

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, March 31, 2006 6:42 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: RE: Inside the Wire - GITMO

that's why he didn't copy me... he was responding directly to your email to paul, so it probably didn't occur to him to copy me.... since you didn't! see? :)

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Sent: Friday, March 31, 2006 5:05 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: Inside the Wire - GITMO

per our conversation.

-----Original Message-----

From: Gordon Cucullu [mailto:gordon(b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, March 28, 2006 12:19 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; 'Paul Vallely'
Cc: 'Gordon Cucullu'
Subject: RE: Inside the Wire - GITMO

Eric, I was in DC last December and interviewed Doug Feith, Vince Brooks, Max Waxman, Steve Rodriguez, and Tom Hemmingway. Waxman, Brooks, and Hemmingway were for attribution; Feith wants to see anything we do and clear it first, and Steve was background.

We could certainly use more background, non-attribution stuff, particularly as it pertains to 1) capture data on the detainees, 2) the 'checklist' or criteria that were used to determine who got sent to GTMO and who got turned over to the Northern Alliance, 3) stories of released detainees, 4) stories of recidivists, and 4) stories of those considered to be the 'worst of the worst.'

Also we may need another follow on meeting with Tom Hemmingway to discuss the habeas lawyers, especially now that the military commissions are underway.

I'm planning to be in Wash Thurs and Fri this week. I have a presentation on North Korea at noon on the Hill but could meet with anyone prior to or afterwards, if you think it makes sense. Otherwise we can pick different dates.

Best, Gordon Cucullu

On Mon, 27 Mar 2006 17:52:20 -0500, Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD wrote
> thanks for the info, paul. great news about the book. are the questions
> you are posing questions you will answer as authors? and if so, do
> you want to talk to some folks on background - your information only
> and not for publication -- for their views on these questions, and
> thus help you get your thoughts formulated? thanks, eric

>
>
>
>
>
> From: Paul Vallely [mailto:paulvallely(b)(6)]
> Sent: Monday, March 27, 2006 4:22 PM
> To: 'Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA'
> Cc: 'Gordon Cucullu'
> Subject: Inside the Wire - GITMO

Read Gordon's column - The Right Approach - weekly and sign up for a free e-subscription. Review a section of his hot new book on North Korea, Separated at Birth: How North Korea became the Evil Twin. For all this and more log on the web site www.colonelgordon.com.

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@[b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, March 28, 2006 5:43 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: Cancel

Hugh's schedule was just rearranged. Will not be hosting for him tomorrow. Thanks. I'll pester you guys again when I'm next on. Best, Jed.

Jed Babbin

(b)(2) (Home Office)
(Fax)
(Mobile)

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@**(b)(6)**
Sent: Tuesday, March 28, 2006 4:56 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: Tomorrow

Eric: Any chance of getting one of the big dogs to talk about the Iraq update tomorrow? I'm guessing the mosque shoot-em-up story has disappeared, and if so I don't want to revive it. But something on how we're doing would be very good. Please let me know. The Hugh Hewitt Show, 6-9 EST, Salem Radio Network (100+ cities, nationwide). I'll be hosting tomorrow. Many thanks. Best, Jed.

Jed Babbin

(b)(6) (Home Office)
(b)(6) (Fax)
(b)(6) (Mobile)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 28, 2006 1:16 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: ken allard

Home: (b)(2)
Cell: (b)(2)

thanks

(b)(6)
OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison
(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301
(b)(2)

www.AmericaSupportsYou.mil

(b)(6)

From: Paul Vallely [paulvallely@(b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, March 27, 2006 8:11 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Cc: 'Gordon Cucullu'
Subject: RE: Inside the Wire - GITMO

Yes. We need to answer those as the authors based on good interviews, etc. Putting a face on the detainees and terror is essential that is why we need as much on the 20 detainee stories that we can get and more than is already in the public arena and public knowledge or that has been released to the press so far. Hoping the JTF Gitmo will provide us with that info that is not classified. If you can assist in any way on the 20 detailed detainee stories, that would be great. The next solid piece for the book then is what did we get from them intell wise that helped us in the GWOT.....

Need for interviews on background, yes for sure. All of a sudden the book market in NY is hot for this book..... We need to knock their socks off!!!!

Fox News Channel
Paul E Vallely
Military Analyst
paulvallely@(b)(6)
tel: (b)(2)
fax: (b)(6)
mobile: (b)(6)
www.soldiersmemorialfund.org

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD [mailto:Eric.Ruff@(b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, March 27, 2006 3:52 PM
To: 'Paul Vallely'
Cc: 'Gordon Cucullu'
Subject: RE: Inside the Wire - GITMO

thanks for the info, paul. great news about the book. are the questions you are posing questions you will answer as authors? and if so, do you want to talk to some folks on background - your information only and not for publication -- for their views on these questions, and thus help you get your thoughts formulated?
thanks, eric

From: Paul Vallely [mailto:paulvallely@(b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, March 27, 2006 4:22 PM
To: 'Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA'
Cc: 'Gordon Cucullu'
Subject: Inside the Wire - GITMO

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, March 27, 2006 7:12 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: FW: ken allard

Attachments: MEMORANDUM re Ken Allard's request.doc



MEMORANDUM re
Ken Allard's req...

hi. here is the memo with ken's request and my proposed response. i will incorporate larry's suggestions. ken is writing a book called "war heads" about the strategy and planning, etc. including the p.r. effort surrounding the war.
thanks

(b)

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Sent: Monday, March 27, 2006 6:04 PM
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: ken allard

I haven't seen anything from ken so can i please see his inquiry as well? what is he planning to do with the info and why is he asking? thanks.

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD
Sent: Monday, March 27, 2006 5:24 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD
Cc: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: RE: ken allard

1. please don't make it a "SecDef" program, but a DoD program.

Let eric r. look at it and let's decide it. It looks basically okay to me.

I'd like to emphasize if there is a way to do so that we have tried to include as many analysts as possible, some of the interactions involve several, some only a few. Emphasize as well that we often bring them into the department, for a day of briefings and interactions including the secretary, and try to quantify those as distinct from the calls.

Tnx...

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA (mailto:(b)(6))
Sent: Friday, March 24, 2006 5:04 PM
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD
Cc: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: ken allard

here it is. you sent it forward on tuesday to mr. smith and allison asking them to look at it and think about it before proceeding.
thanks

(b)

<< File: MEMORANDUM re Ken Allard's request.doc >>

MEMORANDUM

To: Larry Di Rita
From: (b)(6)
Through: Allison Barber
Date: March 20, 2006
RE: Colonel Ken Allard's request

Below is an overview of our outreach program to Retired Military Analysts for Ken Allard's book. For your review, I've preceded the overview with his comments to me clarifying exactly what he is looking for. Please let me know if you are satisfied with the proposed response.

Ken Allard's Request:

Please tell them that it need not be comprehensive.....timely is a lot more important. What I'm really interested in:

1. When the program began.
2. Key briefings from OSD's point of view.
3. Some estimate of how many meetings, briefings et al took place (ie, once a week/twice a month from 2003, for example?) That obviously cannot be a perfect number so a reasonable SWAG is fine. I think it's significant that you guys have put a lot of work into this, including trips, and that's what I want to show.

Ken

Proposed Response:

The Secretary of Defense outreach program to retired military analysts started in October 2002 with a roundtable meeting.

Since then, there have been more than 80 conference calls (at the least one per month, sometimes as often as weekly) and 16 roundtable meetings with senior DoD officials in the Pentagon. Topics covered range from the work up to the war to operations in the global war on terror, including Iraq and Afghanistan, to BRAC, Operations at the Guantanamo Detention Facility, Veterans Healthcare and the DoD budget. Additionally, the analysts have participated in four DoD-coordinated trips to Iraq and three DoD-coordinated trips to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, March 27, 2006 5:25 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: Phone Call

Importance: High

Attachments: image001.jpg; image002.gif

1624 - Jed Babbin at (b)(2)

(b)(6)

Administrative Support Assistant

OASD Public Affairs

(b)(2)

Fax: (b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@**(b)(6)**
Sent: Monday, March 27, 2006 12:24 PM
To: **(b)(6)** Col, OCJCS/PA
Cc: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: Question and Interview Request

(b)(6) Long time no talk. Hope all is well with you.

I'm subbing for Hugh Hewitt today (6-9 EST, Salem Radio Network, nationally-broadcast to over 100 cities). Any chance I can get Gen. Conway to talk about the action yesterday in the Sadr mosque? I think, given the coverage, that we need to get someone who can talk about the fact that we didn't send anyone into any mosque and blast the notion we're destroying Islamic sites. Anything in those hours, ten-twelve minutes is all we need. Pls call. Best, Jed.

Jed Babbin

(b)(2) (Home Office)
(Fax)
(Mobile)

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@**(b)(6)**
Sent: Monday, March 27, 2006 12:20 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: Re: Change in plan

Haven't. Will do now; thanks

Jed Babbin

(b)(2) (Home Office)
(Fax)
(Mobile)

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@**(b)(6)**
Sent: Monday, March 27, 2006 7:47 AM
To: tmcinerney@**(b)(6)**; paulvalley@**(b)(6)**; nashcl@**(b)(6)**; Glenstrae77@**(b)(6)**; BURM41516@**(b)(6)**; **(b)(6)**; CIV, OASD-PA; WSSInter@aol.com; robertscales@**(b)(6)**; **(b)(6)**
Subject: Illegal Immigration - Today's Spectator

All this talk about illegal immigration has to come down to fencing the border and pressuring Mexico. Neither of which we're doing.

The American Spectator

Jed Babbin

(b)(2) (home office)
(home fax)
(mobile)

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@nytimes.com
Sent: Sunday, March 26, 2006 9:54 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: Change in plan

Eric: Sounds like, from the overseas reports, it's important to get out the idea that we didn't attack or enter a mosque. Instead of Cucolo, is someone such as Conway available?

Aljazeera.Net - Many killed in Baghdad mosque clash

Hugh Hewitt Show, Salem Radio Network, 6-9 PM Monday, 27 March, nationally-broadcast (www.hughhewitt.com). Let's talk tomorrow. Best, Jed.

Jed Babbin

(b)(2) (home office)
(home fax)
(mobile)

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@**(b)(6)**
Sent: Saturday, March 25, 2006 4:35 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: Re: Cucolo

Eric: Many thanks. will do. Best, Jed.

Jed Babbin

(b)(2) (home office)
(home fax)
(mobile)

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@**(b)(6)**
Sent: Friday, March 24, 2006 7:22 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Cc: dewey.ford@iraq.centcom.mil
Subject: Cucolo

Eric: Please remember to get me the contact info on Gen. Cucolo's PAO. He'd be a great guest for Hewitt on Monday. Many thanks. Best Jed.

Jed Babbin

(b)(2) (Home Office)
(Fax)
(Mobile)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) TSgt, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, March 24, 2006 11:51 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: Jed Babbin called at 1050. Substitute for Hewitt on Monday and wanted to talk.
(b)(2)

(b)(6) TSgt, USAF
Administrative NCO
OASD/PA

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@[b](6)
Sent: Thursday, March 23, 2006 1:46 PM
To: [b](6)
Cc: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: Re: [U] MNF-I Press Conference

(b)(6) I'm subbing for Hewitt again on Monday. Wanna take a shot at getting Chiarelli or Casey again? Best, Jed.

Jed Babbin

(b)(2) (home office)
(home fax)
(mobile)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, March 22, 2006 9:33 PM
To: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Subject: Fw: Tom Sullivan's article.

Fyi.....

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) LTC USSOUTHCOM JTFGTMO
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Wed Mar 22 18:28:16 2006
Subject: RE: Tom Sullivan's article.

Hi (b)(6)

Super idea, if it comes out in the next week I believe we can strategically place it in the Early Bird - let me know.

Believe an analyst trip would be great in the May/June timeframe, give the new commander of the JTF, RMDL Harris (March 31), time to assimilate his considerable new responsibilities. Some thoughts on your visit agenda:

Believe the impact of the OARDEC process has been under reported. Commissions aside, 280 detainees have been transferred to their country of origin or outright released through the CSRT/ARB process - this is unprecedented in an ongoing war. Another 130 detainees have been recommended by the ARB process for release or transfer and will probably occur this year. We currently have approximately 490 detainees in custody at the JTF. Look at the numbers when another 130 detainees are released. The POTUS and the SECDEF have always stated that we don't wish to hold a detainee any longer than he's a threat to the U.S. or are no longer of intelligence value. The annual ARB process validates that statement.

The media often negatively focuses on the commissions process, citing that only 10 detainees have been charged to date and the rest are languishing at GTMO. The ARB process that has released nearly 300 detainees turns that misinformation/deception on it's head!

Believe that the military analysts could also visit Camp 6 which will be completed in August. This 30M plus facility is state-of-the-art, includes medical and dental facilities, recreation yards, etc.. will have less escort requirements, etc. allows the JTF to significantly reduce the Trooper footprint. Camp 6 is not about expansion it's about improving our process and procedures and the quality of life for detainees. Eventually Camps 1-3 will close.

Why would the American people expend such resources and require such sacrifice from the young men and women who serve here in this challenging environment? Because we run a professional camp, serious about our mission of safe, humane, care and custody of the dangerous men in our charge - a true reflection of our American and service values.

We've also significantly upgraded our medical facilities since the last analyst visit. The population health initiatives offered to detainees rival those provided in the U.S. Example: we offered colonoscopies to our detainee population over 50 recently. 90% accepted, and there are other health initiatives for the detainees that would ultimately reinforce with the American people our commitment to our nations values.

The other exciting piece is the strategic intelligence that's being gathered in support of the global war on terrorism. The media and habeas attorneys cite the fact that the detainees here no longer provide valuable intel due to prolonged detention. That's absolutely false!! A targeted intel brief for military analyst on the valuable strategic intelligence currently produced at GTMO would prove very valuable as an extra tool in their briefing kit bags.

Just my 2 cents worth, (b)(6) ;-)

Take care,
JM

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, March 22, 2006 5:35 PM
To: (b)(6) LTC USSOUTHCOM JTFGTMO
Subject: RE: Tom Sullivan's article.

hi (b)(6)
no, i believe he is writing a whole story and wanted dana's thoughts on the original article to give him some fuel....

while we're on the subject... we're thinking of another analyst trip down there. we'd like to focus more on the commissions process, where we are, how it's going, etc. rather than how we treat them, what their housing is like, etc. do you suppose we could do this relatively soon??
the next couple of weeks?? let me know what would make sense for you folks down there and i'll run the traps on this end.
thanks... hope you're well,

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) LTC USSOUTHCOM JTFGTMO
[mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, March 22, 2006 4:49 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Tom Sullivan's article.

(b)(6)

Are they sending a letter to the editor?

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, March 22, 2006 4:30 PM
To: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; Heilsnis, Harold Mr OSD PA;
(b)(6) LTC USSOUTHCOM JTFGTMO
Subject: FW: Tom Sullivan's article.

all, forwarded from a mil analyst, fyi. i've also pasted the article he references at the bottom of this email.
thanks

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Dillon, Dana [mailto:dana.dillon(b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, March 22, 2006 4:00 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: Tom Sullivan's article.

fyi

-----Original Message-----

From: Crimmins, Jerry [mailto:JCRIMMINS(b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, March 22, 2006 10:29 AM
To: Dillon, Dana
Subject: RE: Tom Sullivan's article.

Dana,

3/22

7

Or do I call you Major?

Thanks for your very clear responses. Can't think of anything extra to ask you right now. I should start writing this tomorrow. If I encounter another question, I hope I can contact you again.

Have had to question about 20 people this week and last on both sides. My publisher wants a thorough story.

Few can get to the point as fast as you.

Jerry Crimmins
Chicago Daily Law Bulletin
312-644-4535

-----Original Message-----

From: Dillon, Dana [mailto:dana.dillon@b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, March 22, 2006 8:47 AM
To: Crimmins, Jerry
Subject: re: Tom Sullivan's article.

Jerry,

You can call me almost anytime today at (202) 608-6133.

A few comments.

I believe the very first sentence of Sullivan's article is incorrect. It is the policy of the International Committee of the Red Cross to not publish its findings or make them available to the public.

I believe that the "tantamount to torture" statement came from a United Nations group that did not visit GITMO. The rest of that paragraph is equally misleading. First, there were about 800 prisoners that have stayed at GITMO at one time or another and the current number is approximately 400. This information is on the DoD website and easily obtainable. I don't know what "virtual solitary confinement" means to Mr. Sullivan. His own article discusses prisoners talking to other prisoners and exercising in a yard with other prisoners. If he means they don't have cell mates, then yes, each of the cells was for one person. The last sentence of the paragraph is the first one that is factually correct.

Paragraph 2: yes some, maybe many, prisoners are repeatedly interrogated. The interrogators have to check facts and then come up with a new list of questions to ask. There is frequently weeks and months between interrogations. I witnessed three interrogations. There were no dogs, no improper use of force and one prisoner was eating doughnuts during the interrogation.

Paragraph 5: I have limited personal experience with prisons, I toured the disciplinary barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and my duties as an army officer took me to the military prison in Mannheim, Germany several times, and once I visited a city lock up in Kearney, Nebraska. Based on that experience, the prison cells at GITMO were comparable in size and availability of amenities to any other prison cell I've seen. It is not CLUB-CUBA - it is a prison. Yes, there was a mattress available to sleep on, and a toilet and a sink. I also sleep on a mattress at home.

Mr. Sullivan is incorrect about the rain coming in. The cells are protected from the rain. It was pouring rain when I visited the cells and I did not get rained on while in the prison area, in fact the group I was with was reluctant to leave the cell area because we had to run thru the rain to get to the busses. The only people that got wet from the rain, were the group I was with, one prisoner that was being transferred from interrogation to his cell, and the guards. The cells were not air conditioned and it does get hot in Cuba, but the cells were shaded and open to the sea breeze.

I do not recall seeing "undulating horizontal bars" and when I spoke with a prison doctor he did not mention that there was any unusual or exceptional eye damage to prisoners. Yes, the prison exercise yard was surrounded by a chain link fence. So is my backyard.

The prisoners write, send and receive letters. Are the letters to and from terrorists screened? Yes.

Yes, some prisoners are

As far as meals go, I am not sure what Mr. Sullivan is accustomed to, but I ate one of the meals that were served to the prisoners and it was plentiful and tasty, including

fresh fruit and vegetables. I've heard my experience with meals repeated by a number of people that have visited GITMO. I have never heard or read a statement from any person that actually ate at GITMO, that the food was in anyway improper or insufficient.

Paragraph 6: I spoke with doctors at GITMO and they claim that most of the prisoners there are in much better shape than when they arrived. The doctors said that there was no lack of medical facilities at GITMO. The doctors specifically stated that the incidence of mental health problems was no higher at GITMO than in the general American population.

Last Paragraph: The battlefield is not a crime scene and soldiers don't carry CSI kits. Investigating the alleged crimes of enemy combatants picked up on the battlefield is almost impossible. Of the almost 400 prisoners released since the invasion of Afghanistan there has been 12 incidents of released prisoners returning to fight American or coalition soldiers. If the United States does not keep enemy combatants at GITMO, then where else should they be kept?

Dana Dillon

article:

A national disgrace
Scandalous state of affairs at Gitmo

By Thomas P. Sullivan
Published March 1, 2006

"Tantamount to torture" is how an inspection committee of the International Committee of the Red Cross recently described detention practices at Guantanamo Bay. More than 400 men have been detained for more than four years in virtual solitary confinement at the military detention center in Cuba. The prisoners, whom the U.S. government has denominated "enemy combatants," are foreign citizens taken into custody from various countries.

They have been interrogated repeatedly. With few exceptions, they have insisted they have done nothing wrong and took no action against the U.S. government. Some may have violated international laws, some may be terrorists. But others may not. What we do know is that these people have not been charged, let alone tried. The Bush administration has fought tooth and nail to prevent these "detainees" from being given an opportunity to appear before a court to challenge the basis for the government's classifying them as combatants. They just languish in Gitmo.

The writ of habeas corpus is enshrined in our Constitution: "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in case of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it."

It is the traditional method used to require prosecutors to explain to a judge the basis for imprisoning those suspected of committing crimes. In an astounding surrender to executive power, Congress recently passed a bill purporting to repeal the prisoners' right to file habeas petitions and substituted a procedure that leaves the prisoners at the whim and caprice of military tribunals. Translation: continued indefinite incarceration.

I recently traveled to Guantanamo to interview a client, a man from Saudi Arabia. He is in his 30s, married, father of several children, who has been incarcerated since late 2001. An interpreter who speaks Arabic accompanied me. I am serving without charge. Armed soldiers searched us and escorted us to and from a small cubicle. One of my client's legs was shackled to the floor.

Many of the cells--more appropriately described as cages--were made from shipping containers, 6-by-9-feet, with a raised cement slab and mattress for a bed, a metal floor, a toilet and a wash basin. That's it. Heat and rain enter freely, often making it alternately extremely hot or cold.

The walls are mesh or undulating horizontal bars, causing damage to prisoners' eyesight. Prisoners see and converse only with detainees in cells adjacent or directly across from their cells. Prison guards escort them individually to a shower twice a week and to exercise twice a week in an enclosure consisting of a cement floor about 15 yards square

surrounded by a chain-link fence. They have no access to radio, TV, magazines, newspapers or telephone. Reading materials are sparse--everything sent, including letters from families, is screened, a process that often takes many months. The lunch I saw served appeared hardly fit to eat.

Many prisoners are suffering physically and mentally from isolation, lack of proper food, medical care and exercise. Some have been driven to hunger strikes and attempts at suicide.

In times of national stress our commitment to due process is most severely tested. The temptation to adopt autocratic measures springs to the fore, made all the more palatable when the perceived enemy is a foreigner who speaks in a strange tongue and adheres to unfamiliar religious and cultural traditions. Former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor once reminded us that "it is in those times that we must preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which we fight abroad." We should promptly bring an end to this national disgrace.

Thomas P. Sullivan is an attorney in Chicago.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, March 21, 2006 10:59 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: RE: ret'd ltg mike delong

Michael DeLong

(b)(6)

(b)(2) direct
cell
fax

[mike.delong@\(b\)\(6\)](mailto:mike.delong@(b)(6))

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Sent: Tuesday, March 21, 2006 8:54 AM
To: (b)(6), CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: ret'd ltg mike delong

do we have cell and email contact info on mike? thanks

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@ (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, March 20, 2006 9:27 AM
To: tmcinerney@ (b)(6); paulvalley@ (b)(6); nashct@ (b)(6); Glenstrae77@ (b)(6); BURM41516@ (b)(6); (b)(6) OSD PA; WSSinter@aol.com; robertscales@ (b)(6); (b)(6)
Subject: Endgame Conservatives: Today's Spectator

Rich Lowry's column in NR last week - the "To hell with them hawks" - was wrong in many respects. Here's the answer to it.

The American Spectator

Jed Babbin

(b)(2) (home office)
(b)(2) (home fax)
(b)(2) (mobile)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, March 17, 2006 2:39 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: Fw: Dempsey military analyst transcript
Attachments: 03-16-06 Dempsey ISF training.doc

Do I deliver or what??? :)

-----Original Message-----

From: Murphy, Margaret, CIV, OASD-PA
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
CC: Smith, Dorrance, HON, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Thorp, Frank, RDML, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Col, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Lt Col, OASD-PA; (b)(6) OASD-PA; Ballesteros, Mark J, LTC, OASD-PA; Vician, Todd, Maj, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LCDR OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Gilmore, Gerald, CIV - OASD(PA)
Sent: Fri Mar 17 13:32:47 2006
Subject: Dempsey military analyst transcript

<<03-16-06 Dempsey ISF training.doc>>

Attached is the edited transcript from yesterday's military analyst call with LTG Dempsey.

The entire call was on background.

Military Analysts Call

Thursday, March 16, 2006

Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey, commander of the Multi-National Security Transition Command - Iraq (MNSTC-I)

On Background

Hosts: Mr. Dallas Lawrence, OASDPA, (b)(6) OASDPA

Room (b)(2) LTG Dempsey in Iraq

Transcriber: Murphy

Lawrence: (in progress) the entire call will be on background. You are free to quote the source as a senior military leader, but other than that, it's on background, and General Dempsey should be calling in shortly.

(break to wait)

The show is yours, sir. We have gone over the ground rules. Our folks know this call is on background, and we appreciate you joining us this evening from Iraq.

Dempsey: My pleasure.

Lawrence: General, if you'd like to kind of give an opening overview of the current status of forces, what the successes your folks are seeing there, anything you'd like to discuss, then we can open it up for questions.

Dempsey: Yeah, I think I would. But I will keep it brief, because I would rather just field the questions that they are interested in.

First of all, hello to all of you. Most of you have been over here at one time or another. I am just crossing my 21st month in Baghdad, 14 the first time and seven now. So I've got a bit of a, it seems to me, a historical perspective on this whole thing.

And what I would say in general terms in that regard is that although the generation of the combat forces, the more than 100 battalions of Army and police battalions that are out there get most of the notoriety, the – it seems to me that the – an equally important story is the institutions that are being built above it, that is to say the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior, as well as the – kind of the foundation of the whole thing which is an education system, an Iraqi training and doctrine command that includes 18 institutes, academies, colleges and training centers so that this force we are building will be two things principally – three really. One is capable, clearly. But the other two are one that is an institution from top to bottom, from foot soldier to minister, and even more important than that an institution of national unity, that is, a cohesive force inside the country at a time when they clearly need some cohesive forces working on their behalf. And I think there's been some reasons to believe that that endeavor and that entire enterprise is moving in that direction.

And with that, I will say only one other thing, and that is I know nothing, literally, about Operation Swarmer, so if you will stay clear of that, I would be happy to answer your questions.

Q: General, this is Jeff McCausland. Good to talk to you again. Could you talk a little bit about that national unity function? Of course, there's been various reports after the bombing of the Golden Mosque (22 February in Samarra). And in general, the ones I have read seem to be summarized by saying the Iraqi security forces, the army, performed quite well; in fact, they deployed rapidly and were a settling influence, however, that the police forces were somewhat mixed results in terms of that whole being cohesive, being identified as a unifying force, et cetera.

Could you talk a little about those events, and those two different parts of the security force?

Dempsey: Sure. In general terms, I would say that the army and the national police – and the national police, by the way, used to be called when you were here last time the special police – and consist of the commando division and the public order division, those national forces, we have more visibility on them than we do the local police, but – performed very well. They were very deliberate; they were poised. I would describe their activities as a settling – clearly a settling influence on what was essentially a very emotionally charged atmosphere.

There were reports of certain units that chose not to confront armed militia, and there were some armed militia activities that cropped up, notably the (Muqtada Sadr's) Jaysh al Mahdi in and around Sadr City. But frankly, they didn't have much political top cover to do so. In other words, there was a conscious decision taken at the national level not to exacerbate the problem by handling two problems at once, you know, you've got the emotionally charged atmosphere of the mosque and the religious undertones of that and the decision was made not to confront militias, but rather ensure that they were not acting in criminal ways. So, for example, there were a couple of mosques that were taken over by militias – the militia of course claimed – and it may be true -- that they took them over in order to protect them – but when the legitimate forces went and said, okay, we got it now, they -- in every case -- they dispersed.

There were other reports about armed groups moving through the streets, you know, shooting their rifles in the air and things that over here are somewhat common place, I don't want to diminish that, but in every case, again, the legitimate security forces had a leveling effect on all that and kind of channeled all this excess energy.

Now we're still in the – this is all very recent, so we're still in the process at some level of accumulating our lessons learned. And there were a couple of instances where local police in particular, I am not talking about the national police or the national army, but the local police may have, you know, turned a blind eye to some things. But frankly, I saw this as a watershed moment for the Iraqi Security Forces, and they not only passed the challenge but did so very well.

Q: General, Jed Babbin. Thanks again for hosting us when we were over there in December. What can you tell us about the militias infiltrating the legitimate forces and we hear all sorts of goofy reports about people coming in and sectarian violence coming out of some of these forces.

Dempsey: First of all, let me go from the latter part of your question to the former. Make no mistake about it, there are intelligence reports on a frequent basis that cause us to be concerned about the activities of pieces of the legitimate security forces, never an entire unit, but rather an individual or two or three or 10, maybe, inside of a legitimate unit. And we've got a system in place with our Iraqi counterparts to investigate those. And we have on, I don't know, in the last six months or so, we've had the occasion to change commanders of battalions in both the army and the national police -- again, the commandos and public order.

We've also changed a number of brigade commanders because there was enough evidence they were not exerting the kind of control and discipline over their force they needed.

But again, this is probably two or three battalions out of 100 or so in the army, and one brigade out of eight in the national police and two battalions out of 24 in the national police.

So, I mean, you know, it's significant, but not anything that would me to describe this as an endemic problem.

Now, back to the issue of infiltration. This is one of my favorite words, naturally. And it's hard for me to sign up for infiltration when we talk about the legitimate, that is to say, the governmental recognized militias -- you know, the peshmerga, the Badr and seven others are identified in CPA order No. 91 as legitimate militias that must be over time disarmed and/or assimilated into Iraqi society and even the Iraqi Security Forces.

So we clearly have had former Badr Corps, former peshmerga come in to the security forces as individuals, intentionally. In fact, in some cases we've taken inputs and allowed them to be recruited intentionally that way as part of an assimilation process. The key is not to have them all in one place, and the second key is to have the leaders of units be diverse, and have the MiTT (Military Transition Team) teams that overwatch them be sensitive to these kind of things and also the special police transition teams as well.

Now there are other militias, let's even be less specific, and call them armed groups out there that are more problematic. And I mentioned the Jaysh al Mahdi as one of them, because it's not a recognized militia by the CPA order No. 91.

Secondly, many of the young men that tend to drift toward Jaysh al Mahdi are uneducated, almost universally unemployed, and as a result they can't even get into the

legitimate security forces because the legitimate security forces have a recruiting standard and generally they can't pass it. So they pose a little bit different kind of problem.

But infiltration is probably less precise than it ought to be, given that in some cases these men are actually invited in.

Q: Hey Marty, Bob Scales, how are you doing?

Dempsey: Hi, Bob, good to hear from you.

Q: Listen, I am intrigued by your description of a building of an institutional part of the army, a sort of TRADOC if you will. Are you actually building things like academies, staff colleges, war colleges, NCO academies, things of that sort? And if so, is that your mission or does that belong to somebody else? And I guess the last part is how is that going?

Dempsey: It is my mission. It was actually – it all started on Dave's (Petraeus) watch, actually. The concept has kind of matured and in fact, in my other hat, which is the NATO commander in Iraq, that's really in terms of officer education, that's their niche.

But, yeah, we've graduated our first class from the Iraqi military academy at Rustamiyah 78 new second lieutenants, none of whom had previous military experience. And that's significant, because you know we've also brought in, as you know, former officers to fill the ranks, and this was the first class – it graduated in January, that is young men who never had any previous military experience. So that's the beginning, it seems to me, of an officer development system, officer education system that will over time, you know, essentially replenish the ranks from start to finish.

And we're going to – we actually, it's another one of these national unity initiatives. There's three military academies in Iraq. One in Zakho, one in Qualachulon (?), they're both in Kurdistan, and one at Rustamiyah. And we've got them linked together with a common curriculum, a common program of instruction, common course length, they share instructors. And now they are each producing about 100 every nine months. Where we want to get them is to each produce about 300 because our analysis of the life-cycle needs of the army is that they'll need about 900 new lieutenants every year.

But that's all in place. There's a joint staff college equivalent to our Command and General Staff College in place. It will graduate 50 junior level they call it – that'd be majors and lieutenant colonels and then this year, this is the pilot year, 37 of the seniors, which are essentially full colonels and civilians, by the way, and that course will double in size next year as well.

There's a war college – actually they are going to call it a national defense university, that will open in September. And by the way, that's not unique on the army side. On the police side we've recently converted Baghdad police college to the production of officers, and they've got a nine-month course – I'm sorry, they've got a six-month, a one-

year course, and they've got a three-year course. And all those are up and running and if you all come over here and want to visit them -- I think that this is what will essentially create this enterprise that will endure over time.

Q: I am trying to get over there specifically just to bother you for a couple days so I can come back and report all that. I really think the larger message needs to be made. It's not just about producing battalions or producing soldiers and policemen, but it's also about producing infrastructure, and I think that's a story that the American people need to hear.

Dempsey: Absolutely right. And, just to highlight -- or reinforce that point, it's really what we focus on now. I mean the generation of units is really (in train?) and requires very little -- and by the way, handed over in great measure. The platform instructors for all of these institutes, academies, training centers, used to be exclusively Coalition and now it's 70 percent Iraqi. And by the end of this year, we will have transitioned most instructor positions over to Iraqis and then we'll be in a mentoring and advising role there.

We've also sent 500 mid-grade officers out of country as part of a NATO initiative to, you know, to the Marshall Center. And we had a kid graduate from Sandhurst who graduated with an award for the best foreign cadet. So, I mean, that's the institution side of it. It's not sexy, but it's the most important thing we're doing.

Q: And a story that needs to be told.

Q: Hey, sir, Ken Allard. Actually I think we adopted the class at Rustamiyah on our last trip over there ourselves. And we sure remember them very fondly.

Dempsey: Yeah, that's right, I do.

Q: The thing that I am getting a lot of questions about from our correspondents -- by the way, they talk about the present level of violence is making it even tougher on them to cover the story than it otherwise would have been.

One of the things that is interesting to me, based on my own experience in Bosnia, is whether or not you are seeing any signs of what amounts to a de facto ethnic cleansing? Because what happened over there was not so much that you had the death squads moving around, they were certainly present, probably in the same way that they are in Iraq, but what was happening is that a lot of what was going on was simply people getting out of harm's way. Are you seeing any signs that that is going on, and if so, what are the institutions you're building doing about that?

Dempsey: Yeah, one of the -- well, a couple of ways to answer that, or a couple of aspects to the answer. And that is most of the problems, this is no surprise, it's a flash to the obvious, you know, it's where the fault lines exist. And the principal fault line exists in Baghdad, pure and simple. It's also the center of gravity politically and so forth.

So we haven't seen the kind of problems that you are talking about any place else than Iraq with the exception of Baghdad. One of General Casey's CCIR (commanders' critical information requirements) is displacement of civilians, for exactly the reason you talk about. Are they being forced out, are they leaving?

By the way, the analysis of that is very complicated right now because we are right in the middle of Arba'een. Ashura is, you know, their Good Friday essentially, and then 40 days later is the Arba'een holiday and they – and many of them troop south, many of the Shi'a pilgrims, I should be more specific – troop south. And that's going on at precisely the time we are trying to figure out, you know, what's truth and what's fiction about the movement of people.

There have been two – since the Samarra mosque incident – there's been two reports of families on the move. One was I think – and again this is all on background, so please don't use the exact number – one involved 200 families and another one about the same number moving from Baghdad south. And the first report was absolutely determined to be pilgrims. The second one we don't have the answer yet; it could very well be that there were people that had moved out of southeast Baghdad to the south, to get away from what they perceived to be an insecure situation.

As to what we're doing about it, this is really an operational answer to that question, but we are really focused like a laser beam on Baghdad, because again, for all the reasons I mentioned. And General Casey as you know has brought up the – a piece of his operational reserve to thicken the ranks. It's also been, by the way, a pretty good test of their ability to move and determine what timelines they would need to have to move.

We've brought three battalions of public order back from – they were forward deployed elsewhere, we brought them back into Baghdad. The Iraqi army has moved another couple battalions into Baghdad.

So we've probably increased the force levels in Baghdad by about anywhere from 3,500 to 4,000. Increased a number of patrols by between 150 and 200 a day. Kind of the issue now is restoring public confidence, frankly, and that takes place by increased presence. And so all that's happening. And we're monitoring the kind of things you just talked about as part of our CCIR.

But to this point, we haven't seen those kind of displacements. What we have seen is kind of a bit of a back and forth, you know, there will be a Sunni atrocity and then there will be a Shi'a atrocity and a Sunni atrocity. So the real trick here is to break the cycle, and we are working on that.

Q: General, Bob Maginnis. Question regarding the defense ministry and the interior ministry and whether or not you are seeing indications that they are maturing enough to be able to oversee countrywide the types of functions that you just described.

Dempsey: Yeah, maturing -- the present participle applies. They are clearly, they are clearly maturing. And we monitor -- just like the tactical units have a -- we call it a transitional readiness assessment. It's a monthly report card, if you will. We've got one that we, that we -- where we evaluate ourselves, because we are not advisors over there, we're partners with them. And so on a monthly basis we determine what progress we have made or have failed to make on 18 key functions in any ministry, and it's everything from personal management with, you know, subtext of pay and promotion and retirement, all the way down to the inspector general function.

And we have -- you know that I've got developmental responsibility for both ministries. And I've got right now about 70 soldiers and civilians in each ministry, and that number is going to go up a bit here in the next month because we have made some analysis of additional needs. And we really want them to get off to a promising start in this first 100 days of the new government. We are really focused on having them achieve some successes in the first 100 days or so in the new government. And so we're really, we've got some programs we've worked out with them to give them a few early wins if you want to call it that.

So, now there are some processes though where we have made enormous strides, pay for example. Promotion we're close, very close. And some that are just going to take longer. And the two that come immediately to mind are procurement and contracting. You know, they come from a command-directed economy where pretty much if you needed it you asked for the money, if you got it, you spent it. There was no competitive bidding and no competing in the free market economy against other sectors of the economy.

But they are very much in a free market economy now. They have to make their case to a council, and they've to do competitive bidding. This is their law, by the way, not ours -- their new law I should say. So that's been a real eye opener for them, and that probably is going to take, you know, a couple of years, I think, to mature.

Q: General, just one follow-up. The pay you mentioned, you know, what have you done to fix that?

Dempsey: Great question. Well, first of all, we've identified the problem. The problem wasn't pay; it was easy to lump it in to the category of pay. The problem was really personal accountability, frankly. So, for example, if a commander up in Mosul didn't have proper accountability of his people and either numbers or in rank structure and he placed a demand on the system -- and it's still a manual system -- and here came the payroll (north?) and he got there and he didn't have enough money to pay, then it was sort of lumped in in precisely as a pay problem. Well, it wasn't a pay problem, it was a personal accountability problem. So that's where we put our effort.

And we've got a couple of initiatives in place to build for them what we might call a little personnel administration center in each battalion where as these soldiers go on leave, you know, they're basically on a 21-day on, seven-day off cycle, they process in and out each time. And it's beginning to give us a heck of a lot more clarity on what's out there. And

as a result, I would venture to say -- now this, our last month may have been an anomaly, I hope not, but the last month we had fewer than 1,000 pay problems in an army of, you know, that's just now at about at 106,000. And those were corrected very quickly upon identification.

The police is a little different. You know, they draw their pay and their support for local police from the provinces and then the national police are supported from the center. So, you know, we're learning as we go with that, but we've made some pretty significant strides with that as well.

Q: General, this is Jeff McCausland again. On the (inaudible) side, there's been a lot of focus frankly on the actual ministers, a Mr. (inaudible -- sounds like he might mean Bayan Jaber, interior minister) the minister of interior is one that (inaudible -- is talked about?) an awful lot. I'll fully understand if you don't want to want to comment at all. But I am curious about your thoughts at all, because obviously the guys at the top are going to be key and essential on answering a lot of these questions, whether it's infiltration, whether it's pay, (inaudible) et cetera.

Dempsey: You know ministers -- in general terms -- I don't want to comment about them personally because, you know, I mean, I have such a close relationship to them it wouldn't take too long to figure out where it came from.

But I will tell you in tell you in general terms, what this country needs in my view is ministers who -- you know, we tend to say we need a government of national unity, and that's a fact. No doubt about it. But you do need ministers in the key positions who have a strong political backing. In other words, they've got to have a constituency so that as they are buffeted by other influencers they've got some political backing. I mean, this is a democracy now.

(break in transcript)

Q: Sir, Ken Allard again. I was really impressed with some of the (inaudible -- sounds like BUDS) that we saw, particularly with the overlapping surveillance systems. Have those things been any real assistance to you guys in dealing with the problem of the civil violence? Have those systems helped you guys at all react?

Dempsey: Yeah, I think so. Frankly, Pete Chiarelli would be better positioned to answer that because he really has access to that all the time. But I do know that --

Q: Well tell him that I said hi and also that --

Dempsey: I will.

Q: And I'll ask him those embarrassing questions myself.

Dempsey: Yeah, yeah. No problem. But I will say that he has reported that some of those things have allowed – you know the whole issue in this part of the world, I am not just talking about Baghdad or Iraq, but this part of the world is rumor generally trumps fact. And what these overlapping systems have allowed us to do in many cases is confirm or deny and tamp down things that otherwise could really spin out of control.

Lawrence: Any additional questions for the general?

Q: Well, thanks for what you've done, buddy. This is Bob Scales. You know, you've done a terrific job and all of us over here are really proud of you.

Dempsey: Well, thanks. That means a lot. And by the way though, it hasn't escaped me. I know you're trying to get over here, but I notice you didn't try to get over here before St. Patrick's Day (laughter).

Q: Hey, I am on a (six - inaudible) train tomorrow morning; I am going to O'Houlihan's on 57th Street, and I'll drink a beer (inaudible) I am going to march in the parade, Marty (laughter).

Dempsey: Are you really? That's great.

Q: Take care, my friend.

Dempsey: All right, you all take care.

Q: Take care, sir.

Q: Thanks to you, general.

Q: Hey Dallas?

Lawrence: Yes, sir. Folks, just a quick reminder that was on background. Go ahead, colonel.

(sidebar conversation continues).

End of transcript

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA
Sent: Thursday, March 16, 2006 3:25 PM
To: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Subject: Military Analyst Call Today

May we have the list of participants? We will then be glad to watch for coverage. Thanks. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, March 16, 2006 1:17 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: RE:

Sounds great. Id love to see if we could get them in with potus as well (I think that was submitted to karl and company from dorrance smith last week).

Take care!
dl

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) (mailto:(b)(6))
Sent: Thursday, March 16, 2006 12:13 PM
To: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Subject: Re:

I'd love to - but I'm at Hadlye's speech and will miss it. Thanks for thinking of me!
I'm hoping to have Hadley brief these guys next week.

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA <Dallas.Lawrence@(b)(6)>
To: (b)(6)
Sent: Thu Mar 16 12:01:40 2006
Subject: FW:

Hi there. I wasn't sure if you would be interested in listening in on this call. This is not for distribution and is a closed call open only to our retired military television analysts to get them on message heading into the weekend on iraqi troop strength, advances etc.

Hope you are doing well.

Dl

Dallas B. Lawrence
Director, Office of Community Relations & Public Liaison United States Department of Defense

W) (b)(2) C) (b)(2) F) (b)(2)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, March 16, 2006 6:10 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject:

MEMORANDUM

To: Retired Military Analysts

From: Dallas Lawrence
Director, Community Relations and Public Liaison

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Date: March 16, 2006

Re: Conference Call with Senior DoD Officials

We invite you to participate in a conference call, TODAY, March 16, 2006 from 12:30-1:00.

Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey, Commander Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq will brief you on current operations in training the ISF as well as successes and future challenges. (His Biography is attached for your review). This call will be on Background.

To participate in this conference call, please dial (b)(2) and ask the operator to connect you to the Analysts conference call.

Please R.S.V.P. to (b)(6) at <mailto:(b)(6)> or call her at (b)(2)

We hope you are able to participate.

<<Dempsey Bio.doc>>

(b)(6)
OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison
(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301
(b)(2)

<file://www.AmericaSupportsYou.mil> www.AmericaSupportsYou.mil

Fyi, if you would like to call in. Not for distribution however, just for your info.

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, March 16, 2006 6:10 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject:

Microsoft Photo Editor 3.0 Picture

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<<Dempsey Bio.doc>>

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Washington, D.C. 20301
(b)(2)

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(b)(6)

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, March 16, 2006 1:02 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: FW:

Attachments: Microsoft Photo Editor 3.0 Picture; Dempsey Bio.doc

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DI

Dallas B. Lawrence
Director, Office of Community Relations & Public Liaison
United States Department of Defense
W) (b)(2)

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Sent: Thursday, March 16, 2006 6:10 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject:



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Dempsey Bio.doc
(166 KB)

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(b)(2)

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United States Army

**Lieutenant General
MARTIN E. DEMPSEY
Commander**

**Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq/
Commander, NATO Training Mission-Iraq
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq**



SOURCE OF COMMISSIONED SERVICE: USMA

MILITARY SCHOOLS ATTENDED

Armor Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
United States Army Command and General Staff College
National War College

EDUCATIONAL DEGREES

United States Military Academy - BS - No Major
Duke University - MA - English
United States Army Command and General Staff College - MMAS - Military Arts and Sciences
National Defense University - MS - National Security and Strategic Studies

FOREIGN LANGUAGE(S) French

PROMOTIONS

DATE OF APPOINTMENT

2LT	5 Jun 74
1LT	5 Jun 76
CPT	8 Aug 78
MAJ	1 Sep 85
LTC	1 Apr 91
COL	1 Sep 95
BG	1 Aug 01
MG	1 Sep 04
LTG	Frocked

MAJOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>ASSIGNMENT</u>
Jan 75	May 76	Platoon Leader, B Troop, 1st Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
May 76	Sep 77	Support Platoon Leader, 1st Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Sep 77	Jun 78	S-1 (Personnel), 1st Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Jul 78	Jan 79	Student, Armor Officer Advanced Course, United States Army Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky
Apr 79	Jan 80	Motor Officer, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado
Jan 80	Oct 80	Commander, A Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado
Oct 80	Jun 81	S-3 (Operations), 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado

Jun 81	Jul 82	Commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado
Aug 82	May 84	Student, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina
Jun 84	Jul 87	Instructor, later Assistant Professor, Department of English, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York
Aug 87	Jun 88	Student, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Jul 88	Sep 89	Executive Officer, 4th Battalion, 67th Armor, 3d Armored Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Sep 89	May 91	S-3 (Operations), later Executive Officer, 3d Brigade, 3d Armored Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany and OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/STORM, Saudi Arabia
Jul 91	Jun 93	Commander, 4th Battalion, 67th Armor, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Jul 93	Jun 95	Chief, Armor Branch, Combat Arms Division, Officer Personnel Management Directorate, United States Total Army Personnel Command, Alexandria, Virginia
Aug 95	Jun 96	Student, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC
Jul 96	Jul 98	Commander, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Carson, Colorado
Jul 98	Oct 99	Assistant Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs, Europe and Africa, J-5, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC
Oct 99	Aug 01	Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC
Sep 01	Jun 03	Program Manager, Saudi Arabian National Guard Modernization Program, Saudi Arabia
Jun 03	Oct 04	Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq
Oct 04	Jul 05	Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Rank</u>
Assistant Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs Europe and Africa, J-5, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC	Jun 98 – Oct 99	Colonel
Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC	Oct 99 – Aug 01	Colonel

US DECORATIONS AND BADGES

Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
 Defense Superior Service Medal
 Legion of Merit (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)
 Bronze Star Medal with "V" Device
 Bronze Star Medal
 Meritorious Service Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)
 Joint Service Commendation Medal
 Army Commendation Medal
 Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
 Parachutist Badge
 Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge

As of 11 September 2005

(b)(6)

From: Susan Phalen [susan_phalen@**(b)(6)**]
Sent: Thursday, March 16, 2006 12:36 PM
To: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: FW:

Great...thanks a million. I'll be on...on mute.

"Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA" <Dallas.Lawrence@**(b)(6)**> wrote:

This is not for distribution, but in the event you wanted to listen in to get a better feel for the message on isf build up, you might be interested. Please be sure to be on mute otherwise we will get monster feedback from the cheap iraq phones.
Thanks!

From: **(b)(6)** CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, March 16, 2006 6:10 AM
To: **(b)(6)** CIV, OASD-PA
Subject:



MEMORANDUM

To: Retired Military Analysts

From: Dallas Lawrence
Director, Community Relations and Public Liaison
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Date: March 16, 2006

Re: **Conference Call with Senior DoD Officials**

We invite you to participate in a conference call, **TODAY, March 16, 2006 from 12:30-1:00.** Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey, Commander Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq will brief you on current operations in training the ISF as well as successes and future challenges. (His Biography is attached for your review). This call will be on Background. To participate in this conference call, please dial **(b)(2)** and ask the operator to connect you to the Analysts conference call.

Please R.S.V.P. to **(b)(6)** at **(b)(6)** or call her at **(b)(2)**

We hope you are able to participate.

<<Dempsey Bio.doc>>

(b)(6)
OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison
(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301
(b)(2)
www.AmericaSupportsYou.mil

Yahoo! Mail

Use Photomail to share photos without annoying attachments.

Non
Responsive



From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA [mailto:Dallas.Lawrence@**(b)(6)**]
Sent: Thursday, March 16, 2006 8:46 AM
To: **(b)(6)**
Subject: FW:

Fyi, if you would like to call in. Not for distribution however, just for your info.

From: **(b)(6)** CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, March 16, 2006 6:10 AM
To: **(b)(6)** CIV, OASD-PA
Subject:



MEMORANDUM

FW:

Page 2 of 2

To: Retired Military Analysts

From: Dallas Lawrence
Director, Community Relations and Public Liaison
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Date: March 16, 2006

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We hope you are able to participate.

<<Dempsey Bio.doc>>

Tara Jones
OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison
(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301
(b)(2)

www.AmericaSupportsYou.mil

(b)(6)

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, March 16, 2006 12:26 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: FW:

Attachments: Microsoft Photo Editor 3.0 Picture; Dempsey Bio.doc

This is not for distribution, but in the event you wanted to listen in to get a better feel for the message on isf build up, you might be interested. Please be sure to be on mute otherwise we will get monster feedback from the cheap iraq phones.

Thanks!

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, March 16, 2006 6:10 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject:



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From: Dallas Lawrence
Director, Community Relations and Public Liaison
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Date: March 16, 2006

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We hope you are able to participate.



Dempsey Blo.doc
(166 KB)

(b)(6)
OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison
(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301
(b)(2)

www.AmericaSupportsYou.mil

(b)(6)

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, March 16, 2006 8:23 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Re:

Thanks (b)(6) Let's have the intersn start dialing the top 20 analysts at 9 today and those on the west coast at 10 to make sure they know about this.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thu Mar 16 06:09:59 2006
Subject:

<<Microsoft Photo Editor 3.0 Picture>>

MEMORANDUM

To: Retired Military Analysts
From: Dallas Lawrence
Director, Community Relations and Public Liaison
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Date: March 16, 2006
Re: Conference Call with Senior DoD Officials

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We hope you are able to participate.

<<Dempsey Bio.doc>>

(b)(6)
OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison
(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301
(b)(2)

www.AmericaSupportsYou.mil

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, March 16, 2006 7:10 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA

Attachments: Dempsey Bio.doc; Microsoft Photo Editor 3.0 Picture



Dempsey Bio.doc
(166 KB)

MEMORANDUM

To: Retired Military Analysts

From: Dallas Lawrence
Director, Community Relations and Public Liaison
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Date: March 16, 2006

Re: Conference Call with Senior DoD Officials

We invite you to participate in a conference call, **TODAY, March 16, 2006 from 12:30-1:00.**

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Please R.S.V.P. to (b)(6) at (b)(6) or call her at (b)(2)

We hope you are able to participate.



(b)(6)
OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison
(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301
(b)(2)

www.AmericaSupportsYou.mil

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, March 16, 2006 6:08 AM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6) Merritt, Roxie, AFIS-HQ; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: [U] FW: Urgent/ PAO contact info for Gen Dempsey

(b)(6) sounds great! I will send out the invite within the hour. Dial in info will be included. No need to forward dempsey's bio, as I have it! :) thanks again for the coordination on this!
More soon,

(b)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) LTC/O5
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
CC: (b)(6) COL MNFI STRATCOM; Merritt, Roxie, AFIS-HQ; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Sent: Thu Mar 16 00:53:21 2006
Subject: RE: [U] FW: Urgent/ PAO contact info for Gen Dempsey

(b)(6)

LTG Dempsey will be available at 2030 Baghdad Time / 1230 EST. Let me know who you are targeting and I'll try to match what bios I have. Will also need the phone number that you would like me to dial. Unless you tell me differently, I'd like to focus LTG Dempsey on these areas:

- * The framework - transition from developing the Iraq army to professionalizing it.
- * Counter some misperceptions of sectarianism in the force (both the Army and Police)
- * Highlight some of the successes we've experienced since 2003.
- * Highlight the challenges that lie ahead.

Please acknowledge soonest so I know we can go forward.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

LTC (b)(6)

Public Affairs Officer

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq

Phoenix Base, International Zone, Baghdad

DSN: (b)(2)

Commercial: (b)(2)

MCI Cell: (b)(2)

Iraqna Cell: (b)(2)

Read the Advisor newsletter at www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil

<http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/>

From: Merritt, Roxie, AFIS-HQ [mailto:Roxie.Merritt@**(b)(6)**]
Sent: Wednesday, March 15, 2006 9:06 PM
To: **(b)(6)** LTC/O5; **(b)(6)**, CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: **(b)(6)** COL MNFI STRATCOM; Merritt, Roxie, AFIS-HQ
Subject: RE: [U] FW: Urgent/ PAO contact info for Gen Dempsey

Mike,

Thanks for all your support!

Roxie T. Merritt
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (Internal Communications)
U.S. Department of Defense
601 North Fairfax Street - Rm **(b)(6)**
Alexandria, Virginia 22314-2007
Phone: **(b)(2)**
Fax: **(b)(6)**
email: roxie.merritt@**(b)(6)**

-----Original Message-----

From: **(b)(6)** LTC/O5 [mailto:**(b)(6)**]
Sent: Wednesday, March 15, 2006 12:50 PM
To: **(b)(6)** CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: **(b)(6)** COL MNFI STRATCOM; Roxie.Merritt@**(b)(6)**
Subject: RE: [U] FW: Urgent/ PAO contact info for Gen Dempsey

Tara,

I don't mind. Will help if I can.

Fred left about 6 weeks ago. I just came from the DC. In fact, I know many of the analysts. Hope we can get Bob Scales, Bob McGuinnis, Ralph Peters (who missed LTG D when he was visiting two weeks ago) Paul Vallely, Bill Nash, John Garrett, Tim Eads, to name a few.

I asked LTG Dempsey if we could shoot for tomorrow after 1800 our time. Am awaiting a response. If he can't, I'll pursue MG Peterson.

Very difficult to turn these guys on a day. LTG D has time at night. Just need to see if he'll take or defer.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

LTC **(b)(6)**

Public Affairs Officer

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq

Phoenix Base, International Zone, Baghdad

DSN: (b)(2)

Commercial: (b)(2)

MCI Cell: (b)(2)

Iraqna Cell: (b)(2)

Read the Advisor newsletter at www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil
<<http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/>>

From: (b)(2) CIV, OASD-PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, March 15, 2006 4:54 PM
To: (b)(6) LTC/O5
Subject: FW: [U] FW: Urgent/ PAO contact info for Gen Dempsey

hi there. did you take over for (b)(6) glad to connect with you. i am the poc for the retired military analysts... i talked to col ford a few minutes ago and we'd like to go ahead and set up a conf call with mg peterson and bg bolger to talk about current ops over there, how it's going, etc. is it possible to do that later today? i tried your number, but you must be away from your desk... please let me know as soon as you can if we can work something out. if i can get a few hours notice so that i can contact the analysts, that would be great!

i hope you won't mind if i contact you occasionally when i have questions that come from the analysts. the analysts are also a great resource for you guys to get the word out about what's happening on the ground. they all have distinguished careers, which gives them a ton of credibility..... so, please feel free to pass along information to me that you would like them to have.

nice to meet you and i look forward to hearing from you shortly.

thanks!

(b)

p.s. if you need to contact me for any reason, here's where i can be found:

(b)(6)
OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison
(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301
(b)(2) (desk) / (b)(2) (mobile)

www.AmericaSupportsYou.mil

From: Merritt, Roxie, AFIS-HQ
Sent: Wednesday, March 15, 2006 8:05 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: [U] FW: Urgent/ PAO contact info for Gen Dempsey

Hope this isn't too late.

Roxie T. Merritt
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (Internal Communications)

U.S. Department of Defense
601 North Fairfax Street - Rm (b)(6)
Alexandria, Virginia 22314-2007
Phone: (b)(2)
Fax: (b)(6)
email: roxie.merritt@ (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) LTC/O5 [mailto:]
Sent: Wednesday, March 15, 2006 2:20 AM
To: Roxie.Merritt@ (b)(6)
Subject: FW: [U] FW: Urgent/ PAO contact info for Gen Dempsey

Checking in. contact info below.

COL Ford will let you know about the conflict and any plans for option B.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

LTC (b)(6)

Public Affairs Officer

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq

Phoenix Base, International Zone, Baghdad

DSN: (b)(2)

Commercial (b)(2)

MCI Cell: (b)(2)

Iraqna Cell: (b)(2)

Read the Advisor newsletter at www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil
<<http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/>>

From: (b)(6) SFC On Behalf Of PAO
Sent: Wednesday, March 15, 2006 9:57 AM
To: (b)(6) LTC/O5
Subject: FW: [U] FW: Urgent/ PAO contact info for Gen Dempsey
Importance: High

This is for you, Sir. It came in to the public mailbox.

SFC (b)(6)

MNSTC-I PAO NCOIC

DSN: (b)(2)

From: (b)(6) TSGT MNFI STRATEGIC EFFECTS
[mailto:(b)(6)] On Behalf Of CPIC Press Desk
Sent: Wednesday, March 15, 2006 9:10 AM
To: PAO
Subject: [U] FW: Urgent/ PAO contact info for Gen Dempsey
Importance: High

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Sir,

I'm sure this made it to MNSTC-I before now, but I wanted to make sure someone got back with Ms. Merritt.

Vr,

(b)(6)

TSGT, U.S. Air Force

CPIC Press Desk

DSN (b)(2)

Comm

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

If this e-mail is marked FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY it may be exempt from mandatory disclosure under FOIA. DoD 5400.7R, "DoD Freedom of Information Act Program", DoD Directive 5230.9, "Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release", and DoD Instruction 5230.29, "Security and Policy Review of DoD Information for Public Release" apply.

From: Merritt, Roxie, AFIS-HQ [mailto:Roxie.Merritt@(b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, March 15, 2006 2:07 AM
To: (b)(6) COL MNFI STRATEFF COMMS DIV
Cc: (b)(6) (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Col (b)(6) (E-mail) (E-mail); CPIC Press Desk
Subject: RE:Urgent/ PAO contact info for Gen Dempsey
Importance: High

Dewey,

(b)(6) OASD(PA) media analysts, needs Gen Dempsey's contact info as soon as possible. They are trying to set up a conference call for him tomorrow. I know he has a new PAO and thought I had his contact info in my folder, but am unable to locate it. I've cc'd Tara on this email if you can reply soonest. Thanks

Roxie T. Merritt
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (Internal Communications)

U.S. Department of Defense
601 North Fairfax Street - Rm (b)(7)
Alexandria, Virginia 22314-2007

Phone: (b)(2)

Fax:

email: roxie.merritt@(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@**(b)(6)**
Sent: Wednesday, March 15, 2006 4:12 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: Re: Another idea

Eric: Yes, indeed. I was thinking of doing a piece on the cadets and their training. They're graduating 26 April (according to Dan Bolger) and will go right into the firefight. They - and the faculty - deserve a small tribute. Whaddya think?

Jed Babbin

(b)(2) (home office)
(home fax)
(mobile)

(b)(6)

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, March 15, 2006 3:40 PM
To: 'Bolger, Daniel BG'
Cc: (b)(6) LTC/O5
Subject: RE: conf call with military analysts

Thank you general. I just saw email traffic within the past hour that shows LTC (b)(6) is indeed all over this and is trying to move LTG Dempsey's schedule around to accomodate.

Thanks again to all on your team.

dl

Dallas B. Lawrence

Director, Office of Community Relations & Public Liaison

United States Department of Defense

W/(b)(2)

From: Bolger, Daniel BG [mailto:bolgerdp@(b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, March 15, 2006 2:38 PM
To: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) LTC/O5
Subject: RE: conf call with military analysts

Dallas,

I can't answer for Major General Peterson, but for me, tomorrow will be tough as I will be out with an uncertain return time (due to ground convoy ops).

I will work with (b)(6) and MG Peterson's guys and see what we can do to meet this request.

Thanks.

Strength & Honor!

Dan Bolger

BG, USA

CG, Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT)

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq

APO AE 09316

DSN (b)(2)

daniel.bolger@ (b)(6)

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA [mailto:Dallas.Lawrence@ (b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, March 15, 2006 8:28 PM
To: Bolger, Daniel BG
Subject: FW: conf call with military analysts

General,

I hope this note finds you well sir. I wanted to make sure you had visibility on this request from my team. As we approach the 3 year anniversary, we think it would be great to give our retired military talking heads your solid metrics and talking points on the huge steps we have taken forward in training ISF. I hope your schedule can accommodate, we are happy to move the time to just about anything between 11 am EST to 4 pm EST to make it work tomorrow. Obviously the more notice we have the push the call, the greater participation will be.

Thanks again sir for all you have done to help us in telling the good news.

Best,

DI

Dallas B. Lawrence
Director, Office of Community Relations & Public Liaison
United States Department of Defense
W (b)(2)

From: (b)(2) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, March 15, 2006 12:24 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; (b)(6) COL MNFI STRATEFF COMMS DIV
Subject: conf call with military analysts

hi (b)(6)

I'm a little concerned that i have not yet heard from you, as I'm afraid your day will be ending soon. we would like to set up the call with mg peterson and bg bolger for tomorrow. i need to know what time would work for the generals to be able to do so.

in addition, it would be great if we could get some metrics from you to forward on to the analysts... things like battlespace turned over to the iraqis, the increase in iraqi forces, % of engagements that are iraqi or joint-led, perhaps a battlespace map that depicts these things in color?? is that possible?? it would be helpful for our analysts to have.

please let me know as soon as you can if we are going to be able to make this happen! i am standing by to pull this together as soon as i hear from you that we're a go.

thanks!

(b)

(b)(6)

OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison

(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

(b)(2)

www.AmericaSupportsYou.mil

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, March 15, 2006 2:55 PM
To: (b)(6) LTC/O5
Cc: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: [U] FW: Urgent/ PAO contact info for Gen Dempsey

great, (b)(6) thanks. as i mentioned in an earlier email, i'm checking email as early as 0500, so i can send out the invite first thing in the a.m.... just lemme know!
oh, and whoever we get, would you mind attaching their bio(s) for me??
thanks much!

(b)(6)

p.s. got your voicemail... sorry for the crisscrossing messages!! thanks.

From: (b)(6) LTC/O5 [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, March 15, 2006 12:50 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) COL MNFI STRATCOM; Merritt, Roxie, AFIS-HQ
Subject: RE: [U] FW: Urgent/ PAO contact info for Gen Dempsey

(b)(6)

I don't mind. Will help if I can.

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Very difficult to turn these guys on a day. LTG D has time at night. Just need to see if he'll take or defer.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

LTC (b)(6)

Public Affairs Officer

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq

Phoenix Base, International Zone, Baghdad

DSN: (b)(2)

Commercial: (b)(2)

MCI Cell: (b)(2)

Iraqna Cell: (b)(2)

Read the Advisor newsletter at www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, March 15, 2006 4:54 PM
To: (b)(6) LTC/O5
Subject: FW: [U] FW: Urgent/ PAO contact info for Gen Dempsey

hi there. did you take over for fred wellman?? glad to connect with you. i am the pbc for the retired military analysts.... i talked to col ford a few minutes ago and we'd like to go ahead and set up a conf call with mg peterson and bg bolger to talk about current ops over there, how it's going, etc. is it possible to do that later today? i tried your number, but you must be away from your desk... please let me know as soon as you can if we can work something out. if i can get a few hours notice so that i can contact the analysts, that would be great!

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nice to meet you and i look forward to hearing from you shortly.

thanks!

(b)

p.s. if you need to contact me for any reason, here's where i can be found:

(b)(6)

OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison

(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

(b)(2)

www.AmericaSupportsYou.mil

From: Merritt, Roxie, AFIS-HQ
Sent: Wednesday, March 15, 2006 8:05 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: [U] FW: Urgent/ PAO contact info for Gen Dempsey

Hope this isn't too late.

Roxie T. Merritt
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (Internal Communications)
U.S. Department of Defense
601 North Fairfax Street (b)(2)
Alexandria, Virginia 22314-2007
Phone: (b)(2)
Fax: (b)(2)
email: roxie.merritt@(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) LTC/O5 [mailto:]
Sent: Wednesday, March 15, 2006 2:20 AM
To: Roxie.Merritt@(b)(6)
Subject: FW: [U] FW: Urgent/ PAO contact info for Gen Dempsey

Checking in. contact info below.

COL (b)(6) will let you know about the conflict and any plans for option B.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

LTC (b)(6)

Public Affairs Officer

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq

Phoenix Base, International Zone, Baghdad

DSN: (b)(2)

Commercial: (b)(2)

MCI Cell: (b)(2)

Iraqna Cell: (b)(2)

Read the Advisor newsletter at www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil

From: (b)(6) SFC On Behalf Of PAO
Sent: Wednesday, March 15, 2006 9:57 AM
To: (b)(6) .TC/O5
Subject: FW: [U] FW: Urgent/ PAO contact info for Gen Dempsey
Importance: High

This is for you, Sir. It came in to the public mailbox.

SFC (b)(6)

MNSTC-I PAO NCOIC

DSN: (b)(2)

From: (b)(6) TSGT MNFI STRATEGIC EFFECTS [mailto:(b)(6)] On Behalf Of CPIC Press
Desk
Sent: Wednesday, March 15, 2006 9:10 AM
To: PAO
Subject: [U] FW: Urgent/ PAO contact info for Gen Dempsey
Importance: High

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Sir,

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Vr,

(b)(6)

TSGT, U.S. Air Force

CPIC Press Desk

DSN (b)(2)

Comm (b)(2)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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From: Merritt, Roxie, AFIS-HQ [mailto:Roxie.Merritt@ (b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, March 15, 2006 2:07 AM
To: Ford Dewey G COL MNFI STRATEFF COMMS DIV
Cc: (b)(6) (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Col (b)(6) (E-mail) (E-mail); CPIC Press Desk
Subject: RE:Urgent/ PAO contact info for Gen Dempsey
Importance: High

Dewey,

(b)(6), OASD(PA) media analysts, needs Gen Dempsey's contact info as soon as possible. They are trying to set up a conference call for him tomorrow. I know he has a new PAO and thought I had his contact info in my folder, but am unable to locate it. I've cc'd (b)(6) on this email if you can reply soonest. Thanks

Roxie T. Merritt
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (Internal Communications)
U.S. Department of Defense
601 North Fairfax Street - Rm (b)(2)
Alexandria, Virginia 22314-2007
Phone: (b)(2)
Fax: (b)(2)
email: roxie.merritt@ (b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, March 15, 2006 1:28 PM
To: 'BolgerDP@'(b)(6)
Subject: FW: conf call with military analysts

General,

I hope this note finds you well sir. I wanted to make sure you had visibility on this request from my team. As we approach the 3 year anniversary, we think it would be great to give our retired military talking heads your solid metrics and talking points on the huge steps we have taken forward in training ISF. I hope your schedule can accommodate, we are happy to move the time to just about anything between 11 am EST to 4 pm EST to make it work tomorrow. Obviously the more notice we have the push the call, the greater participation will be.

Thanks again sir for all you have done to help us in telling the good news.

Best,

DI

Dallas B. Lawrence

Director, Office of Community Relations & Public Liaison
United States Department of Defense

(b)(2)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, March 15, 2006 12:24 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; (b)(6) COL MNFI STRATEFF COMMS DIV
Subject: conf call with military analysts

hi (b)(6)

i'm a little concerned that i have not yet heard from you, as i'm afraid your day will be ending soon. we would like to set up the call with mg peterson and bg bolger for tomorrow. i need to know what time would work for the generals to be able to do so.

in addition, it would be great if we could get some metrics from you to forward on to the analysts... things like battlespace turned over to the iraqis, the increase in iraqi forces, % of engagements that are iraqi or joint-led, perhaps a battlespace map that depicts these things in color?? is that possible?? it would be helpful for our analysts to have.

please let me know as soon as you can if we are going to be able to make this happen! i am standing by to pull this together as soon as i hear from you that we're a go.

thanks!

(b)(6)

OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison
(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

(b)(2)

www.AmericaSupportsYou.mil

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@**(b)(6)**
Sent: Wednesday, March 15, 2006 10:30 AM
To: BolgerDP@**(b)(6)**
Cc: **(b)(6)** Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: Another idea

Dan: When is your big class graduating? I'd like to interview a couple of them and some of the faculty for a graduation article unlike the usual prom pics we get here. Lemme know, and I'll work thru PAO. I'm sending a copy of this to Dewey Ford and Eric Ruff to keep them in the loop from the outset. Best, Jed.

Jed Babbin

(b)(2) (home office)
(b)(2) (home fax)
(b)(2) (mobile)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, March 13, 2006 7:19 PM
To: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: outreach lists
Attachments: Fred Gedrich.doc

hi. here is someone who'd like to be added to our outreach lists. i asked (b)(6) team to pull up recent articles he's published. i've attached what they came up with. not sure if we have a new s.o.p. for adding people now?? i think he'd be a good addition. let me know what you think.

thanks

(b)

From: Fred Gedrich [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, March 10, 2006 11:18 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Iraq and Afghanistan

Hi (b)(6)

I spoke yesterday with Steve Greer at the White House Ceremony for Patriot Act renewal. He said you coordinated his December trip to Iraq. In the event you are interested, I am very interested in making such a trip as well. I do a lot of media and the experience would be very beneficial to what. FYI. I collaborated with Frank Gaffney on recently published, "War Footing," along with Generals Tom McInerney and Paul Vallely and quite a few others. If such a trip is possible, please let me know.

All the best,

Fred Gedrich

Fred Gedrich

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

Mr. Gedrich is a foreign policy and national security analyst with extensive media experience. He contributed a section on State Department in War Footing.

Mr. Gedrich has appeared on the BBC, CNN, CNN International, Fox News Channel, MSNBC and CNBC and has been a guest on many radio stations throughout the country discussing U.S. relations with other countries and international organizations as well as the Global War on Terror. His articles have been published by, among others, *United Press International, Le Monde, The Miami Herald, American Enterprise Institute Magazine, and Insight Magazine.*

Mr. Gedrich served in the U.S. Departments of Defense and State for 28 years, as a Freedom Alliance senior policy analyst for three years, and is currently an Executive Vice President of MobilVox, Inc., a defense wireless technology contractor. He traveled throughout the United States and to U.S. missions in over 50 countries. He evaluated many of the most sophisticated weapon systems in the U.S. arsenal. And his notable State Department assignments include Beijing, China during Tiananmen Square massacre; Beirut, Lebanon under hostile conditions; Haiti during the embargo; several African countries

undergoing political, economic, and social turmoil; the several newly independent states in the former Soviet Union shortly after the collapse of communism. He has also attended UN World Summits in Monterrey, Mexico and Johannesburg, South Africa.

Mr. Gedrich graduated from Wilkes College in 1973 – with a bachelor's degree in commerce and finance – and from Central Michigan University in 1983 with a master's degree in business. He enjoys running, weightlifting, and traveling in his spare time.

Some recent articles by Mr. Fred Gedrich

U.S. should extend visa courtesy to Poles 1
Change at Foggy Bottom ; Rice's restructuring of the Foreign Service2
Iraq War Critics Blowing with Prevailing Wind Says Former U.S. State and Defense Department
Official..... 4

U.S. should extend visa courtesy to Poles

(This appeared on CentreDaily.com (a central Pennsylvania website), the American Enterprise Institute's web site, and the Christian News Wire.

DURING his recent visit to America, Poland's President, Lech Kaczynski, championed the special long-standing relationship between our nations. He also attempted to persuade President Bush and key members of Congress to make it easier for Polish citizens to visit America. The United States' reluctance to admit Poland into its Visa Waiver Program since that country became free and democratic in 1990 has become a major irritant to Polish leaders and people. The program was established in 1986 ostensibly to foster better relations with U.S. allies and to eliminate the need for U.S. State Department consular officers to evaluate great numbers of visa applications from citizens of friendly countries. So far, 27 countries participate in the program, including all Western European countries. Being arguably the most pro-U.S. nation in Europe, it is understandable why Poles are upset.

The special U.S./Polish relationship dates back to the Revolutionary War era. As America fought for its independence, it did so with major contributions from Generals Thaddeus Kosciuszko and Casimir Pulaski. As the world faced the Cold War's darkest days, it was two Poles, Pope John Paul II and Solidarity's Lech Walesa, along with U.S. President Reagan, who served as principal catalysts for leading hundreds of millions out of their enslaved existence and into the sunshine of freedom. Today, Poland continues the brave tradition of standing alongside its American friends in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Three major waves of Polish immigrations to the U.S. (1800s to World War I, World War II, and during the 1980 martial law period) have filled the country with a healthy and productive population of Americans of Polish descent. The Polish-American Association estimates that there are approximately 9 million Americans of Polish ancestry in the United States with about 40 percent located in four states: New York (986,141), Illinois (932,996), Michigan (854,844) and Pennsylvania (824,146).

State Department officials and U.S. Sen. Dianne Feinstein of California (who sits on the Senate Judiciary Committee's Immigration, Border Security and Citizenship Subcommittee) say Poland is not eligible for entry into the VWP because U.S. consular officers, in Warsaw and Krakow, refused to grant non-immigrant tourist visas to about 33 percent of approximately 150,000 Polish applicants in 2004. The rejections exceed the program's maximum refusal rate of 3 percent.

Adding insult to injury, the U.S. Government requires all Polish visa applicants to pay a \$100 non-refundable fee, regardless of whether the application is approved or disapproved.

Marek Purowski, the Polish embassy spokesman in Washington, D.C., says, "Poland's high refusal rate has more to do with economics and educational status than anything else. Moreover, the State Department has not provided Poland with reasons why so many visa applicants have been turned down and what the criteria the refusals are based on."

Statistics seem to support Purowski's main contention. Poland, about the size of New Mexico and having a population of nearly 39 million, is not as wealthy as any of the 27 nations enjoying VWP status. According to the CIA's World Factbook, Poland's per capita gross domestic product for 2005 is estimated at \$12,700 while the average GDP of the 27 VWP nations is \$30,900.

Another chief State Department concern appears to be that many Poles, because of their relatively poor economic standing, are more likely to stay in the United States longer than the 90-day VWP limit. However, the Census Bureau reported that Poles comprised just 1 percent (92,684) of the United States' total estimated illegal alien population of 8.7 million. Conversely, Germany, which enjoys VWP status, has 113,327 illegal aliens listed on the same report. U.S. Sens. Rick Santorum of Pennsylvania and Barbara Mikulski of Maryland introduced legislation in 2004 to put Poland in the VWP. When scheduled for a vote, a "secret hold" of one of the other senators stopped the process. In arguing for passage of the legislation, Santorum noted that the United States "treats Poles as second-class" friends. Mikulski posed an important rhetorical question: "Shouldn't we make it easier for the Pulaskis, Kosciuskos, and Curies of today to visit our country?" In 2005, two pieces of similar legislation, introduced by U.S. Reps. Nancy Johnson of Connecticut and Sheila Jackson-Lee of Texas, failed to get out of the House. The desire of Poland to participate in the VWP has a significant domestic political consideration. Ninety percent of Poles are Catholic, and their American cousins are key swing voters. Poland's first freely-elected President and Nobel Laureate, Lech Walesa, described entry into the VWP as a "matter of honor" for Poland. As Poland's President in 1991, he unilaterally abolished visa requirements for U.S. citizens visiting Poland and he expected that the United States would respond in kind. It's about time we did.

Fred Gedrich, an Avoca native and Wilkes College graduate, is a foreign policy and national security analyst and a retired State Department official.

Change at Foggy Bottom ; Rice's restructuring of the Foreign Service

Fred Gedrich and Paul E. Valley, SPECIAL TO THE WASHINGTON TIMES

31 January 2006

The Washington Times, A19

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice recently announced bold State Department transformation plans. The secretary called for, among other things, a global repositioning of diplomatic personnel and recalibration of the agency's mission. The plans will surely stir the hornet's nest. Career Foreign Service Officers (FSOs), who handle the bulwark of U.S. diplomatic activity, have a notorious record in resisting change and the legitimacy of presidential and congressional control and direction. Some have been accused of purposely undermining President George W. Bush's global war on terror and national- security strategy.

The department must play a vital role in confronting the enormous diplomatic and national-security challenges facing America and the free world. With diplomats deployed to many of the globe's most strategically important areas and dangerous outposts, it is the perfect instrument to carry out the president's vision of making the world more secure, free and prosperous for the benefit of Americans and the international community.

About 6,400 FSOs perform the nation's diplomatic business. And the department assigns one third of them to positions in Washington, while the rest serve in U.S. embassies, consulates and missions to international organizations in 180 countries.

Believing current diplomatic staffing is not attuned to contemporary geopolitical realities, Miss Rice would like to eventually shift several hundred FSO positions - most from desk jobs in Washington and comfortable assignments in Europe - to less desirable but more important posts in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and elsewhere. The secretary expects the change will enhance the promotion of American values; help build democracy and prosperity; and fight terrorism, disease and human trafficking.

Unfortunately, her plans will likely encounter difficulty. Presidents and secretaries of state since Franklin D. Roosevelt have learned that FSOs and the American Foreign Service Association, the sole bargaining agent for the 23,000 active and retired FSOs, are more apt to reject, rather than embrace, reform plans and the legitimacy of foreign-policy direction received from elected and appointed officials.

During World War II, President Roosevelt countered State Department intransigence by creating his own personal diplomatic corps, relying on back-channels to communicate directly with U.S. wartime allies. Today's presidential critics would undoubtedly consider the action "hijacking State Department foreign policy." Government Accountability Office and State Department Inspector General (IG) reports covering two decades cast doubt on whether the secretary's plans can succeed without overhauling, or scrapping, the assignment system. The 30-year-old system is driven by employee preferences, as opposed to department needs. As a result, hardship posts in places like China, Russia and Saudi Arabia typically experience significant staffing shortfalls while other posts such as Paris and Berlin do not. One IG report disclosed that more than 50 percent of the department's nearly 2,000 language-designated positions were not filled with qualified linguists, even though the department had abundant numbers of language-trained resources deployed elsewhere.

Without proper staffing, overseas missions cannot perform important tasks such as collecting national-security information, properly screening visa applicants and engaging local populations in public-diplomacy efforts. Nonetheless, the department did not require hardship post service and rarely used directed assignments to fill staffing shortfalls and critical language-designated positions.

These longstanding problems persist largely because FSOs thrive under the current system and firmly control the department's foreign policy apparatus and personnel systems. Career diplomats currently occupy powerful slots including undersecretary for political affairs and director general of the Foreign Service. The latter is responsible for recruitment, assignment, evaluation, promotion, discipline, career development and retirement policies and programs for the Department's Foreign and Civil Service employees.

During the past several years the Hart-Rudman Commission, Council on Foreign Relations/Center for Strategic and International Studies Non-Partisan Task Force, former House Speaker Newt Gingrich, the New Republic's Lawrence Kaplan and others have called for substantive reforms to improve FSO discipline and make the department better organized and staffed. However, the Foreign Affairs Council in November 2004 noted, "Countless reports have been produced to make the Department perform its diplomatic missions more effectively, but these reports have been duly filed and forgotten." If uncorrected, the deficiencies can seriously damage U.S. national security interests, make victory over mankind's enemies more difficult,

place Americans serving overseas at greater risk and greatly diminish the chances for Miss Rice's commendable reform initiatives to succeed.

It's apparent to many outsiders that the department must make fundamental changes to the institution and culture and implement new strategies to effectively cope with daunting 21st-century national- security and foreign-policy challenges. It's about time the folks at Foggy Bottom realized it too.

Fred Gedrich is a foreign policy and national security analyst and served in the State Department from 1988 to 1997. Retired U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Paul E. Vallely is a military analyst for the Fox New Channel. Both are contributing authors to the newly released "War Footing."

Iraq War Critics Blowing with Prevailing Wind Says Former U.S. State and Defense Department Official

17 November 2005

U.S. Newswire

WASHINGTON, Nov. 17 /U.S. Newswire/ -- The following statement regarding Iraq war critics was issued today by Fred Gedrich, former U.S. State and Defense Department Official:

"Democratic Party leaders have apparently committed themselves to a revisionist, false view of history on Iraq. Former President Bill Clinton, Senator John Kerry, and Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid have said the 2003 invasion was a 'big mistake,' the country and the Congress were 'misled' into war, and the administration engaged in a pattern of 'manipulating' pre-war intelligence as it made the case for invading Iraq, respectively. These folks thought differently when their party held power.

"Theirs, and statements of many others, don't square with history, the facts, and ignore solid evidence of a half-dozen U.S. commission investigations.

"In 1998, President Clinton made it U.S. policy, under the Iraq Liberation Act, to depose Saddam Hussein's regime with unanimous Senate, and overwhelming House, support. In 2002, Congress voted overwhelmingly, including Senators Kerry and Reid, to pass the 'Joint Resolution to Authorize the use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq' which chronicles Saddam's weapons of mass destruction programs, their use, and his crimes against humanity.

"Saddam's regime ranks among the most notorious in history, alongside the likes of Hitler, Stalin and Mao. During his three- decade reign of terror, he launched unprovoked attacks against Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Israel, killing and displacing millions of Muslims in the process, including his own country's citizens. He also used weapons of mass destruction on his enemies, ran a terrorist state, aided and harbored international killers and thugs, and was considered, by all respectable human rights groups, one of the world's worst human rights abusers. And for more than 10 years he defied the international community by flouting Non-Proliferation Treaty provisions and refusing to disarm according to surrender terms of the first Gulf War.

"By engaging in revisionist politics and demanding a firm timetable for withdrawing American troops from Iraq, Democrat Party leaders are now resorting to the defeatism Vietnam War Model of another era which plays right into hands of America's terrorist enemies like Bin Laden and Al Zarqawi.

"Global terrorism will not be defeated, in Iraq and elsewhere, by revisionism or weak-kneed politicians in either major party who blow with prevailing winds. Instead, it will be accomplished

by strong-willed and consistent people like America's President George W. Bush, Great Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair, and others who recognize the clear and present danger terrorism poses to the Free World. Saddam Hussein was a terrorist and a clear menace to world peace and security. And Iraq, America and the world is safer with him in prison rather than in power. Anyone who thinks otherwise is doing mankind a great disservice."

Article 5

Iraq Moving Closer to Self-Governing Democracy Says Former U.S. State and Defense Department Official

390 words

14 October 2005

U.S. Newswire

English

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WASHINGTON, Oct. 14 /U.S. Newswire/ -- The following statement on democracy in Iraq was released today by former U.S. State and Defense Department Official **Fred Gedrich**:

"Despite continuing violence perpetrated on the civilian population by foreign terrorists and disgruntled Baathists still loyal to Saddam Hussein in an attempt to dissuade them from voting, an overwhelming majority of Iraq's 14 million eligible Kurdish, Shiite, and Sunni voters are expected to participate in the country's October 15, 2005, referendum on a new constitution. In so doing, they will move their nation closer to establishing a self-governing democracy, in the heart of the world's terror region. The expected large turnout will also signify that opponents of this fledgling democracy have lost the battle for the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people.

"Iraq's constitutional referendum is opposed by Sunni-bred foreign terrorists like Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al Zarqawi, a small portion of Iraq's minority Sunni population who comprise the remnants of the Baathist regime, and other authoritarians who inhabit the region. It is also opposed by global leftist groups such as ANSWER and others who are lending support the 'resistance' in Afghanistan and Iraq, and who foolishly and dangerously demand an immediate withdrawal of U.S.-led coalition troops from the country. Their recipe for 'peace' would surely lead to establishment of a new terrorist state and more chaos and killings of innocents.

"All indicators suggest that the Iraqi electorate will come out in great numbers and vote to approve the constitution, and pave the way for parliamentary elections in December which will eventually make Iraq the freest country in the Arab World. Such a result would represent a devastating defeat for the forces of evil and their enablers -- and a victory for all those who believe that freedom and democracy is possible in the Middle East."

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@**(b)(6)**
Sent: Monday, March 13, 2006 8:20 AM
To: tmcinerney@**(b)(6)**; paulvalley@**(b)(6)**; nashct@**(b)(6)**; Glenstrae77@**(b)(6)**; BURM41516@**(b)(6)**; **(b)(6)**; CIV, OASD-PA; WSSInter@**(b)(6)**; robertscales@**(b)(6)**; **(b)(6)**
Subject: The Yale Taliban: Today's Spectator

The Yale silence, and its condescending attitude to all - especially the military - makes me wonder.

The American Spectator

Jed Babbin

(b)(2) (home office)
(b)(2) (home fax)
(b)(2) (mobile)

(b)(6)

From: McIntyre, Jamie [Jamie.McIntyre@(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, March 10, 2006 11:48 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: FW: Lou Dobbs on Abizaid

See highlighted text-- Jamie

From CNN's Lou Dobbs Tonight
Thursday, March 9, 2006

DOBBS: That's a terrific idea, and I hope your colleagues are listening to you.

I'd like you to, however, listen to something that General John Abizaid, the head of the U.S. Central Command, said just a few hours ago. If we could roll that sound bite.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

GEN. JOHN ABIZAID, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND: The United Arab Emirates is absolutely vital to our stake in the Arabian Gulf area, that they have been good partners, good allies. I'm very dismayed by the emotional responses that some people have put on the table here in the United States, that really comes down to Arab and Muslim bashing. That was totally unnecessary.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

DOBBS: What is your reaction to a member of the general staff getting involved in what is, first of all, by the White House's assertion, a commercial transaction, one that would work tirelessly for -- but to hear the head of the Central Command accuse the opponents of this deal of being anti-Arab, anti-Muslim and inject himself into a domestic political discussion?

HUNTER: Well, first, General Abizaid and other generals have said that this -- that the UAE and Dubai have been very cooperative. What they've seen, Lou, is a cooperative side when we're making military operations...

DOBBS: But, Mr. Chairman, if I may interrupt you...

HUNTER: But they don't...

DOBBS: I'm talking about what he said about the critics of this deal. And he injected himself specifically into it. That's got to concern you.

HUNTER: Yes, I can just speak for myself, and that is, I don't know if he's referring to my criticism, but my criticism is based on 66 nuclear triggers being shipped through Dubai while American agents are sitting there asking the Dubai government not to let them go, and they say we don't care what America's position is; they're going. Now, that's not anti-anything expect pro-American security.

DOBBS: Exactly.

HUNTER: I don't think the general knows about those things. I think he sees -- he sees the smiling face of Dubai when we're making military operations.

DOBBS: It is in my judgment, and I will say it this way, and in my judgment it is unseemly to see this administration and this Department of Defense literally -- and I hate to use this, in all respect for the uniform and the men, these men who serve the country so well -- to be trotted out to support a deal that is a commercial transaction and a domestic political issue like this. Does that offend you?

HUNTER: Well, actually, Abizaid, General Abizaid was over here to give his regular briefings to...

DOBBS: No, I understand.

HUNTER: Which he did in private session, and he was asked that question. So to his credit and to Tommy Franks' credit, Lou, those guys have seen when we have been moving men and material into war, they have seen the Dubai government and a UAE that has accommodated us. The problem is they accommodate the bad guys when that's in their interest.

DOBBS: Congressman Duncan Hunter, we thank you for being with us.

HUNTER: Let's stick with this issue, Lou. We've got a lot of work to do.

DOBBS: Thank you, sir. Appreciate you being here.

DOBBS: And one of those issues that I'd like to discuss is General Abizaid, General Grange, standing up and talking, basically suggesting that critics of the Dubai ports deal, many were in fairness as he's put it were anti-Arab and anti-Muslim and thereby injecting his uniform into this debate.

FUND: It is a problem. We now have severed a lot of...

DOBBS: ... I'm sorry, I was talking -- John, I appreciate it, but I was talking to General David Grange.

FUND: Oh, I'm sorry.

BRIG. GEN. DAVID GRANGE, CNN MILITARY ANALYST: Thank you, Lou, I think it's my turn. I would say that it's OK for the general to talk about UAE as an ally and a benefit in that region, **but uniformed services do not want to get involved in any political debate or the perception thereof and something like this port deal.**

DOBBS: And do you think that it's appropriate for this administration and I'm going to ask you -- the country has not produced a finer warrior than you -- do you think it's appropriate for this administration, whatever the issue, domestic politics, because this was a commercial contract, to move out men who are so distinguished, so distinguished in the service to the country, like General Abizaid, to promote a position taken, a political position taken?

GRANGE: **I hope that was not the intent. I don't believe it was. The problem is, if it looks like you have the military doing some type of political statement or posturing, that perception, the military service of the American people, the military does not represent the American people in Washington D.C.**

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, March 08, 2006 2:43 PM
To: Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA
Subject: RE:

we morphed it into the civilian defense experts list...

From: Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA
Sent: Wednesday, March 08, 2006 2:04 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE:

thanks, also, where is our think tank list?

Dallas B. Lawrence

Director, Office of Community Relations & Public Liaison

United States Department of Defense

(b)(2)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, March 08, 2006 2:00 PM
To: Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA
Subject: RE:

here you go...

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, March 07, 2006 5:38 PM
To: Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA
Subject: RE:

here are my suggestions:
Colonel Ken Allard (USA, Retired)

NBC Affiliates

Mr. Jed Babbin (AF, Former JAG)
American Spectator, Freelance Radio

General Wayne A. Downing (USA, Retired)
ABC

Command Sergeant Major Steven Greer (USA, Retired)
The Greer Foundation, Fox News

Colonel Jack Jacobs (USA, Retired)
MSNBC

Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis (USA, Retired)
Freelance for Fox News, national radio

Dr. Jeff McCausland (Colonel, USA, Retired)
CBS Affiliates

Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney (USAF, Retired)
Fox News

Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr. (USA, Retired)
Fox News

Major General Donald W. Shepperd (USAF, Retired)

CNN

From: Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA
Sent: Tuesday, March 07, 2006 5:21 PM
To: (b)(6), CIV, OASD-PA
Subject:

i cut off the last 3 by accident

Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr. (USA, Retired)

(b)(6)

Telephone:

(b)(2)

Cellular:

Fax:

None

Email:

(b)(6)

Major General Donald W. Shepperd (USAF, Retired) CNN

(b)(6)

Telephone:

(b)(2)

Cellular:

Fax:

Email:

shepdonald@(b)(6)

Mr. Wayne Simmons (USN, CIA, Retired)

(b)(6)

Suite (b)(2)

Telephone:

(b)(2)

Fax: (b)(2)

Cell: [REDACTED]

Email: (b)(6)

Dallas B. Lawrence

Director, Office of Community Relations & Public Liaison

United States Department of Defense

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, March 07, 2006 5:21 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA

i cut off the last 3 by accident

Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr. (USA, Retired)

(b)(6)

Telephone: (b)(2)

Cellular:

Fax: None

Email: (b)(6)

Major General Donald W. Shepperd (USAF, Retired) CNN

(b)(6)

Telephone: (b)(2)

Cellular:

Fax:

Email:

Mr. Wayne Simmons (USN, CIA, Retired)

(b)(6)

Suite (b)(6)

Telephone: (b)(2)

Fax:

Cell:

Email:

(b)(6)

Dallas B. Lawrence

Director, Office of Community Relations & Public Liaison

United States Department of Defense

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, March 07, 2006 5:18 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA

Colonel Ken Allard (USA, Retired)

(b)(6)

Home: (b)(2)

Cell: (b)(2)

Email: [allardck@\(b\)\(6\)](mailto:allardck@(b)(6))

Mr. Jed Babbin (AF, Former JAG)

(b)(6)

Telephone: (b)(2)

Cellular:

Fax:

Email: [jedbabbin@\(b\)\(6\)](mailto:jedbabbin@(b)(6))

Commander Peter Brookes (USN, Reserve)

Senior Fellow for National Security

The Heritage Foundation

214 Massachusetts Avenue NE

Washington, DC 20002

Telephone: (b)(2)

Home:

(b)(2)

Fax:

Cellular:

Email:

(b)(6)

Major Dana R. Dillon (USA, Retired)

Heritage Foundation

214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE

Washington, DC 20002

Telephone:

(b)(2)

Cellular:

Fax:

Home:

Email:

(b)(6)

General Wayne A. Downing (USA, Retired)

(b)(6)

Telephone:

(b)(2)

Cellular:

Fax:

Email:

(b)(6)

Colonel John Garrett (USMC, Retired)

Partner

Patton Boggs, LLP

(b)(6)

Telephone: (b)(2)

Cellular:

Fax:

Email: (b)(6)

Assistant: (b)(6)

Command Sergeant Major Steven Greer (USA, Retired)

(b)(6)

Telephone: (b)(2)

Cellular:

Email: (b)(6)

Residence: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Colonel Jack Jacobs (USA, Retired)

(b)(6)

Telephone: (b)(2)

Cellular:

Fax:

Email: (b)(6)

Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis (USA, Retired)

(b)(6)

Telephone: (b)(2)

Cellular: (b)(2)

Fax: (b)(2)

Email: robertmag73@(b)(6)

Dr. Jeff McCausland (Colonel, USA, Retired)

Director

Clarke Center, Dickinson College

Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013

Telephone: (b)(2)

Cellular: (b)(2)

Fax: (b)(2)

Home: (b)(2)

Email: mccauslj@(b)(6)

Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney (USAF, Retired)

(b)(6)

Telephone: (b)(2)

Cellular: (b)(2)

Fax: (b)(2)

Email: tmcinerney@(b)(6)

Captain Chuck Nash (USN, Retired)

(b)(6)

Telephone: (b)(2)

Cellular:

Fax:

Home:

Email: nashct@(b)(6)

Dallas B. Lawrence

Director, Office of Community Relations & Public Liaison

United States Department of Defense

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@[b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, March 06, 2006 12:07 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: Re: The Ideological War

No word back yet; still waiting. Any help you can give would be appreciated. Would love to get Casey or Abizaid or the marine commander (Steve Johnson?). Thanks.

Jed Babbin

(b)(2) (home office)
(home fax)
(mobile)

(b)(6)

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, March 06, 2006 10:43 AM
To: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: Intelligence submission - ref. Don Shepperd

im not really sure what to do with this...
it came in via don sheppard.

Dallas B. Lawrence

Director, Office of Community Relations & Public Liaison

United States Department of Defense

(b)(2)

From: Phoenix Intelligence [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 12:13 AM
To: Dallas.Lawrence@ (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: Intelligence submission - ref. Don Shepperd

Dear Mr. Lawrence,

My name is Brent Astley and I represent Phoenix Global Intelligence Systems. Our group monitors the activities of terrorists and their sympathizers on the internet. From time to time, we come across information that we feel is actionable, such as the following which suggests possible attempt to breach the security of detainment facilities or perhaps a prison breakout from--Abu Ghraib.

Gen. Don Shepperd suggested that the material below be forwarded for your information. Actually, my deputy, Nena Wiley had asked if he could suggest routing for this information, but as she is somewhat under the weather this evening I am sending it along on her behalf. I had sent same to Lt. Col. (b)(6) USMC, OIC Cyber Team MNF Iraq, who is interested in follow-up on this matter and any future backup we might provide his team. He has been most cooperative and receptive, something for which we are most grateful.

For your information, the attached material was discovered at the Lajnah forum, tajdeed.org.uk/forums. While the material is posted publicly, this particular forum has, in the past, posted credible threat information. Our sense of this material is that it does not represent a direct or immediate threat or operational plan, but rather may express some intention for the future or perhaps it is one of several different operations being considered. As such, we felt that it merited FYI status with the relevant folks in Iraq.

The attached file contains the original arabic material posted as well as our machine translation. The original Arabic URL is as follows: <http://tajdeed.org.uk/forums/showthread.php?s=2285c788f38e70948ff79dbc12abfc6&threadid=39316> (You probably want to avoid machine translation as it can cause headaches, but some of the salient points do come through on it.)

I believe that Lt. Col. (b)(6) is the correct person to have forwarded this material to, but there may be other agencies or branches of the military who might be able to make use of it. Any assistance that you might provide with such routing would be greatly appreciated. I would like to thank you sir, very much for your time and consideration of this correspondence.

Sincerely,

Brent Astley
Executive Director
Phoenix Global Intelligence Systems

(b)(2)

www.phoenixintelligence.com

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@**(b)(6)**
Sent: Monday, March 06, 2006 8:10 AM
To: tmcinerney@**(b)(6)**; paulvalley@**(b)(6)**; nashct@**(b)(6)**; Glenstrae77@**(b)(6)**; BURM41516@**(b)(6)**; **(b)(6)**; CIV, OASD-PA; WSSInter@**(b)(6)**; roberthscates@**(b)(6)**; **(b)(6)**
Subject: RCP: The Ideological War

I've been busy this weekend. This is much more important than the other one.

[RealClearPolitics - Commentary - Fighting the Ideological War by Jed Babbin](#)

Jed Babbin

(b)(2) (home office)
(home fax)
(mobile)

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@**(b)(6)**
Sent: Monday, March 06, 2006 7:56 AM
To: tmcinerney@**(b)(6)**; paulvalley@**(b)(6)**; nashct@**(b)(6)**; Glenstrae77@**(b)(6)**; BURM41516@**(b)(6)**; **(b)(6)**; CIV, OASD-PA; WSSInter@**(b)(6)**; roberthscales@**(b)(6)**; **(b)(6)**
Subject: Britain Falling? Today's Spectator

It's the multiculturalists who will bring Britain's demise. And they may already have.

The American Spectator

Jed Babbin

(b)(2) (home office)
(home fax)
(mobile)

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@[b](6)
Sent: Thursday, March 02, 2006 9:44 AM
To: Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA
Cc: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; [b](6) CIV, OASD-PA; [b](6) LTC, OASD-PA
Subject: Tomorrow's retirement ceremony

Dear Roxie: I had planned to go to your retirement ceremony tomorrow at 11, but some people from a radio network I'm working with have called me to a command performance meeting. I apologize profusely. Please accept my best wishes and do keep in touch. [b](6) has a new cigar coming out at the end of the month that your husband really needs to try. All the best, Jed.

Jed Babbin

[b](2) (home office)
[b](2) (home fax)
[b](2) (mobile)

(b)(6)

From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, February 28, 2006 9:45 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; Smith, Dorrance, HON, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Next week

Yes-agent referrals count.

Bryan Whitman

(b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Smith, Dorrance, HON, OASD-PA
Sent: Tue Feb 28 09:43:20 2006
Subject: FW: Next week

as you can see, jed babbin has all week with hewitt's show. if we're thinking about radio for the sd, jed might be someone to consider for live to tape, same day. as to zal or casey, he can work with folks in theater. bryan, i've told jed i would put this into the system, and this email accomplishes this, no? thanks.

From: JedBabbin@[\mailto:JedBabbin@(b)(6) [mailto:JedBabbin@[\]\(b\)\(6\)](mailto:JedBabbin@)
Sent: Tuesday, February 28, 2006 8:25 AM
To: eric.ruff@[\]\(b\)\(6\)](mailto:eric.ruff@)
Subject: Next week

Eric: I'm subbing for Hugh Hewitt all next week (6-10 March). He's on nationally, Salem Radio Network, 6-9 EST.

Would love to get one of the big guys (Rumsfeld? Khalilzad? Casey?) to tell me things ain't as bad in Iraq as I may have thought looking at the news this week. Can try?

Please let me know with whom I can follow up. Best, Jed.

Jed Babbin

(b)(2)

(home office)
(home fax)
(mobile)

[REDACTED]

From: JedBabbin@[REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, February 28, 2006 9:44 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: Re: Next week

Eric: Thanks on all counts. Yep, a whole week is mucho good. I've done week-long stints before for Hugh. It's easy with a first-class production crew such as his or [REDACTED] Best, Jed.

Jed Babbin

[REDACTED] (home office)
[REDACTED] (home fax)
[REDACTED] (mobile)

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@**(b)(6)**
Sent: Tuesday, February 28, 2006 8:25 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: Next week

Eric: I'm subbing for Hugh Hewitt all next week (6-10 March). He's on nationally, Salem Radio Network, 6-9 EST.

Would love to get one of the big guys (Rumsfeld? Khalilzad? Casey?) to tell me things ain't as bad in Iraq as I may have thought looking at the news this week. Can try?

Please let me know with whom I can follow up. Best, Jed.

Jed Babbin

(b)(2) (home office)
(home fax)
(mobile)

(b)(6)

From: Paul Vallely [paulvallely@(b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, February 28, 2006 8:12 AM
To: Scott Belliveau
Subject: True Story of WMDs

Source is close hold for now.

Thirty years ago Hermann Eilts, was our ambassador to Egypt, and one of my deputies was in Cairo looking into the then 2 billion dollars in the Egyptian aid program. My office had sent a cautionary cable to my guy saying "make sure you don't miss the now-you-see-it-now you don't programs" Eilts, who was a Germanic clone on the Kissinger model at the ambassadorial level, read every bit of cable traffic that came into his embassy. Accordingly he bearded my deputy in the hall and said, "what is a now you see it now you don't program?" The answer was it was a program which was visible at the beginning of the project approval process, but which disappeared in the periodic reviews of a country program by being artfully placed under some different category. They then would reappear when there was a crisis involving the initiative, and then slide beneath the sands so that no measurement of its success or failure could be taken except when the managers found it useful.

WMDs in Iraq have become something of a now-you-see it now you don't issue of this decade. They became a prime rationale for our entry into Iraq and a reality accepted by everyone. When months went by without any success in finding them the press, quickly joined by the Democrats in Congress began a howl and cry that they had never existed and had been a fabricated casus belli of the Bush administration, a furor that continues to the present. Those of us with experience in the region and reliable sources there knew that that revisionism was wholly baseless, but were perplexed when any attempt to surface accurate stories of their disposition and whereabouts were ignored or minimized by the press and more curiously, by the intelligence community and by the administration itself. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld correctly opined that "an absence of evidence is not evidence of absence", but the ways in which the administration has handled the subject suggests something much more complex than the press or public has been able to grasp. The short answer to the question of where the WMDs Saddam bought from the Russians went was that they went to Syria and Lebanon along with the most powerful explosives in Saddams arsenal to be recycled and become the nexus for an escalation of the conflict after the fall of Baghdad. They were moved by Russian speznaz units (out of uniform) that were specifically sent to Iraq to move the weaponry and eradicate any evidence of

its existence. This was a coordinated and well orchestrated campaign using two neighboring client states with which the Russian leadership had a long time security relationship. Syria was an ideal repository of Saddams munitions as his arsenal was complementary to Syria's and the movement of the weaponry provided for a continuation of the military supply relationship with both clients by other means. Many of Saddam's generals exited Iraq via Damascus and thereafter disappeared. One might ask why Saddam did not follow them but stayed in Anbar province where we captured him. But did he? Or did he come back along with the explosives that have fed the insurgency? I would suggest that in our narrow focus on the location of the WMDs we have assiduously avoided and have managed to miss the pattern in the carpet in which they are woven. Am reminded of oil cartoon from the early 70s.

Let me explain my entry into the evanescent world of WMD. My office at the Pentagon--DUSD (International Technology Security) was set up in 2001 in AT&L to try and fix the international technology transfer process. We were trying to revamp the system by focusing on a Militarily Critical Technology List and tying that to the licensing activities at the State and Commerce Departments. I have been in and out of senior positions in the export control world for over 30 years. My initiation in that arena began as Inspector General of Foreign Assistance at the State department, a bureau that oversaw every US agency in the foreign assistance field, and because of the switch from grant aid to Foreign Military Sales all of FMS as well. That background led naturally to my forming an alliance with the DoD IG to monitor everything that was getting through our control grid. An MOU was set up to conjoin the technical capabilities of my office with the investigative resources of the OIG to create an independent entity in OIG called Director, International Armament and Technology Trade. After 9/11 and during the preparations for the Iraq war we agreed to use the MOU to see specifically what had gotten through our controls into Iraq. We were not looking for WMD but for conventional munitions and militarily important technology that had found its way to Iraq. At about the same time the Office of the Asst to the Sec for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Warfare mobilized the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to take the initial lead in the search for WMDs and my office was put on as a caboose on that train on the assumption that whatever they dug up by way of intelligence would include much on conventional weapons as well.

We started as well to work out an arrangement with DARPA and with INSCOM to develop a system to track the non-WMD inventory we were finding in Iraq. In our effort we got considerable help from CENTCOM, SOCOM, the customs folks in Iraq and initially from DIA. As we had not been given new resources for our initiative we developed a cross section of people already in my office with an appropriate

background, and augmented that with a small cadre of people who had good contacts in the areas of interest to us. These included a small group of Brits that were old Iraqi hands, including Julian Walker, a former British ambassador who had been responsible for drawing up all the southern boundaries for Iraq. They included as well a friend of the IG's, a Ukrainian American with extremely good contacts in Ukrainian intelligence, who suggested that, as the Russians had been the largest supplier of munitions to Saddam their records, which were available in Kiev, could be of immense use to our office.

First, a comment on conventional munitions and weaponry in Iraq as part of the fabric of the WMD story. Our efforts and the efforts on the ground in country revealed the immensity of the arsenal that Saddam had assembled before the war. When we began to tot up the total of the various inventories it became evident that the conventional munitions in Iraq were in excess of 100 million tons. The US inventory of these categories of munitions has been estimated at somewhere between 1.6 and 1.8 million tons--so 60 odd % of the whole US arsenal. What was more striking was that these weapons were spread all over the Iraqi landscape, carefully separated out into artillery shells, land mines, grenades, rockets, and differing kinds of high explosives and consigned to networks of 20 foot high sand berms interspersed with covered reinforced bunkers. These dumps were not the work of hastily assembled Iraqi conscripts but an orderly and professional segregation of weapons by class. There were several hundred such locations discovered in the aftermath of the invasion, and many of these were unsecured and subjected to ongoing pilfering by night. The origins of these weapons were Russian, Chinese, and French in declining order of magnitude, with the Russkis holding the lions share and the Chinese just edging out the French for second place. My office made a concerted effort to get CENTCOM to focus on the security implications of these dumps.

In the run up to the war my office was getting a flow of information from our British contacts on the ground at the Syrian border and from London via Iraqi contacts. The intelligence included multiple sightings of truck convoys, convoys going north to the Syrian border and returning empty. They also included specific locations of conventional munitions and rockets in towns near the Syrian border. It also included intelligence about possible WMDs that had been moved to Syria and Lebanon. They confirmed the report of the Dutch journalist regarding three locations of moved WMD in Syria, and provided information about steel drums with painted warnings that had been moved to the cellar of a hospital in Beirut. I duly passed whatever I got to the Iraqi desk officer at DIA and was surprised by the seeming lack of interest the information generated. My report on the convoys he brushed off as "Israeli disinformation". What was more interesting was about a month after I had

spoken to him the GC at DIA wrote to the GC of AT&L complaining about my activities--my GC wrote it off as a "rice bowl" issue. I decided to channel the flow thru the DIA guy who gave me my weekly technology briefing, but I got a similar and stronger response from CIA. They trashed one of my Brits and tried to declare him persona non grata to the intelligence community. Finally, we got constant indicators that Langley was aggresssively trying to discredit both my Ukrainian American and me in Kiev, even though the man was very close to David Nicholas, the OSCE ambassador in Ukraine and one of Vice President Cheney's best friends. Aside on Saddam as an indicator of the quality of what being provided.

Let me explain the Ukrainian connection to partially explain the situation: The head of Ukrainian intelligence, Igor Smesko, had been the first military attache in Washington in the early 90s when Ukraine had become independent and Dick Cheney was SECDEF. Smeshko had told Cheney that when Ukraine became free of Russia he wanted to show his friendship for the United States. With the Iraq war in progress and with Ukraine as part of the Coalition of the Willing, he was ready to deliver on that statement. Smeshko had gotten to know Gen. James Clapper, now Director of the Geospacial Intelligence Agency, but then head of DIA. I had a long personal friendship with the head of MI6, and this all came together in a two day meeting in London with me and my man in Kiev, Smesko's people, the MI6 contingent, and Gen. Clapper, who had been deputised by George Tenant for this mission. In a meeting with Clapper and me Smeshko promised to give us a comprehensive picture of Russian arms related activities in Iraq in the period before the war, to include all the relevent documents that were available to him in Kiev, and which my guy had already spent several months perusing. The stage was therefore set for a confirmation of the information I had accumulated on the movement of munitions over the past 18 months.

Over the next six months my guy began to gather material in Kiev and my office collated what they could in Washington. The process was slow and it was unclear just how the materials and my guy were going to get back to the US. As it turned out the balloon went up on the issue when the New York Times produced an article on October 30, a week before the Presidential elections, saying that 377 tons of high explosives had gone missing from a dump at al Qaqa after the fall of Baghdad. Simultaneously, Senator Kerry led an attack on the President and the administration that had all the hallmarks of coordinaton with CBS (who had originally planned to break the story) as a strategy for winning the election. The administration and the President were being crucified over their seeming inability to secure the explosives or provide an adequate explanation of what happened to them. As my office was the only place in the US government which had any thing approaching an inventory of

conventional munitions in Iraq, together with their locations and a sense of their disposition, I moved immediately to get the detailed story out to Demetri Sevastopolo of the Financial Times, and Bill Gertz of the Washington Times. I gave them my office's detailed assessment of the movement of the munitions and had my man in Ukraine brief them both on the central Russian role in moving them before the war started and their stories came out on Wednesday, two days after the NYT article. What was striking about the DoD response to the stories was that no one asked me anything about their source and provenence--or indeed whether they were true. It was the dog which didn't bark. The only instructions I got was not to talk to the press any more. I believe that they already knew all about the Russian role and knew that everything which I said was true. Dave Patterson, Wolfowitz's assistant, was told on Monday as he agonized over the NYT allegations that he had the answers to everything right there on the E Ring of the Pentagon with me and my office. But I heard absolutely nothing from him until an urgent phone call on Wednesday after the two articles interviewing me had appeared, and his only comment was "whatever you do don't talk to the press any more!" That response, as Secretary Rumsfeld could have said, was "counterintuitive". Interestingly, I was told at the end of that day that Rumsfeld did not seem interested in the Russian involvement, but only wanted to know "who had provided the fact that they went to Syria." But the official reaction was that they knew nothing about this and that it was probably without foundation and untrue. The need for a quick response to the NYT piece and the desire to keep the extent of the Ukrainian initiative under wraps allowed their terse rejections of the story to go unchallenged. The pushback was, however, sufficient to put the story on ice. The editors of the Financial Times citing questions about the credibility of the story, refuse to follow up even though Demetri Sevastopolo had been given additional details about the extent of the Ukrainian initiative and its international intelligence dimension. And the lemmings in the press followed.

But let us put a frame around the story so that the movement of these munitions is understood in its proper context. Russia, following its Cold War posture in the region, continued its role as arms supplier of choice to Iraq and Syria. The Gulf War and the various impositions on Iraq following the war merely changed the public profile of the relationship with the two Arab regimes without altering its fervor or substance. Instead of trying to uncover WMDs in Iraq or try to track their sequential movement into Syria in the weeks before the Iraq war started in 2003, that is, looking at the problem narrowly focused from the bottom up; it is more fruitful to look at it from the perspective of Russian strategy over a decade in managing the three way politico-military relationship with both Iraq and Syria. By consolidating the client relationship with the two countries the Russians could materially reinforce the arsenals of the two countries and provide a pipeline thru Syria to funnel weapons to

Saddam as the pressure on him increased. As important, they could put beyond the reach of an invasion force such munitions and weapons as Saddam wanted a safe haven for.

The ongoing advisory role inherent in the Russian military sales effort assured that the traffic in both directions would be directed and implemented by Russians, providing deniability on both sides of the border. Add to the professionalism of this effort the fact that the borderland across which this traffic moved has had a 3000 year experience of successful smuggling. The effort began shortly after the Gulf War as the brainchild of General Yevgeny Primakov. Primakov, you may remember, ran Saddams' weapons programs in the late 70s and was promoted to be head of the Soviet foreign intelligence service in 1990. to become Russia's minister of foreign affairs in 1996 and in 1998 to prime minister.

In spite of the huge indebtedness of the Iraqi regime to Russia (over 8 billion dollars) Primakov convinced the Russian govt to invest anew in the rebuilding of Iraqi military forces by supplying large quantities of spare parts, equipment components, and air defense equipment worth over a billion dollars. Secret agreements, signed between Iraqi intelligence and the Russian GRU, provided for clean up operations to be conducted by Russian and Iraqi military personnel, to remove WMDs, materials for production, technical documentation etc from Iraq, so that the regime could announce the Iraq was "WMD free". Roumanian intelligence chief Ion Pacepa who defected to the US in the 80s was debriefed by the CIA for three years and is living under protective custody. His description of the Russian intelligence plan "Sarandar" or emergency exit, describes a Soviet KGB plan for disposing of WMD--Chem/Bio in a rehearsed manner. Pacepa implemented it under KGB direction in Libya. The main tenet of the operation as specified by the Russians was that all chemical/bio weapons were to be burned or buried at sea in the event of potential capture. In February and March of 2003 two Russian ships set sail from the port of Umm Qasr headed for the Indian Ocean and anchored in the Indian Ocean for three days. Whether they went north to Syria or south to be deep sixed, however, the WMD were summarily escorted out of the country. Iraq's Sarandar program was controlled by Russian GRU operatives under ministry of Emergency Security Situations cover as civilian catastrophe workers. The Sarindar was a clean up mission to simultaneously remove all evidence of Russian sales and to physically remove the weaponry itself. This of course had the marvellous effect of not only making the weaponry available for later use, but of compromising the United States by seeming to "prove" that the war against Saddam was not justified.

Primakov made repeated visits to Baghdad during this entire period, but most

importantly returned to Baghdad in December 2002 shortly after Saddam had issued his last "full, final and complete disclosure" regarding WMDs, and stayed until shortly before the invasion. The carefully planned Russian clean up operation was entrusted to a combination of the GRU (military intelligence) and Spetsnaz (special operations troops) and Russian military and civilian logistical personnel in Iraq under the command of two experienced ex Soviet generals, Col. Gen. Vladislav Achatov and Col General Igor Maltsev, both retired and posing as civilian commercial consultants. A week before the invasion they were given medals by the minister of defense and departed. The importance of their role is reflected in the fact that they--by Russian count--had visited Baghdad no fewer than twenty times in the preceding 5-6 years. From Ukrainian sources we have determined the identity and strength of the various spetsnaz units, their dates of entry and exit, and the fact that the effort began with a planning conference in Baku from which they flew to Baghdad. That conference, chaired by the Russian Minister of Emergency Situations, Sergei Shoigu, laid out the plans for the cleanup effort so that Shoigu could leave after the keynote speech for Baghdad to orchestrate the planning for the disposal of the WMD. An intelligence official who attended the conference flew to on to Moscow from which he reported that all spetsnoz operatives were now changing to civilian clothes from military/GRU garb and told to integrate and await instructions. (The Russian denial of my revelations in late October 2004 included the statement that "only Russian civilians remained in Baghdad." There is no doubt that together that special ops group carried out the final Sarindar clean up just weeks before the outbreak of the war and produced the political windfall of undercutting the US rationale for going to war. But the Russians also secured important gains for themselves: As they lost their influence over Iraq they moved their influence to Syria and put themselves in a position to support armed guerilla action in Iraq after the war. In the view of many military and intelligence experts, the Russian WMD cleaning operation in Iraq was a "masterpiece of military camouflage and political deception." And so indeed it was....

The story of this deception has come out piecemeal, and its fragmented nature has allowed both the Russians and its detractors here to kill the story by systematically picking holes sequentially in each of the pieces and in their bearers. The fact that the administration had made a strong and successful effort to massage--indeed strong arm--intelligence regarding Iraq in the run up to the war made it difficult for versions of the truth to get a bloodless hearing after the success of the Russian ploy. I am not going to try to provide a detailed chronology of the Russian movement of both explosives and WMD to Iraq. It is already out there in the public domain and merely requires better informed journalists who can connect the dots of the story and who are not awed and are unwilling to accept the pat criticisms that are

offered up by the rump of our intelligence agencies and cabinet departments in the wake of their repeated failures in this area. The question remains of not only how badly we got snookered by the Russkis, but why it is in the US interest to continue the cover up of the real story. It has been suggested that our knowledge of the movement of these weapons is not helpful as we cannot prove what happened without expanding the war. There is also the old intelligence rationale of not blowing your cover so you can continue to mine your intelligence sources without compromising them. But what is the current Bush administration's game plan? Does it have one? And who are its enforcers? On one level it is a product of the unwillingness of the policy makers at the Pentagon and White House to admit mistakes. They never learned Churchill's axiom that "it is better to be right than consistent!" One observer believes that they preferred to continue to be beaten over the head by the WMD and munitions issues (which they knew would ultimately vindicate them) rather than explain why they allowed everything to be moved to Syria and beyond to feed the international war on terrorism and the Iraqi insurgency. That is indeed a story they would have good reason to avoid. Whatever the reason for their attempts to kill the story, however, they went to great lengths to undermine it and turn it into a 24 hour phenomon. Larry DiRita did everything he could to keep the journalists who broke the story off the talk shows, and told everyone sotto voce that the whole story was without foundation and should be left alone as I was a loose cannon. The effort chilled the story temporarily, but the facts were ultimately going to come out, as indeed they have. But the story is much bigger than the public has been led to believe. It ties into the Libby effort to quiet Judith Miller and the myriad stealth efforts to make the unpleasant emerging reality in Iraq conform to the public pronouncements of those who orchestrated the planning for it. .

We Trust Fox News
 Fox News Channel
 Paul E Vallely
 Military Analyst
 paulvallely@**(b)(6)**
 tel: **(b)(2)**
 fax: **(b)(2)**
 mobile: **(b)(2)**
 www.soldiersmemorialfund.org

Add me to your address book. Want a signature like this?

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@**(b)(6)**
Sent: Monday, February 27, 2006 7:02 AM
To: tmcinerney@**(b)(6)**; paulvalley@**(b)(6)**; nashct@**(b)(6)**; Glenstrae77@**(b)(6)**; BURM41516@**(b)(6)**; **(b)(6)**; CIV, OASD-PA; WSSInter@**(b)(6)**; roberthscales@**(b)(6)**; **(b)(6)**
Subject: Lost in Iraq? Today's Spectator

This ain't good, and will get worse unless the president begins to lead as a wartime president must.

The American Spectator

Jed Babbin

(b)(2) (home office)
(home fax)
(mobile)

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@**(b)(6)**
Sent: Wednesday, February 22, 2006 7:15 PM
To: **(b)(6)**
Cc: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: Request

(b)(6) I'll probably be doing my Spectator column for Monday on the situation in Iraq. Any chance of getting a phone interview Friday (pretty much any time, for print not broadcast) with Casey or Chirelli? Would also love to talk to Steve Johnson. Please let me know. Need about ten minutes with one or more of these guys. Issue is, to state the obvious, how bad it is with the mosque bombing and cleric killings. Are we on the edge? What's being done to unwind some of this?

Many thanks. I'm out of pocket most of Thursday, in depositions and flying back from Florida. Will be online tonite and late (after 2100 EST Thursday). By cell phone on breaks tomorrow. Thanks. Best, Jed.

Jed Babbin

(b)(2) (Home Office)
(Fax)
(Mobile)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, February 21, 2006 2:45 PM
To: Barber, Allison, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) Col OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: RE: 22 Feb Outreach - time.

Attachments: (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA.vcf



(b)(6)
Capt. USMC, OASD..

Got it ma'am...will leave it on his chair.

(b)(6)
Captain (b)(6)
Military Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs 1400 Defense
Pentagon (b)(2) Washington, DC 20301-1400
(b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: Barber, Allison, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, February 21, 2006 2:39 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Cc: (b)(6) Col OASD-PA; (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: 22 Feb Outreach - time.

hi joe or (b)(6)
would you give a copy of the read ahead to eric? thanks. i am in old town and cant get to
it from this computer.

ab

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD [mailto:Eric.Ruff@ (b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, February 21, 2006 2:28 PM
To: Barber, Allison, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: 22 Feb Outreach - time.

allison, can i have a copy of the agenda? thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: Barber, Allison, SES, OASD(PA) [mailto:allison.barber@ (b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, February 21, 2006 1:35 PM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6) Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA;
(b)(6)
(b)(6) Barber, Allison, SES, OASD(PA); Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-
PA; (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; (b)(6)
OASD-PA; Bucci, Steven, Dr., OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Col
OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) LtCol, OSD; (b)(6) CIV,
OSD; Veazey, (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Cc: (b)(6) (b)(6) CIV, JCS, OCJCS; (b)(6) CIV, JCS, OVCJCS
Subject: RE: 22 Feb Outreach - time.

yes that is correct.
ab

> -----Original Message-----

> From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
> [mailto:(b)(6)]
> Sent: Tuesday, February 21, 2006 1:32 PM
> To: (b)(6)
> CIV
> (b)(6) Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6)
> (b)(6)
> Barber, Allison, SES, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; Merritt, Roxie T.
> CAPT, OASD-PA; (b)(6); Lawrence, Dallas,
> OASD-PA; (b)(6), CIV, OASD-PA; Bucci, Steven, Dr., OSD;
> (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Col OASD-PA; (b)(6)
> (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) LtCol, OSD; (b)(6)
> CIV, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OSD
> Cc: (b)(6) CIV, JCS, OCJCS; (b)(6) CIV, JCS, OVCJCS
> Subject: RE: 22 Feb Outreach - time.

> Confirming that we are still on for tomorrow as shown below - room? Is
> it (b)(2)

> (b)(6)

> -----Original Message-----

> From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
> Sent: Wednesday, February 08, 2006 11:59 AM
> To: (b)(6)
> (b)(6)
> (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6)
> (b)(6)
> (b)(6) Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Merritt, Roxie T.
> CAPT, OASD-PA; (b)(6); Lawrence, Dallas,
> OASD-PA; (b)(6), CIV, OASD-PA; Bucci, Steven, Dr., OSD;
> (b)(6), CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Col OASD-PA; (b)(6)
> (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) LtCol, OSD; (b)(6)
> CIV, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OSD
> Cc: (b)(6) CIV, JCS, OCJCS; (b)(6) CIV, JCS,
> (b)(6)
> Subject: 22 Feb Outreach - time.

> For the outreach on 22 Feb, is it possible to adjust the time to
> start 15 minutes later - new time would be:


> 1:30pm-1:45 - PA Prep
> 1:45pm-2:30 - Outreach

> Let me know - thanks,

> (b)(6)

> -----Original Message-----

> From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
> Sent: Friday, January 13, 2006 9:19 AM
> To: (b)(6)
> (b)(6)
> (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6)
> (b)(6)
> (b)(6) Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Merritt, Roxie T.
> CAPT, OASD-PA; (b)(6); Lawrence, Dallas,
> OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Bucci, Steven, Dr., OSD;
> (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Col OASD-PA; Murphy,
> (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) LtCol, OSD; (b)(6)
> CIV, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OSD
> Cc: (b)(6)
> (b)(6)
> Subject: RE: PA - Schedule Items from 12 Jan Meeting
>
> Friday 3 February:
> 10:45am-10:55 - PA Prep

> 1100-1120 - Tri-West Healthcare Alliance - SD participate in
> ceremony presenting portraits of MoH recipients - location TBD.
>
> Wednesday 22 February:
> 1:15am-1:30 - PA Prep
> 1:30pm-2:15 - Outreach w/Retired Military Analysts & Civilian
> Defense Experts - location TBD
>
> Tuesday 28 February:
> 8:45am-9:00- PA Prep
> 9:00am-9:20 - Meet w/National Guard Youth Challenge Group - location
> TBD
>
> Friday 10 March:
> 11:10am-11:20 - PA Prep
> 11:25 - Walk to POAC
> 11:30am-11:50 - Meet w/USA Basketball Leadership (ASY event) @ POAC
>
> Thursday 16 March:
> 1:15pm-1:30 - PA Prep
> 1:30pm-2:15 - Outreach w/Strategic Communicators
>
> Let me know if this works - thanks,
>
>  -----Original Message-----
>
>

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Sent: Tuesday, February 21, 2006 1:41 PM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6) Whitman, Bryan, SES,
OASD-PA; (b)(6)
(b)(6) Barber, Allison, SES, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; Merritt, Roxie T.
CAPT, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA;
(b)(6)
(b)(6) Smith, Dorrance, CIV, OSD
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: 22 Feb Outreach - time.

I just spoke with Allison; Since they have a nice group of 8 Analysts plus a few outside DoD, let's move this to the SecDef Dining Room -- it is a nicer room and we can set for coffee, etc. ----and it will be easier for the SecDef to talk to them, etc. --- (b)(2)

Thanks,

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Sent: Tuesday, February 21, 2006 1:32 PM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6) Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6)
(b)(6) Barber, Allison, SES, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA;
(b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; (b)(6)
(b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Richard, Joseph, Col OASD-PA; Murphy, [redacted] CIV, OSD
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, JCS, OCJCS; (b)(6) CIV, JCS, OVCJCS
Subject: RE: 22 Feb Outreach - time.

Confirming that we are still on for tomorrow as shown below - room? Is it (b)(2)

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Sent: Wednesday, February 08, 2006 11:59 AM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6) Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6)
(b)(6) Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Merritt, Roxie T.
CAPT, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; (b)(6)
Bucci, Steven, Dr., OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Col OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV,
(b)(6)
Cc:
Subject: 22 Feb Outreach - time.

For the outreach on 22 Feb, is it possible to adjust the time to start 15 minutes later - new time would be:

1:30pm-1:45 - PA Prep
1:45pm-2:30 - Outreach

Let me know - thanks,

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Sent: Friday, January 13, 2006 9:19 AM

To: (b)(6)
(b)(6) Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6)
(b)(6) Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA;
Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; (b)(6)
(b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Bucci, Steven, Dr., OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Col OASD-PA;
(b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) LtCol, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) CIV,
OSD
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, JCS, OCJCS; (b)(6) CIV, JCS, OVCJCS
Subject: RE: PA - Schedule Items from 12 Jan Meeting

Friday 3 February:
10:45am-10:55 - PA Prep
1100-1120 - Tri-West Healthcare Alliance - SD participate in ceremony presenting portraits of MoH recipients - location TBD.

Wednesday 22 February:
1:15am-1:30 - PA Prep
1:30pm-2:15 - Outreach w/Retired Military Analysts & Civilian Defense Experts - location TBD

Tuesday 28 February:
8:45am-9:00- PA Prep
9:00am-9:20 - Meet w/National Guard Youth Challenge Group - location TBD

Friday 10 March:
11:10am-11:20 - PA Prep
11:25 - Walk to POAC
11:30am-11:50 - Meet w/USA Basketball Leadership (ASY event) @ POAC

Thursday 16 March:
1:15pm-1:30 - PA Prep
1:30pm-2:15 - Outreach w/Strategic Communicators

Let me know if this works - thanks,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, February 21, 2006 1:35 PM
To: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: 22 Feb Outreach - time.

Nope. We'll do it tomorrow. Ab has changed the policy on this. She wants them distro'd the day of, so that no one can make edits.

Thx

(b)(6)

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tue Feb 21 13:33:17 2006
Subject: Fw: 22 Feb Outreach - time.

Please tell me we have a read ahead done and distributed.
Dallas Lawrence
Director, Office of Community Relations and Public Liaison

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6) Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA;
(b)(6)
(b)(6) Barber, Allison, SES, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA;
(b)(6); Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; (b)(6)
OASD-PA; Bucci, Steven, Dr., OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Col
OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) LtCol, OSD; (b)(6) CIV,
OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OSD
CC: (b)(6) CIV, JCS, OCJCS; (b)(6) CIV, JCS, OVCJCS
Sent: Tue Feb 21 13:31:45 2006
Subject: RE: 22 Feb Outreach - time.

Confirming that we are still on for tomorrow as shown below - room? Is it 3E733?

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Sent: Wednesday, February 08, 2006 11:59 AM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6) Whitman, Bryan, SES,
OASD-PA; (b)(6)
(b)(6) Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Merritt, Roxie T.
CAPT, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; (b)(6)
(b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Bucci, Steven, Dr., OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6)
(b)(6) Col OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) LtCol, OSD; (b)(6)
(b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Cc: Cicio, (b)(6)
Subject: 22 Feb Outreach - time.

For the outreach on 22 Feb, is it possible to adjust the time to start 15 minutes later -

new time would be:

1:30pm-1:45 - PA Prep
1:45pm-2:30 - Outreach

Let me know - thanks,

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Sent: Friday, January 13, 2006 9:19 AM
To: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Whitman, Bryan, SES,

(b)(6)

(b)(6) OSD-P&R; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: RE: PA - Schedule Items from 12 Jan Meeting

Friday 3 February:

10:45am-10:55 - PA Prep

1100-1120 - Tri-West Healthcare Alliance - SD participate in cermeony presenting portraits of MoH recipients - location TBD.

Wednesday 22 February:

1:15am-1:30 - PA Prep

1:30pm-2:15 - Outreach w/Retired Military Analysts & Civilian Defense Experts - location TBD

Tuesday 28 February:

8:45am-9:00- PA Prep

9:00am-9:20 - Meet w/National Guard Youth Challenge Group - location TBD

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11:25 - Walk to POAC

11:30am-11:50 - Meet w/USA Basketball Leadership (ASY event) @ POAC

Thursday 16 March:

1:15pm-1:30 - PA Prep

1:30pm-2:15 - Outreach w/Strategaic Communicators

Let me know if this works - thanks,

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

[REDACTED]

From: Barber, Allison, SES, OASD(PA) [allison.barber@ [REDACTED]]
Sent: Tuesday, February 21, 2006 1:35 PM
To: [REDACTED]; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA [REDACTED]; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; [REDACTED] Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; [REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: 22 Feb Outreach - time.

yes that is correct.
ab

> -----Original Message-----
> From: [REDACTED] CIV, OSD
> [mailto:[REDACTED]]
> Sent: Tuesday, February 21, 2006 1:32 PM
> To: [REDACTED]
> [REDACTED] Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) [REDACTED], CIV,
> OASD-PA; (b)(6) [REDACTED] CIV, OSD; Reinhard, Daniel E., CTR, OSD-P&R;
> Barber, Allison, SES, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; Merritt, Roxie T.
> CAPT, OASD-PA; (b)(6) [REDACTED] Capt. USMC, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas,
> OASD-PA; (b)(6) [REDACTED] CIV, OASD-PA; Bucci, Steven, Dr., OSD;
> (b)(6) [REDACTED] CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) [REDACTED] Col OASD-PA; (b)(6) [REDACTED]
> (b)(6) [REDACTED] CIV, OSD; (b)(6) [REDACTED] LtCol, OSD; (b)(6) [REDACTED]
> CIV, OSD; (b)(6) [REDACTED] CIV, OSD
> Cc: (b)(6) [REDACTED] CIV, JCS, OCJCS; (b)(6) [REDACTED] CIV, JCS, OVCJCS
> Subject: RE: 22 Feb Outreach - time.

> Confirming that we are still on for tomorrow as shown below - room? Is
> it [REDACTED]

> Cathy

> -----Original Message-----
> From: [REDACTED]
> Sent: Wednesday, February 08, 2006 11:59 AM
> To: (b)(6) [REDACTED] CIV, OSD; (b)(6) [REDACTED] YN1, OSD;
> (b)(6) [REDACTED] CIV, OSD; (b)(6) [REDACTED] CIV, OASD-PA;
> (b)(6) [REDACTED] CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) [REDACTED]
> (b)(6) [REDACTED], CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) [REDACTED] CIV, OSD; (b)(6) [REDACTED]
> CTR, OSD-P&R; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Merritt, Roxie T.
> CAPT, OASD-PA; (b)(6) [REDACTED] Capt. USMC, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas,
> OASD-PA; (b)(6) [REDACTED] CIV, OASD-PA; Bucci, Steven, Dr., OSD;
> (b)(6) [REDACTED] CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) [REDACTED] Col OASD-PA; (b)(6) [REDACTED]
> (b)(6) [REDACTED] CIV, OSD; (b)(6) [REDACTED] LtCol, OSD; (b)(6) [REDACTED]
> CIV, OSD; (b)(6) [REDACTED] CIV, OSD
> Cc: (b)(6) [REDACTED] CIV, JCS, OCJCS; (b)(6) [REDACTED] CIV, JCS,
> OVCJCS
> Subject: 22 Feb Outreach - time.

> For the outreach on 22 Feb, is it possible to adjust the time to
> start 15 minutes later - new time would be:

> 1:30pm-1:45 - PA Prep
> 1:45pm-2:30 - Outreach

> Let me know - thanks,
> (b)(6)

> -----Original Message-----

> From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
> Sent: Friday, January 13, 2006 9:19 AM
> To: (b)(6) YN1, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OSD;
> (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA;
> (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Turenne, Jr.,
> Bill., CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6)
> CTR, OSD-P&R; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Merritt, Roxie T.
> CAPT, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas,
> OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Bucci, Steven, Dr., OSD;
> (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Col OASD-PA; (b)(6)
> (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) LtCol, OSD; (b)(6)
> CIV, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OSD
> (b)(6) CIV, JCS, OCJCS; (b)(6)
> CIV, JCS, OVCJCS
> Subject: RE: PA - Schedule Items from 12 Jan Meeting

> Friday 3 February:
> 10:45am-10:55 - PA Prep
> 1100-1120 - Tri-West Healthcare Alliance - SD participate in
> ceremony presenting portraits of MoH recipients - location TBD.

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> Tuesday 28 February:
> 8:45am-9:00- PA Prep
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> 1:15pm-1:30 - PA Prep
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> Let me know if this works - thanks,

> (b)(6)
> -----Original Message-----

[REDACTED]

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, February 21, 2006 9:25 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: (Babbin) Fiddling with FISA

http://www.spectator.org/dsp_article.asp?art_id=9434

Fiddling with FISA

By [Jed Babbin](#)

Published 2/21/2006 12:09:43 AM

Our republic will not die of terrorism, but of euphemism. Congress doesn't declare war, it passes resolutions authorizing military force. The president doesn't veto the worst legislation, he issues "signing statements" that reinterpret Congressional language to fit the president's ideas. And where does that leave those who are trying to fight a war against terrorists and their state sponsors? Drifting, befogged by the wobblers that surround them. Churchill said that when you mean to kill someone, it costs nothing to be polite. In the matter of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act -- FISA -- we require much less politeness and a lot more clarity.

Congress is about to fiddle with FISA and the results will, inevitably, be bad. In fact, even before they are reached, the legislative process, leaking as it does, may do severe damage to the nation's security.

Last week, after being beaten about the head and shoulders for almost two months by the *New York Times* and the rest, the Bush administration apparently agreed to do that which it had hitherto refused. According to a statement by Kansas Republican Pat Roberts, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, the administration has come on board with the senators and congressmen who want to amend FISA to deal with their various kinds of dyspepsia the program has produced in them. Would that they had, instead, reached for the flask or the Maalox. The FISA fight is the signature clash of the executive and legislative branches in the war on terrorism. Like the War Powers Act before it, FISA attempts to circumscribe what the president can and cannot do in dealing with foreign threats. And, like the War Powers Act before it, every president since FISA's enactment hasn't scrupled at ignoring it (in FISA's case with warrantless searches) while, at the same time, working hard to appear he's following it.

On the political side, President Bush can accept some sort of Congressional me-tooism on the NSA program. It injures not our Constitution if Congress endorses what the president is already doing to gather foreign intelligence. If the FISA amendments could be no more than that, there would be little reason for concern. But with a Democratic party still sunk in the Michael Mooron fever swamp, the FISA amendments may include enough anti-Bush hysteria that the president may be forced to do what he has never yet done: veto a bill passed by Congress. And we may have to take a hand in getting him to do it.

On one side, Sen. Roberts plans to use the FISA amendments to expand the list of leaks for which people can be prosecuted criminally. Which could be good but is almost certainly unnecessary. Given the administration's manana approach to leak investigations, no matter how many crimes may be committed by leaking our top secrets, it's unlikely that anyone will ever go to jail for the leaks no matter how many more crimes are defined. Where, may you ask, is the criminal investigation of Sens. Durbin, Rockefeller and Wyden for leaking a top-secret satellite program? Like the Energizer Bunny, it

keeps going and going. And unlike said bunny, it's apparently going nowhere. (Please. Don't even whisper about the Plame Name Blame Game. It's gallows humor, not a leak. It hurt Scooter Libby's career, and nothing else. Certainly not national security.)

So if Roberts expands the list of criminal leaks, the Dems will exact their pound of flesh and require more court supervision of the NSA program. They will try to impose more of the usual civilian court functions on NSA such as "probable cause." To make a legal search for admissible evidence of crime, you have to have probable cause (usually an affidavit sworn by a law enforcement agent on the basis of evidence already in hand) justifying a warrant. Under FISA, the probable cause standard only requires the court to find that the subject to be surveilled is a foreign agent. What, then, if the Fourth Amendment criminal standard for probable cause is extended to the NSA program? In short, the vast majority of information now being gathered by NSA -- legally, under the president's inherent Constitutional powers -- will be lost because that standard won't be met.

Tactical information -- those numbers programmed into a terrorist's speed dial -- is enough to justify a sudden visit by a SEAL platoon to your cave near Kabul but not enough to justify a search warrant to tap your phone in Tappahannock. Throughout American history, the Judicial Branch has -- wisely, and in accord with the Founders' vision of its function -- steered clear of ruling on issues that are the president's to decide in the conduct of a war. In this case, Congress is aiming to put the courts in precisely the position they have properly avoided. And the more the courts are involved in the NSA program -- and those that come after it -- the less likely those programs will do what they must in defense of our nation because the courts will not just second-guess: they will erect barriers that will have the same effect as the famous "Wall" that prevented intelligence agencies from sharing information with their law enforcement counterparts to "connect the dots" before 9-11. Congress, as the president should have said, demands that the administration connect the dots and then takes away all its pens and pencils.

It's entirely possible that the president will let something patently unconstitutional -- like the McCain-Graham "anti-torture" amendment -- become law after issuing a toughly-worded "signing statement" that basically says the president will only enforce this law up to what he believes are its constitutional limits. Which is kind of like saying he'll break the law when he wants to, and leaves all our guys and gals interrogating prisoners twisting in the wind, subject to the whim of any federal prosecutor who wants to define the terms the law leaves vague. The president erred badly in that one. He cannot repeat the error on FISA.

Another president will have to take over this war when Mr. Bush leaves office in three years. And that next president may not share -- or be bound by -- the sentiments expressed in a signing statement. President Bush, if faced with a FISA amendment that creates a limitation on his inherent power, should veto the bill. And he should be subjected to the same amount of pressure from conservatives he felt on the Miers nomination when and if a FISA mess presents itself.

We need to do everything we can -- everything the Constitution allows -- to prosecute this war. In order to do that, we must also press ahead, with determination and appropriate speed, to prosecute and punish leakers. The administration, not being on great terms with Congress, is slacking on investigations of leaks by members and staffs even as the FISA amendments are about to be taken up.

Last Friday I interviewed Attorney General Alberto Gonzales for the Hugh Hewitt Show. Weeks ago, before he appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Gonzales wrote to Chairman Arlen Specter (R-PA) about some of the considerations he had over Congressional action on FISA. High on the list was his explanation of why the administration hadn't pursued FISA amendments before. Gonzales said then that members of Congress warned that the legislative process might compromise the NSA

program. That is, Congress leaks so badly it couldn't be trusted to look at the details of the program. I asked him pointedly if those problems had been resolved. He demurred. In short, without saying so, the AG was repeating that Congress still can't be trusted with secrets.

What is more urgent a task for the administration and Congress: fiddling with FISA or finding and punishing the Congressional and administration leakers? Before either can undertake the former, they must both cooperate in accomplishing the latter. We are a nation at war. We cannot afford to have an untrustworthy Congress. Let the matter be pressed, and let the chips fall where they may.

TAS contributing editor Jed Babbin is the author of Inside the Asylum: Why the UN and Old Europe Are Worse Than You Think (Regnery, 2004).

[REDACTED]

From: JedBabbin@[REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, February 21, 2006 7:59 AM
To: tmcinerney@[REDACTED] paulvalley@[REDACTED] nashct@[REDACTED] Glenstrae77@[REDACTED]
BURM41516@[REDACTED] [REDACTED] CIV, OASD-PA; WSSInter@[REDACTED]
roberthscates@[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
Subject: FISA Fiddling - Today's Spectator

This is almost certain to be so bad, even President Bush will have to veto it.

The American Spectator

Jed Babbin

[REDACTED] (Home Office)
[REDACTED] (Fax)
[REDACTED] (Mobile)

(b)(6)

From: Hemingway, Thomas, BG, DoD OGC
Sent: Friday, February 17, 2006 8:44 AM
To: Stimson, Charles D. (Cully), CIV, OSD-POLICY
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY; (b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY; (b)(6)
Subject: CIV, USA, OSD-POLICY; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Response to UN Report
Attachments: LEGAL-#21648-v3-USG_Reply_to_SR_GTMO_Report_2006.DOC

Cully,

Thanks very much for taking this on. Jed Babbin's Cell Phone number is: (b)(2) His home office number is (b)(2) (b)(2) He indicated to me earlier this morning that cell phone would be the best way to track him down today.

Attached is the draft DoS response to the Special Report and a link to a John Bellinger press conference that should be useful. I may be able to supply you with additional talking points on errors in the report later this morning. I'll get the to you as soon as possible.

Tom

Thomas L. Hemingway, Brig Gen, USAF
Legal Advisor to the Appointing Authority
Office of Military Commissions (DoD)
Room (b)(2)
Crystal City
(b)(2)



LEGAL-#21648-v3-
USG_Reply_to_S...

Bellinger comments:
<http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/61444.htm>

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY
Sent: Friday, February 17, 2006 8:27 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; Hemingway, Thomas, BG, DoD OGC; (b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, USA, OSD-POLICY; (b)(6) CTR, OSD-POLICY
Subject: Re: HELP!!

Gen hemingway... Please tell me you'll get the opportunity to give your "rights to killers" speech on air. :) I gotta be online and listen to that!

I'll be available with cully when this happens. Keep me in the CC chain. Thanks!

(b)(6)

This message was sent from my Black Berry:

(b)(6)
Office of Detainee Affairs
United States Department of Defense
Tel: (b)(2)
Fax: (b)(2)
Pager: (b)(2)
Blackberry: (b)(6) or (b)(2)

This message may contain information exempt from mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; Hemingway, Thomas, BG, DoD OGC; (b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY
CC: (b)(6) CIV, USA, OSD-POLICY; (b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY; (b)(6) CTR, OSD-POLICY
Sent: Fri Feb 17 08:23:09 2006
Subject: RE: HELP!!

Okay, I'm comfortable doing the telephone interview. Would appreciate your staff's assistance since this is my first public interview. I've got the substantive points here, but could use your professional assistance in making contact with him to do the interview, and establishing the ground rules. Barb is not in today. Best times for me would be between 11:30 and 3:30.

Please cc (b)(6) and (b)(6) as I am in meetings throughout the day.

Thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, February 17, 2006 6:19 AM
To: Hemingway, Thomas, BG, DoD OGC; (b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY; (b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY
Subject: Re: HELP!!

I don't have a problem w/being on the record to reaffirm the need for gtmo and that we absolutely do not torture. Also, remind the audience -- get jed to raise it first if you can -- of the manchester document and it's terrorist training instructions on how to lie about torture, etc.

This said, jed is no fan of the un and he will have some very political statements about the organization and how he perceives it is an anti-u.s. operation, etc. If anybody does the interview there should be a groundrule -- and jed understands this -- that dod doesn't

do politics and we can talk factually about the issue, not rhetorically. Thanks.

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Hemingway, Thomas, BG, DoD OGC

To: (b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY; (b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY

CC: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD

Sent: Fri Feb 17 05:15:47 2006

Subject: HELP!!

(b)(6)

Would either of you be interested in doing a telephone interview with Jed Babbin this morning to help him rebut the UN report? If not, would you have any objection to my doing so?

Tom

Thomas L. Hemingway, Brig Gen, USAF
Legal Advisor to the Appointing Authority
Office of Military Commissions (DoD)

Room (b)(2)
Crystal City

(b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: JedBabbin@ (b)(6) [mailto:JedBabbin@ (b)(6)]

Sent: Thursday, February 16, 2006 18:30

To: hemingwt@ (b)(6)

Subject: HELP!!

Tom: I'm subbing for Hugh Hewitt again tomorrow, and want to bash the UN report. I asked for Jay Hood and got the answer that the military isn't going out on that now. Can you do it? Please call asap. Best, Jed.

Jed Babbin

(b)(2) (Home Office)
(b)(2) (Fax)
(b)(2) (Mobile)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY
Sent: Friday, February 17, 2006 8:23 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; Hemingway, Thomas, BG, DoD OGC; (b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, USA, OSD-POLICY; (b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY; (b)(6)
Subject: (b)(6) CTR, OSD-POLICY
RE: HELP!!

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Thanks.

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To: Hemingway, Thomas, BG, DoD OGC; (b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY; (b)(6)
(b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY
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From: Hemingway, Thomas, BG, DoD OGC
To: (b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY; (b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY
CC: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Sent: Fri Feb 17 05:15:47 2006
Subject: HELP!!

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Tom

Thomas L. Hemingway, Brig Gen, USAF
Legal Advisor to the Appointing Authority
Office of Military Commissions (DoD)

(b)(2)
Crystal City

(b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: JedBabbin@aol.com [mailto:JedBabbin@ (b)(6)]
Sent: Thursday, February 16, 2006 18:30
To: hemingwt@ (b)(6)