

there. Some obvious choices would be BG Jay Hood and perhaps the interrogator, Dr. Jennifer Bryson (double check the name), among others. I would coordinate with General Hood on this.

I have not contacted folks at GTMO and am informing you first of the idea. Larry DiRita and I have discussed and think this proposal has real merit. I will follow this memo up with a phone call in a day or two to get your perspective and thoughts. Thank you, sir.

(b)(6)

**From:** Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 03, 2005 4:07 PM  
**To:** Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** RE: military analysts

I talked to Frank, he agrees it is a good idea and is working it now.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 03, 2005 3:44 PM  
**To:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** Re: military analysts

May be worth a 30 min phone call if gen ham or someone were available.

-----  
Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@[\(b\)\(6\)](#)>  
**To:** Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA <larry.diritae@[\(b\)\(6\)](#)> Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA <Bryan.Whitman@[\(b\)\(6\)](#)>  
**Sent:** Wed Aug 03 14:20:51 2005  
**Subject:** military analysts

given events of the last two days in theater, should we pull together a call with military analysts to give them some context. for example, bryan has worked with frank thorp to get ham or conway (don't recall the second name, bryan, sorry) in touch with bill cowan, who is doing o'reilly tonight.

also, we may want to think about expanding our posture on things for the next day or two, reaching out to some of the radio people with senior civilians or military, to place events of the last two days in context.

this isn't a clarion call suggestion, but i'm wondering if we ought to turn up our efforts to try and make sure balance and perspective are achieved.

thanks, eric

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 03, 2005 3:13 PM  
**To:** Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA  
**Cc:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** RE: mil analyst on o'reilly

oh, that's great! thank you.

(b)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 03, 2005 2:45 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Cc:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** RE: mil analyst on o'reilly

I have arranged for him to talk to either LTG Conway or BG Ham

---

**From:** (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 03, 2005 1:25 PM  
**To:** Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** RE: mil analyst on o'reilly

i believe eric is calling to tell him that we're trying to track down the info for him. i told bill i would take his request for action and see what i could get from the pao's..... would you be able to give him the info eric mentioned (if we don't have the info bill wants)? thanks for being willing to help out!

(b)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 03, 2005 1:03 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** RE: mil analyst on o'reilly

I'll talk to him if you like

---

**From:** (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 03, 2005 11:44 AM  
**To:** Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA  
**Cc:** Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** mil analyst on o'reilly

bill cowan will be on fox's o'reilly report tonight and wanted to give us a heads-up about what he's going to say... and to also ask for anything and everything we can give him re. the deaths of the marines yesterday and today.

i told him that larry just got out of a press avail where he basically said that as soon as we have the facts we will release them. he said if there's anything we can send him, he'll take it. he wants his comments to be factual. he doesn't want to speculate, which he's sure o'reilly will do plenty of.

he's going to talk about the overall situation and what his contacts in iraq are telling him. it may not all be friendly, but it comes from the perspective of not wanting the war effort to fail--but tough on some of the things that are going on over there.

if there's anything we can give him, i will be glad to get it to him.  
thanks

(b)

*Respectfully,*

(b)(6)

*OSD Public Affairs*

*Community Relations and Public Liaison*

(b)(2) *The Pentagon*

*Washington, D.C. 20301-1400*

(b)(2)

<< OLE Object: Picture (Metafile) >>

[www.AmericaSupportsYou.mil](http://www.AmericaSupportsYou.mil)

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 03, 2005 2:10 PM  
**To:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** FW: Conference Call TODAY

another analyst wondering what's coming up....

any ideas i should pass along?

thanks

(b)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Allardck@(b)(6) [mailto:Allardck@(b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Monday, August 01, 2005 9:09 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: Conference Call TODAY

(b)(6) - I'm up at MSNBC this week after Tuesday. IS there anything I should be looking for?

Hope things are well!

Ken Allard

(b)(6)

**From:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 03, 2005 11:54 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA  
**Cc:** Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** Re: mil analyst on o'reilly

Also, how many provinces are now patrolled or have been turned over to the iraqis and when did we hanoff the first one? Thanks.

-----  
Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

**From:** (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA (b)(6)  
**To:** Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA <Allison.Barber@(b)(6)>; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@(b)(6)>; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA <Bryan.Whitman@(b)(6)>; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA <Dallas.Lawrence@(b)(6)>  
**CC:** Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA <Roxie.Merritt@(b)(6)>; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wed Aug 03 11:44:14 2005  
**Subject:** mil analyst on o'reilly

bill cowan will be on fox's o'reilly report tonight and wanted to give us a heads-up about what he's going to say... and to also ask for anything and everything we can give him re. the deaths of the marines yesterday and today.

i told him that larry just got out of a press avail where he basically said that as soon as we have the facts we will release them. he said if there's anything we can send him, he'll take it. he wants his comments to be factual. he doesn't want to speculate, which he's sure o'reilly will do plenty of.

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if there's anything we can give him, i will be glad to get it to him.  
thanks

(b)

Respectfully,

(b)(6)  
OSD Public Affairs  
Community Relations and Public Liaison  
(b)(2), The Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301-1400  
(b)(2)

www.AmericaSupportsYou.mil

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
Sent: Wednesday, August 03, 2005 11:53 AM  
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
Subject: RE: mil analyst on o'reilly

Telephone: (b)(2) Extension 216  
Cellular: (b)(2)  
Email: bill\_cowan@(b)(6)

best place to catch him is on his cell...

thanks

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
Sent: Wednesday, August 03, 2005 11:52 AM  
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA  
Cc: Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; Turner, James, CIV, OASD-PA  
Subject: Re: mil analyst on o'reilly

Has frank thorp gotten further verification on petraeus's assessment that 85 percent of missions are iraqi led or co-led?

Let's make sure bill has the latest trained and equipped #s.

(b)(6) meantime, please send me bill's phone numbers. Thanks.

-----  
Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA (b)(6)  
To: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA <Allison.Barber@(b)(6)>; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@(b)(6)>; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA <Bryan.Whitman@(b)(6)>; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA <Dallas.Lawrence@(b)(6)>  
Cc: Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA <Roxie.Merritt@(b)(6)>; (b)(6), CIV, OASD-PA

(b)(6)  
Sent: Wed Aug 03 11:44:14 2005  
Subject: mil analyst on o'reilly

bill cowan will be on fox's o'reilly report tonight and wanted to give us a heads-up about what he's going to say... and to also ask for anything and everything we can give him re. the deaths of the marines yesterday and today.

i told him that larry just got out of a press avail where he basically said that as soon as we have the facts we will release them. he said if there's anything we can send him, he'll take it. he wants his comments to be factual. he doesn't want to speculate, which he's sure o'reilly will do plenty of.

he's going to talk about the overall situation and what his contacts in iraq are telling him. it may not all be friendly, but it comes from the perspective of not wanting the war effort to fail--but tough on some of the things that are going on over there.

if there's anything we can give him, i will be glad to get it to him.

thanks

(b)(6)

Respectfully,

(b)(2)

OSD Public Affairs  
Community Relations and Public Liaison

(b)(2) The Pentagon

Washington, D.C. 20301-1400

(b)(2)

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(b)(6)

**From:** JedBabbin@nytimes.com  
**Sent:** Monday, August 01, 2005 1:02 PM  
**To:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** Hewitt

Eric: Just checkin' in. Any further thoughts on one of the big dogs for the Hewitt national show Wednesday or Thursday? Would love to talk about the Iraq constitution, or whatever else is at the top of the agenda. Let's talk. Many thanks. Best, Jed.

**Jed Babbin**

(b)(2) (home office)  
(home fax)  
(mobile)

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Monday, August 01, 2005 8:39 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** Jed Babbin on Profiling

See link below for the latest Babbin article.

<http://www.familysecuritymatters.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=381>

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

*Researcher*  
*Department of Defense*  
*OSD Speechwriters Group*  
*The Pentagon, Room (b)(2)*  
*Telephone: (b)(2)*  
*Fax: (b)(2)*

(b)(6)

**From:** JedBabbin@**(b)(6)**  
**Sent:** Monday, August 01, 2005 8:25 AM  
**To:** tmcinerney@**(b)(6)**; paulvalley@**(b)(6)**; nashct@**(b)(6)**; Glenstrae77  
@**(b)(6)**; BURM41516@**(b)(6)**; **(b)(6)**; CIV, OASD-PA; WSSinter@**(b)(6)**  
roberthscales@**(b)(6)**; **(b)(6)**  
**Subject:** Another one

This was a busy weekend.

About the Brit "shoot to kill in order to protect", please read

[Family Security Matters - EXCLUSIVE: Shoot to Kill?](#)

**Jed Babbin**

**(b)(2)** (home office)  
(home fax)  
(mobile)

(b)(6)

**From:** JedBabbin@**(b)(6)**  
**Sent:** Monday, August 01, 2005 7:29 AM  
**To:** tmcinerney@**(b)(6)** paulvalley@**(b)(6)** nashct@**(b)(6)** Glenstrae77  
@**(b)(6)** BURM41516@**(b)(6)** **(b)(6)** CIV, OASD-PA; WSSInter@**(b)(6)**  
roberthscates@**(b)(6)** **(b)(6)**  
**Subject:** Today's Spectator

NASA needs a new direction. The International Space Station is about as useful as the UN.

The American Spectator

**Jed Babbin**

**(b)(2)** (home office)  
(home fax)  
(mobile)

(b)(6)

**From:** Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Monday, August 01, 2005 6:59 AM  
**To:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** RE: Question

(b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Monday, August 01, 2005 5:56 AM  
**To:** Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** Re: Question

(b)(2)

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA <Bryan.Whitman@**(b)(6)**>  
**To:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@**(b)(6)**>; 'ldirita@**(b)(6)**> <ldirita@**(b)(6)**>  
**CC:** Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA <larry.dirita@**(b)(6)**>  
**Sent:** Sun Jul 31 18:42:53 2005  
**Subject:** RE: Question

(b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Sunday, July 31, 2005 6:15 PM  
**To:** 'ldirita@**(b)(6)**>  
**Cc:** Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** Fw: Question

Good question.

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

**From:** JedBabbin@**(b)(6)** <JedBabbin@**(b)(6)**>  
**To:** tmcinerney@**(b)(6)** <tmcinerney@**(b)(6)**>; paulvallely@**(b)(6)** <paulvallely@**(b)(6)**>; nashct@**(b)(6)** <nashct@**(b)(6)**> Glenstrae77@**(b)(6)** <Glenstrae77@**(b)(6)**> BURM41516@**(b)(6)** <BURM41516@**(b)(6)**>; **(b)(6)** <**(b)(6)**> WSSInter@**(b)(6)** <WSSInter@**(b)(6)**>; roberthscales@**(b)(6)** <roberthscases@**(b)(6)**>  
**Sent:** Sun Jul 31 15:17:42 2005  
**Subject:** Question

If the Brits did this, good on 'em. But why the hell didn't we do it sooner?

Finger points to British intelligence as al-Qaeda websites are wiped out - Sunday Times - Times Online

Jed Babbin

(b)(2) (home office)  
(b)(2) (home fax)  
(b)(2) (mobile)

(b)(6)

**From:** JedBabbin@**(b)(6)**  
**Sent:** Saturday, July 30, 2005 9:39 AM  
**To:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** Re: Hugh Hewitt show

Eric: Hugh's show is 6-9 EDT. Could tape earlier, I'm sure. And if not the Big Dog hisself, how 'bout Myers or Pace? I'm not set on one or another, just want to get whatever the biggest war-related news is out to the widest audience. Many thanks. Best, Jed.

**Jed Babbin**

(b)(2) (home office)  
(home fax)  
(mobile)

(b)(6)

**From:** JedBabbin@**(b)(6)**  
**Sent:** Friday, July 29, 2005 4:51 PM  
**To:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Cc:** Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** Hugh Hewitt show

Eric: I've been asked to guest-host for Hugh Hewitt on Wednesday and Thursday, 3 and 4 August, and have agreed to do so. Please scrap the plans to support the Greg Garrison show on 8 August. This is obviously much bigger and more important.

May we talk Monday? I'd like to get one of the big guys on either Wednesday or Thursday. The Gitmo story is (thankfully) quieting down, methinks. Is Big Dog eager to talk about his recent trip? If not, what's hottest on your plate? Have a great weekend. Best, Jed.

**Jed Babbin**

**(b)(2)** (home office)  
(home fax)  
(mobile)

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Friday, July 29, 2005 9:38 AM  
**To:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** Jed Babbin called (b)(2)

**Attachments:** (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA.vcf

- "You are not paying enough for (b)(6)
- 8th of August - Babbin is filling in for Greg Garrison and is looking for a principle to participate in the show
- Interview w/ SecDef for Babbin's new book on China; and Adm. Giambastiani

Semper Fidelis,  
Captain (b)(6) USMC  
Military Assistant to the  
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs  
Comm: (b)(2)  
BlkBry:  
Fax: (b)(2)  
1400 Defense Pentagon (b)(2)  
Washington, DC 20301-1400



(b)(6)  
Capt. USMC, OASD..



(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Thursday, July 28, 2005 9:01 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) Col OASD-PA; (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA; (b)(6) SFC, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Cc:** Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OSD  
**Subject:** Read Ahead for today's conference call  
**Attachments:** Read Ahead.doc

all -  
here is the most up-to-date read ahead for today's conference call with the military analysts. please note the only change is in the number of attendees. we now have 24 confirmed.  
thanks

(b)



Read Ahead.doc  
(45 KB)

*Respectfully,*

(b)(6)

*OSD Public Affairs*

*Community Relations and Public Liaison*

(b)(2) *The Pentagon*

*Washington, D.C. 20301-1400*

(b)(2)

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(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Wednesday, July 27, 2005 5:08 PM  
**To:** Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Col, OCJCS/PA; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Col, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OSD-LA; (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) OASD-PA; (b)(6) Maj, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) SSgt, OASD-PA; (b)(6) TSgt, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LCDR, JCS OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LtC OASD-PA; (b)(6) CRPL-Intern  
**Subject:** SD-CJCS deck for 07-28-05  
**Attachments:** SD-CJCS Update 07-28-05.ppt



SD-CJCS Update  
07-28-05.ppt (1...

### 28 July

**SECDEF:** Conference call with military analysts (1030); address "formers" (DoD, State, CIA heads) (1145, 3E928).

**DEPSEC:** Addresses formers meeting on QDR (1030, 3E928).

**CJCS:** Addresses formers meeting on GWOT (1100, 3E928).

**CENTCOM:** Brig. Gen. Donald Alston, MNF-I spokesman, press briefing via teleconference with western journalists (1600 local, Baghdad).

### Issues

Army repositioning; number of insurgents killed or arrested; 3<sup>rd</sup> ID anonymous Iraqi quotations; Boy Scout jamboree; Secretary's trip; London attacks; Iraq constitution drafting; Iraq security and stability report; attacks on diplomats and kidnappings; hostages; BRAC.

### Headlines

- PM al-Jafaari calls for speedy withdrawal of U.S. troops, says key is picking up pace of training troops, coordinated planning between Coalition and Iraqi government on security transition (AP).
- U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq could begin by spring 2006 if political progress continues and if insurgency doesn't expand, Gen. Casey tells reporters (AP).
- Two kidnapped Algerian diplomats killed, Algerian radio reports; al Qaeda in Iraq claims responsibility (AP).

FOUO

*As of 1700 07-27-05*

## Public Affairs

### 28 July

**SECDEF:** Conference call with military analysts (1030); address “formers” (DoD, State, CIA heads) (1145, 3E928).

**DEPSEC:** Addresses formers meeting on QDR (1030, 3E928).

**CJCS:** Addresses formers meeting on GWOT (1100, 3E928).

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### Headlines

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- **U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq could begin by spring 2006 if political progress continues and if insurgency doesn’t expand, Gen. Casey tells reporters (AP).**
- **Two kidnapped Algerian diplomats killed, Algerian radio reports; al Qaeda in Iraq claims responsibility (AP).**

FOUO

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Wednesday, July 27, 2005 3:30 PM  
**To:** (b)(6), Col OASD-PA; (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA; (b)(6) SFC, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Cc:** Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** RE: Read Ahead for tomorrow's conference call  
**Attachments:** Read Ahead.doc

ok, let's try that trick again WITH the attachment!

thanks

(b)



Read Ahead.doc  
(44 KB)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Wednesday, July 27, 2005 3:26 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) Col OASD-PA; (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA; (b)(6) SFC, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Cc:** Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** Read Ahead for tomorrow's conference call

here is the read-ahead for the secdef call with military analysts tomorrow. please let me know if you have questions.

thanks

(b)

*Respectfully,*

(b)(6)

*OSD Public Affairs  
Community Relations and Public Liaison  
The Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301-1400*

(b)(6)

<< OLE Object: Picture (Metafile) >>  
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**READ AHEAD FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD RUMSFELD  
TELECONFERENCE WITH RETIRED MILITARY ANALYSTS**

**Date/Time:** Thursday, July 28, 2005 10:30 a.m. to 11:00 a.m.

**Location:** Secretary of Defense Office (3E880)

**Audience:**

Confirmed are:

Colonel Ken Allard	(USA, Retired)
Mr. Jed Babbin	(USAF, JAG)
Lieutenant General Frank (Ted) Campbell	(USAF, Retired)
Dr. James Jay Carafano	(LTC, USA, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Bill Cowan	(USMC, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Cucullu	(USA, Retired)
Major Dana R. Dillon	(USA, Retired)
Colonel (Tim) J. Eads	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Rick Francona	(USAF, Retired)
Brigadier General David L. Grange	(USA, Retired)
Command Sergeant Major Steven Greer	(USA, Retired)
Colonel Jack Jacobs	(USA, Retired)
General William F. "Buck" Kernan	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis	(USA, Retired)
Colonel Jeff McCausland	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney	(USAF, Retired)
Major General Michael J. Nardotti, Jr.	(USA, Retired)
Captain Chuck Nash	(USN, Retired)
General William L. Nash	(USA, Retired)
General Glen K. Otis	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant General Erv Rokke	(USAF, Retired)
Major General Donald W. Shepperd	(USAF, Retired)
Major General Paul E. Vallely	(USA, Retired)
General Tom Wilkerson	(USMC, Retired)

- You last met with roughly this same group June 16, 2005.

**Media:**

- Call is closed to the media.
- Comments should be considered on background. However, you may go off-the-record as you see fit.

**Timeline:**

- 10:30 a.m. Welcome and Introduction  
Larry Di Rita
- 10:31 a.m. SecDef comments on recent trip, Iraq Transition, Afghanistan Progress, update  
on Detainee Related Activities
- 10:45 a.m. Open for Q&A

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, July 26, 2005 1:11 PM  
**To:** Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Andrew OSD-RA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA  
**Cc:** (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/CNS; (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/CNS; (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Final Round up of coverage for the second group of military analysts visiting Iraq  
**Attachments:** Update- Gitmo Military Analyst Visit 7.25.05.doc



Update- Gitmo  
Military Analys...

Report attached: thumbnail summary for those out of town and using the Blackberry - not nearly as much coverage in this second round, with Jed Babbin generating the most.

**READ AHEAD FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD RUMSFELD  
TELECONFERENCE WITH RETIRED MILITARY ANALYSTS**

**Date/Time:** Thursday, July 28, 2005 10:30 a.m. to 11:00 a.m.

**Location:** Secretary of Defense Office (3E880)

**Audience:**

Confirmed are:

Colonel Ken Allard	(USA, Retired)
Mr. Jed Babbin	(USAF, JAG)
Lieutenant General Frank (Ted) Campbell	(USAF, Retired)
Dr. James Jay Carafano	(LTC, USA, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Bill Cowan	(USMC, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Cucullu	(USA, Retired)
Major Dana R. Dillon	(USA, Retired)
Command Sergeant Major Steven Greer	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis	(USA, Retired)
Major General Michael J. Nardotti, Jr.	(USA, Retired)
Captain Chuck Nash	(USN, Retired)
General William L. Nash	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant General Erv Rokke	(USAF, Retired)
Major General Donald W. Shepperd	(USAF, Retired)
Major General Paul E. Vallyely	(USA, Retired)
General Tom Wilkerson	(USMC, Retired)

- You last met with roughly this same group June 16, 2005.

**Media:**

- Call is closed to the media.
- Comments should be considered on background. However, you may go off-the-record as you see fit.

**Timeline:**

- 10:30 a.m. Welcome and Introduction  
Larry Di Rita
- 10:31 a.m. SecDef comments on recent trip, Iraq Transition, Afghanistan Progress, update  
on Detainee Related Activities
- 10:45 a.m. Open for Q&A



**MILITARY ANALYST FEEDBACK**  
**POST GUANTANAMO VISIT**  
(July 13-25, 2005)

*Note: The analysts in this second group generated less media coverage than the first group. There were no fundamental differences in comments between the two groups.*

**Highlights:**

➤ **Mr. Jed Babbin**

- *White House Bulletin*: "...witnessed parts of four different interrogations and saw no abuse."
- *White House Bulletin*: "They're [the prisoners] not happy down there, but they are living better than they were [in Afghanistan or Iraq]."
- *American Spectator*: "Everything is done in ways calculated to respect Islam."
- *American Spectator*: "The common belief among the [Gitmo] terrorists is that political pressure will soon result in our having to close Gitmo and let them go."
- *American Spectator*: "There are no prisoner abuses at Gitmo. It's a matter of pride among them [the prison guards]"
- *U.S. News and World Report*: Jed Babbin gave a copy of the menu served to Gitmo detainees to the publication, which printed it and said it was so healthy it "could be a model for the FDA's new food pyramid."
- *CSPAN*: (Rep. Rohrabacher quoting Jed Babbin) Critics of Gitmo are making interrogations tougher, as detainees are now resisting, as they believe that the facility might close... Those running Gitmo have done "a fantastic job."

➤ **Captain Chuck Nash**

- *Fox News*: "It has more scrutiny" and it is a "very professionally run organization [Gitmo]"
- *Fox News*: "Some of the treatment may be uncomfortable but it is not torturous and it's not illegal."
- *Fox News*: "...the only leverage that we have remaining on these prisoners is they don't know when they're going to get out."
- *Fox News*: "There is absolutely zero truth to charges about the abuse of the Koran. There were instances where Korans may have been dropped but there are no instances of guards desecrating the Koran."

➤ **Colonel Jeff McCausland**

- *WCBS Radio*: Guantanamo is "not a 'gulag' but it's also not 'Club Gitmo'"

- *WCBS Radio*: Gitmo is a well-run maximum security prison for some very dangerous people
- *WCBS Radio*: Commenting on recent abuse charges - the interrogators are trying to humiliate and degrade as part of approved interrogation techniques; not physically abuse

➤ **Lieutenant Colonel Sherwood**

- *Human Events Online*: The guards feel more threatened than the inmates... There's more truth to Rush Limbaugh's comparison to "Club Gitmo" than Sen. Durbin's "shameful and false" reference to a "Nazi concentration camp."

**Mr. Jed Babbin**

**Print**

**One Shiny Apple: The Gitmo Diet**

(U.S. News and World Report - Washington Whispers) - July 25

It certainly wasn't a good week on the PR front for the Guantanamo Bay prison authorities accused of belittling and degrading captives during interrogations. But there is one area where the military's treatment seems to shine, at least recently: fitness. During a press tour last week, our spies saw prisoners playing soccer, getting medical care, and eating a diet that could be the model for the FDA's new food pyramid. *Jed Babbin, a former Pentagon official who's a contributing editor for the American Spectator, snagged a weekly menu for us, and it shows a diet that's heavy on veggies, fruits, and whole grains.* Of note: no pork in deference to the Muslim faith of many prisoners. Will this spark a Gitmo Diet craze?

Actual Menu from Gitmo.

**White House Bulletin** - IN THE WHITE HOUSE AND AROUND TOWN; Prisoners At Guantanamo Bay Prison Providing Good Information.

*Several members of the press have recently been brought to the Guantanamo Bay prison camp to see what's going on at the facility amid claims that prisoners are being abused, and American Spectator Contributing Editor Jed Babbin is among the latest. Babbin was flown to the base on Tuesday for a nine-hour tour, and during the visit officials suggested that some prisoners are providing good information to government investigators and battlefield commanders. "We're getting some good stuff," one official told Babbin. He said some of the information extracted from prisoners has been used by the FBI investigators of 9/11, and by battlefield generals in Iraq and Afghanistan. Babbin said in a telephone interview that he witnessed parts of four different interrogations and saw no abuse. Babbin also visited all of the five separate camps. He described the interrogation rooms as stark, filled only with cameras and folding chairs. He said the prisoners were provided cheese crackers and soda during interrogations, but otherwise were fed from a nutritious menu. "They're not happy down there," Babbin said of the prisoners, "but they are living better than they were [in Afghanistan or Iraq]." He said that many are receiving health, dental and mental care.*

### The Gitmo Varsity

(The American Spectator)... Byline: Jed Babbin – July 18

GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA -- Abdullah M. was missing a leg when he got to Gitmo. In due course, he was fitted with a prosthetic leg and given occupational therapy to teach him how to use it. In the Orwellian inversion that dominates "world opinion" and requires us to prove we're the good guys, he was interrogated and -- after convincing our guys that he really wasn't a terrorist fanatic -- released and repatriated to Afghanistan. Now sought for involvement in the kidnapping of Chinese engineers and a bombing of the Islamabad Marriott, Abdullah is walking around on the artificial leg we evil Americans paid for.

Last Tuesday, in the company of Gen. Jay Hood, the Gitmo Joint Task Force commander, I and several other military analysts spent the day inside the terrorist detention camps and interrogation facilities, talked to a lot of intel people and soldiers, and saw about all there is to see at Gitmo.

*What I saw made me proud and disgusted: proud at how our guys and gals are dealing with some of the world's worst; disgusted at the Fonda-Durbins of the world who want the world to believe that Gitmo is Auschwitz and terrorists are some oppressed minority.*

As Gen. Hood explained, the mission of the Gitmo facility is twofold. First, to interrogate and obtain useful information from the terrorists held there. Second, to keep the dangerous ones from returning to terrorism, as so many of them openly say they want to do. There are about 520 of them. Many of them are just common thugs; foot soldiers in the terrorist gangs. With only a few exceptions -- notably those who reside in Gitmo's equivalent of a psycho ward -- they are cold, hard cases well trained in murder and in resisting interrogation. Mostly Afghani, Saudi, and Yemeni, they average in age at about 32, are fit, strong men who are proud to dedicate their lives to terrorism and look forward to the day they can go back to their chosen work. While observing one interrogation of a typical detainee -- a Saudi man in his mid-thirties -- some of the intel people who deal with him nearly every day told me how he contemptuously, and frequently, proclaims his eagerness to get back to killing Westerners.

*They are divided into separate mini-camps. Those who follow camp rules, basic stuff such as "don't throw feces on the guards," get to wear white uniforms and live in a semi-communal environment. In the minimum-security camp, I saw groups playing soccer and volleyball. One guy was jogging around in his issue slip-on sneakers. Others, who are less cooperative, get fewer privileges. Medium security camp inmates wear tan uniforms and are kept in cells, allowed out often to exercise. Everything is done in ways calculated to respect Islam.*

*Inmates' Korans -- in the medium security camps, hung from the steel mesh walls in surgical masks -- are accompanied, in every cell and exercise area I saw throughout Gitmo, by little black arrows painted on bunks and floors, showing the direction of Mecca. Many prayer rugs were in evidence, as were chess sets, playing cards, and -- in the minimum-security camp -- prescription sports glasses. In the maximum-security building, the Korans sit in the narrow windowsills. Interrogators will even interrupt interrogation sessions to allow detainees to pray. One interrogation I observed passed through the 4:30 p.m. call to prayer. The detainee, engaged in conversation with his interrogator, ignored the call and kept talking. To these faux-religious thugs, Islam is apparently less important than a cold Diet Coke.*

*The common belief among the terrorists, fed by reports apparently conveyed to some by their lawyers, is that political pressure will soon result in our having to close Gitmo and let them go. (Note to Messrs. Durbin, Kennedy, the New York Times, et al.: Please shut up. You are making the interrogators' job much harder than it already is.) Because they believe we'll close Gitmo, many of the detainees resist years of interrogation.*

A large bunch of the detainees, about 100 of them, are smarter, better trained, and very knowledgeable of what their pals want to do to. They are the terrorist varsity, the high-value detainees. Up against them, and their ilk, are some of America's finest.

I DON'T KNOW THE NAMES of the soldiers: I didn't ask, and they didn't volunteer. No one -- other than the few top guys, including General Hood, his deputy, and the command sergeant major -- wears nametags. If the others' names were visible to inmates, they and their families would be at risk. That goes double for the intel crew. Like every soldier I've ever met, they had to bitch a little. The two enlisted guys I lunched with at the "Cafe Caribe" -- a chow hall that will never be mistaken for The Ritz -- were from towns in Texas and Washington State. The Texan wanted to be home with his infant son. His pal from Washington wondered why the hell was so much detail about the camp on the Internet. "How can you have OPSEC" -- operational security -- "when the whole world can see so much?" he asked.

They tried to do what every soldier is expected to do: shrug off the political floggings inflicted on them and their commanders every day. They meant well, but they couldn't b.s. this old b.s.'er. *When someone compares Gitmo to a Nazi death camp, they take it personally. They know it's idiocy, but it still hurts. Their motto is, "honor bound to defend freedom," and they take that personally, too. There are no prisoner abuses at Gitmo. It's a matter of pride among them. The chow is okay, they said, but mail is really slow. It takes almost three weeks for mail to get to them. The Texan -- who is assigned to the psycho ward -- had another concern. "These guys have hepatitis, TB and who knows what other diseases. When they throw feces on us they can give us a disease we can't get over."* The medical crew looks after them, and the terrorists, very well. The terrorists can't seem to make up their minds about it, though. Some, like a man who's had surgery for a serious cardiac condition, refuse further treatment.

The guards move a lot of prisoners: to and from the hospital, to and from interrogation and even between camps. The intel crew is as organized as I've seen any military operation, and that says a lot. The head of one Interrogation Control Element toured us around "gold block," a hall along which are a number of interrogation rooms. The rooms are all the same: stark white, with a small table and a few folding chairs. There's a steel ring in the floor, to which the detainees are attached by one or both leg irons. We observed a few interrogations there. The ICE boss disagreed with what I'd been told before. The intel crews don't feel downtrodden or unreasonably constrained by regulations. They're succeeding, and they take pride in the results they're getting. There are a bunch of FBI investigations going on right now that are propelled by intelligence garnered from the Gitmo detainees. *It's not just possible -- it's a dead-bang certainty -- that terrorist attacks in the United States are being thwarted by the patience and skill of the Gitmo crew.* And as the FBI benefits, so do the combatant commanders. The operational military levy requests on Gitmo several times a week, and are often answered with information they can apply on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. And elsewhere.

TO ANYONE WITH OPEN eyes, it must be clear that we are treating these hard-core terrorists humanely, and that our interrogators -- men and women, military and civilian -- should be praised, not scorned. Investigation after investigation has showed that there is no torture at Gitmo. But the outrageous and disgusting characterizations of what we are doing at Gitmo continue.

On Friday, a New York Times editorial said, "Surely no one can approve turning an American soldier into a pseudo-lap-dancer or having another smear fake menstrual blood on an Arab man. These practices are as degrading to the women as they are to the prisoners. They violate American moral values -- and they seem pointless....Does anyone in the military believe that a

cold-blooded terrorist who has withstood months of physical and psychological abuse will crack because a woman runs her fingers through his hair suggestively or watches him disrobe? If devout Muslims become terrorists because they believe Western civilization is depraved, does it make sense to try to unnerve them by having Western women behave like trollops?" First they're all Nazis or Cambodian murderers; now the gals are whores.

I've met a few of these gals, and I can tell you they are smart, tough, and are accomplishing things other people can't. They aren't "behaving like trollops," but like the dedicated intel professionals they are. I -- and a lot of people who are, fortunately, in control of what they do -- approve because they are acting within the rules, and producing results. There are no whores at Gitmo, but there are intellectual whores in Congress and at the Times.

***Who should be blamed for failing to prevent the next terrorist attack? Not the guys and gals of Gitmo who are working tirelessly, under awful conditions and politically correct constraints, to get information from hard-core terrorists. Every American should be proud of them, and grateful for what they're doing to defend us.***

There are terrorists here in the United States and, along with many others overseas, they are planning to kill more Americans in more attacks. What will the intellectual whores of the left say after the next 9-11? Will they say that we were right to forgo interrogation methods that used sexual taunting and the use of psychotropic drugs? Or will they say that we should have done more to protect America?

We know what torture is, and we know what it isn't. Anything else and everything else should be done, consistently and thoroughly, to get the information we need. To say we should do less is to say we must sacrifice American lives that could otherwise be saved.

TAS contributing editor Jed Babbin is the author of *Inside the Asylum: Why the UN and Old Europe Are Worse Than You Think* (Regnery, 2004).

## Television

### CSPAN

7/20/2005 2:48:42 PM

*(Commentary by Rep. Dana Rohrabacher quoting Jed Babbin – U.S. House floor)*

One military analyst, Jed Babbin, recently toured Gitmo and concluded the following. The common belief by the terrorists fed by reports apparently conveyed to some by their lawyers is that political pressure will soon result in our having to close Gitmo and to let them go. ***Critics are making the interrogator's job much harder than it already is because they (the terrorists) are beginning to believe we'll close Gitmo and many of the detainees will resist interrogation because of this belief.*** To the critics of Gitmo, I would ask them where do they suggest we put them? Where are we going to put those people we need to interrogate? People there (at Gitmo) have done a good job, a fantastic job ...not a perfect job. ***We should keep it open and not close it and we should congratulate their efforts there.***

### Radio\*

*(\*Interviews scheduled; transcripts not available for the following radio shows)*

### KOGO (San Diego)

7/22/2005

Interview with Jay Hood.

**"The Core Hour"** - The Alternative Black Radio Show (National)  
7/22/2005

Interview with the radio show of the Congress of Racial Equality

**KSFO** (San Francisco)  
7/19/2005

Interview with Lee Rogers and Melanie Morgan

**WPHT** (Philadelphia)  
7/16/2005

Interview with Joe Watkins

**WJOB** (Winnipeg)  
7/15/2005

Interview with Charles Adler

**KOGO** (San Diego)  
7/15/2005

Interview with Mark Larson

**Accent Radio Network** (National)  
7/15/2005

Interview with Greg Allen

**WSBA** (York, PA)  
7/15/2005

Interview with Dennis Edwards

**KFBK** (Sacramento)  
7/14/2005

Interview with radio commentators Paul and Phil

**WMET** (DC)  
7/14/2005

Interview with Mark Bisno

**ABC Radio Networks** (National)  
7/13/2005

Interview with nationally syndicated show host John Batchelor

**Westwood One** (National)  
7/13/2005

Interview with Lars Larson

**WIBA** (Madison, Wisconsin)

7/13/2005

Interview with Vicki McKenna

**Radio America** (National)

7/13/2005

Interview with Chuck Harder and Greg Corumbus

### **Chuck Nash**

#### **Television**

**Fox News** – Your World with Neil Cavuto

7/15/2005 1:15:28 AM

**Cavuto:** Today's guest just got back from Guantanamo bay and says if anything, the prisoners are treated too well. He joins us right now. What do you make, Chuck, of the attention Gitmo gets these days? **Nash:** Unfortunately we have a situation that should not be political that is being made political. To add more wood on to the proverbial fires that are started here on Capitol Hill, this in no way should be in the news and the reason is because this is a very professionally run organization. It has had more scrutiny than probably, you know, any other military organization out there. They're doing a fabulous job, and they are, take it from me, they are getting some tremendous intelligence information out of these guys. I know you're aware, but my security clearance is still current. And while I was down there, I was given a classified briefing of what was going on. And just take it from me, that we are gaining tremendous value out of these prisoners. **Cavuto:** I know you were there and you know better than I but there is a separate report that says there were some cases of abuse there and John McCain, a guy who of course was in the North Vietnamese prison for seven years of his life says we (as a country) can do better. What do you say? **Nash:** Well, I think anything can be improved but when you look at the way they're being treated down there, there is something in the codes that people talk about and they say:....are they given their Geneva convention rights? They are being treated humanly and although some of the treatment may be uncomfortable, it is not torturous and -- it is not illegal. **Cavuto:** you are saying we should be reminded of the terrors that are real like in London last week and juxtapose that with what are fairly comfortable conditions in Gitmo. **Nash:** This is a war and the next time this country gets hit, god forbid, people will wonder when do we get tough on these guys? What is going on, the folks in Gitmo are getting the information they're getting and playing by the rules and it is disastrous for them. The one lever that they have, if you think about this, we have pretty much published what we can and can't do to prisoners. The prisoners know that the only leverage that we have remaining on these prisoners is they don't know when they're going to get out. Do you know when they're going to get out? When this war is over. If we start talking like some of these people up here on the hill about closing down Gitmo then that just stokes their fire and props them up because they think we don't have to talk to these guys. **Cavuto:** Chuck, you were there. Have you seen cases of that where they're saying, look, we will just go slowly? **Nash:** There are instances where, after certain statements are made and it's been reported in the press where folks from the Middle East are coming back and saying, see, even U.S. Senators and Congressmen are saying these things. So it is being used against us and you know when you're playing by the rules you have to control the environment. To control the environment, you have to really be careful about what these

prisoners can and cannot get access to. **Cavuto:** There were -- I don't know what you know or what you can comfortably say. I know you had a clearance to go in there so maybe you can't say much. But one of the reports was the abuse of the Koran, physical abuse or sort of more embarrassing type abuse for the prisoners there. Any of that true? **Nash:** There is absolutely zero truth to charges about the abuse of the Koran. There were instances where Korans may have been dropped but no instances of guards desecrating the Koran. Every Koran is hanging object a surgical mask by each prisoner's bed where it's in plain view and everything. There have been instances where some of the prisoners have desecrated the Koran and what they did was they tore it up to try to stop up a toilet or they tore it up and threw it out to try to incite the other prisoners to riot. As far as the abusive stuff, yeah, they had this guy. This guy, turns out he was the 20th hijacker...**Cavuto:** Wish we had more time but thank you for putting that in perspective. Appreciate it. Chuck Nash with the latest on Gitmo.

### Jeff McCausland

#### Radio\*

(\*Interviews scheduled; transcripts not available for radio shows with an asterisk)

#### WCBS NewsRadio 880

7/15/05

Interview with Jeff McCausland with limited commentary on his recent visit to Gitmo

#### CBS - Up to the Minute\*

Transcript not available at the time of this report

#### Additional Commentary\*

Interviews with two radio stations in the San Francisco and Pittsburgh markets

### Carlton Sherwood

#### Print

#### Gitmo Prisoners Are Right Where They Belong: Firsthand Look at Camp Delta

(Human Events Online)...Carlton Sherwood - July 22

*The thought occurs more than once on the (Guantanamo Bay) tour that those guarding the terrorists feel more threatened than the inmates. And they should...* One detainee told his captor that when he was released he would track him and his family down on the Internet and "cut their throats like sheep..."

Many are living in better conditions than they have ever experienced...

They play soccer, volleyball, cards and chess. A fully equipped hospital is within the prison compound. Military doctors provide detainees with everything from new limbs to heart surgery...

Each detainee is provided with a copy of the Koran, prayer rug and beads, skullcap and oils and the chance to use them five times daily during calls to prayer...



I was allowed to observe, remotely, four interrogation sessions... If not for the shackles on their ankles, tethered to a bolt on each interrogation room floor, a necessary safety measure to protect the questioners, you'd think the detainees were enjoying it.

(Jay) Hood insists the interrogations are producing in-depth intelligence, what he calls "a wider mosaic of how al Qaeda operates," which has proven invaluable to both military field commanders and Homeland Security officials. But given the nature of intelligence gathering, it is unlikely you will see any headlines reporting success, nothing about terrorist attacks foiled or innocent lives saved...

***There is far more truth to Rush Limbaugh's parodies of "Club Gitmo" than Democratic Sen. Richard Durbin's shameful and false analogy to a Nazi concentration camp.***

**Radio\***

(\*Interviews scheduled; transcripts not available for the following radio shows)

- o Interviews scheduled this week on the Tony Snow and Laura Ingraham shows.
- o Radio interviews to take place this week in Philadelphia, Pittsburgh and Washington D.C.

(b)(6)

**From:** JedBabbin@**(b)(6)**  
**Sent:** Tuesday, July 26, 2005 8:11 AM  
**To:** tmcinerney@**(b)(6)**; paulvalley@**(b)(6)**; nashct@**(b)(6)**; **(b)(6)**  
**(b)(6)**; BURM41516@**(b)(6)**; **(b)(6)**; **(b)(6)**; CIV, OASD-PA; **(b)(6)**  
**(b)(6)**  
**Cc:** **(b)(6)**  
**Subject:** Hanoi Jane's Return: Today's American Spectator

The return of an old affliction.

The American Spectator

**Jed Babbin**

**(b)(2)** (home office)  
**(b)(2)** (home fax)  
**(b)(2)** (mobile)

(b)(6)

**From:** JedBabbin@**(b)(6)**  
**Sent:** Monday, July 25, 2005 12:48 PM  
**To:** tmcinerney@**(b)(6)**; paulvalley@**(b)(6)**; nashct@**(b)(6)**; Glenstrae77@**(b)(6)**; BURM41516@**(b)(6)**; **(b)(6)** CIV, OASD-PA; WSSInter@**(b)(6)**; **(b)(6)**  
**Subject:** Baghdad Jane

So where do I report to the picket line accompanying her bus tour?

My Way News

**Jed Babbin**

**(b)(2)** (home office)  
(home fax)  
(mobile)

(b)(6)

**From:** JedBabbin@**(b)(6)**  
**Sent:** Monday, July 25, 2005 8:43 AM  
**To:** tmcinerney@**(b)(6)**; paulvalley@**(b)(6)**; nashct@**(b)(6)**; Glenstrae77@**(b)(6)**; BURM41516@**(b)(6)**; **(b)(6)**, CIV, OASD-PA; WSSInter@**(b)(6)**  
**Subject:** Today's Spectator: London and the NY Subway

The Brits have legislated themselves into a bad corner. We need to do a lot more, and not follow their example of coddling terrorist "imams."

The American Spectator

**Jed Babbin**

**(b)(2)** (home office)  
(home fax)  
(mobile)

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) SFC, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Friday, July 22, 2005 8:56 AM  
**To:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** Jed Babbin's number (b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Friday, July 22, 2005 8:15 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) SFC, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** Re: PA Ops Meeting is Cancelled for Friday 22 Jul 04

Can you please email jed babbin's #? Thanks.

-----  
Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

**From:** (b)(6) SFC, OASD-PA <(b)(6)>  
**To:** (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA (b)(6); Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA <Allison.Barber@ (b)(6)>; (b)(6), OIG DoD <(b)(6)>; (b)(6), CIV, OSD <(b)(6)>; (b)(6), CIV, OASD-PA <(b)(6)>; (b)(6) Col, OCJCS/PA <(b)(6)>; (b)(6), CIV, JCS SJS <(b)(6)>; (b)(6), OASD-PA <(b)(6)>; (b)(6), OASD-PA (b)(6); Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA <Dallas.Lawrence@ (b)(6)>; (b)(6) CAPT, OASD-PA <(b)(6)>; (b)(6), CIV, OASD-PA <(b)(6)>; (b)(6) MSgt, OCJCS/PA <(b)(6)>; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@ (b)(6)>; (b)(6), OASD-PA <(b)(6)>; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA <frank.thorp@ (b)(6)>; (b)(6), CIV, OASD-PA <(b)(6)>; (b)(6), SFC, OASD-PA <(b)(6)>; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA <Bryan.Whitman@ (b)(6)>; (b)(6), Col OASD-PA <(b)(6)>; (b)(6), CIV, OASD-PA <(b)(6)>  
**Sent:** Fri Jul 22 07:30:26 2005  
**Subject:** PA Ops Meeting is Cancelled for Friday 22 Jul 04

(b)(6)

**From:** JedBabbin@**(b)(6)**  
**Sent:** Thursday, July 21, 2005 3:27 PM  
**To:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** FYI

I have Gen. Jay Hood, JTF-GTMO commander, as a guest while I'm subbing on the Mark Larson show on KOGO (San Diego) tomorrow. We'll do a half hour on the good stuff. Special thanks to Flex Plexico (and, as usual, **(b)(6)** who still walks on water without getting wet above the ankles.)

**Jed Babbin**

**(b)(2)** (home office)  
**(b)(2)** (home fax)  
**(b)(2)** (mobile)

(b)(6)

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**From:** (b)(6) OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Thursday, July 21, 2005 11:29 AM  
**To:** Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CAPT, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OSD-LA; (b)(6) Maj, OCJCS/PA  
**Subject:** Rodman, Sharp military analyst transcript  
**Attachments:** 07-20-05 Rodman, LTG Sharp Iraq report.doc

Attached is the transcript from yesterday's briefing by Mr. Rodman and LTG Sharp to the military analysts on the Iraqi security and stability report being sent to Congress.

Note: information embargoed until after release of the report.



07-20-05 Rodman,  
LTG Sharp Ira...

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Wednesday, July 20, 2005 10:02 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** Conference Call TODAY

**Attachments:** Microsoft Photo Editor 3.0 Picture; Picture (Metafile)



## MEMORANDUM

**To:** Retired Military Analysts

**From:** Dallas Lawrence  
Director, Community Relations and Public Liaison  
Office of the Secretary of Defense

**Date:** July 20, 2005

**Re:** **Conference Call with Senior DoD Officials**

We invite you to participate in a conference call, **WEDNESDAY, July 20, 2005 from 4:00 p.m. to 4:30 p.m.**

The topic will be the report to Congress on Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq. In order to participate in this call, we ask that you agree to **EMBARGO** any information you acquire during the discussion until the report has been provided to Congress.

Participants in this conference call will be Mr. Peter Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (bio at: [http://www.defenselink.mil/bios/rodman\\_bio.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/bios/rodman_bio.html)) and Lieutenant General Walter Sharp, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, J-5 (bio at: [http://www.jcs.mil/bios/bio\\_sharp.html](http://www.jcs.mil/bios/bio_sharp.html)).

Your host for this call will be Dallas Lawrence.

To participate in this conference call, please dial (b)(2) or (b)(2) and ask the operator to connect you to the Military Analysts conference call.

Please R.S.V.P. to (b)(6) or call her at (b)(2)

We hope you are able to participate.



Respectfully,

(b)(2)

*OSD Public Affairs*

*Community Relations and Public Liaison*

(b)(2) *The Pentagon*

*Washington, D.C. 20301-1400*

(b)(2)



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(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA; (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, July 19, 2005 4:11 PM  
**To:** Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) OSD-RA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA;  
(b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA  
**Cc:** (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/MO; (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA; (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/CNS;  
(b)(6) AFIS-HQ/CNS; (b)(6)  
**Subject:** 2nd group of military analysts visit Guantanamo - media progress report  
**Attachments:** Update- Gitmo Military Analyst Visit 7.25.05.doc



Update- Gitmo  
Military Analys...

We will issue another report later this week.

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Tuesday, July 19, 2005 3:02 PM  
**To:** Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CAPT, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LCDR, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** FW: china military power report conf call transcript  
**Attachments:** 07-19-05 Rodman, BG Allen, china.doc

all,  
here is the transcript of the military analysts call this morning... thanks to (b)(6) for transcribing it and to lcdi (b)(6) for his help in setting it up.

(b)(6) would you pass along to rodman's and the general's folks?  
thanks

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** (b)(6) OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Tuesday, July 19, 2005 2:00 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** Whoa. Shoot me. Here's the transcript



07-19-05 Rodman,  
BG Allen, chi...

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Tuesday, July 19, 2005 8:56 AM  
**To:** Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6), LCDR, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** mil analyst call this morning  
**Attachments:** Picture (Metafile)

here are the rsvp's i've received so far for the 9:30 conf call on the china military power report:

Mr. Jed Babbin	(USAF, JAG)
Dr. James Jay Carafano	(LTC, USA, Retired)
Major Dana R. Dillon	(USA, Retired)
Colonel (Tim) J. Eads	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel David Finkelstein	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis	(USA, Retired)
General Montgomery Meigs	(USA, Retired)
Colonel Jeff McCausland	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant General Erv Rokke	(USAF, Retired)
Major General Paul E. Vallely	(USA, Retired)
James Mulvenon	(Deputy Dir., Cntr for Intel Research and Analysis)
John Tkacik	(Heritage Foundation)

Respectfully,

(b)(2)

OSD Public Affairs  
Community Relations and Public Liaison  
(b)(2) The Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301-1400

(b)(2)



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(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Tuesday, July 19, 2005 8:36 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** Conference calls

**Attachments:** Picture (Metafile)

Gentlemen,

Our first conference call of the day will be at 0930 EST re. the China Military Power Report. Please dial (b)(2) and ask to be joined to the Military Analysts call.

If you have not yet RSVP'd, please do so. We hope you are able to participate.

(b)(6)

*Respectfully,*

(b)(2)

*OSD Public Affairs  
Community Relations and Public Liaison*

(b)(2)

*The Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301-1400*

(b)(2)



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Military Analyst Call  
Wednesday, July 20, 2005 (1600, Room (b)(2) The Pentagon)  
Briefers: Mr. Peter Rodman, LTG Sharp  
Host: Ms. Allison Barber  
OSD Staff: (b)(6) LTC (b)(6)  
Joint Chiefs Staff: Maj (b)(6)  
Transcriber: (b)(6)  
Subject: release of Iraq stability and security report to Congress  
ON BACKGROUND  
EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE UNTIL AFTER REPORT RELEASE

#### Participant Information

1. General Kernan
2. Robert Maginnis
3. (b)(6)
4. Ervin Rokke
5. Rick Francona
6. (b)(6)
7. Paul Vallely
8. Jed Babbin
9. Jeff McCausland
10. (b)(6)
11. Mark Hoffman
12. General Grange

Ms. Barber: (in progress) stability and security report in Iraq report that will be released tomorrow. I am not sure if you saw the secretary's briefing today; he did the broad strokes and gave a lot of context to this issue.

What we are going to do today on the call is this will be on background, as always, but today with a little bit of a twist it will be embargoed until tomorrow. So I am going to ask you to hold the information you hear today until tomorrow when we release the report at about 1700 and at which point we will actually send you copies of the report. (b)(6) is here; she is great about getting you stuff and information.

So, just to refresh the ground rules: this is on background plus embargoed until tomorrow when you get the report from us which will be about 1700. So with that I will open it up – did you have opening remarks that you'd like to start?

Mr. Rodman: This is Peter Rodman, nice to talk to you again. This is a report, as you know, required by Congress. It was in the conference report for the '05 supplemental. And they asked for, you know, indicators, performance standards, how to measure what's going on. And they were smart enough to not just limit this to security training measurements, or stability measurements, but also political and economic conditions.

And I think that is, as you'll see, is a more comprehensive way to judge what is happening, you know, who's doing well, how are we doing in Iraq?

So I am going to talk a little bit about political and economic things, and then General Sharp will talk about the security issues, including the training and so forth. The report that's going up is an unclass report; there's a classified annex that will go along with it on some details, but let me just start with the political timeline.

I mean this, to me this is one of the most important measures of what's going on – the strategic prize in Iraq is this political process. The strategic objective of the enemy is to derail this political process because they see it as a threat. I mean, if the political process succeeds, you're isolating the extremists politically; you're splitting the Sunni, you're splitting the mainstream Sunni from the extremist. And, you know, while we hunt them down militarily we're also engaged in this political effort to – as I said – to isolate them and to consolidate what is clearly the will of the overwhelming majority of the population.

So I mean -- that's the – the political game is in fact the main game going on. And so we, in this report, talk about the political process. And January 30<sup>th</sup> was a great milestone, reminded everybody about what is really going on there and where the overwhelming majority of the population is.

Now the game as you know right now is the constitution drafting. I mean, first you had the election in January, then the government was formed, the Transitional National Assembly was formed. The main game now is constitution drafting. There is a commission in being that has been working for many months; their deadline is August 15<sup>th</sup> to produce a draft; October 15<sup>th</sup> is to be a referendum; and if the referendum is approved, then a national election in December – December 15<sup>th</sup> for a new government – a new government based on the permanent constitution.

We think they can keep this deadline; and our report, again, lays out the familiar timeline, but, the people drafting – the people on this constitution drafting commission are convinced that they can do it. They have most of a draft text already agreed. There are some very tough issues out there like Kirkuk and the nature of a federal system. But they think they can do it, and the U.N. people out there who are monitoring this think this is doable.

We think it is absolutely essential to keep to this timeline. You know in the interim constitution that-- the Transitional Administrative Law – that there's a provision that permits, you know, a delay of up to six months, but we think this would be a terrible idea because the momentum of this is -- again -- one of the weapons we have. You know, keep this process going is a blow – in fact, again – it symbolizes, like January 30<sup>th</sup>, that the strategic – that we are winning the strategic game here, and that they are utterly failing to derail this, and so the momentum is important.

So we're saying one of the measurements of, you know, who's -- who's doing well there is whether this political timeline is being kept. And so we lay out -- you know, lay that out here and that's, you know, our assessment is what I've said. We think this is not only going pretty well but it's really crucial.

We also lay out some other facts. I mean, there are public opinion polls in the country that show a large majority thinks the country is going in the right direction. Another good indicator -- their international support is something else we track and there was a donors' conference in Brussels in June that Secretary of State Rice went to, high-level representation from all over the world. There's a donors' conference going on right now in Jordan, international contributions -- economic contributions to Iraq.

So all of that is continuing, and -- and, so again, the international support that the country is getting is important, and it's worth mentioning when -- in any discussion of, you know, how are we doing?

The economic side -- you know, again, it's easy to measure it; it's a mixed picture because the security situation clearly is hampering, you know, the potential of Iraq, but, you know, there are clearly some important positive macro-economic indicators. It's a stable currency; I mean this is one of the underappreciated things that happened I guess very early on. A new currency which has been a success; inflation is in check.

Now unemployment is pretty high, it's about 28 percent, but we have some figures or some references to things like the formation of new businesses, private sector activity, there's some measurements of that which show there is an economy -- you know, a modern economy developing. And, you know, we think this is -- again, it's worth mentioning. And we know the security situation hampers it, but there it is.

We discuss the basic -- some of the other basic other indicators like electricity and, you know, we think we're making some progress there; it's not as good as the demand. I mean, the demand -- particularly in the summer is high, but we're meeting the goals we have set in electricity generation. Oil -- you know, crude oil production is fairly steady, exports are at 1.4 million barrels a day -- again, this is hampered by security problems, but, they're earning a lot of revenue-- given the price of oil, they're earning a lot of revenue.

So we've got other statistics that are interesting. Communications -- I mean, cell phones, Internet use -- these things are just skyrocketing, and that's -- you know, again, it's worth mentioning some of the positive things as well the things that aren't going as well as they should.

So that's -- that's in a nutshell what the report has on the political and economic side, and I'm going to give you General Sharp to talk about the security picture.

LTG Sharp: OK, thanks Peter. On the security side we really in the report cover three basic things.



First off is the influence and effectiveness of the insurgents. The second is the capacity and the effectiveness of Iraqi Security Forces. And then we also touch on Iraqi rule of law. So let me hit each one of those very briefly.

First off, on the effectiveness of the insurgents. As Peter has pointed out, the insurgents have not been able to derail the political process. It has continued to move on, and I think that that is a key element in our success is to be able to ensure that that process continues.

If you look specifically at the number of attacks, during the recent period they have been reduced from the period of sovereignty – and we cover in the report sovereignty running from about 29 June last year until late November of last year, where we were averaging per week somewhere in the order of 530 attacks per week.

Then we got into the election period, which ran from late November until early February, and we were down in the order there about the same – 510, 515 per week.

Since then, we're down in the order of about 420 per week attacks across the board, and those are attacks on not only Coalition forces, but Iraqi forces, civilians, infrastructure – really, across the board. So there have been a significant decrease in attacks since just prior to and during the election time period.

And then we you peel that back a little bit further as to where the attacks are, 84 percent of those attacks are occurring in four provinces of the 18 that are in Iraq. So the majority of it of course are in the Baghdad, al Anbar, Ninawah, and Sula ad Din Provinces, with substantially less in the other provinces, and that's laid out in the report.

We also think that it is important to look at infrastructure. And that – in (and?) infrastructure it has significantly reduced from approximately over 40 a month during the sovereignty period to down now where we're in the vicinity of about 10 per month, because there's been a lot of focus by Iraqi Security Forces to try to maintain the infrastructure so that electricity and oil can continue to flow across the board.

The report then gets into some details on Iraqi Security Forces themselves and the numbers that we have out there. And again, you'll be able to see in the report exact numbers, but what we lay out is what has been trained and equipped—in other words, that have come out of our schoolhouse, and it talks – it gives the number for Ministry of Defense forces of 77,300 and Ministry of Interior forces of 94,000 – both of those approximate numbers. So, schooltrained, out there, doing the hard work day-to-day is about 171,300.

And you have to keep in mind that above and beyond that are some force protection or facility protection forces that are out there and then some that industries have hired as local contractors that are out there also. So these are the numbers that General Petraeus and General Casey are focusing on getting trained and capable.

The report then talks in the unclassified side about how we measure the performance of those forces that are out there, because we all understand that training continues even after you get out of the schoolhouse, and talks about the performance of the units and capability of the units.

In the unclassified side, it lays out how we assess them, and we assess them really using a technique similar to how we do in our military with our unit status reports, looking at a composition of personnel, command-and-control ability, training, sustainment, logistics, equipment, leadership, and then an overall assessment ranked into really four different categories: ones that are capable of doing everything by themselves against the insurgency – from planning, executing and sustaining; that would be the top category. The next category are those that are capable of planning, executing and sustaining counterinsurgency operations with our help – in other words, with our folks there helping call in medevac or call in artillery, but it's generally them in the lead but with our help.

The third category is then capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations only when operating closely and along side the Coalition. This is much more with us in the lead. Still, substantial number of Iraqis there, but with us in the lead.

And then the final category is those that are forming that aren't out doing operations yet.

The report on the unclassified side does of course not give the total numbers that are in each one of those categories, because as we do not give out our readiness ratings, we do not feel that it is right to give out the Iraqis' because it really does give a lot of information to the enemy out there. But when we testify in front of Congress, which Peter and I will both do tomorrow, and is (it's?) laid out in the classified version of the report, we go through very specific numbers. And to say in general there are substantial numbers of Iraqi units both in the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior out doing operations on a day-to-day basis, some of them by themselves, a lot of them with them leading, and some of them with us just enabling them. They really are taking the fight to the enemy out there, and General Casey has been very, very encouraged by what they've been able to do.

And then the last part that we go through is talk a little bit about the rule of law, the fact that there have been many cases – about, over 300 Coalition cases that have been – or cases that have been tried by the Central Criminal Court of Iraq with 300 – or, over 300 convictions because some of the cases have more than one individual involved in it. Special Tribunal case – I am sure you've read – has been referred on the 17<sup>th</sup> of July, and they are establishing an anti-crime task force with FBI assistance to help investigate other terrorist activities as we go through.

But the report generally shows from the security side progress on Iraqi Security Forces being able to go out and take the fight on, and be in the lead in many cases in the country to be able to provide security and stability for their country.

And with that – Peter, unless you have anything else – maybe we can throw it open to a couple questions.

Mr. Rodman: Sure.

Mr. Maginnis: General, Bob Maginnis. Question on the cooperation of neighbors, whether or not that's measured, because clearly Syria's sending bad people into Iraq and that's been a problem on the insurgency.

LTG Sharp: Yeah, - it is, it -- we watch it very closely. We touch on it in the report, but it really wasn't one of the things that we were asked to highlight in the report in here. I think what General – what you've heard General Casey say is that, is that, you know, he's working very hard to try to stop the flow of insurgents coming in through Syria, and – but still sees that happening out there. And I think our government has continued to push Syria to try be very proactive, to try to stop the – that flow coming in, because it is a – it is a major source of insurgents that are coming in. Pete, I don't know if you want to answer that?

Mr. Rodman: It's a big political issue with Syria, and we're heading into some kind of crisis with Syria if they don't reverse it. And, it's not a border control problem. It's a problem of political decision by the Syrian government to tolerate, you know, the use of Syrian territory as a sanctuary. I mean, there's a lot of political organizing by these bad guys; there are these infiltration rat lines using Syrian territory, and this is a police state which, you know, sure as hell ought to be able to put a stop to this activity inside Syria.

Syria is not known for tolerating a lot of freelance political activity. So we think it's a strategic decision that needs to be made by the Syrian government to crack down on this inside the country. Now, they are doing a little bit more on border control, but that isn't the central issue, and that's how we've – that's how we've put it to them.

Mr. Maginnis: If I could follow up just on that.

Mr. Rodman: Sure.

Mr. Maginnis: The meeting with (Prime Minister) Jafaari(?) over in Iran and Tehran last week – there have been reports about security agreements. Are we just talking, you know, security cooperation along the border, or are they involved in any training of any Iraqis?

Mr. Rodman: No, I think the answer is no. It, it -- I mean, I saw the first reports, too, and got worried. But it seems to be border control, some other very practical things which seem very good, particularly if the Iranians live up to them, but no, they're not involved in any training.

Voice (LTG Sharp?): That's correct.

Mr. McCausland: This is Jeff McCausland. Question for General Sharp. Sir, while I take your point that the overall numbers may have gone down since last fall (from?) 530 to 420, at least the clear impression on this side of the water is the level of lethality has gone up significantly over the last few months with a dramatic upsurge in car bombings and the like and even the number of – particularly the Iraqi deaths – has gone up significantly in the last months now, I think (inaudible) heard numbers of 800 or more people killed just in the last month.

Can you comment on that? Because again, the picture again when you talk about things like Operation Lightning, which was widely bandied as an effort to cut down on particularly car bombings in the Baghdad vicinity, and then, you know, it doesn't seem to at least have (essentially?) been all that successful, based on the lethality we're witnessing. For us now to argue that things are really getting better because the number of actual attacks is going down will be, quite candidly, a pretty darned tough sell.

And then, Mr. Rodman, if I could ask real – does anyone have any thoughts about on the political side – you know, one of the strange things about this insurgency, unlike any history, I think, is they don't seem to have in any way, shape or form painted a political picture on what they would do if they were successful. We seem to be their Achilles' heel. I mean, they're not encouraging the Iraqi people that they'll give them anything except more chaos. And I am just curious if you have any thoughts on that because I agree with you the political piece is the centerpiece.

Mr. Rodman: Yes, well Skip, why don't you go first, and I'll do the second one.

LTG Sharp: You are correct. The lethality of the attacks we are watching very closely because they are increasing. We are trying to work very hard to try to reduce the number of IEDs and vehicle-borne IEDs and suicide bombers. I think you are seeing a shift to more attacks against Iraqi Security Forces and against civilians out there. And, you know, if you get a couple of these that are in the right area that cause a whole bunch of casualties, they are very deadly.

I think, to answer question though, is it progress or not? You've really got to look at a mixture of both of them – how many attacks that they're able to generate, and then what are they able to cause from it?

But you've got to measure that against what is the effect also that they're having on the people out there? And all the polls that we have seen recently say that -- a couple of things, that the people of Iraq have got great confidence in the Iraqi Security Forces and see them as professional that are out there, and that they are going to vote in the upcoming referendums and elections. So they're not deterring the people of Iraq out there.

Mr. Rodman: On the other issue, I think you're absolutely right, I think it's a weakness on their part. It's a mixture, I mean, the hard core of the insurgency is former regime elements and I think there, if they have a political vision, it's a fantasy, a fantasy that they

can somehow restore, you know, Sunni Ba'athist dominance of the country. And there's a mixture of more Islaamist types who have different goals and to that degree it's totally incoherent. So I think that's a weakness, but it also – the Sunni Ba'athist line is a minority, and it's a minority of a minority. So I don't know how they aspire to, you know, somehow gain control other than by brute force which I don't think they have the capability of.

And another way to look at it – if you look at these classical theories of guerilla war, maybe you start out with terror attacks that demoralize a population, but if you do well, then you graduate to guerilla operations and if you broaden your base, you graduate to larger unit operations. But if all these guys can do – you know, they can blow up civilians on street corners, and it's a horror, but I just sort of wonder whether, you know, from their point of view, you know, do they think they're gaining militarily or strategically? So I think at least from that perspective, you know, they have some serious weaknesses and we have, you know, it's a fight over legitimacy – every kind of, any struggle like this is a fight for legitimacy, and I think we have that weapon in our hands.

Mr. Nardotti: This is Mike Nardotti for Mr. Rodman. You mentioned earlier on the constitution drafting there are still some tough issues, very tough issues to get through. What do you see as the toughest issues, and do they, of those tough issues, which may have the possibility of kind of derailing the process in its entirety or the time frame that you're trying to achieve, or that they're trying to achieve?

Mr. Rodman: The two are Kirkuk, and some of the basis (bases?) of federalism. You know, Kirkuk, it was Arabized during the Saddam period and now the Kurds have unilaterally kind of done some ethnic cleansing, and so the issue is, you know, where do you draw boundaries and who do you count as a voter in Kirkuk? You know, if you draw a political map and a political system you sort of have to face up to this: Who counts as a citizen?

So they have to solve that, and that's a tough one. The other one is, you know, federalism – by that I mean what kind of – do you divide the country up into provinces and have voting by province? You remember the first election they had was sort of one, undifferentiated national electorate because they didn't have time to draw districts. And for districts you need some sort of census or some, you know, some agreed basis for, you know, deciding how many voters you have.

So -- and the issue of federalism is also how much autonomy do the Kurds get? The Kurds want, you know, a significant degree of autonomy. Federalism I think as the phrase – as the word is used now, involves a little more of national control. And the Kurds, I mean everybody else is reluctant to give the Kurds too much power, but the Kurds are in a pivotal position. You may have noticed some of the Shia'a, some of the folks in the south who were Shia'a, were thinking of forming a kind of autonomous region themselves to take advantage of whatever autonomy the Kurds got. So they have to sort out some of these macro issues as well.

Mr. Kernan: Hey Skip, this is Buck Kernan. Can you speak to the reformation efforts of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior, and the fusion of those two ministries?

LTG Sharp: Yes sir. Good to hear from you. We are, of course as you know, have got advisors in both of those ministries working very closely with MNC-I and with MNF-I over there. We're seeing great progress we think in the Ministry of Defense side. We are continuing to work on the Ministry of Interior side. General Casey, last I talked to him, was very satisfied with the ministers themselves.

I think there's still more work to be done on the Ministry of Interior side linking them to the provincial police headquarters and the police elements actually out in the field.

On the Ministry of Defense side, that seems to be working really -- pretty -- very, well, and I think we've got a good chain of command working down through there.

Mr. Babbin: Jed Babbin for Mr. Rodman. Mr. Rodman, Jed Babbin here. Question about the timing of the trial for Saddam. Are we concerned it may bump up against the 15 October or 15 December proceedings? How is that going to affect the Iraqi Security Forces? Are we expressing any concern to the Interim Government on that?

Mr. Rodman: Well I don't think we've had a concern of that kind. I think we have wanted to have some of these trials sooner rather than later, because we think it's a great, you know, the psychological and political effect it would have in the country would be very positive, reminding everybody about what this is about and showing that the new -- showing that it's a new Iraq, you know, showing the diehard extremists that the old regime is dead.

So we have just tended to want them to do it. To help them we have, you know, some Department of Justice legal people helping them with their tribunals. I don't think we've worried so much about deconfliction of -- or any particular dates.

LTG Sharp: If I could just -- as we end, and I'm sorry, I do have to run off here, but let me go back to the casualty question again just very briefly. And although I can't give you numbers because they're classified, I think I am safe to characterize a couple things on it.

First off, if you compare it to the time of last summer and last fall, what we call the "sovereignty period," we are up in casualties -- weekly average, if you will, of casualties. But where it has gone up significantly is against Iraqi civilians. And again, it's up about -- well, it's up about 1.5 -- 150 percent above where it was during the pre-sovereignty period. It has gone down against Coalition. And again, it has gone up against Iraqi Security Forces, but not as much as up against civilians.

So I think what we're seeing here is less attacks, but the insurgents are realizing that both Iraqi Security Forces are becoming much more capable harder targets, if you will -- they've always realized the Coalition are hard targets -- and trying to make their mark against civilians, and I think the civilians are telling them we're not going to be, we're

not going to be deterred; we're going to continue to vote and we want this to move forward.

So that's – I hope that gives you a little more detail as far as the casualties.

Ms. Barber: Great. Thanks General Sharp. Thanks Mr. Rodman. And as we mentioned, we will send out the report to you tomorrow around 1700 and all this information will be embargoed til then. So thanks so much for your time on the call today.

Voice: Thanks a lot.

(end)

**MILITARY ANALYST FEEDBACK**  
**POST GUANTANAMO VISIT**  
(July 13-18, 2005)

*Note: The analysts in this second group are generating less media coverage thus far than the first group did. There are no fundamental differences in comments between the two groups.*

**Highlights:**

➤ **Mr. Jed Babbin**

- *White House Bulletin*: "...witnessed parts of four different interrogations and saw no abuse."
- *White House Bulletin*: "They're [the prisoners] not happy down there, but they are living better than they were [in Afghanistan or Iraq]."
- *\*American Spectator*: "Everything is done in ways calculated to respect Islam."
- *\*American Spectator*: "The common belief among the [Gitmo] terrorists is that political pressure will soon result in our having to close Gitmo and let them go."
- *\*American Spectator*: "There are no prisoner abuses at Gitmo. It's a matter of pride among them [the prison guards]"

➤ **Captain Chuck Nash**

- *Fox News*: "It has more scrutiny" and it is a "very professionally run organization [Gitmo]"
- *Fox News*: "Some of the treatment may be uncomfortable but it is not torturous and it's not illegal."
- *Fox News*: "...the only leverage that we have remaining on these prisoners is they don't know when they're going to get out."
- *Fox News*: "There is absolutely zero truth to charges about the abuse of the Koran. There were instances where Korans may have been dropped but there are no instances of guards desecrating the Koran."

➤ **Colonel Jeff McCausland**

- *\*WCBS Radio*: Guantanamo is "not a 'gulag' but it's also not 'Club Gitmo'"
- *\*WCBS Radio*: Gitmo is a well-run maximum security prison for some very dangerous people
- *\*WCBS Radio*: Commenting on recent abuse charges - the interrogators are trying to humiliate and degrade as part of approved interrogation techniques; not physically abuse

*\*New commentary since the last report*



Mr. Jed Babbin

White House Bulletin - IN THE WHITE HOUSE AND AROUND TOWN; Prisoners At Guantanamo Bay Prison Providing Good Information.

*Several members of the press have recently been brought to the Guantanamo Bay prison camp to see what's going on at the facility amid claims that prisoners are being abused, and American Spectator Contributing Editor Jed Babbin is among the latest. Babbin was flown to the base on Tuesday for a nine-hour tour, and during the visit officials suggested that some prisoners are providing good information to government investigators and battlefield commanders. "We're getting some good stuff," one official told Babbin. He said some of the information extracted from prisoners has been used by the FBI investigators of 9/11, and by battlefield generals in Iraq and Afghanistan. Babbin said in a telephone interview that he witnessed parts of four different interrogations and saw no abuse. Babbin also visited all of the five separate camps. He described the interrogation rooms as stark, filled only with cameras and folding chairs. He said the prisoners were provided cheese crackers and soda during interrogations, but otherwise were fed from a nutritious menu. "They're not happy down there," Babbin said of the prisoners, "but they are living better than they were [in Afghanistan or Iraq]." He said that many are receiving health, dental and mental care.*

The Gitmo Varsity\*

(The American Spectator)... Byline: Jed Babbin – July 18

GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA -- Abdullah M. was missing a leg when he got to Gitmo. In due course, he was fitted with a prosthetic leg and given occupational therapy to teach him how to use it. In the Orwellian inversion that dominates "world opinion" and requires us to prove we're the good guys, he was interrogated and -- after convincing our guys that he really wasn't a terrorist fanatic -- released and repatriated to Afghanistan. Now sought for involvement in the kidnapping of Chinese engineers and a bombing of the Islamabad Marriott, Abdullah is walking around on the artificial leg we evil Americans paid for.

Last Tuesday, in the company of Gen. Jay Hood, the Gitmo Joint Task Force commander, I and several other military analysts spent the day inside the terrorist detention camps and interrogation facilities, talked to a lot of intel people and soldiers, and saw about all there is to see at Gitmo.

*What I saw made me proud and disgusted: proud at how our guys and gals are dealing with some of the world's worst; disgusted at the Fonda-Durbins of the world who want the world to believe that Gitmo is Auschwitz and terrorists are some oppressed minority.*

As Gen. Hood explained, the mission of the Gitmo facility is twofold. First, to interrogate and obtain useful information from the terrorists held there. Second, to keep the dangerous ones from returning to terrorism, as so many of them openly say they want to do. There are about 520 of them. Many of them are just common thugs; foot soldiers in the terrorist gangs. With only a few exceptions -- notably those who reside in Gitmo's equivalent of a psycho ward -- they are cold, hard cases well trained in murder and in resisting interrogation. Mostly Afghani, Saudi, and Yemeni, they average in age at about 32, are fit, strong men who are proud to dedicate their lives to terrorism and look forward to the day they can go back to their chosen work. While observing

one interrogation of a typical detainee -- a Saudi man in his mid-thirties -- some of the intel people who deal with him nearly every day told me how he contemptuously, and frequently, proclaims his eagerness to get back to killing Westerners.

*They are divided into separate mini-camps. Those who follow camp rules, basic stuff such as "don't throw feces on the guards," get to wear white uniforms and live in a semi-communal environment. In the minimum-security camp, I saw groups playing soccer and volleyball. One guy was jogging around in his issue slip-on sneakers. Others, who are less cooperative, get fewer privileges.* Medium security camp inmates wear tan uniforms and are kept in cells, allowed out often to exercise. *Everything is done in ways calculated to respect Islam.*

*Inmates' Korans -- in the medium security camps, hung from the steel mesh walls in surgical masks -- are accompanied, in every cell and exercise area I saw throughout Gitmo, by little black arrows painted on bunks and floors, showing the direction of Mecca. Many prayer rugs were in evidence, as were chess sets, playing cards, and -- in the minimum-security camp -- prescription sports glasses.* In the maximum-security building, the Korans sit in the narrow windowsills. Interrogators will even interrupt interrogation sessions to allow detainees to pray. One interrogation I observed passed through the 4:30 p.m. call to prayer. The detainee, engaged in conversation with his interrogator, ignored the call and kept talking. To these faux-religious thugs, Islam is apparently less important than a cold Diet Coke.

*The common belief among the terrorists, fed by reports apparently conveyed to some by their lawyers, is that political pressure will soon result in our having to close Gitmo and let them go. (Note to Messrs. Durbin, Kennedy, the New York Times, et al.: Please shut up. You are making the interrogators' job much harder than it already is.) Because they believe we'll close Gitmo, many of the detainees resist years of interrogation.*

A large bunch of the detainees, about 100 of them, are smarter, better trained, and very knowledgeable of what their pals want to do to. They are the terrorist varsity, the high-value detainees. Up against them, and their ilk, are some of America's finest.

I DON'T KNOW THE NAMES of the soldiers: I didn't ask, and they didn't volunteer. No one -- other than the few top guys, including General Hood, his deputy, and the command sergeant major -- wears nametags. If the others' names were visible to inmates, they and their families would be at risk. That goes double for the intel crew. Like every soldier I've ever met, they had to bitch a little. The two enlisted guys I lunched with at the "Cafe Caribe" -- a chow hall that will never be mistaken for The Ritz -- were from towns in Texas and Washington State. The Texan wanted to be home with his infant son. His pal from Washington wondered why the hell was so much detail about the camp on the Internet. "How can you have OPSEC" -- operational security -- "when the whole world can see so much?" he asked.

They tried to do what every soldier is expected to do: shrug off the political floggings inflicted on them and their commanders every day. They meant well, but they couldn't b.s. this old b.s.'er. *When someone compares Gitmo to a Nazi death camp, they take it personally. They know it's idiocy, but it still hurts. Their motto is, "honor bound to defend freedom," and they take that personally, too. There are no prisoner abuses at Gitmo. It's a matter of pride among them. The chow is okay, they said, but mail is really slow. It takes almost three weeks for mail to get to them. The Texan -- who is assigned to the psycho ward -- had another concern. "These guys have hepatitis, TB and who knows what other diseases. When they throw feces on us they can give us a disease we can't get over."* The medical crew looks after them, and the terrorists, very well. The terrorists can't seem to make up their minds about it, though. Some, like a man who's had surgery for a serious cardiac condition, refuse further treatment.

The guards move a lot of prisoners: to and from the hospital, to and from interrogation and even between camps. The intel crew is as organized as I've seen any military operation, and that says a lot. The head of one Interrogation Control Element toured us around "gold block," a hall along which are a number of interrogation rooms. The rooms are all the same: stark white, with a small table and a few folding chairs. There's a steel ring in the floor, to which the detainees are attached by one or both leg irons. We observed a few interrogations there. The ICE boss disagreed with what I'd been told before. The intel crews don't feel downtrodden or unreasonably constrained by regulations. They're succeeding, and they take pride in the results they're getting. There are a bunch of FBI investigations going on right now that are propelled by intelligence garnered from the Gitmo detainees. ***It's not just possible -- it's a dead-bang certainty -- that terrorist attacks in the United States are being thwarted by the patience and skill of the Gitmo crew.*** And as the FBI benefits, so do the combatant commanders. The operational military levy requests on Gitmo several times a week, and are often answered with information they can apply on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. And elsewhere.

TO ANYONE WITH OPEN eyes, it must be clear that we are treating these hard-core terrorists humanely, and that our interrogators -- men and women, military and civilian -- should be praised, not scorned. Investigation after investigation has showed that there is no torture at Gitmo. But the outrageous and disgusting characterizations of what we are doing at Gitmo continue.

On Friday, a New York Times editorial said, "Surely no one can approve turning an American soldier into a pseudo-lap-dancer or having another smear fake menstrual blood on an Arab man. These practices are as degrading to the women as they are to the prisoners. They violate American moral values -- and they seem pointless....Does anyone in the military believe that a cold-blooded terrorist who has withstood months of physical and psychological abuse will crack because a woman runs her fingers through his hair suggestively or watches him disrobe? If devout Muslims become terrorists because they believe Western civilization is depraved, does it make sense to try to unnerve them by having Western women behave like trollops?" First they're all Nazis or Cambodian murderers; now the gals are whores.

I've met a few of these gals, and I can tell you they are smart, tough, and are accomplishing things other people can't. They aren't "behaving like trollops," but like the dedicated intel professionals they are. I -- and a lot of people who are, fortunately, in control of what they do -- approve because they are acting within the rules, and producing results. There are no whores at Gitmo, but there are intellectual whores in Congress and at the Times.

***Who should be blamed for failing to prevent the next terrorist attack? Not the guys and gals of Gitmo who are working tirelessly, under awful conditions and politically correct constraints, to get information from hard-core terrorists. Every American should be proud of them, and grateful for what they're doing to defend us.***

There are terrorists here in the United States and, along with many others overseas, they are planning to kill more Americans in more attacks. What will the intellectual whores of the left say after the next 9-11? Will they say that we were right to forgo interrogation methods that used sexual taunting and the use of psychotropic drugs? Or will they say that we should have done more to protect America?

We know what torture is, and we know what it isn't. Anything else and everything else should be done, consistently and thoroughly, to get the information we need. To say we should do less is to say we must sacrifice American lives that could otherwise be saved.

TAS contributing editor Jed Babbin is the author of *Inside the Asylum: Why the UN and Old Europe Are Worse Than You Think* (Regnery, 2004).

### Additional Coverage

Scheduled to broadcast were approximately seven radio shows with Jed Babbin; these transcripts were not immediately available for this report.

### Chuck Nash

Fox News – Your World with Neil Cavuto

7/15/2005 1:15:28 AM

**Cavuto:** Today's guest just got back from Guantanamo bay and says if anything, the prisoners are treated too well. He joins us right now. What do you make, Chuck, of the attention Gitmo gets these days? **Nash:** Unfortunately we have a situation that should not be political that is being made political. To add more wood on to the proverbial fires that are started here on Capitol Hill, this in no way should be in the news and the reason is because this is a very professionally run organization. It has had more scrutiny than probably, you know, any other military organization out there. They're doing a fabulous job, and they are, take it from me, they are getting some tremendous intelligence information out of these guys. I know you're aware, but my security clearance is still current. And while I was down there, I was given a classified briefing of what was going on. And just take it from me, that we are gaining tremendous value out of these prisoners. **Cavuto:** I know you were there and you know better than I but there is a separate report that says there were some cases of abuse there and John McCain, a guy who of course was in the North Vietnamese prison for seven years of his life says we (as a country) can do better. What do you say? **Nash:** Well, I think anything can be improved but when you look at the way they're being treated down there, there is something in the codes that people talk about and they say:....are they given their Geneva convention rights? They are being treated humanly and although some of the treatment may be uncomfortable, it is not torturous and -- it is not illegal. **Cavuto:** you are saying we should be reminded of the terrors that are real like in London last week and juxtapose that with what are fairly comfortable conditions in Gitmo. **Nash:** This is a war and the next time this country gets hit, god forbid, people will wonder when do we get tough on these guys? What is going on, the folks in Gitmo are getting the information they're getting and playing by the rules and it is disastrous for them. The one lever that they have, if you think about this, we have pretty much published what we can and can't do to prisoners. The prisoners know that the only leverage that we have remaining on these prisoners is they don't know when they're going to get out. Do you know when they're going to get out? When this war is over. If we start talking like some of these people up here on the hill about closing down Gitmo then that just stokes their fire and props them up because they think we don't have to talk to these guys. **Cavuto:** Chuck, you were there. Have you seen cases of that where they're saying, look, we will just go slowly? **Nash:** There are instances where, after certain statements are made and it's been reported in the press where folks from the Middle East are coming back and saying, see, even U.S. Senators and Congressmen are saying these things. So it is being used against us and you know when you're playing by the rules you have to control the environment. To control the environment, you have to really be careful about what these

prisoners can and cannot get access to. **Cavuto:** There were -- I don't know what you know or what you can comfortably say. I know you had a clearance to go in there so maybe you can't say much. But one of the reports was the abuse of the Koran, physical abuse or sort of more embarrassing type abuse for the prisoners there. Any of that true? **Nash:** There is absolutely zero truth to charges about the abuse of the Koran. There were instances where Korans may have been dropped but no instances of guards desecrating the Koran. Every Koran is hanging object a surgical mask by each prisoner's bed where it's in plain view and everything. There have been instances where some of the prisoners have desecrated the Koran and what they did was they tore it up to try to stop up a toilet or they tore it up and threw it out to try to insight the other prisoners to riot. As far as the abusive stuff, yeah, they had this guy. This guy, turns out he was the 20th hijacker....**Cavuto:** Wish we had more time but thank you for putting that in perspective. Appreciate it. Chuck Nash with the latest on Gitmo.

**Jeff McCausland**

**\* WCBS NewsRadio 880**

7/15/05

Interview with Jeff McCausland with limited commentary on his recent visit to Gitmo

Military Analyst Call

Tuesday, July 19, 2005

Briefers: Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Peter Rodman, USMC BGen John Allen (principal director, Asian and Pacific Affairs), David Helvey

Hosts: Mr. Bryan Whitman, Mr. Dallas Lawrence

OSD Staff: (b)(6), LCDR Greg Hicks

Transcriber: (b)(6)

RSVP'd yes:

Colonel Ken Allard	(USA, Retired)
Mr. Jed Babbin	(USAF, JAG)
Dr. James Jay Carafano	(LTC, USA, Retired)
Major Dana R. Dillon	(USA, Retired)
Colonel (Tim) J. Eads	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel David Finkelstein	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis	(USA, Retired)
General Montgomery Meigs	(USA, Retired)
Colonel Jeff McCausland	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney	(USAF, Retired)
Captain Chuck Nash	(USN, Retired)
General Joseph Ralston	(USAF, Retired)
Lieutenant General Erv Rokke	(USAF, Retired)
Major General Paul E. Vallely	(USA, Retired)
James Mulvenon	(Deputy Dir., Cntr for Intel Research and Analysis)
John Tkacik	(Heritage Foundation)

(tape started in progress)

Mr. Rodman: There are a lot of nuggets in this report, and I think – unfortunately you don't have it in front of you, but you'll see it on DefenseLink; it'll be posted on the web sometime this afternoon on DefenseLink. But I think if I can give you on an embargoed basis some of the nuggets in there it may be of help.

First let me say a couple things about context and the tone. The tone of the report is deliberately non-alarmist. I mean, the Secretary of Defense wanted us to be factual, descriptive, analytical; so it just lays things out; it doesn't have a lot of alarmist adjectives. On the other hand, a lot of the stuff in there is, as I'll mention, a lot of it is worrisome. On the other hand, the point – the report talks about limitations. I mean, there are a lot of things the Chinese cannot do. They cannot do a full-scale amphibious invasion – certainly not do it very easily or without giving us a lot of strategic warning.

They are not yet able to project power significantly outside, you know, their immediate periphery. So there is some good discussion of some weaknesses; on the other hand there are a lot of things in there that are – I think are worrisome.

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They are not yet able to project power significantly outside, you know, their immediate periphery. So there is some good discussion of some weaknesses; on the other hand there are a lot of things in there that are – I think are worrisome.

And the context of this – again, the President believes we have a good relationship with China, a constructive relationship with China in a lot of spheres, and that is the context in which we write this report. We're not beating the war drum; we're not, you know, saying China is a threat or not a threat; we're being descriptive. And as I say, that's partly because that – this is the context of the President's overall policy which we are a part of.

All right, the second aspect of context is interagency clearance. This is a good news story. This report has been massaged several times in several drafts through the interagency. The State Department, the NSC staff, the intelligence community have had a good look at this, various stages. A lot of the rumors out there are wildly off the mark about, you know, huge brawls in the interagency.

This has been a pretty good process of clearance. The final product – in fact, for several months or weeks this has been blessed and we've been refining it ourselves for the last several weeks, and the interagency process has been pretty good. And Secretary Rice even said this. She was just in China last week and we held the thing for a week so it wouldn't come out just before or during her trip. But she was totally aware of this. She even told the press and the Chinese that she endorsed the report. It reflects not only Pentagon concerns, but the U.S. government's concerns. So this is blessed by the whole U.S. government, and that's very important. It's an antidote to a lot of these wild stories of brawls, and it gives even greater weight to the conclusions of the report.

But let me mention a bunch of things that I think you'll find interesting, and that I find a little worrisome. One is we've tried to make the point that China's interest – China's modernization is not just a matter of concern to the United States, it ought to be a concern to the region. And we say this explicitly. And you might also go back and look at Secretary Rumsfeld's speech in Singapore, where he talked about this. And in Singapore, he made a point of say, look this isn't just a U.S. issue, it's not just a U.S.-China matter, it's, you know, an issue of interest to everybody in the region. The speech that the Secretary gave on June 4, you can find it on, you know, DefenseLink. But that's a point we make. So a lot of the report is written, you know, not to say oh, this is U.S.-China faceoff, but it concerns the region. And there are a couple of maps to show the ranges of Chinese missiles. And, you know, it shows around the periphery of China and particularly mobile missiles, which they have an increasing number of, and even the missiles opposite Taiwan – a lot of them are mobile.

So this is something that we hope the whole region will take note of.

A second point, somewhat related, is it's clear that a lot of Chinese military planning is geared to Taiwan. But there are also some quotations from Chinese analysts suggesting that ultimately, their longer-range objective is beyond Taiwan, and ultimately they do hope to have a power projection capability beyond just a Taiwan scenario, and a capability that could down the road affect, you know, the militaries of other nations.



So again, this is something we point to not exaggerating their present capability but just noting what they say, and some of the capabilities they're developing to support that and just giving people a heads up about, you know, their strategy – strategic objectives beyond Taiwan.

Another point to mention – there's a Deng Xiaoping quote, which we've used in previous reports; it's called the 24-character maxim. And we've used this in past reports; we report a little more attention to it this time, and you'll spot it. It's a maxim that goes back to Deng – the early 90s he used it in a lot of speeches and it is quoted to this day by senior national security people; it's used in – we think in some of their internal security documents. I'll read it. It's a maxim that says, "Observe calmly, secure our position, cope with affairs calmly, hide our capacities and bide our time, be good at maintaining a low profile, and never claim leadership."

You may have heard the phrases in their "hide our capacities and bide our time." We think this is a pretty good encapsulation of China's long-term strategy. Clearly they try to downplay the significance of what they're doing now. They act modestly and say, "Oh, we're not a major power." But they are building up to give themselves options for the future. And it seems to us a patient, long-term strategy. And that's, as I say, it seems to be a very apt description of what they're doing. They're building up what they call their comprehensive national power. There's a cliché out there that they're just building up their economy; all they care about is their economy. Well, they are building their economy, but their economy is fueling double-digit increases in their defense budget, and, which of course funds the modernization that we're describing in detail in the report.

So this is of interest. As I say, it's a public – it's a quotation that they've used a lot and that we've pointed to, but I think that it deserves some attention.

Their defense budget – just a little nugget – I think the Secretary may have said this in his Singapore speech. We talk a little bit about the lack of transparency in their defense budget. We think they're actual defense spending as we measure it is about two or three times their official figure. We say that in the report. And – yeah, which makes it the highest in Asia and the third in the world. And even by their own figures they, you know, they – the double-digit increases every year are in their own figures and we think that applies.

A couple of other nuggets, at least something that I am struck by. You know, I mentioned the mobile ICBMs. They have this – the DF-31 is a road mobile, solid fuel ICBM that we think is going to come, you know, have an IOC in the next couple years, and that's discussed in the report. And that's, it seems to me an indicator this is not a Third World military power. There are some areas in which they are becoming a First World military power, and this seems to be one example. And the DF-31 is a DF-31A a longer-range variant that will come down the pike. But this is a significant system and it, you know, they have some opposite Taiwan I think and, but, well, I don't know where – I am not sure where they are but it's a strategic system and they – it's, you know, as I say, it's going to be deployed in the next few years.

There's a doctrinal point – they used to use the phrase “local wars under high-tech conditions,” that was their definition of the kind of war they expected to fight. They've refined this. They use a new phrase now. It's called “local wars under conditions of informationalization.” Local wars under conditions of informationalization. It's a kind of clumsy translation, but they're obviously trying to keep up with the revolution in military affairs. We don't know too much about what this new phrase means, but that's their doctrine; that's what they – how they now – that's what they gear their planning to. It's, you know, one of the new developments we talk about.

There's another point in the report, just mentioned in passing, that a lot of their new systems are things that we didn't know about. They have a habit recently of rolling out a new system whose development we were not aware of. This has happened in a few instances and that's mentioned in the report. And I think that's worth of note.

And the last thing I'll mention now is – there's a long discussion of European effort to lift the arms embargo, the EU arms embargo, on China. This has been a big preoccupation of my office and in fact of the whole U.S. government, trying to fight this and discourage the Europeans from lifting the arms embargo. And we have achieved at least a temporary success.

But in this report, we spent some time explaining why this is – why this is of concern and what we are worried about. You know, we think the Chinese would be able to obtain in Europe a lot of military or dual-use technologies that would be of great qualitative benefit to them, and you know, again, I think we've mentioned it in the past but this time we spend a little more time on this, you know, explaining why we object to European sales of technology.

Lastly there's a point – again, this is another point I don't want to forget – I think we've said this in previous reports – that the balance of power is shifting in the Taiwan Strait. That's the trend. I know we've said this before, but we have to say it again. The balance of power in the Taiwan Strait is shifting in Beijing's favor because of this, you know, modernization, and because of Taiwan's, you know, so far inability to keep up their defense spending.

Taiwan's defense spending has been declining while Beijing's has been going up. And this is not a – I mean the trend is disturbing and we call attention to that. There is, as you know, a special budget – what is it -- \$15 billion or so? Fifteen, sixteen billion that is before the Taiwan legislature that would purchase some important systems, but there's, but there's some – as I say, in our report, there's a theme that, you know, if the Taiwanese don't, you know, take on greater responsibility and show, you know, enough discipline or commitment on their own that it's going to make things harder. And we're not jumping to conclusions about how a conflict would come out but we're pointing to a disturbing trend in the Taiwan Strait. And it's important that Taiwan be able – you know, be difficult to defeat. We all know that, you know, our possible intervention is a factor

here, maybe decisive. But (we?) think a part of the balance ought to be carried by Taiwan, and that's a disturbing, and that's a disturbing trend in that respect.

Anyway, let me stop there. These are little nuggets I think you might find of interest. There's a lot of other stuff in there. A lot of good, useful information I think. And let me stop there. I am happy to answer some questions.

Mr. McCausland: This is Jeff McCausland. Two quick questions. One, is there any suggestion of the Chinese being involved (x?) proliferation activities, particularly Pakistan and their weapons development. And second of all, you mention quite rightfully that this is a regional threat at least for the moment. Can you give us any insight in discussions with our Japanese allies, perhaps the Russians, or even the recent discussions we had with the Indians how they perceive this change in China's military power? And a big hi to John Allen.

BG Allen: Hey sir; how are you?

Mr. McCausland: Good.

Mr. Rodman: The first point about proliferation. We don't spend a lot of time on it in this report; there are other I think -- other publications we do on Chinese proliferation activities, and I've done some testimony on this myself. So that's not what this report is about. Second, on the regional threat, we don't characterize what other governments are thinking; that's for them to say, I guess on background, well this whole discussion's on background, but I do know we, we certainly have conversations with a lot of these countries on this subject. And, you know, the Japanese -- you may remember the U.S.-Japanese joint statement of a few months ago; it was a ministerial meeting here and there was a joint statement in which both sides mentioned the Taiwan issue as a matter of a common strategic objective or common -- I think that was the phrase. There's no -- and the Japanese defense white papers speak quite explicitly about the Chinese missile threat and so forth. I can tell you it does come up in discussions with the Indians, with the Vietnamese -- the Vietnamese prime minister was here a few weeks ago -- with Southeast Asian countries. And Secretary Rumsfeld was in Singapore in June for this multi-lateral conference of defense ministers and he mentioned this in his speech, precisely to make that point. And they say the feedback he got from just about everybody was -- you know, they view this with the same concern, and none of us -- but the bottom line is, nobody wants to prejudge what this means, or nobody's saying the conflict is inevitable, and there's a tendency in most of the region to, you know, hope for some constructive evolution, but I think we are -- and that's our view, as well. But I think we've done something constructive here if we've added some realism into the discussion because I think you have to face this reality.

Mr. McCausland: Thank you.

Mr. Rodman: The Russians, I don't know. You mentioned the Russians. I think we have started to put this on the agenda with the Russians. They are overwhelmingly the biggest

arms supplier and selling the most dangerous systems. And I know this – and there's a debate within Russia for years about whether this is smart from the Russian point of view. But that's something we haven't made a lot of headway. We've made headway with the EU; we've made headway with the Israelis in, you know, trying to constrain or shut down some of this trade. But with the Russians, that's a big problem.

Mr. Maginnis: Mr. Rodman, Bob Maginnis. A two-part question. One on the Blue Sea Navy (?) and whether or not their submarine force is not only becoming larger, but far more sophisticated. And then secondly, Global Security sent out something recently with some pictures of an old Soviet aircraft carrier. Is fact is it going to be a casino as they suggest perhaps, or is it going to be used?

Mr. Rodman: The Blue Sea, well the submarines – yeah, there's a lot of discussion of that. I think we know that that's a threat – the Chinese are developing this capability with not just the kilos (?) from Russia but their own indigenous production. I mean, there are limitations – there are a lot of capabilities they don't have yet. We think our Navy, you know, out matches anybody else. But they're – they're developing this and there's a lot of discussion of that. General Allen wants to –

BG Allen: John Allen. We watch the submarines pretty closely; the combination of what they're doing with their Song class submarines, their type 98 nuclear attack boat – 93, sorry – that's coming out; the new Youn class submarine which is, by the way, a submarine that we didn't know existed until it was rolled out. Those are some fairly sophisticated systems. So obviously we're watching the roughly five concurrent submarine programs, to include the kilo purchase and a new ballistic missile submarine, we're watching those very closely. We can't get inside them, but we suspect there is some fairly significant technological improvement over some of the older class subs that they have.

Voice (Mr. Rodman?): The carrier, what do we think about the carrier? I don't think...

BG Allen: We haven't decided yet what's going to happen to the carrier. It would be a hell of a good casino (laughter) if they developed that capability, but they may be developing it just to test some future capacity for building a carrier or for naval aviation, or they could be restoring it, although it's in really in pretty bad shape. So I think the jury's still out within the intelligence community on where this thing is going to go. But that's a good question. Because pursuit of a carrier is a very clear indicator of some naval aspirations and national aspirations simply for – beyond the current configuration; it's going to be a sea-controlled navy if we start seeing carrier being built.

Mr. Lawrence: Next question?

Mr. Allard: Yeah, Ken Allard. Have you guys seen any indications – and I am fascinated by the references to informational conditions because I have been an avid fan of their stuff ever since I read that white paper on unrestricted warfare that came out back in the

late 90s. Have you seen any indications that that is anything more to them than pure doctrinal speculation? Although they appear to take that very seriously.

Mr. Rodman: Well, I'll ask General Allen to pitch in. But I think they clearly see this as the definition of modern warfare. They analyze closely everything we do; everytime we're involved in a campaign there's a spate of articles analyzing it. Sometimes they put themselves in the shoes of our opponent; sometimes they try to see what can we emulate that the Americans have done. You know, they have a long way to go in, you know C4ISR and integration of things, but I think they are clearly interested in that and see how – that's the way to go. I don't know what – and we see them doing a lot of R&D(?) anti-satellite capabilities – clearly, computer network operations of different kinds, and there's definitely some discussion of that in this report.

Voice (BG Allen?): If you have a chance to look at it – the 2004 Chinese – the PRC defense white paper uses this term for the first time – local wars under the conditions of informationalization. And as Assistant Secretary Rodman says correctly, we're not entirely sure what that means. We know they have followed very closely the improvements and sophistication of our command and control capabilities, the improvements in our ISR, both in terms of enhancing command and control and targeting, and in particular, they have followed the augmentation by space of our command and control – C4ISR capacity in war.

If you -- one of the folks that we actually quote in the report is General Jiany Guang-kai who I would assume is known to some of you. He has written on this issue – I hope I am not tainting my source immediately by mentioning his name, but I think he is emblematic of the interest in the revolution of military affairs, the advent of knowledge-based warfare, the improvement in space-based ISR and command and control support to operations, and some of the quotes we offer in the report provide indications of how much the Chinese are interested in this, and the fact that they would employ this as a new doctrinal term would seem to indicate that they're headed off in this direction.

Mr. McNerney: Tom McNerney for either the general or Peter. What do you say about the recent pronouncement by the major general about using nuclear weapons and hitting our cities in the event of a Taiwanese event?

Mr. Rodman: Well, it's not in the report but you're right to ask. You know -- a couple of things can be said. Now, the Chinese government has repudiated his remarks; they've said that there's no change, that he's speaking for himself, that they stick to their, you know, previous policy on Taiwan and no first use.

On the other hand, I think we're entitled to draw some conclusions. I mean, it is clear that some people in the Chinese establishment are not so comfortable with no first use, and might be advocating some reevaluation of that. It also just highlights the risk of Chinese miscalculation. There's another theme in the report I think in various places, where (we're?) at the risk the Chinese might miscalculate (inaudible) in a crisis, or that just any crisis involved (involves?) an inherent risk of things happening in ways that the sides

don't expect. So I think it's something that we have to pay attention to. It shows – reminds us of risks of escalation in a crisis, but I hope the Chinese, you know, are thinking of the same thing – the risk to them of any use of force. You know they may have in mind, for example, limited use of force, or coercive steps against Taiwan that, you know, they may think are, you know, are not all out war, but others who are the target of them may interpret them differently. So -- it's another element. I mean, the risk of miscalculation is something serious and it imposes a responsibility on us to deter unambiguously in my view.

Voice (Mr. McInerney?): Does it, does it suggest that perhaps there are elements in the Army that even the political apparatus doesn't feel they can control?

Mr. Rodman: No. It may – I think they are a disciplined army but, you know, and policy, you know – as far as we know, their policymaking apparatus is disciplined. But, I mean, this fellow is somewhat outside the policymaking chain; he's in an academic setting; he has a reputation for popping off a lot. So I am not sure how authoritative – I mean, I wouldn't assume he is speaking authoritatively, but it obviously affects the view of some people in the military establishment. Dave, my colleague David Helvey who helped in the report – if you want to add something.

Mr. Helvey: Well, I think as the Assistant Secretary said, there's some discipline; there's a good degree of discipline in China's, you know, civil military apparatus and decision making on the use of force. Now (and?) I would draw a clear distinction between this individual who is a military academic, and somebody that would actually be responsible for maintaining the chain of command for nuclear weapons use.

BG Allen: But I think you asked a central question. Is this indicative of whether there is in fact complete control over the military? And to me, the statement, while ludicrous, I was watching more the Chinese leadership reaction to the statement than I was General Zhu Chengu's comment in particular. And I frankly wasn't impressed by the Chinese – by the strength of their disavowal of that comment. One of the points we make in the, in the report is that this report attempts to identify the capabilities of the Chinese military, and its modernization, and the potential capacity of those capabilities in the future. What we say of course, the old intelligence equation which is threat equals capabilities plus intentions, in the report is we don't know the Chinese intentions and we seek to ferret those out in so many different ways. When we have a general who is a very senior leader in the National Defense University talking in those terms and receives only a velvet glove in return, then that may be an indication of an intention. So we've got to watch this sort of thing very closely.

Mr. Lawrence: We probably have time for two more questions.

Mr. Allard: Yeah, Ken Allard again. On the cross straits problem. Did you look at all at asymmetric capabilities that are often left out of the traditional calculus as to how would they do it if they chose to do it?

Mr. Rodman: That is something we definitely looked at and there's some discussion here of different scenarios, you know, not only a full-scale amphibious invasion; there are a lot of coercive options which we think the Chinese are looking at that are more complicated from our point of view, precisely because they, you know, have asymmetric elements. David, do you want – John Allen?

Mr. Helvey: One of the things that we do talk about – you mention the asymmetric capabilities – we talk about it within the context of anti-access, although I want to preface that remark that compared to the United States military just about anything would be asymmetric. But when we talk about anti-access, we look at some of the programs and systems that China is trying to develop, many of which fall under this term of assassins mace types weapons systems, which in the Chinese context are programs and capabilities designed to generate turning points in battle. So we look at some of the new submarines, anti-ship cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, as well as – for example, some longer-range ballistic missiles that China might be looking at for an anti-access mission. So we do, we do address asymmetry quite a bit in this report.

Voice: Do you think you've got a (inaudible).

Voice: Yes, sir?

Voice: Yeah, those of use who are going to be queried by the media are going to undoubtedly be asked, well, how does one account if one possible can for the alleged delay in the report, and I'm not necessarily convinced there was any big delay, but that story is out there. How would one address something like that?

Mr. Rodman: Well, I would say...

Voice: ...words put in my mouth,

Mr. Rodman: No, no, no. I appreciate your...

Voice: But this is something that people won't get off of.

Mr. Rodman: Well, I appreciate your asking, because obviously this will be asked. The report is a little bit late. A lot of it is just the clearance process. It takes time; we have the State Department, the NSC, the intelligence community. We did a draft; it went through this process, then Secretary Rumsfeld saw it and he had his own contributions to it – I mean, it's his report, so he was entitled make suggestions of different kinds, so we had to, you know, go back again. The last few weeks part of it was, as I mentioned, Secretary Rice was in China and we ourselves had the wit to mention this to her and to say, look, we don't want this to come out just before you're there or while you're there, we'll wait til your back, and she agreed with that completely.

Voice: That's very helpful, thank you. It certainly comports with what my instincts were on what's going on. Thank you.

Mr. Rodman: I mean, you all know how the bureaucracy works...

Voice: Absolutely.

Mr. Rodman: And this was just, you know, bureaucratic stuff and nothing melodramatic.

Mr. Nash: One last thing, if I could. This is Chuck Nash. When you brought up that there were several systems that you did not know existed, that sort of, you know, runs back to the words intelligence failure, or whatever, when you hear those kind of things, so you might want to think about how you describe that when you put that out.

Mr. Rodman: Well, you're right. I mean, it's one sentence in the report, and we're obviously....

Mr. Nash: I know, but it's a, it's a, yeah.

Mr. Rodman: No, but deliberately, we're not trying to advertise this overly, and give the Chinese too much satisfaction, and it -- but it's something that's just a fact that we thought we ought to mention. And it's something we have to consider when we make assessments. And there's -- there is a discussion in there about the lack of transparency; I mean, this is a theme of the report, they don't -- you know, there's not transparency in their defense budget as I mentioned already, and there's just lack of transparency on a lot of things and plus, you know, a lot of traditional Chinese state craft keeping things secret, but there's a little -- no, you can read into that sentence what you want and I think you're correct to see some of the implications of it.

Mr. Nash: Well it also ...

Mr. Rodman: (crosstalk) the uncertainty about what they're up to and what they're strategy is and maybe we have to be conservative given that -- the recent experience of finding out that they're doing more than we expected.

Mr. Lawrence: Gentlemen, that's all we...

Mr. Nash: It also (inaudible) the question of what were those systems that we didn't know about? You mentioned the submarine.

Mr. Rodman: Well, the submarine is one of the dramatic examples. I think maybe we don't want to say too much in a public document about other things, but, the U-on (sp) submarine is one.

Voice: One last quick question. Can you review real quick -- I assume the testimony is with what, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or Senate Armed Services, who exactly is testifying? Mr. Rodman, are you testifying? Is General Allen testifying?



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Mr. Rodman: Well, it's a briefing. It's Armed Services Committee in both places. It's a closed briefing doing first the HASC – the House Armed Services Committee in the early afternoon and then the Senate Armed Services Committee later, and it's staff and Members, so it's not a public hearing. It might well be – they may try to get us up there for a public hearing, you know, some later date, but that's not on today's agenda.

Voice: And you'll be doing the briefing sir?

Mr. Rodman: Probably I think they'll try to invite me; there's nothing scheduled at this point.

Mr. Lawrence: Gentlemen, thank you very much for calling in today. Just to recap, this is on background, anybody quoted should be quoted as a senior Defense Department official, and returning to Mr. Whitman's comments, this is embargoed until either after the briefing, or you're hearing it on TV, and as we all know, after the first House briefing, I am sure it will start to come out (laughter).

Once the report is available, we will email it to all of you. In addition, we'll get some of those quotes out to you that were from, that Secretary quoted during his briefing.

Mr. Rodman: My whole, no, I think that, I don't, I'm calling those things to your attention on a background basis, because I say we're trying to, we're portraying the report as very balanced, and it has strengths and weaknesses. But I think you guys would appreciate some of these nuggets, and I think, you know, you should, you know, discover them for yourself, but I think, you know, I thought you'd welcome, you know, some pointers to what some of these interesting things are.

Mr. Lawrence: Thank you very much gentlemen.

Voices: Thank you.

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Monday, July 18, 2005 6:07 PM  
**To:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** RE: Gitmo request

no, that was the one with the detail on taking the vietnam pow's.....

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Monday, July 18, 2005 6:06 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** RE: Gitmo request

oh, i thought there was one with greater detail.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Monday, July 18, 2005 6:03 PM  
**To:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** RE: Gitmo request

it's at the bottom of this one..... :)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Monday, July 18, 2005 6:02 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** RE: Gitmo request

okay, can you please forward it to me, though, before the meeting. thanks

-----Original Message-----

**From:** (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Monday, July 18, 2005 3:56 PM  
**To:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** RE: Gitmo request

found the email. will bring it to our am meeting tomorrow.  
thanks

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Thursday, July 14, 2005 8:42 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Cc:** (b)(6) CIV, OSD  
**Subject:** Re: Gitmo request

Let's talk in the am. I think it's worth considering. Thanks.

-----  
Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

**From:** (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA <(b)(6)>  
**To:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@ (b)(6)>  
**Sent:** Thu Jul 14 18:52:31 2005

Subject: Gitmo request

er-

passing this one along to you. is this something we can work?  
thanks

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Gordon Cucullu [mailto:colonelgordone@(b)(6)]

Sent: Thursday, July 14, 2005 6:04 PM

To: (b)(6)

Subject: RE: Affiliations

Hi, (b)(6)

I asked Dallas about OSD/PA support (in the form of permissive travel, permission to stay at GITMO, permission to interview people there) in order to do a book about the facility, the detainees, the troops, and the future. Paul Vallely will collaborate with me on it. We need your office clearance before attempting the project. I know he and you are busy but if you could let me know if he is at least working the problem it would be helpful.  
Thanks.

All the best,

Gordon Cucullu

(b)(6)

**From:** JedBabbin@**(b)(6)**  
**Sent:** Monday, July 18, 2005 4:22 PM  
**To:** **(b)(6)** CIV, OASD-PA  
**Cc:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** Re: USN&WR

T: Thanks. I now have something with Jay Hood, which is even better. **(b)(6)** worked that for us. (Didn't know, but had mentioned to Eric, and he's obviously ahead of the power curve.)

**Jed Babbin**

**(b)(2)** (home office)  
(home fax)  
(mobile)

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Monday, July 18, 2005 3:55 PM  
**To:** 'JedBabbin@'(b)(6)  
**Cc:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** RE: USN&WR

jed,

(b)(6) line is (b)(2)

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Monday, July 18, 2005 3:51 PM  
**To:** 'JedBabbin@'(b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** RE: USN&WR

i'd work it through (b)(6) and ltcd (b)(6) starting with (b)(6) (b)(6) has been out on vacation but is back now. thanks, eric

-----Original Message-----

**From:** JedBabbin@'(b)(6) [mailto:JedBabbin@'(b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Monday, July 18, 2005 1:28 PM  
**To:** Eric.Ruff@'(b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: USN&WR

Eric: Thanks. I'm doing as much as possible. Hope you liked the TAS column today. Don't have (b)(6) (b)(6) set yet, but will soon. Would still like to get (b)(6) (b)(6). Shall I follow up with his office? Best, Jed.

**Jed Babbin**

(b)(2) (home office)  
(b)(2) (home fax)  
(b)(2) (mobile)

(b)(6)

**From:** Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Monday, July 18, 2005 3:13 PM  
**To:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** FW: JTF GTMO - Radio Interview Request with Jed Babbin on KOGO (San D iego) -...

FYI

---

**From:** JedBabbin@**(b)(6)** [mailto:JedBabbin@**(b)(6)**]  
**Sent:** Monday, July 18, 2005 3:13 PM  
**To:** **(b)(6)**  
**Cc:** **(b)(6)**; Bryan.Whitman@**(b)(6)**; **(b)(6)**; **(b)(6)**  
**Subject:** Re: JTF GTMO - Radio Interview Request with Jed Babbin on KOGO (San D iego) -...

Flex: I'll make it happen; pls let me know where/how to call, or I can get you the call-in stuff. Many, many thanks to all. Best, Jed.

**Jed Babbin**

**(b)(2)** (home office)  
**(b)(2)** (home fax)  
**(b)(2)** (mobile)

(b)(6)

**From:** Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Monday, July 18, 2005 1:46 PM  
**To:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** FW: JTF GTMO - Radio Interview Request with Jed Babbin on KOGO (San Diego) - July 22

FYI -- Hood is on with Babbin

**From:** (b)(6) COL (L) [mailto:(b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Monday, July 18, 2005 1:21 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) LtCdr, OASD-PA; (b)(6) COL (L)  
**Cc:** (b)(6); (b)(6) Maj, OASD-PA; (b)(6), Lt Col, OASD-PA; (b)(6), CAPT, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC HQDA DCS G-3/5/7; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) COL (L); (b)(6) LCDR (L); (b)(6) LTC (L); (b)(6) Lt Col (L); (b)(6) (L); (b)(6) (L); (b)(6) (L); (b)(6) MAJ (L); JTFGTMO-PAO  
**Subject:** RE: JTF GTMO - Radio Interview Request with Jed Babbin on KOGO (San Diego) - July 22

BG Hood is available Friday and willing to do a radio phone interview. He would prefer to do the interview 1300-1330 timeframe. His calendar is full that afternoon with events that cannot be changed.

Pls confirm if the time change will still meet your needs. Thanks.

(b)(6)

**COL Brad K Blackner**  
**Director of Public Affairs**  
**Joint Task Force Guantanamo**  
**Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**blacknerbk@(b)(6)**

(b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** (b)(6) LtCdr, OASD-PA [mailto:(b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Monday, July 18, 2005 8:12 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(6); (b)(6) Maj, OASD-PA; (b)(6), Lt Col, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CAPT, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC HQDA DCS G-3/5/7; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; COL (b)(6); LCDR (b)(6); LTC (b)(6); LTC (b)(6); (b)(6); (b)(6); Maj (b)(6); PAO  
**Subject:** JTF GTMO - Radio Interview Request with Jed Babbin on KOGO (San Diego) - July 22

Colonel (b)(6)

Could you please check BGEN Hood's availability/willingness to do a radio phone interview Friday, July 22 for approximately 20 minutes sometime between 3-6 ET?

As you may know, Mr. Babbin is one of our military analysts and would be willing to discuss just about any aspect of the JTF that BGEN Hood would like.

KOGO-radio reaches a large Navy and Marine Corps audience, so any information/update BGEN Hood could provide on how the Navy guards are doing would be well-received, along with a reminder, perhaps, that Marines are the ones who initially built the first detention facilities with only days notice.

Very respectfully,

(b)(6)

Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy  
Western Hemisphere Press Officer  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

Tel: (b)(2) Fax: (b)(2)

✉ E-mail: (b)(6) or (b)(6)

www.dod.mil

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA

**Sent:** Monday, July 18, 2005 6:42 AM

**To:** (b)(6) Maj, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LtCdr, OASD-PA

**Cc:** (b)(6), CIV, OSD-POLICY; (b)(6) CAPT, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6), COL (L)

**Subject:** Jed Babbin Interview Request

Jed Babbin is substituting for Mark Larson on KOGO, San Diego, next Friday, 22 July. The show airs 3-6 EDT.

He is asking if BG Jay Hood or (b)(6) might be available for an interview. As you probably know Jed is very friendly and supportive.

(b)(6) and (b)(6) please take for action and keep me updated.

**Jed Babbin**

(b)(2) (home office)  
(b)(2) (home fax)  
(b)(2) (mobile)



(b)(6)

**From:** JedBabbin@**(b)(6)**  
**Sent:** Monday, July 18, 2005 1:28 PM  
**To:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Cc:** **(b)(6)**, CIV, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** Re: USN&WR

Eric: Thanks. I'm doing as much as possible. Hope you liked the TAS column today. Don't have **(b)(6)** set yet, but will soon. Would still like to get Matt **(b)(6)**. Shall I follow up with his office? Best, Jed.

**Jed Babbin**

**(b)(2)** (home office)  
**(b)(2)** (home fax)  
**(b)(2)** (mobile)

(b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Monday, July 18, 2005 9:54 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA  
**Subject:** Babbin

This weeks Spectator (Jed Babbin)

[http://www.spectator.org/dsp\\_article.asp?art\\_id=8447](http://www.spectator.org/dsp_article.asp?art_id=8447)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

*Researcher*  
*Department of Defense*  
*OSD Writers Group, Room (b)(2)*  
*Telephone: (b)(2)*  
*Fax: (b)(2)*

(b)(6)

**From:** JedBabbin@**(b)(6)**  
**Sent:** Monday, July 18, 2005 7:29 AM  
**To:** tmcinerney@**(b)(6)**; paulvalley@**(b)(6)**; nashct@**(b)(6)**; Glenstrae77@**(b)(6)**; BURM41516@**(b)(6)**; **(b)(6)**; CIV, OASD-PA; WSSlinter@**(b)(6)**; roberthscales@**(b)(6)**  
**Subject:** Today's Spectator

At Gitmo last week, I saw some of our best dealing with some of the world's worst.

The American Spectator

Jed Babbin

**(b)(2)** (home office)  
(home fax)  
(mobile)

(b)(6)

**From:** JedBabbin@[b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Sunday, July 17, 2005 12:33 PM  
**To:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Cc:** [b)(6)] CIV, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** USN&WR

This is Monday's Washington Whispers column.

[USNews.com: Washington Whispers \(7/25/05\)](#)

He got one thing wrong: I told him we were told about the medical care, not that we saw anyone getting care.  
We didn't

**Jed Babbin**

[b)(2) (home office)  
[b)(2) (home fax)  
[b)(2) (mobile)

(b)(6)

**From:** JedBabbin@[b](6)  
**Sent:** Friday, July 15, 2005 4:51 PM  
**To:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** Re: Mark Larson - KOGO,

Will do; thanks.

**Jed Babbin**

(b)(2) (home office)  
(home fax)  
(mobile)

(b)(6)

**From:** Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Friday, July 15, 2005 4:50 PM  
**To:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** Re: Mark Larson - KOGO,

We can work it, but I hope you are getting a cut of Babbins action as his agent.

-----  
Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@[\(b\)\(6\)](#)>  
**To:** Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA <Bryan.Whitman@[\(b\)\(6\)](#)>  
**Sent:** Fri Jul 15 16:43:34 2005  
**Subject:** FW: Mark Larson - KOGO,

hey, beach boy, i have replied that waxman will be easier to get. do you want to forward to [\(b\)\(6\)](#) or [\(b\)\(6\)](#) thanks, eric -----Original Message-----

**From:** JedBabbin@[\(b\)\(6\)](#) [mailto:JedBabbin@[\(b\)\(6\)](#)]  
**Sent:** Friday, July 15, 2005 4:34 PM  
**To:** eric.ruff@[\(b\)\(6\)](#)  
**Cc:** [\(b\)\(6\)](#)  
**Subject:** Mark Larson - KOGO,

NEWSRADIO 600 KOGO

Eric: I'm going to sub for Mark Larson on KOGO, San Diego, next Friday, 22 July. The show airs 3-6 EDT.

Is there a way I can get Gen. Jay Hood or [\(b\)\(6\)](#)? Please let me know. Have a great weekend. Best, Jed.

Jed Babbin

[\(b\)\(2\)](#) (home office)  
[\(b\)\(2\)](#) (home fax)  
[\(b\)\(2\)](#) (mobile)

(b)(6)

**From:** JedBabbin@hva  
**Sent:** Friday, July 15, 2005 4:34 PM  
**To:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Cc:** (b)(6), CIV, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** Mark Larson - KOGO,

NEWSRADIO 600 KOGO

Eric: I'm going to sub for Mark Larson on KOGO, San Diego, next Friday, 22 July. The show airs 3-6 EDT.

Is there a way I can get Gen. Jay Hood or (b)(6)? Please let me know. Have a great weekend. Best,  
Jed.

**Jed Babbin**

(b)(2) (home office)  
(b)(2) (home fax)  
(b)(2) (mobile)

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Friday, July 15, 2005 9:47 AM  
**To:** (b)(6); (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** FW: follow up on gitmo trip

gentlemen,  
please see the request below from one of the military analysts who was on the tuesday trip. would you please forward me what you have?  
thanks

(b)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** (b)(6) [mailto:(b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Thursday, July 14, 2005 8:39 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: Affiliations

Hello (b)(6).- Right now I'm working on a major piece for Human Events but expect to writing about the tour elsewhere and on several radio talk shows. I'll keep you posted. But, I need some follow-up materials I requested in Gitmo and was told the PAO could furnish. First, a complete list of all who have toured the facilities/when. I'm primarily interested in press/media. Also, if available, clips of those stories/reports. Thanks. (b)(6)



(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Thursday, July 14, 2005 6:53 PM  
**To:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** Gitmo request

er-  
passing this one along to you. is this something we can work?  
thanks

(b)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Gordon Cucullu [mailto:colonelgordon@(b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Thursday, July 14, 2005 6:04 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Affiliations

Hi, (b)(6)

I asked Dallas about OSD/PA support (in the form of permissive travel, permission to stay at GITMO, permission to interview people there) in order to do a book about the facility, the detainees, the troops, and the future. Paul Vallely will collaborate with me on it. We need your office clearance before attempting the project. I know he and you are busy but if you could let me know if he is at least working the problem it would be helpful. Thanks.

All the best,

Gordon Cucullu

(b)(6)

**From:** JedBabbin@**(b)(6)**  
**Sent:** Thursday, July 14, 2005 1:38 PM  
**To:** **(b)(6)**  
**Cc:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; **(b)(6)** CIV, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** Re: interview with the female ph.d.

Many thanks. Standing by. Best, Jed.

**Jed Babbin**

**(b)(2)** (home office)  
(home fax)  
(mobile)

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) COL (L) (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, July 14, 2005 1:19 PM  
**To:** 'JedBabbin@(b)(6)'; (b)(6) COL (L)  
**Cc:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** RE: interview with the female ph.d.

Mr. Babbin,

I am in the process of coordinating an interview for you. I have emailed your request and are awaiting for reply on how we can best accommodate you. I will let you know as soon as I hear. Thanks!

(b)(6)

**COL Brad K Blackner**  
**Director of Public Affairs**  
**Joint Task Force Guantanamo**  
**Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**  
**blacknerbk@(b)(6)**  
**off.(b)(2)**

-----Original Message-----

**From:** JedBabbin@(b)(6) [mailto:JedBabbin@(b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Thursday, July 14, 2005 1:20 PM  
**To:** blacknerbk@(b)(6)  
**Cc:** eric.ruff@(b)(6); (b)(6)  
**Subject:** interview with the female ph.d.

Dear Col. Blackner: At Eric Ruff's suggestion, I'm contacting you directly to request a phone interview asap (lasting no more than 15-20 mins) with the lady in question. I met her while at Gitmo Tuesday, and was enormously impressed. I understand, and agree, to not use her name or voice in any way.

By way of introduction, I enclose my bio. I make this request in my status as a contributing editor of The American Spectator magazine. You can read my weekly columns there at [www.spectator.org](http://www.spectator.org).

I want "mom" to talk about some of the things we discussed while there: how detainees react differently to different people, the need for patience in the interviews, how dedicated to terrorism and violence these people are, that many have said that when released they will go back to terrorism, that they believe we will release them and they can wait us out, and so forth. And anything else she thinks should be understood by the public.

I will, from this interview, write a feature article for The American Spectator Magazine that will appear in September. My deadline (as nuts as it is) is 17 July. Please let me know as soon as you can if and when we can do this. Best, Jed.

**Jed Babbin**

(b)(2) (home office)

(b)(2)

(home fax)  
(mobile)

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6), CIV, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Thursday, July 14, 2005 1:24 PM  
**To:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** FW: Affiliations

don't feel comfortable giving it to him unless you say it's ok. if not, i'll have jed email you and col. blackner the thank you note to pass along to gen. hood. but, if you say it's ok, i'll give it to him.

thanks

(b)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** JedBabbin@ (b)(5) [mailto:JedBabbin@ (b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Thursday, July 14, 2005 1:20 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: Affiliations

BTW, may I get Gen. Hood's e-mail? I'll be good, just want to send him a thank you note.

**Jed Babbin**

(b)(2) (home office)  
(b)(2) (home fax)  
(b)(2) (mobile)

(b)(6)

**From:** JedBabbin@[b](6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, July 14, 2005 1:20 PM  
**To:** blacknerbk@[b](6)  
**Cc:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; [b](6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** interview with the female ph.d.

**Attachments:** jlbjournres.doc



jlbjournres.doc (21  
KB)

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**Jed Babbin**

(b)(2) (home office)  
(b)(2) (home fax)  
(b)(2) (mobile)

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Thursday, July 14, 2005 12:54 PM  
**To:** Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CAPT, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Maj, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LtCdr, OASD-PA; (b)(6) AFIS, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** Craddock military analyst transcript attached  
**Attachments:** 07-13-05 Craddock, Schmidt, Furlow GTMO FBI.doc

Attached is the transcript from the military analyst call yesterday with Craddock, Schmidt and Furlow.



07-13-05 Craddock,  
Schmidt, Fu...

(b)(6)

**From:** JedBabbin@[b](6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, July 14, 2005 7:57 AM  
**To:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Cc:** [b](6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** Feedback

There will be a good item in next week's US News & World Report (Washington Whispers column) about Gitmo and the detainees' food.

Did 7 radio hits on Gitmo yesterday, more coming today.

**Jed Babbin**

(b)(2) (home office)  
(home fax)  
(mobile)



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## Jed L. Babbin

Jed Babbin is the best-selling author of, "*Inside the Asylum: Why the UN and Old Europe are Worse than You Think*" (Regnery 2004). He is a former Air Force officer who served as a deputy undersecretary in the first Bush administration (1990-1991).

Mr. Babbin writes regularly for *National Review Online* and for the *American Spectator Magazine*. His weekly column, "Loose Canons", appears in *The American Spectator Online*. Mr. Babbin's expertise is in national security and foreign affairs. However, he also writes about legal matters and for *The American Spectator's* "Saloon" series on subjects such as single barrel bourbon and fine cigars. He also wrote the military adventure novel, *Legacy of Valor*. (Pentland Press, 2000).

Mr. Babbin is a military analyst and appears frequently on the Fox News Channel and MSNBC, on shows such as "The O'Reilly Factor", "Hardball with Chris Matthews", "Scarborough Country" and many others.

For about four years, Babbin served as designated guest host of Oliver North's "Common Sense Radio" when Col. North was unavailable. During the Iraq military campaign in 2003, Babbin subbed for North for nine weeks straight. Since then, Babbin has also subbed for Laura Ingraham and Greg Garrison, and now often serves as guest host on several shows for WMET AM1160 Talk Radio in Washington, DC.

Mr. Babbin is a graduate of Stevens Institute of Technology (B.E. 1970), Cumberland School of Law (J.D. 1973) and the Georgetown University Law School (LL.M. 1978).

Military Analysts Conference Call  
Wednesday, July 13, 2005, Room 2E572 The Pentagon  
Host: Ms. Allison Barber  
Briefers: Gen. Bantz John Craddock, Lt. Gen. Randall Mark Schmidt, BG Gen. John T. Furlow  
Subject: FBI allegations of abuse at GTMO  
ON BACKGROUND

Ms. Barber: Hi, it's Allison Barber, Department of Defense. Thank you for joining us today for the call. We're going to open it up with General Craddock who will make some opening remarks, and then General Schmidt will give us a briefing on the findings. And then we'll turn it back over to General Craddock to talk about the results of that and our actions and then we'll open it up for questions.

Just as a reminder, this is on background. We're also joined by General Furlow. We'll be happy to take your calls after we go through the opening remarks. So with that, General Craddock, thank you for joining us today.

Craddock: Thank you Allison. I appreciate it. I am going to give you a truncated version of what we used this morning in the SASC (Senate Armed Services Committee) hearing, with a little background, and I'll turn it over to Mark Schmidt, and he'll talk about his findings, recommendations, and I'll close with my decision on those recommendations.

The allegations in the FBI emails came to light as a result of a FOIA request last year, late in the year. After review of the emails, following their release – I believe it was in December – I determined that the allegations merited a detailed examination in order to establish the truth, and ascertain what, if any, actions needed to be taken.

So I ordered a 15-6, Army Regulation 15-6 investigation, and appointed Brigadier General John Furlow, who is the deputy commander for U.S. Army South, my component command for the Army, as the investigating officer. I told John to address eight allegations that were drawn from the FBI emails. I will not articulate each of them. If there's questions later on, I can do that.

Subsequent to that initial appointment of Furlow, I directed John to investigate two additional allegations that came up and were brought to light. One concerned a female military interrogator allegedly performing a lap dance on a detainee. Second was the use of red ink as fake menstrual blood during an interrogation.

Now those allegations came from a separate document. In my instructions to John Furlow, I did not limit him to just those allegations. I gave him the flexibility to bring into his investigation any additional allegations of detainee abuse that he might discover during the course of his work.

Now on 28 February, 2005, after two months of investigation, John advised me that he needed to interview officers who were senior in rank to him. As a result of that, I

appointed Lieutenant General Mark Schmidt, who is the commander of my Air Force component command, AFSouth, and 12 Air Force, as the senior investigating officer. Then, Generals Schmidt and Furlow conducted their investigation. They are here with me today. They are going to brief you as soon as I finish with this opening. Their report reflects the combined findings and conclusions of the initial effort that Furlow did, and the combined investigative efforts that they both did.

General Schmidt submitted his initial report to me on the first of April this year. After a review, I directed on the 5th of May the investigation be reopened to consider two memos from the December 2004 time frame that had been recently discovered. And they were with regard to a special interrogation plan on a detainee.

While the team was completing that additional task, I further directed on the 2nd of June that General Schmidt address a second set of new allegations made by a detainee that also concerned a special interrogation plan. General Schmidt completed his investigation on the 9th of June, and my staff judge advocate began a legal review of the report. I have completed my review, taken my actions with regard to the findings and recommendations. I will inform you of those actions after Mark Schmidt and John Furlow brief you on their investigations and findings. So I'll turn it over to Mark.

Schmidt: Thank you, sir. Lieutenant General Mark Schmidt. I am going to go through the scope of this review and try to give, as General Craddock did, a truncated version of the briefing.

The investigation was directed and accomplished under the informal procedures provisions of that regulation, AR 15-6. And the AR 15-6 investigation centered on FBI alleged abuses occurring during interrogation operations. The team found incidents of abuse during detention operations, all of which were appropriately addressed by the command.

The team conducted a comprehensive review of thousands of documents and statements<sup>1</sup> pertaining to any allegations of abuse occurring at Guantanamo, to include the complete medical records of the subjects of what we call the first and second special interrogation plans.

The team interviewed 30 FBI agents, conducted interviews of over 100 personnel, had access to hundreds of interviews conducted by several recent investigations. These interviews included personnel assigned to Guantanamo, U.S. Southern Command, Office of the Secretary of Defense, all during the tenure of JTFs 160, 170 and currently Guantanamo. It included 76 DoD personnel, to include every general officer who commanded the Joint Task Force 160, 170 and Guantanamo. Additionally, we considered abuse allegations made by two high-value detainees themselves.

The investigation team attempted to determine if these allegations in fact occurred, those allegations made by the FBI. During the course of a follow-up investigation, the AR 15-6 also considered allegations raised specifically by the detainees who were the subject of

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The investigation team attempted to determine if these allegations in fact occurred, those allegations made by the FBI. During the course of a follow-up investigation, the AR 15-6 also considered allegations raised specifically by the detainees who were the subject of

those two special interrogation plans. The investigating team applied a preponderance standard of proof consistent with the guidance contained in the Army Regulation 15-6. Much of the testimony was obtained from witnesses who had served as much as three years earlier, and sometimes for 45 days or less. Civilian witnesses were not required to cooperate, nor under subpoena to answer questions.

The team also applied guidance contained in that regulation, Commander U.S. SOUTHCOM and Secretary of Defense memorandums authorizing special interrogation techniques if deciding if a particular interrogation approach fell properly within an authorized technique.

In those cases in which the team concluded that the allegation had in fact occurred, the team then considered whether the incident was in compliance with interrogation techniques that were approved either at the time of the incident or subsequent to the incident.

In those cases where it was determined that the allegation occurred to not have been an authorized technique, the team then reviewed whether disciplinary action had already been taken and the propriety of that action.

On the 28th of March, General Craddock asked me to determine accountability for those substantiated violations that had no command action taken.

We did not review the legal validity of the various interrogation techniques outlined in Army Field Manual 34-52, or those approved by the Secretary of Defense.

I'd like to cover the summary of findings.

There were nine FBI allegations. Two were unsubstantiated. Two were never authorized, and corrective action was taken on those. And there were five that were authorized.

The detention and interrogation operations at JTF-Guantanamo cover a three-year period and over 24,000 interrogations. This investigation found only three interrogation acts to be conducted in violation of interrogation techniques authorized by the Field Manual 34-52 and DoD guidance. And I will cover those three.

The first one – on at least two occasions between February 2002 and February 2003 two detainees were short shackled to the eye bolt on the floor of the interrogation room. And that was an FBI allegation.

Secondly, some time in October 2002, duct tape was used to quiet a detainee. Also an FBI allegation.

Three – military interrogators threatened the subject of the second special interrogation and his family, and that was discovered; that was not part of an FBI allegation.

The inspection team also found that the commander of JTF-Guantanamo failed to monitor the interrogation of one high-value detainee, that is ISN-063. The team found that the individual interrogation techniques, while authorized, resulted in the persistent, cumulative effect of being degrading and abusive treatment.

Finally, the investigation found that the communication of a threat to the second high-value detainee was in violation of SecDef guidance and the UCMJ.

The team found no evidence of torture or inhumane treatment at JTF Guantanamo.

Again, the investigation focused on FBI allegations on aggressive interrogation tactics. That was our focus.

General Craddock?

Craddock: Thanks, Mark. Under Army Regulation 15-6, as the appointing authority for the investigation, my responsibility was to review the report and take action on the findings and recommendations. In taking my action, I accepted or approved all the numbered findings and recommendations included in the written report which was provided to the Committee this morning both in, I believe, unclass and classified format, except for two recommendations that I did not approve.

First, I disapproved recommendation No. 16 which was that Major General (Geoffrey) Miller be held accountable for failing to supervise the interrogation of ISN-063 and that he be admonished for that failure.

Now, in accordance with current procedures and regulations, I forwarded this report to the Department of the Army Inspector General for review and action as he deems appropriate. Even though I disapproved it, under Army regulations any allegation of wrongdoing must be forwarded to the Army IG for information and action as he deems appropriate. And as a Combatant Commander, I could not admonish someone not under my command at this time anyway.

Secondly, I modified recommendation No. 22 to request that the Naval Criminal Investigative Service conduct further investigation into the threat communicated by an interrogator to a particular high-value detainee before forwarding the matter to the current commander of that interrogator for action.

The interrogator admitted communicating a threat, but in his statement he said he believed he had authority to do so because he had asked his servicing staff judge advocate and his supervisor. The interviews with those two individuals were inconclusive with regards to that statement; therefore, rather than sending to the commander that interrogator, I have directed a criminal investigative -- investigation be done, then results of that provided to the Navy commander.

I will now explain the rationale for my decisions. My reason for disapproving recommendation 16 to hold General Miller accountable is that the interrogation of ISN-063 did not result in any violation of any U.S. law or policy and that the degree of supervision provided by General Miller does not warrant admonishment under the circumstances.

As the commander, even in the early days of his assignment, General Miller was responsible for the conduct of his subordinates. However, as all commanders must do to an extent that THEY determine appropriate, General Miller relied on the judgment and experience of his people to carry out their duties in a manner that was both professional and authorized. The evidence shows that he was not misguided in this trust, since there was no finding that U.S. law or policy was violated.

General Miller did supervise the interrogation in that he was aware of the most serious aspects of ISN-063's interrogation -- the length of interrogation sessions, the number of days over which it was conducted, and the length of segregation from other detainees. The evidence does show that General Miller was NOT aware of certain other aspects of the interrogation. However, since there was no finding that U.S. law or policy was violated, there is nothing for which to hold him accountable concerning the interrogation of 063. Therefore, under the circumstances, I do not believe that those aspects of which he was not aware warrant disciplinary actions.

Again, of particular importance to my decision is the fact that there was no finding that the interrogation of 063, albeit characterized as creative, aggressive and persistent, violated U.S. law or policy.

With regard to the rationale for No. 22, again, I believe that further investigation by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service may discover evidence in mitigation and extenuation that should be considered in determining whether disciplinary action is appropriate for the interrogator.

Finally, of the recommendations I approved, recommendations 23 through 27 are not within my authority to implement. Therefore, I forwarded those to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for detainee affairs for review and action as he deems appropriate.

If you are not aware or informed of all these findings and recommendations as they are listed numerically, we can provide that. Dave, you've got that and we can get that out to you. And that concludes my statement.

Ms. Barber: And with that, we'll take your questions.

Mr. Maginnis: General Craddock, Bob Maginnis. You are running a great program down at Guantanamo, and I was down there with the group that went down on the 24th, so I can't say anything bad about what I saw; I thought it was great.

Question with regard to the female allegation of a lap dance and red ink fake menstrual blood. Can you respond to that?

Craddock: Let me turn that over to Mark or John because they've got the details on that in their report.

Schmidt: The substantiated – ah, first of all the lap dance was not substantiated. We could find no evidence, through any witness, that there was ever a lap dance. There was, however, multiple instances of gender coercion where a female would invade the personal space of the detainee, to include touching him, straddling him without putting weight on him, running her fingers through his hair, touching his arm with perfume, and that sort of thing. But no lap dance.

The incident concerning the fake menstrual blood. That incident was not authorized. The occurrence happened while the female interrogator was interrogating this high-value detainee. He spit in her face. She left the room – she was fairly distressed. While she was out of the room she took a marking pen, marked it on her hand – red – went back in the room, approached the detainee, touched his face, or, shoulders, told him that that was menstrual blood and that she was menstruating, and that 'What do you think of that?' and of course he went nuts. Then she left the room. That was an act of revenge; she lost control, lost control of the environment. She was admonished. She was taken off of interrogation duty, retrained, and eventually returned after about 30 days. So that was corrected when it happened. But it was an incident that was reported.

Mr. Sheppard: General Schmidt, Don Sheppard.

Schmidt: Hey Don.

Mr. Sheppard: Much has been made in the media about confusion over changing rules, what's to be done, et cetera, between Afghanistan, Iraq, Guantanamo. Did you find that to be the case? Or were the people clear on what they could do at all times?

Schmidt: I will tell you, Don – first of all, Guantanamo Bay is a separate, closed-loop detention interrogation operation. The connection between any other operation really begins to open up a basket of worms and it does not pertain.

At Guantanamo the rules changed when they had these resistance trained – particularly one high-value – ISN-063 – high-value detainee-- that was resistance trained and they were getting nowhere with him. And they thought, and later proved to be fairly accurate, that he had valuable information on the Global War on Terror.

The Joint Task Force requested additional interrogation techniques from a higher authority, and they went up through the Office of the Secretary of Defense. They did receive that authority on the 2nd of December 03 (*sic*, 2002, see below with Craddock) to open up the envelope a little bit with more aggressive techniques.



Now the techniques at that level look fairly benign. The problem that I encountered was they get down to the application of those techniques, the supervision and the supervisory chain of how you translate a futility technique down to what happens in the interrogation room is where the issues we had sort of resided. And I did find that there was abusive and degrading techniques applied. So that was the problem. However, the authorities to open up interrogation techniques in response to Guantanamo, and it did not mean it went anywhere else, Guantanamo under the closed crucible of the controls they have down there were approved on the 2nd of December. They were rescinded on the 15th of January. A new set came out on the 16th of January through 16 April, and on the 16th of April another set came down that sort of resolved it all and for the 16th of April, that's what's in place right now. And the Field Manual 34-52 is kind of provided as a guide for interrogators. So it changed, but it was not an out-of-control process, and it wasn't a wild bunch of ideas coming from OSD or anything either. So it was fairly controlled.

Craddock: This is John Craddock. Let me just amplify, Don. I think Mark said approved December 2, 2003. It's important. It's actually December 2, 2002.

Schmidt: I'm sorry. I'm sorry. Two thousand two.

Craddock: But it's important from the perspective of 14 months after 9-11. Look, they found out about end of summer, August – July, August, fingerprint matched up, Khatani, who he really was, 20th hijacker. And there was a lot of angst. And they said this guy has resisted interrogation techniques from the FBI for eight months; we think he's got information on al Qaeda. If he's the 20th hijacker he's in the know; we have to find out what he knows. I think the angst, the tension, the anxiety that another attack was going to happen – and we still believe it is, it's a matter of when – was greater then. And the notion was, we have to do something to get inside his head to find out what it is. That's the genesis of these interrogation techniques.

Part two. The techniques still approved on 2 December are largely derived from 34-52. Ego down, futility. Those techniques are a broad banner. And as Mark said, in the application developed by the JTF-GTMO interrogation teams becomes where they actually then determine what they are going to do in that interrogation booth.

(Sheppard?) Follow up here. One of the obvious questions we're going to be asked is, OK, so things changed and aggressive – can you characterize a little for us or could you give us something that we can use to characterize what changed, without revealing specific techniques?

Craddock: Well I think probably techniques are in the open press now. Go ahead Mark.

Schmidt: Yeah, they are. Let me try to give you an example. I put two examples when we did our testimony. The first one was, for instance, the field manual has – 34-52 -- has an example of futility.

What that means at that level – that broad topic – the interrogator convinces the source that resistance to questioning is futile. Then that goes down through a process. If that technique is chosen by the JTF to be used against a particular detainee, then there's an interrogator, typically an NCO, constructs a written interrogation plan. That plan now is vetted through a team chief or intelligence control element supervisor – that means it's either an O-5 or a DIA GG14 level -- then that's approved or not – adjusted – then an interrogation is conducted with a translator with this NCO, and possibly with another analyst.

What that meant down in the application at Guantanamo – remember, the application is futility, convince the source that resistance to questioning is futile --- that translates into tell the detainee about how al Qaeda's falling apart; everyone's been killed or captured, and we know a lot about this individual.

But it also translates to gender coercion via some domination. It's futile. I'm a female; I'm in your face; you can do nothing about it. Start talking to us.

He was straddled, massaged, touched, that sort of thing. It could be as non-injurious type of touching.

Another example is ego down. And this is the one where we start seeing a different sort of thing, and it gets into possible sexual humiliation. Ego down, that's an approach based on attacking the source's sense of personal worth. Goes through the same process. That NCO, written plan, vets it through the O-5 level, GG14 level, and then conducts the interrogation with translator.

In GTMO, that ego down translated down to telling the detainee that his mother and sister were whores, he was forced to wear women's lingerie, multiple allegations of his homosexuality, he was forced to dance with a male interrogator, he was strip searched for control measures, and he was forced to perform dog tricks on a leash.

Now, the basic line there -- you say that sounds, you know, like I did – that sounds like degrading. Well, we said yes, it could be. The basic line though in the charter for those interrogators was humane treatment. And humane treatment is spelled out by the President. It's a safe, secure environment that provides medical care, food, water, and the basics of that person's security. Not this. Was this person injured, harmed? No. Were they denied any medical care, anything? No. So there was a line there with don't cross the line between inhumane, and that's where it went, Don.

So, those are some processes we kind of had to wrestle with.

Mr. Babbin: Jed Babbin for General Craddock. General, we see General Miller's name having popped up before, and I know exactly what's going to be in the New York Times tomorrow, or CBS News tonight. You know, they reprimanded Janice Karpinski, even though Miller had been at some point at Abu Ghraib and had helped developed interrogation techniques, now again, at GTMO. I understand your good answer about the

fact that, you know, what happened at GTMO didn't violate law or policy. But we are going to be bombarded tomorrow about why Miller wasn't admonished.

Second question. I was at GTMO yesterday and I saw a really very good operation, and I have no reason to think that anything like this would ever happen at that point down there now, and I would like to have your view on that.

But first, Karpinski versus Miller, please.

Craddock: I can't make a comparison with Karpinski and Miller. I only dealt with this situation, with Miller, at GTMO. And I am not read into the situation with Karpinski. The fact is that this special interrogation plan was developed in advance of Geoff Miller showing up. He walked in to GTMO early November. It was approved and went into place the end of that month. He did not develop it. It was in staffing; it left, I believe it left GTMO the 11th of October, got up to SOUTHCOM, SOUTHCOM forwarded it, then later on it was, you know, worked over and staffed in the Pentagon. So he walked in and what he had to do was one, understand what's going on down there.

He was told 'take these two task forces,' one JTF-160 and the other JTF-170; one dealing with detainee operations, the other with intelligence collection, put them into one, meld them into a common operating environment that is compatible, and that they are integrated and fully functioning together.

That kind of translated, based on some of the folks that my investigators talked to, is bring order out of chaos. Secondly, while you're there, coordinate the inter-agency. Let's get all of the inter-agency folks represented down there on board and let's pull together, instead of pulling apart. Third, take a look at the facilities for the detainees and let's see what needs to be done and enhance those. And also, last but not least, we want you to enhance and improve the quality of life for our servicemembers down there, commensurate with what they would expect to have back at their bases, camps, posts and installations in the States. So he had a lot of things he had to do.

My point to you is a difference between the investigators and myself on the degree of supervision required. He did know certain things that I felt that were important that he knew about that investigation, but he did not know everything about what was going on.

If a commander is required to know everything about what is going on in a unit where there is no violation of law, policy or regulation, I am afraid that he is unable to command. So that's the point - and the other thing, keep in mind only one SIP ever implemented, this one, he walked into it essentially in progress.

Babbin: Good. And I appreciate that. And I suspect that what I am going to answer, at the risk of belaboring the point, is you know, your point about the fact that law and policy was not violated I think is the most compelling one and that, you know, that's the difference between Abu Ghraib and here. Second point though, sir, what assurance would you say, what would you give us in terms of what we saw yesterday? We saw a lot of

things including all of the camps, including some of the ongoing interrogations, we had a chance to observe briefly. Do you have confidence that what's going on down there right now is all in accordance with law and policy as well as it should be?

Craddock. Absolutely. Look, we're a learning organization – the military is. We learn. There were extraordinary requirements and needs on that SIP based up on the notion, the belief that the 20th hijacker had some information we needed to get. We had him a long time. What was cooking we needed to know.

Now, what we have done is we've got new guidelines, the 16 April memo, they're in place. We understand, we know, that over time building reproachment and rapport with these detainees and then getting information from them is a better way to go. And generally speaking, with this population that's what we've done. We've gotten some successes with that, as you were down there, I am sure you heard. And I am confident in the professionalism of all of JTF-GTMO. I mean that is a very, very well run organization.

Mr. Babb: Excellent, thank you.

Mr. Valley: Paul Valley. One last question. You know with all of the things that have come about in the (inaudible) down there, do we really provide enough flexibility now on interrogation techniques that we can really get the information from all of these people which is so vital?

Craddock: Good question. I would tell you that based upon the procedures in place, there are four techniques that if we feel like we need to use have to be advance notification to the SecDef. There is also guidance that if any of those, or all of those, we believe competent authority – and that's the joint interrogation group chief, and the JTF-GTMO would request it of me -- if we believe that we have a situation that we have someone that is nonresponsive to the current techniques over time that there are processes whereby they can request specialized techniques.

So I think the safeguards in place are adequate. I think that the interrogation techniques are working. But I also know that if a peculiar situation arises, we have avenues to address that.

Mr. Valley: Great. Thank you.

Mr. McCausland: Sir, this is Jeff McCausland. First of all, I'd like to say I'm delighted that Jed knows what CBS is going to do, because I work for them and hell, I don't know what they're going to do (laughter).

But having said that, sir, first of all I would like to say I was also down in Guantanamo yesterday and as an old soldier, I've got to say that's one of the most professional, well-disciplined, highly motivated, well-led units I have had the pleasure to visit, and they should be commended. Jay Hood and his sergeant major and his guys are just doing a bang-up job under pretty tough conditions.

I do have two questions for you, and I think it's kind of a follow-up from Jed's and that is, the question of accountability and will be one we're going to be beat up on. And you've answered that with respect to General Miller quite adequately. But in terms of any other accountability action taken against any other soldier or for that matter any other FBI or any other civilian involved in interrogation, from what I've heard, the only person I've heard who any action was taken against was the one female interrogator who you rightfully described as having lost control, and therefore was removed, retrained for her actions. And that's perfectly appropriate. But, were there any other, based on what was discovered, any other actions of accountability, be it admonishment, be it reprimand, be it Article 15, UCMJ, any other action taken as part and parcel of this investigation?

And second of all, I'd just like your reaction as the regional component commander down there, about this idea now that having done all this is what we really need is a national commission to continue these types of investigations?

Craddock: Let me turn it over to John Furlow to address the first question about accountability.

Furlow: Let me first start off with the duct tape. The duct tape was an incident that's contained in the report where it got out of control and they ended up duct taping up a detainee's head. And, obviously, went beyond the limits of what we expected. And the interrogator was brought up and given an oral reprimand. And we're in the process of sending a form on to his current supervisor to make that a little bit more official.

On the interrogation side, whenever an incident would come up, it was addressed by the chain of command, it was documented and they moved on with business. On the detention side, same type of deal. If an individual was determined to exhibit misconduct, he would receive the punishment that was due to fit the crime, and they moved on. As in any type of military organization there is, you know, dealings that the supervision and the leadership has to deal with. But those are the main things; there's accountability there. As you mentioned, you talked to the sergeant major, the command sergeant major and Staff Sergeant Major Mendez who runs the detention center runs and leads and supervises a very active NCO chain and keeps the soldiers informed and accountable for their actions on a daily basis, despite the fact that they are in a very arduous task and the fact that they are often insulted on a daily basis. They are cussed at; they are threatened; they have feces and urine thrown on them; I mean they are doing a great job down there. And so for the accountability, the leadership there, especially at the middle management, is obviously commendable. And I think you folks saw that.

Craddock: John Craddock. Let me amplify that real quick. On the recommendations from the investigators, one was the duct tape issue. The recommendation is that the individual who told the guard to do that was admonished, but that's not adequate. I agreed. I have sent that recommendation to the director of the Joint Staff to forward to the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency because that individual worked for him for reprimand.

Secondly. I think there was another one there concerning the death threat that was issued to a detainee. What I understood of the situation there was that the interrogator thought he had top cover; he said he did; the two individuals he thought he got it from, when – when we interviewed initially and then went back a second time they refused to talk. I am not convinced, I am skeptical that he acted on his own, so I said let's refer that, and I've sent it to Naval Criminal Investigative Service for a criminal investigation to compel those individuals to talk to the criminal investigators since they wouldn't talk to my informal investigators under 15-6.

Second part. The commission issue. The national commission. Some of the recommendations were we need to clarify procedures, how we coordinate with the interagency, at what point do the combined effects of interrogation applications cross the line into abusive or degrading treatment? I agreed with those, and I approved those. I don't know how to go about that. I sent those recommendations that I approved to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs, Matt Waxman, and said, 'here they are, I recommend approval, I've approved them, I recommend that you initiate them.' Then Matt, ASD Detainee Affairs, will deal with it through the Policy OSD channel.

I am skeptical, concerned that a national commission – look, I don't know that that's the right way; I don't know that it's the wrong way. But whatever we do ought to be sooner rather than later, if we're going to do it, and it ought to be focused on the future, not the past. We ought not to go back and headhunt, and try to hold people accountable when all these investigations have done that, and folks, to a great extent, it ain't there in my judgment. What we need is we need guidance for the future that commanders can use either specifically or generally so that without guidance they use their best military judgment and then later on are held accountable or questioned for it because it's not in agreement with someone's perception of what's right and wrong.

Now, I'm off my soapbox.

Ms. Barber: And with that, General Craddock's got a busy schedule today, so we're going to wrap it up. We do have a briefing that we can send to you, that Tara (Jones) will email to you.

Craddock: And a paper that shows you all the findings, recommendations, and the numbering system.

Mr. Babbin: Allison, is there any way that we can get the unclass version of the report itself?

Ms. Barber: Yes, we're going to send that to you Jed.

Voice: What were the dates of the alleged abuses that they covered? Can you give that real quick? The time period.

Furlow: This is John Furlow here. Primarily the window of the FBI emails and such started somewhere around August, September 02 and ran to about the end first calendar quarter 2003. Now I say that kind of tentatively because when we started off the investigation we were only able to nail down some of these allegations and events to months, rather than specific date-time groups. So that was one of the things that we had a problem with in going back into a – two, three years into the past. What we would do is visit with an individual that was down there on a 45-day tour. They knew it happened while they were down there 45 days. And what sometimes we ended up getting (was) it was toward the front or toward the back of their 45-day tour.

Craddock: Yeah, this is – let me give you one alibi. John Craddock. The difference between Miller and Karpinski. Karpinski's situation – the guards maltreated detainees, so there was a violation of law. Not true with Miller. It was a lawful interrogation. That's the difference.

Ms. Barber: Thanks so much for the time on the call. If you have additional questions you can zap those off to Tara; we'll get answers for you, and we'll send you the briefings and the papers. General Craddock, General Schmidt and General Furlow, thank you for your time today as well.

Craddock: Thank you, Allison.

Call ends:

Furlow: Now one thing (he?) just told me, the end date was really like August 03.

Craddock: 03, yes.

Voice: It's in the report.

(b)(6)

**From:** Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Wednesday, July 13, 2005 2:51 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA  
**Cc:** Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; (b)(6), Maj, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** Re: craddock call

Great.

-----  
Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

**From:** (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA (b)(6)  
**To:** Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA <Allison.Barber@(b)(6)>; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@(b)(6)>; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA <Bryan.Whitman@(b)(6)>  
**CC:** Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA <Dallas.Lawrence@(b)(6)>; (b)(6), Maj, OASD-PA <(b)(6)>  
**Sent:** Wed Jul 13 14:50:17 2005  
**Subject:** craddock call

the analysts are ready to go at 3:30. we are waiting for confirmation from craddock's folks, but unless the analysts hear from me again, they will call in.

here is the list of those planning to be on the call:

Colonel Carl Kenneth Allard	(USA, Retired)
Mr. Jed Babbitt	(USAF, JAG)
Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Cucullu	(USA, Retired)
Colonel (Tim) J. Eads	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Rick Francona	(USAF, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis	(USA, Retired)
Colonel Jeff McCausland	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney	(USAF, Retired) - tentative
Captain Chuck Nash	(USN, Retired)
General Joseph Ralston	(USAF, Retired)
Lieutenant General Erv Rokke	(USAF, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Carlton Sherwood	(USMC, Retired)

a couple of them are asking for the report. can we send it to them?  
thanks.

(b)



(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Wednesday, July 13, 2005 2:50 PM  
**To:** Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA  
**Cc:** Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Maj, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** craddock call

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Lieutenant Colonel Carlton Sherwood	(USMC, Retired)

a couple of them are asking for the report. can we send it to them?  
thanks.

(b)

(b)(6)

**From:** JedBabbin@**(b)(6)**  
**Sent:** Wednesday, July 13, 2005 11:35 AM  
**To:** tmcinerney@**(b)(6)**; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; bill\_cowan@**(b)(6)**;  
mccausj@**(b)(6)**; mnardotti@**(b)(6)**; nashct@**(b)(6)**;  
Scasherwood@**(b)(6)**  
**Cc:** **(b)(6)** CIV, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** Re: gtmo visit

Let me add my thanks to **(b)(6)**. And **(b)(6)** all. Thanks.

**Jed Babbin**

**(b)(2)** (home office)  
**(b)(2)** (home fax)  
**(b)(2)** (mobile)

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Monday, July 11, 2005 11:05 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA  
**Subject:** Jed Babbin's Article (London Bombings)

[http://www.spectator.org/dsp\\_article.asp?art\\_id=8413](http://www.spectator.org/dsp_article.asp?art_id=8413)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

*Researcher*  
*Department of Defense*  
*OSD Writers Group, Room (b)(2)*  
*Telephone: (b)(2)*  
*Fax: (b)(2)*

## Deadly Tolerance

By Jed Babbin

Published 7/11/2005 12:08:43 AM

Two features dominate our thinking about terrorism at home. We are, first, complacent. Nothing has happened since 9-11, and we have begun to believe that nothing ever will. Grimly tolerant of what passes for security at airports and train stations, we are -- second -- annoyed at the thought that more and different security measures may be needed. The London bombings last Thursday, the Brits' reaction to them, and the revelations of how the problem has been building there are highly instructive. Or will be if we look at the unvarnished facts.

What happened in London last week could happen here today, and will -- in one form or another -- all too soon. We can, and must, do more to control our borders, but the sad fact is that -- like Britain -- the people who are intent on conducting such attacks are here already, and are allowed too much support from too many quarters in America, as well as abroad. Just like those who struck London, and apparently are still at large to strike again.

The Brit reaction was, on one hand, all stiff upper lip and, on the other, unrestrained irresponsibility. Those whose voices count -- such as Tory MP John Redwood and historian Paul Johnson -- were adamant in condemning the terrorists and compassionate in mourning the dead. Johnson, in particular, almost scoffed at the idea that such small attacks were going to change British policy. Those who have to call the TV bookers to get attention, such as former Labourite Tony Benn, were unrestrained in moral equivalence and "give peace a chance" cant. It was too much for

even his BBC interviewer. Benn went so far as to equate the people killed in London with those "innocents" we'd killed in Fallujah. Tell it to the Marines, Mr. Benn.

The surprising element in this was Redwood's reflexive hope that there would be no backlash against the Muslim community. Redwood, who is one of the best thinkers on the Tory side, said it almost in passing. His sentiment is rightly placed. But it masks a real problem that we and Britain face. No one should want to oppress any minority. No one -- here or in Britain -- wants to say that all Muslims are responsible for the acts of the terrorists. That's fine, as far as it goes. But we have to go much farther.

It matters not whether the terrorists are Muslim, Christian, Jewish, Buddhist, or American Indian snake dancers. It is sufficient that they are an identifiable group dedicated to the destruction of our freedom. Religion is a factor in this war only to the extent that it helps us identify and defeat the enemy.

IT'S PROPER TO BE CONCERNED about oppression of minorities, but this concern has so governed British self-defense over the past decade or more that London is now the hottest of terrorist hotbeds in Europe. Tolerance is one hallmark of democracy. But when it is given importance beyond its proper measure, it becomes a recipe for national suicide.

According to a newly leaked Brit intelligence dossier, al Qaeda's recruitment of terrorists is well organized and successful on British campuses. The al-Q recruiters are focused on the affluent Muslims who should be among the best assimilated in British society. But, according to the report, entitled "Young Muslims and Extremism," up to 1% -- some 16,000 British Muslims -- are actively engaged in terrorist activity in Britain and abroad. Couple that with the statement of Lord Stevens, the former London police chief, who said that up to 3,000 British-born or British-based people have passed through bin Laden's terrorist training camps, and you get some idea of how Britain has allowed itself -- by lax immigration policies, political sensitivity, and all the rest in the name of "tolerance" -- to become a terrorist haven.

It's probably not that bad in the United States, but if the al-Q recruiters, the radical imams in mosques and the other terrorist sympathizers here aren't watched and -- when they break the law arrested and imprisoned -- we will have the same problem Britain has. Is this a condemnation of Islam? No. It's only a recognition of reality that should be characteristic of American political speech. Instead, we have the Durbin-Kennedy Deanocrats hammering our soldiers and aiding the enemy.

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the al Qaeda chief in Iraq, sent a thank you note to the Dick Durbins and Ted Kennedys of Congress in a message to his followers and sympathizers on July 5. According to an unreleased translation read to me by a Defense Department source, Zarqawi's message exhorted his terrorists to greater effort, because, Zarqawi said, it is very clear that America was being defeated in Iraq.

Zarqawi's proof? His message said that the proof that America is losing is that some American congressmen are saying just that.

IT IS ESSENTIAL TO THE war that our enemy has no reason to doubt our resolve. Winston Churchill knew that. His ringing speeches, throughout the war, and especially in its darkest hours, were literally the fuel that propelled British courage when everyone, including many of his closest advisers, thought all was lost. When Dick Durbin compared our people at Gitmo to Nazis, Gulag guards, and Pol Pot's mass murderers, there was a short burst of outrage, quelled by his phony apology. Senate Republicans never demanded -- or got -- a clear and unequivocal apology from Durbin. By their failure to do so they give credence to Zarqawi's message.

Republicans in the Senate and House are failing in one of their key wartime tasks: to take on the political opposition in the debate. Not to shout people down, but to take them to task. On the floor, we should be hearing one speech after another critical of the irresponsible rhetoric of the left. Why don't we? Because they want comity, to pass laws we don't need, spend money we should save, and give themselves pay raises without voting for them. What they should be doing, instead, is taking on the tough problems they were elected to tackle. Like what do we do about the terrorists who are within our borders, and those who preach violence and hatred to young Muslims here. They should read carefully the newly leaked dossier on recruitment of terrorists in the U.K. And they should not allow those who apologize for terrorists scare them out of it.

TAS contributing editor Jed Babbin is the author of *Inside the Asylum: Why the UN and Old Europe Are Worse Than You Think* (Regnery, 2004).

(b)(6)

**From:** Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Monday, July 11, 2005 9:35 AM  
**To:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** RE: GITMO CONFIRMED LIST

also, (b)(6) is going to be able to go, we checked and there is room for two on the jump seat, wont be the most comfortable seat, but she wants to go and id like for her to have the experience and it will be good to have her help with the logistical on the ground details. hope you have a great trip.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Monday, July 11, 2005 9:19 AM  
**To:** Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Maj, OASD-PA; (b)(6); Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** RE: GITMO CONFIRMED LIST

folks, alot of time and energy went into pulling this one together and i truly appreciate everyone's effort. thank you for all the due diligence.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Monday, July 11, 2005 9:13 AM  
**To:** Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Maj, OASD-PA; (b)(6); Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** RE: GITMO CONFIRMED LIST

please note corrected manifest, MG Vallely is unable to attend

**DOD**

Eric Ruff  
Admiral McGarrah  
BG Hemmingway

**Analysts**

Jed Babbin  
Lieutenant Colonel Bill Cowan  
Colonel Jeff McCausland  
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney  
Major General Michael J. Nardotti, Jr  
Captain Chuck Nash (USN)  
Lieutenant Colonel Carlton Sherwood

(b)(6)

**From:** Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Monday, July 11, 2005 9:28 AM  
**To:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** RE: GITMO CONFIRMED LIST

thank you for the nice words.

looking ahead, for the 18th, i may have one 3 or 4 analysts that want to go, do you want to open it up to your media list?

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Monday, July 11, 2005 9:19 AM  
**To:** Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Maj, OASD-PA; (b)(6); Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA;  
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Captain Chuck Nash (USN)  
Lieutenant Colonel Carlton Sherwood

(b)(6)

**From:** JedBabbin@**(b)(6)**  
**Sent:** Monday, July 11, 2005 8:20 AM  
**To:** tmcinerney@**(b)(6)**; paulvalley@**(b)(6)**; nashct@**(b)(6)**; Glenstrae77@**(b)(6)**; BURM41516@**(b)(6)**; **(b)(6)**; CIV, OASD-PA; WSSInter@**(b)(6)**; roberthscales@**(b)(6)**  
**Subject:** Today's Spectator: Zarqawi's Love Note to Dick Durbin

The worm is turning, and not necessarily in the right direction.

The American Spectator

**Jed Babbin**

**(b)(2)** (home office)  
**(b)(2)** (home fax)  
**(b)(2)** (mobile)



(b)(6)

**From:** Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Friday, July 08, 2005 9:45 AM  
**To:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** FW: Idea for your consideration

here is his email to me...

From: Gordon Cucullu [mailto:colonelgordon@(b)(6)]

Hi, Dallas,

I want to run something by you for comment/suggestions, please.

After the GITMO trip and the pieces I wrote and the reaction I'm getting from Americans on talk radio and TV I am considering writing a quick book about GITMO. I checked and found nothing positive or even truthful about the facility. Inside the Wire is a kiss and tell, and there are two others by hard leftists who hate America and President Bush.

I don't want to make the book a history per se, but rather focus strictly on contemporary issues: value of the camp, need for the camp, who are the detainees, why are they so dangerous, what we hope to obtain from them, NO TORTURE, interrogation techniques, and morale and welfare of the troops. I don't intend to get too bogged down in the legal tangles, just hit the highlights. Mostly I want Americans to know what the hell is really going on there and why it is important to them.

More a look at GITMO today and tomorrow, some past to put things in context but not an effort to explain, discuss, condemn, or justify past actions.  
Bottom line: we need to get beyond rumor and accusation and look to the future.

I think I can have it done by September (I'd put all other projects on hold). I would need passive DoD support: permission to travel my mil aircraft to GITMO and stay in facilities, permission to interview military and civilians at GITMO (with their agreement, of course), contacts at the Pentagon (Matt, maybe the Secretary, Wolfowitz, others you suggest), interviews and contacts with some who have served previously on the island, and access given by JTF discretion of non classified detainee interviews.  
That sort of thing.

I envision spending one to two weeks back at GITMO, conducting interviews in the DC area and having a draft manuscript by the end of August or so.

Prior to asking my agent to talk to publishers I want to run the idea past you for your thoughts.

Thanks, all the best, Gordon

(b)(6)

**From:** Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Friday, July 08, 2005 9:44 AM  
**To:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** RE: More hits

he had asked to have access to gitmo for several weeks, essentially embed, to write a book on the process etc. he has received sign off from a publisher, i had thought he discussed this with you on the plane. my apologies. Ill get you more details asap.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Friday, July 08, 2005 9:43 AM  
**To:** Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** RE: More hits

this is the first i've seen this message, i believe. what does gordon have in mind?  
thanks.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Friday, July 08, 2005 9:41 AM  
**To:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** FW: More hits

did his request get anywhere?

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Gordon Cucullu [mailto:colonelgordon@(b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Friday, July 08, 2005 9:24 AM  
**To:** Dallas.Lawrence@(b)(6)  
**Subject:** More hits

Hi, Dallas,

I did two radio shows out of St. Louis this week (Wed and Fri), both involved war on terror/GITMO material. Today we tied the London attacks to the value of continued interrogations.

I'm booked tonight on Al Rantel's Show from Los Angeles, same subject.

Hope things are well. Any news from my request for support for a GITMO book?

Thanks, be well,

Gordon Cucullu

(b)(6)

**From:** Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Friday, July 08, 2005 9:22 AM  
**To:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6), CIV, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** RE: Military Analyst Visit to Guantanamo

yes sir, i passed those to (b)(6). she is preparing to send them out today, regardless if we brief on the plane or via conf call. also, she is going to check to see if there was a more updated detainee brief, the one i have is dated june 14.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Friday, July 08, 2005 9:10 AM  
**To:** (b)(6), CIV, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** RE: Military Analyst Visit to Guantanamo

just so we're thinking ahead, depending upon the type of aircraft we get, we may not be able to brief above a noise level. we should be thinking about getting unclass materials to the analysts as early as today so they can review it and be ready for discussion during a conference call that would have to occur on monday. and, if monday is going to be a travel day for people, it will be important to make sure we get materials out.

dallas, recall that during our lookback with the analysts the one thing they all said was that they would have appreciated getting the briefing materials used by mcgarrah, hemingway and waxman, ahead of time. thanks, eric

-----Original Message-----

**From:** (b)(6), CIV, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Thursday, July 07, 2005 5:03 PM  
**To:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** FW: Military Analyst Visit to Guantanamo

fyi.

i'm having him send to me on sivr. and hemingway can brief that part as well.

thanks

(b)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Waxman, Matthew, CIV, OSD-POLICY  
**Sent:** Thursday, July 07, 2005 3:53 PM  
**To:** (b)(6), CIV, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** RE: Military Analyst Visit to Guantanamo

unfortunately they're on SIPRnet. Are you on there?

Tom Hemingway says he feels comfortable giving the briefing -- he'll do it, so no need for pre-brief

-----Original Message-----

**From:** (b)(6), CIV, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Thursday, July 07, 2005 3:36 PM  
**To:** Waxman, Matthew, CIV, OSD-POLICY  
**Subject:** RE: Military Analyst Visit to Guantanamo

hi.

did you get a response to this message?

also, would you please forward your slides to me so that i can have someone start putting the briefing books

together?  
thanks

(b)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Waxman, Matthew, CIV, OSD-POLICY

**Sent:** Thursday, July 07, 2005 9:22 AM

**To:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Hemingway, Thomas, BG, DoD OGC; (b)(6) RADM (OARDEC)

**Cc:** (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA

**Subject:** RE: Military Analyst Visit to Guantanamo

Does it make sense to send them my slides in advance and to have a phone pre-brief before I leave? Tom, otherwise, would you feel comfortable giving a brief policy overview, having heard my pitch a few times now and knowing the law?

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA

**Sent:** Thursday, July 07, 2005 9:18 AM

**To:** Waxman, Matthew, CIV, OSD-POLICY; Hemingway, Thomas, BG, DoD OGC; (b)(6) RADM (OARDEC)

**Cc:** (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA

**Subject:** RE: Military Analyst Visit to Guantanamo

good a.m., gentlemen. we have just received confirmation that we will be taking a new round of military analysts, a very strong group of folks, down to gtmo on tuesday, july 12. matt, since you're out next week this email is for your s/a. jim, tom, hopefully your schedules will accommodate your traveling with us again, as your briefings were of great value to the analysts. the same laydown as the last trip is being planned -- out early and back around 8 p.m. thanks, eric

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA  
Sent: Friday, July 08, 2005 7:52 AM  
To: (b)(6), CIV, OSD-LA  
Cc: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA  
Subject: RE: Jed Babbin (b)(2) cell

Done. Connection made. Babbin still says she needs "wood under her fingernails."

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6), CIV, OSD-LA  
Sent: Friday, July 08, 2005 7:47 AM  
To: (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA  
Subject: Re: Jed Babbin (b)(2) cell

She does not need firing up. He needs to call soon- she is wheels down in Memphis around 10:00. Ryan Loskarn is her press guy. (b)(2). His cell is (b)(2)

-----  
Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA <(b)(6)>  
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@(b)(6)>; (b)(6), CIV, OSD-LA <(b)(6)>  
Sent: Fri Jul 08 07:34:37 2005  
Subject: Jed Babbin (b)(2)

Needs a good number for (b)(6) for the Laura Ingraham show this a.m. The number he has isn't good (b)(2). Also, he asked that someone speaks to her folks about getting her a "little fired-up" for the radio show.

His cell (b)(2)

(b)(6)  
Captain (b)(6), USMC  
Military Assistant to the  
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs  
Comm: (b)(2)  
BlkBry: (b)(2)  
Fax: (b)(2)  
1400 Defense Pentagon (b)(2)  
Washington, DC 20301-1400