

(b)(6)

From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, August 31, 2005 9:06 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Gitmo Jive

Sure, this is the first time I have heard of this project. Let's discuss tomorrow.

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@**(b)(6)**>
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA <Bryan.Whitman@**(b)(6)**>
Sent: Wed Aug 31 18:32:59 2005
Subject: FW: Gitmo Jive

bryan, as you can see from the trail below, we're getting the goahead to work with a military analyst to tell the story about gtmo. i'd like to work this with you and whomever in your shop you think ought to handle. thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: **(b)(6)**, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, August 31, 2005 6:30 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: Gitmo Jive

here it is.
thanks

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: **(b)(6)** COL (L) [mailto:**(b)(6)**]
Sent: Monday, August 22, 2005 4:39 PM
To: **(b)(6)** CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: Ruff, Eric, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Gitmo Jive

(b)(6)

GEN Craddock has seen the proposal to permit Mr. Cucullu access to Guantanamo to write a book and he supports the concept. Naturally, the details of his visit would have to be worked out with the appropriate personnel in SOUTHCOM and JTF-GTMO. v/r, COL Miles

From: **(b)(6)** CIV, OASD-PA [mailto:**(b)(6)**]
Sent: Tuesday, August 16, 2005 8:56 AM
To: **(b)(6)** COL (L)
Cc: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: Gitmo Jive

sir,
please see the story below. eric ruff asked that i pass this along to you for general craddock as it is written by the retired military analyst who would like to write a book about Guantanamo. mr. ruff sent a memo to general craddock a week or so ago re. this. he would like to see if we can set up a call next week with the general at a time convenient to him. please let me know if there is a time that would work for the general and i will have it put on mr. ruff's calendar.

thanks.

(b)

Respectfully,

(b)(6)

OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison
(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 30401-1400

(b)(2)

www.AmericaSupportsYou.mil

Gitmo Jive

By Gordon Cucullu

The American Enterprise, September 2005

www.taemag.com/issues/articleID.18656/article_detail.asp

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba-In the fall of 2001, the U.S. Naval Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba ("Gitmo" to those who live here) was teetering on the edge of oblivion, with a skeleton crew of fewer than 2,000 servicemembers on duty. Now a contingent of more than 10,000 resides here. Behind that surge: the need for secure confinement of a collection of human debris snatched from the battlefields of Afghanistan in early 2002.

These "detainees" are not innocent foot soldiers, or confused Afghan opium farmers drafted by the Taliban. They are Islamic fundamentalists from across the Middle East, rabid jihadists who have dedicated their lives to the destruction of America and Western civilization. Among the residents are al-Qaeda organizers, bomb makers, financial specialists, recruiters of suicide attackers, and just plain killers. Many of these men met frequently with Osama bin Laden. The terrorist Maad Al Qahtani, a Saudi who is a self-confessed collaborator with the September 11 hijackers, is one of many infamous captives.

In the opening salvos of the global war on terror, our forces took a lot of prisoners from the battlefield. Estimates are that more than 70,000 Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters were captured and screened. Of that number, approximately 800 were deemed of such high value for intelligence purposes, or such a severe threat in their own person, that they needed to be interrogated and confined in a secure locale from which they could not easily escape or be rescued. Welcome to the new Gitmo.

I was able to observe conditions at the detention facility, firsthand, at the end of June, when I was invited to join a group of ten former military and intelligence analysts on an inspection tour. Briefings commenced aboard our aircraft shortly after take-off, and continued until landing. We were met planeside by Brigadier General Jay Hood, the commanding officer of Joint Task Force Gitmo, whose soldiers are responsible for the security, interrogation, housing, and oversight of all the terrorists confined there. General Hood and his staff fielded all questions and criticisms, and were very forthcoming.

Who are these men?

While we observed absolutely no evidence of torture of prisoners at Gitmo, it is clear that the daily atmosphere is rife with harsh abuse: The prisoners are constantly assaulting the guards.

Our young military men and women routinely endure the vilest invective imaginable, including death threats that spill over to guards' families. All soldiers and sailors working "inside the wire" have blacked out their name tags so that the detainees will not learn their identities. Before that step was taken the terrorists were threatening to tell their al-Qaeda pals still at large who the guards were. "We will look you up on the Internet," the prisoners said. "We will find you and slaughter you and your family in your homes at night. We will cut your throats like sheep. We will drink the blood of the infidel."

That is bad enough, but the terrorist prisoners throw more than words at the guards. On a daily basis, American soldiers carrying out their duties within the maximum-security camp are barraged with feces, urine, semen, and spit hurled by the detainees. Secretly fashioned weapons intended for use in attacking guards or fellow detainees are confiscated regularly. When food or other items are passed through the "bean hole"-an opening approximately 4 inches by 24 inches in the cell doors, the detainees have grabbed at the wrists and arms of the Americans feeding them and tried to break their bones.

When guards enter the cells to remove detainees for interrogation sessions, medical visits, or any number of reasons, detainees sometimes climb on the metal bunks and leap on the guards. They have crammed themselves under the bunks, requiring several guards to extract them. Some have attacked unsuspecting soldiers with steel chairs. Determined to inflict maximum damage, detainees have groped under the protective face masks of the guards, clawing their faces and trying to gouge eyes and tear mouths.

Keep in mind that our soldiers-young men and young women-are absolutely forbidden from responding in kind. They are constrained to maintain absolute discipline and follow humane operating procedures at all times, at risk of serious punishment. Documents recently obtained by the Associated Press through a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit show that one detainee punched a guard in the mouth, knocking out his tooth, then began to bite the MP. Several guards were required to repel the prisoner's attack; one soldier who came to the rescue delivered two blows to the inmate's head with a handheld radio. For this he was dropped in rank to private.

In a different incident, an MP doused with toilet water responded by spraying the offending inmate with a hose. For this he was charged with assault. Another American soldier was disciplined for cursing at inmates. One guard punched a detainee after being struck and spit on while placing the man in restraints in the prison hospital in October 2004. ("My instincts took over after the hitting and spitting," the soldier wrote in his report.) He was recommended for a reduction in rank to E-4, loss of a month's pay, and extra duty for 45 days.

How cooperative a detainee is determines where he is housed, how much free time he is given, whether he lives alone or in a group, and what color clothing he wears. The most dangerous wear an orange jump suit. Those who heed instructions earn a beige jumpsuit, and those who are deemed to be fully compliant wear white. The latter groups have daily recreation periods, live in groups of as many as ten, and receive extra privileges. The compliance rating, by the way, has nothing to do with cooperation with interrogators. Indeed, many fully compliant detainees have maintained stoic silence, while some of the most notorious, dangerous prisoners speak freely with interrogators.

Nearly all of these hardened terrorists have been well coached on how to be an American captive. Given any opportunity, they will all claim torture and human rights violations. They have been schooled on counter-interrogation techniques, on how to construct and maintain a cover story, and other subterfuges to fool or deflect interrogators.

Some detainees, including one classified as a "high value intelligence source" that I was able to observe, take pride in discussing their activities and capabilities with interrogators. The man I saw brags about Americans he has killed, other Muslims he has terrorized, attacks he has planned and carried out, and what he will do to the Americans if he has a chance. He is a leader, and affirms his high rank within the al-Qaeda chain.

He has started or ended riotous behavior by fellow prisoners on more than one occasion.

With twisted irony, this individual condemns prisoners who maintain silence for being "ashamed" of their past. "They ought to proclaim their feats as proof of their commitment to the cause of Islam," he tells interrogators, while munching continuously from a box of doughnuts provided by the interrogator. Why the doughnuts? "He throws his food at the guards," General Hood says, "so he loves to eat the doughnuts during the interrogation sessions."

Too hard? Or too soft?

We asked Hood if he was possibly being too lenient with these men. "This system of rapport-building works," Hood assures us. In support of the soft-handed approach, he cites an extraordinary amount of actionable intelligence that continues to flow out of the interrogation rooms of Gitmo.

His revelation was a surprise to me. During my own career in the U.S. Army Special Forces, I had been taught that intelligence, like bread, gets stale quickly. That may be true for tactical intelligence of the sort I used in the field. Strategic intelligence, the kind that we continue to collect at Gitmo, however, seems to have a much longer shelf life. Today's interrogators are succeeding at mapping out the complex organizational and financial structure of al-Qaeda in increasing detail, thereby uncovering networks that need to be attacked and dismantled. They are uncovering new "sleeper" cells. They are learning of temporarily shelved plans for new terrorist attacks, some of which have subsequently been thwarted by law enforcement authorities in America and Europe.

Another surprise for me was learning that many of the U.S. interrogators are women. We have all heard the salacious stories about using women to tease or embarrass the detainees. I saw a different reality. The camp behavioral expert, a female Ph.D. who has more than two years of experience at Gitmo, informed me that female interrogators have been very effective.

"We assume the role of sister or mother," she explained, "something that is quite acceptable and natural in their culture." She dresses demurely for her sessions. "I wear long sleeves, an ankle-length dress, and little makeup." The interrogation room she enters is sparsely furnished with leg cuffs to secure the prisoner, a one-way mirror, cameras, and a distress button to summon help if needed.

"We review what we know of their backgrounds, try lots of approaches, and work on them to find something that they can relate to. Once we can get them to relate on a common item, even something irrelevant and mundane, then we can begin to probe." It is a long, complex process requiring great patience, and more than a little human empathy. It categorically rejects the use of drugs, coercion, or duress.

Intelligence gleaned from Gitmo is blended with information from other sources to connect dots. We learned that one non-cooperative detainee had his cover penetrated just last month by having his photo identified by a freshly captured fighter in Afghanistan. Once confronted with his real identity, he began to talk.

It is important to keep in mind that these men, while exceedingly dangerous and even pathological in their desire to kill Westerners, are generally well-educated and broadly traveled. Several detainees have advanced degrees in law, engineering, and medicine from American and European schools like the University of London. Others are highly skilled technical experts with advanced training and knowledge of electronics and demolitions. (Some of these are contributing to our knowledge of al-Qaeda bombs found in Iraq.) Many of these men occupied the top al-Qaeda echelons, and met frequently with bin Laden.

A lot of these men came from middle-class or wealthy families. They come from 17 different countries, but a great many are Saudi Arabian. They are not driven by poverty, unemployment, or class deprivation. They are motivated by a virulent form of Islam that

promotes jihad and death to Western civilization. They will kill Americans-including women and children-without conscience, for they are convinced that restoration of the Islamic caliphate is their sole mission on this Earth.

Gitmo guards in the crosshairs

Many readers will have heard stories about detainees sleeping in air-conditioned berths, while the American troops guarding them sweated in tents. You may have heard that American soldiers were eating MREs while the terrorists dined on three "hots" daily, providing about 2,600 calories of carefully varied food. Those stories were correct.

Conditions for camp guards have been improved dramatically, however. I ate heartily with the soldiers and sailors working the camps (the Navy supplies a large number of experienced Masters at Arms), and learned how they feel about their mission. Universally, they are proud of their work, although somewhat disappointed that the American public is not more aware of the difficulties they undergo to keep us safe.

One young woman at my table, an Army private first class, was asked what she thought about rhetoric in the American media, and from the mouths of elected officials like Senators Richard Durbin (D-IL) and Ted Kennedy (D-MA), describing our service members at Guantanamo as "Nazis." Frowning, she answered, "It hurts my feelings to hear that junk. We try to do as good a job as possible down here. These detainees are dangerous. They try to kill us every time we get close to them, and would certainly kill Americans if released."

I asked her if morale was affected by such political statements. "I'll tell you this," she replied, breaking into a grin. "Every time we get called those names we decide we're going to show 'em. We focus on our mission and work harder."

Guards pull several days of duty inside the wire, and are then rotated out. They need the relief from the intense pressure inside. But the time outside is not R&R; training continues on a constant basis. Gitmo has some of the most detailed and comprehensive procedural rules in the military. Supervision is constant, random inspections are common, all supervisors in the chain of command are held responsible for the actions of subordinates, and soldiers are schooled to report infractions.

The American servicemembers at Guantanamo do not have the satisfaction of tossing a grenade or shooting back at the terrorists in their midst. They will not be recognized when awards for valor are bestowed. In the face of vile abuse they must respond with supreme restraint, aware that even the slightest infraction will draw the fury and condemnation of hyperbolic politicians and reporters who loathe our military and want nothing more than to embarrass and damage American interests in this war.

For defense against irresponsible and slanderous charges, these men and women rely on ordinary Americans-those of us who rest at home in the shadow of safety they cast.

Former Special Forces lieutenant colonel Gordon Cucullu is a frequent television commentator on military matters.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, August 31, 2005 3:23 PM
To: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Analyst Call

here is the rsvp list as of 3:20 pm. mr. whitman has offered his office since both allison's and mr. di rita's are not available.
thanks

(b)

Colonel Ken Allard	(USA, Retired)
Mr. Jed Babbin	(USAF, JAG)
Dr. James Jay Carafano	(LTC, USA, Retired)
Colonel (Tim) J. Eads	(USA, Retired)
Brigadier General David L. Grange	(USA, Retired)
Colonel Jeff McCausland	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant General Erv Rokke	(USAF, Retired)

-----Original Message-----

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, August 31, 2005 1:56 PM
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Analyst Call

Bryan,

per our chat, at the conclusion of our conference call this afternoon with Bg Hemingway, I pulsed our analysts to see if there would be an interest in a 415 pm call today to discuss the DoD response to Katrina (assets being moved into the region, national guard etc). There was a universal positive response, several said they have been doing radio interviews throughout the day and have been asked several times, what DoD, specifically, is doing.

We are now emailing out all the analysts an email announcing a tentative call today to discuss DoD / National Guard response for 415.

At 3 pm we will get everyone the rsvp list.

Thank you.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, August 31, 2005 11:13 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Subject: RE: please see column below.

fyi - drafted and being reviewed as discussed

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Sunday, August 28, 2005 6:36 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Subject: please see column below.

matthew, frank rich is the latest to compare iraq to vietnam, thus the need to get that comparison oped that we discussed. know you're working it and appreciate it, thanks. bryan, it would be nice to get the info to the talk radio folks as well. thanks, folks. eric

New York Times
August 28, 2005

The Vietnamization Of Bush's Vacation

By Frank Rich

ANOTHER week in Iraq, another light at the end of the tunnel. On Monday President Bush saluted the Iraqis for "completing work on a democratic constitution" even as the process was breaking down yet again. But was anyone even listening to his latest premature celebration?

We have long since lost count of all the historic turning points and fast-evaporating victories hyped by this president. The toppling of Saddam's statue, "Mission Accomplished," the transfer of sovereignty and the purple fingers all blur into a hallucinatory loop of delusion. One such red-letter day, some may dimly recall, was the adoption of the previous, interim constitution in March 2004, also proclaimed a "historic milestone" by Mr. Bush. Within a month after that fabulous victory, the insurgency boiled over into the war we have today, taking, among many others, the life of Casey Sheehan.

It's Casey Sheehan's mother, not those haggling in Baghdad's Green Zone, who really changed the landscape in the war this month. Not because of her bumper-sticker politics or the slick left-wing political operatives who have turned her into a circus, but because the original, stubborn fact of her grief brought back the dead the administration had tried for so long to lock out of sight. With a shove from Pat Robertson, her 15 minutes are now up, but even Mr. Robertson's antics revealed buyer's remorse about Iraq; his stated motivation for taking out Hugo Chávez by assassination was to avoid "another \$200 billion war" to remove a dictator.

In the wake of Ms. Sheehan's protest, the facts on the ground in America have changed almost everywhere. The president, for one, has been forced to make what for him is the ultimate sacrifice: jettisoning chunks of vacation to defend the war in any bunker he can find in Utah or Idaho. In the first speech of this offensive, he even felt compelled to take the uncharacteristic step of citing the number of American dead in public (though the number was already out of date by at least five casualties by day's end). For the second, the White House recruited its own mom, Tammy Pruett, for the president to showcase as an antidote to Ms. Sheehan. But in a reversion to the president's hide-the-fallen habit, the chosen mother was not one who had

lost a child in Iraq.

It isn't just Mr. Bush who is in a tight corner now. Ms. Sheehan's protest was the catalyst for a new national argument about the war that managed to expose both the intellectual bankruptcy of its remaining supporters on the right and the utter bankruptcy of the Democrats who had rubber-stamped this misadventure in the first place.

When the war's die-hard cheerleaders attacked the Middle East policy of a mother from Vacaville, Calif., instead of defending the president's policy in Iraq, it was definitive proof that there is little cogent defense left to be made. When the Democrats offered no alternative to either Mr. Bush's policy or Ms. Sheehan's plea for an immediate withdrawal, it was proof that they have no standing in the debate.

Instead, two conservative Republicans - actually talking about Iraq instead of Ms. Sheehan, unlike the rest of their breed - stepped up to fill this enormous vacuum: Chuck Hagel and Henry Kissinger. Both pointedly invoked Vietnam, the war that forged their political careers. Their timing, like Ms. Sheehan's, was impeccable. Last week Mr. Bush started saying that the best way to honor the dead would be to "finish the task they gave their lives for" - a dangerous rationale that, as David Halberstam points out, was heard as early as 1963 in Vietnam, when American casualties in that fiasco were still inching toward 100.

And what exactly is our task? Mr. Bush's current definition - "as the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down" - could not be a better formula for quagmire. Twenty-eight months after the fall of Saddam, only "a small number" of Iraqi troops are capable of fighting without American assistance, according to the Pentagon - a figure that Joseph Biden puts at "fewer than 3,000." At this rate, our 138,000 troops will be replaced by self-sufficient locals in roughly 100 years.

For his part, Mr. Hagel backed up his assertion that we are bogged down in a new Vietnam with an irrefutable litany of failure: "more dead, more wounded, less electricity in Iraq, less oil being pumped in Iraq, more insurgency attacks, more insurgents coming across the border, more corruption in the government." Mr. Kissinger no doubt counts himself a firm supporter of Mr. Bush, but in Washington Post this month, he drew a damning lesson from Vietnam: "Military success is difficult to sustain unless buttressed by domestic support." Anyone who can read a poll knows that support is gone and is not coming back. The president's approval rating dropped to 36 percent in one survey last week.

What's left is the option stated bluntly by Mr. Hagel: "We should start figuring out how we get out of there."

He didn't say how we might do that. John McCain has talked about sending more troops to rectify our disastrous failure to secure the country, but he'll have to round them up himself door to door. As the retired Gen. Barry McCaffrey reported to the Senate, the National Guard is "in the stage of meltdown and in 24 months we'll be coming apart." At the Army, according to The Los Angeles Times, officials are now predicting an even worse shortfall of recruits in 2006 than in 2005. The Leo Burnett advertising agency has been handed \$350 million for a recruitment campaign that avoids any mention of Iraq.

Among Washington's Democrats, the only one with a clue seems to be Russell Feingold, the Wisconsin senator who this month proposed setting a "target date" (as opposed to a deadline) for getting out. Mr. Feingold also made the crucial observation that "the president has presented us with a false choice": either "stay the course" or "cut and run." That false choice, in which Mr. Bush pretends that the only alternative to his reckless conduct of the war is Ms. Sheehan's equally apocalyptic retreat, is used to snuff out any legitimate debate. There are in fact plenty of other choices echoing about, from variations on Mr. Feingold's timetable theme to buying off the Sunni insurgents.

But don't expect any of Mr. Feingold's peers to join him or Mr. Hagel in fashioning an exit strategy that might work. If there's a moment that could stand for the Democrats' irrelevance it came on July 14, the day Americans woke up to learn of the suicide bomber in Baghdad who killed as many as 27 people, nearly all of them children gathered around American troops. In Washington that day, the presumptive presidential

candidate Hillary Clinton held a press conference vowing to protect American children from the fantasy violence of video games.

The Democrats are hoping that if they do nothing, they might inherit the earth as the Bush administration goes down the tubes. Whatever the dubious merits of this Kerryesque course as a political strategy, as a moral strategy it's unpatriotic. The earth may not be worth inheriting if Iraq continues to sabotage America's ability to take on Iran and North Korea, let alone Al Qaeda.

As another politician from the Vietnam era, Gary Hart, observed last week, the Democrats are too cowardly to admit they made a mistake three years ago, when fear of midterm elections drove them to surrender to the administration's rushed and manipulative Iraq-war sales pitch. So now they are compounding the original error as the same hucksters frantically try to repackage the old damaged goods.

IN the new pitch there are no mushroom clouds. Instead we get McCarthyesque rhetoric accusing critics of being soft on the war on terrorism, which the Iraq adventure has itself undermined. Before anyone dare say Vietnam, the president, Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld drag in the historian David McCullough and liken 2005 in Iraq to 1776 in America - and, by implication, the original George W. to ours. Before you know it, Ahmad Chalabi will be rehabilitated as Ben Franklin.

The marketing campaign will crescendo in two weeks, on the anniversary of 9/11, when a Defense Department "Freedom Walk" will trek from the site of the Pentagon attack through Arlington National Cemetery to a country music concert on the Mall. There the false linkage of Iraq to 9/11 will be hammered in once more, this time with a beat: Clint Black will sing "I Raq and Roll," a ditty whose lyrics focus on Saddam, not the Islamic radicals who actually attacked America. Lest any propaganda opportunity be missed, Arlington's gravestones are being branded with the Pentagon's slogans for military campaigns, like Operation Iraqi Freedom, The Associated Press reported last week - a historic first. If only the administration had thought of doing the same on the fallen's coffins, it might have allowed photographs.

Even though their own poll numbers are in a race to the bottom with the president's, don't expect the Democrats to make a peep. Republicans, their minds increasingly focused on November 2006, may well blink first. In yet another echo of Vietnam, it's millions of voters beyond the capital who will force the timetable for our inexorable exit from Iraq.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, August 29, 2005 8:45 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Jed Babbin (American Spectator)

http://www.spectator.org/dsp_article.asp?art_id=8652

(b)(6)

Researcher

OSD Speechwriters Group
The Pentagon, Room (b)(2)
Telephone (b)(2)
Fax

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@(b)(6)
Sent: Monday, August 29, 2005 8:49 AM
To: tmcinerney@(b)(6); paulvalley@(b)(6); nashct@(b)(6); Glenstrae77
(b)(6); BURM41516@(b)(6); (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; WSSInter@(b)(6)
roberthscates@(b)(6); (b)(6)
Subject: Today's Spectator: UN reform?

The proposed UN "reforms" don't change anything. BUT UN interference in deportation of terrorist-backing "imams" and "Islamic scholars" could.

The American Spectator

Jed Babbin

(b)(2) (home office)
(home fax)
(mobile)

(b)(6)

From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, August 29, 2005 6:33 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: Meet the press transcript

NBC
Meet the Press
August 28, 2005

TIM RUSSERT: Our issues this Sunday: Iraq, political violence and deaths surge. This morning, an announcement of a draft constitution, but will all sides accept the document? And a majority of Americans now say the war was a mistake as demonstrations build at home. With us, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad. Then insights and analysis from four retired military generals: General Wesley Clark, former NATO Supreme Allied commander, Europe; General Wayne Downing, former commander in chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command; General Barry McCaffrey, former commander in chief of the U.S. Southern Command; and General Montgomery Meigs, former commander of the NATO Stabilization Force. The war in Iraq, where do we go from here?

Zalmay Khalilzad interview

RUSSERT: But first, this was the scene just hours ago in Baghdad, an announcement of a new Iraqi constitution. The Shiites in the south, the Kurds in the north have both expressed their support. But what about the Sunnis? Early this morning, I asked the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, whether any of the 15 Sunni negotiators had signed the draft constitution.

AMB. ZALMAY KHALILZAD: Later today, there will be a ceremony hosted by the president and I understand from the president that there will be a significant number of Sunni members of the constitution commission who will be there.

RUSSERT: You said on this program just two weeks ago, "...it's very important that the Sunnis participate in the political process. Without them participating, the insurgency will have a substantial base of support." Are you confident that the Sunnis will vote for this constitution before October 15 and it will pass?

AMB. KHALILZAD: Well, that is the real test, whether they will vote for it in large numbers or not. If the Sunnis do vote for it and approve the constitution, the constitution is not stopped, then it will be a national compact and it will help with the counterinsurgency strategy and with the development of a joint road map for the future of Iraq. And if they don't, then it will be a problem, but we will have to wait and see.

RUSSERT: Mr. Ambassador, let me read for you and our viewers this morning something that exists in this draft Constitution. Islam is the official religion of the state, and it is a main source for legislation. No law can be passed that contradicts the fixed principles of Islam's rulings.

Do you believe that the 1,800 American men and women who have died in Iraq died for the creation of another Islamic republic in the Middle East? East?

AMB. KHALILZAD: No. Those were exactly the same words that were in the constitution of Afghanistan which we celebrated. And also do not forget that immediately after what you just read, there are two other requirements that the draft mentions, one, that no law can be against the practices of democracy and also that no law can be in violation of the human rights enshrined in that constitution. What you have, Tim, is a new consensus between the universal principles of democracy and human rights and Iraqi traditions in Islam. And in that, it is an agreement, a compact between the various communities and it sets a new paradigm for this part of the world, a reconciliation, a consensus between the various forces and tendencies that are at work here in Iraq.

RUSSERT: As you well know, some secular Iraqi leaders disagree with you in terms of the effect of the so-called Islamic influences. This is how The New York Times reported it on Wednesday. "Secular Iraqi leaders complained that the country's nearly finished constitution lays the groundwork for the possible domination of the country by Shiite Islamic clerics, and that it contains specific provisions that could sharply curtail the rights of women. The secular leaders said the draft contains language that not only establishes the primacy of Islam as the country's official religion, but appears to grant

judges wide latitude to strike down legislation that may contravene the faith. To interpret such legislation, the constitution calls for the appointment of experts in Shariah, or Islamic law, to preside on the Supreme Federal Court. The draft constitution, these secular Iraqis say, clears the way for religious authorities to adjudicate personal disputes like divorce and inheritance matters by allowing the establishment of religious courts, raising fears that a popularly elected Islamist-minded government could enact legislation and appoint judges who could turn the country into a theocracy. The courts would rely on Shariah, which under most interpretations grants women substantially fewer rights than men."

AMB. KHALILZAD: Well, let me say several things on each of the points that you've raised. One with regard to women first. This constitution, this draft, recognizes equality between men and women before the law and disallows any discrimination. It also disallows violence in the family. It encourages women's political participation. And it grants a 25 percent minimum women's representation in the National Assembly.

With regard to family law, which is a controversial article, it recognizes the freedom of choice, that people can choose which law, whether secular or religious, can--will govern their personal matters having to do with marriage, divorce, inheritance. This is no different than what is the case in Israel.

With regard to the role of the Supreme Court, I think your comments reflected an earlier draft. The current draft does not establish a separate constitution review court but gives the responsibility to the Supreme Court here and it doesn't call for Shariah judges. It calls for experts in law, which includes expertise in Islamic law, but also expertise with regard to democracy and human rights, to be represented in the Supreme Court and it allows the next parliament to legislate on that.

RUSSERT: So if a Shiite man decides to bring his wife to a Shiite religious court, you believe that woman will have equal protection?

AMB. KHALILZAD: Well, first, exactly how this will be done will be regulated by law. What the constitution says is that it's freedom of choice. And it directs the next legislator to regulate. What I've heard from the conversations that we've had with various members of the commission is the concern that if someone was of strong faith and wanted to go to a religious court or to get an affair settled, he should not or she should not be disallowed from doing that by the state. But how they will do it exactly, that will depend on the legislature.

I have encouraged many groups who have concern about this that they ought to make this a campaign issue and run against ideas that they find unacceptable with regard to what their legislation might be. This is a living document, as all constitutions are, Tim, and as Iraq evolves and changes, this constitution will also change and adapt to the circumstances. Our own Constitution, as you know, had to change in order to remain relevant. And this will be the case with Iraq as well, as it will be the case with other countries. Constitutions are not just one-time documents. To be relevant, they will have to adapt.

RUSSERT: Are the Shiite clerical leaders closer to Iran or the United States?

AMB. KHALILZAD: Well, they know that there are differences among them on this. There are Shiite clerics that are hostile to the United States and there are Shiite clerics who want to have a good relationship with the United States. I think talking about millions of people and talking about thousands of clerics it's difficult to group them and characterize them with sort of one kind of characterization. Some are close to Iran; there is no doubt about that as well. Iran is seeking to influence developments here. Some of the clerics who were oppose to Saddam Hussein were based in Iran. Iranians assisted them. So there is an Iranian influence. There's no question about that.

RUSSERT: The president has said that American troops will stand down whether Iraqi troops stand up. How many Iraqi troops do you believe are now fully combat-ready and capable of replacing Americans on the front lines?

AMB. KHALILZAD: I think that the number of Iraqi forces that can operate entirely independent of the United States are not very large. But the number of Iraqis that are participating in combat with differing degrees of American support is very large. And, of course, over time, more and more Iraqi forces will be able to do things without the United States. But the fact that they are participating in the combat, even with the help of the United States, is a step in the right direction. And, of course, the ultimate goal is to have Iraqis taking care of Iraqi security. And it's not only the question of numbers, it's not only the question of the quality of the force, but also these sources have to be trusted by all Iraqi communities. Building institutions such as army and police and a judicial system, these are not easy things to do.

RUSSERT: Finally, do you expect an uptick in the violence in the insurgency between now and October 15?

AMB. KHALILZAD: Well, of course, as you know, the insurgents have declared war on the constitution. They have declared war on the election. So I will not be surprised if they

increase violence. They go after people who support the constitution. I understand the problem particularly with regard to the Sunnis who are facing intimidation and worse. They face difficult choices, a lot of pressure. But it is time for them, for the interests of their people, to join the political process. Not everyone loves every article of this document. Not everyone is totally satisfied. But there is enough in this constitution that meets the basic needs of all communities and for Iraq to move forward. But I do expect then that the terrorists and extremists will try their best to intimidate people, to prevent them--those who support the constitution from voting and to encourage opposition to this draft.

RUSSERT: Mr. Ambassador, we thank you very much for your views. Be safe.

AMB. KHALILZAD: Well, thank you, Tim. All the best.

RUSSERT: Coming next, more on the war in Iraq. An in-depth military analysis from four retired generals, Downing, Meigs, Clark, and McCaffrey. They're next right here coming up on MEET THE PRESS.

(Announcements)

RUSSERT: A military assessment of the war in Iraq with four retired generals, after this brief station break.

(Announcements)

Retired generals provide a military analysis of Iraq

RUSSERT: And we are back.

Generals, welcome all. General Clark, let me start with you. You just heard our ambassador and there are wire reports now the Kurds, the Shiites say this is a good constitution. The Sunnis, apparently at this point, don't want any part of it. What now?

GEN. WESLEY CLARK: Well, I think it has to be worked in country. I think there's a chance that this can be worked out. It's a political process. And that's the process we want. We've got a choice. Are we going to go forward and try to make a political process work or are we going to let it disintegrate into a civil war? And a lot of it does depend on American leadership, whether we like it or not. And the ambassador is over there. He's the man on the point and he's got to do it.

RUSSERT: What happens if the Sunnis do not support this constitution?

GEN. CLARK: Well, it depends on the significance of that lack of support. It may be dissolved over time. It may be that it crystalizes a Sunni political operation that empowers them and lets them get greater bargaining leverage. Maybe the constitution gets modified over time or maybe it breaks up into civil war. All of that's in play.

RUSSERT: General McCaffrey, there's been a lot of discussion about the president's comments about when the Iraqi troops stand up, the American troops stand down. You just heard the ambassador saying there are very few combat-ready Iraqis who could replace American troops on the front line. Senator Joe Biden, a Democrat from Delaware, said there are about 3,000 in his estimation, after 28 months of the war. What is your sense? How many Iraqi troops are there? And when will there be enough Iraqi troops so Americans can come home?

GEN. BARRY McCAFFREY: Well, Tim, to be honest, I'm usually optimistic about this. I talked to General George Casey in country and Dave Petraeus, a guy who's actually in charge of trying to build the Iraqi security forces. My judgment is today there is probably 110 battalions fielded, probably 36 of them are capable of taking a lead in active operations. But most of them are out there somewhere in the streets or in the rural countryside. They're a huge factor, and by next summer they're going to be very important. Now having said that, the key is not training, equipping, and deploying Iraqi security forces. It's getting a government for which they're willing to fight and die. That's more troublesome. That's more non-linear. But I actually believe that will probably happen by next summer also.

RUSSERT: So what's the hard number?

GEN. McCAFFREY: Well, you know, you can say the hard number is 182,000. But more likely you've got 36 Iraqi battalions right now that are capable of fighting engagements on their own.

RUSSERT: How many per battalion?

GEN. McCAFFREY: Well, maybe 600, 700. It's a sizable force. It's certainly out in Anbar province. Right now the Marines have got 15 Iraqi army and police battalions. That's a huge force and it's going to start to make a difference.

RUSSERT: Well, maybe that will help shed some light on the following comments, because I think I'm not alone in being confused by what we're hearing from U.S. military leadership. This is the front page of The Financial Times on Wednesday. "U.S. General Sees Significant Withdrawal In Iraq. The U.S. is expected to pull significant numbers of troops out of Iraq in the next 12 months in spite of the continuing violence, according to the general responsible for near-term planning. Maj. Gen. Douglas Lute, director of operations at U.S.

Central Command, said the reductions were part of a push by Gen. John Abizaid, commander of all U.S. troops in the region, to put the burden of defending Iraq on Iraqi forces. ... "We believe at some point, in order to break this dependence on the...coalition, you simply have to back off and let the Iraqis step forward. You have to undercut the perception of occupation in Iraq. It's difficult to do that when you have 150,000-plus, largely western, foreign troops occupying the country."

And then the Associated Press just a week ago: "The U.S. Army is planning for the possibility of keeping the current number of soldiers in Iraq--well over 100,000--for four more years, the top Army general said of Peter Schoomaker." And then this, "The top U.S. military leader in Iraq [Gen. George Casey] said there could be substantial withdrawals of the 135,000 U.S. troops in the country as early as next spring. ..."

General Downing, what's going on?

GEN. WAYNE DOWNING: Well, I think what you're seeing here, Tim, is the people in country--this is the General Casey, General John Binds--they're weighing out the requirements on how many forces are actually needed. Then it's up to the Marine Corps and the Army to satisfy those force requirements. I think what you're seeing here with General Schoomaker is he knows the future is very uncertain, that we're not going to withdraw troops on any kind of a time line. We're going to withdraw these troops, Tim, based on the conditions. One of the key conditions is going to be the stand-up of the Iraqi army. As Barry pointed out, 36 good battalions now. A year ago, we only had one. Maybe three times that, maybe 108, 110 battalions ready by next summer. That would indicate that there's a possibility that you could start pulling U.S. forces out at that time. So I think what you're seeing here are these generals playing--each one of them playing their roles. I personally don't think anybody is going to move out of there in any kind of sizable numbers for another year or two years.

RUSSERT: Keep the current force of 135,000?

GEN. DOWNING: I think that's what it's going to take.

RUSSERT: General Meigs, Peter Baker in The Washington Post wrote that the U.S. has given up hope of defeating the insurgency with U.S. forces, that it's going to take the Iraqis a step forward. Robin Wright, in The Washington Post, said that American officials have determined that they cannot defeat what could only diminish the insurgency and we will not leave a day before it's necessary, but it may be a day before that's necessary for us. Is there a sense amongst the military leadership of this country that we cannot, in fact, defeat the insurgency as it exists and that it's perhaps time to start winding down the war?

GEN. MONTGOMERY MEIGS: No. Look, the key point here is the Iraqis have to defeat the insurgency. It's the Iraqi tribal leaders and the security force that are now being produced that have to control this problem. We have to help them. We have to create a safe and secure environment that would allow those units to become capable, but the commanders I talk to that are coming back from Iraq talk about the progress they have made in their sectors. And when I ask senior Army officials who are longtime friends who aren't going to give me a BS answer how we're doing, "Are we winning or losing?" they're saying, "We're winning." But it's slow, hard going in an insurgency. It always has been. It always will be.

RUSSERT: Are we winning?

GEN. McCAFFREY: Well, probably the wrong question to be honest, Tim. I think the real question at hand is: What will happen in the constitutional process? Will there be a successful referendum? Will we get a vote in December? Will there be a legitimate government? If there won't be, we're in trouble by next summer. I personally think we can't sustain this current rate of deployment much longer than by next fall. We've got to draw down the 17 brigades in my judgment probably down to around 10.

RUSSERT: The fall of '06.

GEN. McCAFFREY: The fall of '06. So we'd better be doing pretty well next summer; we, meaning the Iraqis got a government, they got a security force and are starting to pull it together. I think that's likely to happen. This ambassador, Khalilzad, the team we've got on the ground is pretty astute. John Abizaid, you know, our Arabic-speaking CENTCOM commander, I think has a pretty good feel for it. So I don't sense despair inside the U.S. armed forces at all.

RUSSERT: General Clark, you wrote an op-ed piece for The Washington Post on Friday and I want to cite it and come back and talk about it. "Before It's Too Late in Iraq. The growing chorus of voices demanding a pullout should seriously alarm the Bush administration, because President Bush and his team are repeating the failure of Vietnam: failing to craft a realistic and infective policy and instead simply demanding that the American people show resolve. Resolve isn't enough to mend a flawed approach--or to save the lives of our troops. If the administration won't adopt a winning strategy, then the American people will be justified in demanding that it bring our troops home."

GEN. CLARK: Exactly. And it starts with the intent and the purposes, the mind-set of the

administration when it went into Iraq. This administration went into Iraq as this was the first of a number of states that it was going to knock off, get leadership change in, maybe even move military forces against. They expected to be welcomed as liberators. Then they refused to really construct a diplomatic dialogue in the region. For us to succeed in Iraq, we've got to deal with Iraq's neighbors. You cannot isolate Iraq from its neighborhood. Iraq's neighbors are part of the problem, and they've got to be part of the solution. That means we're going to have to talk to Syria and Iran and Turkey and Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and the best thing to do is to try to get them all together in a step-by-step process so that there can be a regional dialogue. If we can put a regional dialogue together on top of the political process that's going on in Iraq, then maybe we've got a chance. Without that, then it's in the interest of every one of those states to fight inside Iraq for their own interests. So the Iranians pull their faction in Iraq one way. The Syrians and the Saudis work on the Sunnis to do what they want. And this state is getting ripped apart from the outside. We want to help put that state together, we've got to work with Iraq's neighbors.

RUSSERT: Why is it in Iran or Syria's interests to help us? Why not let the current status quo continue and they can take full advantage of having a radical Islamic state in Iraq, which is fueled by terrorism who can help destroy the United States?

GEN. CLARK: Well, it's up to U.S. diplomacy to find those elements of common interest. And here's the way I'd do it. If you look at Iran, what they want is a Shia-dominated buffer state in Iraq. After all, they were invaded by Iraq once. They see this as an historic opportunity to advance the cause of Shia Islam. That's exactly what the Saudis and the Kuwaitis and other Gulf states don't want. And so between those two diverging points of views, we could pull together the common interests, broker the compromises, work the arrangements, and craft a state in Iraq that meets everybody's concerns in the regions and gives the Iraqi people the kind of self-determination and regional support that they're going to need.

RUSSERT: Was it a mistake to go into Iraq?

GEN. CLARK: Well, I think it was a strategic blunder. First it wasn't connected to the war on terror, at least not to the people that struck us. Secondly, it has proved a huge recruitment tool for al-Qaeda. It's a feed lot for terrorists who want to learn how to fight Americans. We put our American soldiers at risk there. And we're producing terrorists out there. It's a training ground. And seeing American soldiers engaged there just raises the temperature and the blood pressure throughout the Islamic world. So I wish we hadn't done it. But having said that, I still believe there's an opportunity to make the best of a bad situation in Iraq. I don't want to see us come out of there if we can put a strategy together that will leave that region more peaceful and protect our interests and the interests of the other nations.

RUSSERT: Would Iraq have been more stable with Saddam Hussein?

GEN. CLARK: I think we could have worked against Saddam Hussein in a different way. We hadn't exhausted the diplomatic process. We hadn't finished squeezing him. There were lots of different moves we could have put on Saddam Hussein and maintained the focus on Afghanistan, where we've still got significant problems. We really haven't addressed the issues of Pakistan yet. We really haven't worked the whole arrangement of militant Wahabism coming out of Saudi Arabia, the funding, the ideology. If we're going to succeed in the war on terror, we have to succeed first on an ideological basis. It's about persuading people that they don't want to feel this way and that they shouldn't feel this way. It's about changing minds before it's about killing people.

RUSSERT: All of you have had distinguished military careers, leading men into war. We now have a majority of the American people saying this war is a mistake. General Downing, how long can you conduct a war that is not supported by a majority of the American people?

GEN. DOWNING: Well, Tim, you absolutely have to have the support of the American people. And the troops that we have in Afghanistan and Iraq right now feel this very, very strongly. They want the support. Quite frankly, I think one of the problems that we're having is that the news media, the opposition to the war are framing this entire discussion in the terms of casualties and casualties only. I think what we don't have is a serious discussion about why you take those casualties.

We're not out there roaming the roads in Iraq and Afghanistan, looking for IEDs to blow up. Everything we're doing in a military campaign, both the U.S., the coalition and the Iraqi forces, are aimed at objectives. And those objectives are to promote the political process, number one, because what we're doing, Tim--for the last six weeks we've been doing this--we're preparing for the election in the middle of October--I mean, the referendum on the constitution and then the following one, the election in December to ratify it.

The other things we're doing is we're supporting the economic development of that country and the social development. That's why these military operations are going on. And I really think that it's incumbent upon you and the others and the responsible American

press to put the casualties into these kind of context. In other words, what is it that they're accomplishing? I mean, can you imagine us and, you know, it's been quoted out there in the Web, judging the D-Day invasion of Normandy back in 1944 by the casualties that were suffered?

RUSSERT: But those opposed to the war will say there's no comparison between World War II and Iraq; that one was a war of choice and one was a war of necessity. Those opposed to the war will say that we entered this war on the rationale of weapons of mass destruction that do not exist. Those who oppose the war will say that the number of troops that were necessary to conduct the war and the level of armament was woefully inadequate. And that it is--and that we would be greeted as liberators. None of those things have happened. And it's time to take the troops home because this was a tragic blunder.

GEN. MEIGS: Tim, it doesn't matter. We're there. We lanced the boil. We're there. We have Salafist penetration into this situation in a very-hard core Sunni insurgency and a critical point in the Middle East, for fit goes south, if we get a civil war between Sunnis and Shias, international markets will be affected. Our role as an international leader will be affected. We'll have a huge strategic problem. So having pushed Humpty Dumpty off the wall, which I would agree was untimely, the Pottery Barn rule applies. We have got to leave this as a stable situation. We cannot afford to pull out here prematurely.

RUSSERT: Does that mean putting in more troops, if necessary?

GEN. MEIGS: It means doing whatever's required strategically to ensure that we get an Iraqi government and an Iraqi security services that can run a reasonable country that's constituent-based.

RUSSERT: Do we have more troops to put in there if need be?

GEN. MEIGS: If we had to surge troops, we could. It wouldn't be easy but we could, yes.

RUSSERT: General McCaffrey, you said this two weeks ago: "It's a race against time because by the end of this coming summer we can no longer sustain the presence we have now. This thing, the wheels are coming off it. The American people are walking away from this war." You were involved in Vietnam. How long can you conduct a war without the support of the majority of the American people?

GEN. McCAFFREY: Well, remember, I was one that supported the intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan from the start. I thought the president was right when he went in. I still feel that way. Now, having said that, armies don't fight wars, countries fight wars. So without the support of the American people, this thing will come to a grinding halt rather quickly. I think part--I actually agree with Wayne Downing's views. We haven't put the strategic argument in the right context in the public. However, you know, I pulled out a quote, 24 August news conference, Secretary Rumsfeld: "Throughout history there's always been those that predict America's failure just around every corner." And he goes on to talk about "many Western intellectuals praised Stalin during the period of World War II." For God's sakes, Tim, you know, we have to have this argument set up in a respectful manner to the American people. We have had 16,000 killed and wounded, \$200 billion. It's a very difficult situation. And I think some of the happy talk and spin coming out of the Pentagon leadership is part of the president's problem.

RUSSERT: Do you believe that Secretary Rumsfeld should stay in his current position?

GEN. McCAFFREY: Well, I don't think I have a legitimate viewpoint to express on that thing. I think many people argue that his misjudgments have put us in a serious difficult position. I think the intervention, as Wes Clark says, was badly done. You know, I go over there and look at these soldiers and Marines in combat right now and Navy SEALs. They're the best kids we ever had in uniform--I don't think that's an overstatement in term of courage and commitment--but they've got to be backed up by the American people, by the Congress and by the Pentagon with more sensible policies and adequate resources and we don't have that right now.

GEN. CLARK: Tim, and if I could just--I just want to come in on one thing here. You got us here as military experts. But if you ask any of the top leaders, they will tell you that the country has a responsibility. The president has a responsibility. This administration has a responsibility diplomatically in the region. One of my greatest heartburns with this operation is we dumped the responsibility on our uniformed services over there for doing this. We haven't carried the load diplomatically in the region.

Now, every one of us who serve in top positions knows that there has to be hand-in-glove teamwork between military force, diplomacy, economic power and informational power. This administration has relied excessively on the courage and skill of the men and women in uniform. It doesn't want to talk to the people in Iran. It doesn't want to talk to Syria. It doesn't want to do the hard work and heavy lifting of diplomacy because of domestic politics at home. And I think it's time we said it. You know, I just can't stand to see the sacrifices men and women in uniform and their families make when this administration won't lift its finger the right way diplomatically to give them the help they need to succeed in Iraq.

RUSSERT: You have this concern about diplomacy. General McCaffrey, you raised a concern about misjudgments made. Anthony Zinni, a man you know well, had this to say--he's the former head of the U.S. Central Command. He says that "Rumsfeld has turned the nation's top military officials into 'Stepford generals,' who have acquiesced in a transfer of power from uniformed officers to the Pentagon's civilian managers. ... 'We have a very strong-willed secretary. We went into a war where he took away a lot of the prerogatives of the military, made some military decisions on troop strength and postwar planning, and they did not do well to say the least.'"

Do you agree with General Zinni?

GEN. DOWNING: Well, that's a--that's a--that's a very controversial statement. The people that I know in the building, Tim, in the Pentagon say that Secretary Rumsfeld is a very aggressive, very, very tough leader, but you can talk to him. Certainly there were decisions made during the Iraq War, Tim, that were probably ones that we wish we could--we could relive. You know, when you--when you do a war plan, you probably make 50 assumptions, and if five of them go bad, that's OK, because--providing you recognize you made a bad assumption and you react to it. And I think there's a lot of truth in the fact that we probably wasted the first 12 months in Iraq because we didn't plan enough for post hostilities. But...

RUSSERT: I think what you're saying, General...

GEN. DOWNING: But what is--yeah.

RUSSERT: Let's just stop right here, because this is very important. We have four military generals on this table. You're saying we wasted the first months. General Clark is saying...

GEN. DOWNING: First year.

RUSSERT: First year.

GEN. DOWNING: Yeah.

RUSSERT: General Clark is saying that there has been not the necessary diplomatic research. General McCaffrey said there have been misjudgments made. Some people will say declare that you're armchair quarterbacks, armchair generals. But you're four men with vast experience and you're coming to some very harsh judgments about the execution of this war and its process.

GEN. DOWNING: But the fact is, is they've made the adjustments. And by the way, I'm not an apologist for the administration. I'm not a member of the administration, although I was. But they've made the adjustments. I don't agree with Wes on the diplomatic tracks, because I think the diplomatic tracks are being pursued except not in a visible way. The other thing you've got to realize, Tim, is what we're doing in Iraq is a revolution, and one of the reasons this--that we're having trouble with this in this region is if a democratic Iraq arises, it is going to change the landscape of that entire region. It is the most strategic country from the Mediterranean out to Afghanistan. And if we're able to produce this democracy, which by the way I think we are, it may not be an American democracy, but it's going to be an Arab democracy. This is going to be a watershed effect which is going to affect an entire region.

RUSSERT: It's going to be an Islamic state, by the--by the wording of its own constitution.

GEN. DOWNING: There are other Islamic states. Turkey is an Islamic state. Malaysia is an-- is an Islamic state. Indonesia are Islamic states. These are all states which are acceptable to us and acceptable to the world.

GEN. CLARK: Tim, I'd like to go back there...

RUSSERT: Who will have--I'll get there. Who'll have more influence with Iraq: Iran or the United States?

GEN. DOWNING: I do not think it's going to be Iran. And I think one of the things you're seeing with this federation is the ability to protect the minorities of those countries, both Sunni and Kurdish. And one of the things that's lacking from this entire equation, Tim, is trust. This is a country that has no history of trust in any kind of a political process, you know, and we're judging this with 230, 250 years of experience with democracy. This is the first time these people have actually done this and, you know--and I really think that they will grow into this thing and this constitution, whatever it's going to be. And by the way, it's going to be ratified, and it's probably going to be accepted because the numbers tell you that. I think this overall will be good for the country once they establish trust.

RUSSERT: Go ahead, General.

GEN. CLARK: Two points. First, when generals are given senior command positions and they've had their entire lives and professional education in the military, they're expected to have a body of professional knowledge and character that lets them stand up for what they believe. So we have a principle of civilian supremacy. No one doubts that the secretary of defense is ultimately in charge. He's going to make the right decision or he's going to make the right decision as he sees it. It's up to the generals. If they feel

he's making the wrong decision, they fight it. If they feel it's that significant, then they retire or resign from their position. Nobody's done that. So whatever the thrashing around was, they are complicit in that decision, in those decisions. Whether they turn out to have been bad or not, that was military advice.

Now, we've all been in positions where we've disagreed with our bosses, and it turns out, you know, bosses normally don't like that, so it's a pretty unpleasant thing, and you've got to have people of character in uniform at high positions, and then you've got to trust the process. In this case, I don't think the answers that came out of that process were good.

Secondly, with regard to diplomacy, I've talked to members on the NSC staff. I know they're not doing the diplomacy. Going to the Iranians and asking them not to help their side is not the kind of contact I'm talking about. I'm talking about having something like a contact group which we set up in the Balkans at the diplomatic level, at the representational level, in public where you can get nations' interests out on the table, where you can talk about regional issues, including trade and travel, you know, tourism, visiting Najaf, where the airport are going to be. All of these are regional concerns, and they need to be dealt with in an open fashion.

It's not just about cutting off the supply of weapons or the flow of jihaddists, although that's part of it. This administration needs to bite the bullet and say, "Look, we're in a part of the world where there are going to be people that we wouldn't necessarily run their countries the way they're doing it. But they are the governments, and we're going to talk to them even if we don't agree with everything they say." It's up to us find areas of common interest and try to work this.

RUSSERT: We're at a critical stage in this war by everyone's estimation. And, General Downing, you raised the role of the media. There was widespread discussion about the role of the media in Vietnam, the media lost the war and so forth, but we're in a situation now where Cindy Sheehan, who lost a son, has encamped herself down in Crawford, Texas, is coming to Washington. There are anti-war demonstrations throughout the country. The reconstruction of the country has not occurred on pace. Money that was supposed to be used for reconstruction is being used to help secure the country. General Meigs, General McCaffrey, everybody, we in the media are covering the reality. Are we not obligated to do that even though it may not, in fact, "encourage," quote, unquote, the American people to support the war effort?

GEN. MEIGS: Wrong question, Tim. Look, there is a very complicated phenomenon here, and we in the media tend to go to the extremes. We tend to go to the most controversial, the most exciting event. So the problem is, in an insurgency, progress comes from dogged, hard, sweaty, dangerous work. It's very slow business. And it's hard to get the complexities of this kind of an operation into soundbites and above the full paragraphs. It's very difficult work. That is compounded by the fact that reporters down range have a very difficult time getting out of that Green Zone and getting down into the grass roots of what's going on politically. So the frustration I have as a former soldier is I will talk to people who've just returned from Vietnam. And you saw Chris Matthew's "Hardball" program. There are commanders...

GEN. McCAFFREY: Iraq.

GEN. MEIGS: ...Iraq--there are commanders who believe very strongly that their soldiers have made tremendous progress on the ground in their sectors. Better human intelligence. Better cooperation from Sunnis. Better hit rates in going around and policing of insurgents. Better use of technology to trump what this very innovative enemy is doing. You don't read about these things in the major newspapers that should have a sophistication to cover them. You generally don't get that in the TV media. Now, yes, absolutely the fourth estate has to cover the problem. It's got to cover the bad news as well as the good, but a lot of the really constructive stories that are coming out of this war never make it above the fold.

RUSSERT: Is it because, in your mind, that the notion of weapons of mass destruction or major combat operations are over, of many of those things that the media had been told proved to be incorrect?

GEN. MEIGS: I think we are all citizens frustrated by the fact that the precepts upon which this war was ostensibly based proved to be wrong. And I think the historians will tear that apart when the proper documents are finally declassified in a decade or two.

RUSSERT: I want to give you each a minute and explain the best you can, based on all your experiences and judgment, what Iraq will look like one year from now.

GEN. McCAFFREY: A pretty good news story. I think you'll have an act of vicious insurgency going on in Anbar province. You'll have assassinations and trouble throughout the mixed Sunni-Shia areas. You'll have the economy coming along strong. You'll have some form of government operationally. You'll have a huge Iraqi security force out in the field. And you'll see a drawdown of a third or so of U.S. military forces starting in about another year.

RUSSERT: But we'll still be at about 100,000?

GEN. McCAFFREY: Yeah, probably.

RUSSERT: What do you see a year from now?

GEN. CLARK: Continuing political disagreements, strong insurgency, strong terrorist movement, a drawdown in U.S. forces, an administration that claims success, continuing concerns about the Islamization of the political process in Iraq, growing encroachments on Iraqi sovereignty from neighboring states and continuing efforts as the United States starts to pull out, other nations start to go in. Iraq's on the fault line between Shia and Sunni Islam. And we can't fix that. We've got to help fix it and we won't. I don't see this administration making the diplomatic effort required. So what I see is they're doing a minimalist job trying to put a papier-mache government together and use that with the training of forces and then try to pull out forces here in time for the 2006 elections. I think, you know, the question is five years and 10 years down the line. This would be a government that we won't be--it'll be a state that we won't necessarily be proud of having created.

RUSSERT: General Downing?

GEN. DOWNING: Well, Tim, 12 of 16 provinces, which is two-thirds of the country, are going to be peaceful and are going to have great development. I think two of the three Sunni provinces are going to come around. I think Al Anbar province, which is from Baghdad on out to the Iraqi border around Al-Khem, is still going to be a pest, though. I think we're still going to have this link of the jihadists coming in from Syria and some of the former Ba'athists using this as a base area. I do think that in another year or 15 months, we're going to be able to start taking the U.S. forces down somewhat, because I think the Iraqi forces are going to be in strength of about 150,000 of both police and army. So I'm very, very positive. And I'm giving you this without any political motive. You know, I'm giving you this as a military analyst. But speaking from the fact that military operations are conducted for larger ends, not for ends of themselves--political, social, economic--I think this thing is going to go the right way.

RUSSERT: General Meigs?

GEN. MEIGS: I am pretty much on the same ground with Barry and Wayne. I think that we'll see pol--halting, difficult, problematic political progress. I disagree that we'll not be proud of the results. I worry that the administration will start perhaps pressuring drawdown numbers, which is why I hate to see round numbers go on the table, and try to get to a premature withdrawal of brigades.

RUSSERT: Why? Because of the 2006 election?

GEN. MEIGS: Well, because wear and tear on the Army costs and the election, obviously. I hope that doesn't happen. I think they're listening the commanders on the ground. And that's the key to this thing.

RUSSERT: There's been a lot of discussion about the impact, the effect of this war on the U.S. military. They now acknowledge, those who are involved in recruitment, that this is a very difficult recruiting year and perhaps the next several years, not only for the Guard Reserve but rank and file military. What has the war in Iraq done to the U.S. military?

GEN. CLARK: I think it's given the people in the military a chance to really show how good they are. It's built a lot of teamwork. It's hurt. A lot of people have suffered both physically and family-wise. And we're losing junior officers. We're losing NCOs. But I never bet against the United States Army. We've got an incredible group of men and women in that force. They are going to hold with us. And they will be there as long as the country needs them.

RUSSERT: Is the volunteer Army at risk?

GEN. McCAFFREY: No, not at all. I don't think so. I think--I agree with Wes completely. This is the toughest, strongest, bravest Army we've ever fielded. When I say Army--Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard team along with it. Special Operations capability is absolutely phenomenal. The military won't be the cause of failure. Having said that, we're going to damage fatally the National Guard if we try and continue using Reserve components at this rate. Forty percent of that force in Iraq right now is Reserve component. We have shot the bull. We've got to back off and build an Army and Marine Corps capable of sustaining these operations.

RUSSERT: That means increase the size?

GEN. McCAFFREY: Absolutely. And get the incentives out of Congress. You know, thank God, we now hear Senator John McCain, Chuck Hagel, Jack Reed, Duncan Hunter, talking about bringing to bear the resources we need to build an adequate force.

GEN. MEIGS: Well, we need to be realistic about this. The Army has to recruit 80,000 people a year or we're going to be short somewhere between 2,000 and 8,000. The Army has moved 30,000 spaces from non-combat to combat. That's a division equivalent--four or five brigade equivalent. That's new units coming out, combat units coming out. The Army's authorized to have 512,000 out until '09. We can't try to build an Army we can't afford and we can't man.

RUSSERT: That will have to be the last word. To be continued. Generals, thank you all for a most interesting, insightful discussion.

-----Original Message-----

From: [b] [redacted] AFIS-HQ/PIA
Sent: Sunday, August 28, 2005 4:54 PM
To: Phoebus, Taft, AFIS-HQ/MO; Lee, Linda, AFIS-HQ/MO
Subject: Meet the press transcript

Pls send it to Bryan as soon as you see it. Thanks.

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Sunday, August 28, 2005 9:47 AM
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Fw: Sunday Shows

Let's put together some ideas that include a pentagon briefing, some hill time, and some targeterd stuff. Also, analysts, perhaps in the bldg where they can see secdef/cjcs, too.
Tnx

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Petraeus, David LTG/09 <david.petraeus@(b)(6)>
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA <larry.dirita@(b)(6)>
CC: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA <Bryan.Whitman@(b)(6)>
Sent: Sun Aug 28 09:40:52 2005
Subject: RE: Sunday Shows

I'm changing command here on 8 Sep, Larry, and then head to Afghan at the SECDEF's request (to look at the train/equip program there) for about a week. Should be home on or about the 16th. Guess we could do London, but the logistics of it would be tough, frankly, as we'll have a fair amount of stuff and had planned to hop C-130s and C-17s most of the way. But if it's key, am willing to do it.

The only other item I'm considering at present is an AEI Panel on 3 Oct. (Am also committed to a speech to Army JAG officers in Charlottesville on 6 Oct, but that's preaching to the choir and without press.) Have also done Charlie Rose before and might be willing to do that again.

Best - Dave

-----Original Message-----

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA [mailto:larry.dirita@(b)(6)]
Sent: Sunday, August 28, 2005 5:07 PM
To: Petraeus, David LTG/09
Cc: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Sunday Shows

Dave-thanks for what you did with the generals.

I don't think we need to be too aggressive with your sked, but if we are smart we can cover things with a handful of thoughtful activities.

I can call you at your convenience and we can discuss, but I think I'll have bryan put together an outline of the things that might make sense and get it to you.

When do you plan to be back in u.s.?

One thing, if possible en route, would be a forum we (dod) sponsors in london that is of the record but involves a very good collection of journalists for a roundtable discussion. Abizaïd has done it, among others, and it really helps.

We can discuss the eaches once we sketch it out. It would help to know your dates.
Best....

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Petraeus, David LTG/09 <david.petraeus@[\(b\)\(6\)](#)>
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA <larry.dirita@[\(b\)\(6\)](#)>; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
<Bryan.Whitman@[\(b\)\(6\)](#)>
CC: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD [EX:/O=ORGANIZATION/OU=SECDEF/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=DIRITA];
ldirita@[\(b\)\(6\)](#) <ldirita@[\(b\)\(6\)](#)>

Sent: Sat Aug 27 13:32:03 2005
Subject: RE: Sunday Shows

Larry, thanks for the head's up and trying to make those points. Talked to GEN McCaffrey, and am Emailing GEN Downing (who Emailed me). Will call GEN Meigs. GEN McC, frankly, has some bomb chucker ideas that I tried to temper, but I'm not sure I succeeded. (Told him for ex that we got \$5.7B this year!)

Would be happy to have Bryan develop a plan for my return and work with me directly. Do have some leave plans and things I need to do (including seeing my father for the first time since Iraq started), so would appreciate not too ambitious a program. Did send up one plan, which was returned; then sent another which I thought had been forwarded. In any event, something that's modest is best, I think. (Have done a couple of things here, including an intv with Jane Arraf that we think came our pretty well.) Maybe he and I can talk directly...

Best - Dave

-----Original Message-----

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA [mailto:larry.dirita@[\(b\)\(6\)](#)]
Sent: Saturday, August 27, 2005 4:40 PM
To: Petraeus, David LTG/09; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD; 'ldirita@[\(b\)\(6\)](#)'
Subject: Re: Sunday Shows

Dave...if you have not already spoken to these guys, one of the things you might want to be mindful of is that some of these retired military analysts are trying to have it both ways.

They want to be extremely critical of the policy, of the secdef and his supposed bad plans, but very supportive of their fellow generals.

I appreciate the impulse, but it's crappy and it ultimately undermines the public's confidence across the board to see this relentless misinformation about how things would be better if rumsfeld would give the generals what they need in iraq.

It's b.s., and you might want to help these guys better understand the situation in this regard.

P.s.... Still have not seen a workable proposal for a contact plan for you. Great interest in one. I got a list of interview requests you or someone has approved, bbut that is just one element of a plan. Can I ask bryan w. to develop one and work with you directly? Tnx

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Petraeus, David LTG/09 <david.petraeus@**(b)(6)**>
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA <Bryan.Whitman@**(b)(6)**>
CC: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD [EX:/O=ORGANIZATION/OU=SECDEF/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=DIRITA];
ldirita@**(b)(6)** <ldirita@**(b)(6)**>

Sent: Fri Aug 26 22:59:45 2005
Subject: RE: Sunday Shows

Will do, Bryan, thanks --

From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA [mailto:Bryan.Whitman@**(b)(6)**]
Sent: Sat 8/27/2005 6:24 AM
To: Petraeus, David LTG/09; Petraeus, David LTG/09
Cc: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD; Larry DiRita (ldirita@**(b)(6)**)
Subject: Sunday Shows

Dave,

I noticed that Meigs, Downing and McCaffrey are each appearing on various Sunday Shows this weekend. If you had the time, I'm sure they would appreciate hearing from you and getting a current update on the status of your efforts in training security forces. If past experience is any indication, it really helps their commentary if they have the opportunity to spend a few minutes to hear from somebody who is actually out there doing it.

I've attached some contact numbers for each of them if you are inclined to engage. If I can be of any assistance, please don't hesitate to let me know. Thanks for your consideration.

Regards,

Bryan

DASD (Media Operations)
(b)(2)

General Montgomery Meigs (USA, Retired)
Telephone: **(b)(2)**
Cellular: **(b)(2)**

General Wayne A. Downing (USA, Retired)
Telephone: **(b)(2)**
Cellular: **(b)(2)**

General Barry R. McCaffrey (USA, Retired) Telephone **(b)(2)** Executive Assistant, Ms.
Christi Mayer
office: **(b)(2)**
cell: **(b)(2)**
home: **(b)(2)**

(b)(6)

From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, August 26, 2005 5:38 PM
To: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA; Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: Re:

Larry,

You want me to send Dave a note asking him if he would be willing?

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA <Allison.Barber@**(b)(6)**>
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA <Bryan.Whitman@**(b)(6)**>; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA <frank.thorp@**(b)(6)**>; Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA <larry.dirita@**(b)(6)**>; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@**(b)(6)**>
Sent: Fri Aug 26 17:34:37 2005
Subject: Fw:

Gotcha covered!!! Contact info below.

-----Original Message-----

From: **(b)(6)**, CIV, OASD-PA <**(b)(6)**>
To: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA <Allison.Barber@**(b)(6)**>
Sent: Fri Aug 26 17:05:46 2005
Subject: RE:

General Montgomery Meigs (USA, Retired)
Telephone: **(b)(2)**
Cellular: **(b)(2)**

General Wayne A. Downing (USA, Retired)
Telephone: **(b)(2)**
Cellular: **(b)(2)**

General Barry R. McCaffrey (USA, Retired) Telephone **(b)(2)** Executive Assistant, **(b)(6)**
office: **(b)(2)**
cell: **(b)(2)**
home: **(b)(2)**

-----Original Message-----

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, August 26, 2005 5:00 PM
To: **(b)(6)**, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Fw:

Please send me phone nnumbers for these guys.
Thx

-----Original Message-----

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA <larry.dirita@**(b)(6)**>
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA <Bryan.Whitman@**(b)(6)**>; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
<frank.thorp@**(b)(6)**>
CC: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@**(b)(6)**>; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
<Allison.Barber@**(b)(6)**>
Sent: Fri Aug 26 16:54:20 2005
Subject:

I notice that monty meigs, wayne downing, and mccaffrey are on Sunday shows

I wonder if it would make sense to see if general petreaus were willing to speak with them
between now and then?

(b)(6)

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, August 26, 2005 5:35 PM
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA; Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: Fw:

Gotcha covered!!! Contact info below.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA <(b)(6)>
To: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA <Allison.Barber@(b)(6)>
Sent: Fri Aug 26 17:05:46 2005
Subject: RE:

General Montgomery Meigs (USA, Retired)
Telephone: (b)(2)
Cellular: (b)(2)

General Wayne A. Downing (USA, Retired)
Telephone: (b)(2)
Cellular: (b)(2)

General Barry R. McCaffrey (USA, Retired) Telephone (b)(2) Executive Assistant, (b)(6)
office: (b)(2)
cell: (b)(2)
home: (b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, August 26, 2005 5:00 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Fw:

Please send me phone nnumbers for these guys.
Thx

-----Original Message-----

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA <larry.diritata@(b)(6)>
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA <Bryan.Whitman@(b)(6)>; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA <frank.thorp@(b)(6)>
CC: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@(b)(6)>; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA <Allison.Barber@(b)(6)>
Sent: Fri Aug 26 16:54:20 2005
Subject:

I notice that monty meigs, wayne downing, and mccaffrey are on Sunday shows

I wonder if it would make sense to see if general petreaus were willing to speak with them between now and then?

(b)(6)

From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, August 26, 2005 5:33 PM
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
Cc: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Col OASD-PA
Subject: Re:

Not a bad idea. That a tough group and as you know have not been very supportive before. If everyone thinks it is a good idea I can send the thought downrange. I will have to find contact info for those guys.

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA <larry.dirita@(b)(6)>
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA <Bryan.Whitman@(b)(6)>; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA <frank.thorp@(b)(6)>
CC: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@(b)(6)>; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA <Allison.Barber@(b)(6)>
Sent: Fri Aug 26 16:54:20 2005
Subject:

I notice that monty meigs, wayne downing, and mcaffrey are on Sunday shows

I wonder if it would make sense to see if general petreaus were willing to speak with them between now and then?

(b)(6)

From: Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Friday, August 26, 2005 5:35 PM
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE:

Importance: High

Sorry, meant to also answer you -- YES, I think we should connect them with LTG Petreaus...

V/r,
Frank

Frank Thorp
Captain, USN
Special Assistant for Public Affairs
to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, August 26, 2005 4:54 PM
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
Cc: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject:

I notice that monty meigs, wayne downing, and mccaffrey are on Sunday shows

I wonder if it would make sense to see if general petreaus were willing to speak with them between now and then?

(b)(6)

From: Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Friday, August 26, 2005 5:34 PM
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE:

Importance: High

And I think we should make sure that they get transcripts of CJCS press conference today...

Frank Thorp
Captain, USN
Special Assistant for Public Affairs
to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, August 26, 2005 4:54 PM
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
Cc: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject:

I notice that monty meigs, wayne downing, and mcaffrey are on Sunday shows

I wonder if it would make sense to see if general petreaus were willing to speak with them between now and then?

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@**(b)(6)**
Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2005 4:53 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Interviews for China Book

Bless you, my friend. Many thanks.

Jed Babbin

(b)(2) (home office)
(home fax)
(mobile)

(b)(6)

From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2005 4:35 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Interviews for China Book

We will get him started with the right folks in Policy.

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2005 4:16 PM
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Subject: FW: Interviews for China Book

this is the essence of what jed is trying to get into. he's provided a fairly detailed roadmap. thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: JedBabbin@[\(b\)\(6\)](mailto:JedBabbin@(b)(6)) [mailto:JedBabbin@[\(b\)\(6\)](mailto:JedBabbin@(b)(6))]
Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2005 4:12 PM
To: eric.ruff@[\(b\)\(6\)](mailto:eric.ruff@(b)(6))
Subject: Interviews for China Book

Eric: As we've discussed a bit, I'm writing a new book for Regnery about China, its military buildup, and the likelihood that we will, at some time in the next decade, be in a shooting war with them. The manuscript is due in late November so I'm eager to get as much going as soon as I can. (The deadline is subject to revision if SECDEF makes a trip to China and I get to join the group accompanying him).

I will characterize China as a regional superpower (which, I hope, is not an oxymoron). It is, I think, not a "peer competitor" of the United States, but on the verge of being a "peer antagonist." The book will present a strategic picture, a discussion of Chinese military/political doctrine, using the new DoD report, "The Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2005" as a starting point. The book will also set forth about five scenarios on how a war is most likely to break out and how it might be fought.

To best do this, I would greatly appreciate your help in arranging interviews with senior DoD officials to discuss these principal questions:

1. Is there a Sino-Russian military alliance? Some analysts think so. The recent joint exercises -- coupled with Chinese purchase of all sorts of top Russian weapon systems -- indicate something more than just a thawing of Cold War-era hostility;
2. How unified is the Chinese government? Is it factionalized, and how much power does Hu Jintao have personally? How dangerous to them is the increasing unrest among the populace? It seems too small to portend much real instability.
3. The "24-character strategy": How do our strategists and policy makers deal with the emphasis on deception and concealment?
4. This year's QDR is aimed, in significant part, at Chinese intentions and capabilities. Why? In top-level terms, what does that mean for our force structure, especially weapon system development? How did SECDEF

express his (and the president's) concerns in the terms of reference to the QDR?

5. Space and counter-space: Chinese investment in weapons to reduce or destroy our satellite nav/comm/defense structure seems enormous. What's our answer to an enormous vulnerability?

6. The most far-out scenario is one based on the "Unrestricted Warfare" book by Liang and Xiangsui. A war that could destroy America without a shot fired, an aircraft leaving the ground or a ship leaving port. Cyberwar, and counter-cyber war. Hackers -- and not just the government organized Chinese hackers -- seem to be able to access all but our most highly-protected systems. How are we dealing with this vulnerability?

7. The Chinese seem to be adopting our "network-centric" warfare. How well are they doing it, and what's the answer to it? and

8. Is China involved in nuclear/other WMD proliferation? Did they cooperate with the A.Q. Khan network? Are they encouraging North Korean missile and weapons proliferation?

I realize some of these questions may require answers I'm not going to get. And I know of one particular gent over there who doesn't answer hypothetical questions. I hope to interview him, and promise to avoid same. Many thanks in advance for all the help. Best, Jed.

Jed Babbin

(b)(2) [REDACTED] (home office)
[REDACTED] (home fax)
[REDACTED] (mobile)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) Col OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2005 3:18 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: transcript of o'reilly

Sir: You saved my hide Tks much

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2005 2:56 PM
To: (b)(6) Col OASD-PA
Subject: FW: transcript of o'reilly

(b)(6) in case you need it. thanks.

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SHOW: THE O'REILLY FACTOR 8:37 PM EST

August 23, 2005 Tuesday

TRANSCRIPT: 082305cb.256
SECTION: NEWS; Domestic
LENGTH: 1527 words
HEADLINE: Strategies for Winning in Iraq
BYLINE: Bill O'Reilly, Bill Cowan, David Hunt
BODY:

O'REILLY: Thanks for staying with us. I'm Bill O'Reilly.

In the "Unresolved Problem" segment tonight, winning the war in Iraq. Some Americans don't believe that can be done. I disagree. And so do two FOX News military analysts. Joining us now from Washington, Lieutenant Colonel Bill Cowan and from Boston, Colonel David Hunt.

Now, we might tell everybody we saw you guys a few weeks ago, that you came in with very pessimistic assessments of Iraq as it stands now. Both of you did. And I'm sure you both know the Pentagon didn't like that, all right? They watched that report. You both got grief, I'm sure, and your e-mails burned off.

But you were honest, in my opinion. You brought in what was going on over there. I don't think anybody can put a happy face on the military situation at this point. You can't go out for a cup of coffee in Baghdad. It's tough to get from the airport into Baghdad on the airport road. Things are dicey over there.

But now tonight I want to put forth in very simple terms so even I can understand it, colonels, how you think the war can be won. Colonel Hunt, we'll start with you. Go.

COL. DAVID HUNT, U.S. ARMY: Yes, in a college football game, you fire football coaches for losing seasons. It's time to fire some people. I'd fire three -- one CIA, one State Department, one military four star and above. The CIA is only rotating every 90 days their personnel. That guy is fired. The State Department only 90 days.

And the military is not working. I'd put a four-star general in charge, Schoomaker, bring him a chief of staff of

the Army's job or Jim Jones, the NATO commander. And no, they didn't call me and suggest it. These are two fighters, two killers, and it needs to be done.

Put more Special Forces on the ground. Put two Army divisions up north to stop the infiltration. The State Department have a meeting with the surrounding countries. One more citizen of your country kills one of our guys, we're going to blow up a building in your city and have an F-18 fly over that meeting. No more games. Start the Phoenix program as we did in Vietnam.

Again disband all militias, the Iraqi police are using militias. And guess what, Iran is supporting a militia in the south. I'll let Bill get some more. It's outrageous; it needs to stop now.

O'REILLY: All right. But I don't understand some of what you said there, Colonel Hunt, which is not unusual for me, so please be patient. All right. Ninety-day rotations, what does that mean? All right? What does...

HUNT: Bill, got to talk about also the State Department and Central Intelligence Agency are rotating their people every 90 days in Iraq. Our guys, the military is spending a year to 15 months.

O'REILLY: All right. So they need to stay there longer, correct?

HUNT: A hundred percent right.

O'REILLY: All right.

HUNT: How do you spy with 90 days?

O'REILLY: Do you want a battlefield commander to take over overall at -- overall...

HUNT: I want a killer -- I want a killer to take over Jim Jones as NATO commander. Marine, absolutely capable guy.

O'REILLY: OK. Not a politician but a wartime commander.

HUNT: A hundred percent.

O'REILLY: And the third one that was going to be replaced was Rumsfeld? Is that what you said or...

HUNT: I said one three -- four star above, DOD, and the CIA to get this nation's attention. Nobody pays for the mistake of WMD or 9/11. Our soldiers are dying and 14,000 wounded. It's time to change the team.

O'REILLY: OK. Colonel Cowan, go.

LT. COL. BILL COWAN, U.S. ARMY: Well, Bill, let me tell you first, that after that show last time not only did we get some grief from the Pentagon but I think Dave and I both got a lot of supportive e-mails from friends in the military, the same people who had come to us before that show to talk about a lot of the problems so we could address them.

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O'REILLY: OK.

COWAN: Secondly, we need to dismount. We've got people riding all over in Humvees and other kinds of vehicles. We need to get out of those things, get back on the ground, establish relationships with people.

Third, very quickly, Bill, we've got a lot of intelligence expertise flowing out of Iraq. Young men and women serving over there for a year or on second tours. And they come back to the United States, and that expertise just disappears back out into their guard unit or their military unit, whatever, instead of the best and brightest being brought together to stay on top of the intelligence problem so that we can start working out where the bad guys are, who they are.

O'REILLY: You would give them jobs in Washington?

COWAN: Right here, Bill. Right here. A hundred, 150 people right here in town, go over it every day.

O'REILLY: Rumsfeld -- Rumsfeld says, Colonel Hunt, that you don't need more guys on the ground. You need more intelligence. That's the mantra this week from the Defense Department.

Now, my question is, if Rumsfeld was on the program, and he was a few months ago, would he look, don't you need more security? Don't you need to guard -- they did finally secure the oil pipeline, which is good news. It hasn't been reported to mainstream media, but they did. And they're getting like 98 percent flow of oil now out of there. So this is money going back to that government.

But don't you need more security so people can go out to have a cup of coffee and can get in from the airport?

HUNT: Yes, you do, and the guys that can do that are the Special Forces. Green Berets. They're the best at what's called sensitive trigger information. You find a bad guy, they can kill them. We need two more Special Forces groups there. Not into Africa right now. We need some there, of course, but we need two more Special Forces groups and a little less tanks.

We need Special Forces guys running the training programs that Petraeus has been running and it hasn't been working.

At the same time take care of the corruption that's in Iraq, both Iraqis and Americans, French and Brits who are taking money. You're right, 97 percent of that country's oil capacity is working, and money is going out the back door.

The Iraqi government cannot support the battalions that it's putting in the field with beans, bullets, trucks. That's one of the reasons the Iraqi soldiers aren't fighting; they don't have the gear. It isn't working. Take Petraeus out. Put a Special Forces captain in there. Your point is well taken, when a Green Beret unit can provide both some security and the intelligence that's needed to deal with that.

O'REILLY: OK. So I mean, it's obviously in a chaos of any situation. People will exploit it, Colonel Cowan, and that's what we're talking about with corruption. There simply aren't police overseeing a lot of these transactions.

I'll give you the last word.

COWAN: It's a way of life over there, Bill. Well, I've got one other quick one if I may, Bill, the tribal leap. We've absolutely avoided developing a relationship with the tribal leaders and the sheiks over there. Hundreds and hundreds of years of those tribes in existence. We have failed from the outset. We continue to fail to bring in the tribal leaders and put them responsible, with money, for the cleanup of some of the areas, the areas where...

O'REILLY: Yes, like the Manyards (ph) and people like that, the indigenous peoples in Southeast Asia.

OK, guys, we appreciate it.

HUNT: It's winnable.

O'REILLY: If anybody gives you any grief, let us know. We'll give you more grief.

COWAN: I'm not worried.

O'REILLY: We'll sympathize with them and give you grief.

All right, next, the Aruban prime minister finally admits problems in the Natalee Holloway disappearance. And some other young women may testify Joran Van Der Sloot drugged them. We'll be right back with that story.

LOAD-DATE: August 24, 2005

Respectfully,

(b)(6)

OSD Public Affairs

Community Relations and Public Liaison

(b)(2) The Pentagon

Washington, D.C. 20301-1400

(b)(2)

<< OLE Object: Picture (Metafile) >>

www.AmericaSupportsYou.mil

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2005 8:20 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: Inaccurate comments about advisors in Iraq
Importance: High

fyi.

(b)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) LTC [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2005 12:08 AM
To: Petraeus, David LTG/09; (b)(6) COL
Subject: FW: Inaccurate comments about advisors in Iraq
Importance: High

Sir,

From Bill Cowan.

v/r

LTC (b)(6)

LTC (b)(6)

Public Affairs Officer

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq

Phoenix Base, International Zone, Baghdad

DSN: (b)(2)

Commercial: (b)(2)

MCI Cell: (b)(2)

Iraqna Cell: (b)(2)

Read the Advisor newsletter at www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil

From: bill_cowan [mailto:bill_cowan@(b)(6)]

Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2005 2:31 AM
To: (b)(6) LTC
Subject: RE: Inaccurate comments about advisors in Iraq
Importance: High

(b)(6)

thanks for your message, and i mean it. i am not above accepting criticism, and always take it in the hope that i'll learn something and do a better job next time. hopefully, you'll pass my response on to General Patreus and to those people under his command who saw the show and expressed their concerns or disappointment.

first, under no circumstances do i want to put out bad scoop on international TV, particularly on Bill O'Reilly's show. what i expressed as 'facts' came from numerous sources in the Pentagon, in Iraq, or just back from Iraq. i'm the first to admit that my 'facts' may have been wrong. but, in the past two months i've met or talked with senior general officers within the JCS or from the Army and the Marine Corps, and the IMPRESSION i've consistently been left with is a lack of a viable top down advisor program emanating from this side to that. i've also talked at the staff level in the Pentagon and to some individuals who had served as advisors. two 'facts' i got from more than one source were that some people were arriving in Iraq to learn they were advisors (that is, no stateside selection, vetting, or training before going overseas), and that individuals were being assigned as advisors at levels they'd never served at. i guess my point is that my complaints about the advisor program were pointed at the failure of the JCS/Pentagon leadership to adequately support the advisor program starting from THIS end, not yours.

to those who are serving as advisors, i'd note that of my 3 1/2 years in Viet Nam, over 2 1/2 was as an advisor to Vietnamese forces on the par of the Iraqis when i started with them. i ran operations with teams as small as five Vietnamese up to company sized, and i only returned to CONUS when i did because the Marine Corps wouldn't let me stay any longer. there is certainly no job more difficult, and certainly none more rewarding. i laud the men and women serving as advisors, and deeply regret saying something which may have offended them. it was not intended, and i will do my best to reflect properly on them in future shows when the opportunity presents itself.

again, let me emphasize that i appreciate your writing me. don't hesitate to do so in the future, and i won't hesitate to contact you if i have questions. i've been a fan of General Patreus' since visiting the 101st in Mosul in September of '03, and i've probably been one of his most ardent supporters on TV since then. i know it's not a perfect world trying to stand up the Iraqis and get them out on the front lines. i also believe you all are busting your butts to make it happen.

again, thanks.

resp'y,

bill (not "mr", not "col", not "ltcol")

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) LTC [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, August 24, 2005 5:43 PM
To: bill_cowan@(b)(6)
Subject: Inaccurate comments about advisors in Iraq

Mr. Cowan,

I caught your comments highlighted below on Bill O'Reilly and frankly we here at Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq are flabbergasted at how incorrect you are. What is more disturbing is that these comments came just hours before we pinned the Distinguished Service Cross on one of our senior advisors for valor while fighting with the Special Police Commando's in Mosul last November.

MNSTC-I, and now Multi-National Corps-Iraq, has had advisors with every unit built since July 2004 from battalion to brigade to division. As LTG Petraeus briefed you during the roundtable VTC just two weeks ago that I sat in on, every single Iraqi battalion, brigade and division headquarters has a Transition Team of 10 to 12 advisors assigned to it right from the day the unit is formed and continuing with it as it fights. There are almost 140 of these teams in place with Army, Special Police Commandos, Mechanized Police, Public Order Brigades and Border Enforcement battalions. In addition, there are teams with the Air Force, Navy, Ground Forces headquarters and Joint Headquarters manned by some of finest Soldiers, airmen, Marines, sailors and civilians this nation has to offer.

This transition program is the cornerstone of Multi-National Force-Iraq's detailed campaign plan and was publicly announced months ago in several press conferences and has since been featured in numerous news articles and TV pieces. The teams are put through an extensive training process that culminates here in Iraq at the Phoenix Academy where they get cultural, weapons and tactical training to work with the ISF and survive in this incredibly challenging tactical environment.

Most notably we have lost three of our brother advisors in combat in Fallujah, Tal Afar and just two weeks ago in Baghdad. COL (b)(6) has just been awarded our nations second highest award for valor for his actions as an advisor to the Special Police Commandos. That medal was given by GEN Casey and the Iraqi Minister of the Interior today in an awards ceremony covered by nearly all of the news networks.

I am disappointed that you would present yourself as an expert on operations in Iraq with such a poor understanding of what is going on here and by doing so would sully the efforts of some of the hardest working warriors in the Armed Forces. I have had several of these soldiers approach me simply dumbfounded at your remarks. These men and women ARE the best America has to offer and they are fighting and bleeding here to make this endeavor succeed.

I am available for you to contact before future appearances to ensure you have a clear understanding of the situation in Iraq. We have never said it is perfect or that everything is going along like sunshine and roses but momentum is on our side and each day our Iraqi brothers grow more capable and confident.

I have attached the citation to today's award and a story about it so you can see just how heroically just one of these men fought in combat...over 9 months ago.

Finally, this is not about your opinions being wrong, this is about your facts being wrong.

Sincerely,

Fred Wellman

LTC Frederick P. Wellman

Public Affairs Officer

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq

Phoenix Base, International Zone, Baghdad

DSN: (b)(2)

Commercial: (b)(2)

MCI Cell: (b)(2)

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O'REILLY: Is that not being done?

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(b)(6)

From: (b)(6), CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, August 24, 2005 6:00 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: Inaccurate comments about advisors in Iraq

Follow Up Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Red

Attachments: 24 AUG 05 US Army colonel receives Distinguished Service Cross.doc; Coffman Award Narrative.doc



24 AUG 05 US Army Coffman Award
colonel rece... Narrative.doc (3...

fyi.

(b)(6)

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Sent: Wednesday, August 24, 2005 5:43 PM
To: bill_cowan@(b)(6)
Subject: Inaccurate comments about advisors in Iraq

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(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, August 24, 2005 2:48 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: Bill Cowan Contact Info

please come see me asap after your next meeting!!!!
thanks

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Wellman, Frederick LTC [mailto:WellmanFP@(b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, August 24, 2005 2:20 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Bill Cowan Contact Info

(b)(6)

I need a big favor. Bill Cowan is on Fox saying there is no Advisor program here. My boss wants me to email him and straighten him out. Do you have contact info for him?

Thanks,

Fred

LTC Frederick P. Wellman

Public Affairs Officer

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq

Phoenix Base, International Zone, Baghdad

DSN: (b)(2)

Commercial: (b)(2)

MCI Cell: (b)(2)

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(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, August 24, 2005 12:42 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: transcript of o'reilly

Attachments: Picture (Metafile)

here's the transcript of the segment i told you about this morning.
thanks

(b)

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SHOW: THE O'REILLY FACTOR 8:37 PM EST

August 23, 2005 Tuesday

TRANSCRIPT: 082305cb.256
SECTION: NEWS; Domestic
LENGTH: 1527 words
HEADLINE: Strategies for Winning in Iraq
BYLINE: Bill O'Reilly, Bill Cowan, David Hunt
BODY:

O'REILLY: Thanks for staying with us. I'm Bill O'Reilly.

In the "Unresolved Problem" segment tonight, winning the war in Iraq. Some Americans don't believe that can be done. I disagree. And so do two FOX News military analysts. Joining us now from Washington, Lieutenant Colonel Bill Cowan and from Boston, Colonel David Hunt.

Now, we might tell everybody we saw you guys a few weeks ago, that you came in with very pessimistic assessments of Iraq as it stands now. Both of you did. And I'm sure you both know the Pentagon didn't like that, all right? They watched that report. You both got grief, I'm sure, and your e-mails burned off.

But you were honest, in my opinion. You brought in what was going on over there. I don't think anybody can put a happy face on the military situation at this point. You can't go out for a cup of coffee in Baghdad. It's tough to get from the airport into Baghdad on the airport road. Things are dicey over there.

But now tonight I want to put forth in very simple terms so even I can understand it, colonels, how you think the war can be won. Colonel Hunt, we'll start with you. Go.

COL. DAVID HUNT, U.S. ARMY: Yes, in a college football game, you fire football coaches for losing seasons. It's time to fire some people. I'd fire three -- one CIA, one State Department, one military four star and above. The CIA is only rotating every 90 days their personnel. That guy is fired. The State Department only 90 days.

And the military is not working. I'd put a four-star general in charge, Schoomaker, bring him a chief of staff of the Army's job or Jim Jones, the NATO commander. And no, they didn't call me and suggest it. These are two fighters, two killers, and it needs to be done.

Put more Special Forces on the ground. Put two Army divisions up north to stop the infiltration. The State Department have a meeting with the surrounding countries. One more citizen of your country kills one of our guys, we're going to blow up a building in your city and have an F-18 fly over that meeting. No more games. Start the Phoenix program as we did in Vietnam.

Again disband all militias, the Iraqi police are using militias. And guess what, Iran is supporting a militia in the south. I'll let Bill get some more. It's outrageous; it needs to stop now.

O'REILLY: All right. But I don't understand some of what you said there, Colonel Hunt, which is not unusual for me, so please be patient. All right. Ninety-day rotations, what does that mean? All right? What does...

HUNT: Bill, got to talk about also the State Department and Central Intelligence Agency are rotating their people every 90 days in Iraq. Our guys, the military is spending a year to 15 months.

O'REILLY: All right. So they need to stay there longer, correct?

HUNT: A hundred percent right.

O'REILLY: All right.

HUNT: How do you spy with 90 days?

O'REILLY: Do you want a battlefield commander to take over overall at -- overall...

HUNT: I want a killer -- I want a killer to take over Jim Jones as NATO commander. Marine, absolutely capable guy.

O'REILLY: OK. Not a politician but a wartime commander.

HUNT: A hundred percent.

O'REILLY: And the third one that was going to be replaced was Rumsfeld? Is that what you said or...

HUNT: I said one three -- four star above, DOD, and the CIA to get this nation's attention. Nobody pays for the mistake of WMD or 9/11. Our soldiers are dying and 14,000 wounded. It's time to change the team.

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COWAN: Secondly, we need to dismount. We've got people riding all over in Humvees and other kinds of vehicles. We need to get out of those things, get back on the ground, establish relationships with people.

Third, very quickly, Bill, we've got a lot of intelligence expertise flowing out of Iraq. Young men and women serving over there for a year or on second tours. And they come back to the United States, and that expertise just disappears back out into their guard unit or their military unit, whatever, instead of the best and brightest being brought together to stay on top of the intelligence problem so that we can start working out where the bad guys are, who they are.

O'REILLY: You would give them jobs in Washington?

COWAN: Right here, Bill. Right here. A hundred, 150 people right here in town, go over it every day.

O'REILLY: Rumsfeld -- Rumsfeld says, Colonel Hunt, that you don't need more guys on the ground. You need more intelligence. That's the mantra this week from the Defense Department.

Now, my question is, if Rumsfeld was on the program, and he was a few months ago, would he look, don't you need more security? Don't you need to guard -- they did finally secure the oil pipeline, which is good news. It hasn't been reported to mainstream media, but they did. And they're getting like 98 percent flow of oil now out of there. So this is money going back to that government.

But don't you need more security so people can go out to have a cup of coffee and can get in from the airport?

HUNT: Yes, you do, and the guys that can do that are the Special Forces. Green Berets. They're the best at what's called sensitive trigger information. You find a bad guy, they can kill them. We need two more Special Forces groups there. Not into Africa right now. We need some there, of course, but we need two more Special Forces groups and a little less tanks.

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O'REILLY: OK. So I mean, it's obviously in a chaos of any situation. People will exploit it, Colonel Cowan, and that's what we're talking about with corruption. There simply aren't police overseeing a lot of these transactions.

I'll give you the last word.

COWAN: It's a way of life over there, Bill. Well, I've got one other quick one if I may, Bill, the tribal leap. We've absolutely avoided developing a relationship with the tribal leaders and the sheiks over there. Hundreds and hundreds of years of those tribes in existence. We have failed from the outset. We continue to fail to bring in the tribal leaders and put them responsible, with money, for the cleanup of some of the areas, the areas where...

O'REILLY: Yes, like the Manyards (ph) and people like that, the indigenous peoples in Southeast Asia.

OK, guys, we appreciate it.

HUNT: It's winnable.

O'REILLY: If anybody gives you any grief, let us know. We'll give you more grief.

COWAN: I'm not worried.

O'REILLY: We'll sympathize with them and give you grief.

All right, next, the Aruban prime minister finally admits problems in the Natalee Holloway disappearance. And some other young women may testify Joran Van Der Sloot drugged them. We'll be right back with that story.

LOAD-DATE: August 24, 2005

Respectfully,

(b)(6)

OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison

(b)(2) The Pentagon

Washington, D.C. 20301-1400

(b)(2)



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**PRESS RELEASE
MULTI-NATIONAL SECURITY
TRANSITION COMMAND – IRAQ**

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

August 24, 2005

Contact: U.S. Army Lt. Col. Frederick P. Wellman

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U.S. Army colonel receives Distinguished Service Cross

Story by U.S. Army Sgt. Lorie Jewell

MNSTC-I Public Affairs

BAGHDAD, Iraq – The Distinguished Service Cross – second only to the Medal of Honor in military decorations – has been awarded to U.S. Army Col. James H. Coffman Jr. for his role in leading Iraqi Special Police Commandos through a 5 ½-hour battle against insurgents trying to overrun an Iraqi police station.

Flanked by the commando unit Coffman fought with, U.S. Army Gen. George Casey, commander of Multi-National Forces – Iraq, pinned the cross and eagle medal on Coffman's body armor during an Aug. 24 ceremony at Adnon Palace in Baghdad's International Zone. Iraq's Minister of Interior, Bayan Jabr, and a number of other high-ranking Iraqi and Coalition leaders also attended the ceremony.

"It's humbling to me, to be in the company of heroes," Casey said, noting Coffman's extraordinary heroism in the battle that killed 12 Iraqi commandos and wounded 24. "Such exemplary conduct is a great example to Iraqi commandos and to all American Soldiers and warriors."

Coffman, 51, is a senior adviser to Iraqi Special Police Commandos with the Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq's Civilian Police Assistance Training Team. He accompanied a commando Quick Reaction Force with the 3rd Battalion, 1st Iraqi Special Police Commando Brigade on Nov. 14, 2004 to help a commando platoon under attack in a Mosul, Iraq police station.

As the QRF approached the station, it was besieged with rocket-propelled grenades, small arms fire and mortar rounds. Coffman and the commandos fought the insurgents for four hours before help arrived. When the initial firefight killed or seriously wounded all but one of the commando officers, Coffman rallied the remaining commandos while trying to radio for assistance, according to his award citation.

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“Under heavy fire, he moved from commando to commando, looking each in the eye and using hand and arm signals to demonstrate what he wanted done,” the citation said.

When an enemy round shattered his left shooting hand, damaging his M4 rifle in the process, Coffman bandaged it and continued fighting with AK-47 rifles he collected from commando casualties until each ran out of ammunition. He also passed out ammunition to the uninjured commandos with the help of the remaining commando officer; when all that remained were loose rounds, Coffman held magazines between his legs and loaded the rounds with his good hand.

When a second commando unit arrived four hours after the fight began, Coffman led them to his position and continued to fight, refusing to be evacuated for treatment until the battle was over. Not long after the commando reinforcements arrived, air support and a Stryker Brigade Quick Reaction Force were on hand to assist to assist in the battle.

Coffman supervised the evacuation of injured commandos and led another group of commandos to the police station to make contact with the Iraqi Police inside. Once the additional air and ground support elements began attacking buildings the enemy forces were hiding in, Coffman went back to his initial position to check on the injured commandos and then agreed to be evacuated for treatment. Twenty-five insurgents were killed and dozens injured.

“Col. Coffman, the blood you shed will never be forgotten,” said Jabr, the Interior Minister. “We, the forces of the (Ministry of Interior) and the (Ministry of Defense) will continue to fight until we defeat terrorism. Right will always defeat wrong.”

In remarks during the ceremony, Coffman praised the commandos for their service and commitment to defending freedom in Iraq. He also said he viewed the ceremony as a tribute to the Iraqi and Coalition forces that have fought, bled and died together.

“Third battalion, I am truly, truly honored to stand here with you today and remember your courage and bravery last November and in all the days since then,” Coffman said, facing the commando formations. “It has been an honor to fight with you.”

Jabr and Iraqi Maj. Gen. Adnon Thebit, commander of the Special Police Forces, each presented Coffman with medallions.

Prior to the ceremony, Coffman said surgery repaired the shattered bones in his hand but it still isn't back to 100 percent. In the months he's had to reflect on the battle, Coffman said his focus continues to be on the courage and exemplary performance of the Iraqi commandos he fought with.

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"I'm very proud of them, and more importantly, they're proud of themselves," Coffman said. "The next day, they were back out on patrol - after suffering 30 to 50 percent casualties. That's pretty amazing. I'm not sure American units would do that. That says something about their resilience and their ability to maintain morale. They certainly mourned their losses, but they got back into the fight right away. I don't think you can ask much more of people than that."

After nearly two years in Iraq, Coffman is preparing to return home in early September. He'll return to a Pentagon job he held prior to deploying to Iraq in December 2003, in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict.

After celebrating two wedding anniversaries in Iraq, Coffman is looking forward to returning to his wife of 21 years, Patricia White, and their two grown daughters.

Coffman was able to call his wife from the medical aid station before he was evacuated to tell her what happened, and that he was okay. When he learned he would be awarded the DSC - which came as a surprise - Coffman said there was some debate about whether the ceremony should be held here or at home, where his family could attend. He opted to have it done with the men he fought with.

"In my mind, it's more for the Iraqis," he said.

Coffman doesn't see himself as a big hero, just a Soldier who did what he had to do to keep himself and his men alive. He believes there are plenty of heroic deeds going on in Iraq - particularly in the military and special police training teams - that go unrecognized.

"There are equal acts out there. This one just got written up," Coffman said. "I would like to see more people get written up."

Coffman may downplay his actions, but those who work with him on the commando adviser team describe him as a passionate, tough, and no-nonsense warrior.

"At first, I thought he was crazy," laughed U.S. Army Sgt. 1st Class Carl Paris, who arrived to the team shortly after the battle. He recalled Coffman greeting him with a large bandaged hand, saying 'Hey, guess what, kid,' and then giving him a blow-by-blow description of the fight.

"I have nothing but admiration for him," Paris said. "He is the example for me being here. A lot of people talk the talk, but he walks the walk. He has a real Soldier's mentality - cut through the B.S. and get the mission done, no matter what it takes."

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U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Tlaloc Cutroneo feels honored to have been able to serve with Coffman and appreciates the trust Coffman placed with him.

“He has allowed me to be privy to major Iraqi developments and security solutions,” Cutroneo said. “I have sat in on meetings as his battle buddy, not as merely a subordinate. To be referred to as his battle buddy means quite a bit.”

Coffman enlisted in the Army in 1972 in Great Barrington, Mass., where he grew up. The tangible benefits – learning a skill and college tuition – drew him into the service. But gaining an understanding of what being a Soldier means kept him in uniform for more than 30 years.

“The idea of selfless service and patriotism takes over,” Coffman said. “I like that.”

Coffman has a Bachelor of Science degree in Chinese Area Studies from the United States Military Academy at West Point, N.Y. and a Master of Science degree in National Security Affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, Calif. He was also a U.S. Army Fellow at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University in Medford, Mass., and attended the Boston University Overseas Program for Master of Science in International Relations in Vicenza, Italy.

His military career has taken him from Fort Bragg, N.C.; Tampa, Fla. and Washington, D.C. to more far-flung locations like Vicenza, Korea and Gelnhausen, Germany. Along with the Distinguished Service Cross, Coffman’s other awards include the Bronze Star, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal with four oak leaf clusters, Joint Service Commendation Medal with two oak leaf clusters, the Combat Infantryman Badge, Expert Infantryman Badge, and Special Forces and Ranger Tabs.

Coffman will have to retire in three years, but he figures he still has one more overseas tour in him. He isn’t sure it will be in Iraq, though.

“If asked, I would find it hard to say no,” Coffman said. “I have a lot of respect for a lot of the Iraqis. They have a tough time ahead of them.”

Coffman doesn’t believe democracy can be fast-tracked here. The United States had to work through several years of contentious issues – including a Civil War – before it enjoyed a stable democratic government.

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“It’s easy when you’ve had a couple centuries of experience with democracy to overlook the difficulties in getting that,” Coffman said. “I can’t think of a nobler endeavor than to help 28 million people achieve it.”

For more information about the Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq, please visit www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil

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PHOTO CUTLINES

CoffmanDSC8173

U.S. Army Col. James H. Coffman Jr. salutes the Iraqi Special Police Commandos who fought with him in a fierce battle against insurgents Nov. 14, 2004, after receiving the Distinguished Service Cross. Coffman praised the commandos for their courage and dedication to fighting for a free and democratic Iraq.

(Photo by U.S. Army Sgt. Lorie Jewell)

CoffmanDSC8137

U.S. Army Gen. George Casey, commander of Multi-National Forces-Iraq, congratulates U.S. Army Col. James H. Coffman Jr. after pinning him with the Distinguished Service Cross.

(Photo by U.S. Army Sgt. Lorie Jewell)

CoffmanDSC8194

U.S. Army Col. James H. Coffman Jr. glances over at a formation of Iraqi Special Police Commandos after being awarded the Distinguished Service Cross during an Aug. 24 ceremony in Baghdad.

(Photo by U.S. Army Sgt. Lorie Jewell)

Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington D.C.
Permanent Orders Number 201-10

The Distinguished Service Cross
is awarded to

U.S. ARMY COLONEL JAMES H. COFFMAN JR.

For exceptionally valorous conduct while assigned as the Senior Advisor to the 1st Iraqi Special Police Commando Brigade during a lengthy battle on 14 November 2004 in Mosul, Iraq, during which the unit likely would have been overrun were it not for the courageous leadership of Colonel Coffman and the one Commando officer not wounded.

At approximately 1030 hours on 14 November, Colonel Coffman moved with a Commando Quick Reaction Force (QRF) to reinforce a Commando platoon under attack at the Four West Police Station in Mosul. As the QRF neared the besieged platoon, it came under intense rocket-propelled grenade, mortar, machinegun, and AK-47 fire by a large insurgent force. Over the next four hours, the enemy repeatedly assaulted the Commandos' position, at times culminating their attacks twenty meters from Colonel Coffman's location.

With all but one of the commando officers killed or seriously wounded by the initial enemy fire, Colonel Coffman exhibited truly inspirational leadership, rallying the Commandos and organizing a hasty defense while attempting to radio higher headquarters for reinforcements. Under heavy fire, he moved from Commando to Commando, looking each in the eye and using hand and arm signals to demonstrate what he wanted done. At one point, an enemy round shattered Colonel Coffman's shooting hand and rendered his M4 rifle inoperable. After bandaging his hand, Colonel Coffman picked up AK-47s from Commando casualties and fired them with his other hand until each ran out of ammunition. With the assistance of the one remaining Commando officer, Colonel Coffman redistributed ammunition among the uninjured commandos until he had only loose ammunition that he loaded by placing magazines between his legs and using his one working hand. Throughout this period, he repeatedly demonstrated exceptional courage and an extraordinary example to the commandos as they repulsed attack after attack by the enemy.

Four hours after the start of the battle, a second Commando element arrived and Colonel Coffman guided them to his position. Even after their arrival, he continued to direct the fight, refusing to be evacuated until the enemy was defeated. Shortly thereafter, attack helicopters also arrived, followed closely by a Stryker Brigade QRF, and Colonel Coffman used Iraqi radios to direct air strikes and to provide vital information on the location of enemy and friendly forces.

After supervising the evacuation of several dozen wounded Commandos, Colonel Coffman led a squad-sized element to the Four West Iraqi Police Station, fifty meters ahead of the Strykers, to make contact with the Commandos still in the station. After they linked up, the Strykers moved forward, and attack helicopters engaged the buildings occupied by the enemy, following which Colonel Coffman

returned to his original position to ensure that all of the Iraqi casualties had been evacuated. Only then did he consent to be evacuated for surgery for his own serious wound.

During the fierce four-hour battle, twelve Commandos were killed and 42 were wounded. Twenty-five enemy were killed and many dozens more were wounded.

The personal courage and heroic actions displayed throughout the fight by Colonel Coffman – in the face of heavy enemy fire and repeated attacks – were absolutely critical to defeating the enemy force and to saving Iraqi lives. Colonel Coffman's gallantry in action was in keeping with the finest traditions of the American military and reflects great credit on him, the Multinational Force-Iraq, the U.S. Special Operations Command, and the United States of America.

SIGNED

Frances J. Harvey
Secretary of the Army

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, August 23, 2005 9:44 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Jed Babbin (American Spectator)

http://www.spectator.org/dsp_article.asp?art_id=8625

(b)(6)

Researcher

OSD Speechwriters Group
The Pentagon, Room (b)(2)
Telephone (b)(2)
Fax

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, August 23, 2005 8:14 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: Gitmo Jive

fyi. let's discuss after religious leaders outreach tomorrow.
thanks

(b)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) COL (L) [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, August 22, 2005 4:39 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Gitmo Jive

Ms. (b)(6)

GEN Craddock has seen the proposal to permit Mr. Cucullu access to Guantanamo to write a book and he supports the concept. Naturally, the details of his visit would have to be worked out with the appropriate personnel in SOUTHCOM and JTF-GTMO. v/r, COL (b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, August 16, 2005 8:56 AM
To: (b)(6) COL (L)
Cc: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: Gitmo Jive

sir,

please see the story below. eric ruff asked that i pass this along to you for general craddock as it is written by the retired military analyst who would like to write a book about Guantanamo. mr. ruff sent a memo to general craddock a week or so ago re. this. he would like to see if we can set up a call next week with the general at a time convenient to him. please let me know if there is a time that would work for the general and i will have it put on mr. ruff's calendar.

thanks.

(b)

Respectfully,

(b)(6)

OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison

(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 30401-1400

(b)(2)

www.AmericaSupportsYou.mil

Gitmo Jive

By Gordon Cucullu

The American Enterprise, September 2005

www.taemag.com/issues/articleID.18656/article_detail.asp

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba-In the fall of 2001, the U.S. Naval Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba ("Gitmo" to those who live here) was teetering on the edge of oblivion, with a skeleton crew of fewer than 2,000 servicemembers on duty. Now a contingent of more than 10,000 resides here. Behind that surge: the need for secure confinement of a collection of human debris snatched from the battlefields of Afghanistan in early 2002.

These "detainees" are not innocent foot soldiers, or confused Afghan opium farmers drafted by the Taliban. They are Islamic fundamentalists from across the Middle East, rabid jihadists who have dedicated their lives to the destruction of America and Western civilization. Among the residents are al-Qaeda organizers, bomb makers, financial specialists, recruiters of suicide attackers, and just plain killers. Many of these men met frequently with Osama bin Laden. The terrorist Maad Al Qahtani, a Saudi who is a self-confessed collaborator with the September 11 hijackers, is one of many infamous captives.

In the opening salvos of the global war on terror, our forces took a lot of prisoners from the battlefield. Estimates are that more than 70,000 Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters were captured and screened. Of that number, approximately 800 were deemed of such high value for intelligence purposes, or such a severe threat in their own person, that they needed to be interrogated and confined in a secure locale from which they could not easily escape or be rescued. Welcome to the new Gitmo.

I was able to observe conditions at the detention facility, firsthand, at the end of June, when I was invited to join a group of ten former military and intelligence analysts on an inspection tour. Briefings commenced aboard our aircraft shortly after take-off, and continued until landing. We were met planeside by Brigadier General Jay Hood, the commanding officer of Joint Task Force Gitmo, whose soldiers are responsible for the security, interrogation, housing, and oversight of all the terrorists confined there. General Hood and his staff fielded all questions and criticisms, and were very forthcoming.

Who are these men?

While we observed absolutely no evidence of torture of prisoners at Gitmo, it is clear that the daily atmosphere is rife with harsh abuse: The prisoners are constantly assaulting the guards.

Our young military men and women routinely endure the vilest invective imaginable, including death threats that spill over to guards' families. All soldiers and sailors working "inside the wire" have blacked out their name tags so that the detainees will not learn their identities. Before that step was taken the terrorists were threatening to tell their al-Qaeda pals still at large who the guards were. "We will look you up on the Internet," the prisoners said. "We will find you and slaughter you and your family in your homes at night. We will cut your throats like sheep. We will drink the blood of the infidel."

That is bad enough, but the terrorist prisoners throw more than words at the guards. On a daily basis, American soldiers carrying out their duties within the maximum-security camp are barraged with feces, urine, semen, and spit hurled by the detainees. Secretly fashioned weapons intended for use in attacking guards or fellow detainees are confiscated regularly. When food or other items are passed through the "bean hole"-an opening approximately 4 inches by 24 inches in the cell doors, the detainees have grabbed at the wrists and arms of the Americans feeding them and tried to break their bones.

When guards enter the cells to remove detainees for interrogation sessions, medical visits, or any number of reasons, detainees sometimes climb on the metal bunks and leap on the guards. They have crammed themselves under the bunks, requiring several guards to extract them. Some have attacked unsuspecting soldiers with steel chairs. Determined to inflict maximum damage, detainees have groped under the protective face masks of the guards, clawing their faces and trying to gouge eyes and tear mouths.

Keep in mind that our soldiers-young men and young women-are absolutely forbidden from responding in kind. They are constrained to maintain absolute discipline and follow humane operating procedures at all times, at risk of serious punishment. Documents recently obtained by the Associated Press through a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit show that one detainee punched a guard in the mouth, knocking out his tooth, then began to bite the MP. Several guards were required to repel the prisoner's attack; one soldier who came to the rescue delivered two blows to the inmate's head with a handheld radio. For this he was dropped in rank to private.

In a different incident, an MP doused with toilet water responded by spraying the offending inmate with a hose. For this he was charged with assault. Another American soldier was disciplined for cursing at inmates. One guard punched a detainee after being struck and spit on while placing the man in restraints in the prison hospital in October 2004. ("My instincts took over after the hitting and spitting," the soldier wrote in his report.) He was recommended for a reduction in rank to E-4, loss of a month's pay, and extra duty for 45 days.

How cooperative a detainee is determines where he is housed, how much free time he is given, whether he lives alone or in a group, and what color clothing he wears. The most dangerous wear an orange jump suit. Those who heed instructions earn a beige jumpsuit, and those who are deemed to be fully compliant wear white. The latter groups have daily recreation periods, live in groups of as many as ten, and receive extra privileges. The compliance rating, by the way, has nothing to do with cooperation with interrogators. Indeed, many fully compliant detainees have maintained stoic silence, while some of the most notorious, dangerous prisoners speak freely with interrogators.

Nearly all of these hardened terrorists have been well coached on how to be an American captive. Given any opportunity, they will all claim torture and human rights violations. They have been schooled on counter-interrogation techniques, on how to construct and maintain a cover story, and other subterfuges to fool or deflect interrogators.

Some detainees, including one classified as a "high value intelligence source" that I was able to observe, take pride in discussing their activities and capabilities with interrogators. The man I saw brags about Americans he has killed, other Muslims he has terrorized, attacks he has planned and carried out, and what he will do to the Americans if he has a chance. He is a leader, and affirms his high rank within the al-Qaeda chain. He has started or ended riotous behavior by fellow prisoners on more than one occasion.

With twisted irony, this individual condemns prisoners who maintain silence for being "ashamed" of their past. "They ought to proclaim their feats as proof of their commitment to the cause of Islam," he tells interrogators, while munching continuously from a box of doughnuts provided by the interrogator. Why the doughnuts? "He throws his food at the guards," General Hood says, "so he loves to eat the doughnuts during the interrogation sessions."

Too hard? Or too soft?

We asked Hood if he was possibly being too lenient with these men. "This system of rapport-building works," Hood assures us. In support of the soft-handed approach, he cites an extraordinary amount of actionable intelligence that continues to flow out of the interrogation rooms of Gitmo.

His revelation was a surprise to me. During my own career in the U.S. Army Special Forces, I had been taught that intelligence, like bread, gets stale quickly. That may be true for tactical intelligence of the sort I used in the field. Strategic intelligence, the kind that we continue to collect at Gitmo, however, seems to have a much longer shelf life. Today's interrogators are succeeding at mapping out the complex organizational and financial structure of al-Qaeda in increasing detail, thereby uncovering networks that need to be attacked and dismantled. They are uncovering new "sleeper" cells. They are learning of temporarily shelved plans for new terrorist attacks, some of which have subsequently been thwarted

by law enforcement authorities in America and Europe.

Another surprise for me was learning that many of the U.S. interrogators are women. We have all heard the salacious stories about using women to tease or embarrass the detainees. I saw a different reality. The camp behavioral expert, a female Ph.D. who has more than two years of experience at Gitmo, informed me that female interrogators have been very effective.

"We assume the role of sister or mother," she explained, "something that is quite acceptable and natural in their culture." She dresses demurely for her sessions. "I wear long sleeves, an ankle-length dress, and little makeup." The interrogation room she enters is sparsely furnished with leg cuffs to secure the prisoner, a one-way mirror, cameras, and a distress button to summon help if needed.

"We review what we know of their backgrounds, try lots of approaches, and work on them to find something that they can relate to. Once we can get them to relate on a common item, even something irrelevant and mundane, then we can begin to probe." It is a long, complex process requiring great patience, and more than a little human empathy. It categorically rejects the use of drugs, coercion, or duress.

Intelligence gleaned from Gitmo is blended with information from other sources to connect dots. We learned that one non-cooperative detainee had his cover penetrated just last month by having his photo identified by a freshly captured fighter in Afghanistan. Once confronted with his real identity, he began to talk.

It is important to keep in mind that these men, while exceedingly dangerous and even pathological in their desire to kill Westerners, are generally well-educated and broadly traveled. Several detainees have advanced degrees in law, engineering, and medicine from American and European schools like the University of London. Others are highly skilled technical experts with advanced training and knowledge of electronics and demolitions. (Some of these are contributing to our knowledge of al-Qaeda bombs found in Iraq.) Many of these men occupied the top al-Qaeda echelons, and met frequently with bin Laden.

A lot of these men came from middle-class or wealthy families. They come from 17 different countries, but a great many are Saudi Arabian. They are not driven by poverty, unemployment, or class deprivation. They are motivated by a virulent form of Islam that promotes jihad and death to Western civilization. They will kill Americans—including women and children—without conscience, for they are convinced that restoration of the Islamic caliphate is their sole mission on this Earth.

Gitmo guards in the crosshairs

Many readers will have heard stories about detainees sleeping in air-conditioned berths, while the American troops guarding them sweated in tents. You may have heard that American soldiers were eating MREs while the terrorists dined on three "hots" daily, providing about 2,600 calories of carefully varied food. Those stories were correct.

Conditions for camp guards have been improved dramatically, however. I ate heartily with the soldiers and sailors working the camps (the Navy supplies a large number of experienced Masters at Arms), and learned how they feel about their mission. Universally, they are proud of their work, although somewhat disappointed that the American public is not more aware of the difficulties they undergo to keep us safe.

One young woman at my table, an Army private first class, was asked what she thought about rhetoric in the American media, and from the mouths of elected officials like Senators Richard Durbin (D-IL) and Ted Kennedy (D-MA), describing our service members at Guantanamo as "Nazis." Frowning, she answered, "It hurts my feelings to hear that junk. We try to do as good a job as possible down here. These detainees are dangerous. They try to kill us every time we get close to them, and would certainly kill Americans if released."

I asked her if morale was affected by such political statements. "I'll tell you this," she replied, breaking into a grin. "Every time we get called those names we decide we're going to show 'em. We focus on our mission and work harder."

Guards pull several days of duty inside the wire, and are then rotated out. They need the relief from the intense pressure inside. But the time outside is not R&R; training continues on a constant basis. Gitmo has some of the most detailed and comprehensive procedural rules in the military. Supervision is constant, random inspections are common, all supervisors in the chain of command are held responsible for the actions of subordinates, and soldiers are schooled to report infractions.

The American servicemembers at Guantanamo do not have the satisfaction of tossing a grenade or shooting back at the terrorists in their midst. They will not be recognized when awards for valor are bestowed. In the face of vile abuse they must respond with supreme restraint, aware that even the slightest infraction will draw the fury and condemnation of hyperbolic politicians and reporters who loathe our military and want nothing more than to embarrass and damage American interests in this war.

For defense against irresponsible and slanderous charges, these men and women rely on ordinary Americans—those of us who rest at home in the shadow of safety they cast.

Former Special Forces lieutenant colonel Gordon Cucullu is a frequent television commentator on military matters.

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@ (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, August 22, 2005 8:01 AM
To: tmcinerney@ (b)(6); paulvallely@ (b)(6); nashct@ (b)(6); Glenstrae77@ (b)(6); BURM41516@ (b)(6); (b)(6); CIV, OASD-PA; WSSInter@ (b)(6); robertscales@ (b)(6); (b)(6)
Subject: Bush's counter-offensive

We need a lot more from the president than a 5-day campaign with a built-in withdrawal date. Forget (b)(6) (b)(6) Listen to (b)(6), another mother whose son was killed in Iraq.

The American Spectator

Best, Jed.

Jed Babbin

(b)(2) (home office)
(b)(2) (home fax)
(b)(2) (mobile)

(b)(6)

From: Paul Valley [paulvalley@(b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, August 16, 2005 7:08 PM
To: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: in case you missed it

Thanks. But we need to do something about Syria and Iran or it will all be for naught!!!!!!!

Fox News Channel
Paul E Valley
Military Analyst
paulvalley@(b)(6)
tel: (b)(2)
fax: (b)(2)
mobile: (b)(2)
www.soldiersmemorialfund.org

-----Original Message-----

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA [mailto:Dallas.Lawrence@(b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, August 15, 2005 12:40 PM
Subject: in case you missed it

Folks, a year ago, who would ever have believed they would see this story on the frontpage of the Washington Post? Sunni's standing together to protect their Shiite neighbors from al Qaeda loyalists. This is progress.

best,

dl

Dallas B. Lawrence
Director, Office of Community Relations & Public Liaison United States Department of Defense

w) (b)(2)

Iraqi Sunnis Battle To Defend Shiites

Tribes Defy an Attempt by Zarqawi To Drive Residents From Western City By Ellen Knickmeyer and Jonathan Finer Washington Post Foreign Service Sunday, August 14, 2005; A01 BAGHDAD, Aug. 14 -- Rising up against insurgent leader Abu Musab Zarqawi, Iraqi Sunni Muslims in Ramadi fought with grenade launchers and automatic weapons Saturday to defend their Shiite neighbors against a bid to drive them from the western city, Sunni leaders and Shiite residents said. The fighting came as the U.S. military announced the deaths of six American soldiers.

Dozens of Sunni members of the Dulaimi tribe established cordons around Shiite homes, and Sunni men battled followers of Zarqawi, a Jordanian, for an hour Saturday morning. The clashes killed five of Zarqawi's guerrillas and two tribal fighters, residents and hospital workers said. Zarqawi loyalists pulled out of two contested neighborhoods in pickup trucks stripped of license plates, witnesses said.

The leaders of four of Iraq's Sunni tribes had rallied their fighters in response to warnings posted in mosques by followers of Zarqawi. The postings ordered Ramadi's roughly 3,000 Shiites to leave the city of more than 200,000 in the area called the Sunni Triangle. The order to leave within 48 hours came in retaliation for alleged expulsions by Shiite militias of Sunnis living in predominantly Shiite southern Iraq.

"We have had enough of his nonsense," said Sheik Ahmad Khanjar, leader of the Albu Ali clan, referring to Zarqawi. "We don't accept that a non-Iraqi should try to enforce his control over Iraqis, regardless of their sect -- whether Sunnis, Shiites, Arabs or Kurds."

Iraqi Sunni tribal leaders and armed followers of Zarqawi have clashed before in the far west, and Sunnis and Shiites in western cities have sympathized with one another over what they have said are attempts by foreign fighters to spark open sectarian conflict. But Saturday's clash in Ramadi was one of the first times Sunni Arabs have been known to take up arms against insurgents specifically in defense of Shiites.

The dramatic show of unity in the western city came as Sunni and Shiite Arabs and ethnic Kurds in Baghdad continued negotiations over the country's constitution. They were trying to meet a Monday deadline but failing to resolve some key differences.

President Jalal Talabani, who has hosted days of closed-door talks among Iraq's factional and political leaders, said he remained hopeful the deadline could be met. "There will be no postponing of any issue," Talabani told reporters. "God willing, tomorrow the constitution will be ready."

Disputes over federalism -- particularly whether Shiites should be allowed to have a separate federal state in the south equivalent to the one the Kurds have established in the north -- remain the biggest obstacle. Sunni Arabs rigidly oppose the division, expressing fears that it would split Iraq and leave their minority stranded in the resource-poor center and west.

U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad sat with faction leaders throughout the day, pushing for completion by Monday, said a Sunni Arab constitutional delegate, Salih Mutlak.

The fighting in Ramadi suggested a potentially serious threat to Zarqawi's group, al Qaeda in Iraq, which is made up of Sunni extremists from inside and outside Iraq. The insurgency has increasingly targeted Shiite civilians along with U.S. and Iraqi forces, particularly with grisly suicide bombings that have killed scores of Shiites at a time. Zarqawi's followers see Shiites as rivals for power and as apostates within the broader Islamic faith.

Washington and the U.S.-backed Iraqi transitional government have worked to split mainstream Iraqi Sunnis from the radical foreign fighters, hoping to draw them away from the insurgency and into the political process that many rejected after the toppling of Saddam Hussein's Sunni-dominated government in 2003.

At midday Saturday, men with grenade launchers and AK-47s still could be seen in Ramadi's two contested neighborhoods, Sejarriyah and Tameem.

Masked men distributed leaflets that declared the city's tribes would fight "Zarqawi's attempt to turn Ramadi into a second Fallujah," referring to the nearby city that U.S. forces wrested from insurgent control in November. Statements posted on walls declared in the name of the Iraqi-led Mohammed's Army group that "Zarqawi has lost his direction" and strayed "from the line of true resistance against the occupation."

A grateful Shiite resident of Ramadi said he was not surprised at the threats by Zarqawi's followers or the defiance of them. "So many ties of friendship, marriage and compassion" bind Shiites and Sunnis in Ramadi, said Ali Hussein Lifta, a 50-year-old air-conditioning repairman and a resident of Tameem.

"We have become in fact part of the population here, and this we are going to convey to the rest of Iraq and to those who want to instill division between Sunnis and Shiites," Lifta said. "We are happy to know that the ties with the Sunnis have become so strong that the Zarqawis and their terrorism cannot affect them."

Separately Saturday, Zarqawi's movement posted statements in Ramadi pledging to kill Sunni clerics in the west for urging Sunnis to take part in the country's next elections.

"We, al Qaeda in Iraq, announce that we will apply the religious punishment for apostasy upon whoever calls for creation of the constitution. You, preacher at the podium of prophecy, be a speaker of truth, doer of good and rallier for the rule of sharia," or Islamic law, the statement said.

Similar threats led the majority of Iraq's Sunni voters to boycott elections in January, weakening their position when the country's factions began crafting a constitution.

If the draft constitution is finished by Monday as scheduled, and Iraqis agree in an Oct. 15 vote to adopt it, Iraq will hold elections Dec. 15 for its first full-term government since Hussein was toppled.

Missing the deadline would risk greatly aggravating political instability and violence that have claimed thousands of Iraqi and American lives since the elections.

Existing law requires the current government to dissolve if the deadline is not met, opening the way for the election of a new government, which would take another try at writing a constitution.

Around the country on Saturday, bombings and ambushes killed at least 12 Iraqis and wounded more than a dozen, according to the Associated Press and the Reuters news agency.

Late Saturday, the military announced the deaths of five U.S. soldiers, three of whom were killed in a roadside bomb attack while on patrol Friday night in the northern town of Tuz. One soldier died when a roadside bomb detonated in Baghdad Saturday. Another was found dead from a gunshot wound in the Iraqi capital, according to an Army statement. On Sunday, one soldier was killed and three wounded by a roadside bombing in the western town of Ruteah.

Also in Baghdad, a U.S. Bradley Fighting Vehicle was left burning in the Sadr City district, Reuters reported. The U.S. military said the armored personnel carrier was set on fire by a roadside bomb, but there were no reports of American casualties. Local police said an Iraqi civilian was killed in the explosion.

Special correspondents Omar Fekeiki and Naseer Nouri contributed to this report.

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@**(b)(6)**
Sent: Tuesday, August 16, 2005 12:59 PM
To: tmcinerney@**(b)(6)**; paulvalley@**(b)(6)**; nashct@**(b)(6)**; Glenstrae77@**(b)(6)**; BURM41516@**(b)(6)**; **(b)(6)**; CIV, OASD-PA; WSSInter@**(b)(6)**; roberthscales@**(b)(6)**; **(b)(6)**
Subject: Moderate Islam

And just where is that commodity to be found?

[Guardian Unlimited Politics | Special Reports | Full text: joint statement from Muslim groups](#)

Perhaps only in the land of the unicorn and the phoenix.

Jed Babbin

(b)(2) (home office)
(home fax)
(mobile)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, August 16, 2005 8:56 AM
To: Col. Miles (E-mail)
Cc: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: Gitmo Jive

sir,
please see the story below. eric ruff asked that i pass this along to you for general craddock as it is written by the retired military analyst who would like to write a book about Guantanamo. Mr. Ruff sent a memo to General Craddock a week or so ago re. this. He would like to see if we can set up a call next week with the general at a time convenient to him. Please let me know if there is a time that would work for the general and I will have it put on Mr. Ruff's calendar.
thanks.

(b)

Respectfully,

(b)(6)

OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison

(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 30401-1400

(b)(2)

www.AmericaSupportsYou.mil

Gitmo Jive

By Gordon Cucullu

The American Enterprise, September 2005

www.taemag.com/issues/articleID.18656/article_detail.asp

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba—In the fall of 2001, the U.S. Naval Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba ("Gitmo" to those who live here) was teetering on the edge of oblivion, with a skeleton crew of fewer than 2,000 servicemembers on duty. Now a contingent of more than 10,000 resides here. Behind that surge: the need for secure confinement of a collection of human debris snatched from the battlefields of Afghanistan in early 2002.

These "detainees" are not innocent foot soldiers, or confused Afghan opium farmers drafted by the Taliban. They are Islamic fundamentalists from across the Middle East, rabid jihadists who have dedicated their lives to the destruction of America and Western civilization. Among the residents are al-Qaeda organizers, bomb makers, financial specialists, recruiters of suicide attackers, and just plain killers. Many of these men met frequently with Osama bin Laden. The terrorist Maad Al Qahtani, a Saudi who is a self-confessed collaborator with the September 11 hijackers, is one of many infamous captives.

In the opening salvos of the global war on terror, our forces took a lot of prisoners from the battlefield. Estimates are that more than 70,000 Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters were captured and screened. Of that number, approximately 800 were deemed of such high value for intelligence purposes, or such a severe threat in their own person, that they needed to be interrogated and confined in a secure locale from which they could not easily escape or be rescued. Welcome to the new Gitmo.

I was able to observe conditions at the detention facility, firsthand, at the end of June, when I was invited to join a group of ten former military and intelligence analysts on an inspection tour. Briefings commenced aboard our aircraft shortly after take-off, and continued until landing. We were met planeside by Brigadier General Jay Hood, the commanding officer of Joint Task Force Gitmo, whose soldiers are responsible for the security, interrogation, housing, and oversight of all the terrorists confined there. General Hood and his staff fielded all questions and criticisms, and were very forthcoming.

Who are these men?

While we observed absolutely no evidence of torture of prisoners at Gitmo, it is clear that the daily atmosphere is rife with harsh abuse: The prisoners are constantly assaulting the guards.

Our young military men and women routinely endure the vilest invective imaginable, including death threats that spill over to guards' families. All soldiers and sailors working "inside the wire" have blacked out their name tags so that the detainees will not learn their identities. Before that step was taken the terrorists were threatening to tell their al-Qaeda pals still at large who the guards were. "We will look you up on the Internet," the prisoners said. "We will find you and slaughter you and your family in your homes at night. We will cut your throats like sheep. We will drink the blood of the infidel."

That is bad enough, but the terrorist prisoners throw more than words at the guards. On a daily basis, American soldiers carrying out their duties within the maximum-security camp are barraged with feces, urine, semen, and spit hurled by the detainees. Secretly fashioned weapons intended for use in attacking guards or fellow detainees are confiscated regularly. When food or other items are passed through the "bean hole"—an opening approximately 4 inches by 24 inches in the cell doors, the detainees have grabbed at the wrists and arms of the Americans feeding them and tried to break their bones.

When guards enter the cells to remove detainees for interrogation sessions, medical visits, or any number of reasons, detainees sometimes climb on the metal bunks and leap on the guards. They have crammed themselves under the bunks, requiring several guards to extract them. Some have attacked unsuspecting soldiers with steel chairs. Determined to inflict maximum damage, detainees have groped under the protective face masks of the guards, clawing their faces and trying to gouge eyes and tear mouths.

Keep in mind that our soldiers—young men and young women—are absolutely forbidden from responding in kind. They are constrained to maintain absolute discipline and follow humane operating procedures at all times, at risk of serious punishment. Documents recently obtained by the Associated Press through a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit show that one detainee punched a guard in the mouth, knocking out his tooth, then began to bite the MP. Several guards were required to repel the prisoner's attack; one soldier who came to the rescue delivered two blows to the inmate's head with a handheld radio. For this he was dropped in rank to private.

In a different incident, an MP doused with toilet water responded by spraying the offending inmate with a hose. For this he was charged with assault. Another American soldier was disciplined for cursing at inmates. One guard punched a detainee after being struck and spit on while placing the man in restraints in the prison hospital in October 2004. ("My instincts took over after the hitting and spitting," the soldier wrote in his report.) He was recommended for a reduction in rank to E-4, loss of a month's pay, and extra duty for 45 days.

How cooperative a detainee is determines where he is housed, how much free time he is given, whether he lives alone or in a group, and what color clothing he wears. The most dangerous wear an orange jumpsuit. Those who heed instructions earn a beige jumpsuit, and those who are deemed to be fully compliant wear white. The latter groups have daily recreation periods, live in groups of as many as ten, and receive extra privileges. The compliance rating, by the way, has nothing to do with cooperation with interrogators. Indeed, many fully compliant detainees have maintained stoic silence, while some of the most notorious, dangerous prisoners speak freely with interrogators.

Nearly all of these hardened terrorists have been well coached on how to be an American captive. Given any opportunity, they will all claim torture and human rights violations. They have been schooled on counter-interrogation techniques, on how to construct and maintain a cover story, and other subterfuges to fool or deflect interrogators.

Some detainees, including one classified as a "high value intelligence source" that I was able to observe, take pride in discussing their activities and capabilities with interrogators. The man I saw brags about Americans he has killed, other Muslims he has terrorized, attacks he has planned and carried out, and what he will do to the Americans if he has a chance. He is a leader, and affirms his high rank within the al-Qaeda chain. He has started or ended riotous behavior by fellow prisoners on more than one occasion.

With twisted irony, this individual condemns prisoners who maintain silence for being "ashamed" of their past. "They ought to proclaim their feats as proof of their commitment to the cause of Islam," he tells interrogators, while munching continuously from a box of doughnuts provided by the interrogator. Why the doughnuts? "He throws his food at the guards," General Hood says, "so he loves to eat the doughnuts during the interrogation sessions."

Too hard? Or too soft?

We asked Hood if he was possibly being too lenient with these men. "This system of rapport-building works," Hood assures us. In support of the soft-handed approach, he cites an extraordinary amount of actionable intelligence that continues to flow out of the interrogation rooms of Gitmo.

His revelation was a surprise to me. During my own career in the U.S. Army Special Forces, I had been taught that intelligence, like bread, gets stale quickly. That may be true for tactical intelligence of the sort I used in the field. Strategic intelligence, the kind that we continue to collect at Gitmo, however, seems to have a much longer shelf life. Today's interrogators are succeeding at mapping out the complex organizational and financial structure of al-Qaeda in increasing detail, thereby uncovering networks that need to be attacked and dismantled. They are uncovering new "sleeper" cells. They are learning of temporarily shelved plans for new terrorist attacks, some of which have subsequently been thwarted by law enforcement authorities in America and Europe.

Another surprise for me was learning that many of the U.S. interrogators are women. We have all heard the salacious stories about using women to tease or embarrass the detainees. I saw a different reality. The camp behavioral expert, a female Ph.D. who has more than two years of experience at Gitmo, informed me that female interrogators have been very effective.

"We assume the role of sister or mother," she explained, "something that is quite acceptable and natural in their culture." She dresses demurely for her sessions. "I wear long sleeves, an ankle-length dress, and little makeup." The interrogation room she enters is sparsely furnished with leg cuffs to secure the prisoner, a one-way mirror, cameras, and a distress button to summon help if needed.

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find something that they can relate to. Once we can get them to relate on a common item, even something irrelevant and mundane, then we can begin to probe." It is a long, complex process requiring great patience, and more than a little human empathy. It categorically rejects the use of drugs, coercion, or duress.

Intelligence gleaned from Gitmo is blended with information from other sources to connect dots. We learned that one non-cooperative detainee had his cover penetrated just last month by having his photo identified by a freshly captured fighter in Afghanistan. Once confronted with his real identity, he began to talk.

It is important to keep in mind that these men, while exceedingly dangerous and even pathological in their desire to kill Westerners, are generally well-educated and broadly traveled. Several detainees have advanced degrees in law, engineering, and medicine from American and European schools like the University of London. Others are highly skilled technical experts with advanced training and knowledge of electronics and demolitions. (Some of these are contributing to our knowledge of al-Qaeda bombs found in Iraq.) Many of these men occupied the top al-Qaeda echelons, and met frequently with bin Laden.

A lot of these men came from middle-class or wealthy families. They come from 17 different countries, but a great many are Saudi Arabian. They are not driven by poverty, unemployment, or class deprivation. They are motivated by a virulent form of Islam that promotes jihad and death to Western civilization. They will kill Americans—including women and children—without conscience, for they are convinced that restoration of the Islamic caliphate is their sole mission on this Earth.

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The American servicemembers at Guantanamo do not have the satisfaction of tossing a grenade or shooting back at the terrorists in their midst. They will not be recognized when awards for valor are bestowed. In the face of vile abuse they must respond with supreme restraint, aware that even the slightest infraction will draw the fury and condemnation of hyperbolic politicians and reporters who loathe our military and want nothing more than to embarrass and damage American interests in this war.

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Former Special Forces lieutenant colonel Gordon Cucullu is a frequent television commentator on military matters.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, August 16, 2005 8:39 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Babbin (American Spectator)

By comparison to the EUnuchs' actions, Neville Chamberlain's 1938 Munich deal with Hitler looks like masterful statesmanship.

Jed Babbin

http://www.spectator.org/dsp_article.asp?art_id=8583

(b)(6)

Researcher

OSD Speechwriters Group

The Pentagon, Room (b)(2)

Telephone (b)(2)

Fax

(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, August 16, 2005 5:34 AM
To: (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA
Cc: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: Gitmo Jive

i missed this in today's bird.

i have been thinking about the early bird items that don't make it. it seems like those items form the basis of those daily items we should respond to at the minimum. even if we don't print them.

i would appreciate people's thoughts about that. tnx...

-----Original Message-----

From: Christopher C. DeMuth [mailto:CDeMuth@(b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, August 15, 2005 8:10 AM
To: Christopher C. DeMuth
Subject: Gitmo Jive

Gitmo Jive

By Gordon Cucullu

The American Enterprise, September 2005

www.taemag.com/issues/articleID.18656/article_detail.asp

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Former Special Forces lieutenant colonel Gordon Cucullu is a frequent television commentator on military matters.

(b)(6)

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, August 15, 2005 8:50 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Media Analyst Trip to Afghanistan

yes there was a similiar ban. Mr. Di Rita sent an email explaining the nature of the visit and once the CG had full understanding they cleared the trip. I am checking on the availability of the senior leadership now.

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, August 15, 2005 8:42 AM
To: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Media Analyst Trip to Afghanistan

If the leadership is traveling that is problematic, no?

As to the ban on travel, I think we should work around this but we need the dates leadership will be available. Was there a similar ban before we took the analysts to Iraq?

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA <Dallas.Lawrence@(b)(6)>
To: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA <Allison.Barber@(b)(6)>; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@(b)(6)>
Sent: Mon Aug 15 07:35:46 2005
Subject: Fw: Media Analyst Trip to Afghanistan

Fyi, this needs engagement above my pay grade if we want to make it happen today.

Hope you both had a nice weekend.

Dl

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) COL USA CFC-A PAO DIRECTOR <(b)(6)>
To: 'Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA' <Dallas.Lawrence@>
CC: (b)(6) CAPT (b)(6) (USN) (b)(6); (b)(6) (USA)
(b)(6)
Sent: Sat Aug 13 09:36:57 2005
Subject: RE: Media Analyst Trip to Afghanistan

As I mentioned to your earlier, due to the OPTEMPO here, there is now a visitor moratorium in effect during through Sep. As such, CODEL's and FO/GO's have been re-scheduled for OCT. Approval for this visit will take an exception to policy to get approved.

The dates you list are not good dates. Not only because of the OPTMEPO, but our leadership is traveling during this timeframe.

My recommendation is either a telephonic conf call interview or they should hitch-a-ride with the CJCS.

COL (b)(6)

COL (b)(6)

CFC-A Public Affairs Officer

DSN: (b)(2)

C: (b)(2)

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA [mailto:Dallas.Lawrence@(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, August 12, 2005 9:06 PM
To: 'Col (b)(6) (E-mail)'
Subject: RE: Media Analyst Trip to Afghanistan

col,

mr ruff asked me for an update this morning, was hoping to get your read on how best to rapidly proceed. thank you again sir

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, August 11, 2005 2:56 PM
To: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; 'Col (b)(6) (E-mail)'
Cc: (b)(6) Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Media Analyst Trip to Afghanistan

these analysts are very credible and it is highly worthwhile to provide them as much access and real information as possible. i would point out that while it is beneficial to brief these guys on the issues, they are independent and they will ask tough questions and provide viewers their individual analyses. that being said, i hope we can pull this together. thanks, eric

-----Original Message-----

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, August 11, 2005 11:33 AM
To: 'Col (b)(6) (E-mail)'
Cc: (b)(6) Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Media Analyst Trip to Afghanistan

Col,

Pleasure talking with you today.

With the upcoming elections on September 15th and the lack of attention being paid by the media to the enormous successes of the military in Afghanistan, OSDPA is hoping to bring a small group of our most senior retired military analysts to the country at the end of the month. While the travel party is not confirmed yet, a few of the likely analysts we will be inviting are:

Mr. Jed Babbitt (AF, Former JAG)

Lieutenant Colonel Bill Cowan (USMC, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis (USA, Retired)
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr. (USA, Retired)
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney (USAF, Retired)

Again, these are not hostile media, but are our most senior media analysts that serve as message force multipliers for DoD. I also understand the Air Force is very interested in raising awareness for their medivac operations at Ramstein, we would look to incorporate that as well on the back end.

Current plans call for the analysts, along with a senior DoD escort, to fly commercial into Germany, then fly military air into Afghanistan on or around 26 August, departing on or around the 29th (one overnight in country). In coordination with your folks and the CG, we would like to build a robust schedule of hands on briefings that will give our folks solid talking points to bring back to the states and to the media (i.e. your message points). Based on past trips with these folks (Iraq and GITMO), I would expect this trip to pay huge dividends with regard to media access.

I know this is short fused, however, I think the trip will be a huge plus for all involved, General Casey in Iraq seemed very pleased with the results from our trip out there 2 weeks before the elections in January. These folks had a personal meeting with the SECDEF and the CJCS on Tuesday and it is clear that they would benefit from hands on in country experience.

Thank you sir for your guidance on how best to proceed given our short turn around time.

vr,

Dallas B. Lawrence
Director, Office of Community Relations & Public Liaison
United States Department of Defense

W) (b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, August 11, 2005 10:49 AM
To: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Cc: Col (b)(6) (E-mail)
Subject: Media Analyst Trip to Afghanistan

Dallas,

Because your desired dates are coming up so quickly, you should send Col (b)(6) who is cc'd on this email the concept plan. He will assign someone from his staff to work with you.

Roxie T. Merritt
Captain, U.S. Navy
Director, DoD Press Operations
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
Pentagon, Room (b)(2)
Washington, DC 20301-1400
(b)(2)
cell (b)(2)
roxie.merritt@ (b)(6)

"Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of All Who Threaten It"

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@(b)(6)
Sent: Monday, August 15, 2005 12:09 AM
To: tmcinerney@(b)(6); paulvalley@(b)(6); hashct@(b)(6); Glenstrae77
@ (b)(6); BURM41516@ (b)(6); (b)(6); CIV, OASD-PA; WSSinter@(b)(6)
roberthscates@(b)(6); (b)(6)
Subject: Today's Spectator: The EU-3 and Iran

By comparison to the EUnuchs' actions, Neville Chamberlain's 1938 Munich deal with Hitler looks like masterful statesmanship.

The American Spectator

Jed Babbin

(b)(2) (home office)
(home fax)
(mobile)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, August 12, 2005 4:42 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: On the Air: Dillon on FOX

fyi.

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Dillon, Dana [mailto:dana.dillon@(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, August 12, 2005 4:42 PM
To: (b)(6) (E-mail)
Subject: FW: On the Air: Dillon on FOX

Today at 4:40 p.m. on WMET Radio's "The Linda Chavez Show," Senior Fellow Peter Brookes will discuss the troop situation in Iraq. Listen at 1160 on your AM dial, or at www.wmet1160.com

On Sunday at 12:15 p.m. on the FOX News Channel's "Weekend Live with Brian Wilson," Senior Fellow Peter Brookes will discuss his recent State Dept public diplomacy tour through Australia and Papua New Guinea.

On Monday at 1:15 p.m. on the FOX News Channel's "Dayside with Linda Vester," Senior Policy Analyst Dana Dillon will discuss how the US treats military prisoners.

This message (and any associated files) is intended only for the use of (b)(6) and may contain information that is confidential. If you are not (b)(6) you should not disseminate, distribute or copy this email. Any views or opinions presented in this email are solely those of Dana Dillon and do not necessarily represent those of The Heritage Foundation.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, August 12, 2005 2:51 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: FOX TV CABLE NEWS Sunday

he's a nut, but he's fun.

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, August 12, 2005 2:44 PM
To: (b)(6), CIV, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: FOX TV CABLE NEWS Sunday

geez, have i met this guy! he sounds great.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6), CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, August 12, 2005 2:11 PM
To: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: FOX TV CABLE NEWS Sunday

fyi.

(b)

-----Original Message-----

From: Major Andy Messing [mailto:ndcf@ (b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, August 12, 2005 2:14 PM
To: gdecint@ (b)(6)
Subject: Fw: FOX TV CABLE NEWS Sunday

Subject: FOX TV CABLE NEWS Sunday

Dear Friends...

I'll be on FOX NEWS TV this Sunday.... outta Miami.....after 2PM.... before 2:25PM talking about Special Operations Forces...their utility in counter-terrorism... how the "Quality approach VS the Quantity " approach has major advantages... how using the surgical knife VS the Sledgehammer in the China Shop " makes sense in an age of Nuclear Proliferation..."Gladiator Warfare" is fugal, politically, money-wise, and manpower-wise.

So... if you aren't surfing, sailing, parachuting, motorcycling, repelling, or jetskiing.... tune in ! Hopefully, I won't embarrass myself... drooling and twitching and such...

Regards, ANDY

P.S. I always take "Dick the Dog " to the shoot... he sits underneath my chair.... as he's been to dozens of these

(b)(6)

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, August 11, 2005 2:58 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Media Analyst Trip to Afghanistan

thank you sir.

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, August 11, 2005 2:56 PM
To: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; 'Col (b)(6) (E-mail)'
Cc: (b)(6) Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Media Analyst Trip to Afghanistan

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From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, August 11, 2005 11:33 AM
To: 'Col (b)(6) (E-mail)'
Cc: (b)(6) Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Media Analyst Trip to Afghanistan

Col,

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Lieutenant Colonel Bill Cowan (USMC, Retired)
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Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney (USAF, Retired)

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Thank you sir for your guidance on how best to proceed given our short turn around time.

vr,

Dallas B. Lawrence
Director, Office of Community Relations & Public Liaison
United States Department of Defense
W)(b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, August 11, 2005 10:49 AM
To: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Cc: Col (b)(6) (E-mail)
Subject: Media Analyst Trip to Afghanistan

Dallas,

Because your desired dates are coming up so quickly, you should send (b)(6) who is cc'd on this email the concept plan. He will assign someone from his staff to work with you.

Roxie T. Merritt
Captain, U.S. Navy
Director, DoD Press Operations
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
Pentagon, Room (b)(2)
Washington, DC 20301-1400
(b)(2)
cell (b)(2)
roxie.merritt@(b)(6)
"Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of All Who Threaten It"

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, August 09, 2005 4:39 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Phone Message Sir

you mean the note you passed me during the petreaus brief?? did you see the email i just sent you about going on the 26th since sd is now not going??

last convo i had with salveson was that i said i wasn't sure what you'd want to do, but that i'd talk to you and get back to him. so, i'm assuming he's trying to pre-empt you from calling gen. hood.....

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, August 09, 2005 4:33 PM
To: (b)(6), CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: Phone Message Sir

do i still need to call him in light of the message i sent you? let's look at a gtmo visit the last part of august.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) YN1 OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, August 09, 2005 9:23 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Phone Message Sir

Lt Col (b)(6)

DSN (b)(2)

Subject Military analyst visit to Gitmo Cuba

V/R

YN1(SW)(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, August 08, 2005 7:03 PM
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; Richard, Joseph, Col OASD-PA; Romley, David Capt. USMC, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) SFC, OASD-PA; (b)(6) (b)(6), CDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Col, OCJCS/PA
Subject: read ahead for mil analysts roundtable tomorrow
Attachments: Read Ahead 8.9.05.doc; Picture (Metafile)

attached is the most up-to-date read ahead for the military analysts roundtable. please note that the times and briefers have changed since the one that the secretary was given earlier this evening.
thanks

(b)



(69 KB)

Respectfully,

(b)(2)

OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison
(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1400

(b)(2)



Read Ahead
8.9.05.doc (73 KB)

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America Supports You
Our Military Men & Women

Updated August 8, 2005

**READ AHEAD FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD RUMSFELD
MEETING WITH RETIRED MILITARY ANALYSTS**

Date/Time: TUESDAY, AUGUST 9, 2005; 12:30-3:00 PM

Location: 3E928

Background:

- Fifteen retired military analysts who serve as military/defense experts for major media outlets.
- Last outreach meeting with this group was June 2005.
- Comments should be considered on background.

Timeline:

- 12:30 p.m. Welcome and Introduction**
- Ms. Allison Barber, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Internal Communications and Public Liaison
- 12:31 p.m. Update on Current Operations in Iraq**
- Lt. Gen. Conway, Director of Operations, J-3
- 1:05 p.m. Overview of guarding against and responding to terrorist attacks in the U.S.**
- The Honorable Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
- 1:35 p.m. Break**
- 1:50 p.m. Update on the Global War on Terror**
- Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- 2:15 p.m. Discussion and Questions with Secretary of Defense**
- 3:00 p.m. Meeting Concludes**

Attachments:

Tab A: List of Attendees



MEETING WITH SECRETARY RUMSFELD
Retired Military Analysts
TUESDAY, AUGUST 9, 2005 12:30-3:00 PM

PARTICIPANTS

Confirmed Retired Military Analysts:

Mr. Jed Babbin	(USAF, JAG)
Lieutenant General Frank B. Campbell	(USAF, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Bill Cowan	(USMC, Retired)
Major Dana R. Dillon	(USA, Retired)
Colonel John Garrett	(USMC, Retired)
Command Sergeant Major Steven Greer	(USA, Retired)
General William F. "Buck" Kernan	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis	(USA, Retired)
Colonel Jeff McCausland	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney	(USAF, Retired)
Captain Chuck Nash	(USN, Retired)
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Carlton Sherwood	(USMC, Retired)
Wayne Simmons	(USN, Retired)
Captain Robert R. Timberg	(USMC, Retired)

(b)(6)

From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, August 05, 2005 3:05 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA;
(b)(6) Col OASD-PA
Cc: CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: jed babbin

Sure -- but are you sure you are not his agent

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, August 05, 2005 2:53 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Col OASD-PA
Subject: RE: jed babbin

spoke to larry and he'll do an interview. we'll need to get call-in number and sked a specific time. bryan, is this something that (b)(6) should take on, now? thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, August 05, 2005 9:33 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: jed babbin

wants to interview larry on the greg garrison wibc radio show (indy market--he's had myers and rummy on this particular show) on monday. he saw larry's oped today and wants to talk to him about it. he's hosting from 10-1 and would take larry any time that would work for him. would like to see if he can get him for at least 20 minutes. also, would like to see if he'd be game to take calls???

thanks

(b)

Respectfully,

(b)(6)

OSD Public Affairs

Community Relations and Public Liaison

(b)(2) *The Pentagon*

Washington, D.C. 20301-1400

(b)(2)

<< OLE Object: Picture (Metafile) >>

www.AmericaSupportsYou.mil

Military Analysts Call
USMC Lt. Gen. Conway
Aug. 4, 2005

Host: Ms. Allison Barber
2E572 The Pentagon

Staff: Mr. Ruff, OASD-PA; CDR (b)(6) Joint Chiefs; (b)(6) OASD-PA; Jim
Garamone, AFPS.

Transcriber: (b)(6)

ON BACKGROUND

Ms. Barber: Thanks for joining us today. We want to get started right away. We appreciate your interest and your time today. General Conway, thank you for being here, and for your time. And with that, just as a reminder, this is on background. We've got a couple opening statements, I think you were going to talk about a few things and then we'll go into questions.

LtGen Conway: Yes, I would just briefly. Hey guys, good to be with you again. Jim Conway here. I've got maybe three things I'd like to touch on and then I'd like to spring it open for your questions.

First, I know there's some level of interest in exactly what it was that our vehicle struck yesterday out near Haditha. It started out in first reports as a mine, then it went to IED, this morning the informal word coming out of MNF-W is that it was a triple-stacked anti-tank mine.

Voice: You guys are breaking up pretty bad. Could you say that again general, please?

LtGen Conway: Yeah. I'll say it again. The explosive that the AAV struck was a triple-stacked anti-tank mine laid on the roadway. I've seen some pictures this morning. The crater looks to be seven to eight feet across and maybe three or four feet deep. So it's not one of these massive things that we've seen in the past, but significant nevertheless enough to knock the vehicle upside down and really split it open. So it's unfortunate to say that our young Marines never really had a chance.

On Iraqi battalions. I watched a program last night, and one of the commentators talked about the TWO Iraqi battalions out of 90 that are capable of fighting. That's a real distortion in my mind. There are various evaluation techniques taking place in the theater. The figure 90 is roughly accurate; I think it's probably closer to 100 or so. But of that number, four-fifths are currently fighting alongside American forces. And so I think we've got to be careful to holding them to to high a standard.

If we say that they're completely able to independently operate, that's sort of level one. But the Iraqis, in fact, don't have a logistics and intelligence – I think a sophisticated command-and-control system, and without those things they're never going to really be able to fight without us. Now those things are being created. But in the meantime, the reports we're getting back is that these guys are doing pretty doggone good with regard to

small-unit tactics, you know, squad-level, platoon-level, company-level stuff. So I think we need to give credit to some young Iraqis out there that are looking out onto the horizon and trying to do the right thing.

The third thing has to do with numbers of attacks and just the lethality of all of that. It might surprise you to hear that we're seeing about 500 attacks a week or so. That comes to a rough cut average of about 70 a day. That's actually less than we were sustaining at this time last year.

Now some would say that the lethality is up. Once again, I got some figures from our J-1 before stepping over here. In fact, casualty – I'm talking killed now in action – are roughly the same from January through July of 2004, as they are January through July of 2005. Total numbers of casualties are actually down from the period leading up to the election, the sovereignty period, the election period, they're down a little bit, averaging roughly 100 or so a week.

Now, the numbers of Iraqi civilians, and the numbers of Iraqi security forces are up, and I think that reflects the lethality thing of some of these suicide bombers getting closer in to their targets, some of the sizes of the suicide VBIEDs, and so forth, and I think that you would say and our national population ought to say that we somewhat expect Iraqi security force casualties to go up as they continue get more engaged.

So I would just offer those three points to start with and then turn it over to you all for questions.

Mr. Garrett: Hey sir, it's John Garrett.

LtGen Conway: John I just lost a bet. Go ahead.

Mr. Garrett: I should know this, but the security forces, two basic groups there. You've got the several brands of police-type security forces –

LtGen Conway: Yup.

Mr. Garrett: And then you've got the military on the other hand. Are all those being trained under the oversight of MNSTCI (Multi-National Security Transition Command Iraq)?

LtGen Conway: Yes, John, they both come under MNSTCI. In fact, my deputy director Joe Peterson is just coming back Baghdad today and he's going to go over for duty in about another month or so. He will be the guy in charge of police training. The three star has two general officers working for him, one who trains the military and one who trains the police. But both come under the heading of MNSTCI who provides for the training facilities, the equipment, the embeds, those types of things.

Mr. Garrett: Thank you.

Mr. Allard: Hey general, Ken Allard. You certainly were prophetic last month when you warned us about the higher lethality with the IEDs, that certainly seems to have been the case. What I'm wondering are two questions. Are you concerned about the fact that we appear to be setting some patterns in the tactical operations? And the larger question is, of course, having cleared these areas, and certainly Haditha is not the only one, we can talk about Fallujah, or for that matter, the airport road to Baghdad. Do we have enough forces over there to actually secure what we've already fought for? Or are we doing the same thing that we saw (inaudible) to Vietnam.

LtGen Conway: Yeah, solid copy, Ken. First of all on patterns. You know, maybe. I think it probably depends upon the tactical situation. I've got to tell you, as you look at the ground and do the analysis of that area around Haditha, you got the link to the north, very large lake, and the dam, that's somewhat restrictive that direction, you've got a built up area just west of the river, you've got a power line and an access roadway then that leads down south, southeast from the dam, and that's where both the snipers were hit, as well as where the track took the strike.

So, to the extent that those folks were maybe operating along the same routes, avoiding the built-up population, unable to go north, I don't know. But I could – I could see where that could be the case on that particular piece of ground. You know, commanders over there stress NOT doing that of course, but in some ways it's unavoidable.

My oldest son just checked in a couple of weeks ago, he's operating out of Fallujah and he's got responsibility for MSR (main supply route)-Michigan, MSR-Mobile from Abu Ghraib on over to Fallujah. You know, kind of tough to break a pattern. You gotta be out there, you gotta be working it, you gotta be primarily anchored on those MSRs (inaudible – because?) that's where the majority of the traffic is. So how do you get creative and change your patterns when those are your taskings? That said, people are conscious of it and people realize that if you do get complacent with it, certainly bad things can happen.

On the second issue, do we have enough troops? You know, I think so, we're operating from fixed bases, mobile patrols getting out and doing the necessary saturation of the locations, one – where we think the bad guys are and then making sure they're not where we don't think they are if you'll pardon the use of a double negative.

But we are posting people where we've been more and more, Ken, in the west and these people are wearing Iraqi uniforms. And that's as it should be if we're ever going to get out of there, I think, is that those folks are going to have to assume that responsibility. So we, with them, clear it and then we build places where they can both operate out of themselves and rest with some assurance against the VBIEDs or suicide VBIEDs.

Mr. Allard: I would agree with that, because if anybody (who?) is going to alert you to hey, the other guy's setting a pattern here it ought to be those Iraqi troops.

LtGen Conway: Well, you're exactly right. You know, we had a conversation this morning with the Chairman on more ISR, but ISR in urban insurgency isn't necessarily the answer. It's much more to do with human intelligence, and that's where we've got to really capitalize on the Iraqis.

Mr. McNerny: Jim, Tom McNerny.

LtGen Conway: Yes sir.

Mr. McNerny: It appears to me, I mean following up on this question, is our shortage all along has been intelligence. It isn't the size of the forces we have, it's intelligence, and of course, you tie that in with the rat lines in from – in Syria, the support from Syria. So I am kind of asking you two questions. Do we really have good enough intelligence, the HUMINT, to react with the operative intelligence? And then, of course, what do we do about Syria? That's always going to be a problem til I believe you're given cross-border authority and other covert abilities. Could you comment on those points?

LtGen Conway: Yes sir, I would. You know, I would have answered the question on intelligence very differently six or eight months ago when I was there, because we were just NOT getting the available HUMINT that we needed to do the jobs. And part of that was that our (HET? – HAT? Humanitarian assistance teams?) teams couldn't get out, couldn't do the civil affairs things that sort of lead to those types of opportunities when you mix with the civilian population.

It is quantum better now. I've seen some charts coming out of theater on the numbers of HUMINT reports, hotline reports on a national hotline, local reports that are being given - more to the Iraqis. And that's the beauty of getting these forces out there with us, is that they're, you know, they're pretty proud of their Iraqi boys. They've got about a 75 percent approval rate with the military and the police. And the people that want to see the country eventually stabilized realize that that's how it's going to happen, and these bits of HUMINT are given to these guys, and of course they take advantage of it.

There was a figure – it's probably about 30 days old now, but there was a 10-fold growth in the numbers of hotline reports when it was open nationwide. And I think a lot of this has got to do, again, with the growth of the Iraqi security forces.

Syria is a problem. And they're doing some, but I think it's in everybody's belief that they can and should do more. And I think there will be continual pressure to bear, both internationally and certainly on the part of the Coalition forces to try to get them to do more.

You know, but that said, I think there's some thing that can be done on the Iraqi side of the border as well, personally. I tend to think that if we're going to say that it's a priority that we shut down the rat lines, and if we are concerned that there may be a higher percentage of foreign fighters coming in, then there are some things that need to be done on the Iraqi side without starting another front, if you know what I mean. And I think that

the Iraqi government and probably our people there are starting to come to grips with that.

There's not a problem down on the Kuwaiti border with people coming across. And that's because there's an electrified fence, there's a tank ditch, there's a 30-foot crevice in the earth, and there's about three kilometers of standoff between those things. So, you know, at some point if we get serious about constructing border obstacles out there I think we can help ourselves a great deal.

Border (points? Ports?) are going up, but probably not at the rate that you or I would like.

Mr. McInerney: Aren't we going to have to do something covertly in Syria? I know no one wants a new front –

LtGen Conway: Yeah.

Mr. McInerney: But the fact is it certainly sends a signal that even if given cross-border authority to the Multi-National Forces sends a signal to the Syrians they've got to do more. I know we've been reluctant to want to do that, but I think you're fighting with your hands tied behind your back.

LtGen Conway: Tom, I might agree with you, others might agree with you, but clearly I can't talk about it here.

Mr. McInerney: I understand.

LtGen Conway: OK.

Mr. Maginnis: General, Bob Maginnis. A two-part question. One has to do with the 17 alleged al Qaeda that were arrested in Jordan the last couple of days, (mostly threatening?) our interests over there. Are we seeing that sort of thing in the neighborhood out of Iraq in a sustained level, increasing or decreasing? The second part is in Basra, and the Shia radicals increase. At least, the murder of this young journalist the other day, what he wrote about suggested a corrupt police and that there was a lot of influence from next door Iran. Can you comment on either one?

LtGen Conway: You know, I'm not familiar with the specific incident of the 17 arrested in Jordan, but it's starting to follow a pattern. You know, the way that we're going to win this larger global war on terrorism, men, I believe is through empowering the moderates. And I think that some of the other countries in the region are starting to get it. You all may or may not have heard that there was a convention of 12 Arab countries taking place right now at Sharm el-Sheik (?) in Egypt. And to me, that is a very symbolic gesture that we're starting to have it up to here with the extremism and at some points the moderates are going to have to take charge and get us out of this situation we're in.

So it's not surprising at all that nations in the region who have come together at other conferences and sworn support to Iraq would say, hey, we've got people that are being farmed in our own countries, to be brought into Iraq, to be some of these suicide bombers, and it sort of starts there.

And so, I know we've been making the point that you all can help us with that, and in this instance, I'm glad to hear that they may be.

In Basra, certainly the incident with the American journalist I think is a story unto itself. Apparently he had written some things critical of some folks down there. That's a dangerous thing to do when you travel unescorted and stay in places where he was staying.

But beyond that, you know, there are some very wise Iraqis that I've sat with in Baghdad who've said our first problem is the insurgency, our second problem is the Iranian influence that's gotten into our country since the war. And they think they're going to have to root it out of the country and of the politics without going to civil war. And they're wrestling with how they do that.

There is, of course, much more support for a very strict government in the south than there is with the Kurds or with the Sunnis, and Basra I suspect is pretty much the center of that. You could argue that Najaf is sort of the second seat, again, with the religion associated with that city.

Beyond that, I can't talk to it. You know, I think that you also have moderates there say that that may be the Shia preferred form but we're going to have to come together with the Kurds and the Sunnis to make this whole thing work and so it can't be all one or the other.

Mr. Babbin: General, Jed Babbin. To follow on kind of on parallel with what Tom was asking about, do we have the cross border problem as bad from Iran as we do with Syria?

LtGen Conway: You know, we had an incident just this last week where some smugglers fired on the Iraqi border patrol and left pretty much unimpeded. I think that we don't have as significant a problem with regard to foreign fighters coming in from that direction. Some of the technology that we spoke about previously with IEDs I do think came from Hezbollah by way of Iran. Actually, those devices are being found more in the Shia communities right now than they are in the Sunni, and that's somewhat encouraging because, again, they haven't proliferated.

But no, I don't think we're seeing the numbers of foreign fighters coming across. Other untoward types of influences, absolutely. But not the rat lines that were referenced by the first or second question.

Mr. Babbin: Thank you.

Mr. Nash: General, Chuck Nash. There was a question in an article that appeared yesterday about the sniper teams – the two sniper teams that got interdicted. In the article there were two scenarios. Neither one of them made much sense to me and I'm asking if you could clarify this if you know at this point. And that is, one scenario was that the teams were basically surrounded up on the top of a hill or a mountain, asked to surrender, and according to the article the bad guys said they didn't surrender, so we killed them.

The second scenario was that they were walking through a neighborhood and were ambushed. Neither one of those scenarios sounds plausible to me; one, the first one because they would have called in air support, and the second one because as far as I know, Marine snipers don't stroll through neighborhoods. So what happened there? Do we know yet?

LtGen Conway: Chuck we don't know yet for sure. And we may never know because they were not in radio contact and I am not sure the forensics of the site are going to give us an exact portrayal. We'll probably capture some of those bastards sooner or later and then story may come out, if we can believe it.

I'll tell you what we do know and, once again, it's not a lot. Two teams moving together, a third team out moving independently. They were in radio contact with each other, but they were not transmitting at the time that these guys were taken under fire. The third team reported that they heard a sudden burst of fire lasting five to seven seconds and then silence. Now, at that point we can only offer conjecture. I will tell you that they were not in a built-up area. I've seen an overhead of the grid coordinates. It was open terrain. I've flown over that terrain any number of times. It's, again, on the east side of the river pretty much south, southwest of the Haditha Dam and therefore – I'm sorry, south, southeast of Haditha Dam and southeast of Haditha. Pretty much open ground.

All we can offer in terms of conjecture is probably one of two things. Either they were taken under fire by a very well-laid ambush and they just didn't have a chance, or Iraqis got in close. And I wouldn't want to do more conjecture on what type of Iraqis, how they may have been dressed, what words might have been exchanged, if any, those type of things.

What I can tell you is that they were not overrun by 30 or 40 guys that got out of pickup trucks a couple hundred yards away and came at them. In open ground like that these guys would have nailed a dozen or more. They're great shots and that ground lends itself to that.

We had an instance when I was the MEF commander where we lost a couple sniper teams on top of a building in Ramadi. And we found after some weeks that there was an Iraqi construction crew that was working in that building and they had fed and watered these guys on two or three separate occasions previously. On the third or fourth time they came up with pistols in their belt bands, when the Marines got occupied, they shot them. So, something like that – I don't know, I simply don't know and we probably shouldn't

offer conjecture. But that five second -- 5-to-7 second thing I think points towards one or the other scenario.

Mr. Nash: OK, thank you.

Ms. Barber: We probably have time for one more question, if there's one more to have.

Mr. Nash: If I could, Chuck Nash again. This battalion out of Ohio. You take the snipers and the IEDs, that's 21 Marines out of small battalion. We were chatting before you came on the line about, you know, where the D-Day memorial is in Virginia. That is a tremendous sacrifice from that area. Could you tell me, what is the Marine Corps -- I know this is out of your Joint hat -- but what is the Marine Corps doing to address those families, the state people there?

LtGen Conway: Yeah, Chuck, I don't know yet. I suspect there will be some things. I know yesterday morning the Marine Corps was augmenting its (CACO teams?) to try to make sure that we got words to the families as rapidly as we could without delay.

They were contacting congressmen, and congresswomen actually, in the areas where these folks were from, hoping to marshal some additional support I think, and do the courtesy thing. This goes back to Civil War days when you had, you know, large chunks of units that were killed almost at the same time, so it's almost unprecedented in terms of recent warfare.

There will be more, I'm sure. What, I don't know at this point; I guess it's just premature to say. But certainly, as, you know, as everybody that's talked on it has said, our hearts and prayers go out to the community because it's got to be a shock.

Mr. Nash: Thank you.

LtGen Conway: Hey guys, one point I would close with if I can. You know, I -- there's a great article I didn't get to finish reading today but I sure got the gist of it. I think it's in the Wall Street Journal. You know you got Zawahri here all over the air waves today; you've got the events over the last couple days and these people trying to take credit for it. You know, it's absolutely terrible that we lost that number of Marines over a two-day period and they were the tactical target, but the strategic target remains our population. We can lose people day-in and day-out, but they're never going to beat our military. What they can and will do if they can is strip away our support. And you guys can help us not let that happen.

Voice: General, I just made that point on the air. The way that I think you can help us in that cause is to simply underline those points in unmistakable terms every chance you get.

LtGen Conway: Let's work it together, guys. Thank you.

Ms. Barber: Thank you.

Voices: Thank you. Take care.

Call ends.

PART TWO – internal conversation

Military Analysts Call

USMC Lt. Gen. Conway

Aug. 4, 2005

Host: Ms. Allison Barber

2E572 The Pentagon

Staff: Mr. Ruff, OASD-PA; CDR (b)(6) Joint Chiefs; (b)(6) OASD-PA; Jim Garamone, AFPS.

Transcriber: (b)(6)

ON BACKGROUND

ADDENDUM: after call ends, conversation continues.

Male voice (Mr. Garamone): The number of Iraqi forces seems to be stuck around 170,000. Now I know we're, what, 93,000 I think from the police side and 70-some odd thousand on the military side. Is it because it's summer? Or, I mean, I thought we were turning folks out pretty regularly.

LtGen Conway: I would have said that, too. I know we're on schedule. You know, 270 is sort of the magic figure for a year from now. There's no shortage of these guys signing on. There's no sort of lull in the training pipeline or momentum; I don't think there's equipment issues. So it seems to me to grow up a couple thousand every time I look at it and 170, well –

Female Voice: It's actually 175, sir.

LtGen Conway: It's over 175 is the --

Mr. Garamone: The last one I saw was 171, 900, and we've been saying, the Secretary and the Chairman have been saying for about a month now 170, so.

LtGen Conway: It's up over 175 now. And just about every week we report another class graduating 12-1,300 people. I saw an article – maybe two days ago now – where there was a mild riot down in Basra because some of the Iraqi boys had paid some money to ensure that would be recruited – or enlisted. And the door closed before they got there, so they weren't pleased. It's not a pleasant story because it reflects some graft taking place, but the fact is there's no shortage of people that are wanting to be a part of the military even though we see the events and we see the targeting that's taking place with guys.

Mr. Garamone: All right, thanks.

End of tape.

(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, August 05, 2005 9:56 AM
To: Bucci, Steven, Dr., OSD; Rangel, Robert S, CIV, OSD; Stavridis, James, VADM, OSD
Cc: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Fw: unused items

However hard it may be, I'd like to see about finding time next week to get the military analysts in. We had to canx the day after last trip and they could always benefit from hearing from him, as indicated in the squib below from'reilly last nite.

It will be at least as useful application of his time as the nth degree crawford brief.

We'll work on it.

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA <Allison.Barber@**(b)(6)**>
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA <larry.diritaa@**(b)(6)**> Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@**(b)(6)**>
Sent: Fri Aug 05 07:02:58 2005
Subject: FW: unused items

bill o reilly -- see below from last night's show.

Washington Post

August 5, 2005

Pg. 13

In The Loop

By Al Kamen

Rumsfeld Honeymoon Fades Away

Time to reboot the old Loop Rummy Watch. The fortunes of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld have waxed -- The fall of Baghdad, April 2003 -- and waned -- Abu Ghraib, April 2004 -- during his tenure.

There were calls for his firing after Abu Ghraib -- and he twice offered his resignation to President Bush in the wake of that outrage. It's been relatively smoother sailing since then.

But the tragic losses in Iraq in recent days are likely to spark intense criticism -- not just from the "cut and run" crowd, or the more gradualist "cut and walk" folks, but even from the staunchest backers of the administration's Iraq policy.

So Wednesday night, on Fox's "The O'Reilly Factor," none other than the host himself was jumping on Rumsfeld for his handling of the war.

One O'Reilly guest, retired Army Col. David Hunt, author of a book, "They Just Don't Get It," said: "Baghdad is still a disaster. . . . You still can't drive to the airport" and there is "rampant corruption" by "Iraqi government officials, the Iraqi contractors and some American contractors [who] are stealing money in the billions of dollars" that is "supposed to be helping the Iraqis."

Another guest, Fox News military analyst and retired Lt. Col. Bill Cowan, said, "we're having a tough time," and that people in the Pentagon and in Iraq are "expressing a lot of dismay and disappointment at the way things are going."

Then Bill O'Reilly weighed in: "But I don't have any confidence in Donald Rumsfeld at this point. Do you, Colonel Cowan? I don't think he's leveling with the American people. I think that he doesn't have enough people over there to clean up the corruption, or fight the insurgency, or provide security for the oil pipeline, which they need [for] the money. I don't have any confidence in the secretary of defense at this point."

The drumbeat's getting louder.

Last Stand for Feith and Drum Corps

Speaking of departures from the Pentagon, Undersecretary for Policy Douglas J. Feith is taking off -- last day is Monday -- to write a book and do some "freelancing." There was some churlish chatter that Feith could not find a suitable job, but we're told that this

book project has been in the works for months.

There is a strong expectation at the Pentagon that Bush will give a recess appointment to Eric Edelman, a former ambassador to Turkey and onetime aide to Vice President Cheney. His nomination to replace Feith stalled in the Senate.

Word is that Edelman, informally in line for this job since January, has been "taking meetings," as they say, in preparation and sizing up potential aides.

If Bush makes that move now, Edelman, under the Constitution, would be allowed to serve until the end of the next session of this Congress.

There is always uncertainty as to when that is. Typically, a session ends whenever Congress decides to adjourn. In an election year, with lawmakers wanting to leave to campaign, that could be early October (it adjourned on Oct. 4, 1996) but sometimes as late as Jan. 3, when a Congress must officially end. In recent years, it has been around Thanksgiving or just before Christmas.

If, on the other hand, Bush waits until January to appoint Edelman, that appointment would run through 2006 -- the end of the second session of the 109th Congress, and then to late 2007, the end of the first session of the 110th Congress, a total of about two years.

"There is some legal question about when a session actually ends," assistant Senate historian Betty K. Koed says. Maybe if someone wanted to push the issue, they could probably hang on until the Congress ends, which is Jan. 3.

"But precedent has been that the appointment expires with . . . adjournment," Koed said.

Of course, Edelman could get confirmed when Congress comes back.

Wall Street Journal

August 5, 2005

Pg. 8

GWOT That?

Words matter. Which is why we are glad to see that in a speech in Grapevine, Texas, on Wednesday, President Bush employed the phrase "war on terror" five times and the word "war" 15 times, 13 in reference to the global war on terror and two citing World War II. The news here is that Mr. Bush's choice of words is being widely interpreted as a rebuke of National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Joint Chiefs Chairman General Richard Myers, who lately have been favoring the formulation "global struggle against violent extremism" over "global war on terror." Or, in Beltwayese, G-SAVE vs. GWOT.

The G-SAVE crowd is not wrong. Defeating Islamic terrorism will require diplomatic, economic and political means as well as military ones -- as the President himself has said repeatedly. But to quote from another speech Mr.

Bush gave last year in Fort Myers, Florida, after Richard Holbrooke, John Kerry's foreign policy adviser, called the war on terror a "metaphor":

"Anyone who thinks we are fighting a metaphor does not understand the enemy we face. You cannot win a war if you are not convinced we're even in one."

Calling it anything less than "war" also runs the risk of minimizing the sacrifices of America's service men and women.

To those who are not persuaded that the U.S. is at war, may we suggest a ride on the London Underground, a night at a Bali hotel, or a visit to Ground Zero in downtown Manhattan? These are the many faces of the global war on terror.

National Review Online

August 4, 2005

God Save Us

The West is in a death struggle with Islamofascism.

By Frank J. Gaffney Jr., NRO Contributing Editor So - despite possible dissidents - the Bush administration says we are no longer waging the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Instead, we are told that it has become the Global Struggle Against Violent Extremism (GSAVE). If we are not careful, the changes in focus implied by this new nomenclature could give rise to conditions described by a new acronym: GODSAVEUS (Global Order Defined by Sharia Afflicted by Virulent Enemies on the United States).

Such an evocative handle could become appropriate if the administration's rhetorical shift compounds an already acute problem: the perception the American people have been given that, whatever this conflict is called, it is somebody else's problem - that of the military, the government, our allies overseas, etc. They may continue to perceive that their contribution to the war effort (er, struggle) is confined to going shopping.

Let's get a few things straight. This may be a war unlike any other we have ever fought, but it is a war. Nothing less than our survival as a free, democratic and secular nation is at stake.

We confront in this war ideologically driven enemies, not simply the instrument of their

aggression, terrorism. They are bent on our destruction just as surely as were their predecessors - the Nazis, the fascists, and the Communists. Their stated goal is to establish a global "caliphate" subject to a repressive, Taliban-like interpretation of sharia.

Such ambitions may sound as absurd as did Mein Kampf and the Communist Manifesto. But, consider the definition of jihad officially issued by the Islamic Affairs Department of Saudi Arabia's embassy in Washington, D.C.:

"Muslims are required to raise the banner of Jihad in order to make the Word of Allah supreme in this world, to remove all forms of injustice and oppression, and to defend the Muslims. If Muslims do not take up the sword, the evil tyrants of this earth will be able to continue oppressing the weak and [the] helpless."

Today's totalitarian ideology has no agreed-upon name, although its political qualities can be properly described as Islamofascism. The absence of a descriptor embraced by its adherents is no accident. It is a natural byproduct of their desire to portray themselves not as a leading vanguard, discreet cadre, or elite but rather as the representatives of all Muslims.

By so doing, they seek simultaneously to dominate the Islamic faith and to benefit from the tolerance the United States and other Western democracies have traditionally shown toward minorities in the name of religious freedom.

Matters are made worse by Western governments' continuing inability to differentiate between truly non-Islamist Muslims and the Islamofascists, their sympathizers, support cells, front organizations, and apologists. The past few weeks have seen a number of the latter issue highly publicized fatwas professing their opposition to acts of terror that many of them have supported, or at least condoned, for years.

Some of these organizations and individuals have even been publicly embraced in the aftermath of the London attacks by leaders like Britain's Tony Blair and Canada's Paul Martin. Past, well-intentioned but strategically insane efforts by law enforcement and intelligence organizations to reach out to indigenous Muslim communities through such usually Saudi-funded and pro-Islamist organizations are, as a result, now being redoubled. The dangers associated with partnering with the enemies' organizational Trojan horses can only be compounded if the American people perceive re-labeling the "war" a "struggle" as meaning that it is a condition, not a conflict - something we have to get used to living with, not something we have to defeat, lest it destroy us.

In fact, we have no choice but to fight the Islamofascists with every means at our disposal. This will require, among other things, engaging the American people far more fully in the war effort than they have been to date. In fact, it is time to put the country on a war footing.

Elements of such an approach should include the following:

Support the troops. An ideology like Islamofascism is surely something that must be fought with means other than armed forces. But, to the extent that this ideology is enabled by state sponsors, military instruments are likely to be critical to our victory. If we are to maintain the ability to wage conventional war with an all-volunteer force, the public is going to have to encourage young people to enlist and to stay in the military. Help secure the homeland. The danger posed by attacks on soft targets such as the transportation sector clearly require that the authorities' surveillance and intelligence capabilities be augmented by the eyes and ears of millions of Americans whose own survival may depend upon their vigilance and assistance. This should be viewed as a civic duty, not a threat to civil liberties.

In addition to increased public vigilance and involvement in monitoring domestic threats in the tradition of neighborhood watches, the nation needs to involve the American people much more fully in planning for and preparing against attacks on the homeland. Organizing and harnessing the potential of communities to assist authorities at all levels of government is a time-consuming and costly undertaking. But the spirit of volunteerism in response to presidential leadership can diminish both, and provide capabilities that may prove to be of great value in future emergencies.

Enhance energy security. The public can also be enlisted to help reduce our reliance on foreign oil, much of which is purchased from the same nations that are supporting Islamofascism and its allies. While there are various ways this can be accomplished, the most promising were not much advanced in the recently enacted energy bill. The least painful and most sensible would be to expand dramatically the availability and use of alcohol-based fuels and electricity as means of powering the transportation sector, where most of our oil is currently consumed. A blueprint for accomplishing this is detailed here.

Stop underwriting terror. Unbeknownst to most American investors, significant portions of their public pension, mutual fund, life insurance and private portfolios are comprised of stocks of privately held companies that partner with state-sponsors of terror. For example, a study issued last year by the Center for Security Policy determined that about

\$188 billion is invested in such companies by the nation's 100 leading public pension funds alone. Were that money to be divested or these companies otherwise obliged to choose between doing business with us or doing business with our enemies, it could have a profound effect on the ability of terror-sponsoring states to underwrite Islamofascist attacks against us.

This is but a partial list of measures the American people can - and must - be encouraged to help with as part of our struggle with Islamofascism. If we fail, however, to speak truthfully to the public about the threat both the Muslim world and the West face from our common foe, and to enlist citizens in waging this war fully and effectively, then our only hope may shortly be to ask that God save us.

Frank J. Gaffney Jr. is an NRO contributor and president of the Center for Security Policy in Washington.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, August 05, 2005 9:33 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: jed babb

Attachments: Picture (Metafile)

wants to interview larry on the greg garrison wibc radio show (indy market--he's had myers and rummy on this particular show) on monday. he saw larry's oped today and wants to talk to him about it. he's hosting from 10-1 and would take larry any time that would work for him. would like to see if he can get him for at least 20 minutes. also, would like to see if he'd be game to take calls???

thanks

(b)(1)

Respectfully,

(b)(2)

OSD Public Affairs

Community Relations and Public Liaison

(b)(2) *The Pentagon*

Washington, D.C. 20301-1400

(b)(2)



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(b)(6)

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, August 05, 2005 7:44 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: col. david hunt

hi
are you going to follow up with gen conway on this/

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, August 05, 2005 7:38 AM
To: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: col. david hunt

col. david hunt:

(b)(2) office/cell

DHunt12348@(b)(6)

reminder: he has chosen not to be on the military analysts outreach list.
thanks

(b)(1)

-----Original Message-----

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, August 05, 2005 7:26 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Subject: (b)(6)

hi there
please get me or eric hunts phone info. we want gen conway to call him.

thanks
ab

(b)(6)

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, August 05, 2005 7:25 AM
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: unused items

we are taking drew carey over to iraq this month for our america supports you salute so we have a lot of muscle movement in an iraq trip..we can just add on to it and plan a back to back trip for the analysts. dallas can anchor in iraq to facilitate both trips. let me noodle this over and get back to you.

-----Original Message-----

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, August 05, 2005 7:16 AM
To: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: unused items

Let's follow up with hunt and conway.

Is it time for another another analysts trip to iraq?

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA <Allison.Barber@**(b)(6)**>
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA <larry.dirita@**(b)(6)**>; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@**(b)(6)**>; **(b)(6)**, CIV, OASD-PA <anthony.dolan@**(b)(6)**>
CC: Bucci, Steven, Dr., OSD <Steven.Bucci@**(b)(6)**>
Sent: Fri Aug 05 07:12:54 2005
Subject: RE: unused items

on it.

hunt refuses to be included in our analysts calls or meetings. gen conway said he would be happy to just call him directly.

didn't see any response to oreilly.

-----Original Message-----

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, August 05, 2005 7:11 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Dolan, Anthony, CIV, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: Bucci, Steven, Dr., OSD
Subject: Fw: unused items

Let's see about getting the analysyts in next week. Not sure how tough that will be, but they need some bolstering.

Should we reach out to cowen and hunt separately.

How did they respond to o'reilly? Did they?

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA <Allison.Barber@**(b)(6)**>
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA <larry.dirita@**(b)(6)**>; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@**(b)(6)**>

Sent: Fri Aug 05 07:02:58 2005
Subject: FW: unused items

bill o reilly -- see below from last night's show.

Washington Post
August 5, 2005
Pg. 13

In The Loop
By Al Kamen

Rumsfeld Honeymoon Fades Away

Time to reboot the old Loop Rummy Watch. The fortunes of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld have waxed -- The fall of Baghdad, April 2003 -- and waned -- Abu Ghraib, April 2004 -- during his tenure. There were calls for his firing after Abu Ghraib -- and he twice offered his resignation to President Bush in the wake of that outrage. It's been relatively smoother sailing since then.

But the tragic losses in Iraq in recent days are likely to spark intense criticism -- not just from the "cut and run" crowd, or the more gradualist "cut and walk" folks, but even from the staunchest backers of the administration's Iraq policy.

So Wednesday night, on Fox's "The O'Reilly Factor," none other than the host himself was jumping on Rumsfeld for his handling of the war.

One O'Reilly guest, retired Army Col. David Hunt, author of a book, "They Just Don't Get It," said: "Baghdad is still a disaster. . . . You still can't drive to the airport" and there is "rampant corruption" by "Iraqi government officials, the Iraqi contractors and some American contractors [who] are stealing money in the billions of dollars" that is "supposed to be helping the Iraqis."

Another guest, Fox News military analyst and retired Lt. Col. Bill Cowan, said, "we're having a tough time," and that people in the Pentagon and in Iraq are "expressing a lot of dismay and disappointment at the way things are going."

Then Bill O'Reilly weighed in: "But I don't have any confidence in Donald Rumsfeld at this point. Do you, Colonel Cowan? I don't think he's leveling with the American people. I think that he doesn't have enough people over there to clean up the corruption, or fight the insurgency, or provide security for the oil pipeline, which they need [for] the money. I don't have any confidence in the secretary of defense at this point."

The drumbeat's getting louder.

Last Stand for Feith and Drum Corps

Speaking of departures from the Pentagon, Undersecretary for Policy Douglas J. Feith is taking off -- last day is Monday -- to write a book and do some "freelancing." There was some churlish chatter that Feith could not find a suitable job, but we're told that this book project has been in the works for months.

There is a strong expectation at the Pentagon that Bush will give a recess appointment to Eric Edelman, a former ambassador to Turkey and onetime aide to Vice President Cheney. His nomination to replace Feith stalled in the Senate.

Word is that Edelman, informally in line for this job since January, has been "taking meetings," as they say, in preparation and sizing up potential aides.

If Bush makes that move now, Edelman, under the Constitution, would be allowed to serve until the end of the next session of this Congress. There is always uncertainty as to when that is. Typically, a session ends whenever Congress decides to adjourn. In an election year, with lawmakers wanting to leave to campaign, that could be early October (it adjourned on Oct. 4, 1996) but sometimes as late as Jan. 3, when a Congress must officially end. In recent years, it has been around Thanksgiving or just before Christmas.

If, on the other hand, Bush waits until January to appoint Edelman, that appointment would run through 2006 -- the end of the second session of the 109th Congress, and then to late 2007, the end of the first session of the 110th Congress, a total of about two years.

"There is some legal question about when a session actually ends," assistant

Senate historian Betty K. Koed says. Maybe if someone wanted to push the issue, they could probably hang on until the Congress ends, which is Jan. 3. "But precedent has been that the appointment expires with . . . adjournment," Koed said. Of course, Edelman could get confirmed when Congress comes back.

Wall Street Journal

August 5, 2005

Pg. 8

GWOT That?

Words matter. Which is why we are glad to see that in a speech in Grapevine, Texas, on Wednesday, President Bush employed the phrase "war on terror" five times and the word "war" 15 times, 13 in reference to the global war on terror and two citing World War II.

The news here is that Mr. Bush's choice of words is being widely interpreted as a rebuke of National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Joint Chiefs Chairman General Richard Myers, who lately have been favoring the formulation "global struggle against violent extremism" over "global war on terror." Or, in Beltwayese, G-SAVE vs. GWOT. The G-SAVE crowd is not wrong. Defeating Islamic terrorism will require diplomatic, economic and political means as well as military ones -- as the President himself has said repeatedly. But to quote from another speech Mr. Bush gave last year in Fort Myers, Florida, after Richard Holbrooke, John Kerry's foreign policy adviser, called the war on terror a "metaphor": "Anyone who thinks we are fighting a metaphor does not understand the enemy we face. You cannot win a war if you are not convinced we're even in one." Calling it anything less than "war" also runs the risk of minimizing the sacrifices of America's service men and women.

To those who are not persuaded that the U.S. is at war, may we suggest a ride on the London Underground, a night at a Bali hotel, or a visit to Ground Zero in downtown Manhattan? These are the many faces of the global war on terror.

National Review Online

August 4, 2005

God Save Us

The West is in a death struggle with Islamofascism.

By Frank J. Gaffney Jr., NRO Contributing Editor

So - despite possible dissidents - the Bush administration says we are no longer waging the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Instead, we are told that it has become the Global Struggle Against Violent Extremism (GSAVE). If we are not careful, the changes in focus implied by this new nomenclature could give rise to conditions described by a new acronym: GODSAVEUS (Global Order Defined by Sharia Afflicted by Virulent Enemies on the United States).

Such an evocative handle could become appropriate if the administration's rhetorical shift compounds an already acute problem: the perception the American people have been given that, whatever this conflict is called, it is somebody else's problem - that of the military, the government, our allies overseas, etc. They may continue to perceive that their contribution to the war effort (er, struggle) is confined to going shopping.

Let's get a few things straight. This may be a war unlike any other we have ever fought, but it is a war. Nothing less than our survival as a free, democratic and secular nation is at stake.

We confront in this war ideologically driven enemies, not simply the instrument of their aggression, terrorism. They are bent on our destruction just as surely as were their predecessors - the Nazis, the fascists, and the Communists. Their stated goal is to establish a global "caliphate" subject to a repressive, Taliban-like interpretation of sharia.

Such ambitions may sound as absurd as did Mein Kampf and the Communist Manifesto. But, consider the definition of jihad officially issued by the Islamic Affairs Department of Saudi Arabia's embassy in Washington, D.C.: "Muslims are required to raise the banner of Jihad in order to make the Word of Allah supreme in this world, to remove all forms of injustice and oppression, and to defend the Muslims. If Muslims do not take up the sword, the evil tyrants of this earth will be able to continue oppressing the weak and [the] helpless."

Today's totalitarian ideology has no agreed-upon name, although its

political qualities can be properly described as Islamofascism. The absence of a descriptor embraced by its adherents is no accident. It is a natural byproduct of their desire to portray themselves not as a leading vanguard, discreet cadre, or elite but rather as the representatives of all Muslims. By so doing, they seek simultaneously to dominate the Islamic faith and to benefit from the tolerance the United States and other Western democracies have traditionally shown toward minorities in the name of religious freedom. Matters are made worse by Western governments' continuing inability to differentiate between truly non-Islamist Muslims and the Islamofascists, their sympathizers, support cells, front organizations, and apologists. The past few weeks have seen a number of the latter issue highly publicized fatwas professing their opposition to acts of terror that many of them have supported, or at least condoned, for years.

Some of these organizations and individuals have even been publicly embraced in the aftermath of the London attacks by leaders like Britain's Tony Blair and Canada's Paul Martin. Past, well-intentioned but strategically insane efforts by law enforcement and intelligence organizations to reach out to indigenous Muslim communities through such usually Saudi-funded and pro-Islamist organizations are, as a result, now being redoubled.

The dangers associated with partnering with the enemies' organizational Trojan horses can only be compounded if the American people perceive re-labeling the "war" a "struggle" as meaning that it is a condition, not a conflict - something we have to get used to living with, not something we have to defeat, lest it destroy us.

In fact, we have no choice but to fight the Islamofascists with every means at our disposal. This will require, among other things, engaging the American people far more fully in the war effort than they have been to date. In fact, it is time to put the country on a war footing.

Elements of such an approach should include the following:

Support the troops. An ideology like Islamofascism is surely something that must be fought with means other than armed forces. But, to the extent that this ideology is enabled by state sponsors, military instruments are likely to be critical to our victory. If we are to maintain the ability to wage conventional war with an all-volunteer force, the public is going to have to encourage young people to enlist and to stay in the military. Help secure the homeland. The danger posed by attacks on soft targets such as the transportation sector clearly require that the authorities' surveillance and intelligence capabilities be augmented by the eyes and ears of millions of Americans whose own survival may depend upon their vigilance and assistance. This should be viewed as a civic duty, not a threat to civil liberties.

In addition to increased public vigilance and involvement in monitoring domestic threats in the tradition of neighborhood watches, the nation needs to involve the American people much more fully in planning for and preparing against attacks on the homeland. Organizing and harnessing the potential of communities to assist authorities at all levels of government is a time-consuming and costly undertaking. But the spirit of volunteerism in response to presidential leadership can diminish both, and provide capabilities that may prove to be of great value in future emergencies. Enhance energy security. The public can also be enlisted to help reduce our reliance on foreign oil, much of which is purchased from the same nations that are supporting Islamofascism and its allies. While there are various ways this can be accomplished, the most promising were not much advanced in the recently enacted energy bill. The least painful and most sensible would be to expand dramatically the availability and use of alcohol-based fuels and electricity as means of powering the transportation sector, where most of our oil is currently consumed. A blueprint for accomplishing this is detailed here.

Stop underwriting terror. Unbeknownst to most American investors, significant portions of their public pension, mutual fund, life insurance and private portfolios are comprised of stocks of privately held companies that partner with state-sponsors of terror. For example, a study issued last year by the Center for Security Policy determined that about \$188 billion is invested in such companies by the nation's 100 leading public pension funds alone. Were that money to be divested or these companies otherwise obliged to choose between doing business with us or doing business with our enemies, it could have a profound effect on the ability of terror-sponsoring states

to underwrite Islamofascist attacks against us.

This is but a partial list of measures the American people can - and must - be encouraged to help with as part of our struggle with Islamofascism. If we fail, however, to speak truthfully to the public about the threat both the Muslim world and the West face from our common foe, and to enlist citizens in waging this war fully and effectively, then our only hope may shortly be to ask that God save us.

Frank J. Gaffney Jr. is an NRO contributor and president of the Center for Security Policy in Washington.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, August 04, 2005 10:23 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: bill cowan contact

hey, i aim to please.....can't have expectations too high, ya know. would ruin my image!!

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@(b)(6)>
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA (b)(6)
Sent: Thu Aug 04 21:54:42 2005
Subject: Re: bill cowan contact

Yes, thanks. Your usual mediocre rapid response.

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA (b)(6)
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@(b)(6)>
Sent: Thu Aug 04 21:14:09 2005
Subject: Re: bill cowan contact

Sure.....you got the transcript that i sent earlier, right??

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@(b)(6)>
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA (b)(6)
Sent: Thu Aug 04 20:59:08 2005
Subject: Re: bill cowan contact

Will do so tomorrow at the morning ops mtg. Thanks for the reminder.

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA (b)(6)
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@(b)(6)>
Sent: Thu Aug 04 17:32:45 2005
Subject: Re: bill cowan contact

Have you talked to thorp about hunt??

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@(b)(6)>
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA (b)(6)
Sent: Thu Aug 04 15:23:28 2005
Subject: RE: bill cowan contact

just finished up with him, thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, August 04, 2005 3:17 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: bill cowan contact

cell phone: (b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, August 04, 2005 3:29 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: transcript of o'reilly

Attachments: Picture (Metafile)

here are bill cowan and david hunt's comments on o'reilly last night....

Now for the top story tonight, what is really going on in Iraq? 21 Marines have been killed in the last two days. An American journalist was assassinated after writing an article that said Shi'ite militia were executing people in the port city of Basra.

So we asked two top military analysts to assess the current situation. Joining us now from Washington, Lieutenant Colonel Bill Cowan. And from Boston, Colonel David Hunt, the author of the book "They Just Don't Get It."

Colonel Hunt, we'll begin with you. Looks grim to me. What say you?

COL. DAVID HUNT, AUTHOR OF THE BOOK "THEY JUST DON'T GET IT": Yes, I've talked - the guys who I talked to on this piece, Bill, are guys in Iraq, in the Pentagon, military and intelligence people who are in favor of what's going on in Iraq, in favor of the policy, and they're actively in the fight.

So besides the fact we lost almost 1800 guys killed, 13,000 wounded, and over 50,000 Iraqis have died, civilians, and there's rampant corruption throughout Iraq. And the fact that there are 90 battalions trained by us, only two are capable of independent reaction, some people might think it's going well.

Baghdad is still a disaster. Americans and foreigners will not walk around Baghdad without protection. We need political will. You still can't drive to the airport. You have to take a helicopter.

There are lot of issues. The war is not going well. It's an insurgency. It's going to take us seven years, which we can win but we've got to get at it.

O'REILLY: All right now, when you talk to your people, Colonel Hunt, and you have 18 Marines -- 21 Marines in the last two days dead, all right, Americans think that things are getting better there. But are you telling me that things are getting worse there?

HUNT: Yes, no, what's getting worse is the fact that the Iraqis are not standing up and fighting, the 90 battalions that we've trained. Only two are capable of independent action. And the rampant corruption within Iraq is hurting everything we're trying to do. We're about to turn over a lot of...

O'REILLY: What do you mean by corruption? What does that mean?

HUNT: It means that the Iraqi government officials, the Iraqi contractors, and some American contractors are stealing money in the billions of dollars they're supposed to be helping the Iraqis get on with their independence. And it's the pole in the tent. It's the elephant in the living room. Everybody knows it over there. And it's got to get cleaned up.

Couple that with the lack of training of the Iraqi battalions, it's a very bad situation because the tactics of the

terrorists have changed to these car bombings, which is actually giving us larger numbers of kills.

O'REILLY: All right, do you see it the same way, Colonel Cowan?

LT. COL. BILL COWAN, FOX NEWS MILITARY ANALYST: Well, let me first, Bill, that like Colonel Hunt, I talked to a lot of people both in Iraq and in the Pentagon, in the military, on the civilian side, different sources than him. All of them, like the rest of us here, committed to victory in Iraq, supportive of what we're trying to do, but all of them also expressing a lot of dismay and disappointment at the way things are going.

And indeed, Bill, I was on with you almost a year ago, talking about unemployment being a factor. It's not gotten much better, but lack of essential services being a factor. It's not gotten much better.

Our young men and women out there in the field at the tactical level, there are no qualms or questions about their performance, no qualms, Bill...

HUNT: None better.

COWAN: ...but we're having a tough time.

The insurgents - you know, we have good weeks and we have bad weeks. This has been a bad week. The insurgents are tough. They're getting smarter. They're watching us. And they're getting support from outside.

And the long -- the short answer is, Bill, that we're hanging on. I think that's what most people who I talk to would say if they were asked for the short answer.

O'REILLY: OK, but hanging on is not going to really cut it. And it seems to me that the Iraqi people are going to have to decide for themselves, yet they still haven't decided it, Colonel Hunt. It doesn't seem like they're actively involved in their own welfare.

HUNT: No, they're not. And they -- we don't have enough of them. There are some very good things. The best thing going on is, as Bill said, the American soldier, Marine, Airmen, Navy guys are the best in the world. They're doing an unbelievable job, 125-degree heat. And the Kurds north of Mosul, that's going very well. The Kurds are standing up.

But below that, these 90 battalions that we've trained, only two are capable. Couple that with the corruption we've already talked about, and the things that Bill has mentioned again from people who care about Iraq and want to see us win is very disturbing. It's going to take strong political will and commitment, not what we're hearing of a pullout in 2006.

We've got to stay and make this right because of the fight on terrorism and how Iraq affects it.

O'REILLY: But I don't have any confidence in Donald Rumsfeld at this point. Do you, Colonel Cowan? I don't think he's leveling with the American people. I think that he doesn't have enough people over there to clean up the corruption, or fight the insurgency, or provide security for the oil pipeline, which they need the money. I don't have any confidence in the Secretary of Defense at this point.

COWAN: No. Well, Bill, I think it goes beyond the Secretary. I think the spin factor is still high out at the Pentagon. Obviously in the White House, they still want things to...

O'REILLY: Yes, but who's running the operation, colonel?

COWAN: But well, Secretary Rumsfeld in the final analysis.

O'REILLY: OK, there you go.

COWAN: And behind him, General Myers. But I'd add one thing, if I could, Bill. When you talk about the Iraqi people, you're right. A lot of responsibility on the Iraqi people to change things. But they don't know what's going to happen. They're still not sure what side they're going to land up with at the end of the game here.

And the killings, intimidation, fear, kidnappings of Iraqis, it's not something we talk about regularly here on the news, Bill. But my friends in Iraq say it's rampant.

O'REILLY: Of course.

COWAN: It's unbelievable. And you mention coming in here, the killings down in Basra. In Baghdad itself, Shi'ites killing Sunnis, Sunnis killing Shi'ites.

O'REILLY: But that's what I'm talking about. I'm talking about that American forces can't provide security for the people.

COWAN: Can't do it, Bill. They can't. Because the people are afraid. They can't provide it.

O'REILLY: So either the Iraqi forces are going to have to provide the security, and you guys both say they're not, or we lose.

COWAN: Bill, we are not on a good glide path right now. And it's going to be tough. And David's exactly right. When we're talking about pulling out, all the Iraqi people are sitting back saying, well, if they're pulling out, I better decide where I want to be.

O'REILLY: If they've got 90 battalions of Iraq troops, I mean, within six months, they either do it or they don't. I mean, we can't be South Vietnamese all over again. Either you fight or you don't. That's it.

Gentlemen, I've got to run.

COWAN: Thanks, Bill.

O'REILLY: I told you it was going to be a no spin report, ladies and gentlemen. And that's what it was. But I do believe our analysts are right on the mark.

Next on the rundown, are all liberals angry about the decline of George Soros and his ilk? And then, another huge embarrassment for Catholics. A female teacher arrested for sexualizing her students. It's coming up.

Respectfully,

(b)(6)

OSD Public Affairs

Community Relations and Public Liaison

(b)(2) The Pentagon

Washington, D.C. 20301-1400

(b)(2)



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(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@**(b)(6)**
Sent: Thursday, August 04, 2005 10:05 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: **(b)(6)**
Subject: WSJ

Guys: Given the WSJ piece yesterday, I think I'm clear to take a run at Warner et al. over the surety issue. I plan to do just that today, subbing for Hugh Hewitt. Thanks. Best, Jed.

Jed Babbin

(b)(2) (home office)
(home fax)
(mobile)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, August 04, 2005 8:43 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Conference Call TODAY

Attachments: Microsoft Photo Editor 3.0 Picture; Picture (Metafile)



MEMORANDUM

To: Retired Military Analysts

From: Dallas Lawrence
Director, Community Relations and Public Liaison
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Date: August 3, 2005

Re: Conference Call with Senior DoD Officials

We invite you to participate in a conference call, **TODAY, August 3, 2005, from 2:45 to 3:15.**

Lieutenant General James T. Conway Director of Operations, J-3, on the Joint Staff (bio at: <http://www.usmc.mil/genbios2.nsf/0/24f33df7bf06b3a2852568030060440a?OpenDocument&Click=>>) will provide you with the background and current information on operations in Iraq and the recent loss of Marines. Your host for this call will be Dallas Lawrence.

To participate in this conference call, please dial (b)(2) and ask the operator to connect you to the Analysts conference call.

Please R.S.V.P. to (b)(6) at (b)(6) or call her at (b)(2)

We hope you are able to participate.

Respectfully,

(b)(6)

OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison

(b)(2) The Pentagon

Washington, D.C. 20301-1400

(b)(2)



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(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) TSgt (L)/(b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, August 03, 2005 3:44 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: memo regarding book about GTMO

Sir,
I received this and will pass to the XO for the Commander.

V/r,
TSgt (b)(6)
Admin NCO for the Commander
DSN (b)(6)

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA [mailto:Eric.Ruff@ (b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, August 03, 2005 2:04 PM
To: (b)(6), TSgt (L)
Cc: (b)(6) SFC, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Subject: memo regarding book about GTMO

August 3, 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL CRADDOCK

FROM: ERIC RUFF
CC: LARRY DIRITA
SUBJECT: BOOK REQUEST REGARDING GTMO

Gordon Cuchullu is a military analyst who recently traveled in one of our analysts groups to the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. He has since contacted us in hopes of getting our support for a book he would like to write regarding this facility and it's important contributions. He was extremely impressed with what he heard and saw and is very energized to get his perspective to a reputable book publisher.

Gordon is already a published author and frequently appears on television to offer his views as a former serviceman. He specifically wants to focus on the contemporary and in his book would explore: the value of GTMO, the need for this facility, who the detainees are, why they are so dangerous, what we hope to obtain from them, the real story behind interrogation techniques and the morale and welfare of our troops.

In Gordon's own words, "Mostly I want Americans to know what the hell is really going on there and why it is important to them."

What Gordon develops would of course have to respect and protect classified information and we would work with him to be mindful of privacy and other considerations. I envision a DOD team working with him to frame the ground rules for engagement.

I will be working to coordinate interviews with folks up here but Gordon is asking permission to go to GTMO and if possible, stay down there for one or two weeks and interview military and civilians who are working

there. Some obvious choices would be BG Jay Hood and perhaps the interrogator, Dr. Jennifer Bryson (double check the name), among others. I would coordinate with General Hood on this.

I have not contacted folks at GTMO and am informing you first of the idea. Larry DiRita and I have discussed and think this proposal has real merit. I will follow this memo up with a phone call in a day or two to get your perspective and thoughts. Thank you, sir.