

ymie Duman
4/19

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: April 12, 2003
SUBJECT:

4/15/03 Sir

1:15 PM

4/18

please see

SECDEF HAS SEEN

attached JUN - 2 2003
They did a good job
fairly and consistent

Let's think about having some of the folks who did such a good job as talking heads in after this thing is over.

Who else would there be besides Grange, Jacobs, McInerney, Allard? There were three or four others that stood out. There was a major, Bevellequa, and several others.

Let's talk about it.

Thanks.

~~Handwritten signature~~

DHR/azn
041203.11

Please respond by:

4/21/03
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cc: ~~DSD~~ done 4/17

(12 Apr 03)

U05839-03 4/18

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FOIA Exemption (b)(5)

~~FOUO~~

April 24, 2006

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Thoughts on Meeting with Military Analysts -- April 18, 2006

- Focus on the Global War on Terror -- not simply Iraq. The wider war -- the long war. Iraq is a battleground.
- Describe the nature of the threat -- vicious, violent extremists; chop off heads.
- Let the public know there will be no terminal event -- like the signing ceremony on the USS MISSOURI. It will be a long war.
- Set out the next benchmarks. We pointed to the January (2005) elections, the constitution, the December (2005) election, and the formation of the new government. Now we can look forward to the announcement of the new cabinet, and continued transfer of responsibility to the Iraqi Security Forces.
- Describe the "dire consequences" if we toss in the towel. Explain what the world would look like.
- Link Iraq to Iran. Iran is the concern. If we fail in Iraq or Afghanistan, it will help Iran.
- "We fight there so we won't have to fight here at home."
- Go on the offense. Push back, rather than simply defending. We can't win on defense.
- We are at war. It is a test of wills. The center of gravity is in the U.S., not in Iraq. Perseverance = Victory.

DHR:ss
041906-06

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~~FOUO~~

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FOIA Exemption (b)(5)



Adjunct Professor of International Affairs

April 25, 2006

**MEMORANDUM FOR: COLONEL MIKE MEESE
DEPARTMENT HEAD, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY**

**COLONEL CINDY JEBB
DEPUTY DEPARTMENT HEAD, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY**

**Subject: Academic Report- Trip to Iraq and Kuwait
Thursday 13 April through Thursday 20 April 2006**

1. PURPOSE: This memo provides follow-on feedback reference visit 13-20 April 2006 to Iraq and Kuwait. Look forward to doing a faculty seminar with Department of Social Sciences at your convenience in the Fall semester.

2. SOURCES -- IRAQ:

- a. General George Casey, Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I): One-on-one discussions and briefings.
- b. LTG Peter Chiarelli, Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I): One-on-one discussions and briefings.
- c. LTG Martin Dempsey, Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command: One-on-one discussions and briefings.
- d. British three-star General LTG Rob Fry (UK Army), Deputy to General George Casey, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I): Update Briefings.
- e. Acting Chief-of-Mission U.S. Embassy, DCM David Satterfield: One-on-one discussions and briefing.
- f. MG James Thurman, Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division, Multi-National Division - Baghdad (MND-B): One-on-one discussions and briefings.
- g. MG Thomas Turner, Commanding General, 101st Abn Div. Multi-National Division-North (MND-N): One-on-one discussions and briefings.
- h. MG Rick Lynch, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) Strategic Effects: One-on-one discussions and briefing.
- i. MG Timothy Donovan, USMC, Chief-of-Staff Multi-National Forces-Iraq: One-on-one discussions and out brief.
- j. MG Joseph Peterson, Chief of Iraqi Police Transition: Discussion and briefing.

- k. **Mr. David Harris, Acting Chief Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO): One-on-one lunch and discussions.**
- l. **MG Bob Heine, Deputy Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO), Director of Operations: One-on-one discussions and briefings.**
- m. **BG (P) William H. McCoy, Commanding General, Gulf Region Division Project and Contracting Office: Full Staff Briefings.**
- n. **BG John Cantwell (Australian Army): MNF-I Operations Brief.**
- o. **BG Alessio Cecchetti (Italian Army): Coalition Operations Update Briefing.**
- p. **[REDACTED] Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Multi-National Force-Iraq: Intelligence briefing on threat.**
- q. **Briefing: Multi-National Force-Iraq Battlefield Update.**
- r. **Briefing: MNF-I Effects and Synchronization Board.**
- s. **Division Battle Staff Briefing: 4th Infantry Division.**
- t. **Division Battle Staff Briefing: 101st Airborne Division.**
- u. **Briefing: Infantry Brigade Commander, 4th Infantry Division.**
- v. **Briefing: Acting Infantry Battalion Commander, 4th Infantry Division.**
- w. **Briefing: Infantry Company Commander, 4th Infantry Division.**
- x. **Lunch Sensing Session: Soldiers and junior NCOs, 4th Infantry Division.**
- y. **Dinner Discussion: General Officers and Division Command Sergeant Major, 101st Airborne Division.**
- z. **Briefing: Infantry Brigade Commander, 101st Airborne Division.**
- aa. **Briefing: Maneuver Effects Brigade Commander (Engineers), 101st Airborne Division on Counter-IED Campaign.**
- bb. **Briefing: Aviation Brigade Commander, 101st Airborne Division.**
- cc. **Briefing: Maneuver Battalion Commander and Company Commanders, 101st Airborne Division.**
- dd. **Lunch Sensing Session: Aviation Company Commander and Leaders, 101st Airborne Division.**
- ee. **Dinner Sensing Session: Soldiers and junior NCOs, 101st Airborne Division.**
- ff. **Visit and Briefings: Brigade Detention Center and Intelligence interrogators.**
- gg. **Visit and Briefings: Special Operations Intelligence Fusion Center.**
- hh. **Night Movement: To 101st Maneuver Battalion Headquarters for pinning ceremony, Combat Infantry and Combat Action Badges. Discussion with junior soldiers.**

3. SOURCES - KUWAIT:

- a. Ambassador Richard LeBaron, US Ambassador to Kuwait: Office call and discussions with U.S. Ambassador and DCM.
- b. Staff Briefings: [REDACTED] Acting Chief, Office of Military Cooperation - Kuwait.
- c. Briefings: U.S. Embassy Political Officer.
- d. Briefings: U.S. Embassy DAO - [REDACTED]
- e. MG James Kelley, Acting Commanding General, Coalition Land Component Command: One-on-one discussions.
- f. Full Staff Briefing: (3rd U.S. Army), Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC).
- g. Dinner Discussion: CFLCC General Officers, Chief-of-staff, Command Sergeant Major.

4. THE BOTTOM LINE - OBSERVATIONS FROM IRAQI FREEDOM, APRIL 2006:

1st - The morale, fighting effectiveness, and confidence of U.S. combat forces continue to be simply awe-inspiring. In every sensing session and interaction - I probed for weakness and found courage, belief in the mission, enormous confidence in their sergeants and company grade officers, an understanding of the larger mission, a commitment to creating an effective Iraqi Army and Police, unabashed patriotism, and a sense of humor. All of these soldiers, NCOs and young officers were volunteers for combat. Many were on their second combat tour - several were on the third or fourth combat tour. Many had re-enlisted to stay with their unit on its return to a second Iraq deployment. Many planned to re-enlist regardless of how long the war went on.

Their comments to me were guileless, positive, and candidly expressed love for their fellow soldiers. They routinely encounter sniper fire, mortar and rocket attacks, and constantly face IED's on movement. Their buddies have been killed and wounded. Several in these sessions had also been wounded. These are the toughest soldiers we have ever fielded. It was a real joy and an honor to see them first-hand.

2nd - The Iraqi Army is real, growing, and willing to fight. They now have lead action of a huge and rapidly expanding area and population. The battalion level formations are in many cases excellent - most are adequate. However, they are very badly equipped with only a few light vehicles, small arms, most with body armor and one or two uniforms. They have almost no mortars, heavy machine guns, decent communications equipment, artillery, armor, or IAF air transport, helicopter, and strike support. Their logistics capability is only now beginning to appear. Their Institutional Army (Military Schools, logistics base, manufacturing) is beginning to show encouraging signs of self-initiative.

The Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior have shown dramatic and rapid growth in capacity and competence since LTG Dempsey took them under his care. However, the corruption and lack of capability of the ministries will require several years of patient coaching and officer education in values as well as the required competencies. The Iraqi people clearly want a National Army. The recruiting now has gotten significant participation by all sectarian groups to include the Sunni. The Partnership Program with U.S. units will be the key to success with the Embedded Training Teams augmented and nurtured by a U.S. Maneuver Commander. This is simply a brilliant success story. We need at least two-to-five more years of U.S. partnership and combat backup to get the Iraqi Army ready to stand on its own. The interpersonal relationships between Iraqi Army units and their U.S. trainers are very positive and genuine.

3rd - The Iraqi police are beginning to show marked improvement in capability since MG Joe Peterson took over the program. The National Police Commando Battalions are very capable - a few are simply superb and on par with the best U.S. SWAT units in terms of equipment, courage, and training. Their intelligence collection capability is better than ours in direct HUMINT.

The crux of the war hangs on our ability to create urban and rural local police with the ability to survive on the streets of this incredibly dangerous and lethal environment. The police must have fortified local stations (more than a thousand), local jails (more than a thousand), armored Humvees (more than 3000), a nationwide command and control system, embedded U.S. contractor trainers, and in the key battleground areas of Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, and Kirkuk - they need a remote area camera monitoring system such as we now have in most of our major cities.

The police are heavily infiltrated by both the AIF and the Shia militia. They are widely distrusted by the Sunni population. They are incapable of confronting local armed groups. They inherited a culture of inaction, passivity, human rights abuses, and deep corruption.

This will be a ten year project requiring patience, significant resources, and an international public face. This is a very, very tough challenge which is a prerequisite to the Iraqis winning the counter-insurgency struggle they will face in the coming decade. We absolutely can do this. But this police program is now inadequately resourced.

4th - The creation of an Iraqi government of national unity is a central requirement. We must help create a legitimate government for which the Iraqi security forces will fight and die. If we do not see the successful development of a pluralistic administration in the first 120 days of the emerging Jawad al-Maliki leadership - there will be significant chance of the country breaking apart in warring factions among the Sunnis and Shia - with a separatist Kurdish north embroiled in their own potential struggle with the Turks.

The incompetence and corruption of the interim Iraqi Administration has been significant. There is total lack of trust among the families, the tribes, and the sectarian factions created by the 35 years of despotism and isolation of the criminal Saddam regime. This is a traumatized society with a malignant political culture. There is a huge "brain drain" taking place with educated and wealthy Iraqis getting out with their money. This is a loss of the potential leadership to solve the mess that is Iraq today. The pot is also being stirred from the outside Iraq by six neighboring states - none of which have provided significant economic or political assistance.

However, in my view, the Iraqis are likely to successfully create a governing entity. The intelligence picture strongly portrays a population that wants a federal Iraq, wants a national Army, rejects the AIF as a political future for the nation, and is optimistic that their life can be better in the coming years. Unlike the Balkans—the Iraqis want this to work. The bombing of the Samarra Mosque brought the country to the edge of all-out war. However, the Iraqi Army did not crack, the moderates held, Sistani called for restraint, the Sunnis got a chill of fear seeing what could happen to them as a minority population, and the Coalition Forces suddenly were seen correctly as a vital force that could keep the population safe in the absence of Iraqi power. In addition, the Shia were reminded that Iran is a Persian power with goals that conflict with the Shia Arabs of southern and central Iraq.

It is likely that the Iraqis will pull together enough political muscle to get through the coming 30 day crisis to produce a cabinet to submit to the Parliament - as well as the four month deadline to consider constitutional amendments. The resulting government is likely to be weak and barely functional. It may stagger along and fail in 18 months. But it is very likely to prevent the self-destruction of Iraq. Our brilliant and effective U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad will be the essential ingredient to keeping Iraq together. If the U.S. loses his leadership in the coming year, this thing could implode.

5th - The foreign jihadist fighters have been defeated as a strategic and operational threat to the creation of an Iraqi government. Aggressive small unit combat action by Coalition Forces combined with good intelligence - backed up by new Iraqi Security Forces is making an impact. The foreign fighters remain a serious tactical menace. However, they are a minor threat to the heavily armed and wary U.S. forces. They cannot successfully stop the Iraqi police and army recruitment. Their brutal attacks on the civil population are creating support for the emerging government. The foreign fighters have failed to spark open civil war from the Shia. The Samarra bombing may well have inoculated the

country to the possible horror of total war. The Iraqis are rejecting the vision of a religious state. The al Qaeda in-Iraq organization is now largely Sunni Iraqi - not foreign fighters. U.S. Marine and Army combat effectiveness - combined with very effective information operations--- has taken the fun out of Jihad.

6th - The U.S. Inter-Agency Support for our strategy in Iraq is grossly inadequate. A handful of brilliant, courageous, and dedicated Foreign Service Officers have held together a large, constantly changing, marginally qualified, inadequately experienced U.S. mission. The U.S. influence on the Iraqi national and regional government has been extremely weak. U.S. consultants of the IRMO do not live and work with their Iraqi counterparts, are frequently absent on leave or home consultations, are often in-country for short tours of 90 days to six months, and are frequently gapped with no transfer of institutional knowledge.

In Iraq, nothing is possible without carefully managed relationships between the U.S. officials and their Iraqi interlocutors. Trust between people is the prerequisite and basis of progress for this deeply Arab culture. The other U.S. agencies of government such as Justice, DHS, Commerce, Agriculture, and Transportation are in Iraq in small numbers for too short time periods. The U.S. Departments actually fight over who will pay the \$11.00 per day per diem on food. This bureaucratic nonsense is taking place in the context of a war costing the American people \$7 billion a month - and a battalion of soldiers and Marines killed or wounded a month.

The State Department actually cannot direct assignment of their officers to serve in Iraq. State frequently cannot staff essential assignments such as the new PRTs which have the potential to produce such huge impact in Iraq. The bottom line is that only the CIA and the U.S. Armed Forces are at war. This situation cries out for remedy.

7th - We face a serious strategic dilemma. Are U.S. combat troops operating in a police action governed by the rule of Iraqi law? Or are they a Coalition Military Force supporting a counter-insurgency campaign in a nation with almost no functioning institutions? The situation must remain ambiguous until the Iraqi government is actually operating effectively. We currently have excellent rules of engagement (ROE) governing the use of lethal force. These rules are now morphing under the pressures of political sensitivity at tactical level.

Many U.S. soldiers feel constrained not to use lethal force as the option of first instance against clearly identified and armed AIF terrorists - but instead follow essentially police procedures. Without question, we must clearly and dramatically rein in the use of lethal force - and zero out the collateral killing or wounding of innocent civilians trying to survive in this war zone. However, the tactical rules of engagement will need constant monitoring to maintain an appropriate balance.

8th - Thanks to strong CENTCOM leadership and supervision at every level, our detainee policy has dramatically corrected the problems of the first year of the War on Terrorism. Detainee practices and policy in detention centers in both Iraq and Afghanistan that I have visited are firm, professional, humane, and well supervised. However, we may be in danger of over-correcting. The AIF are exploiting our overly restrictive procedures and are routinely defying the U.S. interrogators. It is widely believed that the US has a "14 day catch and release policy" and the AIF "suspect" will soon be back in action.

This is an overstatement of reality, however, we do have a problem. Many of the AIF detainees routinely accuse U.S. soldiers of abuse under the silliest factual situations knowing it will trigger an automatic investigation. In my view, we will need to move very rapidly to a policy of the Iraqis taking legal charge of the detainees in our Brigade Detention Centers--- with us serving a support not lead role. We may need to hire U.S. contractor law enforcement teams at U.S. tactical battalion level to support the function of "evidentiary packages" as well as accompanying prisoners to testify in court in Baghdad.

9th - The stateside Army and Marine Corps needs significant manpower augmentation to continue the Iraq counter-insurgency and Iraqi training mission. In my judgment, CENTCOM must constrain the force level in Iraq or we risk damaging our ground combat capability which we will need in the ongoing deterrence of threat from North Korea, Iran, Syria, China against Taiwan, Venezuela, Cuba, and other potential flashpoints.

The stateside Army and Marine Corps also must rapidly create an enhanced Arabic language capability in the Armed Forces. We need to take 20% of each Leavenworth class and 10% of each advanced course class and put them through a 90 day total immersion Defense Language Institute Arabic course using only native speakers.

10th - CENTCOM and the U.S. Mission are running out of the most significant leverage we have in Iraq - economic reconstruction dollars. Having spent \$18 billion - we now have \$1.6 billion of new funding left in the pipeline. Iraq cannot sustain the requisite economic recovery without serious U.S. support. The Allies are not going to help. They will not fulfill their pledges. Most of their pledges are loans not grants.

It would be misguided policy to fail to achieve our political objective after a \$400 billion war because we refused to sustain the requirement to build a viable economic state. Unemployment is a bigger enemy than the AIF. It is my view that we will fail to achieve our political-military objectives in the coming 24 months if we do not continue economic support on the order of \$5-10 billion per year. This is far, far less than the cost of fighting these people.

11th - We need to better equip the Iraqi Army with a capability to deter foreign attack - and to have a leveraged advantage over the Shia militias and the AIF insurgents they must continue to confront. The resources we are now planning to provide are inadequate by an order of magnitude or more. The cost of a coherent development of the Iraqi security forces is the ticket out of Iraq - and the avoidance of the constant drain of huge U.S. resources on a monthly basis.

12th - There is a rapidly growing animosity in our deployed military forces toward the U.S. media. We need to bridge this gap. Armies do not fight wars - countries fight wars. We need to continue talking to the American people through the press. They will be objective in reporting facts if we facilitate their information gathering mission. The country is way too dangerous for the media to operate in any other manner than temporarily imbedded with U.S. or Iraqi security forces. The enormous good will already generated by the superb performance of U.S. combat forces will ebb away if we do not continue to actively engage media at every level. We also cannot discount 2000 IED's a month, hundreds of US casualties a month, or the chaos of the central battlefield of the insurgency - which is Baghdad.

13th - U.S. public diplomacy and rhetoric about confronting Iranian nuclear weapons is scaring neighbors in the Gulf. They will not support another war. They have no integrated missile and interceptor air defense. They have no credible maritime coastal defense system to protect their ports and oil production facilities. Our Mid-East allies believe correctly that they are ill-equipped to deal with Iranian strikes to close the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. They do not think they can handle politically or militarily a terrorist threat nested in their domestic Shia populations.

A U.S. military confrontation with Iran could result in Sadr attacking our forces in Baghdad - or along our 400 mile line of communications out of Iraq to the sea. The Iranian people have collectively decided to go nuclear. The Chinese and the Russians will not in the end support serious collective action against Iran. The Iranians will achieve their nuclear weapon purpose within 5-10 years.

Now is the time for us to create the asymmetrical alliances and defensive capabilities to hedge the Iranian nuclear threat without pre-emptive warfare. We can bankrupt and isolate the Iranians as we did the Soviet Union and create a stronger Gulf Alliance that will effectively deter this menace to our security.

5. SUMMARY:

The U.S. will remain in a serious crisis in Iraq during the coming 24 months. There is decreasing U.S. domestic support for the war, although in my view the American people understand that we must not fail or we risk a ten year disaster of foreign policy in the vital Gulf Oil Region. U.S. public opinion may become increasingly alienated by Iraqi ingratitude for our sacrifice on their behalf (huge percentages of both the Shia and Sunni populations believe that the MNF Coalition forces are the single greatest threat to safety and security in Iraq today) ---and by astonishingly corrupt and incompetent Iraqi management of their own recovery. (Much of the national oil and electricity problem is caused by poor maintenance or deliberate internal sabotage of the infrastructure for reasons of criminal corruption ---or to prevent energy from flowing away from the production facilities to Baghdad.)

The situation is perilous, uncertain, and extreme - but far from hopeless. The U.S. Armed Forces are a rock. This is the most competent and brilliantly led military in a tactical and operational sense that we have ever fielded. Its courage and dedication is unabated after 20,000 killed and wounded. The U.S. leadership on the ground is superb at strategic level - Ambassador Khalilzad, General Abizaid, and General Casey. The Iraqi security forces are now surging into a lead role in internal counter-insurgency operations.

The Iraqi political system is fragile but beginning to play a serious role in the debate over the big challenges facing the Iraqi state - oil, religion, territory, power, separatism, and revenge. The neighboring states have refrained from tipping Iraq into open civil war. The UN is cautiously thinking about re-entry and doing their job of helping consolidate peace. The Iraqis are going to hold Saddam and his senior leadership accountable for their murderous behavior over 35 years. The brave Brits continue to support us both politically and militarily. NATO is a possible modest support to our efforts.

There is no reason why the U.S. cannot achieve our objectives in Iraq. Our aim must be to create a viable federal state under the rule of law which does not: enslave its own people, threaten its neighbors, or produce weapons of mass destruction. This is a ten year task. We should be able to draw down most of our combat forces in 3-5 years. We have few alternatives to the current US strategy which is painfully but gradually succeeding. This is now a race against time. Do we have the political will, do we have the military power, will we spend the resources required to achieve our aims?

It was very encouraging for me to see the progress achieved in the past year. Thanks to the leadership and personal sacrifice of the hundreds of thousands of men and women of the CENTCOM team and the CIA - the American people are far safer today than we were in the 18 months following the initial intervention.


Barry R McCaffrey
General USA (Ret)
Adjunct Professor of International Affairs
United States Military Academy
West Point, New York

~~FOUO~~

October 25, 2005

000.5

TO: Eric Edelman
GEN John Abizaid
Larry DiRita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Letter from Alan Howell Parrot

Please take a look at the attached letter sent to me by a military analyst, and tell me what you think of it.

Thanks.

Attach: 10/17/05 Letter from Alan Howell Parrot to Thomas McInerney

DHR:js
102505-13

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Please Respond By November 08, 2005

OSD 21090-05

OSD 21090-05

~~FOUO~~



The Union for the Conservation of Raptors

Lt. General Thomas G. McInerney – *military analyst*

Dear Tom,

Monday, October 17, 2005

The analysis provided here is only possible after spending countless hours over many years, intimately involved with today's upper echelons of Middle East Shaikhs, Princes, and leaders. The behavioral patterns described here are, unfortunately, commonly observed by anyone unlucky enough to be a member of their inner circle.

I studied body-language analysis and facial analysis under Dr. Narayan Singh, who is among the best pioneers in the biz. Today Narayan is retired from practicing clinical psychology. But he still provides valuable consulting services, while he continues to develop his work far beyond conventional application modalities. His telephone number is 425-885-2286.

Multiple forms of analysis are invaluable for comprehending aboriginal (i.e. Arab) people who speak other (non-English) languages, because Arabs still share common archetypal body languages with westerners, and can therefore be understood in a common context.

When the DOD asked me to list my language proficiencies, it wasn't enough to list Russian et. al. Rather, today's NOC agents and other intelligence analysts should be ideally optimized with training beyond conventional language (Russian, Chinese, Arabic), to include a wide variety of communication skills that permit D.O.D. agents to penetrate and embed within foreign cultures. If invited, I'm available to lift this veil by introducing the DOD to a whole new world of soft, low-intensity content and communication analysis.

There is an element of delusional religiosity in Zarqawi's letter, most apparent in the beginning of his letter. He is using 'religion' as a safety mechanism, to cover his psyche as a serial killer. But even this demeanor fades away as he advances deeply into a psychotic episode of ranting against his adversaries. We saw the same features in Saddam Hussein during the first Gulf War, when he publicly announced that he is descended from the Muslim prophet Mohammed.

It is notable that in this letter, Zarqawi's emotions are not consistent from beginning to end. Zarqawi is easily influenced by external circumstances that are 'triggering events', capable of starting irrational, emotionally-driven 'brush-fires'. A fanatically 'reactive' psychotic who is in the business of responding to external stimuli, often makes titanic mistakes, and thus feels compelled to problem-solve with overwhelming, brute force.

Handlers for Damage-Control:

This man is out of control. Was this the case prior to the U.S.-led coalition against insurgents? Probably not, to the same degree. A person in this condition requires 'handlers' in his entourage, who mitigate disaster by controlling Zarqawi's manifest, psychotic episodes. These advisors are essential to his survival; but they also represent a dilution of Zarqawi's terrorist capacity. If 70% of their energy is dedicated to pure terror, 30% is dedicated to controlling Zarqawi and evading his wrath. Zarqawi's team is likely to be challenged by crises *inside* Zarqawi's organization, as much as they are challenged by the coalition's hunt for Zarqawi. This 'damage-control' ratio is likely to change over time, to the detriment of Zarqawi's survival capacity.

10/25
C M



The Union for the Conservation of Raptors

Zarqawi's inevitable use of brute force against 'tribal' members inside his own organization can only work to his benefit in the short term, until his organization's members learn how to (1) take Zarqawi's position for themselves (2) split apart into a new organization, or (3) kill Zarqawi. A calculated guess would be that he will soon be delivered dead, to coalition forces.

Therefore Zarqawi uses religion (ie. control of God) and money as strategic tools to delay his fate, that will inevitably be caused by enemies within his organization, if not by the U.S.-led coalition.

Post-Traumatic Stress Is Toxic, and Effectively Kills An Organization:

Similarly, Niccolo Machiavelli, Adolph Hitler and Yasser Arafat were all individuals suffering from fragmented egos, who nevertheless continued public careers as functional psychotics. Zarqawi belongs to the same club, but his half-life is over. The average life-span of an overtly active, public Mafia Don is about five years, and even Zarqawi may be acutely aware that he is approaching payback time at lightning speed. This is also cause for ambient traumatic stress, which serves to shorten his functional career.

Zarqawi suffers from severe ongoing traumatic stress. Unable to process information overload, real and imagined threats become indistinguishable. One symptom of traumatic stress is his toxic view of all people, beyond his immediate circle of Sunni Muslims. A person who is this toxic, cannot sleep and can't make lucid judgments. Symptoms manifest in his extremely toxic analysis of the Shiite, the Kurds, and others. Zarqawi is already overwhelmed by his own psychosis.

Note: Zarqawi states, "America will not leave (Iraq) no matter how numerous it's wounds become and how much of it's blood is spilled". This contradicts Zarqawi's earlier position, that the American public will not countenance high mortality among U.S. troops. Previously, throat-cutting of Americans was a terror-tactic, designed to cause a mass exodus of Americans. Today, U.S. troops are viewed as currency for trading purposes, to secure the freedom of detained terrorists. This means that President Bush's edict that "the U.S. will not back down" has worked. Zarqawi admits here that his tactics have changed, once again under duress, due to U.S. resolve.

Zarqawi is correct to characterize the Shi'a as patiently waiting to implement a long-term plan to dominate Iraq, at the expense of Kurds and Sunni Muslims. His final paragraph is an ascending ruler's mandate, couched in the sycophantic language of an indentured servant.

Summary:

There are many outright historic distortions and evident inaccuracies in Zarqawi's letter. His displayed contempt for Shiite Muslims exceeds his sentiments for Americans, whom he believes to be two-dimensional and of momentary concern. i.e. Shiite Muslims are the long-term enemy, as they are held in contempt by all of al-Qaeda's leaders. Western analysts resolutely maintain this discord between Shiite and Sunni precludes strategic collaboration, but the Koran clearly instructs Muslim enemies to collaborate as allies, when they are attacked by the *kafir* infidels. i.e. Koranic precepts mandate, in principle, that Iran accommodate UBL and al-Qaeda's leaders, as a means for defeating western infidels and Christian/Jewish invaders.

Our goal is to break the back of the insurgency. To achieve this goal, we must first comprehend who we are dealing with. It is a misnomer and counterproductive to view the insurgency as a unified force. The nature of Zarqawi's psychosis, coupled with his ongoing traumatic stress, both serve to create factional discord within his organization. And because Zarqawi's team is constantly forced into a reactionary mode, every milestone such as Saturday's popular vote for the Iraqi Constitution, are factors that exponentially increase many layers and levels of threats to the stability of Zarqawi's organization, from within. Zarqawi's battle is nearing it's end.



The Union for the Conservation of Raptors

This letter is legitimate. Zawahiri orders Zarqawi to stop graphic films of slaughter, which alienate Muslim supporters. After this command was received, Zarqawi stopped throat-cuttings. Zawahiri then instructs Zarqawi to "kill the captives by bullet", which he does.

One Paragraph...

- ◆ The Rosetta stone to this letter is in the question marks. In this 13 page letter, there are a total of 27 question marks. Fifteen of those question marks (56%) are limited to *one paragraph*. These question marks represent a guarded change in emotion, in the context of a 'what if' scenario. They represent as fact, an abrupt change in rhythm and tempo: Zawahiri is afraid to give the answers, so he asks questions and compels the reader to provide the answers for himself.

This anomaly should not be overlooked by intelligence analysts. Imagine if this paragraph had 15 exclamation points, instead of 15 question marks! That paragraph would have stuck out like a sore thumb. In an indirect, between-the-lines oriental society, question marks are just as confrontational as exclamation points.

- ◆ In this paragraph, Zawahiri is confronting Zarqawi about killing Shiite Muslims (Iranian tribals). The unique payload message of that one paragraph, is to stop killing al-Qaeda's sworn enemies. Nowhere else can you find Zawahiri or UBL counseling against the killing of Shi'a. Only here.
- ◆ Why? This paragraph shouts that Zawahiri is obliged to protect Shiite Muslims. This new policy is untenable to al-Qaeda's leadership ... unless al-Zawahiri is a guest, prisoner, or beneficiary of Iranian hospitality. This paragraph supports U.C.R.'s Iranian sighting of UBL last November.

The unique nature of Zawahiri calling for a 'cease-fire' against Shiite Muslims, is underscored when considered in relation to Zarqawi's letter that promises to annihilate the Shi'a. Zawahiri's policy is (1) against al-Qaeda doctrine and is (2) nervously expressed in *one unique paragraph*.

- ◆ Furthermore: prior to that paragraph, there are five paragraphs denoted by A, B, C, D, E. Other paragraphs in this letter, which are preceded by letters or numbers, signify a distinct change of topic. But these five paragraphs are unusual, in that they are all talking about the same subject. Here, the letters are not used to denote a change of topic - rather, they are used to emphasize the *same point* (i.e. the Sunni "collision" with Shiite apostates), like a fist banging on the table.

Somebody has convinced Zawahiri to protect the hated Shiite Muslims. Is it the Iranian Shi'a?

Relative Suffering of Relatives:

In the primary paragraph with 15 question marks, Zawahiri mentions that "we have more than 100 prisoners...who are from the leadership...in the custody of the Iranians." Zawahiri fails to complain about their torture, and the destruction of al-Qaeda's agenda.

Relative to this, consider how Zawahiri complains about his favorite wife, his son, his daughter, and three families suffering from war. Yet there is no thought for the suffering of 100 prisoners. Is this because al-Qaeda's 100 prisoners in Iran, are not suffering at all, because they are guests of Ahmedinijad?

On July 31, 2002 I was a guest of the Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal at his Jeddah palace. The next day he flew to Iran, to receive two al-Qaeda terrorists held in Iranian custody, and to escort them to Saudi Arabia. i.e. It's no secret that Iran holds senior al-Qaeda terrorists.



The Union for the Conservation of Raptors

Be Polite to the Host:

Zawahiri claims that when the U.S. departs Iraq, "un-Islamic forces" will attempt to fill the void. If you review both letters, Shiite Muslims are considered as the only potent long-term adversary, capable of dominating the Iraqi table. Zawahiri is making a polite reference to the Iranian Shi'a. But Zawahiri's words starkly contrast Zarqawi's vituperative tone against Iran's Shiite Muslims. Why is Zawahiri being so polite? Is his tone attributable to his status as a guest of the Iranians?

Zarqawi states Iraq, "has not mountains in which we can take refuge and no forests in whose thickets we can hide." But Zawahiri and UBL have found a third venue for hiding: the sovereign state of Iran, whose borders appear to be impenetrable to the U.S.-led coalition.

Miscellaneous Points:

Zawahiri advises Zarqawi to integrate his organization among the Iraqi populace, to garner support. He tells Zarqawi to develop, "circles of support, assistance, and cooperation, and through them to advance until you become ... an organization." This is impossible, because Zarqawi's organization is already contracting, as described in the previous analysis of his letter. Does Zawahiri repeat this message twice, because he's aware Zarqawi cannot maintain his team?

Zawahiri emphasizes a need to support the *ulema* (religious leaders), even when they are wrong. In these statements, Zawahiri confirms the *ulema's* essential function, calibrating a spiritual compass for today's Muslims and terrorists at large. Saudi, Egyptian, and Pakistani ulema in particular are responsible for seeding terror around the world. Zawahiri continues by admitting the *mujahedeen* are not capable of "undertaking the burden" of illuminating "educational curricula". In summary: like the Saudi *mutawwa* (religious police) the *mujahedeen* fighters are only capable of enforcement, while the *mullahs* are the directors of today's Islamo-fascist terror. ///
We need to reform and reign in the Mullahs first, so the body politic of Islam will follow. //

Both documents taken from the internet, are slightly unusual in that they do not use word-wrap. If you copy both documents to your 'clipboard', then paste them into an MS Word document, then turn on visible formatting, you'll see that each line is manually ended in the right margin, with a manual carriage return. Perhaps both confiscated documents were translated into English and distributed from the same computer. These two documents can be seen at: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2004/02/040212-al-zarqawi.htm> and http://www.dni.gov/letter_in_english.pdf

- ◆ Winter 2001/2002: the UAE Deputy Prime Minister Shaikh Sultan bin Zayed, a valuable U.C.R. resource, revealed that Iran banned hunting of Houbari by UAE falconers. Iran's state-sanctioned policy is established so that UBL can hunt without enemy interference and interdiction;
- ◆ February 06, 2002: the Christian Science Monitor reports the UBL's cook claims that UBL fled to Iran. The cook describes UBL hunting "quail", while other "quail...were brought in by road from Iran". He is not talking about quail. He is talking about Houbara. (article enclosed, below)
- ◆ November, 2004: UBL sighting near Mashad, Iran by U.C.R. staff. The details were reported to Major General Paul Vallely on January 31, 2005. The FBI interviewed U.C.R. on September 02; 2005
- ◆ November, 2004: UBL sighting south of the Caspian, by Ken Timmerman's source. This was an independent sighting, unknown to both U.C.R. and General Vallely, until Paul met Ken in NYC on June 13, 2005. Timmerman met the FBI and also reported the sighting details in his book, Countdown To Crisis, The Coming Nuclear Showdown With Iran.

202-478-2544 Voice/Fax
Monday, October 17, 2005

Please visit our website at:
www.SaveTheFalcon.org

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Page 4 of 5



The Union for the Conservation of Raptors

If Zawahiri's letter is a topographical map, then the density of question marks in *one paragraph* may be viewed as a mountain refuge. They represent an anomaly in the topography of Zawahiri's communication.

At this pivotal moment, the core issue is the relationship between Zawahiri and Zarqawi. From Zawahiri's perspective, he is attempting to contain and control a madman who is out of control. Zawahiri is under duress: his responsibilities to the Iranians mandate an unthinkable concession, that *he* stop the killing of Shiite Muslims. This is like telling a ferret to leave the chickens alone.

So many questions in one paragraph, represent indirect communication: Zawahiri is afraid. Zawahiri feels the ominous weight of responsibility, as he hammers his point home. Very likely, he expects the killing of Shi'a will continue, if not by Zarqawi, then by his followers. This deep fear reaches to the subconscious mind. Zawahiri is afraid that Zarqawi will ignore him, and he is afraid of what he will do. i.e. The consequences of Zarqawi's ongoing sectarian violence in Iraq, shall work to the detriment of Zawahiri in Iran.

In this critical paragraph, Zawahiri also confirms the Koran's mandate that Muslim enemies collaborate as friends, when attacked by *kafir* infidels. He states, "both we and the Iranians need to refrain from harming each other at this time in which the Americans are targeting us."

There is enough material, independently corroborated, to support our claim that UBL resides in Iran. And U.C.R. has developed a tactical strategy whereby he will be compelled to look for us, rather than the opposite. It is my hope that all of us together, shall have the opportunity to fully develop this project.

Yours Sincerely,

Alan Howell Parrot,
for the Union for the Conservation of Raptors, Inc.

1 Page Denied in Full

FOIA Exemption (b)(5)



Adjunct Professor of International Affairs

April 25, 2006

**MEMORANDUM FOR: COLONEL MIKE MEESE
DEPARTMENT HEAD, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY**

**COLONEL CINDY JEBB
DEPUTY DEPARTMENT HEAD, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY**

**Subject: Academic Report- Trip to Iraq and Kuwait
Thursday 13 April through Thursday 20 April 2006**

1. PURPOSE: This memo provides follow-on feedback reference visit 13-20 April 2006 to Iraq and Kuwait. Look forward to doing a faculty seminar with Department of Social Sciences at your convenience in the Fall semester.

2. SOURCES – IRAQ:

- a. **General George Casey, Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I): One-on-one discussions and briefings.**
- b. **LTG Peter Chiarelli, Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I): One-on-one discussions and briefings.**
- c. **LTG Martin Dempsey, Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command: One-on-one discussions and briefings.**
- d. **British three-star General LTG Rob Fry (UK Army), Deputy to General George Casey, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I): Update Briefings.**
- e. **Acting Chief-of-Mission U.S. Embassy, DCM David Satterfield: One-on-one discussions and briefing.**
- f. **MG James Thurman, Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division, Multi-National Division – Baghdad (MND-B): One-on-one discussions and briefings.**
- g. **MG Thomas Turner, Commanding General, 101st Abn Div. Multi-National Division-North (MND-N): One-on-one discussions and briefings.**
- h. **MG Rick Lynch, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) Strategic Effects: One-on-one discussions and briefing.**
- i. **MG Timothy Donovan, USMC, Chief-of-Staff Multi-National Forces-Iraq: One-on-one discussions and out brief.**
- j. **MG Joseph Peterson, Chief of Iraqi Police Transition: Discussion and briefing.**

- k. **Mr. David Harris, Acting Chief Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO): One-on-one lunch and discussions.**
- l. **MG Bob Heine, Deputy Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO), Director of Operations: One-on-one discussions and briefings.**
- m. **BG (P) William H. McCoy, Commanding General, Gulf Region Division Project and Contracting Office: Full Staff Briefings.**
- n. **BG John Cantwell (Australian Army): MNF-I Operations Brief.**
- o. **BG Alessio Cecchetti (Italian Army): Coalition Operations Update Briefing.**
- p. **[REDACTED] Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Multi-National Force-Iraq: Intelligence briefing on threat.**
- q. **Briefing: Multi-National Force-Iraq Battlefield Update.**
- r. **Briefing: MNF-I Effects and Synchronization Board.**
- s. **Division Battle Staff Briefing: 4th Infantry Division.**
- t. **Division Battle Staff Briefing: 101st Airborne Division.**
- u. **Briefing: Infantry Brigade Commander, 4th Infantry Division.**
- v. **Briefing: Acting Infantry Battalion Commander, 4th Infantry Division.**
- w. **Briefing: Infantry Company Commander, 4th Infantry Division.**
- x. **Lunch Sensing Session: Soldiers and junior NCOs, 4th Infantry Division.**
- y. **Dinner Discussion: General Officers and Division Command Sergeant Major, 101st Airborne Division.**
- z. **Briefing: Infantry Brigade Commander, 101st Airborne Division.**
- aa. **Briefing: Maneuver Effects Brigade Commander (Engineers), 101st Airborne Division on Counter-IED Campaign.**
- bb. **Briefing: Aviation Brigade Commander, 101st Airborne Division.**
- cc. **Briefing: Maneuver Battalion Commander and Company Commanders, 101st Airborne Division.**
- dd. **Lunch Sensing Session: Aviation Company Commander and Leaders, 101st Airborne Division.**
- ee. **Dinner Sensing Session: Soldiers and junior NCOs, 101st Airborne Division.**
- ff. **Visit and Briefings: Brigade Detention Center and Intelligence interrogators.**
- gg. **Visit and Briefings: Special Operations Intelligence Fusion Center.**
- hh. **Night Movement: To 101st Maneuver Battalion Headquarters for pinning ceremony, Combat Infantry and Combat Action Badges. Discussion with junior soldiers.**

3. SOURCES - KUWAIT:

- a. **Ambassador Richard LeBaron, US Ambassador to Kuwait:** Office call and discussions with U.S. Ambassador and DCM.
- b. **Staff Briefings:** [REDACTED] Acting Chief, Office of Military Cooperation - Kuwait.
- c. **Briefings:** U.S. Embassy Political Officer.
- d. **Briefings:** U.S. Embassy DAO - [REDACTED]
- e. **MG James Kelley, Acting Commanding General, Coalition Land Component Command:** One-on-one discussions.
- f. **Full Staff Briefing:** (3rd U.S. Army), Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC).
- g. **Dinner Discussion:** CFLCC General Officers, Chief-of-staff, Command Sergeant Major.

4. THE BOTTOM LINE - OBSERVATIONS FROM IRAQI FREEDOM, APRIL 2006:

1st - The morale, fighting effectiveness, and confidence of U.S. combat forces continue to be simply awe-inspiring. In every sensing session and interaction - I probed for weakness and found courage, belief in the mission, enormous confidence in their sergeants and company grade officers, an understanding of the larger mission, a commitment to creating an effective Iraqi Army and Police, unabashed patriotism, and a sense of humor. All of these soldiers, NCOs and young officers were volunteers for combat. Many were on their second combat tour - several were on the third or fourth combat tour. Many had re-enlisted to stay with their unit on its return to a second Iraq deployment. Many planned to re-enlist regardless of how long the war went on.

Their comments to me were guileless, positive, and candidly expressed love for their fellow soldiers. They routinely encounter sniper fire, mortar and rocket attacks, and constantly face IED's on movement. Their buddies have been killed and wounded. Several in these sessions had also been wounded. These are the toughest soldiers we have ever fielded. It was a real joy and an honor to see them first-hand.

2nd - The Iraqi Army is real, growing, and willing to fight. They now have lead action of a huge and rapidly expanding area and population. The battalion level formations are in many cases excellent - most are adequate. However, they are very badly equipped with only a few light vehicles, small arms, most with body armor and one or two uniforms. They have almost no mortars, heavy machine guns, decent communications equipment, artillery, armor, or IAF air transport, helicopter, and strike support. Their logistics capability is only now beginning to appear. Their Institutional Army (Military Schools, logistics base, manufacturing) is beginning to show encouraging signs of self-initiative.

The Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior have shown dramatic and rapid growth in capacity and competence since LTG Dempsey took them under his care. However, the corruption and lack of capability of the ministries will require several years of patient coaching and officer education in values as well as the required competencies. The Iraqi people clearly want a National Army. The recruiting now has gotten significant participation by all sectarian groups to include the Sunni. The Partnership Program with U.S. units will be the key to success with the Embedded Training Teams augmented and nurtured by a U.S. Maneuver Commander. This is simply a brilliant success story. We need at least two-to-five more years of U.S. partnership and combat backup to get the Iraqi Army ready to stand on its own. The interpersonal relationships between Iraqi Army units and their U.S. trainers are very positive and genuine.

3rd - The Iraqi police are beginning to show marked improvement in capability since MG Joe Peterson took over the program. The National Police Commando Battalions are very capable - a few are simply superb and on par with the best U.S. SWAT units in terms of equipment, courage, and training. Their intelligence collection capability is better than ours in direct HUMINT.

The crux of the war hangs on our ability to create urban and rural local police with the ability to survive on the streets of this incredibly dangerous and lethal environment. The police must have fortified local stations (more than a thousand), local jails (more than a thousand), armored Humvees (more than 3000), a nationwide command and control system, embedded U.S. contractor trainers, and in the key battleground areas of Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, and Kirkuk - they need a remote area camera monitoring system such as we now have in most of our major cities.

The police are heavily infiltrated by both the AIF and the Shia militia. They are widely distrusted by the Sunni population. They are incapable of confronting local armed groups. They inherited a culture of inaction, passivity, human rights abuses, and deep corruption.

This will be a ten year project requiring patience, significant resources, and an international public face. This is a very, very tough challenge which is a prerequisite to the Iraqis winning the counter-insurgency struggle they will face in the coming decade. We absolutely can do this. But this police program is now inadequately resourced.

4th - The creation of an Iraqi government of national unity is a central requirement. We must help create a legitimate government for which the Iraqi security forces will fight and die. If we do not see the successful development of a pluralistic administration in the first 120 days of the emerging Jawad al-Maliki leadership - there will be significant chance of the country breaking apart in warring factions among the Sunnis and Shia - with a separatist Kurdish north embroiled in their own potential struggle with the Turks.

The incompetence and corruption of the interim Iraqi Administration has been significant. There is total lack of trust among the families, the tribes, and the sectarian factions created by the 35 years of despotism and isolation of the criminal Saddam regime. This is a traumatized society with a malignant political culture. There is a huge "brain drain" taking place with educated and wealthy Iraqis getting out with their money. This is a loss of the potential leadership to solve the mess that is Iraq today. The pot is also being stirred from the outside Iraq by six neighboring states - none of which have provided significant economic or political assistance.

However, in my view, the Iraqis are likely to successfully create a governing entity. The intelligence picture strongly portrays a population that wants a federal Iraq, wants a national Army, rejects the AIF as a political future for the nation, and is optimistic that their life can be better in the coming years. Unlike the Balkans—the Iraqis want this to work. The bombing of the Samarra Mosque brought the country to the edge of all-out war. However, the Iraqi Army did not crack, the moderates held, Sistani called for restraint, the Sunnis got a chill of fear seeing what could happen to them as a minority population, and the Coalition Forces suddenly were seen correctly as a vital force that could keep the population safe in the absence of Iraqi power. In addition, the Shia were reminded that Iran is a Persian power with goals that conflict with the Shia Arabs of southern and central Iraq.

It is likely that the Iraqis will pull together enough political muscle to get through the coming 30 day crisis to produce a cabinet to submit to the Parliament - as well as the four month deadline to consider constitutional amendments. The resulting government is likely to be weak and barely functional. It may stagger along and fail in 18 months. But it is very likely to prevent the self-destruction of Iraq. Our brilliant and effective U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad will be the essential ingredient to keeping Iraq together. If the U.S. loses his leadership in the coming year, this thing could implode.

5th - The foreign jihadist fighters have been defeated as a strategic and operational threat to the creation of an Iraqi government. Aggressive small unit combat action by Coalition Forces combined with good intelligence - backed up by new Iraqi Security Forces is making an impact. The foreign fighters remain a serious tactical menace. However, they are a minor threat to the heavily armed and wary U.S. forces. They cannot successfully stop the Iraqi police and army recruitment. Their brutal attacks on the civil population are creating support for the emerging government. The foreign fighters have failed to spark open civil war from the Shia. The Samarra bombing may well have inoculated the

country to the possible horror of total war. The Iraqis are rejecting the vision of a religious state. The al Qaeda in-Iraq organization is now largely Sunni Iraqi - not foreign fighters. U.S. Marine and Army combat effectiveness - combined with very effective information operations— has taken the fun out of Jihad.

6th - The U.S. Inter-Agency Support for our strategy in Iraq is grossly inadequate. A handful of brilliant, courageous, and dedicated Foreign Service Officers have held together a large, constantly changing, marginally qualified, inadequately experienced U.S. mission. The U.S. influence on the Iraqi national and regional government has been extremely weak. U.S. consultants of the IRMO do not live and work with their Iraqi counterparts, are frequently absent on leave or home consultations, are often in-country for short tours of 90 days to six months, and are frequently gapped with no transfer of institutional knowledge.

In Iraq, nothing is possible without carefully managed relationships between the U.S. officials and their Iraqi interlocutors. Trust between people is the prerequisite and basis of progress for this deeply Arab culture. The other U.S. agencies of government such as Justice, DHS, Commerce, Agriculture, and Transportation are in Iraq in small numbers for too short time periods. The U.S. Departments actually fight over who will pay the \$11.00 per day per diem on food. This bureaucratic nonsense is taking place in the context of a war costing the American people \$7 billion a month - and a battalion of soldiers and Marines killed or wounded a month.

The State Department actually cannot direct assignment of their officers to serve in Iraq. State frequently cannot staff essential assignments such as the new PRTs which have the potential to produce such huge impact in Iraq. The bottom line is that only the CIA and the U.S. Armed Forces are at war. This situation cries out for remedy.

7th - We face a serious strategic dilemma. Are U.S. combat troops operating in a police action governed by the rule of Iraqi law? Or are they a Coalition Military Force supporting a counter-insurgency campaign in a nation with almost no functioning institutions? The situation must remain ambiguous until the Iraqi government is actually operating effectively. We currently have excellent rules of engagement (ROE) governing the use of lethal force. These rules are now morphing under the pressures of political sensitivity at tactical level.

Many U.S. soldiers feel constrained not to use lethal force as the option of first instance against clearly identified and armed AIF terrorists - but instead follow essentially police procedures. Without question, we must clearly and dramatically rein in the use of lethal force - and zero out the collateral killing or wounding of innocent civilians trying to survive in this war zone. However, the tactical rules of engagement will need constant monitoring to maintain an appropriate balance.

8th - Thanks to strong CENTCOM leadership and supervision at every level, our detainee policy has dramatically corrected the problems of the first year of the War on Terrorism. Detainee practices and policy in detention centers in both Iraq and Afghanistan that I have visited are firm, professional, humane, and well supervised. However, we may be in danger of over-correcting. The AIF are exploiting our overly restrictive procedures and are routinely defying the U.S. interrogators. It is widely believed that the US has a "14 day catch and release policy" and the AIF "suspect" will soon be back in action.

This is an overstatement of reality, however, we do have a problem. Many of the AIF detainees routinely accuse U.S. soldiers of abuse under the silliest factual situations knowing it will trigger an automatic investigation. In my view, we will need to move very rapidly to a policy of the Iraqis taking legal charge of the detainees in our Brigade Detention Centers— with us serving a support not lead role. We may need to hire U.S. contractor law enforcement teams at U.S. tactical battalion level to support the function of "evidentiary packages" as well as accompanying prisoners to testify in court in Baghdad.

9th - The stateside Army and Marine Corps needs significant manpower augmentation to continue the Iraq counter-insurgency and Iraqi training mission. In my judgment, CENTCOM must constrain the force level in Iraq or we risk damaging our ground combat capability which we will need in the ongoing deterrence of threat from North Korea, Iran, Syria, China against Taiwan, Venezuela, Cuba, and other potential flashpoints.

The stateside Army and Marine Corps also must rapidly create an enhanced Arabic language capability in the Armed Forces. We need to take 20% of each Leavenworth class and 10% of each advanced course class and put them through a 90 day total immersion Defense Language Institute Arabic course using only native speakers.

10th - CENTCOM and the U.S. Mission are running out of the most significant leverage we have in Iraq - economic reconstruction dollars. Having spent \$18 billion - we now have \$1.6 billion of new funding left in the pipeline. Iraq cannot sustain the requisite economic recovery without serious U.S. support. The Allies are not going to help. They will not fulfill their pledges. Most of their pledges are loans not grants.

It would be misguided policy to fail to achieve our political objective after a \$400 billion war because we refused to sustain the requirement to build a viable economic state. Unemployment is a bigger enemy than the AIF. It is my view that we will fail to achieve our political-military objectives in the coming 24 months if we do not continue economic support on the order of \$5-10 billion per year. This is far, far less than the cost of fighting these people.

11th - We need to better equip the Iraqi Army with a capability to deter foreign attack - and to have a leveraged advantage over the Shia militias and the AIF insurgents they must continue to confront. The resources we are now planning to provide are inadequate by an order of magnitude or more. The cost of a coherent development of the Iraqi security forces is the ticket out of Iraq - and the avoidance of the constant drain of huge U.S. resources on a monthly basis.

12th - There is a rapidly growing animosity in our deployed military forces toward the U.S. media. We need to bridge this gap. Armies do not fight wars - countries fight wars. We need to continue talking to the American people through the press. They will be objective in reporting facts if we facilitate their information gathering mission. The country is way too dangerous for the media to operate in any other manner than temporarily imbedded with U.S. or Iraqi security forces. The enormous good will already generated by the superb performance of U.S. combat forces will ebb away if we do not continue to actively engage media at every level. We also cannot discount 2000 IED's a month, hundreds of US casualties a month, or the chaos of the central battlefield of the insurgency - which is Baghdad.

13th - U.S. public diplomacy and rhetoric about confronting Iranian nuclear weapons is scaring neighbors in the Gulf. They will not support another war. They have no integrated missile and interceptor air defense. They have no credible maritime coastal defense system to protect their ports and oil production facilities. Our Mid-East allies believe correctly that they are ill-equipped to deal with Iranian strikes to close the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. They do not think they can handle politically or militarily a terrorist threat nested in their domestic Shia populations.

A U.S. military confrontation with Iran could result in Sadr attacking our forces in Baghdad - or along our 400 mile line of communications out of Iraq to the sea. The Iranian people have collectively decided to go nuclear. The Chinese and the Russians will not in the end support serious collective action against Iran. The Iranians will achieve their nuclear weapon purpose within 5-10 years.

Now is the time for us to create the asymmetrical alliances and defensive capabilities to hedge the Iranian nuclear threat without pre-emptive warfare. We can bankrupt and isolate the Iranians as we did the Soviet Union and create a stronger Gulf Alliance that will effectively deter this menace to our security.

5. SUMMARY:

The U.S. will remain in a serious crisis in Iraq during the coming 24 months. There is decreasing U.S. domestic support for the war, although in my view the American people understand that we must not fail or we risk a ten year disaster of foreign policy in the vital Gulf Oil Region. U.S. public opinion may become increasingly alienated by Iraqi ingratitude for our sacrifice on their behalf (huge percentages of both the Shia and Sunni populations believe that the MNF Coalition forces are the single greatest threat to safety and security in Iraq today) ---and by astonishingly corrupt and incompetent Iraqi management of their own recovery. (Much of the national oil and electricity problem is caused by poor maintenance or deliberate internal sabotage of the infrastructure for reasons of criminal corruption ---or to prevent energy from flowing away from the production facilities to Baghdad.)

The situation is perilous, uncertain, and extreme - but far from hopeless. The U.S. Armed Forces are a rock. This is the most competent and brilliantly led military in a tactical and operational sense that we have ever fielded. Its courage and dedication is unabated after 20,000 killed and wounded. The U.S. leadership on the ground is superb at strategic level - Ambassador Khalilzad, General Abizaid, and General Casey. The Iraqi security forces are now surging into a lead role in internal counter-insurgency operations.

The Iraqi political system is fragile but beginning to play a serious role in the debate over the big challenges facing the Iraqi state - oil, religion, territory, power, separatism, and revenge. The neighboring states have refrained from tipping Iraq into open civil war. The UN is cautiously thinking about re-entry and doing their job of helping consolidate peace. The Iraqis are going to hold Saddam and his senior leadership accountable for their murderous behavior over 35 years. The brave Brits continue to support us both politically and militarily. NATO is a possible modest support to our efforts.

There is no reason why the U.S. cannot achieve our objectives in Iraq. Our aim must be to create a viable federal state under the rule of law which does not: enslave its own people, threaten its neighbors, or produce weapons of mass destruction. This is a ten year task. We should be able to draw down most of our combat forces in 3-5 years. We have few alternatives to the current US strategy which is painfully but gradually succeeding. This is now a race against time. Do we have the political will, do we have the military power, will we spend the resources required to achieve our aims?

It was very encouraging for me to see the progress achieved in the past year. Thanks to the leadership and personal sacrifice of the hundreds of thousands of men and women of the CENTCOM team and the CIA - the American people are far safer today than we were in the 18 months following the initial intervention.

Barry R McCaffrey
General USA (Ret)
Adjunct Professor of International Affairs
United States Military Academy
West Point, New York



5.3.06

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

MR. SECRETARY,

THIS TRIP REPORT BY

BARRY MCLAFFERY IS WORTH

A QUICK READ, PARTICULARLY

GIVEN THE SOURCE.

JM

OSD 07227-06



5/3/2006 5:51:10 PM



Adjunct Professor of International Affairs

April 25, 2006

**MEMORANDUM FOR: COLONEL MIKE MEESE
DEPARTMENT HEAD, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY**

**COLONEL CINDY JEBB
DEPUTY DEPARTMENT HEAD, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY**

**Subject: Academic Report- Trip to Iraq and Kuwait
Thursday 13 April through Thursday 20 April 2006**

1. PURPOSE: This memo provides follow-on feedback reference visit 13-20 April 2006 to Iraq and Kuwait. Look forward to doing a faculty seminar with Department of Social Sciences at your convenience in the Fall semester.

2. SOURCES – IRAQ:

- a. **General George Casey, Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I): One-on-one discussions and briefings.**
- b. **LTG Peter Chiarelli, Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I): One-on-one discussions and briefings.**
- c. **LTG Martin Dempsey, Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command: One-on-one discussions and briefings.**
- d. **British three-star General LTG Rob Fry (UK Army), Deputy to General George Casey, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I): Update Briefings.**
- e. **Acting Chief-of-Mission U.S. Embassy, DCM David Satterfield: One-on-one discussions and briefing.**
- f. **MG James Thurman, Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division, Multi-National Division – Baghdad (MND-B): One-on-one discussions and briefings.**
- g. **MG Thomas Turner, Commanding General, 101st Abn Div. Multi-National Division-North (MND-N): One-on-one discussions and briefings.**
- h. **MG Rick Lynch, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) Strategic Effects: One-on-one discussions and briefing.**
- i. **MG Timothy Donovan, USMC, Chief-of-Staff Multi-National Forces-Iraq: One-on-one discussions and out brief.**
- j. **MG Joseph Peterson, Chief of Iraqi Police Transition: Discussion and briefing.**

- k. **Mr. David Harris, Acting Chief Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO): One-on-one lunch and discussions.**
- l. **MG Bob Heine, Deputy Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO), Director of Operations: One-on-one discussions and briefings.**
- m. **BG (P) William H. McCoy, Commanding General, Gulf Region Division Project and Contracting Office: Full Staff Briefings.**
- n. **BG John Cantwell (Australian Army): MNF-I Operations Brief.**
- o. **BG Alessio Cecchetti (Italian Army): Coalition Operations Update Briefing.**
- p. **[REDACTED] Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Multi-National Force-Iraq: Intelligence briefing on threat.**
- q. **Briefing: Multi-National Force-Iraq Battlefield Update.**
- r. **Briefing: MNF-I Effects and Synchronization Board.**
- s. **Division Battle Staff Briefing: 4th Infantry Division.**
- t. **Division Battle Staff Briefing: 101st Airborne Division.**
- u. **Briefing: Infantry Brigade Commander, 4th Infantry Division.**
- v. **Briefing: Acting Infantry Battalion Commander, 4th Infantry Division.**
- w. **Briefing: Infantry Company Commander, 4th Infantry Division.**
- x. **Lunch Sensing Session: Soldiers and junior NCOs, 4th Infantry Division.**
- y. **Dinner Discussion: General Officers and Division Command Sergeant Major, 101st Airborne Division.**
- z. **Briefing: Infantry Brigade Commander, 101st Airborne Division.**
- aa. **Briefing: Maneuver Effects Brigade Commander (Engineers), 101st Airborne Division on Counter-IED Campaign.**
- bb. **Briefing: Aviation Brigade Commander, 101st Airborne Division.**
- cc. **Briefing: Maneuver Battalion Commander and Company Commanders, 101st Airborne Division.**
- dd. **Lunch Sensing Session: Aviation Company Commander and Leaders, 101st Airborne Division.**
- ee. **Dinner Sensing Session: Soldiers and junior NCOs, 101st Airborne Division.**
- ff. **Visit and Briefings: Brigade Detention Center and Intelligence interrogators.**
- gg. **Visit and Briefings: Special Operations Intelligence Fusion Center.**
- hh. **Night Movement: To 101st Maneuver Battalion Headquarters for pinning ceremony, Combat Infantry and Combat Action Badges. Discussion with junior soldiers.**

3. SOURCES - KUWAIT:

- a. **Ambassador Richard LeBaron, US Ambassador to Kuwait:** Office call and discussions with U.S. Ambassador and DCM.
- b. **Staff Briefings:** [REDACTED] Acting Chief, Office of Military Cooperation - Kuwait.
- c. **Briefings:** U.S. Embassy Political Officer.
- d. **Briefings:** U.S. Embassy DAO - [REDACTED]
- e. **MG James Kelley, Acting Commanding General, Coalition Land Component Command:** One-on-one discussions.
- f. **Full Staff Briefing:** (3rd U.S. Army), Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC).
- g. **Dinner Discussion:** CFLCC General Officers, Chief-of-staff, Command Sergeant Major.

4. THE BOTTOM LINE - OBSERVATIONS FROM IRAQI FREEDOM, APRIL 2006:

1st - The morale, fighting effectiveness, and confidence of U.S. combat forces continue to be simply awe-inspiring. In every sensing session and interaction - I probed for weakness and found courage, belief in the mission, enormous confidence in their sergeants and company grade officers, an understanding of the larger mission, a commitment to creating an effective Iraqi Army and Police, unabashed patriotism, and a sense of humor. All of these soldiers, NCOs and young officers were volunteers for combat. Many were on their second combat tour - several were on the third or fourth combat tour. Many had re-enlisted to stay with their unit on its return to a second Iraq deployment. Many planned to re-enlist regardless of how long the war went on.

Their comments to me were guileless, positive, and candidly expressed love for their fellow soldiers. They routinely encounter sniper fire, mortar and rocket attacks, and constantly face IED's on movement. Their buddies have been killed and wounded. Several in these sessions had also been wounded. These are the toughest soldiers we have ever fielded. It was a real joy and an honor to see them first-hand.

2nd - The Iraqi Army is real, growing, and willing to fight. They now have lead action of a huge and rapidly expanding area and population. The battalion level formations are in many cases excellent - most are adequate. However, they are very badly equipped with only a few light vehicles, small arms, most with body armor and one or two uniforms. They have almost no mortars, heavy machine guns, decent communications equipment, artillery, armor, or IAF air transport, helicopter, and strike support. Their logistics capability is only now beginning to appear. Their Institutional Army (Military Schools, logistics base, manufacturing) is beginning to show encouraging signs of self-initiative.

The Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior have shown dramatic and rapid growth in capacity and competence since LTG Dempsey took them under his care. However, the corruption and lack of capability of the ministries will require several years of patient coaching and officer education in values as well as the required competencies. The Iraqi people clearly want a National Army. The recruiting now has gotten significant participation by all sectarian groups to include the Sunni. The Partnership Program with U.S. units will be the key to success with the Embedded Training Teams augmented and nurtured by a U.S. Maneuver Commander. This is simply a brilliant success story. We need at least two-to-five more years of U.S. partnership and combat backup to get the Iraqi Army ready to stand on its own. The interpersonal relationships between Iraqi Army units and their U.S. trainers are very positive and genuine.

3rd - The Iraqi police are beginning to show marked improvement in capability since MG Joe Peterson took over the program. The National Police Commando Battalions are very capable - a few are simply superb and on par with the best U.S. SWAT units in terms of equipment, courage, and training. Their intelligence collection capability is better than ours in direct HUMINT.

The crux of the war hangs on our ability to create urban and rural local police with the ability to survive on the streets of this incredibly dangerous and lethal environment. The police must have fortified local stations (more than a thousand), local jails (more than a thousand), armored Humvees (more than 3000), a nationwide command and control system, embedded U.S. contractor trainers, and in the key battleground areas of Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, and Kirkuk - they need a remote area camera monitoring system such as we now have in most of our major cities.

The police are heavily infiltrated by both the AIF and the Shia militia. They are widely distrusted by the Sunni population. They are incapable of confronting local armed groups. They inherited a culture of inaction, passivity, human rights abuses, and deep corruption.

This will be a ten year project requiring patience, significant resources, and an international public face. This is a very, very tough challenge which is a prerequisite to the Iraqis winning the counter-insurgency struggle they will face in the coming decade. We absolutely can do this. But this police program is now inadequately resourced.

4th - The creation of an Iraqi government of national unity is a central requirement. We must help create a legitimate government for which the Iraqi security forces will fight and die. If we do not see the successful development of a pluralistic administration in the first 120 days of the emerging Jawad al-Maliki leadership - there will be significant chance of the country breaking apart in warring factions among the Sunnis and Shia - with a separatist Kurdish north embroiled in their own potential struggle with the Turks.

The incompetence and corruption of the interim Iraqi Administration has been significant. There is total lack of trust among the families, the tribes, and the sectarian factions created by the 35 years of despotism and isolation of the criminal Saddam regime. This is a traumatized society with a malignant political culture. There is a huge "brain drain" taking place with educated and wealthy Iraqis getting out with their money. This is a loss of the potential leadership to solve the mess that is Iraq today. The pot is also being stirred from the outside Iraq by six neighboring states - none of which have provided significant economic or political assistance.

However, in my view, the Iraqis are likely to successfully create a governing entity. The intelligence picture strongly portrays a population that wants a federal Iraq, wants a national Army, rejects the AIF as a political future for the nation, and is optimistic that their life can be better in the coming years. Unlike the Balkans—the Iraqis want this to work. The bombing of the Samarra Mosque brought the country to the edge of all-out war. However, the Iraqi Army did not crack, the moderates held, Sistani called for restraint, the Sunnis got a chill of fear seeing what could happen to them as a minority population, and the Coalition Forces suddenly were seen correctly as a vital force that could keep the population safe in the absence of Iraqi power. In addition, the Shia were reminded that Iran is a Persian power with goals that conflict with the Shia Arabs of southern and central Iraq.

It is likely that the Iraqis will pull together enough political muscle to get through the coming 30 day crisis to produce a cabinet to submit to the Parliament - as well as the four month deadline to consider constitutional amendments. The resulting government is likely to be weak and barely functional. It may stagger along and fail in 18 months. But it is very likely to prevent the self-destruction of Iraq. Our brilliant and effective U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad will be the essential ingredient to keeping Iraq together. If the U.S. loses his leadership in the coming year, this thing could implode.

5th - The foreign jihadist fighters have been defeated as a strategic and operational threat to the creation of an Iraqi government. Aggressive small unit combat action by Coalition Forces combined with good intelligence - backed up by new Iraqi Security Forces is making an impact. The foreign fighters remain a serious tactical menace. However, they are a minor threat to the heavily armed and wary U.S. forces. They cannot successfully stop the Iraqi police and army recruitment. Their brutal attacks on the civil population are creating support for the emerging government. The foreign fighters have failed to spark open civil war from the Shia. The Samarra bombing may well have inoculated the

country to the possible horror of total war. The Iraqis are rejecting the vision of a religious state. The al Qaeda in-Iraq organization is now largely Sunni Iraqi - not foreign fighters. U.S. Marine and Army combat effectiveness - combined with very effective information operations— has taken the fun out of Jihad.

6th - The U.S. Inter-Agency Support for our strategy in Iraq is grossly inadequate. A handful of brilliant, courageous, and dedicated Foreign Service Officers have held together a large, constantly changing, marginally qualified, inadequately experienced U.S. mission. The U.S. influence on the Iraqi national and regional government has been extremely weak. U.S. consultants of the IRMO do not live and work with their Iraqi counterparts, are frequently absent on leave or home consultations, are often in-country for short tours of 90 days to six months, and are frequently gapped with no transfer of institutional knowledge.

In Iraq, nothing is possible without carefully managed relationships between the U.S. officials and their Iraqi interlocutors. Trust between people is the prerequisite and basis of progress for this deeply Arab culture. The other U.S. agencies of government such as Justice, DHS, Commerce, Agriculture, and Transportation are in Iraq in small numbers for too short time periods. The U.S. Departments actually fight over who will pay the \$11.00 per day per diem on food. This bureaucratic nonsense is taking place in the context of a war costing the American people \$7 billion a month - and a battalion of soldiers and Marines killed or wounded a month.

The State Department actually cannot direct assignment of their officers to serve in Iraq. State frequently cannot staff essential assignments such as the new PRTs which have the potential to produce such huge impact in Iraq. The bottom line is that only the CIA and the U.S. Armed Forces are at war. This situation cries out for remedy.

7th - We face a serious strategic dilemma. Are U.S. combat troops operating in a police action governed by the rule of Iraqi law? Or are they a Coalition Military Force supporting a counter-insurgency campaign in a nation with almost no functioning institutions? The situation must remain ambiguous until the Iraqi government is actually operating effectively. We currently have excellent rules of engagement (ROE) governing the use of lethal force. These rules are now morphing under the pressures of political sensitivity at tactical level.

Many U.S. soldiers feel constrained not to use lethal force as the option of first instance against clearly identified and armed AIF terrorists - but instead follow essentially police procedures. Without question, we must clearly and dramatically rein in the use of lethal force - and zero out the collateral killing or wounding of innocent civilians trying to survive in this war zone. However, the tactical rules of engagement will need constant monitoring to maintain an appropriate balance.

8th - Thanks to strong CENTCOM leadership and supervision at every level, our detainee policy has dramatically corrected the problems of the first year of the War on Terrorism. Detainee practices and policy in detention centers in both Iraq and Afghanistan that I have visited are firm, professional, humane, and well supervised. However, we may be in danger of over-correcting. The AIF are exploiting our overly restrictive procedures and are routinely defying the U.S. interrogators. It is widely believed that the US has a "14 day catch and release policy" and the AIF "suspect" will soon be back in action.

This is an overstatement of reality, however, we do have a problem. Many of the AIF detainees routinely accuse U.S. soldiers of abuse under the silliest factual situations knowing it will trigger an automatic investigation. In my view, we will need to move very rapidly to a policy of the Iraqis taking legal charge of the detainees in our Brigade Detention Centers— with us serving a support not lead role. We may need to hire U.S. contractor law enforcement teams at U.S. tactical battalion level to support the function of "evidentiary packages" as well as accompanying prisoners to testify in court in Baghdad.

9th - The stateside Army and Marine Corps needs significant manpower augmentation to continue the Iraq counter-insurgency and Iraqi training mission. In my judgment, CENTCOM must constrain the force level in Iraq or we risk damaging our ground combat capability which we will need in the ongoing deterrence of threat from North Korea, Iran, Syria, China against Taiwan, Venezuela, Cuba, and other potential flashpoints.

The stateside Army and Marine Corps also must rapidly create an enhanced Arabic language capability in the Armed Forces. We need to take 20% of each Leavenworth class and 10% of each advanced course class and put them through a 90 day total immersion Defense Language Institute Arabic course using only native speakers.

10th - CENTCOM and the U.S. Mission are running out of the most significant leverage we have in Iraq - economic reconstruction dollars. Having spent \$18 billion - we now have \$1.6 billion of new funding left in the pipeline. Iraq cannot sustain the requisite economic recovery without serious U.S. support. The Allies are not going to help. They will not fulfill their pledges. Most of their pledges are loans not grants.

It would be misguided policy to fail to achieve our political objective after a \$400 billion war because we refused to sustain the requirement to build a viable economic state. Unemployment is a bigger enemy than the AIF. It is my view that we will fail to achieve our political-military objectives in the coming 24 months if we do not continue economic support on the order of \$5-10 billion per year. This is far, far less than the cost of fighting these people.

11th - We need to better equip the Iraqi Army with a capability to deter foreign attack - and to have a leveraged advantage over the Shia militias and the AIF insurgents they must continue to confront. The resources we are now planning to provide are inadequate by an order of magnitude or more. The cost of a coherent development of the Iraqi security forces is the ticket out of Iraq - and the avoidance of the constant drain of huge U.S. resources on a monthly basis.

12th - There is a rapidly growing animosity in our deployed military forces toward the U.S. media. We need to bridge this gap. Armies do not fight wars - countries fight wars. We need to continue talking to the American people through the press. They will be objective in reporting facts if we facilitate their information gathering mission. The country is way too dangerous for the media to operate in any other manner than temporarily imbedded with U.S. or Iraqi security forces. The enormous good will already generated by the superb performance of U.S. combat forces will ebb away if we do not continue to actively engage media at every level. We also cannot discount 2000 IED's a month, hundreds of US casualties a month, or the chaos of the central battlefield of the insurgency - which is Baghdad.

13th - U.S. public diplomacy and rhetoric about confronting Iranian nuclear weapons is scaring neighbors in the Gulf. They will not support another war. They have no integrated missile and interceptor air defense. They have no credible maritime coastal defense system to protect their ports and oil production facilities. Our Mid-East allies believe correctly that they are ill-equipped to deal with Iranian strikes to close the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. They do not think they can handle politically or militarily a terrorist threat nested in their domestic Shia populations.

A U.S. military confrontation with Iran could result in Sadr attacking our forces in Baghdad - or along our 400 mile line of communications out of Iraq to the sea. The Iranian people have collectively decided to go nuclear. The Chinese and the Russians will not in the end support serious collective action against Iran. The Iranians will achieve their nuclear weapon purpose within 5-10 years.

Now is the time for us to create the asymmetrical alliances and defensive capabilities to hedge the Iranian nuclear threat without pre-emptive warfare. We can bankrupt and isolate the Iranians as we did the Soviet Union and create a stronger Gulf Alliance that will effectively deter this menace to our security.

5. SUMMARY:

The U.S. will remain in a serious crisis in Iraq during the coming 24 months. There is decreasing U.S. domestic support for the war; although in my view the American people understand that we must not fail or we risk a ten year disaster of foreign policy in the vital Gulf Oil Region. U.S. public opinion may become increasingly alienated by Iraqi ingratitude for our sacrifice on their behalf (huge percentages of both the Shia and Sunni populations believe that the MNF Coalition forces are the single greatest threat to safety and security in Iraq today) ---and by astonishingly corrupt and incompetent Iraqi management of their own recovery. (Much of the national oil and electricity problem is caused by poor maintenance or deliberate internal sabotage of the infrastructure for reasons of criminal corruption ---or to prevent energy from flowing away from the production facilities to Baghdad.)

The situation is perilous, uncertain, and extreme - but far from hopeless. The U.S. Armed Forces are a rock. This is the most competent and brilliantly led military in a tactical and operational sense that we have ever fielded. Its courage and dedication is unabated after 20,000 killed and wounded. The U.S. leadership on the ground is superb at strategic level - Ambassador Khalilzad, General Abizaid, and General Casey. The Iraqi security forces are now surging into a lead role in internal counter-insurgency operations.

The Iraqi political system is fragile but beginning to play a serious role in the debate over the big challenges facing the Iraqi state - oil, religion, territory, power, separatism, and revenge. The neighboring states have refrained from tipping Iraq into open civil war. The UN is cautiously thinking about re-entry and doing their job of helping consolidate peace. The Iraqis are going to hold Saddam and his senior leadership accountable for their murderous behavior over 35 years. The brave Brits continue to support us both politically and militarily. NATO is a possible modest support to our efforts.

There is no reason why the U.S. cannot achieve our objectives in Iraq. Our aim must be to create a viable federal state under the rule of law which does not: enslave its own people, threaten its neighbors, or produce weapons of mass destruction. This is a ten year task. We should be able to draw down most of our combat forces in 3-5 years. We have few alternatives to the current US strategy which is painfully but gradually succeeding. This is now a race against time. Do we have the political will, do we have the military power, will we spend the resources required to achieve our aims?

It was very encouraging for me to see the progress achieved in the past year. Thanks to the leadership and personal sacrifice of the hundreds of thousands of men and women of the CENTCOM team and the CIA - the American people are far safer today than we were in the 18 months following the initial intervention.

Barry R McCaffrey
General USA (Ret)
Adjunct Professor of International Affairs
United States Military Academy
West Point, New York

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

DATE 3/26/07

MEMO FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Sir,

I thought you might find this memo from Barry McCaffrey (USA ret.) about Afghanistan both interesting and useful as an independent check on what Trump said by a frequent, well informed critic.

Eric

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3/26/2007 2:32:04 PM



Adjunct Professor of International Affairs

February 26, 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel Michael Meese
Professor and Head Dept of Social Sciences

CC: Colonel Cindy Jebb
Professor and Deputy Head Dept of Social Sciences

SUBJECT: After Action Report—General Barry R McCaffrey USA (Ret)
VISIT AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN 16-23 February 2007

1. PURPOSE: This memo provides feedback on strategic and operational assessment of security operations in both Afghanistan and Pakistan in support of US Central Command. Be glad to provide Faculty Seminar and Cadet Class AAR on this report during this Semester or at your convenience.

2. SOURCES:

A. Afghanistan:

- 1.) US Ambassador Ron Neumann. DCM Richard B. Norland: Lunch/two hour discussion.
- 2.) Gen Dan McNeill, CG NATO ISAF: One-on-one Office Call.
- 3.) Gen Bismullah Khan. Chief Afghan Army: Two Sessions.
- 4.) MG Bob Durbin USA and BG Bill Chambers USAF: Two Sessions -- CSTC-A.
- 5.) MG Dave Rodriguez. CG RC-EAST. (JTF-76) (CG 82nd Abn Div): Office Call and Battle Staff Briefings.
- 6.) MG Steve Layfield USA. NATO ISAF. DCOM Security: Office Call.
- 7.) DR Zalmay Rassoul, Afghan Director of National Security Council (and Staff): Visit/Briefings
- 8.) CG KMTC Training Center: BG Amin Wardak. BG Doug Pritt, CG Task Force Phoenix: Visit/Briefings Kabul Military Training Center --KMTC.
- 9.) Afghan Commanding General: Afghan National Military Command Center. BG Mike Harrison USA and Mentor Team: Visit/Briefings.
- 10.) US Embassy – Country Team Briefing -- DCM, Political Officer, Economic Counselor, Political-Military Affairs Officer, US AID Director and Deputy, INL Director and Deputy.
- 11.) Senior General Officer USSOCOM and C/S. Special Operations: Briefing.



- 12.) INL Director [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] Deputy Program Manager, Afghan Eradication Force: Meeting/Briefings
- 13.) Senior Intelligence Official: One-on-one Meeting.
- 14.) DEA Country Attaché: [REDACTED] and Assistant Attaché [REDACTED] Meeting.
- 15.) MG Durbin, BG Mike Harrison, BG Bill Chambers USAF, BG Greg Young (Canada), BG Tad Buk (Poland), Mr. Tim Muchmore SES: General Officer-- Dinner/Discussion. CSTC-A.
- 16.) [REDACTED]--Director and [REDACTED]--Chief of Analysis: Border Brief. (Joint Intelligence Operations center-Afghanistan).
- 17.) Mr. Michael Metrinko. US Embassy. Senior Advisor for Afghan Parliament: Dinner/Discussions.
- 18.) Mr. David Dobrotka and [REDACTED] Breakfast Meeting. CSTC-A Police Reform Directorate.
- 19.) [REDACTED] and Staff -- US Army Engineer District Afghanistan: Briefing.
- 20.) [REDACTED] Defense Attaché: Briefing.
- 21.) [REDACTED] 10th Mountain Division and Battle Staff: Visit. FOB Salerno. Brigade Commander.
- 22.) [REDACTED] 82nd Abn Division and Battle Staff: Visit. FOB Salerno. Brigade Commander.
- 23.) Mr. Edward M. Smith, Chief of Staff. [REDACTED] Briefing Afghan Reconstruction Group. Border Initiative.

B. Pakistan:

- 1.) DCM Peter Bodde. (Ambassador in US for Senate Confirmation.): Office Call.
- 2.) US Embassy -- Country Team Briefings. Economic Counselor. Political Counselor. DAO.
- 3.) MG Ron Helmley. ODRP: Office Call/Briefings.
- 4.) Senior Intelligence Officials: Separate Briefings.
- 5.) Pakistan Army Vice Chief Gen Hassan Hyat. (Accompanied by MG Helmley.): Office Call/Briefing.
- 6.) Pakistan Director General ISI and Senior Staff. (Accompanied by MG Helmley and Senior US Intelligence Official.): Office call/Briefings.
- 7.) MG Achmed Pasha -- Pakistan Army Director Military Operations and Staff: Office Call/Briefing.
- 8.) Pakistan Air Vice Marshall and two Pakistan Legislators. (Accompanied by MG Helmley): Dinner/seminar.
- 9.) US Delegation and Senior Pakistani Officials: Reception -- DCM Residence.
- 10.) Commander Special Task Force: Briefing.
- 11.) Gave OPD on GWOT to Officers/NCOs/Civilians ODRP and DAO.

3. GENERAL:

The War in Afghanistan has been shamefully under-resourced by DOD throughout the entire intervention in terms of inter-agency involvement, US combat forces, political will, and nation-building resources.

The situation is now turning rapidly for the better:

- We have an expectation of billions of US Congressional dollars for Afghan Reconstruction (26 PRT's now operating effectively—although only the 13 US PRT's have the flexible \$161 million CERP funds available)
- There is a continued crash development of the ANA by the dedicated soldiers and Marines of Task Force Phoenix.
- We expect the arrival this year of thousands of new military and civilian personnel for ANP Police Reform and Mentoring.
- We have the beginnings of a serious drug eradication effort spurred by State Dept INL and reluctantly supported initially by DOD.
- JTF-76 now has an additional US combat brigade (the courageous soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division whose last minute extension gave us the needed immediate edge of combat power).
- The assumption of command of ISAF by US General Dan McNeil, and the transfer of full battle responsibility for the AOR to NATO is a huge boost to our capabilities.
- Finally, US Air Force, Navy, and Army Air Power have kept us afloat for the last year of bitter fighting.

We are now in a race against time. We must deal with: the Taliban (700% increase in IED's---140 suicide bombers last year); the criminals who control much of the ground level governance of the largest narco-state operation in the world; foreign fighters who now plot terrorism against both the Afghan Government and the US ---from sanctuaries in Pakistan's uncontrolled border region as well as the southern and eastern regions of Afghanistan; and finally from the growing disaffection of the suffering people of Afghanistan who lack police, roads, electricity, security, jobs, and belief in their government.

We can, without question, achieve our US national objective of a functioning law-based state -- with a performing, non-drug economy--- which rejects sanctuary for terrorism. This is the cross-over year. The execution of our plan in the coming 24 months will decide the outcome in the country. 90% of the Afghan people (to include the Pashtuns) reject the extremist ideology of the Taliban. They strongly abhor the continuing violence. They are working frantically throughout the country to re-build. They admire and trust their new Army. They are incredibly eager to absorb new lessons, new opportunities. They trust, admire, and protect their Embedded US Trainers. They will support security and progress while remaining a deeply Islamic state. In addition, the Pakistanis are strongly supportive of our goal of a strong, stabilized state.

Rhetoric and political will cannot achieve our goals. Afghanistan needs strong US inter-agency and Congressional support to provide the dollars, equipment, combat soldiers, ANA and ANP mentors, and vigorous NATO and Afghan leadership to pull this mission from the fire.

4. THE ANP and the ANA:

A necessary but not sufficient precondition of US success is the creation of Afghan Security Forces that can shoulder the burden of internal security. At all levels--- the Afghans reiterate that they want their own soldiers carrying the burden of blood and casualties. (ANA unauthorized absence which was 36% is now reduced to 12%) The whole ASF effort has been brilliantly managed by a succession of National Guard units -- and the leadership of the CFC-A and now CSTC-A. (MG Bob Durbin USA has done heroic work.)

We are now beginning a crash ANP effort to get the equipment, trainers, dollars, and supervision for the police: \$2+ billion consisting of --\$1 billion construction--\$700 million equipment to include 12,000 vehicles--\$440 Million training--3500 US Police mentors ... (2500 military and 1000 civilian police mentors). The effort to create the Afghan police is currently grossly under-resourced with 700 US trainers (500 US Police). In Iraq -- we have 7000 US police trainers working on the Iraqi Police. In Kosovo we had 5000 police mentors for 6500 Kosovo Police.

We have no real grasp of what actual ANP presence exists at the 355 District level operations. We have trained 60,000 Afghan police—but we have no idea where they are. We do know that 50% more Afghan police were KIA last year than ANA soldiers. Probably there are non-uniformed, untrained, and largely criminal elements in many of the District Capitals. There are no real jails-- or prosecutors --or judges -- or squad cars. The 34 Provincial level capitals actually do have a uniformed Police presence with a functioning connection to national Police command authority. The ANP presence in some key areas such as Kabul is inadequate... but functioning. There is a new National Police Command Center.

The task of creating 82,000 Afghan Policemen (currently a notional 62,000 force) is a ten year job that we must fully resource. We are now initiating a Police Reform Program which includes assessing the 15,000 officers of the ANP -- and firing half of them. Without effective police -- there cannot be governance. Without effective police -- there cannot be security and counter-insurgency. Without effective police -- there will be no economic reconstruction. The Germans had the lead on this effort. They have done an inadequate job. The German program consists of a few senior German police mentors (40+) of enormous professionalism but few resources.

The ANA is much better postured. They have pride, embedded US trainers, a functioning chain-of-command, a superb combat leader (Gen Bismullah Kahn as CHOD), and rudimentary equipment. They will fight. They are in good physical shape. (Like mountain goats). They are the first element of national unity in 100 years in Afghanistan. They have successfully mixed ethnic formations at all levels. They have been able to discount the factional pull on their unity of purpose. They actually look like great soldiers. However, they have no real national logistics or maintenance system.

The ANA has for all practical purpose no air power---neither helicopter nor fixed wing. We should in my view have a five year program to equip them with 100+ Blackhawks (some equipped as gun ships), 25+ Chinooks, and two dozen C130's/AC130's.

They have no high speed, wheeled, light armor. (They should have three battalions of Stryker combat vehicles.) They have junk small arms and should be equipped with US Army modern automatic weapons. They lack body armor. They lack deployable, modern mortars and light artillery. (This has been the absolute key to keeping US Army combat units alive along the eastern frontier.)

If we want to be out of Afghanistan in 15 years—we need to spend 10 Billion dollars on ANA and ANP equipment over the next five years ---and equip a capable, dominant battle force and law enforcement capability.

5. NATO:

NATO presence in Afghanistan and their current responsibility for all of the national AOR is a political and security triumph. (37 nations and 36,000 troops---15,000 US) The brave Canadians have done well in very stiff combat in Khandahar Province. (We need to get their battalions to the NTC or JRTC for pre-deployment training). The Brit's are as usual superb and well equipped fighters. The Dutch have left the security of Kabul and are operating in Oruzgan Province. Some other Coalition elements have done excellent service—e.g. the French Special Forces Company, Portuguese Infantry Company, etc. The US should be enormously grateful that NATO legitimacy backs our national strategy.

As a general statement, however, the NATO forces are too weak on the ground, lack essential supporting elements (helicopters, engineers, logistics, intelligence), have severely restrictive rules-of-engagement, and may lack the national political will to fight when required. It is possible that the Taliban will try to knock one or more of these NATO nations out of the war. A major blow to the Italians, the Canadians, the Dutch, the Spanish, or the Germans might shatter their weak domestic political support.

The greatest value of NATO is their Command and Control presence--- the ISAF Headquarters. In my view, it is essential that the US retain the Commander position. The US will continue to provide the bulk of the useful ground combat power, air power, economic reconstruction, and trainers for the ANA and ANP. There is long NATO tradition of allowing the US to retain command where we provide essential resources.

General McNeil is tough, experienced, smart, and can command the respect of the assigned military forces. He now has 19+ NATO Generals ---with more soon to arrive (a Polish three star is expected). All of these senior officers are

extremely talented and dedicated officers. The NATO Allies should rotate the Deputy and other positions—not the commander.

SACEUR should consider eliminating their intervening level of NATO command supervision. There is little value added.

6. PAKISTAN:

The Pakistanis are in a very difficult political and military situation. Their domestic reputation as an Army for professionalism and valor is all that holds together the four nations of Pakistan under one weak state. They have never controlled the FATA areas. The 80,000 troops they put into the FATA have suffered hundreds of killed and wounded. They are still there. They have never controlled Baluchistan outside of the urban areas without concentrated military force. They are a poor country with a very effective Army--- (Partially our military responsibility. We do support them with \$100 million a month. However, we need to provide the support needed to actually control their borders and the chaos of their frontier regions).

In my view, the Pakistanis are NOT actively supporting the Taliban ---nor do they have a strategic purpose to destabilize Afghanistan. There is a history of support for the Taliban among the Pakistani Army. The Taliban are in many respects neither Afghans nor Pakistanis---they are Pashtuns wearing Black turbans and baggy pants—with AK47's and with an aversion to foreigners (US or Pakistani Army). 27 million Pashtuns live on both sides of the border—60 tribes—80% in desperate poverty, 19% literacy, three million are Afghan refugees in Pakistan living right along the frontier. The Duran Line does not exist as a recognized political division in the view of the many tribes which dominate the frontier regions.

The Pakistanis need better US support for COIN operations in South and North Waziristan. We need to sort out a set of strategic tools to help them do better. They immediately require the \$395 million they have requested for their Frontier Corps. It will be a disaster for our strategic purpose if we push them to premature military action which destroys them as a unifying and stabilizing force in the region.

Pakistan is in many respects our most important ally in the global struggle against terrorism. Their economy is booming, poverty is being reduced, and the economy is trying to diversify. President Musharraf must face an election in 2007. He is the most democratic leader in Pakistan history. The control of the Army has been traditionally the only form of continued legitimate political power in Pakistan. The Army is the only load-bearing institution. The Police are corrupt. The lower courts are intimidated. (The higher court system is very capable).

The people trust and admire the Army more than any other institution. The ISI is also essentially an extension of the Army. Some of the national business elite are from the Army. The political parties have been ineffective or dangerous--- (personality not policy based, corrupt, extreme, and incompetent). Politics in Pakistan until Musharaff has been about political families and their struggle for power.

The US will miss our brilliant US Ambassador Ryan Crocker during the coming crucial 24 months. We must continue to strongly support democratic reform--- but not to forget the vital US national objectives at stake in Pakistan in the immediate future.

7. US COMBAT UNITS:

The most important single factor in Afghanistan--without which nothing else is possible— is the reality of the enormous courage, aggressiveness, discipline, and flexibility of US combat forces. No one inside the Washington Beltway actually understands the gravity of this finding. It is assumed to be what happens when you reach for the military tool. This is no accident. It is a function of NCO and Officer leadership--- and the decade long exposure to combat and stability operations of the Joint Forces team in the Balkans, Desert Storm, Iraq II, Afghanistan, and the many other theaters in which US air, sea, and land power operate.

These troops are the best combat force we have ever fielded. They are physically and mentally tough. Their OPSEC is unbelievable (one of the major historical weaknesses of the US Army). Many are now on their third or even fourth combat tour. They know their business cold. They know each other from repeated deployments in the same units.

They have solved the Joint interoperability problems with air power, artillery, and logistics at a tactical level. The commanders are incredibly experienced at company, battalion, and brigade. The generals grew up together in combat and trust each other. (The current Afghan deployed US Army force is the paratrooper--light infantry cult. They are self-actualizing).

The Joint Force fundamental combat skills are awesome. I don't think they understand how good they are. The primary reason that US casualties number in the hundreds killed and maimed -- instead of the thousands -- is the enormous tactical skill of these battle forces. They can employ all elements of combat power in a synergistic manner. The enormously responsive and massively shaky logistics system actually works that operates thru the Port of Karachi and with the dedicated support of US contractors.

US Air Force and Naval air power is the monster combat multiplier. We have employed three times the tonnage of ordnance in Afghanistan as in Iraq. Small diameter bombs and GPS guidance have revolutionized the effectiveness of Close Air Support. B1 bombers have become a strategic tool with tactical application.

C130's give us enormous operational mobility in-country. C17's bring US logistics to the end-of-the-earth in near real time. Air drop now puts heavy drop re-supply into infantry platoon positions at 5000 feet mountain locations with 50 meter accuracy ---from drop altitudes out of ground fire vulnerability. (4 1/2 million lbs dropped last year).

UAV brings persistent eyes on the extended battlefield -- and instant death without warning to small elements of the Taliban or al-Qaeda. Satellite communications are central to command and control. The superb in-country medical treatment is backed up by instant, medically supported air evac to Germany for definitive care. Army aviation is central to every function of ground combat.

This is the worst flying weather and environment on the face of the earth. Air power is the key to tactical success in this operational environment.

8. THE SOCOM STRATEGIC CAPABILITY:

The special operations forces (both regular and black SOF) are a strategic tool of enormous value. By themselves they cannot win the nation's wars. With them -- we can fight an entirely different campaign which is targeted, relatively lower cost, and with relatively lower casualty rate. However, we are busting up these strategic assets at a very high rate with killed, wounded, and injured.

Most importantly--these Air-ground-sea special operations forces can locate and kill or capture terrorist groups operating in a covert manner in both urban and rural terrain while minimizing impact on innocent populations. These are the most dangerous people on the face of the earth.

These SOCOM forces are very difficult to recruit, train, and optimize for a given operational area. We need to significantly expand this strategic tool. The SOCOM air power elements are incredibly costly to create and train. The development of Special Forces ground operators are similar to the time and cost of a program to develop high performance aircraft.

We need to take a revolutionary look at the methods of creating these "Tier One" forces. It will require a separately funded recruiting program similar to WWII OSS programs to identify college graduates, with superb athletic skills, who will volunteer for a 24 month training program (to include total immersion language training in Arabic or Dari) ---followed by a four year employment tour. The financial recruiting incentives of this program would have to reflect the strategic value of the effort to national security. We cannot continue to just find these kinds of operators in the general Army population. The Rangers are already running a separate program that is working reasonably well.

9. ROADS AND NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION:

The central key to winning the war in Afghanistan is economic reconstruction and employment. This requires roads to each Provincial capital, roads to each District capital, cross-border economic transportation roads and rail, electrical power, clean water, a simple but workable educational system, a rudimentary health care system (preventive health and health education), and agricultural reform.

The current system has been badly organized, marked by US governmental turf battles, badly resourced, and has poor oversight. The allies provide inadequate help. (The Saudis and Japanese are an exception). The Indian and Iranian help is viewed as a strategic threat rather than an incorporated value added. We do not exploit for IO purposes the effective work that we have completed. (Total of \$1.97 billion of US Army Engineer work---\$4.50 billion total work).

Fortunately -- help is on the way. If Congress acts ---we should see \$10.6 billion in economic and military aid approved for the Afghans. (The EU has pledged \$780 million in aid for Afghanistan over the next four years.) We must lose the "Expeditionary" mindset. Reconstruction in this destroyed nation is going to take 25 years. We should consolidate all reconstruction activity (State, DOD, USAID, PRT) under a US Army Engineer Major General with an adequate staff and contractor support. This is a turf issue of enormous sensitivity—but only the Army Engineer Corps can marshal the management expertise to work in a dangerous security environment such as Afghanistan.

10. THE DRUG ISSUE:

Afghanistan is now a narco-state. The opium/heroin take is \$3.1 billion -- which is 1/3 of the GNP. The British have the lead for the program and are not adequately resourced for the effort. There is no single unifying leadership for the US nor international effort. President Karzai gets no unified support from the international community—many urge him to ignore the drug eradication program.

Ambassador Ann Patterson at State Department is trying valiantly to organize our governmental effort with grudging support from other departments. We have a superb INL Director on the ground in Afghanistan. [REDACTED] There is a very small but capable DEA presence (7 Agents with intermittent support from six month deployed FAST teams.) There is a battalion-sized Afghan Eradication Force which operates with rudimentary equipment and funding—under frequent fire and with continuing casualties.

In my view, we must support the counter-drug effort as a key to achieving stable government in Afghanistan. This should be a 10,000 man ANP program ---supported by a \$250 million INL program---with an in-country presence of 200+ DEA agents with primary training and operational responsibility for all law enforcement operations.

If we do not get a serious and sustained effort on counter-drug operations—in my view we will fail to achieve our objectives in Afghanistan.

11. SUMMARY:

The Afghan economy is booming at 12% growth rate a year. \$14 billion has been spent on aid since 2001. Six TV channels and a hundred free/uncensored publications are available to the people. Literacy is increasing rapidly. The ring road is now 2/3 complete. The 40,000 soldiers of the ANA are growing rapidly in numbers and capability. There are 45,000 NATO and US troops in-country. There is a functioning democracy with an elected Parliament ---and a serious, dedicated Afghan President in office.

Afghanistan can be a strategic victory in the struggle against terrorism. We are now on the right path.

Barry R. McCaffrey
General USA (Ret)
Adjunct Professor of International Affairs
USMA, West Point, NY.

1 Page Denied in Full

FOIA Exemption (b)(5)

P A R A



Public Affairs Research and Analysis

Military Analysts - Gitmo Trip Wrap-Up

(Media Coverage: June 24 – July 5)

Summary

Coverage of the military analyst visit to Guantanamo included 37 known articles or interviews across television, print, online and radio outlets. Military analyst Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Cucullu had the most coverage followed by Major General Shepperd and then Colonel Jacobs. Themes were consistent with last week's topics as follows:

Prisoner/Guard Abuse

- Most abuse is either toward U.S. military personnel and/or between prisoners
- U.S. military guards are regularly threatened by prisoners
- Some analysts stated there may have been past abuses at Gitmo but not now

Prisoner Interrogations

- Interrogators are building relationships with prisoners, not torturing them
- We are still gaining valuable information from prisoners
- Interrogations are very professionally run

Quality of Prisoner Care

- Soldiers go out of their way to accommodate Islamic practices by providing prayer rugs, Korans and directional arrows pointing toward Mecca
- Dietary needs of prisoners are taken into consideration and medical care is provided

Closing Gitmo


- Gitmo exceeds Geneva Convention requirements
- We should not close this facility and let dangerous terrorists out

Analyst Feedback


- Analysts felt criticism of DoD is unfair and misguided
- DoD should have been more open about Gitmo sooner
- Analyst tour is "long overdue" and there is "nothing to be ashamed of"
- Television media has outdated images of Gitmo (i.e. showed a rundown facility)

COVERAGE BY MEDIA OUTLET

of ARTICLES OR INTERVIEWS



Amount of Coverage per Analyst



No Known Post-Trip Commentary

- > Colonel Tim J. Eads
- > Colonel Glenn Lackey
- > Retired CIA – Wayne Simmons
(Quoted within a Gordon Cucullu piece)

SUMMARY OF MEDIA COVERAGE

(*Indicates new media not covered in last report)

General Montgomery Meigs

Television

WNBC-NY (NBC) - Today

6/25/2005 7:08:07 AM

- > General discussion of Gitmo structural changes, prisoner treatment and Red Cross interviews of detainees. Also talked about whether Gitmo should continue to detain prisoners.

MSNBC News Live

6/25/2005 11:20:12 AM

- > Discussed the quality of the facilities, prisoner interrogations and Red Cross involvement. Also commented on the professionalism of the military personnel at Gitmo and believes DoD is doing the “right thing” at Gitmo.

MSNBC*

6/27/2005 3:24:11 PM

- Spoke of the numerous changes at Gitmo. For example, building rapport with prisoners, the high quality of food and facility improvements in comparison to past conditions.

Command Sergeant Major Steven Greer

(Fox News interview on Saturday, June 25; not available)

Television

Fox News -- Fox and Friends Sunday

6/26/2005 9:45:13 AM

- Emphasized that interrogations are built on rapport rather than torture and that the food quality is good. Also discussed the fact that prisoners attack military guards.

Major General Donald W. Shepperd

(Radio interviews ABC Radio - New York and CNN Radio this Weekend: not available)

Print/Online:

Visit offers glimpse into Guantanamo

(CNN.com; online CNN article by General Donald Shepperd) – July 1

- Criticism of DoD is unfair and misjudged. Gitmo replicates military justice systems (i.e. military tribunals) and is modeled after U.S. prisons. "Certainly no gulag."

Television:

CNN -- American Morning

6/27/2005 9:14:57 AM

- Discussed guards' professionalism, the quality of facilities and interrogation techniques (i.e. building relationships with prisoners).

Live from CNN

6/24/05 2:50 PM

- Gitmo is a modern prison system with dedicated guards and interrogators who know what they're doing. Stated that analysts had access to multiple parts of the facility despite the fact that it was a DoD sponsored trip.

CNNEU* - CNN Europe

6/27/2005 4:21:29 PM

- Military commissions are going on right now. U.S. guards are angry that Gitmo is being portrayed in a negative fashion in the media. Early abuses have been "cleaned-up."

Colonel Jack Jacobs

(MSNBC interview – June 26; not available)

Television

MSNBC

6/26/2005 9:35:56 AM

- He did not get any sense of abuse taking place. Stated that the DoD needs to be more proactive about its Gitmo PR efforts. Valuable and actionable intelligence is still being collected.

MSNBC

6/26/2005 10:38:56 AM

- DoD has been very accommodating to Islamic practices at the Gitmo facilities (i.e. prayer rugs, ritually slaughtered meat, etc.) and conditions are changing for the better.

MSNBC

6/26/2005 11:47:47 AM

- Observed "relationship building" between the detainees and guards and discussed the high quality of the Gitmo facilities.

MSNBC*

6/29/2005 3:32:44 PM

- Mentions there may have been abuse in the past but not now. Discussed the high quality of the facility and the fact that there is still new information being gathered.

Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Cucullu

(Articles: The Walton Reporter – New York; Democracy Project; The Right Approach
Radio: WABC - New York City, Dennis Prager - Los Angeles, KKLA - Los Angeles, KABB - Los Angeles, Greg Allen - Tampa, WMET - Washington, D.C, KFI - Los Angeles, KTFK - St. Louis, Liberty Broadcasting – Nationally Syndicated, True North Radio – Waterbury (VT), Greg Allen Show - Tampa – Not Available)

Print/Online

Interrogations at GITMO: Breaking Stereotypes...*

(The One Republic Journal; Gordon Cucullu) – July 5

- Observed interrogations while visiting Guantanamo and spoke of the importance of building rapport with the detainees. New information continues to be collected from detainees. Was impressed by the professionalism of the facility personnel at the camp.

Abuse at Guantanamo: Reporting on a visit to Gitmo...*

(The One Republic Journal; Gordon Cucullu) – June 28

- Attacks on American service members from prisoners are common. Inspection of cells indicated "a far cry from the harshness of American maximum security prisons." "Combatants are evil and dangerous."

Mothering Terrorists at Gitmo *

(FrontPageMagazine.com ; Gordon Cucullu) – June 28

- Prisoners receive a 2,600-calorie diet. Facility personnel and guards are regularly attacked and gaining information continues to be a challenge. He commended personnel at the Gitmo facility.

What I Saw at Gitmo

(FrontPageMagazine.com; Gordon Cucullu) – June 27

- Observed interrogations and commented on the quality of medical care. He also pointed out that the Korans handed out all have protective cases.

Television

Fox News - Fox and Friends First

6/27/2005 6:23:12 AM

- Discussed the morale of prison guards despite public criticism of how the Gitmo facility is run. Continue to build relationships with prisoners to gain actionable intelligence. The camp continues to serve its purpose.

Fox News* - Dayside with Linda Vester

6/29/2005 1:42:06 PM

- Dangerous detainees regularly threaten guards and interrogations are necessary in order to gain continued intelligence.

Major Dana R. Dillon

Print/Online

Model Gitmo: Very far away from anything Amnesty claims.*

(National Review; Dana Dillon) – July 1

- Detainees are treated humanely and just. The Pentagon is holding U.S. personnel who have previously mistreated prisoners accountable. The detention operations at Gitmo play a “vital role” in the war on terror.

Lieutenant Colonel Robert Maginnis

Print/Online

Commentary & News Briefs

(Agape Press; Compiled by Jody Brown quoting Robert Maginnis on Gitmo) – June 27

- Observed the interrogation process and was impressed with the level of professionalism at the camp. New intelligence is surfacing all the time.

12 Pages Denied in Full

FOIA Exemption (b)(5)

December 12, 2005

**READ AHEAD FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD RUMSFELD
LUNCHEON MEETING WITH THE FORMERS**

Date/Time: Tuesday, December 13, 2005 12:30 p.m. to 1:30 p.m.

Location: Secretary of Defense Conference Room (3E729)

Audience:

- Confirmed attendees are Frank Carlucci III, William Cohen, Robert McNamara, James Schlesinger, William Webster and Jim Woolsey.
- You last met with roughly this same group July 28, 2005.

Media:

- Meeting is closed to the media.
- Comments should be considered on background. However, you may go off-the-record as you see fit.

Timeline:

- 11:15 a.m. Welcome and Introduction
Allison Barber, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
- 11:16 a.m. Update on Quadrennial Defense Review
Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England
- 11:45 a.m. Update on the Global War on Terror (Military Ops)
General Peter Pace, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- 12:15 p.m. Break (buffet lunch served in the Secretary's dining room)
- 12:30 p.m. Luncheon Discussion and Questions with Secretary Rumsfeld
- 1:30 p.m. Luncheon Meeting Concludes

Background:

- Deputy Secretary England will update attendees on Quadrennial Defense Review (key themes/transforming global posture) issues.
- General Pace will discuss progress in the global war on terror (broad strokes with the majority of the time spent on fielding questions).

OSD 00329-06

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- After a brief break, you will join the group for lunch and open the floor to questions:

Potential Topics: --Iraqi elections
--Increased Sunni participation in the Iraqi election
--Troop levels
--Pessimism in the elite media

- Luncheon meeting to conclude by 1:30 p.m.

Attachments:

- Recent Media and Key Comments to Date

Tab A

COMMENTS TO DATE

FRANK CARLUCCI

Co-authored a letter about "Turkey on the right path" to the Washington Times on Oct. 4

Relevant Sections: As a Turk and an American, we join in seeking to straighten out the record in the face of Frank Gaffney's gratuitous and mischievous diatribe against Turkey ("No' to Islamist Turkey," Commentary, Sept. 27). ...

Without attempting to correct every erroneous statement, we make a few points:

- * Turkey repeatedly has been a target of "Islamofascist" terrorism in the past few years. To suggest that it would knowingly tolerate "green" capital to fund this same terrorism is an accusation that falls of its own weight. ...
- * The state-controlled imam hatip schools were undersubscribed this year because of changes in the law that made it harder for graduates of those schools to continue to higher education.
- * There is no way to turn a secular court in Turkey into an instrument of "Shari'a" law any more than it is possible for U.S. courts to subvert the separation of church and state. Both would need a constitutional change that is not being contemplated anywhere.
- * The Turkish media has never been as free as it is today. Turkey is one of the very few democracies in the Middle East.
- * Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is not pushing the media into anti-Americanism. ...

WILLIAM COHEN

CNN, THE SITUATION ROOM 4:00 PM EST

Host: Wolf Blitzer

December 5, 2005 Monday

But does the defense secretary have it right? Is the situation in Iraq much better than it would seem?

Joining us now, our world affairs analyst, the former Defense Secretary himself **William Cohen**. He's chairman of CEO of the Cohen Group here in Washington.

Are we getting an accurate picture of what's happening on the ground?

WILLIAM COHEN, CNN WORLD AFFAIRS ANALYST: Well, it's hard to say. It depends on who you talk to.

I think what Secretary Rumsfeld was saying is the old adage, if it bleeds, it leads. And that's something that media will focus upon, that is, the -- the violent tragedies and afflictions of casualties upon the -- American military.

On the other hand, there are some positive things taking place. And that is, Iraqis going to the polls once again. They have reaffirmed their constitution, ratified it as such. And, so, there are some progress -- there is progress being made.

But I think what any secretary likes to see, especially at a time of war, is that you get a more complete picture, which you necessarily don't get on a day-to-day basis. But, overall, I think what he's asking for is a little more perspective, a wider perspective. But you can't discount the fact that we're fighting and dying on a daily basis. And that's something that's going to continue to be in the news, whatever the criticisms directed toward the media.

BLITZER: In the past, whenever government officials, Democrats or Republicans, go after news media, it seems to suggest, at least to a lot of observers, that it's not going well for them, and they are just blaming the news media, which seems like an appropriate scapegoat.

COHEN: Well, there's some element to that. But, on the other hand...

BLITZER: Did you used to do that when you were defense secretary?

(LAUGHTER)

COHEN: Well, I didn't have the same situation, certainly.

But, during the Kosovo campaign, we had the -- the same kind of criticism. What's happening? Why aren't you progressing more rapidly? It's been going on 30 days, 40 days, 50 days. Where is the victory in sight? And, so, we had to contend with that as well. And I think it's a normal reaction to say, could we have a little more patience, a little more perspective?

But, again, you're not going to cut off the stories about those violent images of tanks being blown up and kids being killed and dismembered. So, it's -- it's going to be with us. And I think what Secretary Rumsfeld is trying to get, a little more perspective, but it's going to be hard to come by.

BLITZER: How difficult of a mission does Condoleezza Rice, the secretary of state, have in Europe right now, dealing with this war on terror?

COHEN: Well, she's got a difficult mission.

She's trying to establish better relations between the United States and Germany, with building a better support anchor with NATO to help us out in Iraq and elsewhere. And the -- the -- the questions whether or not there have been renditions is going to continue to -- to drag alongside beside her.

What she has tried to put that to -- to -- aside. I think it's going to be difficult, because, number one, we still have the Abu Ghraib scandal hanging over this issue, so -- and we still have the White House refusing Senator McCain's legislation. And, so, that makes it much more difficult for her.

But she has tried to -- to deal with this as -- as straightforward as she can, recognizing that she can't really single out which countries are helping or which countries are not, because then it becomes a question for their local constituency: Are you helping the United States? Are you not helping the United States? Very difficult for her to do that.

BLITZER: Secretary Cohen, thanks for joining us...

COHEN: Pleasure.

BLITZER: ... as usual.

CNN, THE SITUATION ROOM 3:00 PM EST

Host: Wolf Blitzer

November 28, 2005 Monday

Let's get some more now on air power, possibly a replacement for U.S. boots on the ground, as they call it.

Let's turn to a member of our CNN Security Council, the former Defense Secretary **William Cohen**. He's chairman and CEO of The Cohen Group here in Washington.

You -- I assume you have had a chance to read the Seymour Hersh article. When you were in charge of the Pentagon, you used airpower very effectively in Bosnia and Kosovo, without deploying huge numbers of American troops. Is that a realistic option in Iraq against an insurgency of this nature?

WILLIAM COHEN, CNN WORLD AFFAIRS ANALYST: No. Airpower is not an effective use of power against an insurgency. You do need boots on the ground.

And the notion that, somehow, it would be a substitution, I think, is simply a -- a wrong choice and one that I don't think the military will make. I think everybody ought to go back and read H.R. McMaster's book about dereliction of duty. In my judgment, were the military to agree to substitute air power for boots on the ground in fighting an insurgency, that would be tantamount to a dereliction of duty.

I think that they proceeding a path that they have anticipated they are going to reduce the size of the force by next spring and into the summer. There will still be a significant force left over, but I don't think that the military has ever planned to simply substitute air power and turn that over, the oversight of the intelligence, to the -- to the Iraqis. I think that would be a -- a fatal mistake for us.

You cannot win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people by driving precision-guided steel into those hearts and minds.

BLITZER: The president is delivering another what -- what the White House calls major speech on Wednesday, in which he's going to be making the case that things are moving in the right direction. How far does he need to go to convince the American public right now that things are moving ahead in a positive way?

COHEN: Well, I think he has to show that the elections are going to take place, that we are going to see a spike in the -- the number are of troops that are there to help provide security for that period of time.

And then I think he has to go about, systematically, staying a course on which there is going to be a reduction and a turning over of responsibility in a large -- in a large factor to the Iraqi people.

We're seeing more officers come into the -- the armed forces now. The process of cleaning out

all the Baathists has now been reversed. So, they're bringing in young captains and -- and others into the force. So, more manpower is coming in. More responsibility will be turned over, over a period of time. And I think the president has to do that, also holding on to a coalition of Capitol Hill. He can't do this by fireside chats, as Jack was suggesting before, commenting on -- on Senator Warner.

He's got to have support of key members of Capitol Hill. He can still do that if he makes an outreach to them.

BLITZER: He doesn't have the support of retired U.S. Lieutenant General William Odom, who was on "AMERICAN MORNING" earlier today with some very harsh words.

Listen to this.

COHEN: OK.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

RETIRED LIEUTENANT GENERAL WILLIAM ODOM, HUDSON INSTITUTE: We're causing the civil war. We are slowly turning the country over to the Shiites, which will become -- they will turn the country into an Islamic republic, very much as Iran.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

BLITZER: Now, that -- that's a pretty dire prediction, which a lot of people believe is possible. But the president certainly doesn't.

COHEN: There's always that possibility.

It's one of the great fears, that we are simply -- the United States is waging a war on behalf of the Shia, who are going to take over and continue that civil war, and then be in -- work in conjunction with an Iran that would be supporting them. That's a great fear.

We have got to try to continue to prevent that from taking place as best we can. No one can predict the future with any certainty. But, hopefully, that will not occur. But the president, at this point, has very limited options. He's got to, again, persuade the American people that we have to see this through, working with key members of Congress. You have Jack Murtha, who has set down a -- a -- certainly, a marker, saying out in six months, or at least we move to Kuwait in six months.

You have got John McCain saying, stay the course, put more troops in. The truth and the reality is going to lie somewhere in between, where you will see a reduction of the troops and a gradual reduction of American forces over a period of time.

BLITZER: William Cohen, as usual, thanks very much.

ROBERT MCNAMARA

Urged End to nuclear weapons urged; asked wants churches to act (from an AP article of Nov. 12)

Calling the spread of nuclear arms the greatest threat to the world today, a former U.S. defense secretary called on religious groups to lead the push for global nuclear disarmament. Robert McNamara said the United States no longer needs its arsenal of thousands of nuclear weapons.

"It's immoral, it's illegal, it's militarily unnecessary, it's very, very dangerous in terms of accidental usage," McNamara told a forum on nuclear perils last night at the Catholic Cathedral of the Assumption in downtown Louisville.

He said more religious groups need to do what the nation's Roman Catholic bishops did in 1983 - issue informed, urgent calls for nuclear disarmament.

Excerpt on the same topic from NPR's "Talk of the Nation" on Nov. 8

Sometimes I'm asked to characterize US and NATO nuclear policies, weapons deployments and policies in one sentence, and this is the reply I give: Their policies--US and NATO--are immoral, illegal, military unnecessary, very, very dangerous in terms of the risk of accidental use, as somebody mentioned; it's even greater risk in Russia than it is here. And they're destructive to the non-proliferation regime. They make no sense whatsoever. And it's time to change it.

JAMES SCHLESINGER

"None of the reviews found evidence that torture and abuse were part of any service wide policy. Yet critics note that each of the reviews was initiated by the Pentagon, and they note that certain questionable interrogation techniques migrated from one detention facility to another. The review by former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger concluded that the scandal went beyond a few rogue soldiers: "There is both institutional and personal responsibility at higher levels."

Christian Science Monitor, December 8, 2005

How common is US abuse of detainees?

By: Mark Sappenfield Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

James Schlesinger – who served as CIA director in the Nixon administration, defense secretary in the Nixon and Ford administrations, and energy secretary in the Carter administration – said the nation is already "plagued by energy insecurity."

In testimony this month before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Schlesinger urged lawmakers to begin preparing for declining supplies and increasing prices in the coming decades. "We are faced with the possibility of a major economic shock and the political unrest that would ensue," he said.

Plain Dealer (Cleveland), November 27, 2005

Chasing efficiency; Clock is ticking on production peak, experts say

Byline: John Funk and Chris Seper, Plain Dealer Reporters

WILLIAM WEBSTER

U.S. Newswire

October 18, 2005 Tuesday 11:35 AM EST

Judge William Webster, the only person to serve as director of the FBI and CIA, received the William J. Donovan Award, named in honor of the founder of World War II's Office of Strategic Services, from The OSS Society at its 63rd anniversary dinner on October 15, 2005 in Arlington, VA.

Previous recipients of the Donovan Award include former Presidents Bush and Reagan, William Casey, William Colby, Margaret Thatcher, Ralph Bunche, and Admiral Lord Mountbatten.

The award is given to individuals who have made significant contributions to the cause of freedom and to the security of the United States exemplified by Major General William "Wild Bill" Donovan, the founder of OSS and a World War I Medal of Honor winner.

The OSS Society celebrates the historic achievements of the Office of Strategic Services, America's first central intelligence agency, and educates the public regarding the importance of strategic intelligence to our national security.

JIM WOOLSEY

Interview by John Gibson on "The Big Story" – Fox – Dec. 9

GIBSON: An al Qaeda prisoner who told Egyptian interrogators about ties between Iraq and the terror network al Qaeda reportedly says he made it up in order to avoid being roughed up. The White House used his testimony to help make its case to go to war in Iraq. So, how can we rely on crucial evidence if it is gained from foreign interrogations, as this one was?

Let's ask former CIA director James Woolsey. So, Mr. Woolsey, with all good intentions, the Americans said, "Well, what did you get from your interrogation of this guy?" And I guess it was the Egyptians -- right -- said, "Well, we got X, Y, and Z." Should the Americans always say, "You guys apply techniques that we would not, maybe even you hurt people or torture them, we're not going to believe you"?

JAMES WOOLSEY, FORMER CIA DIRECTOR: Well, we shouldn't turn people over for torture, and it's my understanding from what Condi Rice has said that we don't.

But this is a more complex story than that. Doug Jeil (ph) in a column this morning, the "New York Times" story that went into this said that Mr. al-Libbi was questioned three times.

First of all, when we captured him and we questioned him, he said there was some connection between Iraq and al Qaeda. Then we gave him to the Egyptians apparently and with them he said there were a lot of connections between Iraq and al Qaeda. And then the third time, now, we've questioned him again and he says he made the whole thing up. So two of those three times he was lying. I'm not sure anybody knows which two of the three were lies.

GIBSON: Well, what do you do about this? Especially if you have to rely on a foreign intelligence service to question somebody, at least somewhere along the way, and we know they won't adhere to standards demanded by the U.S. Congress. **GIBSON:** An al Qaeda prisoner who told Egyptian interrogators about ties between Iraq and the terror network al Qaeda reportedly says he made it up in order to avoid being roughed up.

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So two of those three times he was lying. I'm not sure anybody knows which two of the three were lies.

GIBSON: Well, what do you do about this? Especially if you have to rely on a foreign intelligence service to question somebody, at least somewhere along the way, and we know they won't adhere to standards demanded by the U.S. Congress. So what do you do?

WOOLSEY: Well, we shouldn't turn people over to other countries to question, to be tortured.

But under some circumstances it's reasonable to turn people back to their home countries, particularly I think for questioning, and Condi Rice has done a good job of explaining the reasons for that in Europe.

I don't think there's anything really extraordinary about that.

GIBSON: Yes, but as the CIA director, when you were presented with information that -- let's just say you were -- from this kind of interrogation, a guy ends up in the hands of a friendly foreign service, he's interrogated, they come back and they give you raw information, do you look at it with a high degree of skepticism?

WOOLSEY: Well, this didn't happen when I was there.

The only rendition we had was we caught Kansi, who had killed two CIA officers outside our gates, and that was a cooperative deal between the FBI and the CIA and Pakistani intelligence. And we brought him back and had him prosecuted.

So we -- this issue really didn't arise when I was director and, frankly, I'm not sure of the details of any regulations and so forth that may have been drafted up in the meantime.

GIBSON: But do you have a natural tendency to not believe stuff that comes from an intelligence service that -- where you're not sure how they do handle interrogations?

WOOLSEY: Well, again, we ought not to give people over to be tortured.

But we rely on so-called intelligence liaison services, that is friendly and sometimes only a little bit friendly intelligence services like, say, the Chinese, for a lot of information all the time and they rely on us.

And different countries rely on each other.

There's a huge traffic in information going back between intelligence services around the world below the level of diplomatic exchanges and sometimes between countries that really are very much at odds diplomatically or strategically.

So, you know, I don't think there's a single rule about it. The policy ought to be we don't turn people over to someone to be tortured.

But you have to make a judgment in individual cases based on triangulating from other things that you hear about from other sources.

GIBSON: Lastly, Mr. Woolsey, just because Mr. Libbi says he lied about connections between Iraq and al Qaeda, does that mean there weren't any?

WOOLSEY: No. I mean, that's the third thing he said.

The first thing he told us was that there were connections. And then he told the Egyptians there were a lot of connections. I don't know which of those times he was lying.

I personally believe there were some connections between Iraq and al Qaeda, quite possibly not involving 9/11.

But it's a long and rather convoluted story. But I don't think one should jump to the conclusion that there was no cooperation at all between Iraq and al Qaeda -- certainly there was between Zarqawi of al Qaeda and Iraq under Saddam, and I think there were probably other incidents. So what do you do?

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
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Date	Secretary	Deputy	OPR	OSR	Description	
1-Dec-05	X		USD(P)		Stop-by US-Mongolia Bilateral Consultative Council h/b Richard Lawless	S
1-Dec-05	X		DBB		Defense Business Board	U
2-Dec-05	X		ASD(PA)		Community Group Outreach	U
2-Dec-05	X		CJCS		Stop-by CJCS Luncheon with UK CHOD	U
2-Dec-05	X	X			- ODR Budget Meeting w/OSD, CJCS/V, Jonas, Berkson, Szemborski	U
3-Dec-05	X		USD(P)	Protocol	Meeting with Minister Taro Aso, MoFA Japan	U
3-Dec-05	X		ASD(PA)		Pentagon Memorial Briefing	U
5-Dec-05	X		USD(P)		Remarks ("Future of Iraq") to John Hopkins, Paul H. Nitze, SAIS	U
5-Dec-05	X		USD(P)		Senior Level Review Group (SLRG)	U
5-Dec-05	X		USD(P)	Protocol	Honor Cordon & Working Lunch w/His Excellency Avelino Cruz, Philippines	U
6-Dec-05	X		Protocol		Dinner (h/o the Official 2005 SEDM Ministerial	C
6-Dec-05	X		USD(P)	Protocol	Honor Cordon & Meeting with the Minister of National Defense, Poland	S
7-Dec-05	X		USD(P)	Protocol	Meeting with AMB Turki al-Faisal, Saudi Arabia	S
8-Dec-05	X		USD(P)	Protocol	Meeting with the People Republic of China Executive Minister	S
8-Dec-05	X		ASD(LA)		Congressional Engagement	S
8-Dec-05		X	USD(P)		Mig w/CFC-A Commander, Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry	S
9-Dec-05		X	ASD(LA)		Mig w/ Senator Susan Collins (R-ME)	S
9-Dec-05	X		Protocol		Army Hosted Welcoming Ceremony for Waller Reed Patients	U
9-Dec-05	X		DPB		Defense Policy Board	U
9-Dec-05	X		USD(P)		Senior Level Review Group (SLRG)	S
10-Dec-05	X		USD(P)		HSC Exercise w/McHale & Haynes, EEOB	U
12-Dec-05	X		OSB		DSB Task Force on Nuclear Capabilities- Outbrief	U
12-Dec-05	X		USD(P)	Protocol	Meeting with Minister Oscar Maura, MoFA, Peru	S
12-Dec-05	X		USD(P&R)		Mig w/Dr. Louis Sullivan Chairman President's Board of Advisors on HBCUS	U
13-Dec-05	X		ASD(PA)		Luncheon Meeting with the Formers	U
14-Dec-05	X		ASD(LA)	AT&L	Phone call with Senator Rick Santorum (R-PA)	U
14-Dec-05	X	X	USD(P&R)		Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC)	S
15-Dec-05	X		ASD(PA)		Pentagon "Town Hall" Meeting, Army Auditorium	U
16-Dec-05	X		USD(P)	Protocol	Meeting with Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, President-Elect, Liberia	U
16-Dec-05	X	X	USD(P)		Meeting with AMB Turki Al-Faisal, Saudi AMB to the U.S.	U
16-Dec-05	X	X	USD(AT&L)		Pre US-UK Bilateral Defense Acquisition Committee (BDAC) Mig	U
16-Dec-05	X		Protocol		Meet and Greet w/Walter Reed Patients and Family	U
16-Dec-05	X	X	USD(P)	Protocol	Meeting with Minister Bezhuashvili, MoFA, Georgia	S
16-Dec-05	X	X	ASD(PA)		Radio Interviews	U
19-Dec-05	X	X	USD(P)	Protocol	Mig w/Bill Jeffrey, Mod Permanent Under Secy of State, UK	S
19-Dec-05	X		USD(P)	Protocol	Honor Cordon and Meeting w/New German Mod Franz Josef	S
19-Dec-05	X		ASD(NII)		Visit by Jim Schlesinger	U
21-Dec-05	X	X	USD(P)	Protocol	Meeting with Yokosuka Japan Mayor Ryotchi Kabaya	S



General Charles G. Boyd, USAF (Ret)
President and CEO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE
DEFENSE

2005 OCT -6 PM 3:16

Bringing business models to our nation's security

October 5, 2005

The Honorable Gordon R. England
Acting Deputy Secretary
U.S. Department of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Room 3E944
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary England,

I have just returned from Iraq and the United Arab Emirates, a trip arranged by Business Executives for National Security (BENS) at the invitation of General John Abizaid. My fellow travelers were General Wayne Downing, USA (RET), Jim Kimsey (founding chairman of AOL) and Joe Robert (Chairman and CEO, J. E. Robert Companies).

During this trip, we met with most of the senior military and civilian leadership, including General Casey, Ambassador Khalizad, Prime Minister Jaafari, and the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, among others. We also spent significant time "in the field." The four of us want America to succeed in this effort, and we would like to share our personal observations with you, if possible.

Very little of your time would be needed. If you agree, we will work with your scheduler to find a time in the near future to do so. Alternatively, your staff can contact my assistant, Linda Moseley, at 202-296-2125 or lmoseley@bens.org.

OK

We look forward to meeting with you.

Sincerely,

Charles G. Boyd
General, USAF (Ret.)
President and CEO

CGB:ism

OSD 19971-05

1717 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW • Suite 350 • Washington, DC 20006 • P 202-296-2125 • F 202-296-2490 • WWW.BENS.ORG



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

AUG 14 2003

(b)(6)

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Dear (b)(6)

Thank you for your recent letter to Secretary Rumsfeld. You have raised important issues.

The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Jack Keane, recently outlined unit rotation plans for the coming year in Iraq, and I am enclosing a transcript of his remarks for your benefit.

I have also enclosed a transcript of remarks by Colonel Robert DeFraitres, Office of the Army Surgeon General, regarding recent medical problems among service members in the Gulf.

We appreciate your concern and thank you for your service to our nation.

Sincerely,

Lawrence Di Rita
The Special Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense

Enclosures

U13800 /03

Iraq

14 Aug 03

Updated 23 Jul 2003



United States Department of Defense

News Transcript

On the web: <http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi?http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030723-0444.html>

Media contact: media@defenselink.mil or +1 (703) 697-5131

Public contact: <http://www.dod.mil/faq/comment.html> or +1 (703) 428-0711

Presenter: Gen. John Keane, Acting Chief of Staff of the Army **Wednesday, July 23, 2003**

Gen. Keane Press Briefing on Plans to Rotate Forces in Iraq

(Also participating was Maj. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, Vice Director for Operations, J-3, Joint Staff. Slides of today's briefing are available at

<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2003/g030723-D-6570X.html>.)

Keane: Good afternoon.

Listen, I want to say up front that our soldiers are doing a magnificent job every day, and we should all be proud of them and grateful to them. We have over 368,000 soldiers deployed all over the world. They are absolutely doing what their country needs from them to do, from the Balkans, to Korea, to Afghanistan to Iraq. Many soldiers are in harm's way every day. For our soldiers, the global war on terrorism is personal, it's often brutal, it's frequently terrorizing, it is very demanding and death is always a silent companion. Yet day in and day out, they perform the mission with extraordinary dedication and competence.

Yesterday's news in Iraq is yet one more testimony to just how well-trained, well-led and motivated our soldiers are. On my recent trip to Iraq, I was greatly impressed and proud of how well our Army is performing under difficult, demanding conditions. Morale is high, and soldiers know what their missions are and they're performing them to our standards.

My purpose today is to present to you our rotation plan for Iraq. First, I want to give you a little historical perspective. In the Army's distinguished history, unit manning and unit rotations have long been a challenge. During World War II, troops were mobilized and dispatched to the front for the duration, meaning for the duration of hostilities or indefinitely, with the exception of air crews that flew a set number of missions before rotating back to training assignments. In Korea, the Army established a rotation policy of six months for combat units and 12 months for combat support and combat service support units, and later went through a very complicated point system for individual soldiers. In Vietnam, soldiers rotated after 12 months in theater on an individual basis. Subsequent rotation policies have varied in response to the combatant commander's needs.

Since 1982, we've had a six-month unit rotation policy in the Sinai. In 1995, we began with a 12-month unit rotation in the Balkans, and shortly thereafter, changed it to a six-month rotation

policy, which we are steady-stating today in Bosnia and Kosovo. Finally, our forces in Afghanistan are currently on a six-month unit rotation policy.

Let me give you a snapshot of where our soldiers are today.

(To staff.) Chart.

As I mentioned, 368,000 soldiers-plus, 120 countries. And here's where they are: South Korea, 30,000-plus; the Philippines, a thousand-plus. In the United States, 28,600 soldiers providing forces here for homeland security. In Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay, 1,500 soldiers. In the KFOR and SFOR -- this is in the Balkans, as you know -- 5,100 soldiers. The largest commitment, obviously, is in Operation Iraqi Freedom and in the Southwest Asia CENTCOM AO in support of that, 167,000 soldiers. Afghanistan is 9,600, and the MFO that I mentioned is 750 soldiers.

This is what it means to us down at unit level: 24 of the 33 active component brigade combat teams are deployed overseas during fiscal year '03, or 73 percent. Of our National Guard enhanced battalions, 15 of the 45, or 33 percent of them deployed overseas in '03.

So the 368,000 is what I mentioned, and this is how it's broken down: active, 232,000-plus; Reserves, 61,000-plus; and National Guard, 74,000-plus.

Next chart.

Let me show you what's happening in Iraq. I think you're mostly familiar with it, but the numbers you may not be as well familiar with. A hundred and fifty-six thousand troops; the vast majority of those are Army -- 133,000. You can see the Air Force, the Navy and the Marine Corps. And our coalition forces, which are beginning to grow at 12,400, to include the U.K. division. We obviously have a lot of Army helicopters in the theater as well. We work up from the southeast, from Kuwait, we have 34,000 troops. And the U.K., as you know, is in the southern sector, in Basra. And beginning to see the multinational forces coming; this is an Italian brigade, a Netherlands battalion.

The 1st MEF is the southern sector. You heard Paul Wolfowitz talk about that. A Special Forces group is in the West. In the central corridor, in Baghdad, we have the 1st Armored Division, the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, and the 2nd Brigade from the 82nd Airborne Division was working the central corridor. To the west of that, out near Fallujah, is the 3rd Infantry Division. And the entire western, going to the Syrian and Jordanian border, is the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment.

North of Baghdad, in a very large area of operations, is the 4th Infantry Division, assisted by the 173rd Airborne Brigade, which is a part of this organization. And then up north there's the 101st Airborne Division Air Assault, which goes to the Syrian and the Iranian and Turkish borders.

That will give you a sense of where we are in Iraq and what those numbers are.

Updated 05 Aug 2003



United States Department of Defense

News Transcript

On the web: <http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi?>

<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030805-0523.html>

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Presenter: David Tornberg, DASD (Clinical and Program Policy)

Tuesday, August 5, 2003

News Conference on Recent Cases of Pneumonia Among Deployed Servicemembers

(News Conference to discuss the recent cases of pneumonia among servicemembers deployed to the U.S. Central Command area of operations. Participating were David Tornberg, deputy assistant secretary of defense for clinical and program policy; Bryan Whitman, deputy assistant secretary of defense for public affairs; and Army Col. Robert DeFraités, Office of the Army Surgeon General.)

Whitman: Good morning, and thank you for joining us this morning. There has been some interest in the last couple of days on some force health protection issues and some cases of pneumonia. And so, I thought that it might be useful to bring to you a couple of experts on this issue.

Today, we have Dr. David Tornberg, who is the deputy assistant secretary of Defense for Clinical and Program Policy, as well as Colonel Robert DeFraités from the Office of the Army Surgeon General, that have offered to come down here and spend some time with you and answer your questions.

So with that, let's go ahead and get started.

Tornberg: Good morning. I'd like to thank you all for coming. The purpose, of course, of the briefing today, as was indicated, is to update you and provide you with, hopefully, some comprehensive information on the pneumonia cases that we have recently experienced.

The health, safety, well-being of our fighting men and women are of critical importance to us. They're of utmost importance, and we'll spare nothing to safeguard their well-being. Military medicine, I'm happy to say, is poised to provide the finest of care to our fighting men and women.

As you know, there have been some cases of pneumonia and sadly, there have been two deaths. We're deeply concerned about the deaths. We'd like a comprehensive understanding to be available to the families, to the husbands, to the wives of our servicemen so they better understand the nature of these conditions. And we'd like to assure you that we're sparing no effort to further analyze and diagnose the nature of this condition.

The Army has been taking the lead in providing the health care services, and is involved in the epidemiological investigation of these conditions. I'm happy to have with us today Colonel Bob DeFraités, chief of preventive medicine in the Office of the Surgeon General of the Army, who will provide you more details on the nature of these conditions today.

Thank you.

Bob?

DeFrait: Thanks, Dr. Tornberg.

Good morning, everyone.

A primary mission of the Army Medical Department is to protect the health of the troops and to take care of them and give them the best possible care, regardless of where they are deployed worldwide. Whenever we send soldiers in harm's way, we're committed to bringing them back whole.

We're very saddened in the Medical Department at the loss of life of any of our soldiers, including the two that have unfortunately lost their lives due to the pneumonia that they acquired while they were deployed.

We offer our deepest sympathy to their families.

In response to this, the Army Surgeon General has chartered two epidemiological consultation teams to study the case of the pneumonia, to make sure we do everything possible to avoid new ones and provide the best of care to those who become ill. Epidemiological consultation is a regular tool available to the Army Surgeon General. He can charter a team at any time to study any kind of medical problem that occurs anywhere in the Army, and he's chosen to do so in this situation.

I want to go a little bit into some of the background information about what we know so far about pneumonia in the Army. Since the 1st of March, we have seen about a hundred cases of pneumonia total in the troops that have been deployed in Southwest Asia in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. That number of about a hundred is about -- given the population that's deployed, is about the amount that one might expect in a population of troops deployed, based on our background information and experience that we have -- between 4(00) and 500 cases of pneumonia every year in the Army worldwide. That's fairly standard, and surprising it may seem that otherwise young, healthy adults still do get pneumonia in the Army.

Of the hundred cases since March, 15 of them have been serious enough to warrant respirator support. In other words, they needed to be put on a ventilator to help them breathe for a certain period of time. Of those 15, two unfortunately have died, one in June and one in July.

The -- what we know about these cases so far, the 15 cases -- 14 of them are soldiers and one's a Marine. And they have occurred fairly -- on a fairly spread-out pattern in time since March. We had two cases in March, two in April, one in May, six in June and four in July. The last confirmed case that we have had occurred on the 30th of July.

The other interesting thing about these 15 cases of more severe pneumonia is that they've occurred all throughout the Southwest Asia region. Even though 10 of the 15 occurred in Iraq -- that's where the majority of troops are, of course -- they have occurred as far away as Uzbekistan and Qatar.

And also the fact that two have died, I think, is probably the one issue that has prompted the commissioning of our epidemiology -- epidemiologic consultation.

Though death, unfortunately, just like pneumonia, occurs in the Army in this day and age, so does death due to pneumonia. In the five years ending calendar year 2002, the Army lost 17 soldiers due to complications with pneumonia. So even in this day and age, we still, unfortunately, lose some soldiers

due to pneumonia.

The other issue with the 15 cases is that we have been able to identify streptococcal pneumonia. That's a very common cause of pneumonia. It has been -- we've found that to be the case that we can attribute to at least two of these cases so far that we've studied. But the investigation continues. The other thing that's true is that we've found no evidence of anthrax, smallpox or any other biological agent attributed -- that we can attribute the pneumonia.

Now, I mentioned the epidemiological consultation teams, otherwise known as EPICON teams. The surgeon general has chartered two teams. One team of two physicians is already been posted to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany to assist the physicians there in reviewing the cases. Since most of the cases of the severe cases came to Landstuhl, that's a good place to do some record review and also review the laboratory findings from these cases. And so, we have two of our doctors assisting in the investigation there at Landstuhl. The other team of six individuals -- four officers and two enlisted personnel -- is now in the central region -- they're in theater right now, and they'll be moving into Iraq, and they'll be assisting with the investigation there in Iraq.

The teams consist of -- both have infectious disease, preventive medicine expertise. In addition, the team that's going to Iraq also has laboratory officers and technicians that can assist with laboratory evaluation. That includes patient specimens, and it also includes specimens from the environment.

Pneumonia is a very common condition in the United States in general. There are two basic types of pneumonia: those that are -- pneumonia that's caused by infection and pneumonia that can be caused by non-infectious causes.

Of the infectious causes, there's a long list of bacteria, viruses, parasites and fungi that can cause a pneumonia. The most common cause of pneumonia in the United States is bacterial pneumonia, and I already mentioned that two of our 15 cases we know already have that very common bacteria that causes pneumonia worldwide.

Of the non-infectious causes, there are -- that can be caused by environmental conditions such as dusts or metals or smoke, such as even exacerbated by tobacco smoke.

So the investigation is going to be focused on kind of the infectious conditions that I mentioned, some of the non-infectious conditions, and also look at some of the host factors of the patients or that soldiers themselves of -- whether is anything in their makeup or their background that might explain why they may have gotten severe pneumonia.

Again I want to reiterate that the deployment of these epidemiological consultation teams is a tool that the surgeon general evokes on a fairly regular basis. Normally we have -- it's hard to say on a yearly basis, but about two to three epidemiological consultations every year, and so this is a fairly typical tool that the surgeon general of the Army invokes to address a condition like this.

I think we are -- we are sufficiently concerned about especially the more severe pneumonias that the epidemiological consultation was warranted. Additional study, anything that we can do to learn more about the risk factors for these conditions, these more serious illnesses, especially the two tragic deaths, you know, we want to gain as much as we can; if nothing else, to learn better how to protect soldiers against this particular type of infection or, if it's non-infectious, whatever is causing the pneumonia, and also to learn more so that if in no other small way, perhaps this will offer some small comfort to those who have lost some soldiers due to this condition.

Thanks for your attention.

Q: Colonel?

DeFrait: Yes?

Q: You talked about non-bacterial causes. How many cases do you have of non-bacterial causes of pneumonia? And can you tell us what caused it?

DeFrait: Well, pneumonia typically in the United States and, really, around the world, the way pneumonia presents itself is the patient comes in with typical symptoms of cough, fever, and then on physical examination or x-ray, the doctor diagnoses pneumonia and usually just treats. The typical approach is not really to try to find out what bacteria or virus might be causing it. And nine times out of 10, or 90 times out of 100, that's good enough. It's only when it gets more complicated does the physician pursue a diagnosis more aggressively.

So in these cases we really have only identified the two infectious causes so far. There may be other studies that we have done, as I mentioned, for smallpox and for anthrax so far have been negative. In addition, we have looked for the bacteria that causes Legionnaires' Disease, and that doesn't seem to be playing a factor. But the investigation's not completed yet, so I really can't say more about what -- you know, it's not 100 percent -- we haven't --

Q: You've actually identified a cause in two cases, the two cases --

DeFrait: A positive cause that we could say, yes, this bacterium caused these guys to be sick with pneumonia; in two cases, that's correct.

Q: Are you speculating out down the road about what caused any of the other cases you see?

DeFrait: No, not speculating about any of it. That's what the investigation is for, really.

Q: Are you seeing anything that was similar from the first Gulf War, or are there any lessons learned that you took from the first Gulf War, with pneumonia cases, that were given to the troops now?

I don't know whether there was -- all the oil smoke maybe caused more cases in the first Gulf War, and there isn't as much oil smoke this time. Are there any similarities or differences that you may be seeing between the two?

DeFrait: Well, we've taken this problem as it presented itself, as a pneumonia problem. And as such, there really was no precedent in the Gulf War.

I would say, though, in general, I think we're better postured to recognize these problems earlier and respond in a timely way. And in this case, this investigation really started probably about the same time as the first soldier died. As I said, these cases have been kind of spread out over time and so really didn't show a pattern. But then with the first death, it really kicked off the investigation. But we think we're well on our way to understanding what's going on here.

Q: Have you determined the cause of death for the two cases? And will you release their names?

DeFrait: The cause of death of the two soldiers who have died is still being studied. The pathology report, the postmortem examination, is still not quite completed. We expect it to be done really within the next week or 10 days. And we're factoring that into our investigation.

In interest of the privacy of the families and the patients, we're really not going to be releasing their names.

Q: Colonel, I want to make sure I understood when you said at the beginning the hundred or so cases generally -- that would be the typical number of pneumonia for a year?

DeFrait: No. What I meant by the hundred cases that I talked about is that's the -- that's all pneumonias in Southwest Asia that have required at least treatment in a hospital, of which 15 of them are more severe, needing the respirator.

That a hundred -- again, I was using it as a benchmark in comparison with our worldwide experience every year of the 4(00) to 500 soldiers who need to be admitted to a hospital somewhere around the world -- the Army's deployed all around the world -- somewhere, for pneumonia. And I use that in perspective as saying: Are we seeing more cases in general than we might expect? Despite the harsh

environment, the answer is no, not totally. But again, we're still concerned about these more severe ones.

Q: And the 15 that you sort of identified as the more severe ones -- is that the focus of the investigation right now? Are the other 85 or so not really involved?

DeFrait: Well, they're all involved. Our priority is definitely on the 15, but the -- we know who the other hundred are. Fortunately, they all --

Q: Yeah.

DeFrait: -- you know, they all responded to treatment and are doing well. So --

Q: And the last part -- I'm sorry -- is the non-bacteria thing.

During the Afghan war, where U.S. troops went to Uzbekistan, there was a lot of anecdotal evidence of troops becoming ill because they were breathing in the dust that had been for years treated with chemicals and such like that. Is this one of the things when you refer to non- biological potential factors, is this something you'd be looking at? Because you did say there was one in Uzbekistan, as well.

DeFrait: Yes, I did. Really, the focus of the investigation on the non-infectious causes includes any of the environmental conditions like the dust or, you know, what the soldier might have been doing in his occupation -- you know, it might give us some clues of an exposure he may have experienced that might explain why he got pneumonia. So, the dust -- certainly, everyone's seen the pictures, and whoever has been there understands what -- that the dust is an issue. It's always been an issue. Why it might be contributing to these cases is one of the focus of the investigation, if it does at all.

Q: Could you state all the countries in which the troops have gotten sick? Can you also at least give us the ages and the genders of the two who died, and an age range of the 15 involved? And just one last

thing. Is there any evidence of connection? I mean, are these random cases, or do you see --

DeFrait: Well, I'm glad you brought the question up about the connection, because that really is what an epidemiologist does, is look for these trends. And you know, we have an epidemiological consultation team. We have epidemiologists involved, and so they're looking for these trends.

And I think what we have so far is that we've got, spread out in time, as I mentioned, you know, with the two cases in March, the two in April, the one in May, the six in June and the four in July -- and all of these -- 10 out of the 15 severe cases have occurred in Iraq, but of course, that's where most of the troops are. But they've been spread out -- all of these countries in Southwest Asia. I can't off the top of my head remember what -- how many are spread out to these other countries, but it includes Kuwait, Qatar and Uzbekistan. I don't know if there's any other country that -- from which we have a case right now.

And I don't have the information on the age ranges with me right now. We have that, but I just don't have it with me.

Q: How about those two that died?

DeFrait: But, I mean, they're all active-duty military people. So, it falls in that age range. And I'm not going to -- really, in the interest of the patients' family, I'm not going to talk about specifics about those fatal cases.

There was something I wanted to finish saying, though, about your first question. Oh! In terms of the trends of -- and whether or not these are sporadic cases, the other thing that's key, other than being spread out -- separated by space and time, is also that there's no evidence that -- of any other kind of individual relationship of one case to another to suggest that there could be person-to-person spread. There's no evidence that this is spread from one person to another.

It does seem to be sporadic in nature.

Q: Can you at least say if they're all men, the 15 --

DeFrait: Oh, I'm sorry. I can say that. Fourteen are men and one is a woman.

Q: Colonel, could you also reiterate again the significance of this, that you're really more concerned about the serious cases than on the particular number? And also, are you able to definitively rule out, then, SARS or biological or chemical weapons attacks?

DeFrait: The -- we do have data from several of the cases that have been negative for the SARS virus, the coronavirus. So we don't think this has anything to do with SARS.

And again, SARS, if you remember, was very definitely spread from person to person. So we feel very reassured, from the pattern of cases that we have, that this isn't acting at all like SARS, plus we have the negative finding on several of the cases. So SARS was another agent I should have mentioned that we don't feel is playing any role here.

Q: And biological or chemical -- can you definitively rule out a possibility of biological or chemical weapons?

DeFrait: Based on all the information we have to date, there's been no positive findings of any anthrax or smallpox or any other biological weapons. So yeah, I've -- pretty close to ruling it out.

Q: And what about -- again, just to clarify, the significance of this is that you're concerned about the serious cases, not necessarily the number? Is that correct?

DeFrait: Well, we're concerned about both. I think if the number gets, you know -- starts increasing, we're concerned about that. But really we're approaching this from a prevention and a treatment focus, to see -- is there something we can intervene -- some way we can intervene to protect the health of the troops and then to treat them better. And so that's why we're -- that's the main reason we're studying these more severe cases, because they've required more treatment. And if there's some way we can intervene and learn more about living better or healthier in this particular very harsh --

admittedly very harsh environment, that it'd be -- we think it would be a great benefit to the troops.

Q: This has gone up also to 102, right? So have you had any increase recently or -- I had thought that it had gone up from a hundred to 102.

DeFrait: We are getting a couple of more cases admitted to the hospitals. Of the not severe -- the last confirmed severe case we had was on the 30th of July -- there have been several other soldiers with pneumonia. Of this -- that's why I'm saying it's about a hundred. I don't mean to imply that it's exactly 100. It's about a hundred. It could be 102 now. I haven't checked the list lately to see what it is.

Q: How many of the hundred were in Iraq? And also, two people have died. Is that unusual? I understand the hundred -- it's more or less what you would expect in a force of that size. But how about the deaths?

DeFrait: Well, right now, to answer your first question, I'm not exactly sure how many of the hundred are in -- what's the distribution of those hundred cases.

Again, the focus has been mainly on the 15.

In terms of the deaths, from an epidemiological perspective it is very difficult to interpret the two deaths in terms of whether that's something you expect. I mean, it's concerning enough that it's -- it's hard to say. Like I said, in the Army we have, unfortunately, experienced about -- well, 17 cases of fatal pneumonia in the Army over a five-year period. So if you do the division, it comes out to about three a year. So two occurring in one area of the world in about a month was enough to cause us concern. I haven't -- I don't know statistically who that works out, but it was enough to cause us to be concerned.

Q: Colonel --

DeFrait: (Actually we were,) though, already starting to be concerned with the first death. We didn't really wait for the second one.

Q: Colonel, can I follow on that question, because talking about the two that died, you said epidemiologically statistically. But individually, have you tracked these individuals who died? Were they treated early enough? Did they get the proper treatment? Were they moved forward? How have you looked at those two individuals who died?

DeFrait: I'm glad you brought that up, because that's exactly what the focus of the investigation of those cases is. It includes their exposures, what might have started their illness, and also how were they treated once they got sick.

Q: And are you far enough along that you can draw any conclusions? Were they--

DeFrait: No. That requires the post-mortem examination and a full analysis of the tissues to know what the cause of death was; then go back and see, you know, given that as a cause of death, then how did the treatment stack up compared to that.

Q: And you'll come back and report that to us when you find that out?

DeFrait: That's all part of our investigation, yeah.

Q: Did it start in Kuwait, maybe? You said it happened maybe in March. Did that start in Kuwait and maybe all of the soldiers belonged to some specific unit?

DeFrait: Well, that's what -- that's the other factor that indicates -- I'm glad you brought that up, because I neglected to mention that all of these 15 severe cases are all from different military units. So, aside from the separation in time and space, it does look like they have different units.

You are correct the early cases, of course, before the outbreak of hostilities did occur in Kuwait; however, that doesn't include the soldier who was in -- Uzbekistan, which really had nothing to do with Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Q: Are there any steps underway now to prevent further infections or further spread?

DeFrait: Well, we've put some messages out to -- the question was about preventive -- what can you do to prevent pneumonia. We have put messages out to the field in terms of trying to intervene. Not knowing exactly, you know, what particular causative agent, there are still some prudent things that can be done.

And so, we put messages to the field. We're very concerned about soldiers not becoming dehydrated in this intense heat and dust that they're experiencing in the deployed environment. So, we're trying to emphasize that they stay well-hydrated and that they also protect themselves against the dust as best they can, using either their cravats or some type of dust mask. But of course, that's uncomfortable, and it's hard to do 24 hours a day.

Also, when they're handling dust, if they're in an area where they've got to do sweeping, we recommend that they wet down the area first and do more like wet sweeping than raising big clouds of dust, just in case that's a factor.

And finally, we all know that definitely, cigarette smoking is a risk factor for pneumonia, no matter what age, no matter what population. And so, you know, we're also putting that message out there along. We emphasize that normally to the troops anyway. But this is even a more reason to avoid cigarette smoking.

Q: The two confirmed bacteria cases, are they related in any way in space and time, as well? And did they contribute to either of the deaths?

DeFrait: No, no. None of the -- no two of the cases share any common unit or exact day or time.

Q: They're not the ones who died?

DeFrait: The two known bacterial pneumonia cases are not the ones who died. They both recovered.

Q: What did the two who died die from?

DeFrait: Well, that's what we're still studying -- their deaths with the post-mortem.

Q: (Off mike.) -- bacterial, or --

DeFrait: Right now, that's the focus of the investigation. Right.

Q: Why is it taking so long to determine?

DeFrait: I think we're being very prudent and very careful, whenever we have a death that we investigate, that we look at

all the tissues. There's much more -- it's easy -- actually, it's easy to make the diagnosis if a bacterial grows out of a blood culture. That's easy. You've got it. If you don't get a positive blood culture, it gets much tougher, because now you're looking at other -- that non-bacterial could be virus, could be fungus, could be a parasite or it could be one of these non-infectious causes.

Q: Can we assume that you don't have something growing out of a culture very quick and easy in the case of the two who died?

DeFrait: That's true. At this time, we don't.

Tornberg: It could be mechanical in these two cases.

DeFrait: I don't want to engage in any --

Tornberg: (Off mike.) -- and that's the purpose of the investigation. A forensic exam, however, and that's what we're doing in the case of a death, extends for a significant period of time. You want to have a conclusive diagnosis. And you have to consider all elements of information before you -- you don't want to hastily come up with a theory.

Q: Were both of these in Iraq -- both of the deaths in Iraq?

DeFrait: No.

Q: Were was the other one? Or what -- can you tell us what country?

DeFrait: Well, I'd rather not talk about specifics about these -- about the two cases.

Q: (Off mike.) -- if it's not Iraq, it's either Afghanistan or Uzbekistan or Qatar.

Tornberg: They were from -- they were soldiers who served in Iraq.

Q: They were soldiers who had served in Iraq, but they were no longer in Iraq at the time of death?

Tornberg: One was and one was not.

Q: Okay. Can you tell us where the other one was?

Tornberg: No, we cannot. We cannot. We're trying to accommodate you and reasonably answer your questions. But there are privacy (elements ?).

Q: Okay. (Off mike.) -- tell me what you can.

Tornberg: Right.

Q: Colonel, you mentioned that the six-person team is in the region, but not in Iraq yet. Is that -- did I understand you correctly?

DeFraitess: As of today, I don't believe they've made it into Iraq to date.

Q: Where are they right now? And when do you --

DeFraitess: I'd rather not say where a specific team -- for security purposes, I'd rather not say where they are.

Q: Can you say when they're going to arrive inside Iraq?

DeFraitess: I believe they're supposed to be in Iraq tomorrow -- last I heard. It all depends on transportation a lot in that theater. So it's hard to say for sure.

Whitman: There's time for one more, if there is one.

Q: You had mentioned the 17 deaths over a five-year period from pneumonia in the Army. In this calendar year, aside from those two cases, has the Army had any other cases?

DeFraitess: No, I'm not aware of any other pneumonia deaths. Some of the deaths -- determination, just like in these two cases, takes a long time before the final diagnosis can be made, based on pathology examinations, toxicology. So right -- as of right now, I'm not aware of any other pneumonia deaths in the Army.

Q: In the Army, or would that include Marines? Would you --

DeFraitess: No, just Army is what I can speak to. Just the Army.

Q: Are there other diseases which have claimed the lives of Army soldiers in the Central Command area of operation?

DeFraitess: I don't have that information with me today. I can only address the ones that we're looking at in terms of pneumonia.

Q: One more. I'm sorry. I just cut you off --

Whitman: No, no --

Q: Okay. Okay. Thank you very much.

Whitman: Thank you.

DeFraites: Thank you.

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<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030805-0523.html>

3 pages Denied in Full

FOIA Exemption (b)(6)

Richard A. Knight

From: DoD News [dnews_sender@DTIC.MIL]
Sent: Thursday, August 07, 2003 7:43 AM
To: DODNEWS-L@DTIC.MIL
Subject: DoD Identifies Army Casualty

NEWS RELEASE from the United States Department of Defense

No. 577-03
IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Aug 07, 2003
(703) 697-5131 (media)
(703) 428-0711 (public/industry)

DoD Identifies Army Casualty

The Department of Defense announced today that Staff Sgt. David L. Loyd, 44, of Jackson, Tenn., died on Aug. 5 in Kuwait. Loyd was on a mission when he experienced severe chest pains. The soldier was sent to the Kuwait hospital where he was pronounced dead.

Loyd was assigned to the 1175th Transportation Company, Army National Guard, Brownsville, Tenn.

[Web Version: <http://www.dod.mil/releases/2003/nr20030807-0327.html>]

- News Releases: <http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/>
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TYRONE TURNER, NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE

Preparing for a daytime patrol in eastern Baghdad, Iraq, where temperatures can reach 128 degrees, Staff Sgt. Dennis Miles douses himself with water.

Troops' thirst for water drains supply resources

By David Wood
Newhouse News Service

When the U.S. military goes to war these days, it takes along water.

Not canteen water. Not purified-with-iodine water.

Bottled water. Thousands, tens of thousands — millions of bottles. In Iraq alone, 45 million 1.5-liter bottles a month, drained and tossed aside.

What began in 1990 as a generous but temporary expedient, handing out bottled water to troops gathering in Saudi Arabia for Desert Storm, has grown into a financial and logistical nightmare that runs counter to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's drive to make the military lighter and more agile.

While GIs consider bottled water an entitlement, some generals see it as coddling.

"Spoon-feeding troops bottled water — a mistake," Gen. Jack Keane, the Army's vice chief of staff, growled in an interview. "We want them to have mental toughness."

In the sun-scorched compounds occupied by 130,000 Army troops in Iraq, soldiers have two potential sources of water.

One is bottled in Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia or Greece and shipped to Kuwait, where stevedores wrestle crates of it off ships. Then, in giant, windwapt marshaling yards, forklifts labor in ankle-deep desert grit to stack the stuff into mountains of cardboard boxes. Next, it's loaded onto trucks that groan north in convoys — pallets of cartons, 12 bottles to a case, truck after truck.

The military buys so much bottled water, from so many vendors, through so many agencies, that no one knows how much, at what cost, it takes to slake its thirst.

The other, traditional source is the 400-gallon steel tank sitting on a trailer in the desert sun. In Army lingo, that's a Water Buffalo, which holds water that's been purified by the ROWPU boys — the soldiers who man the Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units. Miracle workers of a sort, they can drop a hose into any green-

scummed swamp or saltwater ditch and pump out something drinkable.

These soldiers force water through a series of filters, which strain out various poisons and "most" smelly stuff, according to a recent Pentagon assessment.

Still, after the water has been pumped into a Smifty, a Semi Trailer Mounted Fabric Tank — basically a huge, rubberized bag on a flat-bed truck, hauled to a battalion headquarters and transferred to a Water Buffalo, what comes out when a thirsty grunt turns the spigot may be less than palatable. Worse, in some units this summer, the treated water was rumored to make soldiers sick.

"We have ROWPUs producing tons of water that soldiers don't want because of expectations we set in Desert Storm," said Lt. Gen. Charles Mahan, the Army's logistics chief. "Was that a mistake? Absolutely!"

ROWPU water, Mahan pointed out, is produced in close proximity to troops, while bottled water is shipped from afar, overloading the supply chain. At one point this spring, about 60 percent of the supply line supporting troops in Iraq was devoted to carrying bottled water, food and ice, he said.

"Where do bullets and repair parts fit in there?" Mahan asked with exasperation.

But the guy whose idea it was to start the bottled-water fad is unrepentant.

"Yeah, I made that decision. I thought it was a great idea," said retired Army Gen. William "Gus" Pagonis, the Army's logistics chief for Desert Storm. "No question it tastes better than ROWPU water. And if you can't give soldiers great food, why not at least give them good water?"

In Dahran, Saudi Arabia, in August 1990, no ROWPUs or Water Buffalos came with the thousands of troops in early-arriving units. But there was a Saudi desalination facility nearby and a bottling plant down the road. Pagonis hired them — and made history. □

David Wood can be contacted at david.wood@newhouse.com.

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Sam all for Fogelman and Garner
Larry Di Rita 11/21

UNCLASSIFIED

November 1, 2002

DepSec ACTION _____

ACTION MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Torie Clarke, ASD(PA)

SUBJECT: SecDef "Thank You" Letters to Retired Military Officers Participating in Thursday, October 31 Outreach Meeting

- To obtain Secretary of Defense signature for thank you letters.
- Officers met with SecDef, DepSec, and CJCS to discuss the global war on terrorism.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign attached thank you letters or approve for autopen.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: Brent Krueger, 703-695-2733

UNCLASSIFIED

11/12
See files -
Also note revised salutations.
D. White
Larry Di Rita 11/12
11/19

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>[Signature]</i>

U17897 / 02



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

NOV 25 2002

000.5

Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis, USA (Ret)

(b)(6)

Dear Colonel Maginnis:

Thank you for joining us Thursday, October 31, for the discussion on the way forward in the global war on terrorism.

Your thoughtful advice and counsel are very much appreciated.

With best wishes,



U17897-02

25NOV02



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

NOV 25 2002

General George Joulwan, USA (Ret)

(b)(6)

Dear General Joulwan:

Thank you for joining us Thursday, October 31, for the discussion on the way forward in the global war on terrorism.

Your thoughtful advice and counsel are very much appreciated.

With best wishes,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "R. M. ...".



U17897-02



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

NOV 25 2002

Brigadier General David Grange, USA (Ret)
Executive Vice President and Chief Executive Officer
McCormick Tribune Foundation
435 North Michigan Avenue, Suite 770
Chicago, Illinois 60611

Dear General Grange:

Thank you for joining us Thursday, October 31, for the
discussion on the way forward in the global war on terrorism.

Your thoughtful advice and counsel are very much appreciated.

With best wishes,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D. Rumsfeld".



U17897-02



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

NOV 25 2002

Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney, USAF (Ret)

(b)(6)

Dear General McInerney:

Thank you for joining us Thursday, October 31, for the discussion on the way forward in the global war on terrorism.

Your thoughtful advice and counsel are very much appreciated.

With best wishes,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "R. M. McInerney".



U17897-02



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

NOV 25 2002

Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor, USMC (Ret)
Director of National Security Programs
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
80 Potter Pond
Lexington, Massachusetts 02421

Dear General Trainor:

Thank you for joining us Thursday, October 31, for the
discussion on the way forward in the global war on terrorism.

Your thoughtful advice and counsel are very much appreciated.

With best wishes,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "R. M. ...".



U17897-02



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

NOV 25 2002

General Wesley Clark, USA (Ret)
Managing Director for Merchant Banking
Stephens Group, Incorporated
601 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Suite 720, South Building
Washington, DC 20004

Dear General Clark:

Thank you for joining us Thursday, October 31, for the
discussion on the way forward in the global war on terrorism.

Your thoughtful advice and counsel are very much appreciated.

With best wishes,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D. Rumsfeld".



U17897-02



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

NOV 25 2002

General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA (Ret)
President
BR McCaffrey Associates LLC
1800 Diagonal Road, Suite 600
Alexandria, Virginia 22314

Dear General McCaffrey:

Thank you for joining us Thursday, October 31, for the
discussion on the way forward in the global war on terrorism.

Your thoughtful advice and counsel are very much appreciated.

With best wishes,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "R. M. Gates", written in a cursive style.



U17897-02



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202-797-6186

Oct. 1, 2003

Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000


Dear Secretary Rumsfeld;

Thank you for an extremely eye-opening and useful trip to Iraq. I am very grateful to have been given the opportunity to partake in the delegation that visited Baghdad, Hilla, Mosul, and Tikrit the week of September 22 to personally witness the remarkable efforts of the U.S. and coalition troops, and the general dynamics underway in post-Saddam Iraq. Please also extend my thanks to your DoD personnel whose great efforts made this tour not only possible, but also comfortable and safe.

Sincerely,


Michael O'Hanlon

with many thanks
to you, Chris Wilcox,
Brent Kreuger, and
many others...

U16731 103 

1 Page Denied in Full

FOIA Exemption (b)(5)

July 18, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Gen. Keane

Jack Keane gave some very eloquent remarks about his visit to Baghdad. I think he might be someone to take down and brief the press.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071803-16

.....
Please respond by 7/25/03

U20837 /03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MAR 20 2002

Honorable William S. Cohen
The Cohen Group
600 13th Street, NW
Suite 460
Washington, DC 20005

Dear Bill,

Thank you for taking the time to visit with me recently to discuss the war against terrorism. I value your perspective and appreciate your thoughts and counsel regarding our ongoing defense and communications efforts.

I will continue to stay in touch and look forward to our next meeting.

Again, it was good to see you.

Sincerely,

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be the letter 'R'.



U04416-02

3/7
1030
9/9 0800



PUBLIC AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1400

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION MEMO

March 7, 2002, 1:00 PM
DepSec Action _____

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Torie *Clarke*, ASD, Public Affairs

SUBJECT: Thank you letters for former Secretaries of Defense and Senior Leaders who attended War on Terrorism outreach meeting

- To obtain Secretary of Defense signature for thank you letters.
- These former Secretaries and Senior Leaders remain highly active within national politics and policy-making institutions. Their stature within senior levels of government and commerce ensures a broad distribution of information regarding the Department of Defense's War on Terrorism. Their input on key issues has served to provide the SECDEF with additional insight into ensuring effective outreach to communities around the nation.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign enclosed thank you letters.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:
As stated

3/14
Done 4/1
Tu
Jerry Di Fite

Prepared by: SSgt Lorenzo Sanchez, 695-3904

UNCLASSIFIED

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR M. C. GIBERTIANI	
MA BUCSI	
EXECUTED	02 3/13



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

OCT 26 2001

The Honorable William S. Cohen
The Cohen Group
600 13th Street, NW
Suite 640
Washington, DC 20005

Dear Bill:

Thank you for joining Paul Wolfowitz and me last Friday to discuss the war against terrorism. I hope you will continue to provide us your thoughtful advice and counsel.

Torie Clarke and members of her public affairs staff will follow up with you regarding support for critical programs to keep opinion leaders and the public engaged in the sustained effort.

Again, it was good to see you. I look forward to meeting with you again in the near future.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Paul Wolfowitz".

U17471 /01

10/18
1200



PUBLIC AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1400

2001 OCT 15 11 09 47

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION MEMO

October 16, 2001, 2:00 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: *TC* Torie Clarke, ASD, Public Affairs

SUBJECT: SECDEF "Thank You" Letters to Attendees of October 12, 2001 Briefing.

- Attached are "thank you" letters to the "Formers" who attended the October 12th briefing.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the letters or authorize signature by autopen.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

EWH

Res re-do with first names

Di Rita

10/22

EWH
Prepared by: Eric Holland, 697-7385

UNCLASSIFIED

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	—
MA BUCCI	—
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>AS 10/12</i>



U17471 /01