

(b)(6)

Subject: military analyst conference briefing dave/ruff/whitman
Start: Tue 1/25/2005 4:00 PM
End: Tue 1/25/2005 4:30 PM
Recurrence: (none)

(b)(6)

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, January 26, 2005 7:34 AM
To: (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA
Subject: RE: Today's Front Pages - What they printed across America on January 25th

hi there
will you guys see if any of our military analysts were out last night on the budget? i saw jed babbins..not sure about others.

(b)(6) will have the list of folks who called in.

thanks
ab

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, January 25, 2005 5:24 PM
To: larry.dirita (b)(6); Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6)
Civ. SAF/PA: (b)(6)
(b)(6) 'Haddock, Col. Ellen (JCS)', (b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; Keck, Gary, Col, OASD-PA;
(b)(6) Davis, Archie, Col, OASD-PA; (b)(6)
(b)(6) Latimer, Matthew, OASD-PA;
(b)(6)
(b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; (b)(6)
(b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA; Chafin, Claude, CIV, OSD-LA; (b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6) Maj, OASD-PA; Thorp, Frank, Captain; (b)(6) AFIS-HQ;
(b)(6)

Subject: Today's Front Pages - What they printed across America on January 25th

- * Of the 223 images of U.S. newspaper front pages available from the newseum.org, ranging from strictly the local to national circulation papers, 137 included DoD-related articles; only a dozen papers had more than one DoD-related item on today's front page.
- * The capture of the al-Zarqawi lieutenant(s) garnered the most headlines: 61.
- * 41 papers headlined the \$80 billion supplemental request for the war on terrorism.
- * 12 papers headlined some aspect of the January 30 elections in Iraq.
- * Seven headlines focused on allegations of U.S. abuse of detainees in Iraq or Guantanamo.
- * Five headlines centered on "thin" or "stretched" Reserve forces in Iraq.
- * Two headlines stated U.S. troop levels will stay high in Iraq.
- * Two headlines focused on BRAC issues.
- * There were seven other headlines, primarily about home town casualties.

(b)(6)

From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 25, 2005 12:44 PM
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LtCol, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) CAPT, OSD-COMPT; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; Keck, Gary, Col, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Service Topline Input: S: 1330 TODAY - 21 JAN 05 (UNCLASSIFIED)

To be more clear -- my current thinking is to not do the Press event but to do the analyst.

-----Original Message-----

From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 25, 2005 12:42 PM
To: Lynch, Roseann LtCol, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) CAPT, OSD-COMPT; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; Keck, Gary, Col, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Service Topline Input: S: 1330 TODAY - 21 JAN 05 (UNCLASSIFIED)

But she can discuss thematics and what this supplemental will address. I think it is very worthwhile to do the analyst. I am leaning against no doing a press event.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) LtCol, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 25, 2005 12:20 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CAPT, OSD-COMPT; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; Keck, Gary, Col, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Service Topline Input: S: 1330 TODAY - 21 JAN 05 (UNCLASSIFIED)

Sir

Ms Jonas is concerned that she will have nothing to give them. They will want details and she can't give them numbers.

She doesn't want them to come in with expectations that can't be met.

V/r

(b)(6)

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@(b)(6)>
To: (b)(6) LtCol, OASD-PA (b)(6)
Sent: Tue Jan 25 11:58:50 2005
Subject: RE: Service Topline Input: S: 1330 TODAY - 21 JAN 05 (UNCLASSIFIED)

see below.

Confirmed Retired Military Analysts:
Colonel Carl Kenneth Allard (USA, Retired)
Mr. Jed Babbitt (USAF, JAG)
Lieutenant General Frank B. Campbell (USAF, Retired)
Dr. James Jay Carafano (LTC, USA, Retired)
Colonel (Tim) J. Eads (USA, Retired)

Colonel John Garrett	(USMC, Retired)
Command Sergeant Major Steven Greer	(USA, Retired)
Colonel Jack Jacobs	(USA, Retired)
Colonel Jeff McCausland,	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney	(USAF, Retired)
General Montgomery Meigs	(USA, Retired)
Captain Chuck Nash	(USN, Retired)
General William L. Nash	(USA, Retired)
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.	(USA, Retired)
Major General Donald W. Shepperd	(USAF, Retired)
Major General Perry Smith	(USAF, Retired)
Major General Paul E. Vallery	(USA, Retired)
General Tom Wilkerson	(USMC, Retired)

Tentative - Awaiting Confirmation

Admiral Dennis C. Blair	(USN, Retired)
Commander Peter Brookes	(USN, Reserve)
Lieutenant Colonel Bill Cowan	(USMC, Retired)
Major Dana R. Dillon	(USA, Retired)
General Wayne A. Downing	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant General Buster Glosson	(USAF, Retired)
Brigadier General David L. Grange	(USA, Retired)
Admiral David E. Jeremiah	(USN, Retired)
General William F. "Buck" Kernan	(USA, Retired)
Admiral Thomas Joseph Lopez	(USN, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis	(USA, Retired)
General Glen K. Otis	(USA, Retired) - not avail. at 1600
General Joseph Ralston	(USAF, Retired)
Mr. Wayne Simmons	(USN, Retired)
Captain Martin L. Strong	(USN, Retired)
General Charles E. Wilhelm	

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) LtCol, OASD-PA
 Sent: Tuesday, January 25, 2005 11:56 AM
 To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
 Subject: Re: Service Topline Input: S: 1330 TODAY - 21 JAN 05
 (UNCLASSIFIED)

Hello Sir

Can you send it back to me so I have it on my blackberry and can forward it from here.

Thank you

(b)(6)

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@^{(b)(6)}
To: ^{(b)(6)} LtCol, OASD-PA ^{(b)(6)}
Sent: Tue Jan 25 11:45:57 2005
Subject: RE: Service Topline Input: S: 1330 TODAY - 21 JAN 05 (UNCLASSIFIED)

^{(b)(6)} do you think you should send him the navy's submission so he can see an e.g.?
thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: ^{(b)(6)} LtCol, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 25, 2005 11:44 AM
To: ^{(b)(6)} T LTC OCPA
Subject: Re: Service Topline Input: S: 1330 TODAY - 21 JAN 05
(UNCLASSIFIED)

^{(b)(6)}

They just want three positive things Army is saying about Transformation along with three
topline messages regarding the Army's budget.

I've sent you all the input I have.

^{(b)(6)}

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: ^{(b)(6)} LTC OCPA ^{(b)(6)}
To: ^{(b)(6)} LtCol OASD-PA ^{(b)(6)}
Sent: Tue Jan 25 11:39:36 2005
Subject: RE: Service Topline Input: S: 1330 TODAY - 21 JAN 05 (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

^{(b)(6)}

I will revisit, but initial indications are negative. Pls provide some examples which may
help me break something loose from the Army Budget Office. Thanks.

v/r.

^{(b)(6)}

-----Original Message-----

From: ^{(b)(6)} LtCol OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 25, 2005 11:17 AM
To: ^{(b)(6)} T LTC OCPA
Subject: RE: Service Topline Input: S: 1330 TODAY - 21 JAN 05 (UNCLASSIFIED)

Hi ^{(b)(6)}

Did you ever get a final Topline input?

^{(b)(6)}

LtCol ^{(b)(6)} USMC
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
Phone ^{(b)(2)}
Fax: ^{(b)(6)}

(b)(6)

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 25, 2005 7:34 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: analyst call

we won't have a mtg this morning because i have to go to the pa conference... I will be around until 9 45.

i might need help with a tour guide to escort susan davis in around 11:00. more to follow.
thanks
ab

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 25, 2005 7:32 AM
To: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: analyst call

We'll start calling this morning to gauge interest. I'll try to have the responses collected in time for the IC/PL morning meeting.

-----Original Message-----

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 25, 2005 7:07 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: analyst call

hi there
the military analysts call looks like it will go at 1600 today. please pulse our folks to see if they would be available for a call to discuss the supplemental budget. there will be senior level people on the call.

just for you info... wolfowitz will be on the call.... we will need to do this in his office.

please let me know the response you get.
thanks
ab

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, January 24, 2005 11:11 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Subject: FW: Today's Spectator (Babbin)

Thought you would be interested in this.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Researcher
Department of Defense
OSD Writers Group, Room (b)(2)
Telephone: (b)(2)

Subject: Today's Spectator

A little dose of reality on the prisoner abuse/interrogation issue, with thanks to Wayne Simmons.

The American Spectator

Jed L. Babbin

(b)(6)

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, January 21, 2005 5:28 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: Tuesday 1 Feb

here is thte date for the military analysts....more to follow on the list.

who do you guys recommend we invite?
thanks
ab

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Sent: Friday, January 21, 2005 5:22 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Rhyndance, George, COL, OASD-PA (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; Reinhard, Daniel E., CTR, OSD-P&R; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, JCS OCJCS; (b)(6) CIV, JCS VCJCS
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Subject: Tuesday 1 Feb

Per Larry Di Rita, likely no press avail. Instead I am holding:

Tuesday 1 Feb
12:50pm-1:05 - PA Prep w/Di Rita
1:10pm-1:35 - Analysts
1:40pm-2:00 - Interview

(SD has to leave at 2:10 to go to WH)

Let me know - thanks.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, January 21, 2005 11:14 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Subject: FW: today's Spectator (Jed Babbin)

Thought you would enjoy this !!!!

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Researcher
Department of Defense
OSD Writers Group, Room (b)(2)
Telephone: (b)(2)

The American Spectator

Jed L. Babbin

(b)(6)

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, January 19, 2005 6:25 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: draft message to service secy's

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, January 19, 2005 6:07 PM
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Subject: draft message to service secy's

larry, appreciate you input from a tone perspective as well as content.

Gentlemen, as part of this year's budet roll out we would like each of you to participate in a background briefing for the military analysts -- the group that provides newspaper and television commentary. The budget will be announced by the President and sent to Congress on Monday, Feb. 7. OSD usually provides an embargoed (hold until introduced by the President) briefing to the Pentagon press corps and to the military analysts, and we anticipate doing so again this year.

We are asking that you and the service chief or vice chief brief the analysts this time around because we are hoping to provide real context about the nature of this budget. It is a document that we hope to frame as much more than the usual programmatic funding levels document. Understanding that people will always look at funding numbers, we hope to persuade the analysts and media to see this budget from another perspective, that of a meaningful stab at shifting the military in a historically new philosophical direction, a direction that is required by the realities of the world today.

In briefing the analysts, we would ask that each of you to talk about your services' respective transformational needs of today and how those needs are addressed in this in budget. We would like your briefing to be done in one session on Wednesday, Feb. 2, or Thursday, Feb. 3. We are timing your briefing ahead of the media's because we expect reporters will go to military analysts for additional thoughts about the DOD budget.

(b)(6)

From: Allardck@^{(b)(6)}
Sent: Wednesday, January 19, 2005 3:11 PM
To: larry.dirita@^{(b)(6)}
Cc: ^{(b)(6)}
Subject: Hersh

Just read the text of your rebuttal. As you may have seen on MSNBC, I attributed a lot of what he said to disgruntled CIA employees who simply should be taken out and shot. Going thru his article, I was also impressed at the extremely thin sourcing - mostly just two guys: "a former high ranking intelligence official and " a government consultant." Had he written the same thing for my GU course - as opposed to the New Yorker - he woulda flunked!

Ken Allard

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, January 19, 2005 12:28 PM
To: larry.dirita@ (b)(6); Ruff, Eric, CIV, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; Keck, Gary, Col, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LCDR, OASD-PA
Subject: Coverage of Military Analysts' Trip - follow up memo
Attachments: MilitaryAnalysts.1.19.doc; MilitaryAnalystsExcerpts.1.19.doc



MilitaryAnalysts.1.1 MilitaryAnalystsExc
9.doc (134... erpts.1.19....

Media coverage of the seven military analysts' visits to Iraq was contained to: Paul Vallely, Bill Cowan, Steven Greer and Ken Allard. Vallely, Cowan and Greer appeared only on Fox News shows from January 13th - 17th, discussing their recent trips to Iraq in primarily positive terms. Allard was quoted in a Washington Times piece on the need for a larger U.S. military force in Iraq, which was reprinted by a handful of foreign news outlets.

Among issues highlighted by the analysts in television coverage:

- The Marines are a key force in maintaining security and stability in Iraq, and "finding the bad guys"
- The extensive security measures being implemented for the upcoming elections
- The "outstanding" training of Iraqi armies - we are "aggressively moving forward"
- The expected high voter turnout for the elections - could reach up to 80% of residents
- Fallujah is now the safest city in Iraq
- And, to a lesser extent, Iraq as a potential training ground for terrorists

Two documents are attached. On the left are the highlights; on the right are the excerpts + links.

(b)(6)

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 18, 2005 6:53 PM
To: (b)(6) OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA
Cc: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: comment for Mr. Di Rita re Hersh statement

have we suggested to bill that he write new yorker or that he send his thoughts to a blogger?

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 18, 2005 6:27 PM
To: Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA
Cc: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Keck, Gary, Col, OASD-PA; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Subject: comment for Mr. Di Rita re Hersh statement

Following please find some comments from one of the military analysts on the 17 January statement by Di Rita on Hersh article (sent as today's talking points per Mr. Di Rita).

Mr. Cowan as you know is an analyst for Fox (wears the black turtlenecks and has the white hair and beard). Retired LTC for Marines.

Col. Rhynedance - for you to forward as you see fit to Mr. Di Rita.

CC for others.

-----Original Message-----

From: bill_cowan [mailto:bill_cowan@(b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, January 18, 2005 6:11 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: DoD Update - Iran

(b)(6)

please pass to Larry DiRita and others as further support to hersch's crap.

i was the OpsO at ISA during the period hersch talks about. Yellow Fruit wasn't about ISA, as he alleges. it was about the Army's ODSO. his BASIC premise of 'run-amuck' commandos is wrong from the outset. Yellow Fruit happened quickly and folks from ODSO went to jail. the Pentagon policed its own.

ISA wasn't involved in supporting the Contras and had no Central American ops that went awry. MOREOVER, i was a senior staffer on the Iran/Contra hearings shortly thereafter, in which ISA was NEVER mentioned.

go after the BASIC premise. specops guys, and ISA in particular, have done a GREAT job of supporting the Pentagon and the nation.

thanks.

resp'y,

bill cowan

-----Original Message-----

From: Military-Analysts List [mailto:MILITARY-ANALYSTS-L@DTIC.MIL] On
Behalf Of [REDACTED] OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 18, 2005 5:59 PM
To: MILITARY-ANALYSTS-L@DTIC.MIL
Subject: DoD Update - Iran

Attached please find the latest update from the Department of Defense.

<<TP 01-18-05 Iran.doc>>

Statement from Pentagon Spokesman Lawrence DiRita on Latest Seymour Hersh
Article

The Iranian regime's apparent nuclear ambitions and its demonstrated support for terrorist organizations is a global challenge that deserves much more serious treatment than Seymour Hersh provides in the New Yorker article titled "The Coming Wars."

Mr. Hersh's article is so riddled with errors of fundamental fact that the credibility of his entire piece is destroyed.

Mr. Hersh's source(s) feed him with rumor, innuendo, and assertions about meetings that never happened, programs that do not exist, and statements by officials that were never made.

A sampling from this article alone includes:

* The post-election meeting he describes between the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not happen.

* The only civilians in the chain-of-command are the President and the Secretary of Defense, despite Mr. Hersh's confident assertion that the chain of command now includes two Department policy officials. His assertion is outrageous, and constitutionally specious.

* Arrangements Mr. Hersh alleges between Under Secretary Douglas Feith and Israel, government or non-government, do not exist. Here, Mr. Hersh is building on links created by the soft bigotry of some conspiracy theorists. This reflects poorly on Mr. Hersh and the New Yorker.

* Mr. Hersh cannot even keep track of his own wanderings. At one point in his article, he makes the outlandish assertion that the military operations he describes are so secret that the operations are being kept secret even from U.S. military Combatant Commanders. Mr. Hersh later states, though, that the locus of this super-secret activity is at the U.S. Central Command headquarters, evidently without the knowledge of the commander if Mr. Hersh is to be believed.

By his own admission, Mr. Hersh evidently is working on an "alternative history" novel. He is well along in that work, given the high quality of "alternative present" that he has developed in several recent articles.

Mr. Hersh's preference for single, anonymous, unofficial sources for his most fantastic claims makes it difficult to parse his discussion of Defense Department operations.

Finally, the views and policies Mr. Hersh ascribes to Secretary Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, Under Secretary Feith, and other Department of Defense officials do not reflect their public or private comments or administration policy.

(link to the Jan. 17, 2005 release
<<http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2005/nr20050117-1987.html>>)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) LtCol, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 18, 2005 9:47 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; Keck, Gary, Col, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: framing the 06 budget
Attachments: FY06 Budget Strategic PA Plan (White)-rev 18 Jan.xls

Good Morning Sir,

This calendar should reflect the changes you suggested over the weekend.



FY06 Budget Strategic PA Plan ...

v/r

(b)(6)

LtCol (b)(6) USMC
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
Phone (b)(2)
Fax: (b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Saturday, January 15, 2005 4:20 PM
To: 'ldirita@ (b)(6)' Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
Cc: (b)(6) LtCol, OASD-PA
Subject: framing the 06 budget

as we move forward with budget rollout preparations i'd like us to consider some non-secdef tactics that will help frame the discussion for the 06 transformational budget.

1) i'd like to recommend that we switch up the order for the briefings just a bit, specifically in the case of the military analysts and the dod briefing team. the current plan calls for the budget to be briefed on background to the media on friday, 4, followed by a feb 5 (saturday) briefing of the analysts by tina jonas and mr. roth.

i recommend we brief the analysts before the 4th, and that we provide the service chiefs (or the vices) plus their uniformed comptroller reps, for this briefing. we would folo the same ground rules as the media briefing and the analysts' briefing could be done over say four hours, here in the building, featuring one hour for each service. whether tina jonas participates is optional.

the 06 budget marks much more than the usual programmatic funding level type of document. it lays the groundwork for a meaningful stab at moving the military in a historically new philosophical direction, a direction that is required by the realities of the world today -- realities brought on by the terrorism threat but also by the changing posture of our military basing.

this angle for the analysts' briefing allows each of the services to talk about their respective transformational needs of today and how those needs are addressed in this budget.

2) related to the service chiefs, i'd also propose that before the congressional hearings on feb. 16 and 17, the chiefs' pao's get op-eds placed in the newspapers with circulations near large military installations of their respective services: e.g., general schoomaker op-ed gets placed in papers circulating around fort campbell, fort sill, etc. (recall that we

are drafting an op-ed for the secdef for feb 8 placement in the wall street journal.) it would be great if the chiefs could do radio around these bases or stations, as well.

thanks.

(b)(6)

From: Keck, Gary, Col, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 18, 2005 7:29 AM
To: (b)(6) OASD-PA
Subject: FW: MSNBC Request: Iraq Election Talking Points (GEN(R) Montgomery Meigs) (UNCLASSIFIED)

FYI

COL Gary L. Keck
Deputy Director
DoD Press Operations
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Boyce, Paul Mr OCPA [mailto:Paul.Boyce@(b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, January 18, 2005 6:54 AM
To: (b)(6) LTC OASD-PA; Keck, Gary Col OASD-PA; 'CPIC Director'; (b)(6)
E MNF-I CG PAO'
Cc: 'mymeigs@(b)(6)'
Subject: MSNBC Request: Iraq Election Talking Points (GEN(R) Montgomery Meigs) (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE

Gentlemen, please forward to me all potential talking point on the military's involvement on the Iraq elections to me today -- to respond to below request. GEN(R) Meigs desires immediate assistance for his request: for commentary information this upcoming Saturday and Sunday on MSNBC. I suspect he also has contacted the State Department, but his below note to us at Army requires our quickest attention here and at DOD public affairs.

Thank you for your unwavering cooperation with this retired general officer request.

Very respectfully,
-- Paul

John P. Boyce, Jr.
Army Public Affairs, Media Relations Division
phone: (b)(6) E-mail: paul.boyce@(b)(6)

From: Montgomery Meigs [mailto:mymeigs@(b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, January 17, 2005 3:16 PM
To: Brooks, Vincent K BG OCPA
Subject: RE: Eye On Iraq - Iraqi Special Operations Forces (UNCLASSIFIED)

MSNBC will do a day long coverage of the election in Iraq, this Sat/Sun. Can you give me anything to help with making sense of that to viewers?
MCM

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE

(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, January 17, 2005 7:27 AM
To: Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; (b)(6)
 Capt. USMC, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; Keck, Gary, Col. OASD-PA; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) CDR, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA
Subject: Re: New Ideas for Military analyst coverage - Iraq trip

This is a thoughtful note...I think it makes a lot of sense to do as you suggest and I guess I thought we already were doing a lot of this in terms of quick contact, etc...we ought to be doing this, though, and we should not make the list too small...

 Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA <Roxie.Merritt@(b)(6)>
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA <larry.diritad@(b)(6)> Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@(b)(6)>; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA <Allison.Barber@(b)(6)> Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA <Bryan.Whitman@(b)(6)> Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA <George.Rhynedance@(b)(6)>
 Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA <Dallas.Lawrence@(b)(6)> Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA <Roxie.Merritt@(b)(6)> Keck, Gary, Col, OASD-PA <gary.keck@(b)(6)> (b)(6)
LCDR, OASD-PA (b)(6)
CC: (b)(6)
Sent: Fri Jan 14 19:25:08 2005
Subject: RE:New Ideas for Military analyst coverage - Iraq trip

BACKGROUND:

One of the most interesting things coming from this trip to Iraq with the media analysts was learning how their jobs have been undergoing a metamorphosis. There are several reasons behind the morph... with an all voluntary military, no one in the media has current military background. Additionally, we have been doing a good job of keeping these guys informed so that they have the ready answers when the network comes calling.

CURRENT ISSUES:

The key issue here is that more and more, media analysts are having a greater impact on the television media network coverage of military issues. They have now become the go-to guys not only on breaking stories, but they influence the views on issues. They also have a huge amount of influence on what stories the network decides to cover proactively with regards to military.

In media ops, I have been using them more frequently to get our side of the story out with media sensitive departments such as USDI, which is typically hard to penetrate with traditionally media, but that we have found to be receptive to talking to the analysts such as Ken Robinson.

RECOMMENDATION:

- 1.) I recommend we develop a core group from within our media analysts list of those that we can count on to carry our water. They become part of a "hot list" that we immediately make calls to or put on an email distro before we contact or respond to media on hot issues. We can also do more proactive engagement with this list and give them tips on what stories to focus on and give them heads up on upcoming issues as they are developing. By providing them with current and valuable information, they become the key go to guys for the networks and it begins to weed out the less reliably friendly analysts by the networks themselves.
- 2.) We need to continue with Dalla's initiative to do regional trips for the analysts on a routine basis. Even though some of these guys on this trip had been to Iraq last summer, the landscape had changed so dramatically that they were "wowed" at the changes in such a short amount of time. Would like to arrange a trip to Afghanistan next.
- 3.) Media ops and outreach can work on a plan to maximize use of the analysts and figure out a system by which we keep our most reliably friendly analysts plugged in on everything from crisis response to future plans. This trusted core group will be more than willing to work closely with us because we are their bread and butter, and the more

they know the more valuable they are to the networks.

4.) I am also going forward on working regional media trips and looking at trips for publishers, columnists and specialty media, including radio.

5.) As evidenced by this analyst trip to Iraq, the synergy of outreach shop and media ops working together on these type of projects is enormous and effective. Will continue to exam ways to improve processes.

Roxie T. Merritt
Captain, U.S. Navy
Director, DoD Press Operations
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Pentagon, Room (b)(2)
Washington, DC 20301-1400

(b)(2)

roxie.merritt@(b)(2)
"Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of All Who Threaten It"

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, January 14, 2005 5:25 PM
To: larry.dirita@(b)(6); Ruff, Eric, CIV, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; Keck, Gary, Col, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LCDR, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: Military analyst coverage - Iraq trip

Below is a summary of the most recent military analyst media items that appeared as a result of the trip to Iraq. We will distribute another report early next week on forthcoming items.

Attached please find the related media excerpts and links.

HIGHLIGHTS:

Paul Valley appeared on Fox on January 13th, on DaySide with Linda Vester (talk show), discussing his recent trip to Iraq. He was extremely upbeat and spoke about the upcoming elections in Iraq in positive terms, saying they will absolutely happen as scheduled. He said he's very comfortable with the election situation, and that voter turnout will most likely be better than expected. A possible issue could be voter registration in certain provinces, due to security threats from insurgents.

He also noted that:

- * The Marines are "doing a great job" in Iraq
- * Fallujah is probably now the safest city in Iraq right now, as citizens are coming back into neighborhoods, getting ID cards, supplies, etc.
- * Iraqis are now very active in helping their people, and finally taking the initiative, which they haven't been able to do up until this point

Paul Valley appeared on Fox News Live on January 14th, in which he noted: the positive morale of the military in Iraq, the Marines as a key force in Iraq, and extremely tight, organized security measures for the upcoming elections. A summary of this appearance was available on a Fox News-focused blog, but the Fox transcript is not yet available.

In military analyst broadcast appearances focusing on subjects other than Iraq:

- * Paul Valley appeared on Fox's Hannity & Colmes on January 13th, discussing the situation in Indonesia, and tension about U.S. foreign aid
- * John Garrett appeared on Fox on January 12th to discuss U.S. military death benefits

and life insurance policies

* Analysis from Bill Cowan was included in a Fox News report from January 14th about Friday's CIA report on new terrorist threats ("Mapping the Global Future")

MILITARY ANALYSTS – IRAQ TRIP

AS OF 1/19/05

OSD(PA) (S)

HIGHLIGHTS

Paul Vallely

Paul Vallely appeared on Fox's DaySide with Linda Vester (talk show) on January 13th, discussing his recent trip to Iraq. He was extremely upbeat and spoke about the upcoming elections in Iraq in positive terms, saying they will absolutely happen as scheduled. He said he's very comfortable with the election situation, and that voter turnout will most likely be better than expected. A possible issue could be voter registration in certain provinces, due to security threats from insurgents.

Also appearing on Fox News Live on January 14th, he noted: the positive morale of the military in Iraq, the Marines as a key force in Iraq, and extremely tight, organized security measures for the upcoming elections. A summary of this appearance was available on a Fox News-focused blog, but the Fox transcript is not yet available.

Fox featured Paul Vallely again on "Fox and Friends" Saturday on January 15th where he repeated the same upbeat description of the voting situation in Iraq. He also mentioned that 13 million Iraqis have registered to vote and that the elections need to go forward as scheduled.

Fox News Channel:

- The Marines are "doing a great job" in Iraq
- Fallujah is probably now the safest city in Iraq right now, as citizens are coming back into neighborhoods, getting ID cards, supplies, etc.
- Iraqis are very active in helping their people, and finally taking the initiative, which they haven't been able to do up until this point
- Syria & Iran are causing a great deal of problems in the region by providing support to the insurgents
- Images of a Humvee retro-fitting plant in Iraq

Bill Cowan

Bill Cowan is also featured on the Fox News Channel on January 14th, 16th and 17th on shows such as "Heartland with John Kasich" and "Fox and Friends." Like Paul Vallely, his take on the Iraq situation was also upbeat. His one overriding statement was that if

the U.S. pulls out of Iraq now, then it would look like Afghanistan before we invaded (i.e. insurgent training camps). He also said he felt that the U.S. would be down to 50,000 troops by the end of the year.

Key points of discussion highlighted by Colonel Cowan:

- The U.S. is being aggressive in training an Iraqi police force
- It has trained "quick response" teams to respond to insurgents threatening Iraqi police forces
- There is increased communication between the Iraqi and U.S. soldiers
- He is upbeat about the number of Sunnis, Kurds and Shiites that will participate in the election process

Ken Allard

A story originally written by *The Washington Times* on news that U.S. military officials are seeking more troops in Iraq included commentary by Ken Allard. The piece was reprinted by several publications, including New Kerala (India), Big News Network (Australia), Assyrian International News Agency (Switzerland) and the World Peace Herald. Specifically, Allard said the current troop numbers are not sufficient to sustain fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, or to deter aggression in Europe and South Korea.

Steven Greer

Steven Greer, also on the Fox News Channel, addressed the primary issue of whether Iraq is just turning into another training ground for insurgents. This became a common theme across many of the military analysts interviewed and was previously a big story in *The Washington Post* (i.e. National Intelligence Council Report).

Sergeant Major Greer had the following to say:

- He focused on the fact that the U.S and Iraq need to work closely together to beat down and contain current terrorist activities in Iraq
- Said Iraq is not a "breeding ground" for terrorists but may possibly be providing "on the job training" to terrorists from other countries who have joined the fight in Iraq

Note: The following military analysts did not appear in media coverage:

- Robert Maginnis
- John Garrett
- Jeff McCausland

1

**MILITARY ANALYSTS - IRAQ TRIP
EXCERPTS
AS OF 1/19/05**

* Indicates excerpt was distributed as part of Friday's analyst update.

ONLINE COVERAGE

KENNETH ALLARD

U.S. officers in Iraq seek more troops: report

Pakistan Dawn - January 17

* Originally produced by *The Washington Times*; reprints by New Kerala (India), Big News Network (Australia), Assyrian International News Agency (Switzerland) and The World Peace Herald (global online source)

Ken Allard, a retired colonel and author of four books on national security, told the (Washington Times) newspaper that America needed to expand its military if it wanted to continue to shoulder its responsibilities abroad.

According to him, the current strength of 500,000-troop active force was not enough to fight wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and to deter aggression in Europe and South Korea. "I would start adding forces until it is demonstratively too much," Mr. Allard said. "What happens if somewhere something else goes wrong ... We are eating seed corn. In an 18-division requirement, we have a 10-division force," he said.

STEVEN GREER

Fox News Channel

1/14/2005 5:05:24 PM

Steve Greer is a retired U.S. Army command Sergeant Major and a senior fellow at the National Defense Council Foundation. The big question today, is Iraq a breeding ground for the next generation of terrorists? Greer: Hi, John, no, I don't think so, not yet, anyway. It certainly has the potential to become so. What you see here is Iraq is a training base. An area where your opportunistic terrorist -- can do on the job training. There are other breeding grounds in the Muslim world. Syria, Lebanon. Those are breeding grounds where the government and the military structure really lets these terrorist operations work unfettered. It was blown into a big story. Apparently sort of waving this at President Bush. You said it was going to be a free, fair democracy in Iraq that was safe from terrorists and now we have terrorists there. John: Why is it -- why wouldn't one conclude that Iraq is a terrorist training ground when they have so much opportunity to train killing Americans? Greer: Well, I certainly think that Iraq is a training ground but it is not a breeding ground for terrorists. The breeding ground comes from when the young terrorists or young individual and they teach them the ideology of hate. I think part of the issue -- the issue is that inside of Iraq the difference is that you have terrorists flooding in from other nation states. The reason why you have that is the nation states like Syria are reluctant to do anything. They're not happy that Iraq may turn into a democracy. The

monarchies are not happy that you may have an elected government next to them in their border region.

PAUL VALLELY

Fox News Channel 1/13/2005 1:33:28 PM *

DaySide with Linda Vester

Vallely: We had great meetings with the first cavalry division and the Marines up in Fallujah. They're doing so many things, but it's security, it's finding the bad guys. We're finding there's more foreigners now than we thought that have come across the borders, so they're working it and doing a great job but what they're doing for the people we can talk about. Just wonderful what we're doing for the people of Fallujah right now....In 60 days, it's the safest city they say in Iraq right now. The marines control it. Now the citizens are starting to come back into the neighborhoods, they're being given identification cards, which they really like, by the way. It gives them some status...I can't say enough about the marines up there doing a great job, the men and women. It's just fantastic.

Fox News Channel 1/13/2005 1:35:38 PM *

DaySide with Linda Vester

Linda: We have a question from a viewer by email. He says what more can be done to get more Iraqis to come forward to help the U.S. soldiers deliver a pinpoint and decisive blow to the insurgency? Vallely: Great question. Two things happening here. We're training more battalions each month. I saw many Iraqi soldiers out there, National Guard. They're doing the security work for the convoys over there. I saw them in downtown Fallujah, we're trying to put the best Iraqi face out there, and that's what we need to do, so the Iraqis are very active, they're very active in the polling stations, in getting those set up throughout the country for the election. So they're taking the initiative finally...Linda: but bottom line, you were comfortable with the vote going off January 30? Vallely: Very comfortable. I think it may be better than we think but there will be problems up in that area only because of registration.

Fox News (Fox and Friends Saturday)

01/15/05 08:23:06

Vallely: There are 13 million people registered to vote... up to 80 percent could vote... The people in Iraq have done a wonderful job of mapping out security for the polling stations... The elections need to go forward, the people there need to get involved in the process of democracy. The Iraqis have taken a lot of initiative, doing positive things in the midst of a lot of terrorism... but security will be the key. In Fallujah - the most marvelous, inspiring trip, to see what the Marines have done up there - it's now the most secure city...

BILL COWAN

Fox News Channel 1/14/2005 10:17:23 AM *

Well, joining us now with some insight, Lieutenant Colonel Bill Cowan who actually just returned from Iraq last week and live in Iraq "Newsweek" magazine's Baghdad bureau chief. Gentlemen, welcome both of you. Colonel Cowan, give us your take on this news that Iraq may be the new terrorist training ground. Cowan: Any fundamentalist out there who wants to be part of their future needs to be in Iraq to start honing up his skills to find out how to fight western, U.S. or coalition forces.

Fox News -- Heartland With John Kasich

01/16/05 04:35:49

John: Colonel, I know there is a sense that if we can continue to train them, you have been there you are more optimistic about the train, I look at Bosnia, it took us ten years to train the Bosnian Army. I mean you are not advocating we stay ten years. What's the responsible exit strategy here? Cowan: John, we have seen good results with the training we have done. In speaking to our American forces over there, those Iraqi battalions that not alongside us in Najaf, Samarra and Fallujah did an outstanding job. No complaints. One key part is we had American advisors alongside the guys and that's what we have now. A program to get American advisors with all of these Iraqi units that are coming out we can take Iraqi units have that combat experience now, well trained, we are finding good lead merits there. Our primary goal now in Iraq besides reconstruction, employment and all other things has to be to build an effective fighting force with the Iraqi Army. John: Colonel, would you send your family there now? Cowan: My son has been in Iraq. I had a son who went there. He was in Afghanistan also. Like any parent whose children are worried over there I was worried the whole time. But it is interesting. I met with young troops, young troops in the reserves over there who had nothing bad to day. Good, highly motivated kids doing a mission and they felt strongly about it.

Fox News -- Fox and Friends

01/17/05 07:26:27

Joining us now to discuss that from his first-hand account is Fox news military analyst, Lieutenant Colonel Bill Cowan back from Iraq. Nice to be with you. Brian: the big difference between the last time you were there and this time. Cowan: Well, seeing what's happening to the Iraqi security forces, how we're really moving forward aggressively, Lieutenant General Petraeus to get qualified Iraqis out there, one putting advisors alongside the Iraqi forces, it bolsters their offense, capabilities and confidence, putting together quick reaction forces, so when they run into trouble, they have folks to help them out. Better communications, better equipment, getting things ready for the Iraqis to take over more responsibilities.

BLOG COVERAGE

PAUL VALLELY

"Happy Iraq" Turns Out To Be Not That Happy *

NewsHounds.us - blog - January 14

On FNL today (1/14), one interview stood out among the usual crop of likely suspects: Rick Folbaum (who substitutes for David Asman on Fridays) interviewed Paul Vallely, Fox News military analyst, who had recently returned from a trip to Iraq. The topic was

"Happy Iraq" -- & to listen to Valley, you'd think the US military had learned nothing in Vietnam.

...The interview was long on hyperbole, short on actual facts. Valley claimed there's "more successes than failures" & offered as an example of "success" that the "Marines have made Fallujah the safest city in Iraq" because "we took out the bad guys..." He added "We're defeating the enemy every time we can find them..." Folbaum acted enthusiastic about how "We are so proud" of what the US military is doing in Iraq & asked Valley what he thought we should be most proud of. Valley said he is "most proud of their morale" & of their "very, very positive attitude" in the face of "isolated incidents like the attacks today." Folbaum asked if there were any surprises while Valley was there. Valley replied that he was surprised by "how well organized they are for this election." Valley added that there will be "extraordinary security" for the upcoming election & he expects everything to go pretty smoothly "except up in Anbar province." He also admitted that the "amount of foreigners [is] greater than we thought..." Valley has been mentioned often on this website because of his frequent appearances on FNC, where he is always very gung-ho & rah-rah. Today was no exception.

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NewsHounds.us - blog - January 14

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Fox News Channel 1/14/2005 10:17:23 AM

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Fox News Channel 1/13/2005 1:35:38 PM

We have a question from a viewer by email. He says what more can be done to get more Iraqis to come forward to help the U.S. soldiers deliver a pinpoint and decisive blow to the insurgency? Great question. Two things happening here. We're training more battalions each month. I saw many Iraqi soldiers out there, National Guard. They're doing the security work for the convoys over there. I saw them in downtown Fallujah, we're trying to put the best Iraqi face out there, and that's what we need to do, so the Iraqis are very active, they're very active in the polling stations, in getting those set up throughout the country for the election. So they're taking the initiative finally. And they haven't been able to do that. They didn't know what taking the initiative was under Saddam Hussein. Now they're finding out as we work with them, they're taking the initiative for projects and helping their own people and this is just wonderful news. Linda: from the troops you were able to talk to, when you're out and about the -- Syria, Iran, a bigger problem and what we hear Baathists in Syria still funding the insurgency, some of the fighters right after they kill them -- I mean, they were being killed, they were found with cash on them. That's right. As they found the insurgents in Fallujah, many of them had \$200 to \$300 in

American money, cash, which means they had just got paid, so this is all being -- Linda: didn't get paid by Joe's construction company. That's exactly right. Didn't get work -- paid from work in Fallujah, from outside sources paying them, so the situation with Syria is very bad, and we need to really take some action over there in some ways because they're fueling the fires there. Linda: but bottom line, you were comfortable with the vote going off January 30? Very comfortable. I think it may be better than we think but there will be problems up in that area only because of registration. Linda: wow, thank you for coming here on zero sleep and welcome back home.

Fox News Channel 1/13/2005 1:33:28 PM

That's half, so the numbers are looking good and this was done by an independent poll. Linda: this is even though the Al Anbar province is the real challenge up there because they haven't been able to go out and register them because of the threats of the insurgents that are out there to terrorize them. Linda: what do you do about it? Well, to continue what we're doing. We had great meetings with the first cavalry division and the Marines up in Fallujah. They're doing so many things, but it's security, it's finding the bad guys. We're finding there's more foreigners now than we thought that have come across the borders, so they're working it and doing a great job but what they're doing for the people we can talk about. Just wonderful what we're doing for the people of Fallujah right now. Linda: yeah, I was surprised that you saw in Fallujah that it's so safe. I mean, that was always considered the worst. We know what happened to American contractors when they rolled in there and it's now really that safe? In 60 days, it's the safest city they say in Iraq right now. The marines control it. Now the citizens are starting to come back into the neighborhoods, they're being given identification cards, which they really like, by the way. It gives them some status. Linda: really? Yeah. They come through, get identified, they come to the next tent, they get a big box of food, water, and some other staples, and then they move out and they're open from 8:00 to 5 every day so more and more are coming back in, and it's just -- I can't say enough about the marines up there doing a great job, the men and women. It's just fantastic. [Applause] Linda: I'm going to tell you, it's by pure accident we happen to have two marines in our audience and I just want you to know, he wasn't pitching that for you. That's what he really saw. Those are pictures of General Vallely during the trip. We have a question from a viewer by email. He says what more can be done to get more Iraqis to come forward to help the u.s. soldiers deliver a pinpoint and decisive blow to the insurgency?...

(b)(6)

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, January 12, 2005 7:22 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Notes

perfect. (b)(6) this is exactly what i am looking for in feedback. thanks.

thanks for doing this trip. be safe.

ab

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, January 11, 2005 11:37 PM
To: Allison.Barber (b)(6)
Subject: Notes

Hi Allison, Just a quick note on the progress so far. The analyst portion of the trip was outstanding. The access and discussions were incredible. Dallas, (b)(6) and crew did a great job. Jeff MacCausland, Bill Cowan and John Garrett told me that the insights they received -- especially from MG Chiarelli and LTC Metz -- were very helpful. The Marines just opened everything for us in Fallujah. It's one thing to see stuff on TV, but something else to experience it.

America Supports You is not well known. I have spoken to about 30 soldiers and Marines and only one knew anything about it and that was because he had just seen a PSA on AFN. The other folks do not have access to TV. Radio seems to be the prime media here.

Speaking of radio, I know you believe TV is the only way to go, but I think we're missing the boat by not producing a five-minute (or two-minute or one-minute) daily radio show. Radios are on all day long and soldiers and Marines listen. Radio is a very valuable command information tool. I think it is something you should consider.

The soldiers in Baghdad are happy with Stars and Stripes. They receive it daily, and there are few problems. Marines in Fallujah get it, but only at the headquarters.

I'm off to the CPIC today. Hope all is well in the Pentagon.

v/r

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA [allison.barber@...]
Sent: Sunday, January 09, 2005 5:25 PM
To: [redacted]
Subject: FW: Heather Mac Donald's Article/Manhattan Institute

hi guys
can you get this article so [redacted] can send to her email list of military analysts...
thanks
ab

-----Original Message-----
From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA <larry.dirita@...>
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA <Bryan.Whitman@...> 'ldirita@...'
<ldirita@...>
CC: Geren, Pete, CIV, OSD <Pete.Geren@...> Maples, Michael D, MG, JCS VDJS
<michael.maples@...> CIV, OSD-POLICY
<...> Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA <George.Rhynedance@...>
Haynes, WJ, Hon, DoD OGC <hayneswj@...> Dell'Orto, Dan, Mr, DoD OGC
<dellordj@...> Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@...> Henry, Ryan, HON,
OSD-POLICY <Ryan.Henry@...>
Sent: Sun Jan 09 12:28:09 2005
Subject: Re: Heather Mac Donald's Article/Manhattan Institute

George...pls do ensure it shows up in the bird..we might also circulate without comment to our lists...

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----
From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA <Bryan.Whitman@...>
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA <larry.dirita@...> Larry DiRita (E-mail 2)
<ldirita@...>
CC: Geren, Pete, CIV, OSD <Pete.Geren@...> Maples, Michael D, MG, JCS VDJS
<michael.maples@...> CIV, OSD-POLICY
<...> Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA <George.Rhynedance@...>
Haynes, WJ, Hon, DoD OGC <hayneswj@...> Dell'Orto, Dan, Mr, DoD OGC
<dellordj@...> Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@...> Henry, Ryan, HON,
OSD-POLICY <Ryan.Henry@...>
Sent: Sun Jan 09 11:09:32 2005
Subject: Heather Mac Donald's Article/Manhattan Institute

This article is very good, but very large (6000 words). As you know we put her together with a number of people -- thanks to the continued persistence of Pete Geren who predicted how helpful she could be. We ought to think about ways to get this out and around -- ebird is one way, military analyst another, but I'm sure others have ideas too.

(b)(6)

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 04, 2005 4:00 PM
To: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Military Analyst Heads up

Who should I have Larry write to make sure we get the flight for you guys. He said he would but he wants someone lower than Abaza and higher than the ltc (b)(6)

Is it lessel??
Allison Barber
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

Sent from my BlackBerry Handheld.

-----Original Message-----

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA <Dallas.Lawrence@(b)(6)>
To: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA <Allison.Barber@(b)(6)>
Sent: Tue Jan 04 15:31:32 2005
Subject: FW: Military Analyst Heads up

id rather forward this to you and then you to Di Rita as you see appropriate.

-----Original Message-----

From: Allardcke (b)(6) [mailto:Allardcke@(b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, January 04, 2005 3:28 PM
To: Dallas.Lawrence@ (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: Re: Military Analyst Heads up

Dallas - Can you please pass this along to Larry Di Rita?

It's no longer my function to advise DOD leaders, but may I make three informal suggestions about your communications strategy in the current tsunami crisis?

1. It is not obvious to general audiences or the media how a CVN or an LHA can contribute to the remediation of a natural disaster. For example: virtually every capability that Kofi Anan called for over the weekend is typically represented by such battle groups. Those points need to be communicated using jargon-free, non-programmatic language (otherwise known as dumb-dumb speak). And the flag officers chosen to communicate that message fail in their mission if they cannot explain those functions convincingly to third graders.

2. Same point needs to be made about mil-to-mil contacts in which PACOM excels. All those otherwise incomprehensible combined exercises, FTXs and educational exchanges can now be seen as critical investments that today are making a difference - just when they are needed most. The fact that most of those things occur well below the media "noise level" should not blind us to their importance.

3. DefenseLink is not a helpful source of information when you're working a time-critical story: too much information, buried way too deep with far too much DOD-speak. Same assessment can be offered about PAO apparatus in DOD as well as the services. In a useful contrast today, I received some very helpful information this morning from an action officer who was far more concerned with helping me tell an accurate story rather than worrying about a fully coordinated "official position."

I respected that and never ratted out his name on TV. Suspect I'm speaking for most of the military analysts in suggesting that we couldn't care less about official positions and authoritative statements from on high: but we do try and get it right under some fairly severe time constraints. Anything helping us do that is incredibly valuable and likely helps DOD as well: but anything that's too late or too self-serving is worse than useless.

Bottom line: say a few things well!

And thanks again!

Colonel Ken Allard
MSNBC

(b)(6)

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 04, 2005 3:47 PM
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: Fw. Military Analyst Heads up

Interesting feedback from an analyst.

Allison Barber
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

Sent from my BlackBerry Handheld.

-----Original Message-----

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA <Dallas.Lawrence@^{(b)(6)}
To: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA <Allison.Barber@^{(b)(6)}
Sent: Tue Jan 04 15:31:32 2005
Subject: FW: Military Analyst Heads up

id rather forward this to you and then you to di rita as you see appropriate.

-----Original Message-----

From: Allardck^{(b)(6)} [mailto:Allardck^{(b)(6)}
Sent: Tuesday, January 04, 2005 3:28 PM
To: Dallas.Lawrence@^{(b)(6)}
Cc: ^{(b)(6)}
Subject: Re: Military Analyst Heads up

Dallas - Can you please pass this along to Larry Di Rita?

It's no longer my function to advise DOD leaders, but may I make three informal suggestions about your communications strategy in the current tsunami crisis?

1. It is not obvious to general audiences or the media how a CVN or an LHA can contribute to the remediation of a natural disaster. For example: virtually every capability that Kofi Anan called for over the weekend is typically represented by such battle groups. Those points need to be communicated using jargon-free, non-programmatic language (otherwise known as dumb-dumb speak). And the flag officers chosen to communicate that message fail in their mission if they cannot explain those functions convincingly to third graders.

2. Same point needs to be made about mil-to-mil contacts in which PACOM excels. All those otherwise incomprehensible combined exercises, FTXs and educational exchanges can now be seen as critical investments that today are making a difference - just when they are needed most. The fact that most of those things occur well below the media "noise level" should not blind us to their importance.

3. Defenselink is not a helpful source of information when you're working a time-critical story: too much information, buried way too deep with far too much DOD-speak. Same assessment can be offered about PAO apparatus in DOD as well as the services. In a useful contrast today, I received some very helpful information this morning from an action officer who was far more concerned with helping me tell an accurate story rather than worrying about a fully coordinated "official position."

I respected that and never ratted out his name on TV. Suspect I'm speaking for most of the military analysts in suggesting that we couldn't care less about official positions and authoritative statements from on high: but we do try and get it right under some fairly severe time constraints. Anything helping us do that is incredibly valuable and likely helps DOD as well: but anything that's too late or too self-serving is worse than useless. Bottom line: say a few things well!

And thanks again!

Colonel Ken Allard
MSNBC

(b)(6)

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 04, 2005 1:28 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: confirmed for Conf. Call @1400

Please send to (b)(6)
Allison Barber
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

Sent from my BlackBerry Handheld.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA (b)(6)
To: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA <Allison.Barber(b)(6)>; Keck, Gary, Col, OASD-PA <gary.keck(b)(6)>; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA <Dallas.Lawrence(b)(6)>; Davis, Archie, Col, OASD-PA <Archie.Davis(b)(6)>
Sent: Tue Jan 04 13:25:31 2005
Subject: confirmed for Conf. Call @1400

Latest list...

Confirmed Retired Military Analysts:

Colonel Carl Kenneth Allard	(USA, Retired)
Mr. Jed Babbin	(USAF, JAG)
Admiral Dennis C. Blair	(USN, Retired)
Major Dana R. Dillon	(USA, Retired)
Colonel (Tim) J. Eads	(USA, Retired)
Colonel John Garrett	(USMC, Retired)
Brigadier General David L. Grange	(USA, Retired)
Command Sergeant Major Steven Greer	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis	(USA, Retired)
Captain Chuck Nash	(USN, Retired)
Major General Paul E. Vallely	(USA, Retired)

(b)(6)
OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison
(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1400
(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 04, 2005 12:52 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: REQUEST

thank you boss. you will be missed in the sandbox. safe travels to bahrain.

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 04, 2005 11:27 AM
To: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Cc: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: REQUEST

dallas, i just saw this so presumably we are obo. also, because i've been asked to go to a centcom pa meeting later this month in bahrain, i won't be going on the trip with the analysts next week. that being said, let me say you have done some very good work on the trip and from my vantage point you have demonstrated some good initiative and follow through. thank you for the effort. eric

-----Original Message-----

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 04, 2005 9:36 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: REQUEST
Importance: High

DO YOU WANT TO TALK WITH HIM?

-----Original Message-----

From: Robert H Scales [mailto:RobertHScales@
Sent: Tuesday, January 04, 2005 8:50 AM
To: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Military Analyst Heads up

Dallas:

Thanks.

I'm going on prime time soon to talk about how the Army and Marines are organizing to support the elections. Other than the usual platitudes I know nothing specific. The media wants to know a bit more in depth. So you have anyone who can talk about this off the record?
Bob Scales

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA [mailto:Dallas.Lawrence@
Sent: Mon 1/3/2005 3:53 PM
Cc: , CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Military Analyst Heads up

Hello folks,

There will be a conference call tomorrow, Tuesday, January 4, 2005 with Admiral Thomas Fargo, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (bio:

<http://www.pacom.mil/leadership/0/0bio.shtml>). The conference call is tentatively set for 1400 est -1430 est.

(b)(6) (copied in the cc column) in our office will be emailing you all tomorrow morning with call-in information along with confirmed times.

Please email all queries and rsvp's to (b)(6) directly at (b)(6)

Thank you for your continued great work on the airwaves!

d)

Dallas B. Lawrence
Director, Office of Community Relations & Public Liaison
United States Department of Defense

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 04, 2005 12:33 PM
To: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: HELP!!!!

I was thinking someone in between him and abizaid. For instance, is gen Lessel in his world?

-----Original Message-----

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 04, 2005 12:21 PM
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Subject: RE: HELP!!!!

he is the deputy PAO and has been one of many people working on this trip. they don't have a dedicated flight for us out of kuwait to iraq -- so they are going to do their best to help us. these things usually work out but actually, if you could zip a note to gen abazaid, that would really clear things up.

the request:

we are sending military analysts over and this is a high priority for the department. we need full support to include airlift from kuwait to iraq.

is that possible?

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 04, 2005 12:10 PM
To: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: HELP!!!!

Who is he? Who does he work for?

-----Original Message-----

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 04, 2005 12:08 PM
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Cc: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Subject: HELP!!!!

could use some ASD muscle please. will you please zip an email to (b)(6) letting him know the iraq trip is a high priority for dod?

thanks... if you ever need muscle support from me -- you are in trouble!

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) LTC CFLCC/3A-ATL-PAO
[mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, January 04, 2005 10:59 AM
To: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA;
(b)(6) LTC ARMY/III Corps MNC-I PAO'; (b)(6) W LTC
MNC-I PAO Media Officer; (b)(6) MAJ MNC-I PAO; (b)(6)
(b)(6) LTC MNE-I CI Trip Planner; (b)(6) LTC; (b)(6)
MAJ; (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) LTC
CFLCC/3A-ATL-PAO; (b)(6) Lt Col CFLCC/3A-FWD-PAO; (b)(6)

MAJ CFLCC/3A-FWD-PAO; (b)(6) COL
MNF-I STRATCOM DEP DIR PAO; (b)(6)
MNF-I CG PAO; (b)(6) LTC MNC-I PAO Media Officer; Pittman, CAPT
(b)(6) COL
CFLCC/3A-ATL-PAO
Subject: RE: Iraq Trip

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE

Sir,

We are continuing to work the issue of dedicated aircraft or priority seating on available aircraft. Although the commanders support this media facilitation they have not necessarily signed up to prioritize air assets for this purpose over other resources in support of operations in theater - It would be very helpful to have a SECDEF endorsement to encourage priority or dedicated aircraft.

My counterpart in Kuwait, LTC Pete Pearse is attempting to coordinate for dedicated Sherpa support.

Dan,

It would help if LTG Metz/MNC-I requested through official message traffic for CFLCC to provide dedicated Sherpa support for this mission.

VR

LTC (b)(6)
Deputy PAO
Third Army/ARCENT/CFLCC
Atlanta

(b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA [mailto:Dallas.Lawrence@ (b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, January 04, 2005 10:29 AM
To: (b)(6) LTC ARMY/III Corps MNC-I PAO; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC MNC-I PAO Media Officer; (b)(6) LTC MNF-I C1 Trip Planner; (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Iraq Trip

Dan,

Hearing that there might be an issue getting a dedicated flight into Iraq from Kuwait. I know this is not in your lane, but wanted to get your guidance. My understanding was this would be taken care of from Kuwait's end once our TCR was approved (which it has).

Also, FYI, ASDPA has added Captain Roxie Merritt, director of press ops, to our trip, she will be on hand to manage the 2 bureau chiefs along for the trip and Fred Barnes if he does indeed confirm his attendance today.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) LTC ARMY/III Corps MNC-I PAO [mailto:Daniel.Baggio@iraq.centcom.mil]
Sent: Tuesday, January 04, 2005 4:58 AM
To: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC CFLCC/3A-ATL-PAO;

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Iraq Trip

Dallas,

Happy New Year!

We'll see what we can do - I'm not going to promise. One of the challenges is that MNF-I have declared a moratorium on visits into theater, because of the resources (like aircraft) being dedicated to the election security mission and the increased troop flow into theater, etc. We have received a waiver for your group to visit. The challenges will be air transportation for such a large group (it would take two helicopters - that's why when I signed up to do this from MNC-I, it was under the assumption that we would try to organize events in the Greater Camp Victory/BIAP Complex Area of Operations). Travel to places like Falluja will be difficult to do.

At this point we have planned on scheduling LTG Metz to talk to the group and MG Chiarelli and/or BG Hammond from the 1st Cav. Also, last night I talked to COL Holbert from I MEF and she is going to talk to her leadership about sending somebody to talk to the group.

As far as site visits are concerned - this will be hard in such a limited time. Is it possible for the group to stay another day? I've been talking to LTC (b)(6) from 1st Cav - there could possibly be a visit to see construction and the security situation in Thawra (Sadr City) - but to make it worthwhile we need to dedicate a day to this.

Also, one of the questions folks have asked me for clarification, is: What kind of products do we expect to get out of this? I would hate to organize all the security and logistics for that size group to go to Thawra or Falluja, etc. for only a limited return on investment. Let me know your thoughts.

I will talk to COL (b)(6) at I MEF to see if it is worthwhile and assets are available to visit Falluja or maybe Najaf or Ramadi. I will also consult with our C-9 (CMO) - COL (b)(6) about the best venues for reconstruction that fit out constraints.

As far as the IIG piece is concerned, I'll punt that back up to STRATCOM to COL (b)(6) & COL (b)(6) for visibility on PM Allawi.

As soon as we can get more granularity on your itinerary - if we can get it on SIPR - it will be helpful. It is hard to book specific times for GOS in particular without specific times.

As far as the issues in Kuwait are concerned, I've copied LTC (b)(6) and MAJ (b)(6) in Kuwait as well as LTC (b)(6) in Atlanta. I defer to them.

Thanks, (b)(6)

P.S. Reminder all of these guys need to bring their own Body Armor & Helmets.

(b)(6)
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
Chief of Public Affairs
Multi-National Corps - Iraq
Camp Victory Main, Baghdad
DSN (b)(6)
MCI Cell (b)(6) (U.S.)

Iraqna Cell (b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA [mailto:Dallas.Lawrence@ (b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, January 03, 2005 9:59 PM
To: (b)(6) LTC MNC-I PAO
Media Officer; (b)(6)
(b)(6) LTC MNF-I C1 Trip Planner
Cc: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Iraq Trip
Importance: High

Gentleman,

I wanted to bring everyone into the loop now that we finally have country clearance approval for our OSDPA Military Analyst trip into Iraq. For obvious security reasons (and my lack of sipr) I will avoid using specific dates, however I think you are all keyed into the dates we are traveling into the theater.

Right now, in addition to the 9 or so military analysts on the trip, we will be bringing two bureau chiefs.

Desired outcomes:

- 1) Provide our television military analysts with 1st person knowledge of the successes in Iraq, both militarily and in rebuilding the infrastructure and democratic institutions.
- 2) Provide 1st person knowledge on the progress being made towards elections on 30 January and the Iraqi's desire for a free and democratic country

Our three day trip will be comprised as follows:

Day 1: Our group will arrive into Kuwait and be picked up and taken to the Kuwait base. opportunity to eat with troops, and attend any late afternoon briefings the folks in Kuwait want to put together (this is at the request of the folks in Kuwait).

Day 2, early am departure for Iraq

Day 3, evening departure for Kuwait

"Dream" Schedule, these are the things we would like to fit into the 38 hours or so we will be in the country:

- 1) Briefings by MNFI on military status in Iraq. Note, this is not a 1-1 interview, but a group unclassified on the record briefing. 1-2 hours
- 2) trip to fallujah (again, dream scenario) to allow the group to meet with the Marine commanders to help our folks understand the huge successes achieved in Fallujah and their positive ripple effects throughout Iraq. This message has not resonated in the States. SecDef has reinforced it time and time again during briefings as has CJCOS.
- 3) Briefing on status of elections from election team officials on the ground
- 4) Meeting with senior Iraqi leaders - ideally 15-20 minutes with PM Allawi or President Ghazi
- 5) Visit to a US reconstruction project to show signs of progress.
- 6) Lots of eating with troops, lunch, dinner etc

I am open to any and all changes that you folks would recommend that would better allow us to meet the objectives of this trip while meeting your trip goals as well.

(b)(6) it will be great to see you again, please let me know if there is anything I can bring you or your guys from the states and Ill pack the extra bag. LTC (b)(6) who is cc'd above, will be advancing the Kuwait leg of our trip and will be traveling in country with us.

Please advise on the following: Does an up to date DOD CAC card still provide access into Kuwait without a Visa, and 2) for our non CAC card folks, I have been told that folks arriving into Kuwait can process their Visa at the airport as long as they have an up-to-date passport. Is this correct, and is the office open 24/7 (we have a few late arrivals coming in in the evening of the 1st day)

Best,

d1

Dallas B. Lawrence
Director, Office of Community Relations & Public Liaison United States
Department of Defense

(b)(2)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE

(b)(6)

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 04, 2005 10:39 AM
To: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Subject: RE:

plus i gave you that guy dillon yesterday.. he is with heritage too..i think.

-----Original Message-----

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 04, 2005 10:39 AM
To: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE:

it would be one of these, i just emailed (b)(6) and asked them. I left the invite composition to (b)(6) and (b)(6) as he knew best the folks that actually get on tv time, i just made sure we invited abc, nbc, cbs, fox and cnn. If i dont hear back in 30 minutes, im just going to call each of them below and see if they got an invite (play dumb, im so good at it) and then extend one

Commander Peter Brookes (USN, Reserve)
Senior Fellow for National Security
The Heritage Foundation

Dr. James Jay Carafano (LTC, USA, Retired)
Senior Fellow
The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies
The Heritage Foundation

Major Dana R. Dillon (USA, Retired)
Heritage Foundation

General William L. Nash (USA, Retired)
Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Preventive Action
Council on Foreign Relations

Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor (USMC, Retired)
Senior Fellow
Council on Foreign Relations



City Journal
How to Interrogate Terrorists
Heather Mac Donald
Winter 2005

It didn't take long for interrogators in the war on terror to realize that their part was not going according to script. Pentagon doctrine, honed over decades of cold-war planning, held that 95 percent of prisoners would break upon straightforward questioning. Interrogators in Afghanistan, and later in Cuba and Iraq, found just the opposite: virtually none of the terror detainees was giving up information-not in response to direct questioning, and not in response to army-approved psychological gambits for prisoners of war.

Debate erupted in detention centers across the globe about how to get detainees to talk. Were "stress techniques"-such as isolation or sleep deprivation to decrease a detainee's resistance to questioning-acceptable? Before the discussion concluded, however, the photos of prisoner abuse in Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison appeared. Though they showed the sadism of a prison out of control, they showed nothing about interrogation.

Nevertheless, Bush-administration critics seized on the scandal as proof that prisoner "torture" had become routine. A master narrative-call it the "torture narrative"-sprang up: the government's 2002 decision to deny Geneva-convention status to al-Qaida fighters, it held, "led directly to the abuse of detainees in Afghanistan and Iraq," to quote the *Washington Post*. In particular, torturous interrogation methods, developed at Guantánamo Bay and Afghanistan in illegal disregard of Geneva protections, migrated to Abu Ghraib and were manifest in the abuse photos.

This story's success depends on the reader's remaining ignorant of the actual interrogation techniques promulgated in the war on terror. Not only were they light years from real torture and hedged around with bureaucratic safeguards, but

they had nothing to do with the Abu Ghraib anarchy. Moreover, the decision on the Geneva conventions was irrelevant to interrogation practices in Iraq.

No matter. The Pentagon's reaction to the scandal was swift and sweeping. It stripped interrogators not just of stress options but of traditional techniques long regarded as uncontroversial as well. Red tape now entangles the interrogation process, and detainees know that their adversaries' hands are tied.

The need for rethinking interrogation doctrine in the war on terror will not go away, however. The Islamist enemy is unlike any the military has encountered in the past. If current wisdom on the rules of war prohibits making any distinction between a terrorist and a lawful combatant, then that orthodoxy needs to change.

The interrogation debate first broke out on the frigid plains of Afghanistan. Marines and other special forces would dump planeloads of al-Qaida and Taliban prisoners into a ramshackle detention facility outside the Kandahar airport; waiting interrogators were then supposed to extract information to be fed immediately back into the battlefield—whether a particular mountain pass was booby-trapped, say, or where an arms cache lay. That "tactical" debriefing accomplished, the Kandahar interrogation crew would determine which prisoners were significant enough to be shipped on to the Guantánamo naval base in Cuba for high-level interrogation.

Army doctrine gives interrogators 16 "approaches" to induce prisoners of war to divulge critical information. Sporting names like "Pride and Ego Down" and "Fear Up Harsh," these approaches aim to exploit a detainee's self-love, allegiance to or resentment of comrades, or sense of futility. Applied in the right combination, they will work on nearly everyone, the intelligence soldiers had learned in their training.

But the Kandahar prisoners were not playing by the army rule book. They divulged nothing. "Prisoners overcame the [traditional] model almost effortlessly,"

writes Chris Mackey in *The Interrogators*, his gripping account of his interrogation service in Afghanistan. The prisoners confounded their captors "not with clever cover stories but with simple refusal to cooperate. They offered lame stories, pretended not to remember even the most basic of details, and then waited for consequences that never really came."

Some of the al-Qaida fighters had received resistance training, which taught that Americans were strictly limited in how they could question prisoners. Failure to cooperate, the al-Qaida manuals revealed, carried no penalties and certainly no risk of torture—a sign, gloated the manuals, of American weakness.

Even if a prisoner had not previously studied American detention policies before arriving at Kandahar, he soon figured them out. "It became very clear very early on to the detainees that the Americans were just going to have them sit there," recalls interrogator Joe Martin (a pseudonym). "They realized: 'The Americans will give us our Holy Book, they'll draw lines on the floor showing us where to pray, we'll get three meals a day with fresh fruit, do Jazzercise with the guards, . . . we can wait them out.' "

Even more challenging was that these detainees bore little resemblance to traditional prisoners of war. The army's interrogation manual presumed adversaries who were essentially the mirror image of their captors, motivated by emotions that all soldiers share. A senior intelligence official who debriefed prisoners in the 1989 U.S. operation in Panama contrasts the battlefield then and now: "There were no martyrs down there, believe me," he chuckles. "The Panamanian forces were more understandable people for us. Interrogation was pretty straightforward: 'Love of Family' [an army-manual approach, promising, say, contact with wife or children in exchange for cooperation] or, 'Here's how you get out of here as fast as you can.' "

"Love of family" often had little purchase among the terrorists, however—as did love of life. "The jihadists would tell you, 'I've divorced this life, I don't care about

my family," recalls an interrogator at Guantánamo. "You couldn't shame them." The fierce hatred that the captives bore their captors heightened their resistance. The U.S. ambassador to Pakistan reported in January 2002 that prisoners in Kandahar would "shout epithets at their captors, including threats against the female relatives of the soldiers guarding them, knee marines in the groin, and say that they will escape and kill 'more Americans and Jews.'" Such animosity continued in Guantánamo.

Battlefield commanders in Afghanistan and intelligence officials in Washington kept pressing for information, however. The frustrated interrogators constantly discussed how to get it. The best hope, they agreed, was to re-create the "shock of capture"-that vulnerable mental state when a prisoner is most frightened, most uncertain, and most likely to respond to questioning. Uncertainty is an interrogator's most powerful ally; exploited wisely, it can lead the detainee to believe that the interrogator is in total control and holds the key to his future. The Kandahar detainees, however, learned almost immediately what their future held, no matter how egregious their behavior: nothing untoward.

Many of the interrogators argued for a calibrated use of "stress techniques"-long interrogations that would cut into the detainees' sleep schedules, for example, or making a prisoner kneel or stand, or aggressive questioning that would put a detainee on edge.

Joe Martin-a crack interrogator who discovered that a top al-Qaida leader, whom Pakistan claimed to have in custody, was still at large and directing the Afghani resistance-explains the psychological effect of stress: "Let's say a detainee comes into the interrogation booth and he's had resistance training. He knows that I'm completely handcuffed and that I can't do anything to him. If I throw a temper tantrum, lift him onto his knees, and walk out, you can feel his uncertainty level rise dramatically. He's been told: 'They won't physically touch you,' and now you have. The point is not to beat him up but to introduce the reality into his mind

that he doesn't know where your limit is." Grabbing someone by the top of the collar has had a more profound effect on the outcome of questioning than any actual torture could have, Martin maintains. "The guy knows: You just broke your own rules, and that's scary. He might demand to talk to my supervisor. I'll respond: 'There are no supervisors here,' and give him a maniacal smile."

The question was: Was such treatment consistent with the Geneva conventions?

President Bush had declared in February 2002 that al-Qaida members fell wholly outside the conventions and that Taliban prisoners would not receive prisoner-of-war status-without which they, too, would not be covered by the Geneva rules. Bush ordered, however, that detainees be treated humanely and in accordance with Geneva principles, to the extent consistent with military necessity. This second pronouncement sank in: all of the war on terror's detention facilities chose to operate under Geneva rules. Contrary to the fulminations of rights advocates and the press, writes Chris Mackey, "Every signal we interrogators got from above from the colonels at [the Combined Forces Land Component Command] in Kuwait to the officers at Central Command back in Tampa-had been . . . to observe the Conventions, respect prisoners' rights, and never cut corners."

What emerged was a hybrid and fluid set of detention practices. As interrogators tried to overcome the prisoners' resistance, their reference point remained Geneva and other humanitarian treaties. But the interrogators pushed into the outer limits of what they thought the law allowed, undoubtedly recognizing that the prisoners in their control violated everything the pacts stood for.

The Geneva conventions embody the idea that even in as brutal an activity as war, civilized nations could obey humanitarian rules: no attacking civilians and no retaliation against enemy soldiers once they fall into your hands. Destruction would be limited as much as possible to professional soldiers on the battlefield.

That rule required, unconditionally, that soldiers distinguish themselves from civilians by wearing uniforms and carrying arms openly.

Obedience to Geneva rules rests on another bedrock moral principle: reciprocity. Nations will treat an enemy's soldiers humanely because they want and expect their adversaries to do the same. Terrorists flout every civilized norm animating the conventions. Their whole purpose is to kill noncombatants, to blend into civilian populations, and to conceal their weapons. They pay no heed whatever to the golden rule; anyone who falls into their hands will most certainly not enjoy commissary privileges and wages, per the Geneva mandates. He-or she-may even lose his head.

Even so, terror interrogators tried to follow the spirit of the Geneva code for conventional, uniformed prisoners of war. That meant, as the code puts it, that the detainees could not be tortured or subjected to "any form of coercion" in order to secure information. They were to be "humanely" treated, protected against "unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind," and were entitled to "respect for their persons and their honour."

The Kandahar interrogators reached the following rule of thumb, reports Mackey: if a type of behavior toward a prisoner was no worse than the way the army treated its own members, it could not be considered torture or a violation of the conventions. Thus, questioning a detainee past his bedtime was lawful as long as his interrogator stayed up with him. If the interrogator was missing exactly the same amount of sleep as the detainee-and no tag-teaming of interrogators would be allowed, the soldiers decided-then sleep deprivation could not be deemed torture. In fact, interrogators were routinely sleep-deprived, catnapping maybe one or two hours a night, even as the detainees were getting long beauty sleeps. Likewise, if a boot-camp drill sergeant can make a recruit kneel with his arms stretched out in front without violating the Convention Against Torture, an interrogator can use that tool against a recalcitrant terror suspect.

Did the stress techniques work? Yes. "The harsher methods we used . . . the better information we got and the sooner we got it," writes Mackey, who emphasizes that the methods never contravened the conventions or crossed over into torture.

Stress broke a young bomb maker, for instance. Six months into the war, special forces brought a young Afghan to the Kandahar facility, the likely accomplice of a Taliban explosives expert who had been blowing up aid workers. Joe Martin got the assignment.

"Who's your friend the Americans are looking for?" the interrogation began.

"I don't know."

"You think this is a joke? What do you think I'll do?"

"Torture me."

So now I understand his fear, Martin recollects.

The interrogation continued: "You'll stand here until you tell me your friend."

"No, sir, he's not my friend."

Martin picked up a book and started reading. Several hours later, the young Taliban was losing his balance and was clearly terrified. Moreover, he's got two "big hillbilly guards staring at him who want to kill him," the interrogator recalls.

"You think THIS is bad?!" the questioning starts up again.

"No, sir."

The prisoner starts to fall; the guards stand him back up. If he falls again, and can't get back up, Martin can do nothing further. "I have no rack," he says matter-

of-factly. The interrogator's power is an illusion; if a detainee refuses to obey a stress order, an American interrogator has no recourse.

Martin risks a final display of his imaginary authority. "I get in his face, 'What do you think I will do next?'" he barks. In the captive's mind, days have passed, and he has no idea what awaits him. He discloses where he planted bombs on a road and where to find his associate. "The price?" Martin asks. "I made a man stand up. Is this unlawful coercion?"

Under a strict reading of the Geneva protections for prisoners of war, probably: the army forbids interrogators from even touching lawful combatants. But there is a huge gray area between the gold standard of POW treatment reserved for honorable opponents and torture, which consists of the intentional infliction of severe physical and mental pain. None of the stress techniques that the military has used in the war on terror comes remotely close to torture, despite the hysterical charges of administration critics. (The CIA's behavior remains a black box.) To declare non-torturous stress off-limits for an enemy who plays by no rules and accords no respect to Western prisoners is folly.

The soldiers used stress techniques to reinforce the traditional psychological approaches. Jeff (a pseudonym), an interrogator in Afghanistan, had been assigned a cocky English Muslim, who justified the 9/11 attacks because women had been working in the World Trade Center. The British citizen deflected all further questioning. Jeff questioned him for a day and a half, without letting him sleep and playing on his religious loyalties. "I broke him on his belief in Islam," Jeff recounts. "He realized he had messed up, because his Muslim brothers and sisters were also in the building." The Brit broke down and cried, then disclosed the mission that al-Qaida had put him on before capture. But once the prisoner was allowed to sleep for six hours, he again "clammed up."

Halfway across the globe, an identical debate had broken out, among interrogators who were encountering the same obstacles as the Afghanistan

intelligence team. The U.S. base at Guantánamo was supposed to be getting the Afghanistan war's worst of the worst: the al-Qaida Arabs and their high Taliban allies.

Usama bin Ladin's driver and bodyguard were there, along with explosives experts, al-Qaida financiers and recruiters, would-be suicide recruits, and the architects of numerous attacks on civilian targets. They knew about al-Qaida's leadership structure, its communication methods, and its plans to attack the U.S. And they weren't talking. "They'd laugh at you; 'You've asked me this before,' they'd say contemptuously," reports Major General Michael Dunlavey, a former Guantánamo commanding officer. "Their resistance was tenacious. They'd already had 90 days in Afghanistan to get their cover stories together and to plan with their compatriots."

Even more than Afghanistan, Guantánamo dissipated any uncertainty the detainees might have had about the consequences of noncooperation. Consistent with the president's call for humane treatment, prisoners received expert medical care, three culturally appropriate meals each day, and daily opportunities for prayer, showers, and exercise. They had mail privileges and reading materials. Their biggest annoyance was boredom, recalls one interrogator. Many prisoners disliked the move from Camp X-Ray, the first facility used at the base, to the more commodious Camp Delta, because it curtailed their opportunities for homosexual sex, says an intelligence analyst. The captives protested every perceived infringement of their rights but, as in Afghanistan, ignored any reciprocal obligation. They hurled excrement and urine at guards, used their blankets as garrotes, and created additional weapons out of anything they could get their hands on-including a sink wrenched off a wall. Guards who responded to the attacks-with pepper spray or a water hose, say-got punished and, in one case, court-martialed.

Gitmo personnel disagreed sharply over what tools interrogators could legally use. The FBI took the most conservative position. When a bureau agent questioning Mohamedou Ould Slahi—a Mauritanian al-Qaida operative who had recruited two of the 9/11 pilots—was getting nothing of value, an army interrogator suggested, "Why don't you mention to him that conspiracy is a capital offense?" "That would be a violation of the Convention Against Torture," shot back the agent—on the theory that any covert threat inflicts "severe mental pain." Never mind that district attorneys and police detectives routinely invoke the possibility of harsh criminal penalties to get criminals to confess. Federal prosecutors in New York have even been known to remind suspects that they are more likely to keep their teeth and not end up as sex slaves by pleading to a federal offense, thus avoiding New York City's Rikers Island jail. Using such a method against an al-Qaida jihadist, by contrast, would be branded a serious humanitarian breach.

Top military commanders often matched the FBI's restraint, however. "It was ridiculous the things we couldn't do," recalls an army interrogator. "One guy said he would talk if he could see the ocean. It wasn't approved, because it would be a change of scenery"—a privilege that discriminated in favor of a cooperating detainee, as opposed to being available to all, regardless of their behavior.

Frustration with prisoner stonewalling reached a head with Mohamed al-Kahtani, a Saudi who had been fighting with Usama bin Ladin's bodyguards in Afghanistan in December 2001. By July 2002, analysts had figured out that Kahtani was the missing 20th hijacker. He had flown into Orlando International Airport from Dubai on August 4, 2001, but a sharp-eyed customs agent had denied him entry. Waiting for him at the other side of the gate was Mohamed Atta.

Kahtani's resistance strategies were flawless. Around the first anniversary of 9/11, urgency to get information on al-Qaida grew. Finally, army officials at Guantánamo prepared a legal analysis of their interrogation options and

requested permission from Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to use various stress techniques on Kahtani. Their memo, sent up the bureaucratic chain on October 11, 2002, triggered a fierce six-month struggle in Washington among military lawyers, administration officials, and Pentagon chiefs about interrogation in the war on terror.

To read the techniques requested is to understand how restrained the military has been in its approach to terror detainees—and how utterly false the torture narrative has been. Here's what the interrogators assumed they could not do without clearance from the secretary of defense: yell at detainees (though never in their ears), use deception (such as posing as Saudi intelligence agents), and put detainees on MREs (meals ready to eat—vacuum-sealed food pouches eaten by millions of soldiers, as well as vacationing backpackers) instead of hot rations. The interrogators promised that this dangerous dietary measure would be used only *in extremis*, pending local approval and special training.

The most controversial technique approved was "mild, non-injurious physical contact such as grabbing, poking in the chest with the finger, and light pushing," to be reserved only for a "very small percentage of the most uncooperative detainees" believed to possess critical intelligence. A detainee could be poked only after review by Gitmo's commanding general of intelligence and the commander of the U.S. Southern Command in Miami, and only pursuant to "careful coordination" and monitoring.

None of this remotely approaches torture or cruel or degrading treatment. Nevertheless, fanatically cautious Pentagon lawyers revolted, claiming that the methods approved for Kahtani violated international law. Uncharacteristically irresolute, Rumsfeld rescinded the Guantánamo techniques in January 2003.

Kahtani's interrogation hung fire for three months, while a Washington committee, with representatives from the undersecretary of defense, the Defense

Intelligence Agency, the air force, army, navy, and marine corps, and attorneys from every branch of the military, considered how to approach the 20th hijacker.

The outcome of this massive deliberation was more restrictive than the Geneva conventions themselves, even though they were to apply only to unlawful combatants, not conventional prisoners of war, and only to those held at Guantánamo Bay. It is worth scrutinizing the final 24 techniques Rumsfeld approved for terrorists at Gitmo in April 2003, since these are the techniques that the media presents as the source of "torture" at Abu Ghraib. The torture narrative holds that illegal methods used at Guantánamo migrated to Iraq and resulted in the abuse of prisoners there.

So what were these cruel and degrading practices? For one, providing a detainee an incentive for cooperation-such as a cigarette or, especially favored in Cuba, a McDonald's Filet-O-Fish sandwich or a Twinkie unless specifically approved by the secretary of defense. In other words, if an interrogator had learned that Usama bin Ladin's accountant loved Cadbury chocolate, and intended to enter the interrogation booth armed with a Dairy Milk Wafer to extract the name of a Saudi financier, he needed to "specifically determine that military necessity requires" the use of the Dairy Milk Wafer and send an alert to Secretary Rumsfeld that chocolate was to be deployed against an al-Qaida operative.

Similar restrictions-a specific finding of military necessity and notice to Rumsfeld-applied to other tried-and-true army psychological techniques. These included "Pride and Ego Down"-attacking a detainee's pride to goad him into revealing critical information-as well as "Mutt and Jeff," the classic good cop-bad cop routine of countless police shows. Isolating a detainee from other prisoners to prevent collaboration and to increase his need to talk required not just notice and a finding of military necessity but "detailed implementation instructions [and] medical and psychological review."

The only non-conventional "stress" techniques on the final Guantánamo list are such innocuous interventions as adjusting the temperature or introducing an unpleasant smell into the interrogation room, but only if the interrogator is present at all times; reversing a detainee's sleep cycles from night to day (call this the "Flying to Hong Kong" approach); and convincing a detainee that his interrogator is not from the U.S.

Note that none of the treatments shown in the Abu Ghraib photos, such as nudity or the use of dogs, was included in the techniques certified for the unlawful combatants held in Cuba. And those mild techniques that were certified could only be used with extensive bureaucratic oversight and medical monitoring to ensure "humane," "safe," and "lawful" application.

After Rumsfeld cleared the 24 methods, interrogators approached Kahtani once again. They relied almost exclusively on isolation and lengthy interrogations. They also used some "psy-ops" (psychological operations). Ten or so interrogators would gather and sing the Rolling Stones' "Time Is on My Side" outside Kahtani's cell. Sometimes they would play a recording of "Enter Sandman" by the heavy-metal group Metallica, which brought Kahtani to tears, because he thought (not implausibly) he was hearing the sound of Satan.

Finally, at 4 am-after an 18-hour, occasionally loud, interrogation, during which Kahtani head-butted his interrogators-he started giving up information, convinced that he was being sold out by his buddies. The entire process had been conducted under the watchful eyes of a medic, a psychiatrist, and lawyers, to make sure that no harm was done. Kahtani provided detailed information on his meetings with Usama bin Ladin, on Jose Padilla and Richard Reid, and on Adnan El Shukrijumah, one of the FBI's most wanted terrorists, believed to be wandering between South and North America.

Since then, according to Pentagon officials, none of the non-traditional techniques approved for Kahtani has been used on anyone else at Guantánamo Bay.

The final strand in the "torture narrative" is the least grounded in actual practice, but it has had the most distorting effect on the public debate. In the summer of 2002, the CIA sought legal advice about permissible interrogation techniques for the recently apprehended Abu Zubaydah, Usama bin Ladin's chief recruiter in the 1990s. The Palestinian Zubaydah had already been sentenced to death in absentia in Jordan for an abortive plot to bomb hotels there during the millennium celebration; he had arranged to obliterate the Los Angeles airport on the same night. The CIA wanted to use techniques on Zubaydah that the military uses on marines and other elite fighters in Survive, Evade, Resist, Escape (SERE) school, which teaches how to withstand torture and other pressures to collaborate. The techniques are classified, but none allegedly involves physical contact. (Later, the CIA is said to have used "water-boarding"-temporarily submerging a detainee in water to induce the sensation of drowning-on Khalid Sheik Mohammad, the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks. Water-boarding is the most extreme method the CIA has applied, according to a former Justice Department attorney, and arguably it crosses the line into torture.)

In response to the CIA's request, Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee produced a hair-raising memo that understandably caused widespread alarm. Bybee argued that a U.S. law ratifying the 1984 Convention Against Torture-covering all persons, whether lawful combatants or not-forbade only physical pain equivalent to that "accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death," or mental pain that resulted in "significant psychological harm of significant duration, e.g., lasting for months or even years." More troubling still, Bybee concluded that the torture statute and international humanitarian treaties did not bind the executive branch in wartime.

This infamous August "torture memo" represents the high (or low) point of the Bush administration's theory of untrammelled presidential war-making power. But note: it had nothing to do with the interrogation debates and experiments unfolding among Pentagon interrogators in Afghanistan and Cuba. These soldiers struggling with al-Qaida resistance were perfectly ignorant about executive-branch deliberations on the outer boundaries of pain and executive power (which, in any case, were prepared for and seen only by the CIA). "We had no idea what went on in Washington," said Chris Mackey in an interview. A Guantánamo lawyer involved in the Kahtani interrogation echoes Mackey: "We were not aware of the [Justice Department and White House] debates." Interrogators in Iraq were equally unaware of the Bybee memo.

Nevertheless, when the Bybee analysis was released in June 2004, it became the capstone on the torture narrative, the most damning link between the president's decision that the Geneva conventions didn't apply to terrorists and the sadistic behavior of the military guards at Abu Ghraib. Seymour Hersh, the left-wing journalist who broke the Abu Ghraib story, claims that the Bybee torture memo was the "most suggestive document, in terms of what was really going on inside military prisons and detention centers."

But not only is the Bybee memo irrelevant to what happened in Abu Ghraib; so, too, are the previous interrogation debates in Afghanistan and Cuba. The abuse at Abu Ghraib resulted from the Pentagon's failure to plan for any outcome of the Iraq invasion except the most rosy scenario, its failure to respond to the insurgency once it broke out, and its failure to keep military discipline from collapsing in the understaffed Abu Ghraib facility. Interrogation rules were beside the point.

As the avalanche of prisoners taken in the street fighting overwhelmed the inadequate contingent of guards and officers at Abu Ghraib, order within the ranks broke down as thoroughly as order in the operation of the prison itself.

Soldiers talked back to their superiors, refused to wear uniforms, operated prostitution and bootlegging rings, engaged in rampant and public sexual misbehavior, covered the facilities with graffiti, and indulged in drinking binges while on duty. No one knew who was in command. The guards' sadistic and sexualized treatment of prisoners was just an extension of the chaos they were already wallowing in with no restraint from above. Meanwhile, prisoners regularly rioted; insurgents shelled the compound almost daily; the army sent only rotten, bug-infested rations; and the Iraqi guards sold favors to the highest bidders among the insurgents.

The idea that the abuse of the Iraqi detainees resulted from the president's decision on the applicability of the Geneva conventions to al-Qaida and Taliban detainees is absurd on several grounds. Everyone in the military chain of command emphasized repeatedly that the Iraq conflict would be governed by the conventions in their entirety. The interrogation rules that local officers developed for Iraq explicitly stated that they were promulgated under Geneva authority, and that the conventions applied. Moreover, almost all the behavior shown in the photographs occurred in the dead of night among military police, wholly separate from interrogations. Most abuse victims were not even scheduled to be interrogated, because they were of no intelligence value. Finally, except for the presence of dogs, none of the behavior shown in the photos was included in the interrogation rules promulgated in Iraq. Mandated masturbation, dog leashes, assault, and stacking naked prisoners in pyramids—none of these depredations was an approved (or even contemplated) interrogation practice, and no interrogator ordered the military guards to engage in them.

It is the case that intelligence officers in Iraq and Afghanistan were making use of nudity and phobias about dogs at the time. Nudity was not officially sanctioned, and the official rule about dogs only allowed their "presence" in the interrogation booth, not their being sicced on naked detainees. The argument that such techniques contributed to a dehumanization of the detainees, which in turn led to

their abuse, is not wholly implausible. Whether or not those two particular stressors are worth defending (and many interrogators say they are not), their abuse should not discredit the validity of other stress techniques that the military was cautiously experimenting with in the months before Abu Ghraib.

That experiment is over. Reeling under the PR disaster of Abu Ghraib, the Pentagon shut down every stress technique but one— isolation—and that can be used only after extensive review. An interrogator who so much as requests permission to question a detainee into the night could be putting his career in jeopardy. Even the traditional army psychological approaches have fallen under a deep cloud of suspicion: deflating a detainee's ego, aggressive but non-physical histrionics, and good cop-bad cop have been banished along with sleep deprivation.

Timidity among officers prevents the energetic application of those techniques that remain. Interrogation plans have to be triple-checked all the way up through the Pentagon by officers who have never conducted an interrogation in their lives.

In losing these techniques, interrogators have lost the ability to create the uncertainty vital to getting terrorist information. Since the Abu Ghraib scandal broke, the military has made public nearly every record of its internal interrogation debates, providing al-Qaida analysts with an encyclopedia of U.S. methods and constraints. Those constraints make perfectly clear that the interrogator is not in control. "In reassuring the world about our limits, we have destroyed our biggest asset: detainee doubt," a senior Pentagon intelligence official laments.

Soldiers on the ground are noticing the consequences. "The Iraqis already know the game. They know how to play us," a marine chief warrant officer told the *Wall Street Journal* in August. "Unless you catch the Iraqis in the act, it is very hard to

pin anything on anyone We can't even use basic police interrogation tactics."

And now the rights advocates, energized by the Abu Ghraib debacle, are making one final push to halt interrogation altogether. In the *New York Times's* words, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is now condemning the thoroughly emasculated interrogation process at Guantánamo Bay as a "system devised to break the will of the prisoners [and] make them wholly dependent on their interrogators." In other words, the ICRC opposes traditional interrogation itself, since *all* interrogation is designed to "break the will of prisoners" and make them feel "dependent on their interrogators." But according to an ICRC report leaked to the *Times*, "the construction of such a system, whose stated purpose is the production of intelligence, cannot be considered other than an intentional system of cruel, unusual and degrading treatment and a form of torture."

But contrary to the fantasies of the international-law and human rights lobbies, a world in which all interrogation is illegal and rights are indiscriminately doled out is not a safer or more just world. Were the United States to announce that terrorists would be protected under the Geneva conventions, it would destroy any incentive our ruthless enemies have to comply with the laws of war. The *Washington Post* and the *New York Times* understood that truth in 1987, when they supported President Ronald Reagan's rejection of an amendment to the Geneva conventions that would have granted lawful-combatant status to terrorists. Today, however, those same opinion makers have done an about-face, though the most striking feature of their denunciations of the Bush administration's Geneva decisions is their failure to offer any explanation for how al-Qaida could possibly be covered under the plain meaning of the text.

The Pentagon is revising the rules for interrogation. If we hope to succeed in the war on terror, the final product *must* allow interrogators to use stress techniques against unlawful combatants. Chris Mackey testifies to how "ineffective

schoolhouse methods were in getting prisoners to talk." He warns that his team "failed to break prisoners who I have no doubt knew of terrorist plots or at least terrorist cells that may one day do us harm. Perhaps they would have talked if faced with harsher methods."

The stress techniques that the military has used to date are not torture; the advocates can only be posturing in calling them such. On its website, Human Rights Watch lists the effects of real torture: "from pain and swelling to broken bones, irreparable neurological damage, and chronic painful musculoskeletal problems . . . [to] long-term depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, marked sleep disturbances and alterations in self-perceptions, not to mention feelings of powerlessness, of fear, guilt and shame." Though none of the techniques that Pentagon interrogators have employed against al-Qaida comes anywhere close to risking such effects, Human Rights Watch nevertheless follows up its list with an accusation of torture against the Bush administration.

The pressure on the Pentagon to outlaw stress techniques won't abate, as the American Civil Liberties Union continues to release formerly classified government documents obtained in a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit concerning detention and interrogation. As of late December, the memos have merely confirmed that the FBI opposes stress methods, though the press breathlessly portrays them as confirming "torture."

Human Rights Watch, the ICRC, Amnesty International, and the other self-professed guardians of humanitarianism need to come back to earth-to the real world in which torture means what the Nazis and the Japanese did in their concentration and POW camps in World War II; the world in which evil regimes, like those we fought in Afghanistan and Iraq, don't follow the Miranda rules or the Convention Against Torture but instead gas children, bury people alive, set wild animals on soccer players who lose, and hang adulterous women by truckloads before stadiums full of spectators; the world in which barbarous death cults

behead female aid workers, bomb crowded railway stations, and fly planes filled with hundreds of innocent passengers into buildings filled with thousands of innocent and unsuspecting civilians. By definition, our terrorist enemies and their state supporters have declared themselves enemies of the civilized order and its humanitarian rules. In fighting them, we must of course hold ourselves to our own high moral standards without, however, succumbing to the utopian illusion that we can prevail while immaculately observing every precept of the Sermon on the Mount. It is the necessity of this fallen world that we must oppose evil with force; and we must use all the lawful means necessary to ensure that good, rather than evil, triumphs.

(b)(6)

From: Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, December 30, 2004 7:28 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: Good News

FYI. Been working on this one with Ken Robinson at CNN since this past summer. We are finally getting some traction on it.

Captain, U.S. Navy
Director, DoD Press Operations

(b)(7)

-----Original Message-----

From: Pittman, CAPT Harold E. (USN) [mailto:pittmahe@ (b)(6)]
Sent: Thursday, December 30, 2004 11:34 AM
To: 'Robinson, Ken'; Lessel, Erwin F. (O-7); 'Lessel, Erwin F. III Brig Gen MNF-I DCS STRATCOM'
Cc: (b)(6); 'roxie.merritt (b)(6) (b)(6)'; (b)(6); (b)(6), CPT Eric E.
Subject: RE: Good News

Ken -

I like it. I am cc'ing the senior leadership of MNF-I Strategic Communications - Brigadier GEN Irv Lessel, & COLs (b)(6) on my response to you... General, (b)(6) Ken Robinson is the national security producer for CNN who also happens to be a retired Army SOF guy... Ken is also the brains behind the CNN Presents GWOT program we are working with Aaron Brown as the host.

This is an opportunity to get some good news coverage from Iraq on CNN - You essentially provide some factoids to Ken that can be used on the program and line up an interview from in country (using DVIDs) that could (I am assuming) be taped or could air live...

Thoughts?

Thanks, vr/Hal

-----Original Message-----

From: Robinson, Ken [mailto:Ken.Robinson@ (b)(6)]
Sent: Thursday, December 30, 2004 7:24 PM

To: 'pittmaher@' (b)(6)
Cc: 'farlowdc@' (b)(6) roxie.merritt@ (b)(6)
Subject: Good News

If I had some guidance, factoids, and a bit of access, I could envision a story about the REMARKABLE works that have been accomplished, under the most HOSTILE conditions imagined...as we lead in to the elections...

Things such as roads, schools, hospitals, shelters, jobs, training, ALL done, on almost a daily basis, while under fire...

A counter to the IF IT BLEEDS IT LEADS story +

We could call it "the rest of the story, drowned out by the sound of a gun or bomb...the bomb sound dies out, the schools, educated children, the infrastructure makes life better for the next generation.

I'd grab a big guest from Capt Roxie Merritt...so tape from the region, and some q and a, and place it in primetime, Sunday slot, 6PM.

I would start this on Jan 9th, 18:00p, then roll it into Jan 10th, 13:00 to 15:30.

Then put all the factoids into a web article on CNN.Com.

This would be to balance the bloody shirt of the day reporting, ALL Networks are guilty of...

Any takers?

VR,

Ken

(b)(6)

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld (www.BlackBerry.net)

(b)(6)

From: Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, December 29, 2004 7:31 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: Summary of Mr. O'Connell's interview on the Tony Snow Show

FYI.

Captain, U.S. Navy
Director, DoD Press Operations

(b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, December 29, 2004 5:14 PM
To: Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA
Cc: Swiergosz, Paul, Maj. OASD-PA
Subject: Summary of Mr. O'Connell's interview on the Tony Snow Show

Ma'am,

As discussed, the interview went very well. It lasted 30 minutes. They took no calls. Instead they stuck to the enclosed format that Col (ret.) Bill Cowan had sent (see email below). Cowan was the stand-in for Snow. Mr. O'Connell making the following key points:

The Goldwater-Nichols and Cohen-Nunn acts significantly changed SF for the better and changed it from being a strp child to an integral part of the military. Both acts ensure close civilian supervision, increased coordination and increased capability. The bottom line is that Congress acted wisely with Goldwater-Nichols and Cohen-Nunn.

Reviewed Enduring Special Operations Truths:
Humans are more important than hardware.
Quality is better than quantity.
SOF cannot be mass produced.
SOF cannot be created after emergencies arise.

Noted SF troops are due to increase from 49k to 52k next fiscal yea.

Replied to the question about women in SF by noting that while some units are closed to them (e.g. Green Berets, Seals, etc.) that women are at the HQ elements and with PSYOP and civil affairs. Also said ... "they're part of the team. We're proud of them."

Noted current accomplishments of SF

- Seals seizure of Oil Platforms in OIF prevented an ecological disaster and saved \$10B in damages.
- 10th SF in Northern Iraq got in prior to OIF and helped pin down 13 Iraqi divisions.
- 7th SF in Colombia have been instrumental in transforming the Colombian military and containing the FARQ.

Noted the future of SF depends on POTUS and SecDef but regardless of their future plans SF will have a role in helping deal with ungovernable areas of the world.

R/

(b)(6)

Lt. Col. (USA)
OASD Press Operations
phone: (b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: bill_cowan [mailto:bill_cowan@(b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, December 27, 2004 9:38 AM
To: Swiergosz, Paul, Maj. OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: O'Connell interview on 12/29

paul, (b)(6)

for wednesday's show, i basically want to do the following:

introduce the Secretary properly by noting his distinguished background and the fact that he's uniquely qualified for the job.

talking briefly about how SpecOps has changed since the legislation of '87. that is, how it looked before and how it looks now.

mention what roles/missions each of the services play in the SpecOps community, including some of the training they go through.

talk about the role of women in the SpecOps community.

talk about what SpecOps is doing in Iraq and Afghanistan.

talk about the role of SpecOps in the future.

under no circumstances will i ask or push for information which is classified or even close to it, nor will i talk politics inside or outside the beltway. this should be an enjoyable session. we've got LOTS of listeners around the country, some catching it on delayed broadcast, so we'll avoid talking about 'morning'.

questions/concerns? call me at (b)(6)

could i get a copy of his resume?

thanks much.

resp'y,

bill

-----Original Message-----

From: Swiergosz, Paul, Maj. OASD-PA [mailto:Paul.Swiergosz@(b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, December 07, 2004 10:43 AM
To: 'bill_cowan' (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY
Subject: O'Connell interview on 12/29

Sir,

Mr. O'Connell forwarded your request for interview on the 29th. My pleasure to arrange.

Feel free to give me a call and we can set it up.

v/r,

MAJ Paul Swiergosz
Public Affairs Officer, OASD(PA)
Office: (b)(2)
Mobile: (b)(2)
Fax: (b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, December 29, 2004 10:13 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Subject: Retired Military Analysts Outreach Group e-mail list.doc

RETIRED MILITARY ANALYSTS

(As of November 12, 2004)

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bill.cowan@ (b)(6) dana.dillon@ (b)(6) wadown@ (b)(6) t.downingaw@ (b)(6)
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jgarrett@ (b)(6) simpsonc@ (b)(6) dgrange@ (b)(6) tptitrof@ (b)(6)
steven@ (b)(6) vze279gy@ (b)(6) Djeremiah@ (b)(6)
nancy.bryant@ (b)(6) qioulwan@ (b)(6) milpriwk@ (b)(6)
sandra.bowersox@ (b)(6) glenn.lackey@ (b)(6) jlopez@ (b)(6)
Lefird@ (b)(6) robertmag73@ (b)(6) mccausij@ (b)(6)
tmcinerney@ (b)(6) mcmeigs@ (b)(6) ndcf@ (b)(6) lorassoc@ (b)(6)
moorman.thomas@ (b)(6) mnardotti@ (b)(6) lshingleton@ (b)(6)
nashct@ (b)(6) wnash@ (b)(6) abranczik@ (b)(6) gkotis@ (b)(6) jwr@ (b)(6)
cls@ (b)(6) meejr01@ (b)(6) Hinkel@ (b)(6) roberthscales@ (b)(6)
hhshelton@ (b)(6) dclark@ (b)(6) shepdonald@ (b)(6)
carlton.sherwood@ (b)(6) WSSInter@ (b)(6) genpsmith@ (b)(6) ggistrong@ (b)(6)
sealmd@ (b)(6) mc151rvn@ (b)(6) paulvalley@ (b)(6) jwarden@ (b)(6)
lwelch@ (b)(6) bschultz@ (b)(6) wilhelmce@ (b)(6) francis@ (b)(6)
twilkerson@ (b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, December 28, 2004 7:09 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Let the Big Dog Run (Babbin)

Busy enough for you? Well done all around...with schmitt, you should turn it into a virtue and acknowledge directly that the senior leaders of the department, including service second's, depsec, and secdef, have reached out to key members and they have been appreciative for the consultation and understand all we are trying to do...you might suggest that if staff and others are unaware, it is understandable that they may be anxious but that since everything is pre-decisional we are trying to focus the info at the member level only...no specifics as to who has been called, but the fact that there has been outreach and consultation so the members would be able to put disconnected and out of context stories (such as loren thompson's) into perspective...assume schmitt has loren's piece and suggest that there may be outcries by people out of the loop or wedded to the past, but that the members seemed to understand and know that transformation requires tough choices...a thought...great work today...

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@^{(b)(6)} [REDACTED]>
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA <larry.diritita@^{(b)(6)} [REDACTED]>
Sent: Tue Dec 28 19:01:03 2004
Subject: RE: Let the Big Dog Run (Babbin)

yes. i spoke with him and he has waived off the story for now. gave him erv's assessments of hmx involvement and held back erv's specific statement. he said if it wasn't hmx then it had to be pe4. i said that would be one that was under consideration and reminded that the investigation is ongoing. i told him he is the only reporter to work this angle and that i would be int touch with him if i got any indications that something had changed. he was very sanguine about the whole thing. i've informed fred jones at nsc.

meantime, i've learned from ^{(b)(6)} [REDACTED] that all explosives have a "tag it", which is a chemical that is mixed in that will not be destroyed in an explosion. this "tag it" is meant to be a fingerprint that allows investigators to trace the munition back to its manufacturer. i've asked barry to go ask the army if the tag its for the hmx in al qaqa were ever known. told him to press hard.

also spoke to eric schmitt. he has the story on the f22. i would not confirm the number of aircraft to be produced and he said he had the info (around 150 total) from dod, admin and hill sources. he asked if we had been talking to the hill and i confirmed that. i worked from the talking points and started up front on the bullets pertaining to the budget we are developing -- accelerate army transition to more powerful and deployable force, transformation, etc. then worked in the qdr talking point and others in the f22 talkers.

i'm fairly certain his original source on this was capitol hill. he also had spoken to omb public affairs.

regarding tsunami, the president will be making a statement tomorrow. i've asked marine bg. john allen, head of asian-pacific affairs in rodman's shop, to put together a gaggle for our reporters afterward. we need to knit together all that is being done.

thanks, eric

-----Original Message-----

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, December 28, 2004 6:45 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Let the Big Dog Run (Babbin)

Read it...it is pretty rough, even if well intended...p.s. Saw your note about the talk radio progress...terrific!!...any more about sanger?

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@^{(b)(6)}>
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA <larry.diritad@^{(b)(6)}>
Sent: Tue Dec 28 18:29:33 2004
Subject: FW: Let the Big Dog Run (Babbin)

hopefully you can read this version. lemme know if you think i should reconsider whether to send. i think we should go by my initial thought, btw. thanks, eric

-----Original Message-----

From: ^{(b)(6)} CIV OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, December 28, 2004 2:23 PM
To: ^{(b)(6)} CIV OASD-PA
Subject: Let the Big Dog Run (Babbin)

Great Article by Jed Babbin

^{(b)(6)}

Let the Big Dog Run
By Jed Babbin <MailTo:editor@spectator.org>
Published 12/28/2004 12:08:57 AM

Dan Rather grimaces whenever pronouncing the man's name. Mo Dowd, the New York Times's anti-testosterone columnist, is so crazed by him that she writes lousy poetry attacking him. John McCain says he has no confidence in him, and the most prominent members of the Ankle-Biter Caucus -- Trent Lott, Chuck Hagel and Susan Collins -- all line up to take their shots at Big Dog Donald Rumsfeld, the man they love to hate. Even Wade Sanders -- one of the Swift Boat vets who campaigned for Kerry -- is in on the act. Sanders sounds a lot like Lott, Hagel, and Collins. Or is it the other way around?

The harpies of the left -- and the opportunists of the right -- realize that because the path to victory or defeat in any war is strewn with setbacks and mistakes, Rumsfeld is much more exposed to their flak than newly reelected President Bush. Rumsfeld stands for everything they despise about President Bush: decisiveness, directness and -- most unforgivably -- impatience with those who most richly deserve it. Like the CIA, the State Department, and the U.N., just for starters. Mr. Rumsfeld actually had the audacity to call Old Europe by its proper name and, according to Ken Timmerman's book, *The French Betrayal of America*, was fond of quoting your humble servant's words, "Going to war without France is like going deer hunting without an accordion. You just leave a lot of noisy, useless baggage behind." Oh, the horror.

THE LATEST KERFUFFLE resulted from a session Mr. Rumsfeld had with soldiers in Iraq on December 8, where he answered a soldier's question about the scarcity of armor for light vehicles in Iraq. If you listen to MoDo, CBS and John McCain, you would believe Rumsfeld told the soldier, "that's a stupid question, and we don't worry about it because we don't give a damn about your life or safety." But that's not even close to what he said.

The "question" -- really a short speech written by a reporter -- said, "Our soldiers have been fighting in Iraq for coming up on three years. A lot of us are getting ready to move north relatively soon. Our vehicles are not armored. We're digging pieces of rusted scrap metal and compromised ballistic glass that's already been shot up, dropped, busted, picking the best out of this scrap to put on our vehicles to take into combat. We do not have proper armament vehicles to carry with us north."

Mr. Rumsfeld responded honestly and at length. He said he talked to the commanding general on the way out to meet the soldiers about the pace at which the vehicles are being armored. He said, the vehicles "have been brought from all over the world, wherever

they're not needed, to a place here where they are needed. I'm told that they are being -- the Army is -- I think it's something like 400 a month are being done. And it's essentially a matter of physics. It isn't a matter of money. It isn't a matter on the part of the Army of desire. It's a matter of production and capability of doing it.

"As you know, you go to war with the Army you have. They're not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time. Since the Iraq conflict began, the Army has been pressing ahead to produce the armor necessary at a rate that they believe -- it's a greatly expanded rate from what existed previously, but a rate that they believe is the rate that is all that can be accomplished at this moment." In short, an honest answer from a concerned leader. (You can read the transcript of the whole session here <<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20041208-secdef1761.html>>.) And, though you'll never learn this from the ankle-biters, Rumsfeld received a standing ovation from the troops when the session ended.

EVER SINCE THE FALL of Baghdad, Mr. Rumsfeld has suffered one media feeding frenzy after another. When the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal broke, he and Joint Chiefs chairman Gen. Dick Myers were subjected to a six-hour marathon of congressional hearings in which they were subjected to little speeches by little men aimed more at scoring a sound bite on the evening news than at getting answers. He has been accused of spending too much on the war, and too little. His faults are found in every failure on the battlefield and in the nation-building process we are pursuing in Iraq. Few know, and fewer still care, about the facts of the latter.

In the planning for the Iraq campaign, Mr. Rumsfeld proposed a plan in which a provisional government would have been formed before the invasion, and would have taken over immediately, reducing the need for American presence, and making our presence that of one ally helping another. A competing plan, advanced by Colin Powell and George Tenet, chose an extended occupation with Iraq ruled by a MacArthur-like consul, and gradual turnover of Iraq to an interim government chosen by the major representatives of the Iraqi population. The President chose the latter, the wrong plan, and then stuck Rumsfeld with the job of implementing a plan Rumsfeld knew was not likely to succeed. In the past twenty months, the interim government wasn't formed as predicted, because some of the major Iraqi leaders -- most notably leading Shia cleric Ali al-Sistani -- refused to play L. Paul Bremer's diplomatic games. Worse still, the President hasn't yet decided to deal with the insurgency at its sources. Without the support of Syria and Iran, the insurgency wouldn't be able to continue under the constant pressure of Coalition military action.

Now, with the Iraqi election scheduled in about five weeks, Rumsfeld is still struggling to push the Iraqis into democracy, and with mixed results. Predictably, the U.N. -- whose function it is to assist new democracies in running elections -- has refused to help bail America out of a situation that the U.N. opposed. In Iraq, a nation of about 24 million, tens of thousands of election assistance representatives should be on the ground. Instead, the UN has -- so far -- provided fewer than fifty. And, somehow, to those who oppose the President and the war we are fighting, that's all Rumsfeld's fault. Nonsense.

FORTUNATELY FOR MR. RUMSFELD, and for us, the President has spoken forcefully in support of Rumsfeld and the job he is doing. And for every CBS there is a Mitch McConnell. For every New York Times or CNN, there is a Pete Domenici, a Bill Frist, a Kay Bailey Hutchison and a Jim Inhofe. And a Jeff Sessions. All of those senators have spoken out in Mr. Rumsfeld's defense, and quieted the media feeding frenzy. For a while.

Alabama Republican Jeff Sessions is one of Rumsfeld's most respected and outspoken supporters. He took time from his Christmas Eve shopping trip to talk to me about the current attacks on the Big Dog. Sessions said Rumsfeld is a "remarkable man. He's been the point man in the war on terror from the beginning." Rumsfeld "understands the military and its need to transform."

I asked Sen. Sessions what motivates Rumsfeld's critics. He said there were three reasons. First, he said, "the Democrats are determined to find fault" in the war and how it is being run. Sessions sees that in any war, the enemy evolves and so must we. He said, "Rumsfeld, the President and all of their team have to be on top of this and able to change tactics at a moment's notice." He's confident they are, and are getting the job done.

The second reason, Sessions said, is that "people who have been supportive of the war, including some editors, are now more difficult." Many of those who advocated the Iraq campaign most vehemently are now afraid that they'll be blamed for its failures and the sacrifices our troops are called upon to make it succeed. Though Sessions didn't say it, it's clear that some of those vehement advocates of invading Iraq -- including one notable neocon magazine -- are political cowards. Sessions said, "The second-guessers enjoy coming out and shooting the [politically] wounded." It's not hard to figure out who he meant.

The third reason is that there is always "some temptation to play for the media." If you're a Republican senator, the best way to buy a place on Meet the Press is to criticize the President. Because the President is in so strong a position, it's not possible to damage him -- yet -- by carping about the daily problems in Iraq. That leaves the people who are running the show as the only practical target, and that means Mr. Rumsfeld.

MR. RUMSFELD SUFFERS from one of the faults his boss often displays: loyalty to those who are not loyal to him, and those who don't do their jobs well. It's unheard of to be three years into a war and never to have fired a general. The military leadership Mr. Rumsfeld works with is not of his creation. Those generals rose to prominence under the Clintons, and many are more politically minded than warrior-like. Neither Rumsfeld nor the President has fired a single one, despite some bad decisions and -- in the case of former Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki -- not only bad judgment but political campaigning against the President's plans and objectives. Shinseki should have been fired, but wasn't. Too many of the Clinton-chosen bureaucrat-generals remain on duty today, though warriors should long ago have taken their place. Military transformation means transforming the generals, not just the hardware.

But Jeff Sessions has it right. As another Southern gentleman of my acquaintance often says, "If you can't run with the big dogs, you'd better go sit on the porch." That admonition should be taken to heart by all the ankle biters in Congress and the press who are calling for the beheading of Big Dog Don Rumsfeld. Their criticisms -- especially those coming from congressional Republicans -- are the worst sort of cowardice and political opportunism.

TAS Contributing Editor Jed Babbin is the author of *Inside the Asylum: Why the UN and Old Europe Are Worse Than You Think* (Regnery Publishing).

(b)(6)

From: Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, December 28, 2004 3:18 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: Brief Summary of IG Body Army Report

Captain, U.S. Navy
Director, DoD Press Operations

(b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, December 28, 2004 1:12 PM
To: Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT OASD-PA
Cc: Rhynedance, George COL OASD-PA; (b)(6) OCPA; (b)(6) OCPA; Keck, Gary Col OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Brief Summary of IG Body Army Report

In summary (as per our in-person conversation of 1:02 p.m., too): the Army IG report looked from December 2003 to April 2004 into **three items**: (1) how fast body armor was obtained, (2) how fast it was sent to Iraq, and (3) how fast it was distributed once in Iraq to our Soldiers.

The **IG findings actually are pretty positive**: the recommendations found we couldn't get it to the troops within the normal 14-day DOD standard because in some places the body armor had to be delivered by vehicle to the Soldiers (taking 31 days from start to finish). Secondly, the IG report cleared up an accounting mix up of 30,000 sets of body armor -- those items merely were in transit or improperly accounted for between the two locations.

We can provide you shortly with a copy of the **actually redacted version** of the Army IG report going to Mr. Mike Moss at the New York Times ... once the redactions of names, vulnerabilities, etc. are complete.

As you know, lastly ... **every Soldier going into Iraq now has body armor -- we achieved the desired goal**.

v/r (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, December 28, 2004 12:34 PM
To: (b)(6) OCPA; Lawrence, Dallas OASD-PA; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT OASD-PA
Cc: Rhynedance, George COL OASD-PA; (b)(6) OCPA; (b)(6) OCPA; Keck, Gary Col OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Military Analyst Phone Call: Armor, Force Protection Year-end Review (12:45 p.m., 30 Dec. 2004)

Please provide additional information on the findings of the IG report.

Captain, U.S. Navy
Director, DoD Press Operations

(b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, December 28, 2004 11:12 AM
To: Lawrence, Dallas OASD-PA; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT OASD-PA
Cc: Rhynedance, George COL OASD-PA; (b)(6) OCPA; (b)(6) OCPA; Keck, Gary Col OASD-PA
Subject: Military Analyst Phone Call: Armor, Force Protection Year-end Review (12:45 p.m., 30 Dec. 2004)

Mr. Lawrence, may I please solicit your assistance for a desired phone conference call this **Thursday** with the military analysts who advise the cable news networks? The topic would be a brief **year-end review** of efforts to

equip Soldiers with **body armor** and to **uparmor our vehicles** -- as part of force protection efforts. The phone conference call would **start, ideally, at 12:45 p.m. on Thursday**, and last for 20 minutes with officials from Army logistics and operations.

CAPT Merritt, Ma'am, we would then follow the planned phone conference call with a **small roundtable** of no more than **five print media** -- likely the Washington Post, New York Times, Associated Press, Army Times and Newhouse News Service -- to address several **pending, similar queries** that we've received: to include Mr. Tom Ricks of the Washington Post inquiring about additional uparmoring for the M-113s that the 3rd Infantry Division would use during their upcoming Iraq deployment and a request from Mr. Mike Moss of the New York Times for the April 2004 Army Inspector General report on body armor. That redacted report addressed how fast we procured needed body armor, how fast we got it to country and then distributed to the deployed troops. Since we've had similar media queries from others, it makes sense to brief a small group on these topics and ensure that the analysts also are aware since one of these already-working stories might be planned for as early as this weekend.

Very respectfully,

(b)(6)

Army Public Affairs, Media Relations Division

phone:

(b)(7)(C)

E-mail:

(b)(6)

fax:

(b)(7)(C)

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(b)(6)

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, December 28, 2004 2:20 PM
To: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Military Analyst Phone Call: Armor, Force Protection Year-end Review (12:45 p.m., 30 Dec. 2004)

I know. I am here to help!!!! Ha.
Allison Barber
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

Sent from my BlackBerry Handheld.

-----Original Message-----

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA <Dallas.Lawrence@(b)(6)>
To: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA <Allison.Barber@(b)(6)>
Sent: Tue Dec 28 14:13:25 2004
Subject: Re: Military Analyst Phone Call: Armor, Force Protection Year-end Review (12:45 p.m., 30 Dec. 2004)

Eric? Have an opinion? I'm shocked, shocked I say!

:)

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA <Allison.Barber@(b)(6)>
To: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA <Dallas.Lawrence@(b)(6)>
Sent: Tue Dec 28 14:09:19 2004
Subject: Re: Military Analyst Phone Call: Armor, Force Protection Year-end Review (12:45 p.m., 30 Dec. 2004)

We do set up calls for the services but it is rare that the army is forward leaning!!

Let's go ahead and do it.

Let eric know we are doing it --he will probably have an opinion. Also let him know that I approved it.

Thx
Allison Barber
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

Sent from my BlackBerry Handheld.

-----Original Message-----

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA <Dallas.Lawrence@(b)(6)>
To: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA <Allison.Barber@(b)(6)>
Sent: Tue Dec 28 13:55:24 2004
Subject: Fw: Military Analyst Phone Call: Armor, Force Protection Year-end Review (12:45 p.m., 30 Dec. 2004)

Is this something we usually do at the request of a service branch or does larry et al need to approve?

Did u have a nice xmas?

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
To: Lawrence, Dallas OASD-PA <Dallas.Lawrence@ (b)(6)>, Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT OASD-PA <Roxie.Merritt@ (b)(6)>
CC: Rhynedance, George COL OASD-PA <George.Rhynedance@ (b)(6)>, OCPA, (b)(6) Keck, Gary COL OASD-PA <gary.keck@ (b)(6)>
Sent: Tue Dec 28 11:12:10 2004
Subject: Military Analyst Phone Call: Armor, Force Protection Year-end Review (12:45 p.m., 30 Dec. 2004)

Mr. Lawrence, may I please solicit your assistance for a desired phone conference call this Thursday with the military analysts who advise the cable news networks? The topic would be a brief year-end review of efforts to equip Soldiers with body armor and to uparmor our vehicles -- as part of force protection efforts. The phone conference call would start, ideally, at 12:45 p.m. on Thursday, and last for 20 minutes with officials from Army logistics and operations.

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Very respectfully,

(b)(6)

Army Public Affairs Media Relations Division

phone: (b)(2)

E-mail: (b)(6)

fax: (b)(2)

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(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, December 28, 2004 2:19 PM
To: (b)(6) OASD-PA
Subject: RE: William Cohen

Margaret, I wanted to share the transcript of Cohen's regular CNN interview yesterday regarding DOD support for the Tsunami countries. Jean Meserve filled in for Wolf Blitzer

MESERVE: Absolutely. I want to turn the corner to the tsunami and the U.S. response to this. You, of course, the former secretary of defense, at this point, the U.S. response has been large in terms of money, \$15 million, and a few reconnaissance planes sent, but what sort of effort eventually might we see the U.S. military make to this?

COHEN: Well, we tend to look at the military in terms of its warrior status, but they're great humanitarians. They provide relief under these kind of extraordinary circumstances. They can help with search and rescue. They can help with refugee resettlement. They can help at delivering medical supplies. They can set up field hospitals, all of which we've done in Turkey in 1999, and frankly, we've also offered this assistance to China when China suffered a major earthquake, and I myself delivered that message to Jiang Zemin, the president of China during their very tragic times.

In a time of crisis, a helping hand can be just as powerful if not more powerful than a fist of iron, and that's a lesson out here. We should be rushing with whatever resources we can to help those in need in a time of crisis. It will certainly be a humanitarian thing to do, but also in our national interest, to help under these circumstances.

From: (b)(6) OASD-PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Tue 12/14/2004 3:27 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: William Cohen

Got it. Thank you. Here's the link to the rotation announcements.

<http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20041214-1823.html>

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, December 14, 2004 3:26 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: William Cohen

(b)(6)

The Cohen Group | Associate VP

(b)(6)

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For more information on The Cohen Group please visit our website at:
<http://www.cohengroup.net/>

(b)(6)

From: Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, December 28, 2004 1:36 PM
To: (b)(6) OCPA; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA
Cc: Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; (b)(6) COL ASA(ALT) (b)(6)
OCPA; Keck, Gary, Col, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Military Analyst Phone Call: Armor, Force Protection Year-end Review (12:45 p.m., 30 Dec. 2004)

(b)(6)

Concur with your plan so far. As soon as possible I need you to send us the package with the talking points, who's doing the briefing, the executive summary of the IG report and general summary of the information you intend to brief. If you have any of the details on the congressional notifications, would appreciate that also. Since this will be a roundtable, will you be conducting it in Army spaces? Please keep LTC (b)(6) on the cc line. Thanks.

Captain, U S. Navy
Director, DoD Press Operations

(b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, December 28, 2004 11:12 AM
To: Lawrence, Dallas OASD-PA; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT OASD-PA
Cc: Rhynedance, George COL OASD-PA; (b)(6) Keck, Gary Col OASD-PA
Subject: Military Analyst Phone Call: Armor, Force Protection Year-end Review (12:45 p.m., 30 Dec. 2004)

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Very respectfully,

(b)(6)

Army Public Affairs, Media Relations Division

phone: (b)(2) E-mail: (b)(6) fax: (b)(2)

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(b)(6)

From: Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, December 28, 2004 12:20 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: Military Analyst Phone Call: Armor, Force Protection Year-end Review (12:45 p.m., 30 Dec. 2004)

Do you have any problems with them doing both the outreach call and the media gaggle?
Captain, U.S. Navy
Director, DoD Press Operations

(b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, December 28, 2004 11:12 AM
To: Lawrence, Dallas OASD-PA; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT OASD-PA
Cc: Rhynedance, George COL OASD-PA; (b)(6) Keck, Gary Col OASD-PA
Subject: Military Analyst Phone Call: Armor, Force Protection Year-end Review (12:45 p.m., 30 Dec. 2004)

Mr. Lawrence, may I please solicit your assistance for a desired phone conference call this **Thursday** with the military analysts who advise the cable news networks? The topic would be a brief **year-end review** of efforts to equip Soldiers with **body armor** and to **uparmor our vehicles** -- as part of force protection efforts. The phone conference call would **start, ideally, at 12:45 p.m. on Thursday**, and last for 20 minutes with officials from Army logistics and operations.

CAPT Merritt, Ma'am, we would then **follow** the planned phone conference call with a **small roundtable** of no more than **five print media** -- likely the Washington Post, New York Times, Associated Press, Army Times and Newhouse News Service -- to address several **pending, similar queries** that we've received: to include Mr. Tom Ricks of the Washington Post inquiring about additional uparmoring for the M-113s that the 3rd Infantry Division would use during their upcoming Iraq deployment and a request from Mr. Mike Moss of the New York Times for the April 2004 Army Inspector General report on body armor. That redacted report addressed how fast we procured needed body armor, how fast we got it to country and then distributed to the deployed troops. Since we've had similar media queries from others, it makes sense to brief a small group on these topics and ensure that the analysts also are aware since one of these already-working stories might be planned for as early as this weekend.

Very respectfully,
(b)(6)

Army Public Affairs Media Relations Division
phone: (b)(2) E-mail: (b)(6) fax: (b)(2)

This e-mail and any files transmitted with it are confidential and intended only for the individual named. If you have received this e-mail by mistake, please notify the sender immediately by e-mail. This e-mail and any files transmitted with it are confidential and intended only for the individual named. If you have received this e-mail by mistake, please notify the sender immediately by e-mail.

(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, December 28, 2004 9:44 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: Fw: Spectator.org

I can't open this piece I got from bill luti but you may want to look at it and send it to the boss if you think appropriate...bill says it is too harsh for the bird

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: wl <prowler@^{(b)(6)}>
To: larry.dirita2@^{(b)(6)} <larry.dirita2@^{(b)(6)}>
Sent: Tue Dec 28 09:37:56 2004
Subject: Spectator.org

The following article from Spectator.org was sent to you by wl.

Let the Big Dog Run

By Jed Babbin

The neocon-Dem chorus bashing Don Rumsfeld is way off base. Sen. Jeff Sessions concurs.

Message from Sender: Larry, not for Early Bird (hits generals), but SecDef might like to read it. Bill

You can read this story in its entirety on the web at:
http://www.Spectator.org/dsp_article.asp?art_id=7556

The article is protected by copyright and should not be printed or distributed for anything except personal use.

(b)(6)

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, December 27, 2004 6:23 PM
To: (b)(6) OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Tony Snow Show

Great. Thanks.
Allison Barber
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

Sent from my BlackBerry Handheld.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
To: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA <Allison.Barber@(b)(6)>
Sent: Mon Dec 27 15:55:56 2004
Subject: Tony Snow Show

Tony Snow Show (With Bill Cowan)
Date: Wednesday, December 29
Segment Time: 11:00 a.m. (for about 30 minutes)
Show Time: 9:00 a.m.-12:00 p.m. EST Live

Contact: Shana Pearlman, Scheduler/ Producer, 202-715-2293, Shana.Pearlman@FOXNEWS.COM

Subject: Provide an overview of America Supports You (with program example--she will choose either A Million Thanks or Operation Gratitude).

Notes: I have spoken to Carolyn and Mike Fleming. Shauan and Carolyn are available and will coordinate directly with Shana.

(b)(6)

Community Relations and Public Liaison
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs U.S. Department of Defense
1400 Defense Pentagon, Room 2C546 Washington, DC 20301-1400

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: Bill Cowan on Tony Snow Show
Due Date: Monday, December 27, 2004
Priority: High

Status: Completed
Percent Complete: 100%
Date Completed: Tuesday, February 01, 2005

Total Work: 0 hours
Actual Work: 0 hours

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, December 24, 2004 12:23 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: thank you

Happy to help. I forwarded this to (b)(6) - he is in on monday.
I am back on tuesday.

Merry christmas!!!!

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@(b)(6)>
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA <(b)(6)>
Sent: Thu Dec 23 17:58:21 2004
Subject: thank you

(b)(6) thanks for your help today, it was really great to get your support. below is the memo i sent to sd. merry christmas. eric

DECEMBER 23, 2004 MEMO FOR THE SECDEF from RUFF

CC: DIRITA

SUBJECT: Talk Radio Interviews

Congressman Jim Marshall, D-GA, will be interviewed today by Roger Hedgecock, KOGO, San Diego.

Senator Sessions will talk with Dom Giordano, WPHT, Philadelphia, today.

As we make contact with radio hosts or their producers, we are suggesting interviews with Marshall, Sessions, Domenici, Mica and Saxton. We also mention Hunter, Kyl, Cornyn, McConnell and Inhofe. We are providing press statements and other material to the programs.

Looking ahead to next week and beyond, Michael Smerconish, WPTH, Philadelphia, is filling in for Bill O'Reilly's radio program. He is interested in talking with some of the members and we are to coordinate with him on Monday.

Scott Hennon, WDAY, Fargo, is filling in for Sean Hannity on Dec. 29. He is interested and we will coordinate that on Monday.

Military analyst, LTC Bill Cowan, is filling in for Tony Snow on Dec. 29. He is interested in talking with Congressman Marshall. He is thinking about other guests we have suggested.

Jed Babbin will be filling in for Greg Garrison, WIBC, Indianapolis, the first week in January. He is interested in interviewing members of Congress and we have put him in touch with Senator Sessions' press secretary.

Talk show host Lars Larson, KXL, Portland, is on vacation until the first week of January but has committed to talking with one or more members. We have left messages for several other hosts with whom we have had good interviews. Like Lars Larson, they are on vacation until the first week in January. We will pursue.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, December 23, 2004 9:55 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Contact info

Mr. Jed Babbin (AF, Former JAG)

(b)(6)
Telephone: (b)(6)
Cellular: (b)(6)
Fax: (b)(6)
Email: jedbabbin@ (b)(6) <mailto:jedbabbin (b)(6)>

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, December 23, 2004 9:51 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Contact info

(b)(6) can you also send me the work number for jed babbin? thanks, eric

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, December 23, 2004 9:20 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: Contact info

Per your request:

Lieutenant Colonel Bill Cowan (USMC, Retired)
CEO, WVC3 Group, Inc.
1800 Alexander Bell Drive, Suite 101
Reston, Virginia 20191

Telephone: (b)(6)
Cellular: (b)(6)
Fax: (b)(6)
Email: bill_cowan@ (b)(6) <mailto:bill_cowan (b)(6)>

v/r
(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: O'Connell, Thomas, HON, OSD-POLICY
Sent: Thursday, December 23, 2004 6:35 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: q for you

Thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, December 22, 2004 4:40 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY; O'Connell, Thomas, HON, OSD-POLICY; 'dfrum@ (b)(6)
Cc: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; Swiergosz, Paul, Maj. OASD-PA
Subject: RE: q for you

From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY
Sent: Wednesday, December 22, 2004 4:25 PM
To: O'Connell, Thomas, HON, OSD-POLICY; 'dfrum@ (b)(6)
Cc: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Swiergosz, Paul, Maj. OASD-PA
Subject: RE: q for you

Wayne will gladly speak to David Frum. His cell phone # is: (b)(6)

(b)(6)
Senior Advisor, OASD (SO/LIC)
Rm (b)(2)
2500 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301
(b)(2) (Cell)

-----Original Message-----

From: O'Connell, Thomas, HON, OSD-POLICY
Sent: Monday, December 20, 2004 2:08 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY; (b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY
Subject: RE: q for you

We can...I better ask first. OC

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Sent: Monday, December 20, 2004 12:30 PM
To: O'Connell, Thomas, HON, OSD-POLICY; Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Cc: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: q for you

Can you help with contact information?

-----Original Message-----

From: David Frum (mailto:dfrum@ (b)(6))
Sent: Monday, December 20, 2004 11:43 AM
To: (b)(6)

Subject: q for you

Jim, I'm organizing some articles to speak up for hte secretary. question: do you know Wayne Downing? would he do it? if so, where do I find him? d

(b)(6)

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, December 22, 2004 5:44 PM
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: Iraq Trip

hi there

here is the scoop on the trip. hal said it will come up on the 8am call tomorrow. please let me know if you need me on the call.

we really have been working on this since august... let's hope it happens.

thanks
ab

-----Original Message-----

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, December 22, 2004 5:41 PM
To: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Iraq Trip

Background

Several Months ago comrel initiated plans to lead a delegation of our senior retired military analysts (folks that actually get air time) to Iraq. The original goal was to be in country the first week of December. In late **August** (b)(6) began communication traffic with LTC (b)(6) Chief of Theater Clearances at CENTCOM. After weeks of no reply, they finally connected. In late October LTC (b)(6) informed (b)(6) that MNF-I had not responded to any of her queries regarding our trip. According to (b)(6) Captain Hal Pittman was cc'd on some of the message traffic between the LTC and himself. In early December, LTC (b)(6) suggested it might be worthwhile for DoD to prep and send an official Theater Clearance message in order to prompt a response from MNF-I who, three months later, had not responded to the LTC.

In late November LTC (b)(6) spoke with LTC (b)(6) C-1 at MNF-I (head of DV visits), regarding our request. He responded to that conversation via e-mail, which was forwarded to our office. LTC (b)(6) assessment of the informal request is that the number of participants should not exceed 20 due to lack of aviation support available to move the group and any planned trip should take place in early December or early 2005. (b)(6) then called LTC (b)(6) and spoke with him personally about the trip. LTC (b)(6) stated that he would inform the MNF-I PAO of the request and would await the Theater Clearance message (with a complete itinerary and stating a specific purpose for the trip).

Having worked on dozens of such trips during my time in Iraq, I wanted to place a call directly to the DV folks in Iraq to talk with them about our proposed trip, now scheduled for early January. I spoke with LTC (b)(6) in Baghdad for more than thirty minutes, discussed our trip, asked for his suggestions and made it clear we would be as low maintenance as possible.

This afternoon, more than four months after beginning the official process, we dispatched the country clearance message, and just as predicted, finally got a reply from MNF-I.

Action Items

1) Country Clearance needs to be approved for our group

Note: we submitted more names than we have seats for, once we have the date locked, we will prioritize and will only bring the maximum of 15 on the trip.

2) Per Captain Pittman, this needs to be managed as a media trip not a DV visit, therefore MNF-I Strategic Communications and General Casey must approve. Per Pittman this should be brought up during the 8:00 am conference call tomorrow.

3) Time: We are rapidly running out of time as we need to book flights into Kuwait and there are limited seats remaining - we also have to give our guests as much heads up notice as possible. Our goal is to be able to confirm the trip and departure date by next Wednesday, the actual schedule once on the ground can be flexible until the first week of January. Our current itinerary is as follows:

Sunday, January 9, 2005

All delegation members arrive in Kuwait

Monday, January 10, 2005

Early am flight in Baghdad, military briefings, lunch or dinner with troops, site visit, (ideally fallujah with briefing in fallujah from commanders on the ground on the huge success). Overnight in Baghdad, tents/cots appropriate for overnight. No high level DV's on trip. Highest ranking retired officer is a MG.

Tuesday, January 11, 2005

Meetings with Iraqi leaders, ideally Allawi, update on election process, outlook on the future of Iraq. Possible briefing on status of reconstruction projects, possible site visit to one of the projects, likely in the Green Zone.

Depart Iraq Tuesday afternoon for Kuwait.

Hope this helps,

dl

Dallas B. Lawrence
Director, Office of Community Relations & Public Liaison
United States Department of Defense

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, December 22, 2004 10:42 AM
To: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Subject: RE: radio-- Garrison show

Thanks, we are going to talk to him about what he will be discussing so we can try to fit the right guest to the topics he is interested in too.

-----Original Message-----

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, December 22, 2004 10:37 AM
To: Bryan Whitman (E-mail); Eric Ruff (E-mail); Frank Thorp (E-mail); (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Subject: radio-- Garrison show

here is the info for the radio opportunity...

-----Original Message-----

From: JedBabbin (b)(6) [mailto:JedBabbin@ (b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, December 22, 2004 10:12 AM
To: allison.barber@ (b)(6)
Subject: Garrison show

Allison: This is the show I'll be subbing on both 4 and 5 Jan. Please note that the hours are 10 am to 1 pm Eastern, not 9-12 as I said on the phone. Many thanks for the help. Best, Jed.

:: wibc.com ::

Jed Babbin

(b)(6) (Home Office)
(b)(6) (Home Fax)
(b)(6) (Mobile)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) LCDR, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, December 22, 2004 9:09 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Subject: RE: TRANSCRIPT.doc

Attachments: Shields Post Response DRAFT 1.0.doc



Shields Post
Response DRAFT 1. (b)(6)

Please find the slightly revised letter, attached.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, December 22, 2004 8:00 AM
To: (b)(6) LCDR, OASD-PA; (b)(6) OASD-PA; Latimer, Matthew, OASD-PA; (b)(6)
(b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA;
(b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: TRANSCRIPT.doc

General Pete Pace has a conference call recently with the Retired Military Analysts and some of the comments he made in this call regarding humvees and armor are useful.

TRANSCRIPT.doc

(b)(6)

Subject: Lunch with Chuck Nash
Location: He will pick me up at 11:45 at River
Start: Wed 12/22/2004 12:00 PM
End: Wed 12/22/2004 12:00 PM
Recurrence: (none)

(b) (6)

Subject: dan senor phone call
Start: Tue 12/21/2004 4:30 PM
End: Tue 12/21/2004 5:00 PM
Recurrence: (none)

(b)(6)

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, December 21, 2004 1:09 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: another request from military analyst

Jed Babbin, on Scarborough tonight and Fox & Friends tomorrow morning

Topic: Defending SecDef/Intel Bill/Iraq Elections

Needed info: "How will intel bill improve quality of intelligence gathering? Why is today's NYT definitely wrong with the attack against SecDef for his positions. Are there any UN election workers in Iraq today."

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, December 21, 2004 7:50 AM
To: Latimer, Matthew, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) LCDR, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Subject: LtGen Newbold criticism of SecDef & CJCS

Matt,

A lot of people are probably going to initially miss this particular **criticism** this morning, because it was only in the **Radio-TV section** of Today's Early Bird (<http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/r20041221rtv.htm>).

LtGen Greg Newbold, USMC, was the Director of Operations for the Joint Staff when I first got there, a job that traditionally destines the recipients for 4-stars. He retired instead, supposedly as a bitter man who did not get along well with SecDef.

He also infers Gen Myers is to blame for not confronting the Secretary on inadequate troop levels.

VR/

(b)(6)

NEWS HOUR WITH JIM LEHRER PBS TV

6:00 PM DECEMBER 20, 2004

Rumsfeld under Fire

GWEN IFILL: Donald Rumsfeld may be the Bush administration's most consistent lightning rod. Is that a good or a bad thing? For an analysis of the secretary's wartime performance, we get two views. Retired Marine Lieutenant General Gregory Newbold had a 30-year career in the military; his last assignment was as director of operations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And James Schlesinger was director of the CIA and then secretary of defense during the Nixon and Ford administrations. He now serves on the Defense Policy Board, which advises Secretary Rumsfeld.

Secretary Schlesinger, how much of this dispute about Donald Rumsfeld is about personality and how much of it is about performance?

JAMES SCHLESINGER: Well, it's mostly about personality. There are a lot of people out there that do not like Donald Rumsfeld. You're getting a recycling of complaints that have gone back to the beginning of the administration.

A lot of the press that talked about quagmire back in the days of the Afghanistan run-up and then in the early days of the war finally have... may have found a quagmire that they've been predicting or maybe they hope that they've got a quagmire.

GWEN IFILL: So, in your opinion, Secretary Rumsfeld's doing a good job?

JAMES SCHLESINGER: Secretary Rumsfeld has done a good job. He gets an A for Afghanistan and an A for the invasion. For the post-invasion period, he probably gets a C-plus. All in all he's done a very good job.

GWEN IFILL: Gen. Newbold, personality or performance?

LT. GEN. GREGORY NEWBOLD (Ret.): I'm not sure you can separate the two completely. Unfortunately his

personality has influenced the performance because in my view you need an open exchange of ideas where notions are maybe contrary to your own are solicited.

And I don't think he's fostered an environment that does that. If there is poor advice offered, and therefore, poor decisions made, sometimes you end up where we are right now.

GWEN IFILL: You worked in the Pentagon under Secretary Rumsfeld or with Secretary Rumsfeld, give us an example of what you mean when you say the personality and the performance got mixed up with one another.

LT. GEN. GREGORY NEWBOLD (Ret.): Well, the climate is very important. I think an environment that fosters contrary opinions or that seeks to determine where advice may be different than your own is very important.

Even when that advice isn't taken, the understanding that it may be offered— whether it's from the Congress, from allies, from the media, from....

GWEN IFILL: From generals.

LT. GEN. GREGORY NEWBOLD (Ret.): Maybe even from generals. But from your commanders is very important. And certainly that didn't exist on many occasions.

GWEN IFILL: Mr. Secretary....

JAMES SCHLESINGER: On many occasions it certainly did exist. Tommy Franks gave him... the secretary his advice. It reshaped the invasion. General Abizaid gives him advice. Certainly Gen. Myers feels that way. There is a great deal of interaction between the secretary and his senior officers.

He sometimes has a challenging style, but general officers should not be dismayed by his challenging style..

GWEN IFILL: Did we see his challenging style on view last week with his answer to the questions about armored vehicles? What did you make of that?

JAMES SCHLESINGER: Well, I think that that is basically a press frenzy. If you look at his answer in the beginning of the answer, what he did was to encourage the troops and say, "I talked to the general officers about when we could get more armored vehicles.

"We are moving these armored vehicles from every part of the world in which they're not needed. We are increasing production of those armored vehicles."

Then he moved into the point that you quoted. And I think that it's a misrepresentation of his views.

GWEN IFILL: Assuming you've seen the entire representation of what he said that day, what's your sense about that, General?

LT. GEN. GREGORY NEWBOLD (Ret.): I agree to some degree.

That is, I think holding Secretary Rumsfeld accountable for the armor issue is a little bit akin to convicting Al Capone for tax evasion. There are many issues of much greater importance than that which the secretary I think should be held accountable. And the armor issue, that's primarily a service issue.

GWEN IFILL: When we talk about -- we'll move on the big ones.

But I'm also curious about another issue which kind of bubbled up over the weekend, which is the signing using auto pen to sign letters of condolences to fallen soldiers' families.

When you were secretary did you sign those letters by yourself? Did you have to sign any of them?

JAMES SCHLESINGER: There was no combat while I was secretary.

GWEN IFILL: Do you think it was a good idea?

JAMES SCHLESINGER: I don't think that is a good idea. I think that the fact that the secretary is now signing those letters personally indicates that he did not think it was a good idea in retrospect.

GWEN IFILL: Is that something that is emblematic of anything to you?

LT. GEN. GREGORY NEWBOLD (Ret.): I'm not surprised by it. The same secretary, when asked if casualties bothered him said, "Well, sure they bother me but remember they're volunteers." That's kind of a troubling approach to this. It he ought to show more sensitivity.

GWEN IFILL: What did you make of the criticisms coming from Capitol Hill last week specifically and most kind of noticeably from Republicans. Senators Hagel and McCain and Lott and Sen. Collins all saying in varying degrees that their sense of confidence in Secretary Rumsfeld has been shaken?

JAMES SCHLESINGER: The real question is whether the president has confidence in Secretary Rumsfeld. And he answered that today.

He serves at the pleasure of the president, and I think that you've got the answer. He will continue to serve as secretary of defense.

GWEN IFILL: Isn't it better to get along with people on the Hill?

JAMES SCHLESINGER: It is better to get along with people on the Hill, but he's getting along with most of them. You saw the quote from John Warner. Of the four people on television yesterday, the ranking Democrats and the two chairmen... none of them called for his resignation.

GWEN IFILL: General, when you hear people talking about lost confidence whether on the Hill or other places perhaps within the Pentagon itself, do you find that significant?

LT. GEN. GREGORY NEWBOLD (Ret.): I hear a lot of those comments. I think the issue probably is as Secretary Schlesinger's articulated. The president clearly has great confidence in the secretary. I think he'll weather this storm. He'll certainly maintain his position through the Iraqi elections.

How many more missteps he can take I'm not certain. He's at the pleasure of the president.

GWEN IFILL: Do you have confidence in the secretary?

LT. GEN. GREGORY NEWBOLD (Ret.): Confidence? I have felt for years that we didn't have the secretary of defense who was the right one to develop the plans to conduct our operations the way we needed to.

And my opinion hasn't changed.

GWEN IFILL: Let me flip this a little bit because you are supportive of the secretary and you are not. So, let me ask you, Secretary Schlesinger, what would you consider to be the secretary's weak points?

JAMES SCHLESINGER: Well, I think that as I indicated earlier the run-up, planning for the post-war period was not complete. And the reaction when the insurgency started was somewhat slow. But the secretary, as soon as those IED's started going off, he established a committee to look into technology that would deal with those IED's.

He has been quite responsive.

GWEN IFILL: The IED's being the...

JAMES SCHLESINGER: Explosive devices that are along the roads. It's interesting that now that we're past Ramadan that the number of incidents is down to pre-Ramadan levels and that as Gen. Casey said yesterday at the Pentagon, that of the 18 provinces, 14 of them are quite calm.

GWEN IFILL: Gen. Newbold, what would you say Secretary Rumsfeld's strong points are?

LT. GEN. GREGORY NEWBOLD (Ret.): He had a great vision when he came into the Pentagon. I think his ideas on changing the character of the way operations were conducted and the way that the Pentagon processes were conducted were right on target.

If you listed the ten top priorities for Secretary Rumsfeld, I would have agreed with all ten of them. It's not what he wished to accomplish. It's probably how.

GWEN IFILL: When you talk about one of his priorities, one of them is the transformation of the military which is a grand term which means in some ways making it kind of a leaner, lighter, more efficient military.

Is that something which can co-exist in your opinion, General, with conducting a multi-front open-ended war?

LT. GEN. GREGORY NEWBOLD (Ret.): I think transformation was probably not fully articulated. It's a desirable goal but there was not a lot behind it. It tended to be platform-centric rather than what I think...

GWEN IFILL: What does that mean?

LT. GEN. GREGORY NEWBOLD (Ret.): Aircraft, submarines, ships. I think a more complete transformation has changed the culture of an institution, to add to its mental agility not just its speed of movement but speed of thinking.

GWEN IFILL: Can it work now, while we're at war?

LT. GEN. GREGORY NEWBOLD (Ret.): Absolutely. It needs to work while we're at war as much as any other time.

GWEN IFILL: Secretary Schlesinger?

JAMES SCHLESINGER: Well, I think that Gen. Shoemaker is making some of those changes in the army. The army has been a slow institution to adjust. But he is moving away from divisions towards brigades that can be moved independently.

Indeed for the Navy and the Air Force, this has been a platform centric adjustment but the Navy and the Air Force are about platforms, whereas the Marines and the Army are about organization and people.

GWEN IFILL: Has Secretary Rumsfeld managed this insurgency well, the idea of troop levels? Is the American military, as it is positioned right now in Iraq, where it ought to be? Is it being managed correctly?

JAMES SCHLESINGER: I think that he has had as much in the way of force in Iraq as the limits of the budget permit. People must remember that there's been a 40 percent increase in the budget and that there are those over in the executive office who limit the funds for the Department of Defense.

Manpower still is the most expensive part of our military establishment as opposed to other military establishments.

GWEN IFILL: Gen. Newbold, when it comes to managing the insurgency and the appropriate troop levels, do you think that Secretary Rumsfeld has done all he can or has he been hamstrung by finances?

LT. GEN. GREGORY NEWBOLD (Ret.): I think the war should probably dictate our troop levels. I think we need to provide what's required for the fight. I think they've been a bit shocked-and-awed by what's happened in the post Baghdad situation.

And although some people I respect deeply have said we have sufficient force over there, my personal opinion is the facts belie that.

GWEN IFILL: And so you think there should be more troops and do you hold Secretary Rumsfeld responsible for that?

LT. GEN. GREGORY NEWBOLD (Ret.): I hold two people responsible. The environment was created by Secretary Rumsfeld but senior military leaders are not gagged. They need to be able to speak out forcefully and if that's not sufficient, then to take other....

GWEN IFILL: Are senior military leaders intimidated?

LT. GEN. GREGORY NEWBOLD (Ret.): They certainly have been.

GWEN IFILL: One final question to both of you quickly which is whether... you're right. Secretary Rumsfeld comes under attack periodically.

This isn't the first time we've had some version of this discussion.

Would a change at the top if he were to be replaced make a difference in your opinion in terms of U.S. Administration policy, military policy?

JAMES SCHLESINGER: I don't think so. The policies come from the president. I think that the removal of Secretary Rumsfeld would be a boon to all of our enemies around the world.

They would rejoice in the caves in which al-Qaida leaders hide; that our enemies in the Middle East would rejoice. He has become a symbol of American steadfastness, and I think that that would be tragedy if he were to be removed.

GWEN IFILL: General?

LT. GEN. GREGORY NEWBOLD (Ret.): I would not make a change until after the Iraqi elections. And it would depend on who became the new secretary of defense and the forcefulness with which they articulated the importance of sticking with a policy of strength.

I think that is absolutely critical. So it depends on who would replace him.

GWEN IFILL: Gen. Newbold and Secretary Schlesinger, thank you both very much.

LT. GEN. GREGORY NEWBOLD (Ret.): Thank you.

(b)(6)

To: Paul Valley
Subject: RE: Military Analyst Meetings

holding awaiting country clearance requests

-----Original Message-----

From: Paul Valley [mailto:paulvalley@(b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, December 20, 2004 2:48 PM
To: 'Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA'
Subject: RE: Military Analyst Meetings

No problem - look forward to next call.

Anything new on pending Iraq trip in January?

PV

We Trust Fox News

Paul E Valley
Military Analyst
Fox News Channel

(b)(6)
paulvalley@ (b)(6)
www.soldiersmemorialfund.org
tel:
mobile:
(b)(6)

Signature powered by Plaxo
Want a signature like this?
Add me to your address book...

-----Original Message-----

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA [mailto:Dallas.Lawrence@ (b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, December 20, 2004 12:42 PM
Subject: Military Analyst Meetings

Folks,

I just wanted to update you all and to let you know that there will not be a meeting at DoD today for analysts. I know Col Davis has already emailed out a correction stating there will not be a conference call today.

Also, just to be clear in the future, and I apologize for any confusion that may have existed on our end with the email from Col Davis on the conference call and the email from (b)(6) with regard to a potential meeting, from time to time we here in ComRel may try and pitch the idea of a conference call or a meeting with senior level defense officials and may want to gauge interest from amongst you all before moving the suggestion through staff level discussions. We need to assume that such conversations will remain confidential amongst the group as we work to try and offer you all the greatest access to information possible. It would be my hope that requests for info on availability from the group for potential meetings would remain a close hold and not be shared publicly - allowing us the greatest flexibility to serve as a resource for your outreach efforts.

Again, my apologies if our request for scheduling availability threw folks off today, and I look forward to working together in the weeks and months ahead.

Best,

Dallas B. Lawrence
Community Relations & Public Liaison
United States Department of Defense

(b)(2)

(b)(5)

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, December 20, 2004 1:18 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: SecDef Outreach

Allison asked me to check with you on the following:

Allison had asked me early this morning to gauge interest from our analysts in a potential meeting with the secdef this afternoon. We had 9 folks reply they would be available and interested in coming in should the meeting come together. It was expressed in very, very tentative terms, and it was made clear that we were just checking as a formality in the event folks in the front office decided to move forward and hold a meeting. Anyhow, long story short, with the decision not to do a conference call, should I let these guys know that there will not be an in person meeting today? The rsvp list is enclosed below.

Dana Dillon
Jed Babbitt
Robert L. Maginnis
Larry Welch
Wayne Simmons
LTG Thomas G. McInerney
Bill Cowan
Steven Greeg
Robert Scales

(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, December 20, 2004 12:36 PM
To: 'Dan Senor'
Subject: RE:

here's what he said about the letter flap. in general, though, you might mention that he has made many many trips to walter reed, bethesda, and other military hospitals, met with hundreds of wounded troops and their families, spends time with grieving widows when he makes troop visits in the u.s.. he does not seek publicity for these things and would certainly be chagrined if any surviving family member did not understand how much he values and honors their sacrifice and service.

"It is a solemn privilege of the many of us in the Department to meet with U.S. forces and families who have experienced injury or death in the defense of our country.

"During visits with wounded forces and their families at Walter Reed Army Hospital or at the Bethesda Naval Medical Center, I have drawn inspiration from the dignity and resolve of these wonderful young Americans and their loved ones.

"Over the past years, my wife, Joyce, and I have met with several hundred wounded troops and their families during visits to intensive care units, therapy facilities, and their rooms in military hospitals in the United States and abroad.

"During visits to military installations, I have met with still others during their visits to the Pentagon.

"Joyce and I also have met together and individually with spouses and children of those killed in action.

"At the earliest moment in the global war on terror, I determined that it is important that military families who have lost loved ones in hostile actions receive a letter from me directly.

"I wrote and approved the now more than 1000 letters sent to family members and next of kin of each of the servicemen and women killed in military action. While I have not individually signed each one, in the interest of ensuring expeditious contact with grieving family members, I have directed that in the future I sign each letter.

"I am deeply grateful for the many letters I have received from the families of those who have been killed in the service of our country, and I recognize and honor their personal loss."

-----Original Message-----

From: Dan Senor [mailto:dansenor@^{(b)(6)}]
Sent: Monday, December 20, 2004 11:37 AM
To: larry.diritad@^{(b)(6)}
Subject: ^{(b)(6)}

Lar,

I'm on Linda Vester (FOX) at 1PM, defending secdef.
Let me know if there are any new points to hit (other than the ones we discussed on Fri).

Thanks!

-Dan

(b)(6)

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, December 20, 2004 7:07 AM
To: Davis, Archie, Col, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Cc: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: Outreach

What are the chances we could get our military analysts in the bldg today or tomorrow?

If not in the bldg, let's set up a call.

Possible guest secdef. More details soon Thx Ab Allison Barber Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

Sent from my BlackBerry Handheld.

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, December 15, 2004 5:03 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: Evans, Dave, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Per your request...

Hey boss, here is the info you requested.

Dave, is this guy on our list of military analysts? have we seen him before or was this his first time in primetime?

BG Nick Halley
Big Story with John Gibbons, December 10, 2004
Transcript, via Fox News: <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,141340,00.html>

Is Iraq Armor Shortage a Problem?

This is a *partial* transcript of "*The Big Story With John Gibson*," Dec. 10, 2004, that has been edited for clarity.

JOHN GIBSON, HOST: We all want the troops to have everything they need, including armored Humvees, but sometimes the army has to prioritize. Is the armor shortage in Iraq a legitimate major problem?

Let's ask retired Brigadier General **Nick Halley** (search http://search.foxnews.com/info.foxnws/redirs_all.htm?pgtarg=wbsdoggpile&qcat=web&qkw=Nick%20Halley). He was in charge of the **82nd Airborne Corps** (search http://search.foxnews.com/info.foxnws/redirs_all.htm?pgtarg=wbsdoggpile&qcat=web&qkw=82nd%20Airborne%20Corps) during the first Gulf War. So, General, should the American people be steamed that American troops in Iraq don't have these armored Humvees even as we speak?

BRIG. GEN. NICK HALLEY, U.S. ARMY (RET.): Well, I think they should be somewhat upset because, of course, it's been a year since we know that we've needed those. And they've worked very, very hard and upgraded most of them, as you saw from the previous graphic.

But I don't think there's any need for any soldier in Iraq not to have the full complement of armor protection.

GIBSON: Well, I think I heard Bret say — I thought the figure yesterday that was given was that two-thirds of the Humvees are armored, but I think I heard Bret say it's up to 78 percent. Would you consider that good progress for the year?

HALLEY: Well, there's about 8,000 that need to be upgraded, and about 6,000 of them have been upgraded. And that's very, very good progress, if you consider all the bureaucracy that you have to go through to upgrade these vehicles.

But still, we needed to have more progress, because there's really no excuse for any soldier in Iraq not to have the full complement of armor.

GIBSON: OK. You only have to go to Bethesda to see that this has taken a tremendous toll on us. These IEDs blowing up Humvees as they drive by. What explains the tardiness of the response of the Pentagon?

HALLEY: Well, remember that the Humvees and the other thin-skinned vehicles were not designed to have armor. In fact, all of the vehicles that we had thousands and thousands of them in Desert Storm, none of them were armored. We did put sandbags on the floor of these vehicles, just to make sure we had some protection against mines that we might run over.

But these were not designed to be armored. So it was only about a year ago that we discovered that the enemy

was going to use the tactic that he did, and so we've really scrambled, the army has, and the Defense Department in the last year, to get these done. And they've done a great job, except it needs to be a little bit more.

GIBSON: General, why was it that somebody in the Pentagon in the planning for post-war Iraq, why didn't it occur to them that the thousands, hundreds of thousands of tons of explosives in Iraq, some of it was going to get used to set off roadside bombs?

HALLEY: Well, I don't think in this particular case — we have had intelligence failures in Iraq — I don't think in this particular case it was an intelligence failure, because we had fought in Iraq before with these same type of vehicles and managed without the armor.

In Monday morning quarterbacking, I think we can see the need for those, but I don't think it was reasonable at the time of this particular war that we would stop what we were doing, spend billions of dollars and delay the attack for a year while we put on this armor.

So, I think the deficiency in this case was not a failure of intelligence.

GIBSON: Do you think it's shocking that American troops are evidently going through scrap heaps looking for pieces of steel to weld on to their vehicles?

HALLEY: I think that's very shocking. And I think all Americans are rightly upset about that, and we need to get that fixed very, very fast.

GIBSON: By the way, who decides and how did they decide, who gets the armored vehicles?

HALLEY: Well, that's done, of course, at the Defense Department level, and it's normally units are prioritized. And, of course, active duty units are always done first, and the units that are in the worst areas are done first. For example, the units that are around Fallujah or Baghdad will be higher priority than the ones perhaps that are down further south.

GIBSON: So do you think this problem is coming to a close, or has this exposed a weakness in the command structure, in seeming not to pay enough attention to the needs of the soldiers, as you might want?

HALLEY: Well, I think it's coming to a close, but if you look at the statistics we heard today, there's still about 2,000 Humvees that need to be upgraded. They're doing them at the rate of 400 a month; now with this increase it'll be 500 a month.

That still is another four or five months where soldiers are going to be in Humvees that aren't armor protected. So, it's somewhat upsetting.

GIBSON: What about these trucks? Only 15 percent of those are armored up to protect the driver.

HALLEY: Right. I haven't seen a time schedule on that, but that must be at least six months or a year out before that's going to happen. So people are going to be vulnerable for some period of time, obviously.

GIBSON: General, do you find it so surprising that soldiers would recognize their own vulnerability and say, "I'm going to do something about this myself. I'm going to get some plate steel and weld it on there."?

HALLEY: No, absolutely not. Soldiers are very, very innovative and they are always doing what they call "field expedience" in many, many different areas to improve the equipment or to improve their way of life. So, this is very typical of American soldiers to do whatever's necessary to get the job done.

GIBSON: General, do you blame Don Rumsfeld for this problem?

HALLEY: No, I don't really blame anyone particularly for this problem, but somewhere in the defense establishment there's somebody that knew how many vehicles needed to be changed; the rate that the armor was

being made; and the date that all this was going to be completed.

And I think there's somebody that should have said the date of completion is not acceptable. So, instead of having two manufacturers of armor, perhaps we should have had four or five companies doing it. Instead of having six places that were putting the armor on the vehicles, maybe we needed 12 or 15 or whatever it took. So, there was some foot dragging there, obviously.

GIBSON: Brigadier General Nick Halley. General, thanks very much, appreciate you coming on.

HALLEY: Thank you very much, John.

(b)(6)

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA [allison.barber@oasd.mil] (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, December 14, 2004 5:41 PM
To: Di Rita Larry (E-mail); Ruff, Eric, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: the road to iraq -- starring hope and crosby

hi there

finally made some forward movement on the military analysts trip to iraq. looks like we have a window of opportunity the first week of jan. larry, i know you had mentioned a bureau chief too.

we have a total of 15 slots. my idea is to use 10 slots for our top military analysts and then have 1 slot for staff (dallas) and then 4 slots for anyone else you want me to include.

we are going to be able to overnight in iraq, so that is good. but all travel will be done in blackhawks which is why centcom can only support 15 people.

thanks
ab

(b)(6)

From: Murphy, Margaret, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, December 14, 2004 3:40 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: William Cohen

Attachments: 12-14-04 DiRita Rodriguez presser.txt



12-14-04 DiRita
Rodriguez pres...

Thank you.

I just checked federal news service and they have a transcript of Mr. Di Rita and BG Rodriguez up already on their site. Here it is.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, December 14, 2004 3:31 PM
To: (b)(6) OASD-PA
Subject: RE: William Cohen

Thanks. Cohen's hit time tonight is about 5:30 on CNN

(b)(6) The Cohen Group I Associate VP
I Fax: (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, December 14, 2004 3:27 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: William Cohen

Got it. Thank you. Here's the link to the rotation announcements.

<http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20041214-1823.html>

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, December 14, 2004 3:26 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: William Cohen

(b)(6) The Cohen Group I Associate VP
Fax: (b)(6)

This message is a PRIVATE communication. If you are not the intended

(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, December 14, 2004 8:40 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: media outreach

Eric: I can't read this grid, but I hope it does not have the secdef/depsec proposals on it...sent you an email earlier on the point..

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@^{(b)(6)}>
To: Lessel, Erwin F. (0-7) <Lessele^{(b)(6)}> 'Pittman, CAPT Harold E. (USN)' <pittmahe^{(b)(6)}>
CC: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA <larry.dirita^{(b)(6)}>, Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA <Bryan.Whitman^{(b)(6)}>, Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA <ellen.haddock^{(b)(6)}>, Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA <George.Rhynedance^{(b)(6)}>
Sent: Tue Dec 14 08:36:52 2004
Subject: media outreach

erv, hal,

following a discussion with larry, i'm forwarding a grid containing tactical suggestions for an array of senior dod leadership. some have been or will be implemented. please note we have some ideas for consideration by generals abizaid and casey. we should also send you an internal-use only copy of the trascript from general pace's briefing with military analysts, which took place at 1745 yesterday. thanks, eric

(b)(6)

From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, December 13, 2004 8:21 PM
To: Larry DiRita (E-mail 2)
Cc: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Rhyndance, George, COL, OASD-PA; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
Subject: FW: MIL ANALYSTS CONF CALL – FEEDBACK

This event went very well -- you were right Gen Pace really gave it the right context and the group on the phone asked insightful questions in a very friendly atmosphere. This should pay off down the road.

-----Original Message-----

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Monday, December 13, 2004 7:32 PM
To: Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
Cc: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Rhyndance, George, COL, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LCDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Maj, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) COL OCPA; (b)(6) CAPT, JCS SJS; (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Subject: MIL ANALYSTS CONF CALL -- FEEDBACK

Capt Thorp,

Late this afternoon, in response to a request from Mr. Di Rita, Gen Pace spoke with 15 retired military analysts on the subject of Armored vehicles/force protection. The session was **ON THE RECORD**, so you will likely hear some of the analysts using his name. Also supporting the event was BG Jeff Sorenson, from Army G8. Call was from 1715-1745. A brief recap follows – not sure when OSD will have a transcript ready to post, but thought some of this might be useful considering the media plan for Gen Myers over the next several days.

Gen Pace opened by discussing the **force protection challenge has two parts – equipment, but also the tactics used**. He described a continuum of protection, from most being buttoned up in a tank, to least, being walking the streets of Baghdad without a flak vest or helmet. The greater the protection, the less the ability to personally interact with the people and influence the situation.

He recapped the history of the "need" -- that shortly after May 03, the requirement was for about 1/3 of the vehicles to be armored; 2/3 of the vehicles to be soft-skinned. **But a thinking, adapting enemy** quickly learned that he couldn't take us on military-to-military so he **changed tactics to IEDs**.

He described the **three levels of armored vehicles, indicated much had been done to procure equipment, and much more to do**. Goal is 28,000 armored vehicles by the end of March. Healthy application of money and industry has already been applied to this challenge, with more to follow. He also described the two task forces SecArmy has initiated: one on equipment, and one -- last October -- an IED Task Force to study TTPs, share lessons learned immediately with the field, analyze results, etc.

He made the point -- several times throughout the call -- that this is more than simply a concern about equipment...the need to balance between equipment and tactics. As a form of summary, Gen Pace indicated that **we should not be collectively too defensive on this subject, nor should we put too big a smiley face on it. Americans need to know that their sons and daughters are important to us**, and the analysts need to keep that in their minds, while we keep hard at this, working on improving force protection against a thinking/adapting enemy.

Focus of the questions:

Any constraints (fiscal, industry, etc.) on getting needed armor?

Can you characterize the tactics (on an unclas basis) that would help us understand other force protection issues, such as convoy protection? (Gen Pace said he didn't want to give TTPs, because then the enemy would change to counter them, but rather he described the changing tactics of the enemy...first 1 IED, then later changed to explode 1 IED, and when responders come, set off the 2nd one, etc.)

Can we reach the goals/numbers of armored vehicles we want in the time frame we want?

How much of this [responding to need for additional armor] is reaction to last week's dust-up at Town Hall, and how much

already in the works?

How would you characterize the level of protection offered by an 'up-armored' Humvee?

How did this issue bubble up? Is it an issue that leadership has ignored previously?

What types of responses are we working on? Substances other than steel being considered? Kevlar? [Analyst asked how they might contact the right person if they were approached by industry or others with a possible solution.]

Overall lessons being learned and applied to future budgets/appropriations? How much is this impacting the future purchases of the military?

Some are suggesting Marines are taking more casualties because they have less armored vehicle support than the Army -- is that accurate?

At the end of the call, Army PA indicated that BG Sorenson and MG Speaks will be doing a press briefing at 0800 Eastern, on Wednesday to discuss Wheeled vehicles -- way ahead.

Analysts who indicated they would be on the call (those in **BOLD** asked questions):

Colonel Carl Kenneth Allard	(USA, Retired)
Mr. Jed Babbin	(USAF, JAG)
Lieutenant General Frank B. Campbell	(USAF, Retired)
Dr. James Jay Carafano	(LTC, USA, Retired)
Colonel (Tim) J. Eads	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Rick Francona	(USAF, Retired)
Brigadier General David L. Grange	(USA, Retired)
Colonel Jack Jacobs	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney	(USAF, Retired)
Major General Michael J. Nardotti, Jr.	(USA, Retired)
Captain Chuck Nash	(USN, Retired)
General William L. Nash	(USA, Retired)
General Glen K. Otis	(USA, Retired)
Major General Donald W. Shepperd	(USAF, Retired)
Major General Paul E. Vallely	(USA, Retired)

I have included COL Joe Curtin's wrap up of the call below.

Provided for your info.

V/R

Katie

GEN Pace and BG Sorenson participated in an OSD PA hosted teleconference today with 15 military analysts. Brief remarks made by each general officer followed by some excellent questions by the military analysts. All on the record. Bullet summary below:

* GEN PACE KEY COMMENTS:

- * Challenge today is to balance equipment versus tactics for troops deployed throughout Iraq.
- * Requirement changed over time as a thinking enemy found innovative methods to attack our troops using IEDs
- * Provided definition for the three levels of protection provided on vehicles going into Iraq.
- * Provided a short summary of the two SECARMY directed task forces underway to look at both the manufacturing base and the IED threat.
- * Provided context on what the Army has done over time to armor vehicles
- * Made clear that armor is only part of protecting Marines and Soldiers: training, lessons learned, TTPs, and technology are also key elements

*BG SORENSON

- * Summarized number of vehicles armored to date: unparalleled accomplishment versus any other coalition nation

-
- * Army is accelerating FMTV armored vehicles into theater
 - * Emphasized funding is there and we are working closely with industry to meet demand
 - * Pointed out the incredible testing effort on-going: tested over 1,000 "coupons" of materials
 - * Added emphasis that armor is only part of the solution to protecting troops -- same points as above.

OSD PA officials very pleased with the engagement. Believe this made a big difference to help counter media misperceptions.

(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, December 13, 2004 8:37 AM
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Brooks, Vincent K BG OCPA
Cc: Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA

we ought to think about a roundtable with military analysts that vcjcs, secarmy, and lgen blum can do today to put this whole armor/ng issue into better perspective.

(b)(6)

From: Daniel Goure [dgoure2001@^{(b)(6)}]
Sent: Thursday, December 09, 2004 11:07 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: Additional request for information

(b)(6)

You have been providing great stuff on this armor issue. I am going on CSPAN this Saturday morning for an hour on this issue. I wonder if you have any information on a couple of questions:

What is the story about Armor Holding Co.? They claim they could build more kits but were not asked to do so.

What is the status of the Tennessee Guard unit that soldier came from? Why were they scrounging for armor?

Although most HUMVEES have been uparmored, what about trucks and other support vehicles?

Thanks for any help you can give me.

Dan Goure

(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, December 08, 2004 4:55 PM
To: 'Dan Senior'
Subject: RE:

Yes. Will talk. I'll call you.

-----Original Message-----

From: Dan Senior [mailto:dansenor@^{(b)(6)}]
Sent: Wednesday, December 08, 2004 4:31 PM
To: Di Rita Larry CIV OSD; ldirita@^{(b)(6)}; larry.dirita@^{(b)(6)}
Subject:

Larry,

Need your help: A number of people trashing Kerik on background (shocker!!!).

NYT is doing a big piece on his service in Iraq.

Would you mind talking to them on background to say positive things? I could give you the points that I've been hitting with them...would be good if they were echoed. You'll have credibility with them, b/c your time in Baghdad overlapped with Bernie's.

Let me know.

Thanks!

-Dan

^{(b)(6)}

(b)(6)

From: Daniel Goure [dgoure2001@^{(b)(6)}]
Sent: Wednesday, December 08, 2004 4:07 PM
To: ^{(b)(6)} OASD-PA
Subject: RE: DoD position on Rumsfeld Visit to Kuwait

Thanks for the quick and very helpful response.

Dan Goure

-----^{(b)(6)} OASD-PA"
^{(b)(6)} wrote:

> Sir:
>
> Keep an eye on the transcript section of the DoD web site.
>
> <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20041208-secdef1761.html>
> They have posted the transcript from the town hall meeting.
>
> Also here is a story on our web site.
>
> http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec2004/n12082004_2004120806.html
> This afternoon Mr. Di Rita and BG Rodriguez held a press conference
> (operational update). That transcript isn't posted yet because the
> presser was at 1300, but should be later. The press asked some
> questions about this and Mr. Di Rita answered.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Daniel Goure [mailto:dgoure2001@^{(b)(6)}]
> Sent: Wednesday, December 08, 2004 3:41 PM
> To: ^{(b)(6)}
> Subject: DoD position on Rumsfeld Visit to Kuwait
>
>
> ^{(b)(6)}
>
> I am going to be on WTOP radio tomorrow morning to talk about the
> testy exchange between the Secretary and the soldier in Kuwait. They
> want to also talk about what has been done to provide the troops in
> Iraq with the gear they need. Could you give me some information on
> the following questions?
>
> What is DoD's position on the interchange? What about the soldier's
> complaints?
>
> What is the status of the effort to provide armor kits and uparmored
> vehicles to Iraq? What percentage of the vehicles are armored?
>
> Thanks.
>
> Dan Goure
>

(b)(6)

From: Paul Vallely [paulvallely@ (b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, December 08, 2004 11:28 AM
To: Thomas G McInerney; (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA; SCOTT B (b)(6) 'Chuck Nash'; brian.gaffney@ (b)(6) 'Cutler, Grace'; WSSInter@ (b)(6) tony.snow@ (b)(6) John Loftus; Joh Batchelor
Subject: Iran
Attachments: image001.jpg; image002.jpg



image001.jpg (3 KB)

As we have stated many times before, Iran is the center of terror now and must be dealt with. There must be consequences for their bad deeds!

When will the US come out with a strongly stated policy on Syria and Iran. Time is of the essence.

Iraq, Jordan see threat to election from Iran

"The leaders of Iraq and Jordan warned yesterday that Iran is trying to influence the Iraqi elections scheduled for Jan. 30 to create an Islamic government that would dramatically shift the geopolitical balance between Shiite and Sunni Muslims in the Middle East. Iraqi President Ghazi Yawar charged that Iran is coaching candidates and political parties sympathetic to Tehran and pouring 'huge amounts of money' into the campaign to produce a Shiite-dominated government similar to Iran's."

* Rebels aided by allies in Syria, U.S. says

"U.S. military intelligence officials have concluded that the Iraqi insurgency is being directed to a greater degree than previously recognized from Syria, where they said former Saddam Hussein loyalists have found sanctuary and are channeling money and other support to those fighting the established government. Based on information gathered during the recent fighting

in Fallujah, Baghdad and elsewhere in the Sunni Triangle, the officials said that a handful of senior Iraqi Baathists operating in Syria are collecting money from private sources in Saudi Arabia and Europe and turning it over to the insurgency."

* Iran rejects Egypt conspiracy accusations

"Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Asafi rejected Wednesday Egyptian accusations an Iranian diplomat is involved in conspiracies against Egypt....Egyptian Public Prosecutor Maher Abdel Wahed announced Tuesday police arrested an Egyptian agent for the Iranian Revolutionary Guards recruited by an Iranian diplomat in Cairo to carry out terrorist attacks against Egypt and Saudi Arabia and to assassinate important Egyptian officials."



Image002.jpg (16 KB)


Paul E Valley
Military Analyst

Fox News Channel



paulvalley@
www.soldiersmemorialfund.org

tel:
mobile:



Signature powered by Flaxo

Want a signature like this?

(b)(6)

From: Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, December 01, 2004 8:17 AM
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Keck, Gary, Col, OASD-PA; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) SMSgt, OCJCS/PA
Subject: Stray Volts on Force Rotation

From the meeting last night, I believe we have the following items outstanding this morning in support of the roll-out of the force rotation issue:

1. Input due early this morning (0800) so we can adjust the talking points and give the staffed version to LA for Hill notifications starting at 0900.
2. Need to set up an outreach call with the military analysts for 1430.
3. Need to set up and announce a press briefing (roundtable-type in Army (?) conference room) for 1500 or 1515.
4. Need to do a courtesy notification to the affected Governors.
5. Need to do a courtesy notification to the government of Japan (31 MEU is out of Okinawa) - I believe we discussed getting the Policy desk officer or the JS involved.
6. Need to coordinate briefers from Army, USMC, Navy, JS - by name.

I'm sure there are some other things that need to get done and we'll work those as they pop-up. Would appreciate any other issues that you think may be out there. I'd be happy to help on any and all issues today. Your thoughts?

GR

(b)(6)

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, November 23, 2004 2:48 PM
To: (b)(6) OASD-PA; Davis, Archie, Col, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: military analyst request

Please forward to roxie at press ops. Thx Allison Barber Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

Sent from my BlackBerry Handheld.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
To: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA <Allison.Barber@(b)(6)>, Davis, Archie, Col, OASD-PA <Archie.Davis@(b)(6)>
Sent: Tue Nov 23 14:36:35 2004
Subject: military analyst request

Any ideas yet on how to help him?

-----Original Message-----

From: Robert H Scales [mailto:RobertHScales@(b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, November 22, 2004 11:45 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: DoD Update: CENTCOM Fallujah

I'm in the process of staffing with Fox a "hero's minute". The purpose is for me to do a series of one minute descriptions of close combat vignettes that highlights recent actions by soldiers and marines in Faluggia and elsewhere. It's an effort to show individual acts to offset some of the bad publicity that's been coming out of Fallugia recently. They would be last minute trailers during prime time. Would you be willing to support this?
Scales

From: Military-Analysts List on behalf of (b)(6) OASD-PA
Sent: Fri 11/19/2004 2:40 PM
To: MILITARY-ANALYSTS-L@DTIC.MIL
Subject: DoD Update: CENTCOM Fallujah

Attached please find today's update from the Department of Defense Office of Public Affairs.

<<TP 11-19-04 CENTCOM Fallujah update.doc>>

USMC Lt. Gen. John Sattler, commander of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force in Fallujah, briefed the Pentagon press yesterday via satellite about Operation Al-Fajr (Dawn). Following are highlights. (transcript) <
<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20041118-1606.html>>

- * The purpose of Operation Al-Fajr was to eliminate Fallujah as either a perceived or an actual safe haven from which terrorists could operate.
- * Based on some of the records and ledgers uncovered during the fighting, commanders believe they have broken the back of the insurgency and eliminated Fallujah as a safe haven. The fighters have been forced to leave for new areas. When fighters are in areas they are not familiar with, it is easier to capture or bring them to justice.
- * The Coalition is now operating throughout all of Fallujah. In order

to make the town relatively safe so it can be turned over to Iraqi security forces, both U.S. troops and Iraqi security forces are now in the search-and-clear phase, going house to house and building to building. They have found stockpiles of weapons and in one basement, a room with bloodstained walls and tools for what appears to be some type of torture chamber.

* The timeline for opening the town for residents to return will be event driven, based on conditions, rather than time driven. Coalition military leaders will make recommendations to Prime Minister Allawi once they feel the area is fairly safe and secure. The intent now is to phase in the return of the city's citizens by sector. The Iraqi government will make the calls about which sections of town to open when.

* More than 50 U.S. troops and eight Iraqi troops have died in the fighting. It is estimated that 1,200 insurgents have been killed. A process is in place to compensate Iraqis for damage to their residence or business and for restitution for injury or death to innocent civilians.

* U.S. forces will move out as the Iraqi security structure takes hold, but forces will stay as close as necessary to ensure the rule of law is maintained. A curfew is still in place.

* Clean-up operations have begun. The Civil Military Operations Center has been stood up; it will bring humanitarian assistance and construction in coordination with the Iraqi government. The water, sewage, electrical grid and basic essential services are being evaluated. Food and water are being distributed.

* The Coalition and the Iraqis will continue to follow all leads to pursue the individuals who got away and the cowards who left early.

Gen. John Abizaid, commander of U.S. Central Command, has completed a three-day visit to Iraq. Following are some highlights of his remarks.

* Most people in Iraq and the rest of the Arab world do not share the views of the extremists. They want to live in a world governed by their own laws, not one dominated by bin Laden or al-Zarqawi.

* Courageous Iraqi patriots are fighting against the extremists so their country can be safe and secure, governed by elections and a constitution.

* Both Iraqis and Americans must have patience and willpower during the time it will take to train the security forces and find brave individuals willing to lead them.

(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, November 22, 2004 1:29 PM
To: 'Dan Senor'
Subject: RE:

Thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: Dan Senor [mailto:dansenor@^{(b)(6)}]
Sent: Monday, November 22, 2004 1:29 PM
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Subject: RE:

Perfect. Great. Watch at 5PM...I promise to stick to script...Thanks!

--- "Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA"
<larry.dirita@^{(b)(6)}> wrote:

- > 1. elections in Iraq...good thing, it will be tough between now and
- > then, lots of pressure to change date from u.n. and elsewhere,
- > transition to sovereignty was hard, too, etc.
- >
- > 2. force levels: a matter for the commanders.
- > They have gotten what they
- > have sought. Abizaid and metz have the job of balancing the requests
- > from individual division commanders against the country-wide
- > requirements. If abizaid and metz determine more is needed, they are
- > going to get what they need.
- >
- > 3. rumsfeld "killed" intel bill: nonsense.
- > Testified in public before the
- > president even submitted legislation. Said we need reform. Details
- > were left to the committees in congress, white house.
- > General Myers was asked
- > for his views and he gave them, as he is statutorily required to do.
- >
- > 4. Through it all, remember the u.s. forces on thanksgiving.
- >
- > Tnx...

> -----Original Message-----

> **From:** Dan Senor [mailto:dansenor@^{(b)(6)}]
> **Sent:** Monday, November 22, 2004 12:14 PM
> **To:** Di Rita Larry CIV OSD; ldirita@^{(b)(6)}
> **Subject:**

> Larry,

> I'm going on FOX News ("BIG STORY WITH JOHN GIBSON") today at 5PM.
> Anything new that you want me to push?

> -Dan

(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, November 19, 2004 11:49 AM
To: 'Dan Senor'
Subject: RE:

Thanks. You might dampen a little bit the comments by the IMEF commander that we "broke the back" of the insurgency.

These points would help:

- We are on track to make Fallujah unavailable as a safe haven to terrorists and f.r.e.
- The campaign of intimidation against Sunnis was part of the strategy in Fallujah, and sunni citizens are now coming forward in large numbers to provide better intelligence.
- Fallujah was obviously being used for zarqawi operations. We have uncovered large weapons caches, i.e.d. factories, etc.
- Now comes the important work of reconstruction and integration of Fallujah into Iraq as a whole. The Iraqi government and coalition have a plan to commit hundreds of millions of dollars to reconstructing the city and helping the residents return.

Thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: Dan Senor [mailto:dansenor@
Sent: Friday, November 19, 2004 11:45 AM
To: Di Rita Larry CIV OSD
Subject:

Larry,

Doing some TV later on Fallujah. Here are the points I will hit:

- Raid on Baghdad mosque & Mosul hospital demonstrate value of having Iraqi security forces on front line of certain operations. Better to have Iraqis engaging Iraqis at politically or religiously sites, rather than Americans engaging Iraqis.
- Discovery of terror facilities in Fallujah (slaughterhouse, terror training classroom, SUV, etc) underscore the importance of going into Fallujah, even if many of the terrorists were able to scatter. We've removed their base of op's. They need these facilities to be effective. Once they're on the run and w/o access to a safe haven from which to build and use such facilities, harder for them to operate.

Anything else? Any other nuggets that would bolster the case for why our strategy is working?

Thanks!

-Dan

(b)(6)

(b)(5)

Subject: Military Analysts conference call
Location: 1-800-860-2442
Start: Sat 11/20/2004 8:30 AM
End: Sat 11/20/2004 9:00 AM
Recurrence: (none)

dial (b)(7) and ask the operator to connect you to the Military Analysts conference call.