 3-24 draws heavily from the counterinsurgent theories of the 1960s and 1970s, which some critics contend makes the manual too focused on waging war against a Maoist-based insurgency. This idea will be examined in detail in Chapter 2.

3. For this thesis, the author will use the term counterinsurgent to refer to all aspects of the counterinsurgent force—whether the counterinsurgent is one nation, a multi-national coalition, or an interventionist power assisting a weaker nation in waging a counterinsurgency campaign.

4. An example is the efforts undertaken by the United Kingdom in building a defense system between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland from 1969 through 1997 during “The Troubles.” The British developed an elaborate surveillance system to monitor border crossings, as well as extensive analysis of vehicles crossing the border. In addition, in 1981, then Prime Minister Thatcher made a personal appeal to the then US President Reagan to assist in halting the trafficking of weapons between the United States and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). These efforts assisted in weakening PIRA’s position and capability, eventually allowing for a negotiated settlement with the “Good Friday Accords.” Brigadier Sir Richard Iron, “Britain’s Longest War,” in *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*, ed. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010), 157-174; Nick Van Der Bijl, *Operation BANNER* (South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Books, 2009), 82-90.

5. There is additional discussion of the definition of borders in Chapter 2 of this thesis.

6. Since the attacks by Al Qaeda on the United States on 11 September 2001, a number of theorists have presented a concept that the western world is now in a “Post-Maoist” period for insurgency. A key point of this discussion revolves around the idea that global communication networks have made the digital environment a sanctuary and a physical sanctuary is no longer necessary. There is no evidence yet of a purely digital insurgency, once this is present then sanctuary may need a new definition. This paper will mainly focus on the physical, terrestrial external sanctuary and border operations necessary to disrupt the movement of people, equipment, and resources into the area in which the counterinsurgents and insurgents are engaged in combat. Also, the scope of the paper will not address the full capabilities of a nation to wield “soft power” to influence another nation. For information on the “Post-Maoist” ideas, see Dr. John Mackinlay, *Insurgent Archipelago* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009); Steve Metz, “New Challenges and Old Concepts: Understanding 21st Century Insurgency,” *Parameters* (Winter 2007-2008): 20-32. For information on “soft power,” see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The Decline of America’s Soft Power,”

Foreign Affairs (May/June 2004), <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59888/joseph-s-nye-jr/the-decline-of-americas-soft-power> (accessed 16 November 2011).

7. The second case study of this thesis, the Dhofar Campaign in Oman, will examine this concept in some detail. Also, the Second *Chimurenga* Campaign in Rhodesia represents a case of a country, at first not wishing to increase international condemnation, later in the campaign authorizing major cross-border attacks to destroy insurgent safe-havens in Zambia and Mozambique. Part of then Prime Minister Ian Smith's decision rested on the amount of international sanctions already in place on the country, and a desire to weaken his political rival, Robert Mugabe, quickly as Ian Smith worked an agreement with Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole. J. R. T. Wood, *Counter-Strike from the Sky: The Rhodesian All-Arms Fireforce in the War in the Bush, 1974-1980* (Johannesburg: 30 Degree South Publishers, 2011), 123-128.

8. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 1-02, *Operational Terms and Graphics* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004), 1-58. A key question when military and civil planners examine border control should be the question of how much legitimate traffic moves across the border. In addition, they should question the assumption that the border is required for commerce. If the border is required for legitimate commerce, then border control operations must address this factor.

9. Stephen T. Hosmer and Sibylle O. Crane, ed., *Counterinsurgency: A Symposium, April 16-20, 1962* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006), 41-44. Some of the practitioners present at this Symposium included David Galula, Frank Kitson, Rufus Phillips, Tony Jeapes, and Edward Landsdale. All these men would prove influential in future thinking on the theories of counterinsurgency. In terms of border operations, the consensus from the practitioners was counterinsurgent operations on islands were the easiest to control the borders, followed by open, desert terrain, with jungle and mountainous terrain being the most difficult for disrupting enemy movement to safe-havens.

10. Examples include British efforts to stabilize the North-West Frontier from 1849-1947, Dhofari tribal support in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen to Dhofari *adoo* in Oman from 1965-1979, the Pathan tribal support to *Mujahedeen* fighters in Afghanistan fighting the Soviet Union from 1979-1989, and Sunni tribal support in Syria and Jordan to Iraqi Sunni insurgents from 2003 to 2010.

11. Joby Warrick, "Clinton Confirms US Contact with Haqqanni Network," *Washington Post*, 21 October 2011. This article details efforts by the US Department of State to influence Pakistan to control groups in its borders, which conduct insurgent activities in Afghanistan. The first case study of this thesis on the North-West Frontier provides an example of border operations conducted mainly to protect the internal population of the Punjab from raids originating out of the North-West Frontier.

Chapter 2

What is Insurgency?

The border areas are a permanent source of weakness for the counterinsurgent whatever his administrative structures, and this advantage is usually exploited by the insurgent, especially in the initial violence states of the insurgency. By moving from one side of the border to the other, the insurgent is often able to escape pressure or, at least, to complicate operations for his opponent.

— David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*

As the quote above highlights, an insurgent force will use any advantages to its favor to defeat the counterinsurgent. If the counterinsurgent fails to identify how insurgent or external forces exploit this weakness in border areas, the counterinsurgent's security efforts may be in vain. This chapter will examine insurgency and counterinsurgency within the context of war, to differentiate this type of conflict from other types within the spectrum of war.

In order to understand how insurgency fits within the spectrum of conflict, it is necessary to examine the definition of war. First presented with the definition of war, this section will then examine how insurgency differs from other forms of conflict. This will help to differentiate the role of border control in insurgency-type operations compared to other types of conflicts.

The current archeological and historical evidence tends to indicate that armed conflict between different groups of humans arose in the third-millennium BC.¹

Yet, from that initial rise of armed conflict through the early 19th-Century, and the rise of nation states, few theorists examined the essence of war. Many of the historical works on war discuss how to conduct the military activities necessary to defeat an opponent, how to organize one's forces, and even discussions on developing duty titles and responsibilities, but few theorists or philosophers addressed the essence of war.² Sun Tzu, the Chinese military philosopher of the Warring States period (fifth through third century BC) of Chinese history was one who provided some insights into the essence war. He wrote in the opening lines of his work *The Art of War*, "Military action is important to the nation—it is the ground of death and life, the path of survival and destruction, so it is imperative to examine it."³

In the opening line of his work, Sun Tzu acknowledges the importance war and conflict has upon society, but he makes few other efforts to breakdown the fundamental essence of war. Deeper within *The Art of War*, Sun Tzu writes, “The ordinary rule for use of military force is for the military command to receive the orders from the civilian authorities, then to gather and mass the troops, quartering them together.”⁴ This statement combined with another passage from his section “Adaptation,” provides evidence that Sun Tzu most likely saw a major divide between the military and imperial leadership on the essence of war, which one could surmise as civilian leadership decided what war is and the military leadership then sends the army to accomplish the goals laid out by the leadership.⁵

The Greek historian, Thucydides, writing about the Peloponnesian War in the fifth-century B.C., discussed the effects of war upon a society and presented an idea that the motives of “fear, honor, and interest” within a society led to war. The three motives provide some insight into the interplay of emotion on the two belligerents, but it fails to provide a comprehensive view of competing factors that influences a society’s behavior in war.⁶

The concise definition of war developed by the Prussian military thinker, Carl von Clausewitz, in his posthumous work *On War*, provides the basic framework for war’s definition in this chapter. That definition is, “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” Within Clausewitz’s tome, he highlights that a nation ties war to its political objectives, so that war is the means to achieve the political ends.⁷ Using these concepts from Clausewitz, the definition of war for this paper is: the use of organized violence by a political body to influence or force another group to meet the first group’s political objectives.

War does have a spectrum of conflict, with governments employing different levels of violence to achieve their desired ends. Figure 1 highlights the spectrum of conflict from the lowest level of hostile act through the logical absolute of the application of force.⁸ The spectrum of conflict usually depends on the level of commitment and the level of violence that both sides are willing to engage in to meet their objectives.

With this definition for war, is insurgency different?⁹ To understand insurgency, one must study the term from both the insurgent’s and the counterinsurgent’s perspectives. How one defines insurgency does rely on which perspective one employs, as the constraints and characteristics of the conflict differ from whether one is an insurgent or the counterinsurgent.




Figure 1. Spectrum of Conflict in War.

Source: Created by author

Note: The spectrum represents a combination of the level of commitment to resolving the political desire and the amount of potential organized violence to achieve the ends. It is meant as a graphic representation of the range of options on a spectrum, and the author understands that no conflict will ever fit neatly into a category, there are always exceptions. A conflict that starts in one part of the spectrum can move up and down the scale based on the commitment and violence. An example is the American

Civil War, 1861-1865, which started closer to the internal rebellion part of the spectrum in 1861, but was much closer to the absolute extreme by the end of 1864.

One British Army counterinsurgency practitioner, General Sir Frank Kitson, wrote in his work *Bunch of Five*, “the main characteristic which distinguishes campaigns of insurgency from other forms of war is that they are primarily concerned with the struggle for men’s minds.”¹⁰ This idea provides a starting point for analyzing insurgency. As highlighted earlier, war is a struggle to impose one government’s will upon another group of people with organized violence; hence, all wars are struggles for the minds of the opponents.

What does begin to differentiate how a counterinsurgent views the conflict is the internal and potentially limited nature of an insurgency. Insurgencies arise when groups of people, in a weaker position than the government, make the conscious decision to employ violence to force change within a government opposed to the change.¹¹ General Kitson is most correct in that the struggle for men’s minds is the central aspect, but he omitted, or at least assumed without stating, that this form of conflict was internal to a country and not a direct conflict between two nation-states.

Consequently, since the conflict is within a country, the counterinsurgents under attack by insurgents elect to limit some aspects of how they conduct their actions in response to the insurgents’ attacks. This limited form of warfare may take numerous forms, including not attacking population centers loyal to the central government, not employing the full capabilities of violence against the insurgent, or not expanding the conflict across other international boundaries. A counterinsurgent could elect to employ nuclear weapons on an insurgent location, but the long-term effects of that decision would more than likely nullify any advantage achieved with the result. For this reason and due to a desire to maintain their legitimacy, the counterinsurgent deliberately constrains their use of military power.¹²

The idea of insurgency is not new to war. History has numerous examples of revolts, uprisings, and civil wars. However, it was not until the rise of industrialism and imperialism when insurgencies became a more viable form of warfare for disenfranchised groups.¹³ Industrialism caused a significant shift for how populations lived, worked and interacted. Large numbers of the people moved from rural villages into cities, in order to work in the newly developed factories and industries. This concentration of population made it more difficult for governments to suppress dissident

thoughts or actions from the broader population. Additionally, new ways to communicate messages to a broad market developed with the rise of urbanization. These forms of communication, from the rolling printing press to the wireless telegraph, allowed communication across large areas for groups who may have been geographically isolated previously. This rise of communication techniques allowed disparate groups to receive manifestos and ideas rapidly, and across a broad audience.¹⁴

With the changes occurring in society, new political movements and grievances among groups of people also began to arise. One of the dominant movements from the mid-19th-century through late 20th-century was the socialist movement, which sought to address real or perceived inequities between workers and factory owners. With the rise of the socialism, the founders Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels highlighted the interconnectedness of the political and violent aspects of their movement. The closing paragraph of the 1888 edition of the *Communist Manifesto* states, “The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions.”¹⁵ Only through violent activity, could the socialist movement achieve its goals and change the social order.

Using the ideas developed by Marx and Engels, both Vladimir Lenin and Mao Tse-Tung inspired their own insurgent movements to gain power within Russia and China, respectively. Vladimir Lenin used many of the ideas espoused by Marx and Engels to develop a communist political base within the working classes and then focused much of his violent activity within the population centers of Russia.¹⁶ This forced the collapse of the Kerensky Government, the short-lived Russian Republic that followed the abdication of Tsar Nicholas I in 1917.¹⁷ Mao Tse-Tung used similar ideas, but after his temporary defeat in 1927, focused his political efforts to the agrarian society and building his support within the peasantry.¹⁸ Both leaders would then work to export their models for insurgency after stabilizing control in their respective countries. Following Mao’s successful rise to power in China in 1948, his model for insurgency became the hallmark of the communist-inspired movements. His work *On Guerrilla Warfare* would serve as the example for many of the other communist-inspired insurgencies during the last half of the 20th-century.¹⁹

The Maoist principles provided a three-stage framework for conducting an insurgent campaign. The first phase was the development of a strong political cadre, which Mao referred to in *On Guerrilla Warfare* as “Organization, Consolidation, and Preservation.”²⁰ This was the most important stage in Mao’s view as this provided the fundamental essence

of the movement. Within this phase was the establishment of the political movement within the civilian population, the development of regional support bases in areas difficult for the government to interdict, and the undermining of the government's political and legal institutions in the targeted areas. Mao reiterates through the work that the preservation of the guerrilla force is one of the critical elements for the first phase.²¹

The second phase Mao called "Progressive Expansion," and others have referred to as the "Guerrilla Phase." At this stage, Mao believed in small-scale attacks against areas of government weakness. The aim during this phase was to:

exterminate small forces of the enemy; to harass and weaken large forces; to attack enemy lines of communication; to establish bases capable of supporting independent operations in the enemy's rear; to force the enemy to disperse his strength; and to coordinate all these activities with those of the regular armies on distant battle fronts.²²

This second stage aligned with Mao's views of a long, protracted struggle in which the guerrilla force would work to wear down the government's forces. He did not see this second stage as operating in isolation, but rather in support of building capability to a conventional force and eventually transform into a conventional force.²³ Mao reiterated throughout his work *On Guerrilla Warfare* that this second stage was part of a protracted struggle that depended upon maintaining mobility, employing manpower in "proper concentrations," and a constant focus on surrounding and destroying vulnerable enemy units.²⁴

The third stage was "positional warfare," or as others referred to it, "a war of movement." This stage would resemble conventional, army-versus-army fighting using organized formations, tactics, and units. Mao believed an insurgency should only enter this phase when conditions assured victory. He reiterated that an insurgent force must move easily between the phases to prevent defeat by a superior force, as survival of the movement was more important than being in a specific phase of insurgency.²⁵

The form of insurgency developed by Mao became the dominant form of communist-inspired insurgency for peasant-based economies following his successful rise to power in Mainland China post-1949. One explanation for the dominance is the amount of publishing Mao undertook to spread his revolutionary ideas across the world. Other revolutionaries, such as General Vo Nguyen Giap and Ernesto "Che" Guevara, used Mao's ideas as the basis for their strategy, but then adapted the teachings to the specific situation facing them.²⁶

Beside the rise of industrialism, the decline of imperialism in the 20th-Century also provided another source of grievance that spawned insurgent movements. The Maoist form of insurgency focused on population grievances for building support within society. This was especially true following the end of World War II, when the empires of Great Britain and France began to withdraw. The anti-colonial movement provided a rallying point for many insurgencies after 1945.²⁷

One can derive a holistic definition for insurgency through a thorough analysis of Maoist principles. What emerges from the insurgent's perspective of insurgency is the use of organized violence, in conjunction with political action, by an initially weaker force to cause a change upon a government to address a real or perceived grievance. From the insurgent's perspective, there are no self-imposed constraints for the level of violence used. The insurgent is waging a war as total as their capacity allows, since the insurgent is fighting for its survival. Any constraints on their use of violence derive from a lack of capability, strength or ability to escalate the levels of violence, rather than a desire to limit the violence, until the insurgency built its potential to escalate.²⁸

With the development of nuclear weapons in 1945, the scale of war changed for the major Western powers. The scope of violence a government could employ within a conflict had the potential now to end human civilization.²⁹ The rise of these new weapons now established the conditions in which potentially neither belligerent could achieve their desired political goals. This then led to governments using indirect methods to achieve their goals against other nation-states or to spread their influence. One means to accomplish this was through providing support for insurgencies, or conversely counterinsurgencies, as more powerful countries conducted proxy wars to gain influence within desired spheres of influence.

Great Britain, France, the United States, the USSR, and China all conducted proxy insurgencies and counterinsurgencies during the 1950s through 1970s. Despite all five of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council supporting both insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, Great Britain, France, and the United States are most associated with support to counterinsurgents, while China and the USSR are most identified with sponsoring insurgency through the end of the Cold War in 1991. Counterinsurgent practitioners from Great Britain, France, and the United States wrote about their experiences to encapsulate potential lessons for fighting in counterinsurgencies. Since many of these insurgencies had communist support or were communist inspired,

a number of the theorists addressed their works to target the communist movement.³⁰ Many consider this period after 1945 through the end of the 1970s the “classical” period for counterinsurgency. One could group the works produced in this period into three major perspectives: the French School, the British School, and the American School.

The French School developed out of the French counterinsurgency efforts in Indochina and Algeria during the 1950s through early 1960s. The two authors most associated with this perspective are Roger Trinquier and David Galula. Both men served in Algeria, though in different capacities, and both men produced works in English that many British and American military officials read at the time.

French colonial paratrooper commander, Roger Trinquier, published his work *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency* in 1962, and though controversial for his views on the use of torture to elicit information, he otherwise provides a very detailed, though severe, examination of counterinsurgency operations.³¹

Trinquier believed the key difference with “modern warfare” compared with earlier conflicts was “victory is not expected from the clash of two armies on a field of battle.” He saw revolutionary warfare had the primary aim of “overthrowing the established authority in a country and its replacement by another regime.”³² The critical idea that Trinquier presents while defining modern warfare is the enemy is “an armed clandestine organization” and the only chance for victory by the counterinsurgent is the “complete destruction of that organization.”³³

In addition to his experiences in French Indochina and Algeria, the French concept of *guerre revolutionnaire* heavily influenced Roger Trinquier. The *guerre revolutionnaire* ideas built upon earlier 19th-century, French colonial writings and developed a view that since communism-inspired insurgencies waged an unrestricted form of warfare against capitalist societies, the capitalist force must likewise wage unrestricted war against the insurgents.³⁴ Included within this viewpoint was the concept that the military had to annihilate the insurgency, as negotiations or compromise only provided the insurgency with time to regroup and consolidate, which damaged the counterinsurgent’s efforts. Since Algeria was not considered a colony, but part of the French political boundaries, many French officers held a strong belief that failure in Algeria would lead to an eventual, complete defeat of France by communist insurgents.³⁵

The second person heavily associated with the French perspective is David Galula. He had a different military career than Roger Trinquier,

and these experiences led him to develop a different perspective on counterinsurgency than Trinquier. Galula produced two works, which came to define his views of counterinsurgency. The first, *Pacification in Algeria 1956-1958*, he published in 1963. The second work, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, he published in 1964. *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* would extract many of Galula's lessons on counterinsurgency from *Pacification in Algeria* in order to provide readers with a collection of principles. Galula did produce both works from the perspective of a company-grade officer, so there is little effort by Galula to place his experiences into a larger context of operational planning.³⁶

In *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, Galula provided a framework for understanding revolutionary warfare. Galula stated, "A revolutionary war is primarily an internal conflict, although external influences seldom fail to bear upon it."³⁷ The distinction in which revolutionary warfare is an internal conflict is a perspective shared by many counterinsurgent theorists. Many insurgents though did not always see the conflict as an internal fight; they viewed the conflict as a fight for survival.

The second difference that Galula provided for what separated revolutionary war from other types of war is the insurgent is the initiator of a revolutionary war, as "counterinsurgency is an effect of insurgency," while either side can initiate a war in conventional war.³⁸ Due to this reactive nature of counterinsurgency operations, Galula believed the insurgency had strategic initiative at the start of the conflict.

The third difference between revolutionary warfare and conventional was the initial asymmetry between the two belligerents at the start of the hostilities. The insurgent was in a much weaker position at the start of the conflict; depending on the insurgent's achievement, the insurgent would grow stronger, while the counterinsurgent's strength would decline in direct relation to the insurgent's success.³⁹

Contemporaneous with Trinquier and Galula, a number of British officers also wrote of their experience conducting counterinsurgency operations. Of these, two influential writers at the time were General Sir Robert Thompson and General Sir Frank Kitson. Both men had extensive experience conducting counterinsurgency operations and their respective works encapsulated their principles for how to defeat an insurgency.

General Sir Robert Thompson was a member of the Royal Air Force in the Second World War who spent a large portion of his career from 1948 through 1960 assisting in the British counterinsurgency efforts during

the Malayan Emergency. His work, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, provides a perspective focused mainly on the strategic and policy levels for administrating a counterinsurgency. Thompson's major influence, beyond his practical experience, was also Mao's *On Guerrilla Warfare*. The structure of *Defeating Communist Insurgency* mirrors much of Mao's work. Thompson writes that one of the primary characteristics of an insurgency is the requirement for a cause. The cause had to appear "legitimate, progressive, and desirable" in order for the population to lend support to it. He further stipulates that following the end of World War II, a readily available cause for most communist insurgencies was anti-colonialism or anti-imperialism.⁴⁰

Once the insurgents established the cause within the population, Thompson believed the critical factor that led to an insurgency was "the breakdown, or near breakdown, of the government's rural administration."⁴¹ This factor was vital to the insurgent's desire to drive a wedge between the population and the government. The insurgents used subversion, murder, intimidation, accusations, and malicious information to discredit the government, neutralize and eliminate opponents of the insurgent cause, and frighten the population. Thompson also believed the insurgents would not use indiscriminate terrorism, as they could push the population closer to the government. He believed the insurgents would attempt to appear disciplined and exhibit "good behavior" in order to discredit further any misstep by the government.⁴²

Thompson further detailed that an insurgent would attempt to collapse the government through this relentless focus on subversion. If this did not prove successful, then the insurgents would move their operations from subversion to full insurgency. He believed this demonstrated both success and failure, in that, the insurgent had the strength to move into another form of conflict, but was unsuccessful in collapsing the government through subversion alone. This movement into insurgency was a calculated risk by the insurgent, since it did make them more vulnerable to government attack and potential collapse. How the insurgent was successful was through the combined political and military operations of "gaining control over the population, by continued subversion and terror."⁴³

The second of the British theorists, General Kitson, also had experience in many of the post-World War II counterinsurgencies waged by the British government. He produced two influential works. The first, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping*, and the second, *Bunch of Five*. Both works provide excellent descriptions of insurgency along with lessons from Kitson's considerable experience.

Within *Low Intensity Operations*, Kitson provided his definitions for subversion and insurgency. Subversion is:

all measures short of the use of armed force taken by one section of the people of a country to overthrow those governing the country at the time, or to force them to do things which they do not want to do. It can involve the use of political and economic pressure, strikes, protest marches, and propaganda, and can also include the use of small-scale violence for the purpose of coercing recalcitrant members of the population into giving support.⁴⁴

Kitson's definition for insurgency is "the use of armed force by a section of the people against the government for the purposes mentioned above."⁴⁵ He then proceeded to explain how subversion and insurgency differ from other forms of war. The two differences he notes is the relationship between the use of force and influence upon the population, and the role of force supporting forms of persuasion.⁴⁶

Six years after the release of *Low Intensity Operations*, Kitson published *Bunch of Five*. This work described four of the campaigns in which Kitson served Kenya, Malaya, Oman, and Cyprus, plus a detailed chapter on counterinsurgency theory. He refined his view of the insurgent's ultimate aim, which "is to overthrow a government, or force it to do something it does not want to do"⁴⁷ This definition differs from previous theorists by highlighting that insurgent goals may be more limited than the complete overthrow of the government. Their goals could be to carve out an exclave for themselves free from the government's influence. This also contrasts with the severe views of Roger Trinquier, who prescribed to a school of thought that the counterinsurgent had to wage unrestrained war. Kitson's definition allowed for more variation within an insurgent's goals, and it opened up the counterinsurgent to employ a larger pool of resources to end the conflict.

A third perspective, the American School, identified with a US Army veteran from the Vietnam War, John H. McCuen and his work *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War* published in 1966. His work differs from the other theorists by focusing on the protracted nature of this type of warfare. McCuen's intent with his work is to detail how to defeat a Maoist structured and influenced insurgency, as the United States was beginning to face in South Vietnam at the time of publishing this work.⁴⁸

McCuen also differed from other theorists by not providing his own definition for insurgency. He used the ideas presented by Mao for the basis of his definitions, and then focused his efforts on addressing how to counter a Maoist insurgency.⁴⁹

Following the defeat of South Vietnam by the North Vietnamese in 1975, most of the conventional United States Army turned away from study of counterinsurgency.⁵⁰ This lack of focus continued, for the most part, until the attacks by Al Qaeda against the United States on 11 September 2001. Following the terrorist attacks, a number of theorists began to question whether the world had entered a “post-Maoist Period,” and the previous works on counterinsurgency were no longer valid as the nature of insurgency had fundamentally changed in the digital age. Many of these theorists questioned whether Islamic Fundamentalism presented an inherently different cause than communism did among the population.

Two authors, who represent the post-Maoist view, are General Sir Rupert Smith with his work *The Utility of Force* and Doctor John MacKinlay with his work *The Insurgent Archipelago*. General Smith’s work *The Utility of Force* highlights that in a post-Cold War era, nations will fight more conflicts within civilian populations. This intertwining of military and civilian interactions will create issues separating regular and irregular forces from the battlefield. General Smith also emphasizes that in a revolutionary war, “force is being used to form the people’s intentions as to their governance: throughout all lines of operations the revolutionary is working to increase the acceptance of the people to be governed by the revolution.”⁵¹

General Smith believed that with the increasing urbanization and globalization of the population, conventional military forces would have greater difficulty separating the opposing combatant from the population. He also stated that the desired ends, which led to war, are changing from “hard absolute objectives of interstate industrial war to more malleable objectives to do with the individual and societies that are not states.”⁵² Though compelling, these ideas tend to overlook many of the smaller wars and imperial policing activities undertaken by the larger western powers over the last 200 years. He only looked at the large-scale wars, while discounted the smaller wars in which western powers, especially the British Empire, fought and negotiated with non-state elements to establish their empires.⁵³ In addition, General Smith overstated the role of urbanization in describing the terrain in which western powers would fight wars. This overlooked the instability in less populated regions, such as Afghanistan, or the space between the population centers where fighting can still occur.⁵⁴

Another theorist, Dr. MacKinlay, postulated that the nature of insurgency has fundamentally changed following the end of the Cold War. With the rise of globalization and modern communication technology, Dr.

MacKinlay stipulated insurgencies are essentially a political process which evolve their techniques based on the society they are a part of that organize as an act of desperation and finally involve the population.⁵⁵ He defined post-Maoism as, “a transformation of the operational space, in which the center of gravity for insurgency and counter-insurgency moves from the national to the international, superseding traditional forms of conflict in which the outcome is decided ‘on the ground’, and creating a myriad of influential factors spread around an archipelago of concerned states and communities across the globe.”⁵⁶

These ideas presented by Dr. MacKinlay overstate the role of globalization, and understate the centrality of a major grievance to an insurgent’s agenda that the government is unwilling or unable to address. Through global communication networks, an insurgent group may be able to keep pressure on the counterinsurgent force and provide moral support to the insurgent, but that does not provide enough evidence that insurgencies are fundamentally different after 11 September 2011.⁵⁷

After a thorough examination of these ideas related to insurgency and counterinsurgency, one can build a comprehensive definition of insurgency in which to examine border control operations. The definition for insurgency is: the use of organized violence by an internal group which is initially militarily weaker than the government, in order to force a significant change upon the government which does not want to change through other political means, and the counterinsurgent elects to impose limits to how it will conduct operations in order to maintain the support of all or part of its population. Though a long definition, it encompasses the ideas laid out by insurgent and counterinsurgent theorists and details what each is attempting to accomplish through organized violence.

With the definition of insurgency established, the paper will present a second concept, which has relevance for operations across the British Empire, of “imperial policing.” Imperial policing was the starting point for British doctrine that evolved into counterinsurgency operations. Imperial policing was the intervention of British armed forces for the restoration of internal peace in British colonies or a country within the British sphere of influence. The goal of the intervention was a return to law and order through military actions, when other means failed or appeared to fail. The imperial policing ideas developed from Colonel Charles Callwell’s work *Small Wars – Their Principles and Practice*, published in 1896.⁵⁸

The doctrine of imperial policing underwent a number of revisions during the 1920s and 1930s. Through these revisions, a number of

bedrock principles arose, which the British Army continued to incorporate into doctrine as it transformed from imperial policing to countering insurgency.⁵⁹ The principles of minimum force, subordination to civil authorities, firm and timely action are paramount, and the importance of military cooperation with police and civil authorities.⁶⁰

Notes

1. Geoffrey Parker, ed., *Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 12.

2. The trend that develops when examining the body of “Art of War” text, which survives from the initial written record through the early Industrial Revolution, is how common war is between societies, but the lack of effort put into examining the essence of war by military theorists. There is a great deal of effort put in to examine war by religious and philosophical thinkers, like St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Augustine of Hippo, but there is little written by military practitioners during this period. It is difficult to assert if this is due to the nature of the text that survived or whether theorist made little effort to define war. The nature of feudal kingdoms may have contributed, as the military leaders were beholden to a monarch who decided what war was.

3. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Thomas Cleary (Boston: Shambhala Publications, Inc., 1988), 41.

4. Sun Tzu, 114.

5. Sun Tzu, 125. The translation by Thomas Cleary appears to take some liberties with the original Chinese text, as he uses the term “civil authorities” in his translation in both sections. Most likely, the term “emperor” or “ruler” would most likely be better terms, as Sun Tzu wrote during the collapse of the Chou Dynasty. “Civil authorities” would be a liberal, democratic society term.

6. Robert B. Strassler, ed., *The Landmark Thucydides* (New York: Free Press, 2008), 43. I also based this concept on discussion and lecture presented in the Command and General Staff College’s course A699, *History of War Theory*, taught by Mr. Robert Bowie in October 2011. Unlike later theorists, Thucydides is not as clear with his definition and ideas on the essence of war. The whole of his *The Peloponnesian War* traces the transformation of Greek society due to the effects of the war upon the various city-states. In Clausewitz’s work *On War*, he presented his paradoxical trinity consisting of blind natural force, the play of chance and probability, and the subordination of war as an instrument of national policy. The trilogy of Thucydides (fear, honor, and interest), I believe, may provide an excellent model for the interactions within the blind natural force leg of Clausewitz’s paradoxical trilogy. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 89.

7. Clausewitz, *On War*, 75, 84. Clausewitz’s masterful work provides the most concise definition for war. Throughout his work, he ensures that violence and the application of this violence in a controlled manner is at the heart of warfare.

8. Clausewitz, 75-77. “The thesis, then, must be repeated war is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force. Each side, therefore compels its opponent to follow suit: a reciprocal action is started which must lead in theory, to extremes.” Clausewitz, 77.

9. The term “insurgency” will be used to cover the terms revolutionary warfare, counter-revolutionary warfare and guerrilla warfare. At times in this section, I will address these terms to provide the broader definition to insurgency.

for communist insurgency, which de-emphasized the Maoist principle of building a strong political base first. Che Guerra believed that rapid, violent action would inspire the revolutionaries to action, so a slowly developed political cadre was unneeded. Ernesto “Che” Guerra, *Guerrilla Warfare* (USA: BN Publishing, 2007), 7-9.

20. In a 1936 essay entitled “On Protracted War,” Mao refers to this first state as “Mobile Warfare.” He highlights within the essay that the primary requirement of war is to destroy the enemy, and the other requirement is self-preservation. Since the insurgency is weak in this first stage, self-preservation was the dominant objective hence his term “mobile warfare.” Mao Tse-Tung, “On Protracted War,” in *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung*, ed. Mao Tse-Tung (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1967), 244-246.

21. Mao, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, 20-22, 95.

22. Mao, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, 53.

23. Mao, “On Protracted War,” 246.

24. Mao, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, 98.

25. In the essay “Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War” written in December 1936, Mao states, “The kind of concentration we advocate is based on the principle of guaranteeing absolute or relative superiority on the battlefield.” Mao Tse-Tung, *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung*, 136.

26. Other revolutionaries had various levels of success with Maoist principles. General Giap found much success with parts of Mao’s ideas though the decision to launch the Tet Offensive in 1968 hurt the North Vietnamese War effort andrew Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 239. Che Guevara also had mixed success with victory in Cuba, but suffered defeat, and his death, in Bolivia. One of the major flaws in Che Guevara’s ideas was second lesson espoused in *Guerrilla Warfare*, “It is not necessary to wait until all conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection can create them.” Ernesto “Che” Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare*, 7. Che’s movement, called *focoism*, believed that violent insurgency could create the conditions for success, so growing a strong political base beforehand was unnecessary. Additional study may need to be done on the *focoist* approach in light of the events of the Arab Spring of 2011, as there little underlying political framework before the protests began in February 2011. I drew the term *foco* from the essay by John Shy and Thomas W. Collier “Revolutionary Warfare,” in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 850.

27. Examples of this type of insurgency include the French-Indochina war (1954-1958), the French Algeria Conflict (1954-1962), the British-Aden Emergency (1963-1967), the British-Palestinian Conflict (1945-1948), and numerous other violent confrontations between colonies and the western powers.

28. John J. McCuen, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War* (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 2005), 50-52.

29. Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping* (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 1991), 15.

30. Due to many of these theorists use of “communist” in their titles, some contemporary leaders have dismissed these earlier theories following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. The important thing to bear in mind is the communist movement was just an ideological base for a movement targeting underlying grievances in a community of people. The approach to counter this ideological movement is similar whether the base is communists, fundamentalist jihadist, republicanism (not the political party), or unionist. The idea is to target the idea and grievance the insurgent is using to gain support.

31. Roger Trinquier served in the French colonial army for most of his career. He saw service in the Far East during World War II, including as a Japanese Prisoner of War, served in Indochina, and in Algeria. During service in Algeria, Trinquier participated in the Battle of Algiers, and commanded the 3rd Colonial Airborne Regiment. As part of Trinquier’s discussion on the use of torture, he believed the counterinsurgent must acknowledge an insurgent is using terrorist activity against the civilian population. This requires the counterinsurgent treat insurgents differently than criminals or uniformed combatants. Trinquier believed that the counterinsurgent direct all means in having the insurgent divulge his organization’s structure. Once the insurgent provided the data, all other questioning was to stop as well as any physical coercion. Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), xiv-xvii, 18-20.

32. Trinquier, 5.

33. Trinquier, 7.

34. One of the major problems within the *guerre revolutionnaire* theory is the classification of everyone as either “with us” or “against us.” The concepts do not allow the practitioner to view the population as neutral or uncommitted. This harsh view could provide a counterinsurgent justification to inflict atrocities on the population by believing if a group was uncommitted then they were supporting the insurgency. Military officers should examine the concepts of *guerre revolutionnaire* to serve as an object lesson on the dangers of a total war view within a counterinsurgency framework. These concepts assisted in creating an environment that led to violence against the civilian population that hurt French efforts in Algeria. In addition, these concepts blinded many French officers to the effects their own actions had in turning Algerian support away from the French cause.

35. In 1848, the Second Republic of France declared Algeria an integrated part of France. This meant that Algeria was no different from any of the provinces inside the territorial boundary of France. Similar to the southern States during the American Civil War, France believed it had a complete right to use any means to stop the insurrection. This distinction also made Algeria different from other French North African colonies (Tunisia and Morocco), to whom France gave independence prior to the Algerian Insurgency. Alistair Horne, “The French Army and the Algerian War 1954-62,” in *Regular Armies and Insurgency*, ed. Ronald Haycock (London: Croom Helm, 1979), 70. Information on *guerre revolutionnaire*: Peter Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria: The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964),

29-30; Douglas Porch, "Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare," in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 376-378.

36. David Galula had experience fighting in Europe during World War II and served in China as a military attaché during Mao Tse-Tung's defeat of Kiang Chi-Shek in 1948. He also served in Greece during their communist-sponsored insurgency. David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 2005), V-VI. Though only a captain during his time in Algeria, Galula did have a collection of experiences with communist-inspired movements in other theaters of war. Trinquier's experience was much narrower, only participating in French anti-communist efforts in Indochina and Algeria, so that may explain some of the differences in their perspectives. In addition, Trinquier had direct experience in the "Battle for Algiers" in the capital city, while Galula's experience was mainly in the rugged, densely populated mountain regions of Kabylia.

37. Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, 3.

38. Galula, 3.

39. Galula, 6-7.

40. Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency* (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 2005), 21-23.

41. Thompson, 24.

42. Thompson, 25. These views of Thompson were idealistic and did not consider that some insurgent groups would use indiscriminate terrorism to cow a population into submission. There were times that indiscriminate terrorism backfired on the insurgent and pushed the population more into supporting the government, such as in Iraq in 2006. Najim Abed Al-Jabouri and Sterling Jensen, "The Iraqi and AQI Roles in the Sunni Awakening," *Prism* 2, no. 1 (December 2010): 1-16.

43. Thompson, 30.

44. Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping* (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 1991), 3.

45. Kitson., 3.

46. Kitson., 4. Kitson stated that insurgents will most likely use influence and persuasion upon populations whose support the insurgents require or want, and use violence as a back up. This dovetails into his second characteristic that belligerents use force to reinforce persuasion, while in conventional combat belligerents use persuasion to support the use of force. From this view the relationship between force and persuasion are inverted in a counterinsurgency compared to conventional combat. These definitions also match the definitions of subversion and insurgency published in the British Army Manual Land Operations, Volume III—*Counter-Revolutionary Principles, Part I – General Principles* in August 1977.

47. Kitson, *Bunch of Five*, 282.

48. John J. McCuen, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War* (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 1966), 27-30.

49. Since McCuen's work was published a year after the decision by the United States to escalate the War in South Vietnam, he may have felt that since the country was now in a counterinsurgency a definition was unnecessary. McCuen instead spent his efforts detailing what the enemy's actions would most likely be and how to counter those actions.

50. Following the post-Vietnam reforms of the US Army, the conventional force spent most of its training time and doctrinal focus on fighting against a Soviet-style armored force, most likely in the Fulda Gap in Germany. Special Force doctrine did focus on counterinsurgency, but mainly on Foreign Internal Defense. James Kitfield, *Prodigal Soldiers* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 151-155.

51. General Sir Rupert Smith. *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), 170.

52. Smith, 19.

53. Examples of smaller wars include imperial policing operations in the North-West Frontier, which the author discusses in Chapter Four. General Smith appeared to look only at when western powers fought each other, and discounted when western powers fought colonial engagements. The examples studied in detail by General Smith in his work are the Napoleonic War, the American Civil War, the Franco-Prussian War, the Boer War, World War I, World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Israel-Arab Wars, Desert Storm, and the NATO operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. General Smith does have one chapter examining the concept of insurgency, which briefly highlights the Malayan Emergency, Northern Ireland, and Algeria. General Smith makes no mention of the smaller wars fought by the British Empire in the North-West Frontier, Aden, Zululand, or Oman.

54. The military operation conducted by NATO in 2011 to assist in the toppling of the Qaddafi-Regime in Libya is an example of this. This military action commenced while Libyan forces were moving between the population centers towards Benghazi, while the Libyan conventional force was easily identifiable by NATO warplanes. The Office of Press Secretary, White House, "Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya," presented on 28 March 2011, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/remarks-president-address-nation-libya> (accessed 20 November 2011).

55. John MacKinlay, *The Insurgent Archipelago* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 4-5.

56. MacKinlay, 101.

57. A paper, which provides an excellent counterpoint to Dr. Mackinlay is Mark O'Neill's *Confronting the Hydra* (Sydney, Australia: Lowy Institute, 2009). During the Philippine Insurrection from 1899-1902, the insurgents, led by Emilio Aguinaldo, actively used American press to build American public opinion opposition to US efforts in the Philippines. Though more extensive and faster in speed of communication, the use of international media to influence the counterinsurgent's home opinion is not a new phenomenon after 11 September 2011. Anthony James Joe, "Counterinsurgent in the Philippines, 1898-1954," in *Counterinsurgent in Modern Warfare*, ed. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 2010), 46.

58. The War Office, War Office Code Number 8439, *Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power* (London: The War Office, June 1949), 4-5; Charles E. Callwell, *Small Wars. Their Principles and Practise* (London: Harrisons and Sons, St. Martens Lane, 1903); Major-General Sir Charles W. Gwynn, *Imperial Policing* (1934; reprint, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004).

59. The British *Countering Insurgency* manual produced in 2010 outlines the evolution of British counterinsurgency doctrine very well. The term counterinsurgency did not become the title of the manual until 1995, as the term went from imperial policing, to counter-revolutionary operations, until the British lexicon adopted counterinsurgency. Ministry of Defense, Army Code 71876, Army Field Manual, *Countering Insurgency* (London: Ministry of Defense, January 2010), 1-1–1-4.

60. The principle of minimum force arose from the Amritsar Massacre, when Indian Army Soldiers fired into a rioting crowd. The Amritsar Massacre occurred on 13 April 1919, when British authorities called in British military forces to Amritsar, India to assist in restoring order after large-scale, violent rioting destabilized the region. The commanding officer, General Dyer, believed he faced an insurrection, which differed from other types of instability in that regulations allowed for the use of lethal force to restore order. General Dyer's unit fired upon the rioters. This action led to 379 rioters killed and over a thousand wounded. An inquest led by Lord William Hunter determined the firing on the crowd without warning, and continued firing by troops into the crowd when the crowd dispersed as unlawful. Ministry of Defense, Army Code 71876, Army Field Manual, *Countering Insurgency* (London: Ministry of Defense, January 2010), 3-10.

Chapter 3

Border Operations and Counterinsurgency

When the time comes, however, for the insurgent to pass from guerrilla warfare to a higher form of operations, to create a regular army, the need for much larger and more varied supplies becomes acute. Either he is able to capture it from the counterinsurgency, or it must come from the outside. If not, the development of the insurgent military establishment is impossible.

— David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*

As noted by the above quotation, the counterinsurgent has an opportunity to isolate an insurgency and prevent its spread if the counterinsurgent undertakes efforts to disrupt the insurgent supply efforts. A critical aspect of this involves border control operations.¹

The conditions that most influence border control operations during either a counterinsurgency or imperial policing environment are the physical terrain of the country, the cultural demographics, the role of border operations within the strategic framework, and the allocation of security forces to this aspect of the campaign.²

Borders are important factors for governments, because the border is a political demarcation that demonstrates to a population where government power stops. It also demonstrates to a population where the benefit of being a member of that political entity begins.³ The political boundaries, which divide countries, can cut across ethnic, tribal, racial, and economic groups. In many border areas, there are no physical markings to demonstrate the divide from one area to another. In countries with weak central governments, or a belief among the people that there are few benefits of being a member of the political body, the population may have much more discontent with the political borders.⁴

The physical terrain within a country will also determine how important border control will be to the counterinsurgent. As mentioned in the previous section, the insurgent starts the conflict in a weaker position than the government. The insurgent must create space between themselves and the counterinsurgent in order to build their political and military capability. The insurgent can use difficult and inaccessible terrain within the country to create this space, but if that option is not available, the insurgent will turn to areas outside the government's control to build capacity. Galula succinctly states, "The border areas are a permanent source of weakness

for the counterinsurgent whatever his administrative structures, and this advantage is usually exploited by the insurgent, especially in the initial violent stages of the insurgency.”⁵

If an insurgent group operates within a large country with varied terrain, they have the potential to create safe havens in border areas on either side of the demarcation line. Mao referred to these areas as base areas and defined them as “the strategic bases on which the guerrilla force rely in performing their strategic tasks and achieving the object of preserving and expanding themselves and destroying and driving out the enemy.”⁶ Mao put less emphasis on the cross-border nature of these base areas. This lack of emphasis most likely stems from the vast territory within China that allowed the Maoist movement to establish secure areas away from government interference.⁷

Mao did list three conditions for establishing base areas, which included the requirement for a military force to hold the base area, the coordination between the military arm and the people to defeat the enemy in that area, and arousing the masses to the cause. Once the guerrilla set these conditions, they would have a secure base area to conduct operations.⁸

If the insurgency is occurring in a country that is already geographically isolated, the insurgent will have more difficulty creating these safe areas. During the 1962 RAND Symposium on Counterinsurgency, the consensus of the participants that conducting a counterinsurgency campaign on an island nation would be the most preferred, due to the ease of isolating the insurgency from outside support.⁹ The most difficult terrain for the counterinsurgency would be a country surrounded by heavily mountainous terrain, which would make establishing a physical barrier most difficult and potentially cost prohibitive.¹⁰

Though the RAND Symposium concluded a counterinsurgent had an advantage over the insurgent if the insurgency depended on water routes for access to their safe havens, this advantage is still dependant on the counterinsurgent’s ability to disrupt the movements across the water. The French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars from 1796 through 1815 provide examples of successful use by the British and Spanish forces of a sea-based sanctuary to maintain an insurgency.

The insurrection, waged by the Spanish against French rule in Spain during the Napoleonic War, began in 1808. The Spanish received extensive support from the British Empire, and this part of the conflict historians refer to as the Peninsular War. The British and Spanish waged a combined campaign employing both conventional forces and guerrillas to defeat

Napoleon's forces in Spain.¹¹

The type of conflict waged by the British and Spanish against Napoleon was possible due to the earlier defeat of the French fleet at the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805. After 1805, the Royal Navy had freedom of movement along the sea lines of communication. This allowed the Royal Navy to provide external support to resupply both the British Army and the Spanish guerrillas. With the French naval forces blockaded into its ports, the French were unable to interdict the Royal Navy's support to these ground forces.¹²

An example of a successful disruption of an insurgent's access to a safe haven through naval force, the American experience during the Philippines Insurrection provides some lessons. At the end of the 19th-Century, the United States was involved in an active counterinsurgency campaign in the Philippines. A major operation for the United States' counterinsurgency efforts was the US Navy's establishment of an effective blockade around the island territory. This blockade effectively contained each insurgent group to its own island and prevented external sanctuary for the insurgents. The blockade also cut off the insurgent's system for pay and resupply. Although this blockade did create hardship for the civilian population with food shortages, it did allow for the rapid occupation of Zamboanga in 1899.¹³

The border length between adjacent countries also influences how the counterinsurgent can affect insurgent movements into the country. A small border length, as found during the Malayan Emergency and in Oman, favors the counterinsurgent efforts to disrupt insurgents. A long border with difficult terrain, as found during the US operations in South Vietnam from 1965-1972, can greatly aid the insurgency with evading the counterinsurgent forces. The supply lines used by the North Vietnamese, called the "Ho Chi Minh Trail," used the dense jungles of Laos and Cambodia to enter the Republic of South Vietnam south of the Demilitarized Zone, which divided the two Vietnams. The Ho Chi Minh Trail consisted of a series of trails, roads, and paths cut through the dense jungle vegetation, which even provided some protection for the North Vietnamese Army from aerial bombing and observation.¹⁴

In addition to the physical terrain, the cultural demographics within the border region can also influence efforts the counterinsurgent undertakes. If the local population at the border shares characteristics with the insurgents, such as tribal affiliation, ethnicity, or mutual dislike of the government, then the population may work to assist the insurgency. However, if the

population does not share cultural similarities with the insurgents, the insurgents may have difficulty finding support in that population.¹⁵

The loyalties of the population within a specific demographic may be difficult to ascertain initially, and can change quickly based on the actions of the counterinsurgent force. An example of this was the initial reactions of the Catholic communities in Northern Ireland to the arrival of British forces in 1969. When the British military first entered into Northern Ireland, the Catholic and Protestant communities greeted them with a degree of relief in hopes the Army would restore order after civil control had collapsed following major rioting in Belfast. Unfortunately, for the British Army, this good will by the Catholic community changed through a series of missteps that led many Catholics to believe that the British Army was biased in favor of the Protestant Communities.¹⁶

The role of the cultural demographics is critical within tribal societies through Central Asia, the Middle East, and Sub-Sahara Africa. These tribal identities are a major part of the culture's worldview. The levels of success western powers had when interacting with these tribal groups depended on how well they recognized how the tribal organization functioned. The cultural demographics of Iraq would also prove important for when the United States and Coalition partners entered Iraq in 2003 to topple the Ba'athist Party led by Saddam Hussein. The Coalition found itself attempting to maintain order between three warring factions, the Iraqi Sunnis, Iraqi Shi'as, and Kurds, all attempting to gain economic, political, and military control of the country in the anarchy that followed the collapse of the Saddam Regime.¹⁷

The third major consideration in counterinsurgency planning is the role border operations have within the strategic framework. By taking the physical terrain and cultural demographics into consideration, the counterinsurgent can develop an inclusive strategy that incorporates the use of border areas to isolate the insurgency from outside support. Techniques for denying this support can include building defensive positions to control movements around the border, raising local security forces loyal to the government to disrupt insurgent movements, or conducting cross-border operations to destroy insurgent stockpiles. The counterinsurgent must ensure that the method they employ supports their strategic plan, and complements other operations to defeat the insurgency in their country.

As the counterinsurgent builds their strategic framework, a number of factors can drive their decisions for border operations. They must consider how the insurgent is using the border regions, what cost the

counterinsurgent is willing to expend to disrupt insurgent operations at the border, and the amount of potential international condemnation the counterinsurgent is willing to accept to support these operations.

The “classical” counterinsurgency theorists are very divergent in how they address the operational plan for border operations. John McCuen highlighted that the counterinsurgent must make all efforts to isolate the revolutionary force while simultaneously building international support for the counterinsurgent.¹⁸ David Galula focused on the role that external support had in sustaining the insurgent cause through moral, material, and training support.¹⁹ Another view presented by Roger Trinquier focused on what the counterinsurgent had to undertake to avoid defeat. Trinquier believed if an insurgent sanctuary was across an international boundary, the counterinsurgent still had to destroy the safe haven—despite any international condemnation or expansion of the conflict. Trinquier stated, “The destruction or neutralization of enemy bases on foreign territory is essential if we are to hasten the end of hostilities and ensure a durable peace.”²⁰

Trinquier elaborated by pointing out that crossing a recognized international boundary with a conventional armed force would be a cause for war. However, allowing an armed insurgent group to cross into a neighboring country is not automatically a cause for war. Trinquier believed these definitions needed to change because modern warfare had changed as well.²¹ The French defeats in Indochina and Algeria heavily influenced Trinquier’s view, which resulted in a harsher view of how to engage insurgents within another country’s boundary.

Also during the French counterinsurgency operations in Algeria, their strategy dictated a major effort to sever the insurgent access to safe havens in Libya and Tunisia. Massive expenditure went into the implementation of the Morice Line by the French. The French constructed this barrier to divide Algeria from Tunisia and Morocco, and it required a major engineering effort and dedication of forces to emplace. The Morice Line was a series of obstacles consisting of barbed wire, electrified fencing, explosive mines, focused intelligence collection, and extensive patrolling by the military.²² The Morice Line cut off the *Front de Liberation Nationale* (FLN), the Algerian insurgent movement, from foreign sanctuaries, as much as any physical barrier could and it did severely restrict their movement to external safe havens. In addition to the physical barrier, the French also committed a large amount of their forces, over 80,000 Soldiers, to patrol the barrier and interdict FLN insurgents moving across the border. This

combination of barriers and security forces had a major deterrent effect upon the FLN, though the FLN did expend considerable resources to discover weaknesses in the Morice Line for exploitation.²³

The construction of the Morice Line played a significant role within the French strategy for ending the insurgency, and though the FLN was effectively cut off from outside support, the Morice Line did not address the grievances of the population. It also did not solve the perceived brutality of French operations against the Algerians, or relieve the level of international condemnation leveled by the world against the French for their operations. Ultimately, the French government, under the leadership of Charles de Gaulle, ended the conflict by granting Algerian independence in 1962.²⁴

Similar to the French in Algeria, the Rhodesian counterinsurgency efforts during the Second *Chimurenga*, which occurred from 1962 through 1980, also demonstrated a major disconnect between its strategic goals and how the Rhodesians conducted operations.²⁵ During the later phase of the insurgency, the Rhodesian government approved the use of the Rhodesian Light Infantry, Rhodesian Special Air Services, Selous Scouts, and Rhodesian African Rifles to cross the borders with Zambia and Mozambique to conduct operations against the insurgent's safe havens. The Rhodesian military had very good success with the individual operations, at times killing thousands of insurgents per engagement. However, the military command did not nest these operations with the overall campaign plan, and by the end of 1977, the military was no closer to achieving its end state.²⁶ It was not until 1978, late in the insurgency, when the Commander of Operations, Lieutenant General Peter Walls, published a strategy. This strategy included the cross-border operations as the fourth major operational task, but the Rhodesian military dedicated the majority of its efforts to these operations through the end of the war.²⁷ Due to the effects of international sanctions, and then British Prime Minister Margret Thatcher rejecting the Rhodesian power sharing agreement, the Rhodesian government lost the insurgency and collapsed.²⁸

The Rhodesians dedicated major efforts to the cross-border operations following the massive success of Operation *DINGO*. The costs of these operations increased as the effects of international sanctions strangled their military supplies and access to critical repair parts for their aircraft required for the airborne insertions across the borders. Unfortunately, these cross-border operations did not address the problems that drove many in the population to support the insurgency, especially the racial disparity within the country.

Another consideration when counterinsurgency planners ponder border operations, especially cross-border operations into other sovereign countries, are the effect those operations will have upon the counterinsurgent's population. This is a critical consideration if the counterinsurgent force is an interventionist force operating in another country. An example of this was the decision by the United States to attack into Cambodia with US and South Vietnamese forces in order to destroy North Vietnamese Army cache sites along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Militarily this operation was a huge success with a large number of caches discovered and destroyed. In terms of support for the American war effort, this operation was a massive failure. Protest occurred in many of the major colleges and universities in the United States, including at Kent State University in Ohio, where National Guardsmen fired on a crowd of demonstrators killing four students. Additionally, the US Congress rescinded the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which provided the American President authorization of military action in South Vietnam. All of these consequences would lead to a hastening of the American withdrawal from South Vietnam and a reduction in military aid to the embattled country.²⁹

Two examples of long term strategic policies for border control include the Roman Empire of the post-Republic Period and the British Empire of the late 19th-century through mid-20th-century. Both empires provided a level of bureaucratic support to the population under their control. This support required both the empires to know where their influence extended and for the population to know if they were living within the area of the empire's control. Both empires also struggled strategically with determining what they wished to accomplish in their border regions.

It was during the period of the Emperor Hadrian (117 – 138 AD) in which Rome undertook a process to demarcate the boundary of Rome to distinguish what was Roman and what was not. This demarcation was part the Emperor Hadrian's decision to establish firm boundaries to control against outside invasion. The Romans built a series of walls across the Empire to mark the extent of Roman control. The most famous of these structures was Hadrian's Wall, parts of which still survive at the boundary between England and Scotland.³⁰

Rome also conducted a number of negotiations with the Germanic tribes to bring stability to the border regions. Rome used a mixture of punitive actions, economic incentives, trading status, and civil projects to build this stability.³¹ By building a series of border forts, the Romans

created a system of mutual support for their diplomatic and military actions. These border forts allowed for the garrisoning of troops near trouble areas in which the military governors could rely on to enforce any required punitive action. Additionally, through the negotiations the Romans convinced the local tribes to provide levies and irregular, local security forces to the Roman Army. This assisted the Roman Army by providing a source of local recruits, and convinced many of the tribes to support the Roman system. The two formations raised of local security forces were the *auxilia* and the *numeria*.³²

As the Roman Empire in the west began to contract in the 3rd-century AD, the *auxilia* and *numeria* became even more important for the defense of Roman borders. These organizations provided a high degree of mobility and rapid employment capability that the legions did not. This use of locally raised security forces also proved a cost saving method to provide a significant security presence across the Roman Empire.³³ The Roman Empire did provide a model for later empires for how to use local security forces within the context of the larger strategic goals in a region.

Similarly, the British Empire in the 19th-Century developed a border strategy on the fringes of their empire. The border zone between Afghanistan and the Indian Empire would prove especially difficult. It would not be until the 1890s, with the establishment of the Durand Line, that the British and Afghan governments achieve agreement as to the demarcation between the two countries. The next chapter on the Northwest Frontier Province will examine these issues in detail and the role of the border in imperial policing activities.

The fourth major factor in border control operations is the allocation of security forces for the mission. The counterinsurgent force must consider what type of force to allocation, whether they are police, irregular forces, paramilitary forces, conventional military, or special forces. Another consideration is the type of mission the security forces should have at the border. Missions could range from operating static, border checkpoints, conducting mobile patrolling, or launching cross-border interdiction missions. The counterinsurgent must nest these considerations with the strategic goals for the border.

A subset of this factor is also the decision as to the type of local security forces the counterinsurgent force should raise in the area, or even if local security forces should be raised. The cultural demographics for the region should heavily influence this decision as to the need for local security forces, and if needed, the recommended composition.

An example of the role played by the composition of security forces occurs during the Malayan Emergency of 1948-1960. The major grievance driving the Chinese insurgency was the lack of Chinese representation in the Malayan government. During World War II, the Japanese occupiers of Malaya had singled out the Chinese population for harsh treatment. In addition, the Chinese had fought actively in the organized resistance movements against the Japanese occupation, which many of the Malaysians had not done. Following the defeat of Imperial Japan in 1945, the Chinese population in Malaya expected to receive a representative share of political and economic power in the country, especially since they had fought against the occupiers. Though the Chinese insurgents had communist backing, the central grievance was about equal representation in the country's governance, not an economic ideology.³⁴

As the insurgency in Malaya spread in 1948-1949, the British working through the Malayan government worked to develop Chinese representation in the police. The British also induced the Malaysians to create position for Chinese Affairs Officers, and Chinese Home Guard provided security for the resettlement "New Villages." All these efforts, plus negotiated settlements for government representation based on the proportion of Chinese, Malayan, and Indian members of the population, addressed the central grievance of the Chinese insurgents. The British and Malayan forces raised the right local security forces for the conflict, not just any local security forces.³⁵

The Malayan Emergency demonstrated how best to raise a security force that undercut a central grievance exploited by an insurgency. Efforts by the United States and its coalitions to raise security forces in Iraq have had an opposite effect. Initially, United States, operating in most of the Iraqi urban centers, did not focus on raising security forces that the population would perceive as working in their interest. Shi'a and Kurds joined the fledging Iraqi Army, Iraqi National Police, and Iraqi local police forces in large numbers, including a large number of Shi'a and Kurdish militia members. With the Sunnis refusing to join or fight their own tribesmen, the Iraqi security forces, especially the police, gained a reputation for sectarianism. Following the Al Qaeda bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra, one of the major Shi'a holy sites in Iraq, a sectarian civil war commenced in which the security forces were seen as playing an active role in conducting murders of rival sects. It was only through the combination of the decision by President Bush to authorize additional forces, the changes in leadership for the senior commander in

Iraq and at the United States Central Command, and the development of the Sons of Iraq Program, that allowed for a retraining and recruitment of a more professional Iraqi Security Force.³⁶

As well as considering whether to raise local security forces due to cultural considerations, another aspect for determining the best type of force is also the level of violence expected. The type of force employed must have the capability to protect itself and the population in the area from insurgent attack. A feature in many of the insurgencies of the 20th-century is the specific targeting of police and constabulary organizations by the insurgents in the early phases of the insurgency to remove the government's internal intelligence gathering capability.

During the Irish Rebellion of 1919-1921, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) specifically targeted the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC). This effectively removed the first line intelligence organization to identify members of both the political and military arms of the insurgency in a community. This led the British government to hire a large number of non-Irish personnel to fill the vacant positions in the RIC. A large number of the new recruits were recent veterans of World War I, and they received little training on police or paramilitary skills. The arrival of these British ex-Soldiers, wearing a combination of police and military uniforms, nicknamed the "Black and Tans" by the local Irish, increased the population's perceptions that Britain was sending an army of occupation. This inflamed Irish sentiment and increased the rebellion, leading to a British withdrawal from Ireland and establishment of Home Rule in 1921.³⁷

There are no quick answers for how a counterinsurgent force should address border control within their campaign. Careful study of the physical terrain, cultural demographics, and allocation of security forces all within a strategic framework must drive the campaign decisions regarding border control. The following two case studies examine in detail efforts by western forces to control their border areas during counterinsurgency and imperial policing operations. Both campaigns provide examples of successes and failures for how to best control border regions.

Notes

1. The term counterinsurgency from this point forth includes counterinsurgency, counter-revolutionary warfare, imperial policing, and keeping the peace operations.

2. I include a brief examination of Roman efforts to control the empire's borders in response to recent publishing by some theorists that refer to a "Roman Way" to conduct counterinsurgency. This "Roman Way" seems based on a false view of how the Roman Empire managed its border. An example of this view is Michael Cohen's "Tossing the Afghan COIN," *The Nation* (3 January 2011), www.thenation.com/article/157154/tossing-afghan-COIN (accessed 20 October 2011). Although Colonel Gian Gentile does not use the term "Roman Way" of counterinsurgency, many identify his arguments against the "population-centric" COIN debate with the "Roman Way".

3. Both these distinctions are important when examining the Roman Empire of the post-Republic Period and the British Empire in the late 19th-century. Both empires needed to demarcate their boundaries so the population knew, respectively, where Roman and British power stopped, and also where the benefits of the empires extended.

4. A number of examples of population discontent with political borders appear to within Central Asia and the Middle East following the Versailles Treaty of 1919. With the demarcations of the areas that had been part of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East, the British and French governments separated a number of tribally and culturally similar groups. This would have some repercussions in later counterinsurgency operations, especially in Iraq from 2003 to 2011, as insurgents received support from cross-border tribal groups. Halim Barakat, *The Arab World: Society, Culture, and State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 251-256; Richard Engel, *War Journal: My Five Years in Iraq* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008), 79-82.

5. Galula, 35.

6. Mao Tse-Tung, "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War," *Selected Military Writing of Mao Tse-Tung*, ed. Mao Tse-Tung (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1967), 167.

7. Tse-Tung, 173. Mao specifically states, "By and large, the vastness of China's territory and the enemy's shortage of troops provide guerrilla warfare in China with this condition."

8. Tse-Tung, 172.

9. For more information on the 1962 RAND Corporation Symposium on Counterinsurgency, see Chapter 1.

10. Stephen T. Hosmer and Sibylle O. Crane, ed., *Counterinsurgency, A Symposium, April 16-20, 1962* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1963), 41-45.

11. There are a number of sources for the Peninsular War. One of the best histories is the *Spanish Ulcer* by David Gates. There is also Charles Esdaile's *Peninsular Eyewitnesses: The Experience of War in Spain and Portugal, 1808-1813*, Owen Connelly's *Napoleon's Satellite Kingdoms and Blundering to Glory: Napoleon's Military Campaigns*.

12. Roy Adkins, *Nelson's Trafalgar* (New York: Viking Press, 2004), 328-335. Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington who commanded the British Army during the Peninsular Campaign, stated, "If anyone wishes to know the history of this war, I will tell them that it is our maritime superiority which gives me the power of maintaining my army while the enemy are unable to do so." Adkin, 335.

13. Brian McAllister Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899-1902* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2000), 131. The town of Zamboanga is on the southwestern tip of the Philippine Island of Mindanao. The blockade was unpopular with some in the US Navy due to its questionable legal status and the level of hardship imposed on the Filipino population. The blockade did also interdict a large amount of legal trade, which General Otis, the American Commander during this period, believed might negatively affect reestablishing order.

14. James H. Willbanks, *Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2008), 70-72. Efforts by the US Military to disrupt movement along the Ho Chi Minh Trail will be examined in greater detail further in the chapter.

15. The best example of this is the lack of a cross-border safe haven for the Chinese insurgents during the Malayan Emergency, who did not share the same ethnicity as the border region population, who were Malayan and Thai. Thompson highlights in his work *Defeating Communist Insurgency* that Malaya only had a 150-mile border with another country, Thailand. Since the Malayan Emergency pitted the Malayan Government, with British support, against an ethnically Chinese insurgency, the border with Thailand was relatively inconsequential. This was also one of the reasons the Chinese used the jungles for their safe havens. This would greatly assist Malayan and British efforts to control this insurgency. Thompson, 19.

16. Rod Thornton, "Getting it Wrong: The Crucial Mistakes Made in the Early Stages of the British Army's Deployment to Northern Ireland (August 1969 to March 1972)," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 30, no. 1 (February 2007): 82-83. The missteps included using the Protestant names for Londonderry, the initial force package into Belfast was the wrong troops (mainly consisted of the Scots Guards Regiment, who as Presbyterians, appeared to naturally side with the Protestants), and during initial demonstrations tended to face the Catholic crowds with their bayoneted rifles. This all led to a perception within the Catholic community that the British Army was not there to provide assistance, but to subjugate the Catholics. Additional information can also be found in David McKittrick's *Making Sense of the Troubles* and Kevin Toolis's *Rebel Hearts*.

17. Dr. Carter Malkasian, "Counterinsurgency in Iraq," in *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*, ed. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 2010), 287-304.

18. McCuen, 68-60.

19. Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, 35-41.

20. Trinquier, 78.

21. Trinquier, 81.

22. Alistair Horne, "The French Army and the Algerian War 1954-62," in *Regular Armies and Insurgency*, ed. Ronald Haycock (London: Croom Helm, 1979), 80. One can find the description for how the French constructed the Morice Line in the 1962 RAND Symposium, 45. David Galula was the counterinsurgency practitioner who provided the details during the Symposium.

23. Alistair Horne, *Savage War of Peace, Algeria 1954-1962* (New York: New York Review Books, 2006), 263-264.

24. Alistair Horne, "The French Army and the Algerian War 1954-1962," 81-82; Douglas Porch, "French Imperial Warfare 1945-1962," in *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*, ed. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 2010), 88-99.

25. The Rhodesian Insurgency pitted the white African government of Ian Smith against a communist-inspired, anti-colonial insurgency composed of two armed groups, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZAPRA). The two armed organization tended along tribal lines. Robert Mugabe was a member of ZANLA and its political wing the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Dr. J. R. T. Wood, "Countering the *Chimurenga*," in *Countering Modern Insurgency*, ed. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (Oxford: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 2010), 191-208.

26. One of the first and largest external operations conducted by the Rhodesians was Operation *DINGO*, which occurred from 23-26 November 1977. The attack involved 165 Rhodesian Special Air Service, Rhodesian Light Infantry, Selous Scouts, and Rhodesian African Rifles who conducted an airborne assault into an insurgent base camp across the Rhodesian border to Mozambique. The insurgent camp strength the Rhodesians estimated between 9,000-10,000 insurgents. The operation employed Rhodesian ground and air forces over a three-day period. Estimates following the battle indicate the Rhodesians killed over 5,000 insurgents, over 20 percent of the overall insurgent strength, with very few Rhodesian casualties. There was some international condemnation of the attack, but that did not dissuade Rhodesia from continuing cross-border operations, though none of the future operations had the level of success of Operation *DINGO*, 202-203; J. R. T. Wood, *Counter-Strike from the Sky: The Rhodesian All-Arms Fireforce in the War in the Bush, 1974-1980* (Johannesburg: 30 Degree South Publishers, 2009), 123-206.

27. Wood, *Counter-Strike from the Sky*, 44-49.

28. Wood, 205-208. There has been a recent increase in books by Rhodesian veterans, which provide a more complete picture of the last years of the Rhodesian country and the cross-border operations conducted by the Rhodesian military. Some of these works are: *The Bush War in Rhodesia* by Dennis Croukamp, *The Saint: The Rhodesian Light Infantry* by Alexandre Binda and Chris Cocks, *Fireforce: One Man's War in the Rhodesian Light Infantry* by Chris Cocks, *Masodja: The History of the Rhodesian African Rifles and Its Forerunner, the Rhodesian Native Regiment* by Alexandre Binda.

29. Willbanks, 69-86. The US-South Vietnamese raid into Cambodia captured and/or destroyed over 16-million rounds of small-arms ammunition, 2500 crew-served weapons, 68,000 mortar rounds, 435 vehicles, and 14-million pounds

of rice. This had significant impacts upon the North Vietnamese Army's ability to resupply itself in South Vietnam. Unfortunately, the long term effects would cripple the US-South Vietnamese war efforts as US public opinion, which was already waiving for the war, collapsed.

30. Edward N. Luttwak. *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, From the First Century A.D. to the Third* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 60. The policy of demarcation, building defensive walls, and not venturing forward of the demarcations is very similar to the Close Border Policy used by the British Empire in the North-West Frontier during the 19th-century. This concept will be examined in Chapter 3 of this thesis.

31. This is based on a collection of works including: Herodian of Antioch. *History of the Roman Empire: From the Death of Marcus Aurelius to the Accession of Gordian III*, trans. Edward C. Echols (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1961), 14; Luttwak, 86-108; Arther Ferrill, *The Fall of the Roman Empire: The Military Explanation* (London: Thames and Hudson, Ltd., 1986), 10-30.

32. Luttwak, 122-123.

33. Luttwak 168-171.

34. James S. Corum, "Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgencies," *Strategic Studies Institute*, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=648> (accessed 1 June 2011).

35. Richard Stubbs, "From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds," in *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*, ed. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 2010), 101-118; Karl Hack, "The Malayan Emergency as a Counter-Insurgency Paradigm," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 32, no. 3 (June 2009): 383-414. The changes in the Malayan security forces to accommodate the Chinese is often overlooked aspect of the Malayan Emergency, as many historians tend to focus on the Briggs-vs.-Templer debate or the role of forced resettlement had on ending the insurgency.

36. Carter Malkasian, "Counterinsurgency in Iraq," 287-306; CB20110904M0001_SESSION1A, Interview.

37. Charles Townsend, "In Aid of the Civil Power: Britain, Ireland, and Palestine, 1916-1948," in *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*, ed. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 2010), 21-29; Hugh Jeudwine, "A Record of the Rebellion in Ireland in 1920-1, and the Part Played by the Army in Dealing with it (Intelligence)," in *British Intelligence in Ireland: The Final Reports*, ed. Peter Hart (Cork: Cork University Press, 2002), 17-60.

Chapter 4

Case Study: The North-West Frontier

The North-West Frontier Province was a region of the British Indian Empire, which served as a source of near constant strife and turmoil for the British government from the middle of the 19th-century through to the Partition of India and Pakistan in 1947.¹

The region had an amalgamation of tribes, harsh terrain, and limited resources that contributed to the sources of conflict between the British and local tribes in this region. British interest in the North-West Frontier arose following the annexation of the Punjab Region in 1849, which led to a desire by the British to secure the borders of this major agricultural region.

Throughout the ninety-seven year period of responsibility for the North-West Frontier, the British Government attempted to develop a coherent strategy for the region, which would reduce the violence and create some level of long-term stability in the area. Debates would rage in India and in the British Parliament over how much responsibility the British had to improve conditions for the tribes in this region, or whether to focus on policies of noninterference. Operations by the Indian Army² in the North-West Frontier Province would bear many of the hallmarks of the frontier wars fought by the British Empire, including the use of indigenous forces in an attempt to pacify tribal areas, conducting tribal negotiations to broker agreements, and punitive expeditions in response to cross-border attacks.³

Over time, the British Empire pursued a number of border and tribal policies in an attempt to bring lasting stability to this region. Due to the various tribal and ethnic groups competing for control of the region, British civil administrators and military officers undertook nuanced and varied approaches to integrate the tribes into the regional administration with varied levels of success. Following the Partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, this region fell under the control of Pakistan, and became a source of instability for the region following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.⁴

In order to develop a comprehensive picture of policy within the North-West Frontier, this case study will examine the terrain and people, the border policies, and the raising of indigenous security forces through the lens of the three major border policies: the closed, forward, and modified forward policies. Up until the Partition of India and Pakistan, the military operations conducted by the Indian Army in this region fell under

the British concepts of imperial policing and providing military aid to civil authorities. Imperial policing served as the basis for the development of British counterinsurgency policies as the concepts developed in the 1960s. This is relevant in that many of the considerations taken by the British for the region have importance in the modern study of counterinsurgency, especially in relation to post-9/11 operations in Afghanistan. Additionally, this study of the North-West Frontier provides an examination of different policies and actions to secure a restive border, which has application for future counterinsurgency operations in tribal and underdeveloped areas.⁵

Terrain and People

In order to understand the types of policies and operations the British Empire embarked on in the North-West Frontier, it is beneficial to examine the terrain and people that inhabited this region of the world. The North-West Frontier, now called the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), occupied the region of India bounded by the Kingdom of Afghanistan to the west, the Baluchistan Province to the southwest, the Indus River to the southeast and the Kashmir Province to the Northeast.

The region abuts the Hindu-Kush Mountains located to the north, which contains mountains up to 20,000 feet in height. The mountains then gradually decrease in size as one moves south. This produces a patchwork of fertile, valleys where populations could subsist. These valleys are relatively isolated as only one or two passes bisect the mountains into the valleys. This produces a population that is very insular from other groups outside of the specific valley one lives, creating a degree of xenophobia amongst the valley populations.⁶

The largest ethnic group within the North-West Frontier was the Pathans.⁷ The Pathan ethnic group occupied an area from the Indus River on the east, to the boundary of the Persian Empire to the west. The Sulaiman Mountain Range, which feeds to the Hindu-Kursh Mountains, provided the northern line for the Pathan people, and to the south, the Pathans abutted with the Baluch culture.⁸

The Pathans are an amalgamation of groups that passed through the region over time. They draw their identity from a belief that they descend from one of the lost tribes of Israel, but also had contact with Alexander the Great's forces in the fourth-century BC, as the Greeks passed through on the way to the Indus River. The Pathans also had contact with the Mongol armies of Genghis Khan, as he conquered the region between the Hindu-Kush Mountains to the Indus River. A characteristic that starts to define the Pathan culture is its position between empires, with the Punjab to the

East and the Persian to the west. In addition, the Pathans, and the land they occupied, represented the crossroad, which empires passed through to reach other empires.⁹




Figure 2. Map of the North-West Frontier.

Source: J. G. Bartholomew, North-West Frontier Province and Kashmir, Imperial Gazetteer of India, Volume 19 (Clarendon Press, 1909), http://dsal.uchicago.edu/maps/gazetteer/images/gazetteer_V19_pg218.jpg (accessed 6 November 2011). Adapted by author.

Another of the defining features of the Pathan people is their shared belief in the *Pashtunwali* code. *Pashtunwali* is the core of tribal interactions and personal conduct for the Pathans. *Pashtunwali* is a rigidly enforced code within the Pathan people, as it serves as a buttress against the strong

individualism of the Pathans.¹⁰ There are many tenets a Pathan must follow, but the three most important are *badal* [revenge], *melmastia* [hospitality], and *nang* [honor]. A fourth component was the use of a *jirga* [council] to mediate disputes and conflicts between tribes. These four components are a major source of Pathan identity and conflict-resolution structure.¹¹




Figure 3. Disposition of Pathan People.

Source: Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 534. Adapted by author. The dots represent the concentration of Pathans by population density within the Pathan belt.

Colonel J. P. Villiers-Stuart, who wrote an influential work on operations in the North-West Frontier Province, stated about the Pathan character:

A great many people have tried to describe Afghan and Pathan character, and found it difficult because it is a mass of contradictions. They are often recklessly brave, and nearly always brave, yet rather easily discouraged by failure. Very proud of their race, and of their honor, yet often treacherous and faithless.¹²

This dichotomy of character would prove very frustrating for western officials as they conducted negotiations and interactions with the Pathan tribes. What does emerge when studying the Pathan character is the importance of self-interest, which may point to difficulties in reaching a negotiated, long-term settlement with Pathan tribes.¹³

In addition to the Pathans, a second major group that influenced the North-West Frontier Province are the Baluchs. They occupied the land south of the Pathan people, in which the geography produced a different tribal organization and type of people. The land consisted of open desert, arid mountains, and small areas of cultivation that follow the drainage. Though the Baluch areas extended to the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea, the terrain only made one harbor possible in Karachi.¹⁴

One of the key differences between the Baluch people and the Pathans is the strong hierarchical structure of the Baluch people. The tribal chiefs held the power within Baluch tribes and the members followed his rulings. This hierarchical structure most likely stemmed from the harsh conditions in which the Baluchs lived, as well as the cultural tradition of trading. In addition, the British viewed the Pathans as “fanatical and priest-ridden”, while they viewed the Baluchs as “free from religious bigotry.”¹⁵

The terrain and people within the North-West Frontier Province had significant impacts upon how the British conducted operations in the area and worked to develop their border policy.

The Closed Border Period (1849-1881)

British interest in the North-West Frontier began following the Second Sikh War and annexation of the Punjab Region in 1849. This interest derived both from a desire to ensure a defensible border for the Punjab as well as a way to address the tribal raids that originated in the Pathan and Baluch areas into this newly acquired region. The acquisition of the Punjab also coincided with the end of the First Anglo-Afghan War, 1838-1842, which built a desire within the British government for a border that did not include the Kingdom of Afghanistan.¹⁶

As the British government interacted with the tribes in the North-West Frontier, the recruitment of local security forces became a major priority for the government. The British government hoped that with the creation of locally manned security forces, the tribes would integrate into the British system and violence would reduce. Within some parts of the North-West Frontier, this would be the case, while in others, especially in Pathan dominated regions, the inter-tribal violence and conflicts would prove major obstacles to stability.

Initially, the British government only wanted influence over the mountain regions, and they did not want full control or responsibility for the tribes west of the Indus River. In addition, from 1849 until 1893, the border between the British Indian Empire and the Kingdom of Afghanistan was undefined. This created a nebulous space between Afghanistan, the Punjab Region, and the “Independent Tribal Area.”¹⁷ The policy the British developed to deal with this area called for the raising of local forces to serve as a police force at the edges of the frontier, non-engagement with the tribes, and the use of punitive expeditions against belligerent tribes. This policy was called the “Close Border Policy.”¹⁸

The Close Border Policy instituted by the British government regulated British interaction with the tribes located north-west of the Indus River. A central tenet of this policy was noninterference with tribal governance in the tribal zones from the Indus River to the Kingdom of Afghanistan. The British government employed a system of punitive expeditions, written agreements between tribes, and allowances for good behavior, called *muwajib*, to enforce behavior on the tribes.¹⁹

The first action the British commander, Sir Henry Lawrence, undertook after the annexation of the Punjab Region in 1849 was to raise local security force to provide security for the boundaries of the Punjab. There had been a locally hired, mixed tribe organization, known as the Frontier Militia, which proved unreliable, and Lawrence raised an organization, called the Corps of Guides, in 1846 to assist with policing the Punjab Region.²⁰ With the full annexation of the Punjab, Lawrence required a larger, uniformed organization to secure the border from outside raiders.

This organization raised in 1849 the British named the Punjab Irregular Force, or the PIF. The initial organization consisted of ten regiments, evenly split between infantry and cavalry. The PIF had mixed race companies, consisting of Punjabi “Musalmans” [Muslims], Sikhs, and Pathan Soldiers, and a British Commandant with three British officers for each regiment. Organizationally, the PIF fell under direct civil control through the Board of Administration of the Punjab. Recruitment of Soldiers and leaders focused on both sides of the Punjab boundary, and the British formed mixed race companies.²¹

The PIF’s mission was to secure the border of the Punjab Province from tribal raids, provide internal security around the border, and prevent safe haven for outlaws in the border areas from between Kohat and Mithunkote. In order to accomplish this mission, the PIF had five infantry and five cavalry regiments. The PIF leadership organized two infantry

regiments, a cavalry regiment and an artillery battery in each district. A series of forts, supported by a road running parallel to the border, allowed the PIF to rapid respond to any incursion.²²




Figure 4. Location of Initial Punjab Irregular Force Recruitment Sites.

Source: Resource Maps. Adapted by the author.

From 1849 through 1881, the Indian Army conducted over 23 punitive expeditions into these tribal areas in retribution for tribal raids. The operations earned the nickname “butcher and bolt” expeditions from Indian troops, since the Indian Army never sought to occupy the tribal territories they marched against. These punitive operations became increasingly unpopular, as Indian forces rarely had the necessary intelligence to target the specific individuals or tribal groups who conducted the raids into the Punjab. This led to the Indian punitive expedition burning villages and taking livestock, in order to force the Pathan tribes to fight and as retribution for the earlier raids. Following these expeditions, the Indian Army would withdraw back into the Punjab having little interactions with the Pathan tribes until the next punitive expedition.²³

Beyond the punitive expeditions, the British would use fines and blockades to punish belligerent tribes. However, later writings indicated that these two forms of punishment rarely produced any tangible results. One problem with these punishments was the requirement for British presence to enforce them. Secondly, due to the *Pashtunwali* tenet of *nanawatia* (hospitality), it was impossible to force a Pathan to deny someone sanctuary.²⁴

The British government also attempted to employ non-punitive means to control the tribes within the North-West Frontier. Two key methods the British used were written agreements between the British government and local tribes and the paying of allowances by the British to tribes for good behavior. The British relied on intermediaries, called *Arbabs*, to facilitate these negotiations. These *Arbabs* had questionable motivation and the British had difficulty knowing what was actually worked out between the tribes and the *Arbabs* at the British's behest.²⁵

In the 1860s, the British undertook a reorganization of the local defense forces. One change was the creation of the Frontier Militia, who the British recruited from the Pathan tribes living on both sides of this administrative area. The Frontier Militia, which eventually became known as the Frontier Scouts, provided local intelligence and served as scouts for the conventional forces. In addition, in 1865, the British renamed the PIF to the Punjab Frontier Force, or "Piffers," as many called them.²⁶

The PIF initially fell under the Board of Administration, the civil authority in the Punjab. This gave the Board of Administration the ability to respond to tribal raids with a local force and did not have to receive permission from the Indian Central Government in Calcutta. This civil control of the PIF would exist until 1886, when the British Army reorganized all of its irregular forces and place all of them under military control.²⁷

Two other organizations operated with the PIF. They were the Sind Camel Corps and the Corps of Guides, and within a few years, these two organizations became a part of the PIF. The Sind Camel Corps provided the PIF with the capability to more large number of Soldiers with logistical supplies within an hour's notice. The Corps of Guides the British intended to provide intelligence on the terrain and cultures in the border region, as well as provide escorts during reconnaissance operations. The officers staffing the Guides also had magisterial powers and could serve in police duties if the situation required. The Guides predated the PIF and proved a reliable force following the Sikh Wars and the Great Mutiny of 1857.²⁸

The PIF and Guide Corps received modern arms from the British government, issuing percussion muskets to four of the regiments and rifles to the fifth. The regiments had a mixture of uniforms with three regiments in traditional, scarlet British uniforms, one regiment in green (the First Regiment, who were the Rifles), and one regiment in brown. The Guides wore brown uniforms, which would eventual transition into khaki uniforms, which would be the dominant uniform for operations in the North-West Frontier.²⁹

During punitive expeditions, the organization and capability of the PIF and Guides would prove invaluable during the fighting in the hills and mountains in the frontier regions. One issue that started to become apparent within the Indian Army was the lack of mountain capability within the Bengal Army, which the government organized along traditional British structures and uniforms. The Eusufzye Field Force expedition in late 1863 represented this difference in capability, as the largest force assembled since the First Anglo-Afghan War took to the field. The expedition ended up taking large casualties before it destroyed the village of Malka and ended the campaign.³⁰

The Close Border Policy would govern British interactions with the Independent Tribal Areas until after the Second Afghan War, 1878-1881.³¹ Once the British concluded hostilities with the Kingdom of Afghan, British officials began to examine their border policies and their effectiveness. At this same period, the British administrator in Baluchistan, Colonel Sir Robert Sandeman, was having success with a different approach to how he interacted with the Baluch tribes.

During the 1870s, the Close Border Policy became increasingly unpopular with the British Government and military leaders. This unpopularity arose from the cost of prolonged military operations, which produced few definitive results, a desire to ensure Tsarist Russia could not interfere with British affairs in India, and a belief among some civil administrators they would bring the benefits of “civilization” to the frontier region. This led to a willingness among British administrators to look for a new policy for tribal interactions in the North-West Frontier.

In 1874, the government in the United Kingdom underwent a turnover in leadership, as Benjamin Disraeli assumed the duties of Prime Minister at the head of the Conservative Party. This opened the possibility for new policies for tribal interactions in the North-West Frontier, especially if the tribal interactions worked to strengthen British control in the region and deny Russian access to the British Empire in India.³²

Two major policy changes arose soon after, which allowed the British an opportunity to change fundamentally their tribal interactions in the North-West Frontier. The first major change was the introduction of the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR). The other was Colonel Sir Robert Sandeman's negotiated Treat of 1876 with the Baluch tribes in Baluchistan. These changes would provide a means for other British civil administrators to change how they interacted with tribes within the North-West Frontier.³³

The FCR was a system of local governance developed in 1872, which moved certain criminal cases from civil courts to tribal arbitration. The FCR had specific provision that made any crimes committed on roads under British jurisdiction, this also applied to crimes, which passed over roads, such as two tribes firing shots at one another over a road. In addition, the FCR outlined the penalties the *jirgas* could impose, and outlined conditions in which the British government could authorize punitive expeditions or blockades against noncompliant tribes. Many, especially Sir Olaf Caroe, the anthropologist and British colonial administrator in the North-West Frontier Province, saw the FCR as a failure since it "satisfied neither the law nor the custom."³⁴ However, the FCR remained in effect for the tribal areas through to the Partition of India and Pakistan in 1947 and remains the basis of law for the FATA to this day.³⁵

The second major change in policy within the tribal regions was Colonel Sir Robert Sandeman's negotiated treaty with the Baluch tribes in 1876. Though not officially part of the North-West Frontier, his engagements would influence engagements within in the North-West Frontier as others attempted to replicate Sandeman's policies. The negotiations conducted by Sandeman established a system of indirect rule over the Baluch tribes in the area. The deal struck in 1876 by Colonel Sandeman would bear the name the "Sandeman System."³⁶

Under the Sandeman System, the Baluch tribes were free to manage their internal tribal affairs without interference from British police or government officials, but the village leaders, or *Maliks*, had to provide levies to the government to serve as tribal local security forces trained by the British. Meanwhile, the British instituted a system of road and rail construction to open up Baluchistan to trade, and the British garrisoned Soldiers in Quetta, the capital of the Baluchistan. Sandeman was able to reinforce the weakened tribal structure of the Baluchs in the area. He also worked to address what he believed was the source of instability, which was the poverty of the tribes.³⁷

The Sandeman System's implementation in Baluchistan aligned with the cultural structures and mores of the Baluch culture, which was not the case in the North-West Frontier. Primarily, the Baluch tribes were very hierarchical and they were not Pathans. The Baluchs, having a different ethnic and cultural background than the Pathans, did not follow the tenets of *Pushtunwali*. With a hierarchical structure, the Baluchs tended to sentence punishments under the Frontier Crimes Regulations that satisfied the British administrators. In addition, the Baluchs were a much smaller population, living in a much smaller part of the district compared to the North-West Frontier. This made administering the district much easier for all parties, and the Baluchs had had very little interaction with the British before these negotiations. Lastly, Sandeman, though his system worked by empowering the tribal leaders, had Indian Army Soldiers stationed in Quetta, the district's capital, to immediately respond with punitive action against noncompliant tribes. This system represented a balance of reward and punishment to encourage compliant behavior from the Baluchs.³⁸

Many have used the Sandeman System as a synonym for the Forward Policy. These policies were different however, and though the Sandeman System served as a model for others for tribal engagements, it was not until the 1880s through early 20th-century that a Forward Policy was pursued in the North-West Frontier as a matter of strategy.³⁹

Forward Border Period (1881-1905)

Following the initial success of the Sandeman System and the conclusion of the Second Anglo-Afghan War, the British civil administrators began to implement the Forward Policy within the North-West Frontier. A major component of this was the creation of additional security forces. In 1878, Colonel Robert Warburton entered into negotiations with the Afridi clan. These negotiations led to the creation of an Afridi-based security force to protect the tenuous pass through the mountains in this province, while the British government in turn would not interfere with tribal feuds in the district.⁴⁰ The Khyber Pass was a critical commercial, as well as military, route to move between Afghanistan and India. This local security force, known as the Khyber Rifles, was one of the first native levies raised in the North-West Frontier and would be a base of comparison by British authorities for other native levies.⁴¹

With the success in Khyber, other British officials would implement elements of the Khyber and Sandeman systems into their districts. What becomes apparent though, is what the Sandeman System or, as Brigadier E.C. Gepp, the Western Commander for the Army in India, wrote in 1931,

“the policy of peaceful penetration” required was the ability to enforce tribal responsibility. The ability of the British to enforce this accountability would tax their abilities as they brought the Forward Policy into the center of the Pathan people.⁴²

As the Second Anglo-Afghan War concluded in 1881, the British government began implementing parts of a more forward boarder policy in the North-West Frontier. With the rise of the Forward Policy, a critical element required for this policy to work was a clear delineation between the Kingdom and Afghanistan and the British Indian Empire. This requirement drove the British Commission, led by Sir Mortimer Durand, to negotiate a country boundary with Afghanistan in 1893. This boundary would be known as the “Durand Line” and is still a source of friction and misunderstanding between the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan.⁴³

With the establishment of the Durand Line, the British Empire could work towards a more progressive policy of engagement with the tribes between the Indus and Durand Line. With the creation of a physical marker for what the British considered the extent of its Indian boundary, it was possible for the British to recognize which tribes to engage and which to exclude from its sphere of influence. In addition, the British, in theory, could hold the Kingdom of Afghanistan accountable for tribal areas on the other side of the line. Without this defined boundary, it would have been difficult to attempt a change in the border policies.⁴⁴

During the late 19th-century, a theory called the “Martial Races” developed within the British and Indian military. This idea postulated that certain races had the innate capability for successful military services. The races associated with this theory were the Scottish Highlanders, Indian Sihks, Nepalese Gurkhas, and Pathan Muslims. This idea would drive Indian Army recruiting efforts, and would lead to a large number of Pathan recruits across the Indian Army. Lieutenant General George MacMunn, an Indian Army veteran a major proponent of this theory, wrote in 1901, “Hardy, active, alert, and inured to war, are these clansmen of the Afghan hills, endued with considerable courage when well led, and capable of much *élan*.”⁴⁵

The belief in martial races would lead to number of recruiting efforts to raise local security forces in the Pathan regions. In addition to the multi-tribal Piffers and the Khyber Rifles, the Indian Army made efforts to recruit the future Frontier Militia (Scouts). Once Lord Curzon assumed the position of Viceroy in 1899, these local security forces became the primary means to secure the North-West Frontier.

Under the direction of Lord Curzon, the Indian Army raised tribal forces named the Kurram, Zhob, North and South Waziristan Militia, and Chitral Scouts. These organizations had Indian officers seconded from the Indian Army to provide the leadership to raise the force. The major issue was a lack of other conventional forces to mentor and assist the officers in training the forces. These militias contained roughly 500 light infantrymen, and manned forts and piquets to interdict and disrupt raiding parties from the Afghan side of the Durand Line.⁴⁶

In 1903, the Piffers ceased being a separate administrative unit, and became a fully incorporated part of the Indian Army.⁴⁷ They were no longer dedicated to just operations in the North-West Frontier, and though they retained the title “Frontier Force”, they saw duty across the Indian Empire and overseas.⁴⁸

Other aspects of the Forward Policy began to break down in the early 20th-Century. As mentioned previously, the Pathans’ cultural mores focused on a high degree of individualism and consensus building for tribal agreements. This strong cultural pull made the fundamental tenet of tribal responsibility a near impossibility for the Pathan tribes to accomplish. Combining these tenets with the principle of hospitality within *Pashtunwali*, the Pathans rarely enforced the FCR to a degree that was acceptable to the British civil administrators.⁴⁹

The Forward Policy would never achieve the level of success in the Pathan regions that Sandeman saw in the Baluch regions. One reason may also have been how the Viceroy, Lord Curzon, elected to allocate Indian regular forces. Under the Sandeman System, the Baluchs had regular forces immediately posted in Quetta, followed by the recruitment of Baluchs into the Indian Army. This served as a demonstration of British intent and provided Sandeman the capability to employ military forces quickly, if needed, to force compliance. Lord Curzon saw native levies as the answer to questions of security, which would have uneven performance when used as a punitive force against their own tribes in later expeditions. By not having the same capability to force compliance, any potential to replicate the Sandeman System failed at the onset.⁵⁰

During the 1890s, there were a series of tribal uprisings among the Pathan tribes, which led to punitive expeditions or fierce fighting between the Indian forces and locals. One uprising in Khyber, even led to the Khyber Rifles having to fight their own tribesmen. Due to the levels of unrest during this period, Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, decided in 1901 to form the North-West Frontier into its own province, separate from

the Punjab Province. It was from this period that the North-West Frontier Province came into being as a full province rather than just a frontier.⁵¹

Modified Forward Border Period (1905-1947)

Following the creation of the North-West Frontier Province, there was a relative calm within the region until the end of World War I. It was not until 1919 when the North-West Frontier Province became the focal point of the Third Anglo-Afghan War. This confrontation differed from the past two in that Afghanistan was the aggressor and invaded across the Durand Line. Afghanistan's leader, Amir Amanullah, hoped to gain control of Peshawar, as well as regain control over Afghanistan's foreign policy. The war was a shorter campaign than the last two Anglo-Afghan Wars, lasting from 3 May to 9 August 1919. The British government employed ground forces, armored vehicles, and aircraft in its defeat of the Afghan army.⁵²

During the Third Anglo-Afghan War, the British government disbanded a number of the local security forces, including the Khyber Rifles, the Northern Waziristan Militia, and Southern Waziristan Militia.⁵³ These organizations during this conflict were unable to enforce the desired British policy upon their tribesmen, which led to their disbandment by the Indian Army.⁵⁴ A major side effect was the destabilization of many parts of the North-West Frontier Province, especially in Waziristan. This deterioration in conditions was the result of both the disbandment of mutinous militias and a major increase in raiding by tribes in the area.

The combination of disbanded militias and increased Pathan raiding led the Indian Army to undertake a new recruiting effort to raise reliable, local security forces. A major reform to the recruitment was the banning of single tribe garrisons. The Indian Officers believed this would help prevent mutiny. Though it did make training more difficult with a more diversity for each garrison, there was also focused effort to recruit from both sides of the Durand Line to create a balanced force. Recruitment also did not include Waziris or Mahsuds for any of the reformed frontier units, due to their unreliability. This volatility led to a series of punitive expeditions by the Indian Army into the North-West Frontier Province to restore order.⁵⁵

The initial punitive expedition launched in late 1919 to suppress this unrest within the Waziristan District was a disaster for the Indian Army. The force, named the Derajat Column, suffered very high casualties during a series of engagement with tribesmen from 19 to 21 December 1919. One major reason for the losses was the degradation of mountain and frontier-fighting capability within the Indian Army, due to an overexpansion of the Indian Army during World War I. Prior to World War I, the Indian Army

had a large cadre of experienced Soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers in mountain warfare. After the heavy attrition sustained during conventional operations in the Great War, the frontier fighting capability was deficient. In addition, the tribesmen reached a level of parity with the Indian infantrymen in terms of weapon capability and marksmanship. No longer could the British expect an easy, overwhelming victory over native tribesmen.⁵⁶

Through the 1920s and 1930s, the British border policy in the North-West Frontier Province shifted to a “modified forward policy.” The modified forward policy continued tribal engagements in regions that complied with British rule, while in restive regions a policy more in line with the Close Border Policy of non-interference was the norm. In 1922, the Indian Army established a presence in Waziristan in Razmak in order to emplace a force capable of punitive operations within the troublesome district.⁵⁷

The modified forward policy would remain contentious through to the Partition of India and Pakistan in 1947. Charles Edward Bruce, the son of Robert Bruce, was an outspoken critic of this modified policy, and wanted the British government to return to the Forward Policy in Waziristan. He believed the “Protected Area,” what he called the modified forward policy, did not create a policy of “control from within.”⁵⁸ Bruce believed this internal control was a critical element for tribal success in the frontier and the secret to Sandeman’s success in Baluchistan.

Following the start of the global economic depression in 1929, the British government did not have the money to invest in the North-West Frontier Province’s infrastructure, especially road construction. Bruce argues during this period that the cost of the infrastructure improvements would be vastly cheaper than the cost of the punitive expeditions, but the argument would fall on deaf ears.⁵⁹

Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the situation in Waziristan and in other districts within the North-West Frontier Province continued to deteriorate. This led to increasing number of punitive expeditions and military operations. One effect of these operations was a renewal in frontier warfare techniques and tactics. In addition, air support and armored vehicles saw increased service in the frontier fighting within this region, with mixed results. The Indian Army also continually examined means to create greater mobility for their forces operating in the frontier. This also led to a number of debates within the Indian Army about whether the British government should raise certain frontier forces, who only trained

on frontier fighting, with no focus on European tactics. The debate between “Borderers” and conventionalist was not decided before the outbreak of World War II.⁶⁰

During these debates on military organization, the Indian Army circulated three major works to assist in training, organizing, and conducting operations in the North-West Frontier. The first, *The Manual of Operations of the North-West Frontier of India*, provided guidance on how to plan operations against the Pathan tribes. A major focus of the writing is on securing the highest ground, establishing *piquets* in supporting locations to the movement, and ensuring Soldiers receive conditioning for operating in the mountains.⁶¹

The second work, *Letters of a Once Punjab Frontier Force Officer to His Nephew*, published in 1925 by J.P. Villiers-Stuart, provided advice and guidance for junior leaders new to the North-West Frontier Province. The major points highlighted within the work is the frank discussion on burning villages to draw the tribesmen out to fight, the importance of holding the high ground, and knowing the terrain. Villiers-Stuart repeatedly highlights that the tribesmen study the column for patterns and weaknesses, so units had to prepare for an adapting enemy.⁶²

The third work, *Passing It On: Short Talks on Tribal Fighting on the North-West Frontier of India*, was written by General Sir Andrew Skeen. He served as the expedition leader for the Derajat Column in 1919, and in 1932, wrote a work to pass key lessons on to junior officers and leaders operating within the North-West Frontier Province. General Skeen devoted a good portion of his work providing specific details of emplacing, removing and manning *piquets* during operations in the hills. *Passing It On* proved very popular and became required reading for officers operating in the North-West Frontier Province.

These works demonstrated both official and unofficial attempts to impart critical lessons for operating within the North-West Frontier Province. Casualty rates for the Indian Army proved very high during the punitive expeditions. Above and beyond the debate on training, other debates surface on equipping and organization for the frontier forces, as a conventional-focused force required heavier equipment and more machine guns, while a frontier-focused force in the mountains required speed, light equipment, and a higher concentration of rifles to mass against the tribesmen.⁶³

The unrest and punitive operations continued off and on from 1919 through the Partition in 1947. The punitive operations had mixed success

with bringing stability to an area, especially in the 1930s when anti-Imperial discontent grew stronger within the Pathan areas. In addition, a number of charismatic Pathan nationalist leaders and “Mad Mullahs”, attempting to incite religious warfare, would lead rebellions against British rule, which spawned more punitive expeditions.⁶⁴

The Pathan nationalist movements of the 1930s would consume a large portion of the British effort in the North-West Frontier, with the equivalent of three divisions dedicated to restoring order in Waziristan in 1936 alone. These operations provided little long-term security. With the arrival of World War II, and later the Partition of India and Pakistan, would the Indian Army depart the North-West Frontier.

Lessons of the North-West Frontier

As the British government withdrew from the North-West Frontier Province in 1947, they left a mixed record as to their success in this region. With just under 100 years of continuous operations in the region, there are many lessons produced during this time. Many of the problems that arose, and are still present in the region, can relate back to not synchronizing operations into a larger, overarching strategy for the region. Secondly, many problems arose from attempting to apply blanket policies across different tribal structures without regard to the cultural demographics. Finally, the lack of integration for recruiting local security forces with the strategic end state produced unreliable security forces in many areas.

The lack of a strategic vision for the North-West Frontier, especially following the Third Anglo-Afghan War, led to a series of short-term policy decisions that did not provide the level of stability desired by the British. The modified forward policy represents this strategic confusion, as the British reached out to some tribal areas, while had a policy of noninterference with others.⁶⁵

Secondly, the attempt to use blanket policies on different tribal structures produced a series of policies that were unsustainable for the British in the region. The major principle of the Forward Policy was ensuring tribal accountability by the tribal elders. This was also a major requirement for the FCR to have a positive impact upon the tribes. Instead, in Pathan regions, the *jirgas* prevented a means to hold individual and tribal groups accountable for their actions without longer-term punitive expeditions. There may have been more success for the Forward Policy if there was a means to hold the tribes, outside of punitive raids, accountable for their member’s actions.

Finally, the uneven recruiting of local security forces did not prepare the Indian Army for when some forces deserted or proved unwilling to engage their tribesmen militarily. This would lead to a reform in recruitment in the 1920s, following the chaos of the Third Anglo-Afghan War, when large numbers of local security forces either refused to fight or deserted their posts.

The North-West Frontier did develop the Indian Army's capability to wage mountain warfare and many of its security forces were the best in the world at mountain operations. Unfortunately, many of these lessons occurred after the Indian Army suffered high casualties during the opening stages of the campaign. A more integrated strategic vision for the region may have better prepared the Indian Army for these operations in terms of training, equipping, and manning.⁶⁶

Notes

1. Some of the secondary sources that provide descriptions of the of the specific campaigns from 1849 through 1947 include: Captain H. L. Nevill's *Campaigns on the North-West Frontier*, George MacMunn's *The Armies of India*, and Victoria Schofield's *Afghan Frontier: Feuding and Fighting in Central Asia*.

2. For the sake of clarity, this chapter will call all British and East India Company troops: the Indian Army. A full description of the development of the East India Company Army to the formation of the Indian Army, post-1860, with supporting British Army troops, can be found in many books. The best one volume is Phillip Mason's *A Matter of Honour*. The term British will be used when discussing civil administration and policy, as it was the product of the British Government.

3. A number of writers have studied the North-West Frontier, especially the district of Waziristan, since 2001. Jules Stewart has produced three works, *On Afghanistan's Plain*, *The Savage Border: the Story of the North-West Frontier* and *The Khybar Rifles*. T.R. Moreman's *The Army of India and the Development of Frontier Warfare, 1849-1947* is an excellent account of use of the Indian Army and the development of local security forces in this region. Also, Caroe's *The Pathans* is probably the most detailed, anthropological account of the Pashtu or Pathan People, though his account is becoming dated since he passed away at the start of the Soviet-Afghan War, so it does not include the effects of the Soviets, the Taliban and the post-9/11, 2011 activities on the region.

4. Once the North-West Frontier Province fell under Pakistani control, the government referred to the area as the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA). This region served as a major safe haven for the Afghan fighters during the Soviet Occupation of 1979 to 1989, and continues to serve as a safe haven for Haqqani Network and Taliban Fighters fighting against the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars* (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 131.

5. This region always fell under the British's ideas of imperial policing, so the change in terminology to "countering insurgency" did not occur until the late-1960s. Many of the base concepts would remain within the British doctrine, especially unity of effort with civilian authorities, minimum force, cooperation with police, and the importance of accurate, relevant intelligence. Since these operations fell under imperial policing, the military operated under the control of civil authorities and in support of the civil objectives. In addition, some of the local security forces raised would operate under the civil authorities until the British government undertook a major reorganization of irregular forces in the 1880s. See Chapter 2 for an explanation of British doctrine development from Imperial Policing to Counterinsurgency. British Army Field Manual AC 71876, *Countering Insurgency*, Case Study, 1-1 to 1-4.

6. T. R. Moreman. *The Army in India and the Development of Frontier Warfare, 1849-1947* (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), 1-2; Caroe, *The Pathans*, xix-xxvi. Caroe's introduction provides a colorful and detailed layout of the terrain of this region as well as the overlay of the tribes within the terrain.

7. For this thesis, the term Pathan describes this ethnic group, and Pashtu, describes the language. Two subtypes compose the *Pathans*, the *Pashtun* and the *Pakhtun*. These groups share a similar language and cultural identity, and the internal dividing difference is a mixture of geographical location and personal identity. The Pakhtun center their identity on Peshawar and spread to the northeast; the Pashtuns identify with the Durrani Tribe and spread to the southwest. There are slight differences in language, with ethnographers believing the *Pashtun* language to be softer, while the Pakhtun is harsher in syllable pronunciation. Caroe, xvii-xix. There is still debate among Pathan scholars as to where the sub-groups divide geographically, or at all.

8. Moreman, xix-xxvi.

9. The Pathans trace their roots to a lost tribe of Israel, a lost son of the Biblical King Saul, who had a son Afghana. Caroe, 4-5. The Pathans also believed that Khalid bin Walid, one of Prophet Muhammad's companions was a descendant of the Afghana Tribe and he converted the Pathans to Islam soon after receiving conversion from the Prophet Muhammad. Caroe, 9. This tale does not align with other written sources, which indicates the Pathans around Kabul converted in approximately 870 AD and Islam did not reach the Indus River until the mid to late-11th century. Victoria Schofield. *Afghan Frontier: Feuding and Fighting in Central Asia* (New York: Tauris Parke Paperbacks, 2003), 24-25; Caroe, 9. During the Mongol conquests, Genghis Khan destroyed the city of Peshawar during his drive across the Indus River. Schofield, 26.

10. Jules Stewart. *The Savage Border* (Phoenix Mills: Sutton Publishing, 2007), 153.

11. The tenets of *Pashtunwali*, I derived from Jules Stewart's *The Savage Border*, 153-155, Victoria Schofield's *Afghan Frontier*, 116-117, and notes I received from a Leader Development and Education for Sustain Peace program I attended in Gig Harbor, Washington on 30-31 March 2009, as part of pre-deployment training for duty in Afghanistan. The role of individuality was very important to the Pathan people, which manifested itself in the *jirga* system, in which the tribes worked to build consensus for a resolution between the two parties. The system was not hierarchical nor was leadership passed by hereditary lines for a seat on a *jirga*. This lack of a strong hierarchy, and reliance on consensus, will be important later in this paper during the examination of the various border policies enacted by the British Empire in the North-West Frontier.

12. J. P. Villiers-Stuart, *Letters of a Once Punjab Frontier Force Officer to His Nephew* (London: Sifton Praed and Company, 1925), 5. Though written as a letter to his nephew, this work would prove every influential for officers operating in the North-West Frontier Province, until Andrew Skeen's *Passing It On* (also written in a conversational tone).

13. Bruce Papers, British Library, London, Call no: MSS EUR F163/8. The papers of R. I. Bruce at the British Library provides the best example of this, when R. I. Bruce wrote in 1888, "I have never met one yet who fanaticism was so strong as to be allowed to stand in the way of his own interests, or to prevent his serving us if made worth his while to do so, and I believe few, if any, such exist." This drive of self-interest could lead to rapid changes in position by tribal elders in order to maintain their position within the Pathan tribes. Also, Charles Chenevix Trench. *The Frontier Scouts* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 2.

14. Thomas Henry Thornton. *Sir Robert Sandeman: His Life and Work on our Indian Frontier* (London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, 1895), 98-105.

15. Thornton, 110; Caroe, 377. These differences will have significant impacts upon early 20th-century border policies enacted by the British Government. The description of Baluchs as traders is from Villiers-Stuart, 8. He wrote specifically, "The Pathan tribes of Baluchistan are traders first and warriors second—indifferent warriors at that."

16. Schofield, 78-88; Moreman, 1-5; Thornton, 11-13. The First Anglo-Afghan War occurred from December 1838 through the end 1842 when British forces initially entered the Kingdom of Afghanistan to overthrow Dhost Muhammad Khan and install a ruler seen as more favorable to British interest in India. The British expedition met initial success, returning Shah Shuja to rule after a thirty-year absence, and establishing garrisons in Ghazni, Jalalabad, Kandahar, and Kabul. The Afghans quickly began to turn against the British forces, who the Afghans viewed as occupiers. This would lead the British government to opt for withdrawal from Afghanistan. During the retreat, the Afghan fighters attacked the British column and decimated the force. After this disastrous defeat, the British sent a retribution force, which marched into Afghanistan, rescued the hostages from the previous defeat, burned parts of Kabul and then retired back to India. This war with Afghanistan was the only time the British Empire attempted to occupy Kabul, but it did set a pattern for punitive expeditions to punish Afghan behavior. Schofield, 62-80.

17. This region Caroe referred to as *ghairilaga* (unadministered territory) or Yaghistan (land of the rebels). This term "Yaghistan" was not just a British term, but the Afghans used the term as well. Caroe, 347-348. What became apparent during this research is that neither Britain nor the Afghans wanted responsibility for this region.

18. Stewart, 137-138; Caroe, 348; Thornton, 16-19.

19. Caroe, 348-349; Stewart, *The Savage Border*, 137-138; Moreman, 4-5. Some referred to this policy as the "Lawrence Policy" named for the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, Sir Henry Lawrence. Since the British and Afghan governments would not define the boundary for another fifty years, this tenet of noninterference would present difficulties for the British government, as they did not know where their empire ended and the Kingdom of Afghanistan began.

20. According to G.J. Younghusband, who wrote a history of the Corps of Guides, Sir Henry Lawrence specifically used the term Corps of Guides for the formation to instill a sense of élan inspired from the Napoleonic Wars. "It was to contain trustworthy men, who could, at a moment's notice, act as guides to troops in the field; men capable, too, of collecting trustworthy intelligence beyond, as well as within, our borders; and, in addition to all this, men, ready to give and take hard blows, whether on the frontier or in a wider field." G. J. Younghusband, *The Story of the Guides* (London: Leonaur, 2006), 9-17.

21. Moreman, 6. The raising of the PIF occurred during the fall and winter 1849 and the organization and manning did not significantly differ from other irregular forces raised in the Bengal Army. The Indian Officers and NCOs, the British recruited from local tribal leaders' families, which assisted in tying this

local security force to the community. The organization of the PIF under the civil authority was a major difference for this organization compared to other irregular forces raised by the British. This did make the PIF very responsive to local needs and crisis, as the local authorities did not require central government approval to employ the PIF. The initial composition of the infantry regiments consisted of four European Officers, 16 native officers, 96 native Non-commissioned officers and 800 Soldiers. The cavalry regiments had the same leadership mix with only 588 Soldiers. *General Report upon the Administration of the Punjab Proper, for the Years 1849-1850 & 1850-1851: Bring the two First Years After Annexation: With a Supplementary Notice of the Cis- and Trans-Sutles Territories* (Lahore: Chronicle Press, 1854), 35 (this work will be referred to as *General Report on the Punjab* in the future citations to save space); Moreman, 5-6.

22. The First Cavalry Regiment was in Peshawar, the Second Cavalry was in Rawul Pindee, the Third Cavalry was in Lahore, the Fourth Cavalry was in Pind Dadun Khan, the Fifth Cavalry was in Mooltan and Leia, the First Infantry Regiment was in Peshawar, Second Infantry was in Lahore, Third Infantry was in Huzara, the Fourth Infantry Regiment was in Lahore, and the Fifth Regiment was in Leia. There were also two companies of Sappers and Miners raised, one in Asnee and the other in Kohat. *General Report on the Punjab*, 36-37; Moreman, 6-7.

23. C. Collin Davies. *The Problem of the North-West Frontier, 1890-1908* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932), 25-26. Davies highlights how these punitive expeditions would rarely produce any permanent effects, also due to the Pathan *jirga* culture, it made distinction between the guilty and innocent difficult. The punitive expedition numbers I derived from Caroe's *The Pathans*, 348. Caroes' numbers were also used by Stewart in *The Savage Border*, and Schofield's *Afghan Frontier*.

24. Bruce Papers, British Library, London, Call no: MSS EUR 163/80, *The Sandeman Policy as Applied to Tribal Problems of To-Day*, by Colonel C. E. Bruce, January 1932, 48. Bruce states, "It was also a system whereby punishment was meted out to the tribes by either fines, blockades, or expeditions, or a combination of these. Fines—which, if paid at all, were generally paid by the most respectable and law-abiding section of the tribe. Blockades—which kept the laborious, hard-working portion of the tribesmen from going about their lawful occasions. Expeditions, where the villages of the wretched people were burnt to the ground, their women, children, and flocks turned out to the hillside. Eventually the troops retired, leaving behind them a legacy of hatred and contempt. A policy which made a desert and called it peace. A policy neither dignified, becoming a Great Power, humane nor even economical." Additionally, the information about inability to deny safe haven was from Caroe, 350-351.

25. Sir Robert Warburton, who would raise the Khyber Rifles in 1878, stated in his autobiography, *Eighteen Years in the Khyber*, "my firm and solemn conviction is that the majority of the wars and fights between the British Government and the independent tribes of the Punjab Border were due entirely to the evil intrigues and machinations of the Arbabs and middlemen, who had been employed by us to do our work with the tribesmen." Robert Warburton, *Eighteen Years in the Khyber* (London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, 1900), 37.

26. Moreman, 23-27.

27. Moreman, 7; Scofield, 82.

28. *General Report on the Punjab*, 38-39; Younghusband, 64-74. Members of the Corps of Guides the British drew from numerous tribes in the area and paid them more than ordinary scale for a similar PIF Soldier.

29. *General Report on the Punjab*, 41. The khaki was adopted for frontier forces in 1853. Moreman, 14; Schofield, 8.

30. *General Report on the Punjab*, 21-24.

31. One could describe the Second Afghan War as an extended punitive expedition by the British Army into Afghanistan followed by a withdrawal. The British invaded Afghanistan following an Afghan meeting with Russian envoys. The result of the war was the removal of the Afghan leader, Sher Ali, installing his son, Yaqub Khan, as Amir, imposition of British control over Afghan Foreign Policy under the Treaty of Gandamak, and the use of Afghanistan as a buffer state between Russia and Britain. This war also demonstrated aspects of the “Great Game” in the region, as Afghanistan became a pawn between Russia and Great Britain as each vied for influence in the region. Schofield, 90-91; Stewart, 77-79.

32. There is some debate within the available literature about the timeline for the introduction of the Forward Policy. In a newly published book, *On Afghanistan's Plain*, Jules Stewart argues that the Forward Policy was the direct result of the change in British Government in England to the Prime Minister Disraeli headed Conservative Government in 1874. This change in government led directly to the 2nd Anglo-Afghan War and the immediate adoption of the Forward Policy. Jules Stewart. *On Afghanistan's Plain: The Story of Britain's Afghan Wars* (New York: I. B. Tauris and Company, Ltd., 2011), 139-143. This view does not align with primary sources of the time, especially writings by Robert Bruce as late as 1888 in a memorandum to the Viceroy of India in which Roberts is advocating a change from the Close Policy in Waziristan to the Forward Policy, as Sir Robert Sandeman instituted in Baluchistan. Bruce Papers, British Library, London, Call no: MSS EUR F163/8 “Memorandum of Waziri-Bhittanni and Shirani Tribe,” 1888. The change in government was important, so British civil administrators had more options for dealing with the North-West Frontier, but there was not an immediate move to the Forward Policy.

33. Christian Tripodi, “Peacemaking through bribes or cultural empathy? The political officer and British strategy towards the North-West Frontier, 1901-1945,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 31, no. 1 (1 February 2008): 122-135; Jules Stewart, *On Afghanistan's Plain*, 139.

34. Caroe, 354.

35. The FCR would undergo two revisions, once in 1876 and in 1901. There would be a number of issues with the Frontier Crimes Regulations, especially due to cultural differences about criminal activity and punishment. The Pathan system focused on providing satisfaction to the aggrieved, and did not focus on punishing the aggressor to the same level of western courts. This would lead to cases of Pathan crimes receiving relatively light sentences – especially crimes against Hindus or Punjabis. Since a Pathan *jirga* required consensus many decisions could

be watered down to satisfy everyone on the jirga. Caroe, 353-356; Jules Stewart, *The Savage Border*, 151-154; Government of the North-West Frontier Province Law Department, *The Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901 (Regulation III of 1901)* (Peshawar, Pakistan: Manager Government Stationary and Printing, 1973).

36. Caroe, 374-37; Thornton, 93.

37. Caroe, 376; Dr. Theodore Leighton Pennell. *Among the Wild Tribes of the Afghan Frontier: A Record of Sixteen Years' Close Intercourse with the Natives of the Indian Marches* (1908, Repr, New York: Ishi Press, 2010), 62; Christian Tripoli. "“Good for One but Not the Other”; The ‘Sandeman System’ of Pacification as Applied to Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier, 1877-1947,” *The Journal of Military History*, 73, 767-802; and Bruce Papers, British Library, London, Call no: MSS EUR 163/80, *The Sandeman Policy as Applied to Tribal Problems of To-Day*, written by Colonel Charles E. Bruce, January 1932. Unfortunately, Sandeman died in 1892, right when the debate for increased engagement in the North-West Frontier Province was reaching a crescendo.

38. Caroe, 376-37; Tripoli, 769. Caroe dedicates a whole paragraph on page 377 highlighting that Sandeman had a clean slate for interacting with Baluchistan, which someone negotiating in the North-West Frontier does not have. Caroe believed that was a major advantage and one reason the Sandeman System worked in Baluchistan.

39. One of the major writers who used the terms synonymously is Charles Bruce, the son of the North-West Frontier Administrator Robert Bruce. Within both his works *Waziristan 1936-1937: the Problems of the North-West Frontiers of India and Their Solutions* and his paper, *The Sandeman Policy as Applied to Tribal Problems of To-Day*, he stated the British had two policies, the Closed Border and the Sandeman System. Also, the Forward Policy did not become policy until the 1880s, so Sandeman appeared to be operating outside of policy as he moved into the Baluch region and commenced negotiations with the Baluch tribes.

40. Caroe, 378-380; Bruce Papers, British Library, London, Call no: MSS EUR 163/11, "Letter from Robert Bruce to the Government of Punjab," 28 February 1894. Bruce highlights as he moved into the North-West Frontier that only two lines of policing a district were available, the Sandeman System and the Khyber System. Bruce did not believe the Khyber would work in his area since the Khyber had only one tribe. Bruce believed that with three tribes, that were hereditary enemies, he would need another approach.

41. Jules Stewart. *The Khyber Rifles* (Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing Limited, 2005), 31-32, 42-43. The initial formation of the Khyber Rifles depended heavily on the leadership of Colonel Warburton, who in the 1890s had to return from retirement to assist in quelling an Afridi uprising. Part of the success of the Khyber Rifles in this region was the tribal homogeneity present in Khyber with the Afridi Clan. This was not the case in other districts within the North-West Frontier. Also, due to the single tribe, the British were able to develop a system of rule that allowed the Afridis to control their internal governing (which was primarily intra-tribal), which the British would have difficulty implementing in other areas. Bruce Papers, British Library, London, Call no: MSS EUR F163/11, "Printed Proceeding of the Punjab Civil Secretariat on the Demarcation of Southern Waziristan," 17 February 1891.

42. Bruce Papers, British Library, London, Call no: MSS EUR F163/62, "A Short Paper on the Political Administration of Baluchistan Province," by E. C. Gepp, Brigadier, HQ Western Command, October 1931.

43. Bijan Omrani, "The Durand Line: History and Problems of the Afghan-Pakistan Border," *Asian Affairs* 40, no. 2 (July 2009): 183-185. This article provides an excellent summation for many of the issues surrounding the Durand Line, though in a footnote, Mr. Omrani makes the contention that the British Empire considered the Durand Line just a temporary fix to the frontier border problem facing the Empire. This does not align with writings from Robert Bruce and Sir Mortimer Durand for the time of the establishment of the border with Afghanistan. Both men write on the border being a permanent demarcation between India and Afghanistan. Bruce Papers, British Library, London, Call no: MSS EUR 163/14, "Memorandum Number 1078" and MSS EUR 163/11 "Foreign Department's Annual File 1894 *Indo-Afghan Border*."

44. Bruce Papers, British Library, London, Call no: MSS EUR F163/1, "Letter from Robert Bruce to *The Times*," undated, though the context of the archive indicates Robert Bruce wrote the letter around 1905. Bruce writes, "When the Durand boundary line was demarcated the Waziris and other tribes believed that the British government would control and be responsible for the tribes on their side, and the Amir would be the same within his jurisdiction, and that raiding across the line would – as long as the Beluchistan limits – be put to a stop to." One aspect of the Durand Line debates that is missing, is the Amir of Afghanistan at the time of the Durand Line negotiations was not in control of any of the land on the British side of the line. Most of the tribal areas were outside his control as well, with no indications he had the capacity or desire to exercise long-term control over the North-West Frontier area. Appendix B of Caroe's *The Pathans* has excerpts from the Durand Agreement and subsequent affirmations by the Afghanistan government in 1905, 1919 and 1921. Caroe, 382, 463-466.

45. George MacNunn, *The Armies of India* (1901, repr, Bristol: Crecy Books, 1984), 148. MacNunn was one of the major proponents for the idea of martial races. These ideas led the Indian Army to over recruit from Sikh, Gurkha, and Pathan communities. During the Partition of Pakistan and India this would cause significant problems during the violence that occurred during the population migration between Indian and Pakistan. For a description of this see Daniel P. Marston, "The Indian Army, Partition, and the Punjab Boundary Force, 1945-1947," *War in History* 19, no. 4 (2009): 469-505. For more on martial races, see Heather Street, *Martial Races: The Military, Race, and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture, 1857-1914* (New York: Palgrave, 2004).

46. Michael Barthor, *The North-West Frontier: British India and Afghanistan* (New York: Sterling Publishing Company, 1982), 141-143.

47. The Piffers merged into the Bengal orbit in 1883 and then in 1903 all the previous commands (Bengal, Madras, Bombay, and Hyderabad) all became one—the Indian Army. George MacMunn, *The Armies of India* (1911, reprint, Bristol: Crecy Books, 1984), 173-176.

48. Moreman, 89-90.

49. Caroe, 354.

50. C. Collin Davies. *The Problem of the North-West Frontier, 1890-1908* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932), 34. Davies highlights that Colonel Bruce did not have the military position of strength that Sandeman had when Bruce entered Waziristan, so he was unable to negotiate a positive settlement for the British government. Also see: Stewart, *The Savage Border*, 142, 143; Moreman, 89.

51. Stewart. *The Savage Border*, 148-151; Caroe, 415-416; Schofield, 145. Lord Curzon's decision was somewhat controversial in that it elevated this region in status to equal with Punjab and the other provinces within India. Stewart highlights that part of Lord Curzon's thinking may have been to reduce costs for punitive expeditions by allowing the British Empire to employ other forms of soft power. In addition, the creation of this province now allowed its population to be members of the British Empire, rather than just unregulated frontiersmen. Caroe highlights in his work that Lord Curzon undertook this decision very deliberately and his concern for the control of the border. Lord Curzon also did not want the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab in a position to interfere with the border policies the Viceroy implemented through his Foreign Minister.

52. Stewart, *On Afghanistan's Plain*, 210-223; Moreman, 104-106. For how short the campaign was, it still produced a very high casualty count in the Indian Army, with over 1700 casualties in the four-month period. Also within the campaign, the British employed a four-engine bomber, which executed a bombing raid against Kabul. Stewart implies in *On Afghanistan's Plain* that the bombing led to Amir Amanullah's capitulation. This seems doubtful as the Afghan army was in a full rout before the strategic bombing of Kabul, but the bombing may have been enough for Amir Amanullah to realize the further armed resistance would achieve very little. Stewart, 223. Stewart does highlight that though British forces defeated the Afghan army in every engagement, Amir Amanullah received a number of concessions from the British, including the removal of the Treaty of Gandamak.

53. Moreman, 104.

54. Trench, *Frontier Scouts*, 41-49.

55. Trench, 53; Moreman, 107-114. Immediately following cessation of the Third Afghan War, Charles Howard Foulkes, who served as Director of Gas Services at the end of World War I, conducted a survey to determine if the introduction of chemical warfare to the North-West Frontier Province may assist in quelling hostilities. His account of the survey and discussions with the Viceroy of India are enlightening. The Viceroy was adamant that he would not authorize the use of chemical weapons, stating, "If there was war with Japan, for example, I wouldn't hesitate to sanction the use of gas: due I don't wish to use any weapon against tribesmen which savours of taking an unfair advantage." Major General Foulkes' accounts of his time in the North-West Frontier Province are interesting mainly in the disgust expressed by most of the British living in India to the use of chemical weapons. His account of a dinner seated next to Lady Chelmsforth, the wife of the Viceroy, was especially interesting as Major General Foulkes attempted to explain the benefits of chemical weapons to a group clearly opposed to them. The British government never decided to employ chemical weapons into the North-West Frontier Province or the border areas of Afghanistan. Foulkes

Papers, Liddell Hart Library, King's College Longon, Call no: GB99 KCLMA FOULKES, Item 6/103.

56. Moreman, 108-109; Stewart, *The Savage Border*, 175-178; Schofield, 149-152; General Sir Andrew Skeen, *Passing it On: Short talks on Tribal Fighting on the North-West Frontier of India* (Aldershot: Gale and Polden, 1939), 17.

57. Tripodi, 145.

58. C. E. Bruce, *Waziristan 1936-1937: the Problems of the North-West Frontiers of India and Their Solutions* (1937; repr., Candler Press, 2007), 7.

59. C. E. Bruce, 24-28.

60. Moreman, 147-150.

61. Army Headquarters, India. *Manual of Operations on the North-West Frontier of India* (Calcutta: Government of India, 1925), 11-13.

62. Villiers-Stuart, 18, 25, 31. Villiers-Stuarts' frank views of the punitive expeditions are best surmised with this statement, "In operating against tribesmen, we have two objects in view: i) (emphatically) to kill as many as possible, that being by far the most convincing form of argument; ii) to destroy his villages and stores of food, and capture his cattle and sheep." Villiers-Stuart, 25. Villiers-Stuart in a later section expounds on the destruction of villages highlights that the burning of villages and taking of livestock was only to force the tribesmen to fight. Though he closes the section with the warning, "The withdrawal will certainly be closely pressed. People don't like having their homes burnt." Villiers-Stuart, 75.

63. Moreman, 176-179.

64. Moreman, 138-168; Stewart, *The Khyber Rifles*, 178-181; Schofield 218-224; Cunningham Papers, British Library, London, Call no: MSS EUR D670/14 "Governor's Report from the North-West Frontier Province," 9 November 1937. The late-1930s especially saw a serious problem in Waziristan with British operations launched against the Faqir of Ipi. The Faqir of Ipi incited Muslim-on-Hindu violence in the Bannu District, about would receive safe haven from Wazir tribes starting in 1937 and continued raids, attacks and mayhem until his death in 1960. His influence did begin to lessen after 1942 with an abortive attempt to seize Datta Khel. Also, with the announcement of a future Muslim state after partition, it allayed some of the fears of tribesmen in the North-West Frontier Province of domination by a Hindu majority. Stewart, *The Savage Border*, 89-90.

65. An example of this is also how many of the historians for this region use a different term to describe the post-forward policies in the North-West Frontier. C. E. Bruce writing as a contemporary to this period uses the term "protected areas" to describe the policy for this period. Caroe makes no mention of a different border policy during this period, even though he is a civil administrator in the North-West Frontier during this specific period.

66. One source not used for this thesis was the work *Waging War in Waziristan* by Andrew M. Roe. Though it is a recent piece of scholarship, the factual errors by Mr. Roe concerning British Border Policy for the North-West Frontier made it a dangerous work to attempt to incorporate with the other research. A similar work *Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias* by Richard H. Shultz and Andrea J. Dew

likewise have their fundamental facts of the border policies incorrect. Both works are deeply confused as to the closed, forward, and modified policies were and what the British government hoped to attain from them. These works I caution others from using due to their inaccuracies.

Chapter 5

Case Study: The Dhofar Campaign, Oman

On December 11, 1975, Sultan Qaboos bin Said, the ruler of the Sultanate of Oman and Muscat, issued a proclamation from a police station in the Dhofar Region declaring the ten-year insurgency within his country defeated.¹

The insurgency was a communist-inspired, externally supported conflict, which aimed to overthrow the Sultanate and establish a communist state within Oman.² The British Government, after withdrawing from Aden in 1967 and areas east of the Suez Canal, opted to provide significant military, advisory, and material support to Sultan Qaboos's efforts to defeat the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (POFLOAG) in 1970.³ These military efforts, integrated with governmental and economic reforms, civic action, and a focused psychological operations campaign under a unified strategy designed and implemented by Sultan Qaboos, addressed many of the grievances expressed by the population and led to a defeat of the *adoo*.

When violent action associated with this insurgency began in 1965, no one knew the outcome or the best way to address the grievances of the *adoo*. The roots of the conflict went back many years and efforts by the Omanis and British required the counterinsurgents to build trust and understanding with the tribally organized people of the Dhofar Region. This was a conflict fought largely outside the glare of the world's media and many British veterans who fought there called it "The Secret War."

Within the strategic construct developed by Sultan Qaboos was a specific campaign to disrupt insurgent access to their safe havens across Omani borders. This campaign plan was not without problems and missteps, but eventually the Sultan's Armed Forces would use locally raised security forces and physical barriers to hinder movement between the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) and the Sultanate of Oman and Muscat.

The Sultanate of Oman was an underdeveloped country in the Arabian Gulf that lacked many basic services for its people when the violence began in 1965. Due to this lack of basic services, an insurgency arose in the southern Dhofar region of the country. The Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF), initially having Saudi Arabian support, wished to bring a degree of modernization to Dhofar and exercise self-rule over the region. By 1967, the DLF and Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF) were in a stalemate, as neither had the capability to successfully hold ground and drive the other

out of their strongholds. These conditions changed by the end of 1967, as the DLF began to receive external support and sanctuary from PDRY, to the west of Oman, following the withdrawal of the British from Aden and South Arabia. This provided the *adoo* with a state-sponsored, safe haven in which to receive training, material support from other communist nations, and sanctuary from attack. The DLF's leadership was replaced and changed the name of the insurgent group to PFLOAG in 1968.⁴

This case study will examine the efforts made in the Sultanate of Oman to combat this insurgency, despite the apparent advantages of the PFLOAG. The focus of the case study will be the physical and cultural terrain, the history of the campaign, and the specific efforts undertaken by the Sultan of Oman to conduct border control operations and disrupt the *adoo*'s ability to use its safe haven. With the recent declassification of this campaign by the British Government, one can conduct a new examination of this counterinsurgency operation and official military documents from the time.⁵

Terrain and People

To fully comprehend the insurgency in Oman, it is necessary to understand the physical and cultural make-up of the country. The Sultanate of Oman is situated on the southeastern side of the Arabian Peninsula. Saudi Arabia to the northwest, the United Arab Emirates to the northeast, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen to the southwest bound the country. Two sides of the Sultanate of Oman are surrounded by water with the Straits of Homuz, the Gulf of Oman, and the Arabian Sea.

The majority of Oman consists of open desert, but along the coastline, there are areas of lush, green vegetation. Due to the desert conditions and location of urban areas, the country divides into two regions. To the north are the few population centers and the country's capital of Muscat. The population centers clustered along the coastline between the Gulf of Oman and a series of mountain ranges, known locally as *jebels*.⁶

In the north, the people are more ethnically Arab and consider themselves Omani. The primary language is Arabic and there are significant cultural and tribal ties to Saudi Arabia. The majority of the country's population live in the north and it was also the center of the majority of the country's commerce. Additionally, the Omani government discovered oil reserves in the 1960s in the north, which continues to demonstrate the economic strength of this area of Oman.⁷

The southern region, known as Dhofar, is separated from the north by desert that is 400-miles wide. The population areas cluster mainly around

the coastline but also extend into the *jebels* to the northwest. In 1970, there was roughly a population of 70,000 Dhofaris with approximately half living in the *jebels* and half living in the towns near the coast. The largest city was Salalah with approximately 35,000 residents.⁸

In the Dhofar Region, the people are a different ethnicity and tribal make-up than the north. The Dhofaris shared similar traits and features with Somali or Ethiopian groups. The Dhofari language, *Jebeli*, was unwritten and shared linguistic characteristics with Aramaic rather than Arabic. The commerce focused on cattle, goat, and camel herds, and the Dhofaris in the *Jebel* were nomadic. The nomadic tradition was necessary in order to find water for the cattle or camel herds, which was in scarce supply outside the monsoon season. Cattle and herding played a critical role in Dhofari society, as these herds provided the Dhofaris with the means to survive. The Dhofaris also had tribal ties and connections that extended across the Omani-Yemeni border and these tribal linkages were a major source of identity within the society. The tribal organization centered on consensus building and valuing individual independence, which at times presented problems for discipline and collective action within the tribes.⁹

The north and south had almost no physical features that tied the country together. When the campaign started in 1965, few roads extended through the 400-mile desert. A single route, the Midway Road, was the only ground link between Dhofar and the rest of Oman. That road was poorly constructed and it was not until the 1970s that the Sultan funded the building of hardtop, improved roads to the south. This lack of an easily navigable route to the south further contributed to the differences felt between the Dhofaris and Omanis as the violent phase of the insurgency began.¹⁰

Though the Dhofaris had many differences from the Omanis of the north, they did share a common connection through their Islamic beliefs. This religious tie would prove important during the Sultan's campaign against the communist insurgents.¹¹

Another group that featured prominently in this campaign was the Baluchs. The Sultan of Oman had controlled parts Baluchistan, Pakistan through the 19th and early 20th-century and retained the ability to enlist Soldiers from Baluchistan into the Sultan's Armed Forces. This would create another rift between the Sultan's Armed Forces and the Dhofari people, as the Dhofaris viewed the Baluch Soldiers as a truly foreign force operating in their lands.¹²




Figure 5. Map of Oman

Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/oman.gif (accessed 22 November 2011).

History of the Campaign

In order to explain fully the Dhofar Campaign, a brief review of the 1958 intervention by the British SAS into northern Oman is necessary to provide context and to understand the mindset of the BATT who arrived in 1970. The 1958 SAS intervention also assists in explaining the actions

of Sultan Said bin Taimur during the later insurrection. Following the explanation of the earlier campaign will be a review of the 1965 to 1979 Dhofar Campaign.

The rebellion in 1958 arose from a change in religious leadership within the Sultanate of Oman. In 1954, a well respected imam, Imam Muhammad bin Abdullah, died without an apparent successor to take over the religious leadership for northern Oman. A relatively unknown imam named Imam Ghalib bin Ali became the religious leader of Oman, but fell under the influence of the Saudi Arabian and Egyptian governments. These outside powers provided material, weapons and moral support for Ghalib bin Ali to raise a revolt against Sultan Said bin Taimur in the northern *Jebels* of Oman.¹³

In 1958, Iman Ghalib bin Ali, his two brothers, Talib bin Ali and Suleiman bin Ali, and 600 followers rose in revolt against Sultan Said bin Taimur. The Sultan's forces were quickly overwhelmed and the British Government decided to intervene to secure their ally on the Arabian Sea.¹⁴ A squadron of SAS departed Malaya and arrived in Oman in November 1958. The SAS consisted of two troops and the squadron headquarters, and only numbered 71 individuals.¹⁵

The original mission of the SAS upon arrival to Oman was to conduct reconnaissance of rebel positions in the northern *jebels* in order to launch later operations to kill or capture Iman Ghalib bin Ali, Talib bin Ali and Suleiman bin Ali. One of the major planning assumptions was the operations would take approximately six months to complete. The focus of the SAS's operations was to remove Talib bin Ali, due to their assessment that he was the major leader holding the rebellion together against Sultan Said bin Taimur.¹⁶

After conducting detailed reconnaissance, Colonel Deane-Drummond, the senior SAS commander during this operation, requested a second squadron of SAS to conduct a major assault up the largest *jebel* in the north, the *Jebel Akhdar*.¹⁷ In January 1959, the SAS conducted an approach march up the *jebel* and successfully defeated Iman Ghalib bin Ali's rebellion. Unfortunately, Iman Ghalib bin Ali, Talib bin Ali, and Suleiman bin Ali all escaped the assault and fled to Saudi Arabia.¹⁸

This early rebellion would have significant impacts on the later insurgency in Dhofar. The first impact was the constant concern by Sultan Said bin Taimur and his son Sultan Qaboos bin Said of a potential rebellion in northern Oman while Dhofar was in rebellion. This led to the continuous commitment of a SAF battalion to the north, leaving only one additional

battalion to fight the insurgency in the south. Secondly, then Major Johnny Watts, Captain Tony Jeapes, and Captain Peter de la Billiere all served in this campaign and would go on to serve in the Dhofar insurgency. Finally, this rebellion, and a later assassination attempt, led Sultan Said bin Taimur to live as a semi-recluse in Salahah, away from the capital of Muscat. He still exercised complete control over all decisions affecting life in Oman.¹⁹

In 1965, another rebellion erupted, this time in the Dhofar region of Oman. The DLF led the rebellion against Sultan Said bin Taimur. The DLF had a number of legitimate grievances against the government, which included the lack of medical care in the country, individual movement in the country requiring the Sultan's approval, lack of secondary schooling, and a lack of access to more modern veterinary care for the livestock.²⁰ In 1967, as the British withdrew from Aden and South Arabia, the newly emboldened communist party in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen began exerting significant influence on the DLF. This led to the DLF changing their name to PFLOAG, and a significant increase in direct material support from the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. Some of the support received included modern AK-47 assault rifles, 82mm mortars, and communist indoctrination in China and the Soviet Union. The support gave the PFLOAG a marked advantage against the SAF.²¹

In 1965, the SAF's Northern Frontier Regiment and Muscat Regiment consisted of two battalion-sized elements composed of Omani and Baluch soldiers²² The SAF was a light infantry organization, trained along a traditional European model. Many veterans noted the discipline and capability of the SAF during the campaign in Dhofar, but early in the campaign, the small size of the SAF hampered its efforts. The composition of the SAF in 1965 was 50 percent Omani or locally hired Baluch and 50 percent Baluch recruited from Baluchistan. British Officers provided all the officer positions within the SAF, as Sultan Said feared a possible coup from Arab or Baluch officers.²³

During the Dhofar Campaign, there were three major types of British Soldiers serving in Oman: seconded officers, contract officers, and the Special Air Service.²⁴ Each would have a unique role and effect upon the outcome of the campaign. Starting in 1958, the British Army began seconding officers to serve in the Sultan's Armed Force. Seconding was a system whereby the British Army provided officers to the SAF to serve in positions from platoon commander up through the Commander, Sultan's Armed Forces (CSAF). These officers wore the uniform of the SAF and reported to the SAF chain of command, but when their time expired they

would return to the British Army with no loss of time in grade or service for promotion within the British Army. The seconded officers would serve between one to two year tours in the SAF.²⁵

In addition to the seconded officers, contracted officers also served in the SAF, usually commanding below battalion level. The British Army provided contract officers, but they did not receive the same benefits as a seconded officer. The contract officers elected to serve in the SAF and received a contract for a set number of years. During the period of service, the contract officers were effectively out of the British Army and did not receive any special benefits or longevity while contracted out. The CSAF, Brigadier John Graham, recorded in his diary that the quality of contracted officers was very mixed. Some were excellent officers who led their units well, while others were mediocre or worse, officers who did not perform their duties. The contract officers did provide a higher level of continuity as many of the contracts were for a minimum of two years and many served much longer in the SAF. The contracted officers served within the SAF chain of command and were not answerable to the British Army while under contract.²⁶

The SAF in 1965 had antiquated equipment compared to their communist adversaries. The SAF was primarily equipped with the Enfield .303 bolt-action rifle, a Bren magazine-fed light machine gun, and had poor equipment for fighting in the *jebels* in Dhofar. Additionally, the state of the SAF's wheeled vehicles and logistical capability made SAF efforts to maintain resupply in the *jebels* difficult for extended operations.²⁷

From 1965 through July 1970, the SAF continued to lose ground and influence in Dhofar. Sultan Said bin Taimur refused to allow for a reconciliation or Surrendered Enemy Personnel (SEP) program. He also refused to address the grievances expressed by the DLF before the outbreak of violence. Due to Sultan Said bin Taimur's concerns of a possible rebellion in northern Oman, one battalion stayed in the north while the other rotated into Dhofar for fighting in four-month increments.²⁸

By 1967, the British Army completed its withdrawal from Aden and South Arabia, which served to bolster the PFLOAG efforts to expand control into Oman. The Sultan was losing government control of Dhofar and his unwillingness to address legitimate grievances caused large portions of the population to side with the *adoo*. However, during this period, PFLOAG also made costly mistakes as they worked to control the Dhofari population. Notably, PFLOAG worked within the villages to establish an atheist, non-tribal, gender-egalitarian environment. These

programs were unpopular with most Dhofaris, as it went against their conservative, Muslim beliefs. This PFLOAG attempt to restructure the Dhofari society led to the *adoo* employing harsh techniques to control the population.²⁹

In 1970, the British Government sent a team led by Colonel Johnny Watts, then the commander of 22 SAS, to assess Sultan Said bin Taimur's counterinsurgency campaign. Two days later, a bloodless coup occurred in which Sultan Said bin Taimur's son Qaboos bin Said came to power, and Said bin Taimur fled to England to live in exile. Sultan Qaboos bin Said was a graduate of the British Military Academy at Sandhurst and received training in civic government while studying in England. Upon his ascension, Sultan Qaboos bin Said immediately began a series of reforms within his government to address local grievances.³⁰

Following the coup that brought Sultan Qaboos bin Said to the throne, the British Special Air Service (SAS) began operations in Oman. When the British government sent the SAS it was only in an advisory role and was kept secret from the public. This secrecy stemmed from a British political desire to maintain a smaller presence in the Arabian Gulf region, as well as due to the escalating conflict in Northern Ireland.³¹ When the SAS arrived, they served under the moniker of the British Advisory Training Team (BATT) and their sole function was in training irregular forces, known as the *firqat*.³² Initially only one squadron of the SAS served in Oman, but in 1971 another squadron arrived to assist in training the irregular forces. The BATT operated in four- to six- person teams as they mentored the *firqat*, which allowed the BATT to operate throughout the Dhofar Province with each of the trained *firqat*.³³ For most of the campaign, the SAS served in 4-month tours and operated in the Dhofar Region. They also had a dual-command relationship with responsibilities to the CSAF and well as back to Hereford, Wales and the SAS Regimental Commander. The equipping of the SAS did appear to be one of the major challenges, and a source of tension between the SAS and SAF, as there were differing expectations by the SAS as to who would provide equipment and sustainment in Dhofar.³⁴

Additionally, the SAS provided members to the Civil Action Teams (CAT). The CAT supported military operations by providing civil development, veterinary, and medical services to areas cleared of *adoo*. These teams would drill wells, work with Dhofar herders to breed cattle, undertake medical examinations of locals, and provide civil services in the name of Sultan Qaboos. Later in the insurgency, the CATs would enter areas the SAF cleared of *adoo* within hours, which demonstrated to the Dhofari people the immediate, positive effects the Sultan could provide to the people.³⁵

Of note with the British involvement in Oman is the limited number of British that ended up serving in this campaign. The contracted and seconded officers only made up 11 personnel for each SAF battalion, and the SAS was never more than 400 officers and Soldiers at one time. This presented a very low number of “white-faces” during this campaign and assisted in furthering the information messaging that this was a campaign waged by the Sultan of Oman to defeat communist insurgents.³⁶

Upon assuming the throne, Sultan Qaboos bin Said instituted a series of reforms to address the grievances the PFLOAG exploited. Simultaneously, the CSAF, then Brigadier John Graham, instituted a campaign plan provided to him by the SAS assessment team. The plan, known as the Watts Plan for Colonel Johnny Watts, focused on five major areas that led to a successful defeat of the *adoo*. The five points were the development of an effective intelligence cell, the development of an information team, improved medical care to the Dhofaris, improved veterinary care of Dhofari livestock, and the raising of Dhofari local security forces to fight the *adoo*.³⁷

As well as domestic reform, Sultan Qaboos bin Said also executed a series of diplomatic and international engagements after assuming the throne. This engagement assisted in building up the credibility of the Omani government and would eventually lead to international aid, besides Great Britain’s, to support Oman’s counterinsurgency efforts. Specific diplomatic efforts included the Sultanate of Oman and Muscat joining the Arab League and taking a more active role in the United Nations.³⁸

As Sultan Qaboos bin Said continued internal reforms, he also worked to expand the size of the SAF. The expansion he conducted was gradual from 1970 through 1974 and fully was funded by Omani oil revenues. During the expansion and equipment modernization, the Sultanate of Oman received no outside funding or military aid. This expansion ensured everything the Sultanate acquired, the government could afford over the long term. In 1974, the Sultan also started a system of “Omanization” within his military to ensure Omani military members would start to assume a greater share of the leadership and officer positions.³⁹

Raising of the Firqat

When Sultan Qaboos bin Said assumed control of Oman, he allowed for the reintegration of SEPs. His father Sultan Said bin Taimur was adamant that there could be no reconciliation with former insurgents, but his son recognize that welcoming SEPs back into society would only quicken the defeat of an insurgent force.⁴⁰

Immediately following the removal of Sultan Said bin Taimur and the ascension of Sultan Qaboos bin Said, a squadron of 22 SAS arrived in Oman with the task of raising a local irregular security force. The 22 SAS was only identified with the non-descript term British Army Training Team, or BATT, and had the specified task of training the *firqat*. The squadron commander during this pivotal period, then Major Tony Jeapes, had experience during the SAS action within the 1958 rebellion against Sultan Said bin Taimur and believed the SAS could quickly raise and train a local security force.⁴¹

The first *firqa*, was a multi-tribal organization. A leader of a small tribe, Salim bin Mubarrack, approached the SAS with the idea of recruiting former members of the *adoo* to fight for the Sultan against the communists. The CSAF and the Commander, Dhofar Brigade met the idea with some skepticism, but allowed the raising of the first *firqa*, *Firqa Salahadin*.⁴²

The *Firqa Salahadin* would prove to be the only multi-tribal *firqa* raised by the Sultan and BATT during the Dhofar Campaign. The *Firqa Salahadin* formed around the leadership of Salim bin Mubarrack, who until crossing over to the government's side was the second-in-command of an *adoo* battalion in Dhofar. The *Firqa Salahadin* had approximately 40 individuals who joined, all former *adoo*. Salim bin Mubarrack believed that a multi-tribal organization would allow for the imposition of discipline upon the *firqat* formations.⁴³

Not long after forming in February 1971, the *Firqa Salahadin* conducted two major operations with the SAF in a supporting role. The first was the identification and arrest of the communist political leadership within the town of Taqah, a town to the east of the Dhofar capital Salalah. The second was a seaborne assault to recapture the town of Sudh, which the *firqa* and SAF conducted without loss of life.⁴⁴

After the raising of the *Firqa Salahadin*, the Sultan authorized the raising of five other *firqat*. The next four *firqat* were all tribally-aligned organizations with a tribal leader serving as the senior *firqat* commander. In addition to providing jobs and salaries to the *firqat*, the Sultan also provided veterinary care for the *firqat's* livestock, medical care for families, and wells for water. The wells especially drew a number of people to the *firqat* locations, and at times, the BATT had concerns that the *firqat* and their families would overwhelm the infrastructure in the area.⁴⁵

On 5 March 1971, only thirty days after the raising of the *Firqa Salahadin*, Salim bin Mubarrack died of an apparent heart attack. A month later, the *Firqa Salahadin*, self-disbanded as the *firqat* members no longer

wished to serve in a multi-tribal organization. Most of the members joined their tribally aligned *firqat* and continued fighting the *adoo*. The *firqat* program continued throughout the war, but all were tribally based.⁴⁶

The *firqat* were an irregular security force, but did prove invaluable to the Sultan's efforts to liberate the communist controlled areas in the southern *jebels*. The *firqat* were dependant on their BATT advisors to provide fire support, air support, logistics, and medical evacuation, but the *firqat* provided excellent intelligence and were very brave fighters. The BATT did experience a number of problems with the *firqat* during the course of the Dhofar Campaign, but outside of the *Firqa Salahadin*, no other *firqat* disbanded.⁴⁷

The BATT served as the primary advisors to the *firqat* through 1973, at which point the advisory mission began to shift to the SAF. After mid-1971, the SAF and *firqat* worked as a complementary force during operations. The *firqat* was a light, irregular force, which meant they could be very unreliable for certain operations. BATT Commanders mention in their dispatches and in interviews the constant negotiation they engaged in with the *firqat* commanders to ensure a sufficient number of *firqat* were present for operations. If the *firqat* were not present during an operation in which the SAF took casualties, the SAF would believe the *firqat* withheld information or informed the *adoo* about the SAF movement timelines. There was never any definitive evidence of *firqat* sabotage of a SAF plan, and many of the interviewed Dhofar Veterans believe the *firqat* just knew it was a bad plan and wanted no part in it.⁴⁸

The CSAF never used the *firqat* to conduct cross-border attacks into PDRY. There is some debate as to whether the Omani Ministry of Intelligence used *firqat* with tribal ties across the border as a cross-border force, but no written orders or signed documents provide evidence of the use of *firqat* in this way. The reason for this restriction on the use of the *firqat* appears to stem from the concern of conflict escalation. The SAF was stretched too thin fighting the internal threat to deal with a potential conventional invasion by PDRY into Oman.⁴⁹

The raising and training of the *firqat* was not a completely smooth process. Besides the self-disbandment of the *Firqa Salahadin*, there were a few cases of *firqat* members returning to the *adoo* after swearing an oath to Sultan Qaboos. One example occurred on 10 May 1972, when a former quartermaster for an *adoo* unit, who served in the *firqat* for two months, returned to PDRY after stealing a Commando Carrier, which was a form of armored car.⁵⁰

In addition to a few isolated cases of *firqa* returning to the *adoo*, the other major problem faced by the BATT was the temperament of the *firqa*. As mentioned earlier, the Dhofaris valued independence and individualism. This would present problems in a military organization, as members of the *firqa* would disobey orders, exercise poor individual discipline (especially concerning water consumption rates), and at times would not muster for patrols. This would cause a great deal of frustration for the BATT and SAF officers, and contributed to a feeling of untrustworthiness within the SAF about the *firqa*. Some of this belief was justified, but other times the *firqa* did not patrol because they knew no enemy was present.⁵¹

Once the BATT raised, trained, and equipped the *firqat*, they were employed increasingly as a static defensive forces, especially following the establishment of the Hornbeam Line in 1973. The use of the irregular forces, allowed SAF elements more flexibility to engage the *adoo*. After the arrival of Iranian and Jordanian forces to assist the Sultan of Oman, the SAF had the capability to begin conducting major offensive operations to drive the *adoo* back into PDRY. The SAF required a significant amount of time to build their capability, as it was not until 1973 through 1975 that the SAF shifted from defensive operations to larger scale clearing operations. These operations will be discussed in more detail in the following section, as they tie into development of defensive lines in Dhofar.

The *firqa* would serve throughout the remainder of the insurgency in the employ of Sultan Qaboos. They served as irregular forces, and provided the Sultan a means to bring SEPs back into the government's side with honor. By allowing a Dhofari to swear allegiance and reenter the fight on the side of the government, the *firqa* created more allies than killing *adoo* would produce.⁵² Outside of the *Firqa Salahadin*, no other *firqa* disbanded and there were no reported incidents of *firqa* members killing BATT or SAF officers. Though they were not without their problems, they proved reliable enough to allow the SAF to continue operations against the *adoo*.

The raising of these local, irregular security forces were the fifth tenet of the Watts Plan, the overarching strategy developed by the Sultan and British advisors in 1970. These forces proved a major element in the eventual defeat of the *adoo*, by allowing former *adoo* a chance to return to the government's side without losing their honor. The *firqa* provided the SAF actionable intelligence and usually provided captured weapons when they crossed to the government side. The raising of these forces were a major element in weakening the *adoo* and the eventual PFLOAG defeat.

Building of the Defensive Lines

Starting in 1972, the Sultan's Armed Forces, supported by the BATT and *firqat*, began operations to establish a series of defensive lines in Dhofar to disrupt *adoo* supply lines from the PDRY. These operations were part of the larger campaign to put pressure upon *adoo* movements and slowly defeat the insurgency.

The first operation approved by the CSAF to establish a defensive line was Operation JAGUAR. The goal of the operation was to establish a permanent presence west of Salalah in an area known as White City. The operation commenced on 2 October 1971 and the combined SAF, BATT and *firqat* operation rapidly seized their objectives and began construction of a defensive line through the *jebel* to the coast. This operation began to signal a change in the momentum of the campaign with the Sultan and the counterinsurgent forces beginning to gain and maintain the initiative against PFLOAG.⁵³

Following the success of Operation JAGUAR, Brigadier Graham began planning Operation SIMBA. This operation's goal was to establish a permanent SAF presence in the town of Sarfayt and to deny permanently *adoo* movement south of the 50 northing gridline into PDRY. This town was a border town next to PRDY and offered a natural narrow point for *adoo* supplies entering into Oman. The operation nested within the over arching strategy, as the CSAF wished to fragment and hunt down the *adoo*, and impose a total blockade of land and sea routes of *adoo* aid into Dhofar.⁵⁴

Unlike during Operation JAGUAR, the reaction by the *adoo* to the establishment of a large SAF and *firqat* presence so close to the PDRY border provoked an immediate response. The *adoo* with PDRY artillery support conducted a diversionary attack against the town of Habrut, a town 80-kilometers north of Sarfayt, on May 5, 1972. The attack killed five members of the SAF and wounded another eight. This was also one of the first direct actions by PDRY against Oman at this point in the insurgency. Brigadier Graham and Hugh Oldman, the Minister of Defense, expressed concern to Sultan Qaboos bin Said about a possible escalation in the conflict. The danger expressed by the senior military leadership was the weakness of the SAF if a conventional force from PDRY invaded across the border. Hugh Oldman convinced Sultan Qaboos bin Said not to retaliate against PDRY for the artillery support to the *adoo*.⁵⁵

After receiving his military advisors recommendation, Sultan Qaboos bin Said built international support through the Arab League and the

United Nations to condemn the cross-border attack by PDRY. This support would not have been possible if the Sultan had not opened up his kingdom diplomatically over the previous year. On May 25, 1972, Sultan Qaboos ordered Brigadier Graham to conduct a limited aerial attack against the Yemeni town of Hauf, which lay directly across the border from Sarfait. Before the air strike occurred, the Sultan of Oman's Air Force dropped leaflets on the town to warn about the impending attack.⁵⁶

After the leaflet drop, Brigadier Graham authorized the launch of an aerial attack against the Yemeni city of Hauf. He expressed much trepidation before the attack about an escalation of the conflict with PDRY. When the fleet of Omani Strikemaster aircraft, piloted by British seconded officers, hit Hauf a number of *adoo* commanders died in the attack. At the time, the SAF did not realize how many *adoo* commanders had been in Hauf for a PFLOAG conference on future operations. PDRY did respond to the air attack by expanding artillery fire across the border against Sarfait and Habrut, but PDRY never sent large concentration of conventional forces across the border.⁵⁷

The secondary effect Sultan Qaboos received working through the Arab League was commitment from Iran and Jordan for additional troops to assist in defeating the communist insurgency. In January 1973, the Shah of Iran provided, initially, a battalion of Iranian Special Forces and a large number of Augusta Bell 204 helicopters. The helicopters, especially, were a critical resource for the Omani government. The Iranian forces served primarily in a static role within the fortified positions of subsequent defensive belts.⁵⁸

Unfortunately, the overall effect of Operation SIMBA was not a success for the SAF. The positions established north of Sarfait were too difficult for the SAF to resupply with their capabilities at the time. The positions also required more manning than the SAF had the capability to produce at this point in their operations, especially with a large *adoo* controlled area between Salahah and Sarfait (a distance over 100-kilometers). A more gradual build would be necessary to liberate the ground between Salalah and Sarfait before the SAF could successfully execute the SIMBA Line in 1975. The SAF would not have the capability for long-term logistical resupply until the arrival of the Iranian helicopters.⁵⁹

After Operation SIMBA, SAF decided to conduct a more deliberate operation expanding the defensive lines from Salalah towards the PDRY border. The clearing of *adoo* around the defensive belts, creation of the lines, and the manning of the positions became the main effort for SAF

from the end of 1972 through 1975. The most extensive defensive line created was the Hornbeam Line, which extended from the coastal city of Mughsayl into the *jebel* to Oven. The line was a series of stone forts with defensive obstacles laid in between. Beyond manning the nine forts, the battalion that manned the Hornbeam Line would conduct active patrolling day and night to detect *adoo* movements across the line and any damage to the minefields.⁶⁰

For the construction of these defensive lines, the first step was the establishment of fortified *sangars*, which was a form of stone fort. These *sangars* served as fortified locations from which the SAF forces patrol out. The Hornbeam Line consisted of nine such positions, and over time, the SAF built a series of barbed wire and mined obstacles between the *sangars*. These defensive lines extended from the coastline through the *jebel*, but did not completely bisect Oman to the border with Saudi Arabia. These lines would force the *adoo* into the desert, which made them easier targets for interdiction by the Sultan of Oman's Air Force or the use of SAF indirect fire assets.⁶¹

As the SAF constructed the Hornbeam Line, the Sultan's Civil Action Teams would move rapidly into the villages behind the line to build up civil development. The major focus of their operations was the construction of water wells. Secondly, they would bring in veterinary care and medical clinics to care for the livestock and people in the villages. The message presented to the villagers was that the civil development was from the Sultan. The critical aspect of the Civil Action Teams work was the speed in which they constructed wells. Later in the campaign, the Civil Action Team would start well construction while fighting was continuing outside the village, so that by the time of the village's liberation the village had a new well.⁶²

From 1973 through 1975, the SAF finished construction of the Hornbeam Line, the Hammer Line, Damavand Line, and finally, the Simba Line. All of these positions allowed the SAF to extend methodically its presence out from Salalah to the border of PRDY. Though these lines were manpower intensive, the systematic approach allowed for the SAF to build its combat power and capability to properly resource these operations. With the introduction of Iranian and Jordanian forces, the SAF had additional combat power to rely on that served well in static, defensive positions.

After the setback with Operation SIMBA, the CSAF ensured the development of the defensive lines was systematic and planned. The SAF did not establish forward positions, which they could not support

logistically. Over time, this systematic pressure applied to the *adoo* reinforced popular support for the government, especially as the population reaped the benefit of the CAT projects in their villages. The PFLOAG was never able to provide the desired civil projects to the communities to build long lasting ties to the population.




Figure 6. Location of Defensive Lines Built in Dhofar.

Source: Created by Author

The Sultan had distinct advantages when constructing these defensive belts. The first was the physical terrain did not require defensive lines across the entire country. The distance from the coastline to the *jebel* near the PDRY border is only eight-kilometers; the Hornbeam Line extended for 30 kilometers. These short distances allowed for detailed obstacle planning and a concentration of the Sultan’s assets to effectively disrupt the *adoo* movements. Secondly, by immediately bringing civil relief projects to recently cleared areas, Dhofaris could witness the advantages of siding with the government against the *adoo*, as they received fresh water, veterinary care for their herds, and medical help for the population. The third major advantage was integrated military operations with conventional and irregular forces to man the static positions and conduct aggressive patrolling. These efforts would hinder PFLOAG efforts to maintain contact with the civilian population and would eventually defeat the insurgency.

Lessons of Dhofar

By the end of 1975, the *adoo* had limited capability to conduct their insurrection inside Oman. Even after Sultan Qaboos’s declaration that the SAF defeated the *adoo*, PFOAG still managed to conduct attacks within Oman until the early 1980s. However, through the development of local

security forces and the use of physical barriers, the government of Oman effectively disrupted PFLOAG's access to their external safe havens. What stands out during the examination of this case study was the development of a long term strategy that incorporated the physical terrain, cultural demographics, resources available to the government, and a unified means of addressing the serious grievances of the population.

The raising of the local security forces and the establishment of physical barriers would not have mattered if the CSAF had not nested these means within the overall strategy. The government of Oman raised local security forces in order to create a Surrendered Enemy Personnel program and allow former *adoo* to return to the government's side with honor. Through interviews with Dhofar Veterans, what becomes apparent is how the Dhofaris welcomed the *adoo* joining the *firqat*. The *firqat* received the former *adoo* with open arms, and considered the *adoo* "misguided" until they came over to the government's side. This willingness to welcome the former *adoo* led more Dhofaris to defect from PFLOAG.⁶³

The government of Oman, working through the BATT, raised the *firqat* and integrated them into their overall strategy. The former *adoo* had to swear loyalty to the Sultan, and they had to provide immediate intelligence on *adoo* locations. This helped to solidify their relationship with the government and cut ties to PFLOAG. The *firqat* had informal communication with the *adoo*, which helped to convince other *adoo* to cross into the government camp. Also, the *firqat* were not an over bureaucratized organization, but rather loosely manned, organized and led with the SAS serving as advisors. This system fit within how the Dhofari culture functioned. If the Sultan expected the Dhofari *firqat* to act as conventional forces, like the rest of the SAF, the *firqat* would have failed. Instead, this organization functioned within its cultural norms and maintained their loyalty to the Sultan.⁶⁴

Likewise, the building of the defensive lines starting in 1972 was part of the larger strategy. After the initial misstep with Operation SIMBA, the CSAF developed a systematic plan for building defensive lines starting at Salahah and working westward to Sarfait. Once additional forces arrived from Iran and Jordan, the SAF, in conjunction with *firqat* elements, had the capability to build these defensive belts, conduct aggressive patrolling to defeat *adoo* forces and conduct civil development projects. The combination of the offensive operations to establish the defensive belts, in conjunction with civil aid, allowed for immediate, positive effects upon the Dhofari population. This would help solidify support among the Dhofari population for the Sultan's government.⁶⁵

Lastly, the strategy employed by the Sultan of Oman focused on maintaining the Dhofari culture. PFLOAG allowed communist ideology to influence how they interacted with the people of the Dhofar Region. PFLOAG worked to remove Islam from the Dhofaris, which was actually a unifying element for the Omani people. The Sultan incorporated the attacks against Islam into his psychological operations messaging, with the simple message, “Islam is our Way; Freedom is our Aim.” This resonated with the Dhofaris and formed a deep wedge between the people and the insurgents. If the Sultan had tried to attack the Dhofari culture or force a radical system on the Dhofaris, success would have been much more difficult.⁶⁶

The success of the SAF against the PFLOAG was always in doubt. It was a difficult campaign, but the unified campaign strategy allowed for the use of complementing operations. By executing a strategy that fit within the physical terrain, worked with the demographic composition of the region, and aimed to address legitimate grievances of the population, the SAF defeated the *adoo*.

Notes

1. The Sultan of Oman and Muscat, "Speech of His Majesty Sultan Qaboos at the Police Station," 11 December 1975, <http://www.mofa.gov.om/mofanew/hmspeech.asp?title=92> (accessed 18 October 2011); Calvin Allen, Jr and W. Lynn Riggsbee, II, *Oman Under Qaboos: From Coup to Constitution, 1970-1996* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), 73.

2. Since the declassification of the documents related to this conflict in 2008, Dhofar Veterans are writing about their experiences and presenting their views of the conflict. Currently, most of the more popular works focus on the role of the Special Air Squadron (SAS) in the campaign. Examples of these works include Major General Tony Jeapes's work *SAS Secret War: Operation Storm in the Middle East* and Peter Sibley's work *A Monk in the SAS*. For works by veterans who served in the Sultan's Armed Forces, Ian Gardiner's *In the Service of the Sultan: A First Hand Account of the Dhofar Insurgency* and Bryan Ray's *Dangerous Frontier's: Campaigning in Somaliland and Oman* are both pivotal. A perspective that is still lacking in the narrative of the Dhofar War is from the Omanis and the *adoo*. Members of the Sultan of Oman's Air Force (SOAF) have also started producing works, including Rowland White's *Storm Front* published in 2011.

3. The Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf was how the Commander, Sultan's Armed Forces called the communist insurgency at the time of Sultan Qaboos' ascension in 1970. The communist force also used the organizational name Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) and the People's Organization for the Liberation of Oman (POLO). For this case study, I will use PFLOAG when referring to the communist movement for consistency, as the overall aims and goals of the movement are fundamentally similar. I will use the term *adoo*, which translates in Arabic to "enemy", to refer to specific fighters or Surrendered Enemy Personnel. The term *adoo* was also used by the enemy fighters to refer to themselves. From interviews conducted with Dhofar Veterans, when fighters came across the lines to surrender, they would refer to themselves as *adoo* as well: CF20110912J0001_SESSION1A, interview; CF20110914DV0001_SESSION1A, interview; CF20110914DV0002_SESSION2A, interview.

4. Tony Jeapes, *SAS Secret War* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1996), 26-27; John Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 140-141; Ian F. W. Beckett, "The British Counterinsurgency Campaign in Dhofar, 1965-1975," In *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*, ed. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010), 177-178; Paul Sibley, *A Monk in the SAS* (London: Spiderwise, 2011), 61-62

5. Due to the recent declassification of all the campaign material, Dhofar is receiving a great deal of focus by the British COIN Center and American counterinsurgency practitioners. Due to this recent focus, the Dhofar Campaign has the potential to become a "cherry-picked" case-study for "silver bullets". By failing to examine the full context of the campaign, one could fail to see why this campaign worked.

6. *Jebel* is the Arabic word “mountain” or “hill.” The *jebels* run along the coastline both in the north and south of Oman, and separate the vegetated coastline from the interior desert in Oman. A northern *jebel*, the *Jebel Akhdar*, figured prominently in the 1958 insurgencies against the Sultan Said of Oman.

7. Beckett, 175-177.

8. The population data was provided during an oral interview with a former member of the British Army Training Team (BATT) who served in Oman from 1971 through 1974 and then returned to Oman to work in the Civil Development Office. He allowed me to copy the Oman Census Data for Dhofar taken in 1970. Derived from interview CF20110914DV0001_ Session1A. Descriptions of the Dhofari culture also taken from Jeapes, 19.

9. Interviews: CF20110914DV0001_Session1A, CF20110914DV0001_Session 2A, CF20110917DV0002_Session1A. Through interviews with the Dhofar Veterans, one can surmise that individual independence was the highest personal trait valued by the Dhofari people. This did present problems for the British Army Training Team and SAF later in the campaign, as the Dhofari irregulars, *firqat*, would elect not to go on operations if they did not wish to.

10. Walter C. Ladwig, III., “Supporting Allies in Counterinsurgency: Britain and the Dhofar Rebellion,” *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 19, no. 1 (March 2008): 64. Besides of a difference in ethnicity and physical separation, a large number of grievances from the Dhofaris drove the insurrection. Sultan Said bin Taimor, the father of Sultan Qaboos, required his written permission for anyone to travel between villages. Oman had no hospitals and very limited education facilities. Even with the discovery of oil in the 1960s, Sultan Said refused to expand Oman’s infrastructure and provide services the population desired. Besides for driving the insurrection, the underdevelopment of Oman led to significant emigration by Omanis to other areas of the Middle East. Bryan Ray, *Dangerous Frontiers: Campaigning in Somaliland and Oman* (South Yorkshire: Pen and Swords Books, 2008), 60-61; Beckett, 175-177.

11. Ian Gardiner, *In the Service of the Sultan: A First Hand Account of the Dhofar Insurgency* (South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Books, 2011), 11-23; Jeapes, 19-27.

12. Jeapes, 31; Gardiner, 13-14; Deane-Drummond Papers, Liddell Hart Library, King’s College London, Call No: GB00099 KCLMA Deane-Drummond. Annex D to Order SD/2939 “Composition of SAF,” 30 June 1965

13. Deane-Drummond Private Papers, Liddell Hart Library Archive, King’s College London, Call No: GB0099 KCLMA Deane-Drummond. This information is principally derived from Annex B, Order SD/29 “The History of British Involvement in Oman,” 25 June 1965.

14. Oman had vital national security interest to the British Government due to its position in the Persian Gulf in relation to India, eastern Africa, and the Middle East, as well as Oman’s ability to protect shipping lanes through the Straits of Hormuz. Frank Kitson, *Bunch of Five* (London: Faber and Faber, 1977), 155.

15. Deane-Drummond Papers, Liddell Hart Library, King’s College London, Call No: GB0099/1 KCLMA Deane-Drummond. The operations order deploying 22 SAS from Malaya to Oman.

16. Deane Drummond Papers, Liddell Hart Library, King's College London, Call No: GB0099/1 KCLMA Deane-Drummond. The original operations order just focused on Iman Ghalib bin Ali and Talib bin Ali, but the second order issued one month after arriving in theater included Suleiman bin Ali.

17. The SAS and the Omanis also referred the *Jebel Akhdar* as "Green Mountain."

18. W. C. Ladwig, III, "Supporting Allies in Counterinsurgency: Britain and the Dhofar Rebellion," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 19, no. 1: 65-66; Beckett, 176; Kitson, *Bunch of Five*, 155-201; Ministry of Defense, *Operations in Muscat and Oman, 1952-1959* (London: The Historical Section Army Department Library, 1964); A. J. Deane-Drummond, "Operations in Oman," *British Army Review* (September 1959): 7-15.

19. Ray, 60-63; Jeapes 18-20.

20. Jeapes, 18-24.

21. Interviews CF20110914DV0001_SESSION1A; CF20110912J0001_SESSION1A; CF20110913C0001_SESSION1A; CF20110917DV0002_SESSION1A. All veterans interviewed mentioned specifically the high quality weapons and equipment used by the *adoo* during their engagements with either the SAF or *firqa*. They also mentioned how the SAF was overmatched in equipment during the early stages of the SAF counterinsurgency efforts.

22. Ian W. F. Beckett, "The British Counterinsurgency Campaign in Dhofar 1965-1975," in *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*, ed. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010), 177.

23. Deane-Drummond Private Papers, Liddell Hart Library, King's College London, Call No: GB0099 KCLMA Deane-Drummond. This information was derived from Annex B and Appendix 2 of Annex B to order SD/29 dated 25 June 1965.

24. The British Government developed a special relationship with the Sultanate of Oman and Muscat in 1798, when the East India Company signed a treaty with the Sultan in order to prevent French usage of Omani ports during the Napoleonic Wars. The Sultanate never became a British colony or protectorate, but they did maintain a special relationship with the British government through the modern day. This special relationship mainly focused on anti-piracy and shipping concerns that could affect the British shipping lanes to and from India through the 19th-century. This relationship also led to the integration of British officers into the Sultan's Armed Forces as seconded officers or as contractors. Deane-Drummond Papers, Liddell Hart Library, King's College London, Call No: GB00099 KCLMA Deane-Drummond. Annex B to Order SD/2939 dated June 1965. This annex provides the history of the British relationship with Oman from 1798 through 1965, and provides background to the start of the Dhofar Insurgency in 1965. Additionally, other British officers from the Royal Corps of Engineers and Royal Logistic Services deployed to Oman and provided assistance during this period, but were not seconded or contracted.

25. The British Army charged the Sultanate of Oman the price of the seconded officer's pay and allowances, plus the cost of replacing that officer in the British system. In the 1970s, the British Army suspended the cost of the replacement officer due to Omani budget issues. The Commander, Sultan's Armed Forces, the senior commander in the SAF, was provided by Whitehall in London to the Sultan. During the 1970s, many officers serving in traditional line units in the British Army of the Rhine did volunteer for seconding in order to gain combat experience and leave the boredom of peacetime maneuvers in Germany. Information on seconding I derived from interviews with the Dhofar Veterans: CF20110914DV0001_SESSION1A, CF20110914DV0001_SESSION2A, CF20110917DV0002_SESSION1A, CF20110912J0001_SESSION1A.

26. Graham Papers, Middle East Center Archive, St. Antony's College, Oxford, Call no: GB165-0327/4. Box 4 of this archive contains the transcribed copy of General John Graham's Diary for his time as the Commander, Sultan's Armed Forces from 1970 to 1972. During General Graham's second year as the Commander, Sultan's Armed Forces, he devoted a number of entries in his diary to the question of how effective the contract officers were in relation to the seconded officers. Also interviews: CF20110917DV0002_SESSION1A, CF20110917DV0002_SESSION2A.

27. CF20110912J0001_SESSION1A, interview; CF20110917DV0002_SESSION1A, interview. With the arrival of Iranian Forces in 1972, the number of helicopters available for logistical resupply increased significantly. Until that time, resupply would always be tenuous. The SAF did not have proper boots for operating in the rocky conditions of the Jebel. In interviews with Dhofar Veterans, many commented on the SAF wearing tennis shoes which had to be replaced after two days of operation in the *jebels* of Dhofar.

28. CF20110 914DV0001_SESSION1A, interview; CF20110917DV0002_SESSION1A, interview.

29. Harsh techniques included shooting dissenters and holding cattle or livestock hostage to force compliance with communist principles. The *adoo* did also attempt to collectivize land and establish model farms to demonstrate communist progress. D. L. Price, "Oman: Insurgency and Development" (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1975), 4-5; Graham Papers, Middle East Center, St. Antony's College, Oxford, Call no: GB165-0327/4. Graham in his diary wrote on 13 February 1971, "Intelligence report to-day about camels being seized by communists in central area for resupply convoys. Owners protested so four sub-sheiks had their throats cut and bodies flung over a cliff." This demonstrated some of the techniques employed by the *adoo* on an uncooperative Dhofari population.

30. Sultan Qaboos had served in the British Army of the Rhine with the British Regiment the Cameronians before returning to Oman. There have been no official documents discovered which provide direct evidence that the British Government sponsored this coup. However, the timing of the coup while the assessment team was in Oman; the positioning of a C-130 aircraft at the airport in Salalah to transport Sultan Said bin Taimur; and the former Sultan's housing in London, until his death in 1972, indicate a large amount of circumstantial evidence that the British government knew and approved of the changeover in leadership. CF20110914DV0001_SESSION1A, interview.

31. Beckett, 179.

32. *Firqa* is Arabic for “Company” and was the term for the irregular forces raised in the Dhofar Campaign. The plural is *Firqat*. Each *Firqa* raised was named for either a figure in Islamic history, Arab culture, or Omani heroes

33. This staffing also allowed the BATT to post a guard at night, especially as the BATT and *firqat* were building their relationship. When the SAF officers took over the mentoring of the *firqat* in 1973, they operated in one-person teams, which did not allow for a guard at night. Dhofar Veterans who served after 1973 that I interviewed indicated a higher level of trust with the *firqat* since otherwise they would never have been able to sleep during their two-year tour. CF20110917DV0002_SESSION1A, interview. The role of the *firqa* will be expanded later in this chapter.

34. Graham Papers, Middle East Center Archives, St. Antony’s College, Oxford, Call no: GB165-0327/4. Interviews CF20110912J0001_SESSION1A; CF20110914DV0001_SESSION1A; CF20110914DV0001_SESSION2A; DC20110917DV0002_SESSION1A. The command relationship appeared to be quite contentious from 1970 to 1972, when Colonel Mike Harvey served as the Commander, Dhofar Brigade. Both from interviews conducted with former SAS members and from Graham’s diaries, it appears as though Colonel Harvey did not support the concept of the *firqat*, primarily because he doubted their reliability and commitment to the Omani government. The Commander, Dhofar Brigade was a seconded officer and had responsibility for the entire Dhofar region, reporting directly to Commander, Sultan’s Armed Forces. After Colonel Harvey departed Oman in 1972, Brigadier John Fletcher replaced him and many of the command problems between the SAS and Commander, Dhofar Brigade no longer appear in written or oral records.

35. Ray, 148; Jeapes, 32-33. The civil support was a major part of the Watts Campaign Plan developed by then Lieutenant Colonel Johnny Watts, the 22 SAS Regimental Commander during his assessment of Oman before the coup of 1970. The CAT usually had a veterinarian and medical doctor permanently assigned to ensure the Dhofaris had access to their specialties.

36. The interviewed Dhofar Veterans presented these numbers during oral interviews: CF20110914DV0001_SESSION1A, CF20110914DV0001_SESSION2A, CF20110917DV0002_SESSION1A, and CF20110917DV0002_SESSION2B. The Dhofar veterans did state a number of times that due to the small number of British present during this campaign it really was a war fought by the Omanis and Dhofaris for their country. They also expressed that if a larger number of British had entered the campaign, the fighting could very well have escalated as the Dhofaris would have fought against foreign intervention in their internal affairs.

37. Jeapes, 32-33; Beckett, 180-181. Interviews conducted with Dhofar veterans stressed the simplicity and effectiveness of the Watts Plan for synchronizing efforts in the Dhofar Region. CF20110914DV0001_SESSION1A, interview; CF20110913C0001_SESSION1A, interview.

38. Calvin Allen, Jr. and W. Lynn Rigsbee, III, *Oman Under Qaboos* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000), 180-195.

39. CF20110914DV0001_SESSION1A, interview; CF20110914DV0001_SESSION2A, interview; CF20110917DV0002_SESSION1A, interview. The process of transitioning officer position from British to Omani officers continued through the 1980s with mixed results.

40. Beckett, 183; Jeapes 38-39.

41. Jeapes, 39-41. The speed that the *Firqat Salahadin* was formed was also reinforced through interviews with the Dhofar Veterans: CF20110914DV0001_Session1 A, CF20110912J0001_Session1A.

42. Graham Papers, Middle East Center, St. Antony's College, Oxford, Call No: GB165-0327/4. In Brigadier John Graham's Diary, he wrote about his reservations with the *firqat* on 14 February 1971, 7 May 1971, and 10 May 1971. He saw the advantage the *firqat* would bring to the counterinsurgency fight, but also had specific concerns about their reliability and capability in the end. Information derived from interviews with Dhofar Veterans indicate that Colonel Mike Harvey, the Commander, Dhofar Brigade, may have expressed even greater reservations, which most likely contributed to the strained relationship with the BATT during his time in command. CF20110912J0001_SESSION1A, interview. Graham's diary also indicates the Colonel Harvey had a problem with tact, which required Brigadier Graham to smooth ruffled feathers in Dhofar regularly.

43. Jeapes, 54; CF20110912J0001_SESSION1A, interview.

44. Graham Papers, Middle East Center, St. Antony's College, Oxford, Call no: GB164-0327/4. Brigadier Graham discussed the arrest of the communist leadership in Taqah and he indicates this operation was a loyalty test for the *firqa*. The operations in Sudh are described in detail in Jeapes, 71-81.

45. The five other *firqat* raised shortly after the *Firqa Salahadin*, with their tribal affiliation, were the Eastern Mahra *Firqa A'asifat*, the Western Mahra *Firqa Tariq bin Zeead* (also called the *Firqa Tariq bin Ziad*), the Bait Kathir *Firqa al Nasr*, the Bait Ma'asheni *Firqa Khalid bin Waalid*, and the Bait Umr *Sudh Defense Force* (which was renamed the *Firqa Gamil Abdul Nasser*). Jeapes, 111; Graham Papers, Middle East Center, St. Antony's College, Oxford, Call no: GB164-0327/4.

46. Graham Papers, Middle East Center, St. Antony's College, Oxford, Call no: GB164-0327. "Irregular Forces-SAF View" Annex A to Section 10, 1972. Also, Graham wrote in his diary on 7 May 1971 that *firqa* should be organized as one tribe, one *firqa*, and strength limited to 70 men.

47. Graham Papers, Middle East Center, St. Antony's College, Oxford, Call no: GB165-0327/4. The *Firqa Tariq bin Ziad* was threatened with disbandment. The only information on this came from Brigadier Graham's diary in which he records traveling to the *Firqa Tariq bin Ziad* on 7 October 1972 due to Colonel Harvey's recommendation that CSAF disband that *firqa*. After Brigadier Graham's inspection, he decides not to disband the organization, because they performed "not too bad" and heralded from the southwestern portion of Dhofar where the

adoo were strongest. This incident may have contributed to the ill feeling between the BATT and Colonel Harvey. Other sources within Brigadier Graham's papers also hinted that Colonel Harvey might have sent the disbandment recommendation back to London as well, since Brigadier Graham mentions responding to Whitehall about the *Firqa Tariq bin Ziad* recommendations.

48. This is based on interview file CF20110917DV0002_SESSION1A and CF20110917 DV0002_SESSION2A.

49. Graham Papers, Middle East Center, St. Antony's College, Oxford, Call no: GB165-0327/4, In mid-1971, Brigadier Graham writes about a group under the command of a Saudi named Karama who operated inside the Oman border and conducted a series of small arms and mortar attacks against PDRY. This group had sponsorship from the Omani Prime Minister Seyyid Tariq. Brigadier Graham and the Minister of Defense Hugh Oldman were able to have the group sent back to Saudi Arabia after informing Sultan Qaboos of the dangers associated with escalation of the conflict. There was debate within Brigadier Graham's diary that Karama's group may have been an attempt by the Saudis to destabilize Oman. Interviewed Dhofar Veterans also indicate that Karama was considered a "rouge." CF20110912J0001_SESSION1A, interview.

50. Graham Papers, Middle East Center, St. Antony's College, Oxford, Call no: GB165-0327/4, Graham Diary, entry 10 May 1971. Graham follows the story with the line, "BAT [sic] especially should take note, the SAS have become a bit starry-eyed about their *Firqa* proteges."

51. 20110912J0001_SESSION1A, interview; 20110913C0001_SESSION1A, interview; 20110914DV0001_SESSION1A, interview; 20110914DV0001_SESSION2A, interview; 20110917DV0002_SESSION1A, interview; Graham Papers, Middle East Center, St. Antony's College, Oxford, Call no: GB165-0327/4; Ian Gardiner, *In the Service of the Sultan: A First Hand Account of the Dhofar Insurgency* (South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Books, 2011), 156-158. Ian Gardiner's book provides an excellent point of view from a member of the Sultan's Armed Forces of how the *firqa* operated in 1973 through 1974.

52. CF20110912J0001_SESSION1A, interview. Killing an *adoo* would result in the *adoo* losing a man and no gain for the SAF, net of zero for the government. By recruiting an *adoo* into the *firqa*, the *adoo* lost a man and the SAF gained one, so a net of one for the government.

53. CF20110914DV0001_SESSION1A, interview; Jeapes, 135-144. The operations to secure White City most of the Dhofar Veterans considered the first of three turning points in the war. The other two were the Battle of Mirbat on 19 July 1972, and the last was the operations into Saufait in 1974 which finally cut the *adoo's* supply lines with PRDY.

54. Headquarters, Commander, Sultan's Armed Forces, "Warning Order: Operation SIMBA" (20 February 1972) from Graham Papers, Middle East Center, St. Antony's College, Oxford, Call no: GB165-0327/1.

55. Graham Papers, Middle East Center, St. Antony's College, Oxford, Call no: GB165-0327/4, Diary entries 9 May through 20 May 1972.

56. Graham Papers, Middle East Center, St. Antony's College, Oxford, Call No: GB165-0327, When Sultan Qaboos bin Said approached Brigadier Graham on 8 May 1972, the Sultan stated that he believed Hugh Oldman had given him bad advice not to conduct a retaliatory attack against the PDRY. The tone expressed in Graham's diary indicated the Sultan was disappointed that Graham had sided with Hugh Oldman and also recommended against action. The Commander, Dhofar Area, Colonel Harvey, also planned a ground operation using SAF forces to attack across the border. The operation never received permission to execute, and most likely would have completely changed the dynamic of the conflict if it had been authorized. Ray, 85-87.

57. CF20110914DV0001_SESSION2A, interview; Ray, 87. The role of the Sultan of Oman's Air Force is just recently receiving more attention. The former Chief of the United Kingdom's Defense Staff, Air Chief Marshall Sir Graham Eric "Jock" Stirrup flew as a seconded officer in the Sultan of Oman's Air Force. Also, a recent publication only available in the United Kingdom, *Storm Front* by Rowland White was published 9 June 2011, details the role of the SOAF in this campaign.

58. Ray, 117-120; CF20110917DV0002_SESSION1A, interview.

59. Ray, 120; CF20110914DV0001_SESSION1A, interview;
CF20110917DV
0002_SESSION1A, interview.

60. Ray, 146-151.

61. Gardiner, 78; Ray, 86, 148-150.

62. Price, 11.

63. CF20110912J0001_SESSION1A, interview; CF20110914DV0001_ SESSION
1A, interview; Jeapes, 57-59.

64. CF20110912J0001_SESSION1A, interview; CF20110913C0001_ SESSION
1A, interview; CF20110914DV0001_SESSION1A, interview;
CF20110917DV0002_ SESSION1A, interview; Graham Papers, Middle East Center, St. Antony's College, Oxford, Call no: GB165-0327/1, "Annex A to Section 10: Irregular Forces-SAF View"; Jeapes, 39.

65. CF20110914DV0001_SESSION1A, interview; CF20110917DV0002_ SESSION1A, interview; Ray, 146-161.

66. CF20110914DV0001_SESSION1A, interview; CF20110917DV0002_ SESSION1A, interview; Jeapes, 37-39;

Chapter 6

Conclusions

To sum up, the ideal situation for the insurgent would be a large land-locked country shaped like a blunt-tipped star, with jungle-covered mountains along the borders and scattered swamps in the plains, in a temperate zone with a large and dispersed population and a primitive economy. The counterinsurgent would prefer a small island shaped like a pointed star, on which a cluster of evenly spaced towns are separated by desert, in a tropic or arctic climate, with an industrial economy.

— David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*

Conclusions

As David Galula noted above, both the insurgent and counterinsurgent have types of environment in which they would prefer to operate due to the advantages provided them. Unfortunately, one rarely chooses where one fights. The counterinsurgency force will emerge victorious if it can rapidly adapt to the actual environment (not the one they wish they had), develop an integrated strategy, and apply their forces to defeat the insurgent. By conducting an integrated border control operation, the counterinsurgent force can isolate the insurgency from its external support and material supplies, and will diminish the insurgency's ability to conduct operations.

When entering into an occupation of new territory, or assisting another country contain an insurgency, counterinsurgency planners must examine four factors to ensure successful border control operations. The first is developing a detailed understanding of the physical terrain. The second is examining the cultural demographics to determine their relationships to the border areas. The third factor is nesting border operations within the overall campaign strategy, ensuring the desired effects at the border complement the overall strategic end state of defeating the insurgency. The fourth factor is determining the allocation of security forces for border operations, including the type and mission the forces should execute.

Border control operations require detailed planning and a relentless focus on ensuring the effects complement the larger counterinsurgency campaign plan. The counterinsurgency planners and leaders must ensure they design their operations to fit the environment they are fighting in, and do not attempt to clone techniques from one campaign and insert them into another without modification.

Factor One: The Physical Terrain

The physical terrain figured very predominately in the two case studies presented in this thesis. The mountains of the North-West Frontier and the *jebels* of Oman made conditions very difficult for both sides of the conflict. The SAF used the terrain very well, especially during the implementation of a series of defensive barriers that pushed the *adoo* into the desert. The SAF realized they did not have to construct barriers across the entire country, which would have been outside both the SAF's capability and desire, but rather they built barriers from the coastline through the *jebel*. By forcing the *adoo* into the desert, the SOAF could more easily interdict the *adoo* camel-based supply convoys.

In addition to understanding the terrain, the counterinsurgent must also ensure they are prepared to operate in the terrain. A theme that arose often during operations in the North-West Frontier was concern for the lack of experience of the Indian Army operating in the mountains. The high peaks in the Hindu-Kush Mountains necessitated a degree of physical fitness and terrain knowledge that required specialized training. The loss of experienced leaders in the Indian Army due to the casualties of World War I made the Indian Army unprepared for combat operations during the Third Anglo-Afghan War.

Counterinsurgency planners must ensure they fully understand the type of physical terrain in the border regions, to ensure a border control operation will have the desired effects.

Factor Two: The Cultural Demographics

The cultural demographics in the border region can have a significant impact on a counterinsurgent's ability to disrupt insurgent external sanctuary. These demographics can also affect how the population perceives the counterinsurgent force's operations in the area which may impact their ability to raise local security forces. Initially during the Dhofar Rebellion, the SAF was viewed as a force not representative of the people in Dhofar, due to the Omani and Baluch composition of the force. By raising an irregular, indigenous force with the *firqat*, the Sultan built a force loyal to him and willing to attack the *adoo*.

Both the Pathan culture of the North-West Frontier and the Dhofaris in Oman fostered a strong sense of individualism. Neither tribe was hierarchical and both groups had to rely on a system of consensus building to function. In Oman, Sultan Qaboos understood this and worked with the SAF and BATT to develop the *firqat*, who could be unreliable compared to the conventional forces, but still maintained their loyalty to the Sultan

through the conflict. Outside of the multi-tribal *Firqa Salahadin*'s self-disbandment following the death of Salim bin Mubarrack, no other *firqat* organization disbanded.

On the other hand, in the North-West Frontier, the recruitment of local security forces had a more mixed result. The PIF was a successful, multi-tribal organization, who earned a reputation for strong military capability. The Khyber Rifles, however, had initial success under the leadership of Colonel Sir Robert Warburton in the 1880s-90s, but failed completely during the Third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919. This would lead to major reforms in recruitment and training for irregular force in the North-West Frontier, which included banning recruitment of certain tribes and groups from the region.

As well as the role of cultural demographics in security force recruitment, the Dhofar Rebellion also demonstrated how Sultan Qaboos and his British advisors developed a campaign plan that resonated with the population. The PFLOAG attempted to radically change parts of the Dhofari society by forcing atheism and gender equality, and undermining tribal structures. Sultan Qaboos built a campaign plan that focused on maintaining the tribal structure and highlighted the importance of Islam to the Dhofari People. This was best encapsulated with the psychological operations message, "Freedom is our Aim, Islam is our Way." This message resonated with the population in Dhofar and assisted in concluding the campaign.

This demonstrates the understanding of the cultural demographics at the border region are necessary for the counterinsurgent to determine how best to integrate border operations into the campaign plan.

Factor Three: Integration of Border Operations in the Strategic Framework

Of the four factors listed, this is probably the most vital to ensuring success in the border regions during an insurgency. However, the integration of border operations in the strategic framework depends on the previous two factors to ensure the border operations are applicable to the specifics of the counterinsurgency environment.

Over time during the British involvement in the North-West Frontier, the British Civil Administrators lost focus for why they had become embroiled in the area. After the annexation of Punjab in 1849, the British desired to protect this region from outside raiders coming from the North-West Frontier. By the 1870s, the British started to become more concerned with possible Russian encroachment through Afghanistan into India.

This would lead to the Forward Policy, in which the British government moved deeper into the tribal regions to create the necessary buffer from Russian involvement. When Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, created the North-West Frontier Province in 1901 that action made this region an equal province to the Punjab or other major provinces and displayed a complete lack of strategic insight as to why the British were involved with the region to start with. By creating the North-West Frontier Province, the British now had responsibility for a region it neither desired to administer or the ability to provide the services required for a full province. This would lead to a cycle of under-resourcing and violence in the region, especially following the Third Anglo-Afghan War, that would never be resolved before the Partition of India and Pakistan in 1947.

Due to the length of time of British involvement in the North-West Frontier, it allowed for numerous changes in the British government which in turn, generated changes in strategic outlook and goals. Unfortunately, the lack of coherent strategy due to these changes only led to a deeper commitment of Indian forces into a region that served little importance for the British national interest.

The insurgency in Dhofar, on the other hand, had the distinct advantage of a single, benevolent, autocratic ruler driving the strategic framework. The Watts Plan changed very little from its inception in 1970 through the end of the Dhofar campaign. There was changes made to how the SAF, with British assistance, accomplished the end goals, but the plan always served to integrate the operational objectives. Even with the temporary setback caused by the overreaching with Operation SIMBA in attempting to build the first defensive line right at the border of Oman and PDRY, the SAF maintained its focus on the larger strategy and accomplishing the desired end state.

Factor Four: The Allocation of Security Forces

Once counterinsurgency planners integrate border operations into the strategic framework, they can determine the allocation of security forces for the border. This allocation should include the type of force and the force's mission at the border. Both case studies detailed key considerations for allocating security forces to the border.

If the counterinsurgent decides to raise local security forces, especially irregular forces, they must build controls into the recruitment system to ensure the local forces remain loyal to the counterinsurgent. The North-West Frontier demonstrated the dangers of rushing to build local security forces without considering if they were the right force for the strategic

goals. When the Khyber Rifles collapsed during the Third Anglo-Afghan War, a number of them joined with the invading Afghan army to fight against the Indian Army. These deserters brought the weapons and equipment provided by the British government with them when they joined with the invading army.

Among the Pathan tribes of the North-West Frontier, the British civil authorities had great difficulty creating a system that ensured tribal accountability for the local security forces. Neither the FCR nor tribal engagements seemed able to create a system that ensured loyalty to the government in exchange for providing security in the region. The cultural mores of the Pathans, especially the adherence to tenets of *Pashtunwali*, stymied efforts to creating a lasting, reliable security force.

In Oman, the SAF was able to integrate the conventional brigades with the irregular *firqat* to provide a loyal, indigenous security force. Part of this integration also included employing the different security forces to their strengths, and ensuring the government resourced what it had the capability to sustain for the campaign. Even though the Dhofar tribes valued individual independence, the Sultan was able to develop a system that ensured their loyalty. Part of ensuring this loyalty included the immediate arrival of CATs to provide wells and basic services to the tribesmen. This assisted the Sultan in tying the Dhofaris to wanting the counterinsurgent efforts to succeed.

This fourth major factor is important to ensure the counterinsurgent considers the available resources and properly allocates them as part of the overall strategy to defeat the insurgency. All efforts and forces must remain focused on defeating the insurgency.

Recommendation

The application of border control operations to defeat an insurgency remains a vital component to the success of a counterinsurgency. As the United States looks towards the future, a degree of uncertainty is apparent in the strategic outlook of the armed forces. Though President Obama has outlined a withdrawal plan for US forces from Afghanistan by 2014, the United States will likely remain engaged in Afghanistan and Pakistan for years to come.

Currently, the US is engaged in a confusing policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan in that the United States conducts a policy similar to the British Closed Border policy on the Afghanistan side of the border. Simultaneously, the United States is putting pressure on the Pakistani government to conduct a form of Forward Policy on the Pakistan side of the same border.

The aspects of the Closed Border Policy in the Afghanistan side include the use of punitive strikes using armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and a lack of interaction from the Afghanistan side to the tribes in Pakistan by US forces. The aspects of the Forward Policy include US pressure on Pakistan to conduct sustained engagements with the FATA tribes, the use of US foreign aid for economic development in the FATA, and increased funds to build Pakistan military capability to operate in the mountainous tribal regions.¹

In order to have success in the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan it is critical the United States, Afghanistan, and Pakistan develop a unified policy for both sides of the border. The tribes will move to whichever side provides them the least amount of interference and maximize independence. By having an uneven American policy, the tribes can continue to cause instability in the border regions.

If history is a guide, sometime in the future the United States will engage in an overseas operation that will require defeating an insurgent force. It is critical that planners for that operation understand the importance of the border regions to providing an insurgency external support. By moving quickly to understand the physical terrain, identifying the relevant cultural demographics, integrating border control operations in the strategic framework, and allocating appropriate security forces, the counterinsurgent force can rapidly strangle the insurgency and restore stability.

Note

1. Kenneth Katzman, *Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and US Policy* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 22 November 2011); K. Alan Kronstadt and Kenneth Katzman, *Islamist Militancy in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Region and US Policy* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 21 November 2008); K. Alan Kronstadt, *Pakistan-US Relations: A Summary* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 21 October 2011).

Glossary

Adoo. Arabic for “enemy,” this was the term for the insurgent fighters during the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman from 1965-1975. This was even how the fighters referred to themselves when surrendering to the Sultan’s Armed Forces.

Black and Tans. The paramilitary force used by the British Empire to replace the Royal Irish Constabulary during the Irish War of Independence from 1919-1920. The name derived from the mix of police and military uniform worn by the members. Many of the members were ex-veterans from World War I and had a reputation for brutality.

Firqat. Arabic for “company,” this was the term for the irregular security forces raised during the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman by the Sultan. Many of the *firqat* were surrendered enemy personnel who swore an oath to the Sultan.

Jebel. Arabic for “mountain,” this was the term used to refer to the mountainous region between the coastline and desert in the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. The majority of fighting during the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman occurred in the *jebel*.

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