Defense Security Cooperation Agency
Defense Solutions for America's Global Partners
C8 - End-Use Monitoring (EUM)
C8.1. - Definition and Purpose Of End-Use Monitoring

C8.1.1. End-Use Monitoring (EUM) is a program designed to verify that defense articles or services transferred by the United States Government (USG) to foreign recipients are being used in accordance with the terms and conditions of the transfer agreement or other applicable agreement. In accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), section 505, and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), section 3 (22 U.S.C. 2753) and section 4 (22 U.S.C. 2754) as reflected in the Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) Standard Terms and Conditions, recipients must agree to use U.S.-provided defense articles, training, and services only for their intended purpose; not to transfer title to, or possession of, any defense article or related training to anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of that country or of the USG without prior written consent of the USG; to maintain the security of any article with substantially the same degree of protection afforded to it by the USG; and to permit observation and review by, and to furnish necessary information to, representatives of the USG with regards to use of such articles. EUM provides USG oversight to ensure these conditions are met. All potential end-use violations must be reported through Department of State (DoS) channels. Information regarding any potential violations should also be forwarded to the Golden Sentry program team at DSCA (Programs Directorate, Weapons Division), the appropriate Combatant Commander (CCDR), and the Military Department (MILDEP).

Table C8.T1. End-Use Monitoring Legal and Policy References

Reference Subject

AECA, Section 40A (22 U.S.C. 2785)

Requires EUM of defense articles and services sold, leased, or exported under the AECA or the FAA.

AECA, Section 38(g)(7) (22 U.S.C. 2778(g)(7)

Establishes standards for identifying high-risk exports for end-use verification.

AECA, Section 3(g), Section 4 (22 U.S.C. 2753(g) and 2754) and 2754)

Requires agreements for the sale or lease of articles on the United States Munitions List (USML) (made after November 29, 1999) to state that the USG retains the right to verify credible reports that the article(s) has been used for purposes not authorized under AECA, section 3.

FAA, Section 505 (22 U.S.C. 2314)

Requires Recipient agreement to use the materiel/services properly; return net proceeds from sales as required; and permit observation of the end-use of articles, services, and training.

DoDI 2030.08

Implementation of Trade Security Controls (TSC) for Transfers of DoD U.S. Munitions List (USML) and Commerce Control List (CCL) Personal Property to Parties Outside DoD Control.

DoDI 4140.66

Registration and End-Use Monitoring of Defense Articles and/or Services

DoD 4160.28-M

Defense Demilitarization Manual
DoD 4160.28-M Volume 1
DoD 4160.28-M Volume 2
DoD 4160.28-M Volume 3

DoD 5100.76-M

Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives.

C8.2 - Golden Sentry

C8.2.1. Section 40A of the AECA (22 U.S.C 2785) requires the President to establish an EUM program to improve accountability with respect to defense articles sold, leased, or exported under the AECA or FAA. The Director, DSCA, has been delegated authority by the Secretary of Defense and USD(P) to administer DoD’s EUM program, known as Golden Sentry, to comply with Section 40A of the AECA. Section 40A requires, to the extent practicable, the EUM program be designed to provide reasonable assurance that the recipient is complying with the requirements imposed by the USG with respect to the use, transfer, and security of defense articles and defense services. The program must also provide for the end-use verification of defense articles and services that incorporate sensitive technology, and/or are particularly vulnerable to diversion or other misuse, or whose diversion or other misuse could have significant consequences. Congress requires an annual report describing actions taken to implement Section 40A, including a detailed accounting of the costs and number of personnel associated with the monitoring program.

C8.2.2. Golden Sentry’s objective is to ensure compliance with technology control requirements in order to minimize security risks to the United States, partner nations, and Allies. EUM includes all actions to prevent misuse or unauthorized transfer of defense articles or services from title transfer until disposal. The type of defense article or service generally determines the level of monitoring required. The Director, DSCA, and/or Combatant Commander (CCDR) may also determine, in consultation at the General Officer, Flag Officer, or Senior Executive Service (SES) level, that a change in physical security and accountability monitoring may be warranted considering the specific defense article or service in question and based on assessment of the threat to security in the area or for other compelling reasons. When changing events or other unusual circumstances prompt Security Cooperation Organizations (SCO) concern regarding the end-use and security of U.S.-provided defense articles and services, SCOs should contact DSCA (Programs Directorate) to discuss the situation and obtain further guidance.

C8.2.3. EUM Responsibilities. Monitoring the use of U.S.-origin items is a joint responsibility of the partner nations and the USG, to include the Military Departments (MILDEPs), the Combatant Commands (CCMDs), and the SCOs. USG representatives have full responsibility for defense articles until title is transferred to the partner nation. The partner nation assumes this responsibility based on the terms under which the transfers are made, including restrictions on physical security and accountability. USG representatives retain a continuing responsibility under Golden Sentry to assist DSCA to verify the appropriate end-use and security of U.S.-origin defense articles and defense services sold or transferred on a government-to-government basis. Table C8.T2. lists DoD organizations and their EUM responsibilities.

Table C8.T2. DoD End-Use Monitoring Responsibilities

Organization Responsibility

DSCA (Programs Directorate)

  • Manage DoD's Golden Sentry EUM program and provide subject matter expertise for all EUM-related issues.

  • Develop and promulgate EUM policy guidance within DoD and the interagency.

  • Draft and submit an annual report to Congress describing the actions taken to execute the Golden Sentry program, including a detailed account of the resources and personnel associated with the monitoring program in accordance with AECA section 40A(c) (22 U.S.C. 2785(c)).

  • Ensure that defense technologies and weapons systems designated for Enhanced EUM (EEUM) controls transferred via government-to-government programs contain appropriate accountability and security notes and provisos.

  • Review LOAs and other government-to-government agreements to ensure they include the appropriate EUM notes, provisos, and transfer conditions.

  • Oversee the fiscal budget planning, programming, and execution of the FMS Administrative funding of EUM activities.

  • Work to improve monitoring of the phases of the export process that are most susceptible to diversion or retransfer: shipping, use, storage, and disposal.

  • Forward reports of possible AECA and FAA violations to the DoS Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Regional Security and Arms Transfer Division (DoS (PM/RSAT)).

  • Participate in USG and international meetings when EUM is an agenda item.

  • Conduct visits to the CCMD Headquarters and the Areas of Responsibility (AOR), SCOs, host nations, and international organizations for:

    • Familiarization and Assistance Visits (FAV) to assist SCOs and host nations to develop EUM programs.

    • Regional EUM Forums to provide SCO personnel updated Golden Sentry Program policy guidance and hands-on training on the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP)-EUM database.

    • Compliance Assessment Visits (CAV) to assess SCOs' compliance with Golden Sentry policy and host nations' compliance with specific physical security and accountability agreements, provisos, and other terms of sale.

    • Investigative Visits and special End-Use Monitoring checks to examine possible violations of partner obligations imposed by the transfer agreement or other applicable agreement pursuant to AECA section 3 (22 U.S.C. 2753) and FAA, Section 505 (22 U.S.C. 2314).

  • Draft and submit CAV reports to the appropriate CCMD, SCO, other DoD organizations, and DoS to ensure EUM compliance.

  • Publish and disseminate EUM best practices and lessons-learned to the SC community through the monthly EUM Newsletter posted in SCIP.

  • Incorporate EUM into workforce training programs, and support efforts by the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) to educate the SC community on the Golden Sentry program.

MILDEPs and Implementing Agencies (IAs)

  • Maintain a Golden Sentry primary point of contact (POC).

  • Assist DSCA in developing EUM policy and promulgate EUM policy within the MILDEP.

  • Include EUM activities in the fiscal budget planning, programming, and execution cycles.

  • In coordination with the DSCA (Programs Directorate), identify and provide DSCA a recommended listing of sensitive technologies and defense articles to be considered for EEUM management.

  • Conduct site survey certifications of host nations' storage facilities for EEUM-designated weapons systems and provide DSCA (Programs Directorate) a current list of site survey certification officials. Provide DSCA the results of all site survey certifications performed.

    • Provide DSCA a current list of all security managers, by weapon type, responsible for performing site survey certifications.

    • Develop certification checklists using parameters from DoD 5100.76-M and submit them to DSCA for review to ensure standardization.

    • Security managers will coordinate with DSCA and the other MILDEPs before site survey certification visits are performed.

  • Provide DSCA (Programs Directorate) feedback and reports based on observations during visits of any potential violations of transfer agreements or other applicable agreements pursuant to AECA section 3 (22 U.S.C. 2753) and FAA, section 505.

  • Draft and coordinate with DSCA (Programs Directorate) security and accountability provisos and checklists for EEUM-designated technologies and/or specific individual transfers designated for EEUM.

  • Submit to DSCA recommendations of defense articles that no longer require EEUM management.

  • Provide a monthly delivery record with serial numbers of EEUM items to DSCA (eeum.reports@dsca.mil) for input into the SCIP-EUM database.

  • Review Military Articles and Services List (MASL) submissions for items identified for EEUM.

  • Work to improve the monitoring of the phases of the export process that are most susceptible to diversion or retransfer:

    • Shipping

    • Use

    • Storage

    • Disposal

  • Assist DSCA with investigative visits regarding potential violations of obligations imposed by applicable agreements pursuant to AECA section 3 (22 U.S.C. 2753) and FAA section 505 (22 U.S.C. 2314).

  • Support Golden Sentry goals and objectives in bilateral discussions.

  • Support Golden Sentry requests for subject matter experts on EUM site visits.

  • Incorporate EUM into workforce training programs.

Combatant Commands (COCOMs)

  • Maintain a Golden Sentry primary POC.

  • Support and coordinate Regional EUM Forums and ensure SCO participation.

  • In accordance with DoD Directive 5132.03:

    1. Ensure that Golden Sentry is assigned as a primary responsibility to assigned SCOs (including Defense Attaché Offices or U.S. Diplomatic Missions fulfilling SA responsibilities) within the AOR;

    2. Ensure that all EUM activities are captured during the fiscal Budget Planning, Programming, and Execution cycles;

    3. Provide adequate funding to SCOs to perform EUM; and

    4. Assess the effectiveness of EUM compliance during Inspector General or similar evaluation team visits.

  • Develop and promulgate EUM policy, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and/or EUM Compliance plans and send via e-mail to: eumhelpdesk@dsca.mil.

  • Ensure SCOs conduct Routine and Enhanced EUM in accordance with Golden Sentry EUM policy and procedures and annotate all accountability and physical security checks in the SCIP-EUM database.

Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs) (including Defense Attaché Offices and U.S. Diplomatic Missions with Security Assistance responsibilities)

Functions that must be performed by a USG employee who is also a U.S. citizen:

  • Designate in writing and maintain a Golden Sentry primary POC.

  • Develop and coordinate EUM SOPs and Night Vision Devices (NVD) Control Plans and send via e-mail to eumhelpdesk@dsca.mil for record keeping in the SCIP-EUM database.

  • Conduct, in accordance with established checklists, EEUM to verify recipients are complying with the physical security and accountability provisos annotated in LOAs containing EEUM-designated items.

  • Establish and maintain a database of all EEUM-designated defense articles and services exported via government-to-government transfers.

  • Assist the host nation in submitting third party transfer and change of end-use requests and verify and document disposal/destruction of defense articles. See Section C8.4.1.4.

  • Report possible violations regarding end use, transfer or security to Department of State (PM/RSAT), DSCA (Programs Directorate), and the CCMD.

Functions that may be performed by direct hire Locally Employed Staff authorized to perform inherently governmental duties, or a U.S. contractor when directly supervised by a USG employee:

  • Report immediately to DSCA the destruction or loss of any EEUM-designated item and annotate the appropriate disposition in the SCIP-EUM database (e.g., active, expended, destroyed, etc.).

  • Review LOAs and other instruments authorizing government-to-government transfer of defense articles and services (e.g., Memoranda of Agreement and Understanding) for notes or provisos requiring specific physical security or accountability procedures.

  • Conduct Routine EUM to verify recipients are complying with applicable agreements regarding use, transfer restrictions, and security of defense articles.

  • Ensure that defense articles designated for EEUM are entered by serial number in the SCIP-EUM database and that scheduled inventories are annotated and updated as required for each EEUM commodity.

  • Ensure that all costs for conducting EEUM activities are captured during the fiscal budget programming and execution cycles. Submit projected funding requirements to the CCMDs and DSCA via the Security Assistance Automated Resource Management System (SAARMS).

  • Support Golden Sentry FAV, CAV, and Investigative Visits as described in Tables C8.T3 and C8.T4, and Section C8.6.3.

  • Support attendance by SCO EUM personnel, and assist in coordinating Regional EUM Forums as requested by the CCMDs and DSCA.

  • When directed by the Chief of Mission, on a case-by-case basis, conduct Blue Lantern end-use checks for commercially exported defense articles and include the cost of performing these checks during the annual budget submission via the SAARMS.

  • Work to improve the monitoring process.

  • Respond to queries pertaining to the shipping, receipt, use, or disposal of defense articles and services provided to host nations.

Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)

  • Maintain a Golden Sentry primary POC.

  • Support Golden Sentry team visits and other SCO EUM-related activities by providing personnel for EUM site visits.

  • Ensure personnel supporting the EUM program are properly trained on Routine and EEUM policy and procedures.

  • Provide DSCA (Programs Directorate) feedback and reports based upon observations during visits of any possible violations of obligations imposed by agreements pursuant to AECA section 3 (22 U.S.C. 2753) and FAA section 505 (22 U.S.C. 2314).

  • Provide to DSCA (Programs Directorate) a cost analysis of all DTRA EUM activities at the conclusion of each mission and a summary at the end of each FY for DSCA's Budget Planning, Programming, and Execution cycle.

  • Support Golden Sentry goals and objectives, as needed, during DSCA-hosted discussions, such as military-to-military meetings, Regional EUM Forums, or as appropriate.

  • Incorporate EUM workforce training programs to educate the DTRA community on the Golden Sentry Program.

  • During any EUM CAV, identify to DSCA (Programs Directorate) additional provisos that should be included in LOAs.

  • Support the Golden Sentry team by conducting inventories to ensure compliance with the EUM checklists.

  • Support Golden Sentry team visits by coordinating details with host nation SCOs through DSCA.

  • Provide an After Action Report (AAR) of any support visits to DSCA (Programs Directorate).

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM)

  • Maintain a Golden Sentry primary POC.

  • Include information on the DSCA Golden Sentry EUM program in curricula.

  • Support attendance to Regional EUM Forums as appropriate to brief SCO personnel.

C8.2.4. Post-delivery Monitoring. Post-delivery monitoring is performed by USG personnel assigned to SCOs or deployed to the host nation in support of SCO functions. The Golden Sentry program employs two post-delivery monitoring methodologies to perform DoD’s EUM responsibilities: Routine and Enhanced EUM. To assist SCOs in conducting post-delivery monitoring of both types, a EUM application is available in the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP-EUM) as a repository of data and means to generate reports. CCMDs and SCOs develop EUM Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) to implement country-specific EUM policy and procedures. A copy must be forwarded to eumhelpdesk@dsca.mil. Written SOPs must contain as a minimum the following information:

Table C8.T3. SOP Minimum Information Requirements

# SOP Minimum Information Requirements
1

EUM responsibilities and procedures for conducting Routine and Enhanced-EUM (EEUM).

2

Host nation EUM points of contact and EUM visit scheduling requirements.

3

Maintenance of records of Routine EUM visits and all EEUM physical security and accountability checks (Memorandums for Record or other written documentation).

4

Host nation internal physical security/accountability procedures.

5

Procedures for record keeping, reporting inventories, losses, theft, unauthorized access, third party transfers/disposal/damaged/expended defense articles, and reporting possible violations and corrective action.

6

Procedures for capturing and submitting to the CCMD and DSCA actual and projected costs associated with performing EEUM functions

C8.3. - Routine EUM

C8.3.1. Routine EUM is required for all defense articles and services provided via government-to-government programs. SCO personnel are required to observe and report to the CMD, DSCA, an DoS any potential misuse or unapproved transfer of U.S.-origin defense articles. SCO personnel perform Routine EUM in conjunction with other security cooperation functions, during visits to the host nation’s installations, through interaction with other assigned embassy personnel, and from any other readily available or opportune source of information. SCOs must document Routine EUM on at least a quarterly basis and maintain records for five years.

C8.3.1.1. To assist SCOs in conducting routine monitoring, DSCA has developed an FMS Routine EUM Summary Report located in the SCIP-EUM database under the Queries/Reports menu. This provides a "watch list" of specific categories of defense articles exported via FMS that includes, but is not limited to: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery systems, fixed and rotary wing aircraft, unmanned aerial systems, warships and military vessels, missiles and missile systems, military vehicles, bombs, crew served and individual weapons, platform-mounted night vision systems, and man-portable NVDs monitored through Routine EUM. To assist SCOs in documenting routine monitoring performed, DSCA developed a Routine EUM Template located in the SCIP-EUM database under the Support-Policy/Procedures Memos.

C8.3.2. Articles or Services Requiring Additional Controls on End-Use. There are instances in which particular items normally subject to Routine EUM are transferred with notes restricting the conditions under which they may be transported, stored, or employed. SCOs should be aware of these restrictions and alert to indications or reports that suggest failure to comply.

C8.3.2.1. Arms, Ammunition and Explosives (AA&E). AA&E items require special protection, and the requestors must submit a plan for safeguards of these items during the Letter of Request (LOR) and/or Pre-LOA process. The DoD applies stringent AA&E controls while these items are in U.S. custody, and the same standards must be applied to the items upon release to the purchaser. Although recipient countries generally do not assume control of sensitive AA&E items within the continental United States, except as cargo loaded and prepared for departure, USG security standards must apply throughout the lifecycle of the weapon system (e.g., transportation, delivery, testing, operational use, storage, and destruction processes). Additionally, a site survey may be required to ensure that appropriate physical security measures are in place at the destination prior to the delivery of the weapon systems. See DoD 5100.76-M, and the Section C7.15 for more information regarding AA&E items.

C8.3.2.2. White Phosphorous and Cluster Munitions. Munitions containing White Phosphorous (See Section C4.4.8.) and cluster munitions permissible for transfer under U.S. law (See Section C4.4.6.) are transferred with notes restricting the conditions under which they may by employed. SCOs should be aware of host nation inventories of these weapons and the restrictions on them, and alert to reports of how the host nation is employing them in operations. SCOs should report to DSCA (Programs Directorate) any information that suggests these items are not being used in accordance with the terms under which they were sold.

C8.4. - Enhanced EUM

C8.4.1. Definition. Enhanced EUM, based on the principle of trust with verification, is required for defense articles and services or individual transfers specifically designated for EEUM by the MILDEP's export policy, the inter-agency release process, or by DoD policy as a result of consultation with Congress. All EEUM-designated defense articles are required to be sold on defined order lines using an EEUM-coded Military Articles and Services Listing (MASL) and are accompanied by specialized physical security and accountability notes. The defense articles listed in Table C8.T4. below have been designated for EEUM for all FMS-eligible countries. Figure C8.F1. identifies the decision process used to determine whether an item or an individual transfer will be identified and designated for EEUM. Other defense articles may require EEUM on a case-by-case basis as a result of the transfer approval process. SCOs will provide the host nation formal notification of all finding noted during EEUM checks and request the host nation to provide within 60 days the actions taking to correct the findings.

Table C8.T4. Defense Articles Designated for EEUM for all FMS-eligible Countries

EEUM-Designated Defense Articles Description

Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM)

AMRAAM or other specified AMRAAM defense articles (Guidance Control Units (GCUs)).

Air Intercept Missiles-9X (AIM-9X)

AIM-9X Missiles, Guidance Units (GU), Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM), and Special Air Training Missiles (NATM).

Communication Security (COMSEC) Equipment

COMSEC items are managed and controlled by the National Security Agency (NSA). NSA, CCMDs, and Embassy COMSEC Custodians are responsible for implementing the necessary procedures to ensure physical security and accountability measures required by the Communication Interoperability & Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA).

Harpoon Block II Missiles

Harpoon Block II missile and/or other specified Harpoon Block II Missile defense articles, (Retrofit kits and GCUs).

Javelin Missiles and Command Launch Units (CLUs)

Javelin Missiles and CLUs only.

Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSM)

JASSM or other specified JASSM defense articles, (Instrument Telemetry Vehicle (ITV)).

Joint Standoff Weapons (JSOW)

JSOW or other specified JSOW defense articles, (Captive Flight Vehicles (CFV), and Missile Simulator Units (MSU)).

Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM)

LAIRCM components as specified in the LOA note.

Night Vision Devices (NVDs)

For each FMS offer of NVDs, the Implementing Agency will include the DSCA NVD Approval memorandum as supporting documentation to the LOA. For NVD exports, the host nation must provide the SCO a copy of the physical security and accountability control plan (NVD Control Plan) for the protection and security of NVDs. The physical security and accountability control plan must be provided within 30 days of signing the LOA. NVDs will not be delivered until receipt of the NVD Control Plan. SCO will review and maintain a copy of the purchaser's physical security and accountability control plan and forward a copy to eumhelpdesk@dsca.mil . SCOs must provide a written report to DSCA (Programs, Weapons Division) within 30 calendar days of any reported loss, theft, or unauthorized access of any NVD provided to the host nation.

Standard Missiles-3 (SM-3)

Standard Missiles-3 (SM-3).

Standoff Land Attack Missiles Expanded Response (SLAM-ER)

SLAM-ER or other specified SLAM-ER defense articles, (Retrofit kits and Guidance Navigational Units (GNU)).

Stinger Missiles and Gripstocks

Stinger Missiles designated for EEUM may include, but are not limited to: MANPADS, AVENGER, Linebacker, and Vehicle Mounted Stinger Launch Platform (VMSLP).

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD).

THAAD missiles or Radar systems.

Tomahawk Missiles

Tomahawk Missiles.

Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided Missiles (TOW-2B)

TOW-2B Missiles only.

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) designated as Category I by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

UAS components as specified in the LOA note.

C8.4.1.1. SCOs are responsible for maintaining an accurate database of all EEUM-designated defense articles exported to the host nation by using the EUM application in the SCIP database for inventory monitoring and historical data. SCIP-EUM provides a centralized, secure information repository of EUM data gained from deliveries and inventories of all EEUM-designated defense articles transferred through FMS, grant assistance, and other security cooperation programs. The SCIP-EUM database includes a Reconciliation Report of EEUM-designated defense articles by country that SCOs should use as the basis for establishing the baseline and all required inventories and reporting.

C8.4.1.2. SCOs are required to conduct EEUM through planned/coordinated visits to the host nation’s installations. SCOs must arrange with the partner nation to verify in-country receipt of EEUM defense articles by serial number within 90 days of delivery. Subsequent inventories require serial number verification and physical security checks of storage sites or other facilities where EEUM-designated defense articles are kept and verification that recipients are complying with the terms and conditions stated in the transfer agreements. SCOs must physically inventory 100 percent of in-country EEUM defense articles annually except for EEUM defense articles not available for observation (deployed, returned to the United States for repair, etc.), or stipulated otherwise in the SCIP-EUM database or by separate policy memo. The inventory must include review of the recipient’s records of verifications as required by the LOA or other arms transfer document note. Deployed equipment must be inventoried within 90 days after returning from operational use or deployment.

Figure C8.F1. Adding or Removing Defense Articles on the Enhanced EUM List

Figure C8.F1.  Adding or Removing Defense Articles on the Enhanced EUM List

C8.4.1.3. EEUM must be performed using checklists developed by the MILDEPs and made available in the SCIP-EUM database. All EEUM checks must be recorded, and the physical security and accountability checklists will be attached to the inventory records. Inventory records must be maintained for five years. Missile containers without the original manufacturer’s anti-tamper seal must be opened and all items visually inspected. If the missiles are not needed in the near term, the SCO and host nation may agree to re-seal the container with the Golden Sentry Security Label or the Golden Sentry Security Cable, if required based on the container’s construction. To obtain either type of anti-tamper seal, SCOs should contact the EUM Help Desk or the DSCA Regional EUM Program Managers, provide a mailing address, and identify the quantity and type of seal requested.

C8.4.1.4. Recording in the SCIP-EUM database includes accountability of inventories and final disposition of all EEUM-designated defense articles, i.e., expended, lost, and destroyed. SCOs must ensure the host nation reports any losses, firings/expenditures, or disposal of any EEUM-designated defense article as required in the transfer agreement and enter the information in the SCIP-EUM database.

C8.4.2. Site Surveys/Certification of Storage Facilities. MILDEPs are responsible for conducting site surveys and certifying foreign countries’ weapons storage facilities in accordance with DoD 5100.76-M, "Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition and Explosives," before EEUM-designated weapons systems are delivered or moved to a new or uncertified facility. MILDEPs should develop certification checklists using criteria from DoD 5100.76-M and submit them to DSCA for review to ensure standardization. MILDEPs will provide DSCA a current list of all security managers, by weapon type, responsible for performing site survey certifications. MILDEPs security managers will coordinate site survey certification visits with DSCA and the other MILDEPs in advance to prevent the need to conduct a new site survey, if another MILDEP has already certified the same facility for proper storage of the same weapon category.

C8.4.3. EEUM Cost Reporting Requirements. DSCA is responsible for submitting an annual report to Congress, as required by AECA section 40A (22 U.S.C. 2785), which includes the costs for executing the Golden Sentry program.

C8.4.3.1. At the end of each fiscal year, the CCMDs and SCOs are required to submit the actual annual costs and future two-year budget projections associated with conducting EEUM, including travel to perform physical security and accountability inventories of in-country equipment and future deliveries and to attend Regional EUM Forums. To maintain accurate cost data and reporting, EUM managers should ensure that upon completion of each EEUM visit the cost is documented and entered into the Security Assistance Automated Resource Management System (SAARMS) under the appropriate expense code for EEUM (Code 210EM). Each entry should include a brief description of the EEUM function performed, e.g., number of personnel, equipment inventoried, locations visited.

C8.4.3.2. On a case-by-case basis, SCOs may request through the CCMD funding to meet unexpected requirements to perform EEUM checks due to disposal verifications or other unforeseen EUM-related activities for which funding was not requested in the regular budget cycle. Unfunded requirements must be submitted to the appropriate CCMD for approval. When CCMD funds are not sufficient or available, CCMDs may request funding from DSCA (Business Operations Directorate) to meet unforeseen SCO requirements.

C8.4.3.3. SCO questions regarding entries for conducting EEUM functions in SAARMS or unfunded requirement requests should be submitted to the CCMD. CCMD questions should be sent to DSCA (Directorate for Business Operations).

C8.5. - Golden Sentry Program Visit Policy and Guidance

C8.5.1. EUM Visit Guidance. The Golden Sentry EUM program includes in-country visits to assess EEUM compliance programs. There are three types of EUM visits:

  1. Familiarization and Assistance Visits (FAV)

  2. Compliance Assessment Visits (CAV)

  3. Investigation Visits

Each visit is unique to the host nation and equipment being assessed.

C8.5.2. FAV Guidance. The purpose of an EUM FAV is to assist the host nation, the SCO (or equivalent organization/office), and the CCMD to develop an effective EUM compliance program. It also provides an opportunity for the DSCA EUM representative to determine the requirements for conducting a potential future EUM CAV. A FAV may be prompted by a request from the host nation, SCO, or the CCMD to validate EUM programs. A FAV can also be prompted by the introduction of specific equipment into the region/country. Figure C8.T5. presents the timeline and formal requirements for a well coordinated and documented EUM FAV. Informal correspondence may occur prior to these actions.

Table C8.T5. EUM Familiarization and Assistance Visit (FAV) Timeline and Requirements

Event No. Timeframe Description

1

Not later than 30 days prior to visit

  • DSCA (Programs Directorate) transmits a Country/Theater Clearance Message in accordance with DoD Foreign Clearance Guide that identifies major topics to be discussed.

2

Upon receipt of Country/Theater clearance message

  • SCO acknowledges receipt and identifies POCs for each subject to be discussed.
  • SCO determines if the visit will be limited to U.S. members only or if host nation participation is warranted.

3

15 days prior to visit

  • SCO finalizes itinerary with DSCA (Programs Directorate) and, if applicable, the host nation.
  • SCO finalizes requirements for the visit, and, if sites are to be visited, confirms entry information for each site and assures unit commanders have received the required authorization and understand the nature and purpose of the visit.

4

Familiarization Visit

  • SCO provides assistance at the airport to the incoming EUM FAV participants when requested and in accordance with Post policy.
  • SCO representative meets with visit participants upon arrival at the hotel and/or duty location, if required.
  • Each FAV must include the following:
    • EUM FAV participants meet with SCO representatives
    • EUM FAV participants meet with host nation representatives (if applicable)
    • DSCA briefing on the Golden Sentry Program
    • Discussion of the type and quantity of Enhanced EUM articles to be transferred to the host nation
    • Discussion of the SCO's and host nation's current compliance with EUM requirements
    • Discussion compliance plan development commensurate with the SCO's manning
    • Discussion of a possible future CAV
    • Site visits (if required)
    • Out-brief to the U.S. country team and host nation as appropriate
  • While the FAV is not intended to perform physical inventories or compliance verification, the EUM FAV Team may observe problems during the visit that must be addressed immediately.

5

No later than 15 days after return to CONUS

  • DSCA EUM lead provides back brief to DSCA (Programs and Operations Directorates)
  • DSCA EUM lead prepares an after action report for distribution to DSCA, the SCO, and the CCMD.

C8.5.3. EUM Compliance Assessment Visit (CAV) Guidance. The purpose of a CAV is to review and evaluate the SCO’s (or equivalent organization/office) compliance with Golden Sentry EUM policy and the host nation’s compliance with specific physical security and accountability requirements and other terms of sale. Activities during a CAV may include facility visits, record reviews, review of Routine and EEUM policies and procedures, and inventories of U.S.-origin defense articles. EUM CAVs are coordinated well in advance with the CCMD, SCO, and host nation to ensure the success of the visit. To maximize resources and minimize disruptions, EUM site visits should be arranged to coincide with scheduled host nations inventory dates whenever possible. Figure C8.T6. presents the timeline and formal requirements to ensure a well-coordinated and documented EUM CAV. Informal correspondence may occur prior to these actions. Inability to obtain proper entry credentials for the CAV Team from the recipient country may result in unfavorable reports within the DoS and DoD and may result in mention in the annual report to Congress.

C8.5.3.1. Factors DSCA considers when determining countries to be scheduled for CAVs include, but are not limited to, the following:

  • Risk assessments, which will include intelligence analysis and estimates to assess risk of transfers of defense articles and defense services monitored by the Golden Sentry Program's EEUM process.

  • The types and quantities of defense articles requiring EEUM.

  • The host nation's history of compliance with transfer agreements.

  • Current or previous reports of concerns relative to the country's protection of U.S.-provided defense articles.

  • The SCO's history of compliance with the policies and procedures of the Golden Sentry program.

  • The region's political or military stability.

  • Opportunities to conserve resources by visiting more than one country in a region.

C8.5.3.2. To assist in planning and coordination with the host nation, a two-year CAV plan has been institutionalized through formal message notifications to the CCMDs and SCOs. The two-year plan provides a quarterly CAV schedule by CCMD and country. DSCA may, in coordination with the appropriate CCMD, perform additional out-of-cycle CAVs as necessary to execute the EUM mission.

Table C8.T6. EUM Compliance Assessment Visit Timeline and Requirements

Event No. Timeframe Description

1

Initial Notification

  • DSCA (Programs Directorate) transmits an EUM Advisory Message to the SCO, its respective CCMD, and DTRA to notify them of the EUM CAV schedule. This message is coordinated with the CCMD.

2

Upon receipt of the Advisory Message

  • SCO notifies the country team and the host nation of the impending EUM CAV.
  • SCO confirms receipt of the EUM Advisory Message.
  • The SCO should review of all LOAs for its assigned country that contains any special security or accountability notes.

3

90 days prior to the visit

  • DSCA (Programs Directorate) confirms to the SCO the list of defense articles/services to be evaluated by the upcoming EUM CAV.

4

70-89 days prior to visit

  • SCO contacts the MILDEPs for assistance at this time if additional information regarding serial numbers, LOAs, etc., is required.
  • SCO determines the location of the articles to be assessed within the host nation.
  • SCO develops a tentative itinerary for the upcoming visit.

5

70 days prior to visit

  • SCO advises DSCA (Programs Directorate) of:
    • Any U.S. country team concerns.
    • The SCO representative on the EUM CAV Team.
    • CCMD EUM CAV Team members (if desired by the CCMD).
  • Recommends additions/deletions from the proposed list of items to be evaluated during the visit.
  • Provides a draft itinerary based on locations of the items within the host nation.
  • Provides the SCO's most recent inventory list for the items to be reviewed, complete with serial numbers.

6

60 days prior to visit

  • DSCA (Programs Directorate) issues a formal cable message that:
    • Identifies the CAV dates, EUM CAV Team members, and;
    • Confirms the list of defense articles and/or services that will be evaluated during the EUM CAV Team visit and their physical location(s).

7

Not later than 30 days prior to visit

  • DSCA (Programs Directorate) transmits a Country/Theater Clearance Message, in accordance with the DoD Foreign Clearance Guidance, that identifies any changes to information provided in the EUM Announcement Message.
  • DSCA (Programs Directorate) confirms the inventory requirements for each EEUM item to be assessed.

8

Upon receipt of Country/Theater Clearance Message

  • SCO acknowledges receipt of the message via e-mail and identifies points of contact (to include names, phone numbers and email addresses) for each site to be evaluated.
  • SCO conducts final coordination with host nation for site clearance for EUM CAV Team members.
  • SCO confirms host nation's preparation for the EUM CAV.

9

15 days prior to visit

  • SCO finalizes itinerary with DSCA (Programs Directorate) and the host nation.
  • SCO finalizes requirements for the visit with the host nation to:
    • Confirm entry information for each site to be visited.
    • Ensure unit commanders have received the required authorization.

10

EUM Compliance Assessment Visit (CAV)

  • SCO ensures someone is at the airport to assist the EUM CAV Team participants when requested by the team.
  • SCO representative meets with the EUM CAV Team upon arrival at the hotel and/or duty location, if required.
  • Each EUM CAV must include the following:
    • An in-briefing to the country team and host nation.
    • Assessment of SCO and host nation's current compliance with EUM requirements.
    • Review of the records for the specific items identified in the announcement message (Event #6).
    • Site visits to evaluate facility physical security and accountability procedures for the locations identified in the announcement message (Event #6)
    • An out-briefing for the U.S. country team and host nation. Preliminary observations and findings will be discussed, including preliminary assessment results and timeline for host nation receipt of final report.

11

Immediately upon identification of problems that preclude successful completion of the CAV

  • The DSCA EUM CAV Team lead notifies the SCO and country team with details about why they are unable to complete the visit successfully.
  • The DSCA EUM CAV Team lead notifies the Principal Director, Programs, with details about the problem precluding a successful visit and SCO/country team response.
  • The Principal Director, Programs, in coordination with the Principal Director, Operations, and DSCA General Counsel will determine an appropriate course of action and notify the EUM CAV Team lead during the visit.
  • After return to CONUS, the EUM CAV Team lead will work with the Operations Directorate to develop a follow-up course of action as required.

12

Immediately upon discovery of a potential AECA Section 3 or FAA Section 505 violation.
(See Section 8.5.)

  • The EUM CAV Team notifies the SCO and country team with details about the potential violation.
  • The EUM CAV Team notifies the Principal Director, Programs, with details about the potential violation and SCO/country-team response.
  • If there is a possible violation, the Principal Director, Programs, in coordination with the Principal Director, Operations, will develop an appropriate course of action.
  • If the host nation's response and subsequent assessments confirm the potential violation, DSCA formally forwards information regarding the potential violation to the DoS for appropriate action.

13

Usually no later than 15 days after the visit

  • DSCA EUM CAV Team lead provides a back brief to DSCA (Programs and Operations Directorates).
  • DSCA EUM CAV Team lead prepares an Interim Team After-Action Report (TAR) providing preliminary assessment results and staffs it with DSCA, the SCO, and the other EUM CAV Team members for coordination and comment. See Figure C8.F2. for the TAR format.

14

Upon receipt of the Interim TAR (no later than 20 days after the visit)

  • SCO reviews the Interim TAR and provides input to the DSCA EUM CAV Team lead.
  • EUM CAV Team members review the Interim TAR and provide input to the DSCA CAV Team lead.

15

Upon receipt of comments (no later than 30 days after the visit)

  • DSCA EUM CAV Team lead prepares the Final TAR providing overall assessment results of "Satisfactory", "Needs Improvement", or "Unsatisfactory"for the host nation and the SCO Country Team.
  • Final TAR is approved by the Director, DSCA, and sent to the appropriate CCMD.
  • SCOs will forward a written report of actions taken to correct all findings and recommendations addressed in the CAV TAR to DSCA (through the CCMD) not later than 90 days after receipt of the TAR.

C8.5.3.3. CAV Rating Criteria. The CAV rating is based on the CAV team's assessment of:

C8.5.3.3.1. SCO compliance with the policies and procedures of the Golden Sentry program and SCO responsibilities stated in Table C8.T2. including:

  • Implementation of written Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) to perform Routine and EEUM;

  • Implementation of physical security and accountability plan(s) (NVD Control Plan) for the protection, storage, use and accountability of NVDs;

  • Maintenance of records verifying Routine and EEUM;

  • Accuracy of the country's EEUM-designated items baseline as per the EEUM Reconciliation Report provided in the Security Cooperation Information Portal EUM database (SCIP-EUM);

  • Timely performance of physical security and accountability checks of all EEUM-designated defense articles and services in accordance with Golden Sentry checklists;

  • Use of the SCIP-EUM database to track inventories and to maintain an accurate disposition of EEUM-designated items;

  • Verification and proper coordination with DoS PM/RSAT for the demilitarization, disposal, or destruction of EEUM-designated items and sensitive defense articles;

  • Accuracy and timeliness of reporting losses, expenditures, and destruction of EEUM-designated equipment; and

  • Proper coordination with DoS PM/RSAT regarding third-party transfer requests and approvals.

C8.5.3.3.2. Country compliance with the conditions of the transfer agreements for U.S.-provided defense articles and services, including:

  • Cooperation and coordination with U.S. officials to implement and maintain a viable EUM program that provides for Routine and EEUM, including CAVs conducted by DSCA;

  • Potential end-use violations found during the assessment or previously reported by the SCO.

  • Implementation of NVD physical security and accountability plan(s) (NVD Control Plan) as required;

  • Implementation of physical security and accountability measures at storage sites/facilities maintaining EEUM-designated items in accordance with the special provisions stated in the LOA or other transfer agreement;

  • EEUM-designated equipment losses, action taken to prevent future losses (as appropriate), and reporting history; and

  • Accurate and timely requests for, and reports of, demilitarization, disposal, destruction, loss, expenditure, or other change of end-use of USG-provided defense articles.

C8.6. - Unauthorized End-Use

C8.6.1. Potential End-Use Violations. While making end-use checks, SCOs should be alert for unauthorized use of defense articles, defense services, or technical data, including information provided during CONUS or in-country training. The check should provide information for both the recipient country and the United States to determine whether a country’s generally sound processes failed due to unusual circumstances, because security and accountability procedures are not given sufficient priority, or because country interests are diverging from those of the United States. Information gained during the special checks that could be useful in correcting the immediate problem or improving future end-use controls should be shared with the DoS and DSCA (Programs Directorate).

C8.6.2. Reporting End-Use Violations. SCOs must report all potential unauthorized end-use, including unauthorized access, unauthorized transfers, or security violations to DoS (PM/RSAT), DSCA (Programs Directorate), and the CCMD. It is particularly important that SCOs are alert to, and report on, any indication that United States-origin defense articles are being used against anything other than a legitimate military target, are otherwise being used for unauthorized purposes, are being tampered with or reverse engineered, or are accessible by persons who are not officers, employees, or agents of the recipient government. Potential violations can be notified via email or message. SCOs must assess the sensitivity of the potential violation and other factors to determine the means of notification. The DoS investigates and reports potential violations and determines whether the AECA section 3 (22 U.S.C. 2753) , criteria require notification to Congress.

C8.6.3. EUM Investigation Visits and Special End-Use Monitoring Checks. The SCO may be required to provide additional information to assist with the investigation process, and special EUM checks may be required to determine the country’s compliance with the transfer agreements. The purpose of an EUM Investigation Visit is to examine possible violations of AECA section 3 (22 U.S.C. 2753) , and FAA, section 505 (22 U.S.C. 2314) and any applicable diplomatic notes or agreements regarding the defense articles. These visits may be prompted by intelligence reports and/or other sources that indicate a host nation may be using U.S.-origin defense articles and services in ways that do not comply with U.S. laws and policies. EUM Investigation Visits are conducted as expeditiously as possible within the required coordination for foreign travel. Due to the unique nature and political sensitivity associated with this type of visit, each EUM Investigation Visit is handled on a case-by-case basis in concert with DoS.

C8.7. - Third Party Transfers, Changes in End-Use, and Disposal

C8.7.1. In accordance with the FAA, section 505 (22 U.S.C. 2314); AECA section 3 (22 U.S.C. 2753); and LOA Standard Terms and Conditions, foreign governments may not transfer title to or possession of any defense articles or services to anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of that country or of the USG until the country receives prior written consent from the USG. Nor may the foreign government use or permit the use of such articles or services for purposes other than for which they were furnished unless the foreign government receives prior written consent from the USG. SCOs should be aware of the pertinent agreements with the recipient country including any special diplomatic notes or agreements that apply to the defense articles involved. SCOs should contact their country program director to ensure that they have all pertinent agreements.

C8.7.2. Third Party Transfer Responsibilities.

C8.7.2.1. Department of State. The DoS is responsible for authorizing third party transfers of U.S.-origin defense articles and/or services worldwide.

C8.7.2.1.1. Office of Regional Security and Arms Transfer Policy (PM/RSAT). DoS (PM/RSAT) is responsible for coordinating the DoS response requests for the transfer of defense articles to a third party, including all associated components, technical data, training, and services originally acquired via FMS or grant programs (e.g., FMF, P.L. 109-163, Section 1206 (as extended), Military Assistance Program (MAP), Excess Defense Articles (EDA), Drawdown) and requests for the demilitarization and disposal of the items. See the DoS web page at www.state.gov/t/pm/rsat/c14025.htm for additional information.

C8.7.2.1.2. Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (PM/DDTC). Pursuant to AECA, section 38 (22 U.S.C. 2738) and the International Traffic In Arms Regulation (ITAR) (22 C.F.R. 120-130),, DoS (PM/DDTC) is responsible for processing third party requests to transfer defense articles or services originally acquired under a commercial export license or other commercial authorization (such as manufacturing license or technical assistance agreements). DoS (PM/DDTC) also authorizes temporary imports of defense articles into the United States.

C8.7.2.2. Department of Justice (DoJ). The Department of Justice's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (BATFE) is responsible for control of the permanent import of U.S. Munitions List (USML) (22 C.F.R. 121.1) items into the United States. DoS approval of a retransfer request by a foreign government must precede and be separate from submission by the importer of an ATF Form 6 import license application to BATFE.

C8.7.2.3. Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs). SCOs are directly involved only in actions related to retransfers of items received through DoD-administered programs. They do not process requests for retransfers of defense articles procured by commercial means. Owning countries make such requests directly to the Department of State's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls through their embassies in Washington, D.C.

C8.7.3. Third Party Transfers Requests: Government-To-Government. The USG may consent to a third party (government) transfer if the USG would directly transfer the articles to the proposed recipient. The divesting government or international organization submits a written third party Government transfer request to the USG for consideration. The request is sent to the SCO and/or Country Team, which in-turn sends the request to DoS (PM/RSAT) with information copies to DSCA and the SCO of the proposed third party recipient country. The divesting government or international organization may also send the request directly to DoS (PM/RSAT). All transfer requests must include a signed cover letter, a completed Standard Questionnaire, and end-use, retransfer, and security assurances from the proposed recipient unless a member of the Blanket End-Use Assurance Program (sections C8.7.2.2. and C8.7.2.3.) The information required for the Standard Questionnaire is provided in Table C8.T7. See www.state.gov/t/pm/rsat/c14031.htm for step-by-step instructions and an example of a completed questionnaire.

Table C8.T7. Required Information for Third Party Transfer Standard Questionnaire

# Required Information
1

The name of the divesting government.

2

A clear description of the articles, services, technical data, or training being transferred including quantity, model, any associated equipment, spare parts and/or classified components or data. Also, where possible, indicate whether equipment is Significant Military Equipment (SME) or non-SME and the category under which the article is listed in the USML. Serial numbers must be provided for SME.

3

The original acquisition source of the defense articles, services, technical data, or training proposed for transfer (e.g., FMS, grant, pseudo case transfer, etc.). The case identifier must be provided for FMS or an explanation as to why it is unavailable.

4

The year of original acquisition.

5

The original acquisition cost or best estimate of that cost.

6

The current value if available.

7

The reason the government wants to divest itself of the articles, services, technical data, or training. If by demilitarization and disposal, describe how it will be accomplished.

8

The proposed recipient.

9

Indicate whether the transfer is temporary or permanent.

10

If known, the proposed end-use of the articles, services, technical data, or training by the proposed recipient.

11

Indicate whether the recipient has the defense article proposed for transfer in its inventory.

12

Estimation of net proceeds. In accordance with FAA, section 505(f) and prerequisite bilateral agreements, if the defense articles were furnished to a country on a grant basis (e.g., MAP-grants, grant EDA), the net proceeds of the sale of the defense articles received by the grantee must be returned to the USG. The following factors relating to the defense articles should be considered in determining the net proceeds: the value of the defense articles when furnished by the USG as a percentage of the aggregate of the value of the defense articles when furnished by the USG added to the value of any capital investment incurred by the grantee in repairing, rehabilitating, or modifying the article (other than routine maintenance and repair expenses); depreciation of that value; and reasonable administrative costs of the sale or disposal. The party requesting the third party transfer of such defense articles must show it has employed a reasonable methodology in calculating the net proceeds [e.g., Net Proceeds = (Gross Sale Proceeds - Administrative Costs of Sale) x (Value at Transfer / (Value at Transfer + Value of Capital Investment))].

DoS may waive return of net proceeds in cases involving grant equipment delivered prior to 1985. There is no waiver authority for articles delivered after 1985. Requests for waiver consideration are included in written transfer requests and must include an estimate of the net proceeds expected, justification/rationale for the request to retain net proceeds, and how the funds will be used.

13

Indicate whether an intermediary is involved in the transfer. If so, provide a description of the role (broker, freight forwarder, etc.), the business address, and a point of contact.

14

Proposed timeframe or time constraints with regard to DoS processing of the request. If immediate action is required, provide explanation.

15

The name, title, and contact details for an official in the divesting and recipient countries with whom DoS (PM/RSAT) can discuss the transfer details and required end-use, retransfer, and assurances.

C8.7.3.1. End-Use, Retransfer, and Security Assurances. The DoS requires end-use, retransfer, and security assurances from the proposed recipient's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) unless the proposed recipient is a member of the Blanket Assurance Program. See Section C8.7.5. The assurances must be obtained by the divesting government and submitted with the retransfer request. These assurances are mandatory, generally non-negotiable, and must be received by DoS before the transfer can be considered for approval. Assurances must be typed in English and signed by an official of the proposed recipient country who can legally bind the entire government (usually the MFA). If the government issues assurances signed by an official of a ministry other than the MFA, such as the Ministry of Defense, the U.S. Embassy in that country must confirm in writing that his or her signature is binding. When language is supplied that does not appear to meet U.S. requirements, it is submitted to the DoS Office of the Legal Adviser for review.

C8.7.3.2. Blanket Assurances. Governments may sign blanket end-use, retransfer, and security assurances to satisfy legislative requirements for future government-to-government retransfers. Governments that sign Blanket Assurances are not required to sign individual assurances to receive USG-origin defense articles from foreign governments. Blanket members under the Defense Trade Security Initiative (DTSI) program have the added benefit of limited advanced consent. Members can transfer between and among themselves when: the original acquisition value of all transferred articles does not exceed $7 million; classified defense articles (including classified technical information) are not being transferred; the defense articles to be transferred are already in the inventory of the proposed recipient (no first introduction); and the proposed recipient is either an approved DTSI country (NATO members, Japan, Australia, or Sweden) or a signatory to the standard blanket assurance program. DTSI assurances, like blanket assurances, apply only to government-to-government third-party transfers of USG-origin defense articles. They do not replace the DSP 83 currently used for the retransfer of defense articles originally acquired through Direct Commercial Sales (DCS). Requests for retransfer of these items continue to be reviewed on a case-by-case basis by the USG. Interested governments should contact DoS (PM/RSAT) for consideration.

C8.7.4. Third Party Transfer Requests Government-to-Non-States or Private Entities. As stated in the FAA and AECA, defense articles and defense services are transferred to foreign governments and international organizations to serve U.S. foreign policy objectives. Following the receipt of a request to transfer U.S.-origin defense articles and defense services from a foreign government or international organization, the DoS adjudicates all requests for transfer of U.S.-origin military equipment to non-states, including private entities, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, and other non-state groups, on a case-by-case basis. In submitting a government-to-non-state transfer request, the divesting country and the SCO follow the same instructions as provided above in Section C8.7.3. and Table C8.T5. For retransfers to private entities, the request should include end use, retransfer, and security assurances from the proposed private entity recipient, as well as Country Over Private Entity (COPE) assurances from the government with legal jurisdiction over the private entity. The written transfer request should include contact details for a representative of the private entity. An exception occurs when a country transfers U.S. equipment to a U.S. contractor for the purpose of refurbishment or salvage, and the name of the contractor is specifically listed in an LOA note that has been coordinated with DSCA (Programs Directorate) and the DoS. Further transfers of the equipment to a different contractor or other party must also be approved by DSCA (Programs Directorate) and the DoS.

C8.7.5. Congressional Requirements for Third Party Transfers. As provided in the FAA and the AECA, certain third party transfers of defense articles, including all associated components, technical data, training, and services originally acquired via FMS or grant programs, are subject to congressional notification and reporting requirements.

C8.7.5.1. Congressional Notification. Third party transfers of defense articles and services originally acquired via FMS or grant programs are subject to requirements for congressional certification pursuant to AECA, section 3(d) (22 U.S.C. 2753 (d)) using certification thresholds similar to those for AECA, section 36(b) (22 U.S.C. 2776(b)) notifications. See Section C5.5. A 30-day prior congressional certification is required for third-party transfer requests that involve defense articles and services with original acquisition values that fall in one of the following categories: Major Defense Equipment (MDE) with an acquisition value equal to or greater than $14M for non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) recipients and $25M if the recipient is a member of NATO, Australia, Israel, Japan, the Republic of Korea, or New Zealand; or any other defense article or related training or defense service with an acquisition value of $50M or more for non-NATO recipients and $100M or more if the recipient is a member of NATO, Australia, Israel, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand. For all recipients, approval is granted after the 30-day calendar day period has expired unless Congress enacts a joint resolution of disapproval.

C8.7.5.2. Transfers pursuant to arrangements among NATO members, or between NATO and any of its member countries for lead-nation procurement are exempt from AECA, section 3(d) (22 U.S.C. 2753 (d)) certification requirements if the defense article to be transferred was originally purchased from the United States, and the transferee on whose behalf the lead-nation procurement was proposed identified to Congress in a notification pursuant to AECA, section 36(b) (22 U.S.C. 2776(b)). Information as to possible subsequent transfers by a NATO member country purchasing on behalf of a third NATO party shall be provided to DSCA for inclusion in AECA, section 36(b) (22 U.S.C. 2776(b)) notifications. The certification requirement of AECA, section 3(d) (22 U.S.C. 2753 (d)) also does not apply to the following:

  • Temporary transfer of defense articles for the sole purpose of receiving maintenance, repair, or overhaul;

  • Transfer of maintenance, repair, or overhaul defense services, or of repair parts or other defense articles used in furnishing such services, if the transfer does not result in any increase, relative to the original specifications, in the military capability of the items;

  • Transfers pursuant to arrangements among NATO members for cooperative cross-servicing.

C8.7.5.3. Congressional Reporting. All approved third party transfers involving defense articles and services with an original acquisition value of $1 million or more are submitted in a quarterly report to Congress (AECA, section 36(a)(9)).

C8.8. - Changes in End-Use and EUM at the Time of Disposal

C8.8.1. Changes in End-Use. Requests to change the end-use of U.S.-origin defense articles follow the same process and require the same information as third party transfers. Changes in end-use may include transfers to non-defense uses by other agencies of the owning government, or demilitarization for museum display. Disposal also constitutes a change in end-use for which prior consent from DoS is required for non-consumable items. Cannibalization is viewed as disposal only if the parts being removed will no longer be under the control of the ministry or agency that owns them, or will be used for purposes other than for national defense

C8.8.2. EUM and the Disposal Process. EUM of demilitarization is a key aspect of disposal due to the potential for unauthorized disclosure of classified or sensitive information, safety concerns, and other factors. During disposal, items often move from operating units to holding areas, where personnel may not be aware of classified features, potential lethality, or other sensitivities. SCOs are to ensure that DoD demilitarization procedures are followed by the host nations unless DoS has specifically authorized or required some other disposition. SCOs will witness the demilitarization and disposal of all EEUM-designated defense articles, and will witness or otherwise verify the demilitarization and disposal of all other defense articles. SCOs should record DEMIL actions by uploading to SCIP a copy of the completed Sample Format of a DEMIL Certificate, found in DoD 4160.28-M, Volume 3, "Defense Demilitarization: Procedural Guidance."

Figure C8.F2. Sample Format of a DEMIL Certificate

Figure C8.F2.  Sample Format of a DEMIL Certificate

C8.8.2.1. At the time the host nation requests DoS consent to dispose defense articles, the SCO should begin working with the host nation counterparts to develop a demilitarization plan to ensure compliance with DoD DEMIL requirements. The SCO determines DEMIL requirements by obtaining the National Stock Number (NSN) from the LOA, 1000 Report or host nation equipment manual; and going to (WebFLIS) to determine the assigned DEMIL code. If the item needs to be demilitarized, the proper procedures are described in DoD 4160.28-M, current version, "Defense Demilitarization Manual." Demil procedures are provided in Volume 3.

C8.8.2.2. DoD Demilitarization Program Office (DDPO). The DDPO manages the DoD DEMIL Program to ensure that policy, procedures, program implementation, and operational performance are consistent with U.S. Foreign Policy, National Security objectives and DoD interest. Demilitarization involves the destruction of an item’s military capability. This is required to prevent property from being used for its originally intended purpose, and thereby prevent unauthorized use, and to prevent the release of inherent design information that could be used against the U.S. and its allies. The methods and degree of DEMIL can range from removal and destruction of critical features to total destruction. Items to be displayed require minimum DEMIL to render such items unserviceable in the interest of public safety. This DEMIL will preserve the intrinsic, historical, or display value of the property, but it usually does not constitute complete DEMIL as required for final disposition.

Page Updated 09-12-2012