

begin working the country clearance message and building the itinerary for the visit. Based on past trips, I would suggest limiting the group to 10 analysts, those with the greatest ability to serve as message force multipliers.

Suggested invitees are:

Colonel Ken Allard (USA, Retired) – NBC Affiliates

Mr. Jed Babbin (AF, Former JAG) – American Spectator

Command Sergeant Major Steven Greer (USA, Retired) – Fox News

Colonel Jack Jacobs (USA, Retired) – MSNBC

Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis (USA, Retired) – Freelance (NPR, BBC, CNN, Fox)

Dr. Jeff McCausland (Colonel, USA, Retired) – CBS

Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney (USAF, Retired) – Fox News

Captain Chuck Nash (USN, Retired) – Fox News

Major General Donald W. Shepperd (USAF, Retired) – CNN

Mr. Wayne Simmons (USN, CIA, Retired) Fox News

(b)(6)

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, May 23, 2006 1:06 PM
To: 'Scott Jennings'
Subject: RE: Revisionist History

Good stuff, thanks for sending it my way.

Dallas B. Lawrence

Director, Office of Community Relations & Public Liaison

United States Department of Defense

(b)(2)

From: Scott Jennings (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, May 23, 2006 12:54 PM
Subject: Revisionist History

Another "must read" from Pete Wehner in today's Wall Street Journal. Dismantles arguments being made against the President's policy on Iraq. -- Scott Jennings, White House Office of Political Affairs

Revisionist History

By Peter Wehner

The Wall Street Journal

May 23, 2006

Iraqis can participate in three historic elections, pass the most liberal constitution in the Arab world, and form a unity government despite terrorist attacks and provocations. Yet for some critics of the president, these are minor matters. Like swallows to Capistrano, they keep returning to the same

allegations – the president misled the country in order to justify the Iraq war; his administration pressured intelligence agencies to bias their judgments; Saddam Hussein turned out to be no threat since he didn't possess weapons of mass destruction; and helping democracy take root in the Middle East was a postwar rationalization. The problem with these charges is that they are false and can be shown to be so – and yet people continue to believe, and spread, them. Let me examine each in turn:

The president misled Americans to convince them to go to war. "There is no question misled the nation and led us into a quagmire in Iraq," according to Ted Kennedy. Jimmy Carter charged that on Iraq, "President Bush has not been honest with the American people." And Al Gore has said that an "abuse of the truth" characterized the administration's "march to war." These charges are themselves misleading, which explains why no independent body has found them credible. Most of the world was operating from essentially the same set of assumptions regarding Iraq's WMD capabilities. Important assumptions turned out wrong; but mistakenly relying on faulty intelligence is a world apart from lying about it.

Let's review what we know. The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) is the intelligence community's authoritative written judgment on specific national-security issues. The 2002 NIE provided a key judgment: "Iraq has continued its [WMD] programs in defiance of U.N. resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of U.N. restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade."

Thanks to the bipartisan Silberman-Robb Commission, which investigated the causes of intelligence failures in the run-up to the war, we now know that the President's Daily Brief (PDB) and the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief "were, if anything, more alarmist and less nuanced than the NIE" (my emphasis). We also know that the intelligence in the PDB was not "markedly different" from that given to Congress. This helps explain why John Kerry, in voting to give the president the authority to use force, said, "I believe that a deadly arsenal of weapons of mass destruction in his hands is a threat, and a grave threat, to our security." It's why Sen. Kennedy said, "We have known for many years that Saddam Hussein is seeking and developing weapons of mass destruction." And it's why Hillary Clinton said in 2002, "In the four years since the inspectors, intelligence reports show that Saddam Hussein has worked to rebuild his chemical and biological weapons stock, his missile delivery capability and his nuclear program."

Beyond that, intelligence agencies from around the globe believed Saddam had WMD. Even foreign governments that opposed his removal from power believed Iraq had WMD: Just a few weeks before Operation Iraqi Freedom, Wolfgang Ischinger, German ambassador to the U.S., said, "I think all of our governments believe that Iraq has produced weapons of mass destruction and that we have to assume that they continue to have weapons of mass destruction."

In addition, no serious person would justify a war based on information he knows to be false and which would be shown to be false within months after the war concluded. It is not as if the WMD

stockpile question was one that wasn't going to be answered for a century to come.

The Bush administration pressured intelligence agencies to bias their judgments. Earlier this year, Mr. Gore charged that "CIA analysts who strongly disagreed with the White House . . . found themselves under pressure at work and became fearful of losing promotions and salary increases." Sen. Kerney charged that the administration "put pressure on intelligence officers to produce the desired intelligence and analysis."

This myth is shattered by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence's bipartisan Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq. Among the findings: "The committee did not find any evidence that intelligence analysts changed their judgments as a result of political pressure, altered or produced intelligence products to conform with administration policy, or that anyone even attempted to coerce, influence or pressure analysts to do so." Silberman-Robb concluded the same, finding "no evidence of political pressure to influence the Intelligence Community's prewar assessments of Iraq's weapons programs. . . . [A]n analysts universally asserted that in no instance did political pressure cause them to skew or alter any of their analytical judgments." What the report did find is that intelligence assessments on Iraq were "riddled with errors"; "most of the fundamental errors were made and communicated to policy makers well before the now-infamous NIE of October 2002, and were not corrected in the months between the NIE and the start of the war."

Because weapons of mass destruction stockpiles weren't found, Saddam posed no threat. Howard Dean declared Iraq "was not a danger to the United States." John Murtha asserted, "There was no threat to our national security." Max Cleland put it this way: "Iraq was no threat. We now know that. There are no weapons of mass destruction, no nuclear weapons programs." Yet while we did not find stockpiles of WMD in Iraq, what we did find was enough to alarm any sober-minded individual.

Upon his return from Iraq, weapons inspector David Kay, head of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), told the Senate: "I actually think this may be one of those cases where [Iraq under Saddam Hussein] was even more dangerous than we thought." His statement when issuing the ISG progress report said: "We have discovered dozens of WMD-related program activities" that were part of "deliberate concealment efforts" that should have been declared to the U.N. And, he concluded, "Saddam, at least as judged by those scientists and other insiders who worked in his military-industrial programs, had not given up his aspirations and intentions to continue to acquire weapons of mass destruction."

Among the key findings of the September 2004 report by Charles Duelfer, who succeeded Mr. Kay as ISG head, are that Saddam was pursuing an aggressive strategy to subvert the Oil for Food Program and to bring down U.N. sanctions through illicit finance and procurement schemes; and that Saddam intended to resume WMD efforts once U.N. sanctions were eliminated. According to Mr. Duelfer, "the guiding theme for WMD was to sustain the intellectual capacity achieved over so many years at such a great cost and to be in a position to produce again with as short a lead time as

possible. . . . Virtually no senior Iraqi believed that Saddam had forsaken WMD forever. Evidence suggests that, as resources became available and the constraints of sanctions decayed, there was a direct expansion of activity that would have the effect of supporting future WMD reconstitution."

Beyond this, Saddam's regime was one of the most sadistic and aggressive in modern history. It started a war against Iran and used mustard gas and nerve gas. A decade later Iraq invaded Kuwait. Iraq was a massively destabilizing force in the Middle East; so long as Saddam was in power, rivers of blood were sure to follow.

Promoting democracy in the Middle East is a postwar rationalization. "The president now says that the war is really about the spread of democracy in the Middle East. This effort at after-the-fact justification was only made necessary because the primary rationale was so sadly lacking in fact," according to Nancy Pelosi.

In fact, President Bush argued for democracy taking root in Iraq before the war began. To take just one example, he said in a speech on Feb. 26, 2003: "A liberated Iraq can show the power of freedom to transform that vital region, by bringing hope and progress into the lives of millions. America's interests in security, and America's belief in liberty, both lead in the same direction: to a free and peaceful Iraq. . . . The world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values, because stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder. They encourage the peaceful pursuit of a better life. And there are hopeful signs of a desire for freedom in the Middle East. . . . A new regime in Iraq would serve as a dramatic and inspiring example of freedom for other nations in the region."

The following day the New York Times editorialized: "President Bush sketched an expansive vision last night of what he expects to accomplish by a war in Iraq. . . . The idea of turning Iraq into a model democracy in the Arab world is one some members of the administration have been discussing for a long time."

These, then, are the urban legends we must counter, else falsehoods become conventional wisdom. And what a strange world it is: For many antiwar critics, the president is faulted for the war, and he, not the former dictator of Iraq, inspires rage. The liberator rather than the oppressor provokes hatred. It is as if we have stepped through the political looking glass, into a world turned upside down and inside out.

Mr. Wehner is deputy assistant to the president and director of the White House's Office of Strategic Initiatives.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) The Heritage Foundation (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, May 23, 2006 11:34 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: FEATURE: Native Hawaiian Legislation, May 23, 2006

May 23, 2006

FEATURE: Native Hawaiian Legislation

Friday EVENT: An Unconstitutional Act Is Back: The Return of the Native Hawaiian Sovereignty Act

When: Friday, May 26, 2006, 12:00 noon

The Honorable Lamar Alexander (R-TN), United States Senate

John Fund, Editorial Board Member, The Wall Street Journal

Senate debate on S. 147, the "Native Hawaiian Government Reorganization Act," has been quietly slated for the week of June 5. This Act purports to authorize the creation of a government of so-called "native" Hawaiians to exercise sovereignty over native Hawaiians living anywhere in the United States. In 2000, the Supreme Court ruled that this approach is unconstitutional. Yet, proponents believe they can avoid this ruling by declaring the descendants of "aboriginal" Hawaiians an American Indian tribe - going so far as to allow for the election of an "interim government" of this alleged "tribe" and recognizing the sovereignty and privileges and immunities that the new government establishes for its "tribal members."

Native Hawaiian Resources
by The Heritage Foundation

<http://www.heritage.org/emails/hidden/pda.gif>

Domestic Policy

Health Care

<http://www.heritage.org/emails/hidden/bluebullet.gif> **Doing It Right: The District of Columbia Health Insurance Market Reform**

by Lawrence H. Mirel and Edmund F. Haislmaier

Under the proposed D.C. Equal Access to Health Insurance Act, all of the incentives in the system would be aligned to put the needs of the patient first, health insurers would compete for customers by offering the best value for money, and providers would compete for patients by offering the best quality of care at the best price.

<http://www.heritage.org/emails/hidden/bluebullet.gif> **Putting Patients in Charge**
by Rebecca Hagelin

Imagine selecting your own health plan, rather than simply accepting the one your employer picks for you.

<http://www.heritage.org/emails/hidden/bluebullet.gif> **Medicare mess guaranteed to grow**
by Robert E. Moffit, Ph.D.

A few wealthy seniors (singles making above \$80,000, couples above \$160,000) will be asked to pay a little more of their Medicare Part B premium costs. As this marks a significant change in the Medicare program, the next step should be to start transforming Medicare from a defined-benefit program into a defined-contribution one.

Energy and Environment

<http://www.heritage.org/emails/hidden/bluebullet.gif> **Congress Should Expand Offshore Energy Production**
by Ben Lieberman

Most of America's offshore areas are off-limits to oil and natural gas drilling, despite years of tight energy supplies and high prices for oil and gas. But a number of bills, including a pro-drilling amendment to the pending Interior appropriations bill, seek to open up some of these restricted areas and increase domestic oil and gas production. These are long-overdue steps.

Taxes

<http://www.heritage.org/emails/hidden/bluebullet.gif> A Victory for Taxpayers and the Economy
by Tracy L. Foertsch, Ph.D.

President Bush signed the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005 (H.R. 4297). His signing assures that millions of taxpayers and millions more workers and business owners will enjoy low tax rates on capital gains and dividends and a potentially stronger economy through 2010.

Congress

<http://www.heritage.org/emails/hidden/bluebullet.gif> Winning the Fight to Curb Excessive FAA Salary Costs
by Ronald D. Utt, Ph.D.

In September 2005, the existing contract between the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the air traffic controllers expired and discussions over its replacement began in earnest. With average controller compensation now totaling \$166,000 per year, the FAA's plan was to slow the growth in controller compensation costs to bring these costs more closely in line with overall private and government pay patterns.

<http://www.heritage.org/emails/hidden/bluebullet.gif> Sky-High negotiations
by Ronald D. Utt, Ph.D.

Air-traffic controllers have overplayed their hand before in negotiations with the government.

Foreign Policy

Immigration

<http://www.heritage.org/emails/hidden/bluebullet.gif> Senate Immigration Plan Fails to Deliver Comprehensive Border Security

by James Jay Carafano, Ph.D.

Though the Senate plan addresses many of the President's concerns, from increasing the number border agents to creating border security grants, it needs significant changes before it represents the comprehensive approach required to dramatically and permanently decrease illegal border crossing and unlawful presence in the United States.

<http://www.heritage.org/emails/hidden/bluebullet.gif> Immigration Reform or Central Planning?
by Tim Kane, Ph.D.

If the goal of immigration reform is to enhance the liberty and prosperity of the U.S. and its citizens, then a robust flow of immigrants is desirable. But that logic hinges on two assumptions: that immigrants are coming to America for work, not welfare, and that reform will improve, not hinder, the labor market.

<http://www.heritage.org/emails/hidden/bluebullet.gif> Senate bill adds 66 million immigrants
by Robert Rector

Early last week, Sen. Jeff Bingaman (D.-N.M.) forced through an amendment to the bill (opposed by the bill's authors) to reduce one of the major categories of proposed immigrant inflow.

<http://www.heritage.org/emails/hidden/bluebullet.gif> Tidal Wave
by Robert Rector

Think the immigration debate boils down to whether the 10 million illegal immigrants already here deserve amnesty? Think again.

<http://www.heritage.org/emails/hidden/bluebullet.gif> The SAFE Visa: A Good Starting Point for a Truly Temporary Guest Worker Proposal

by Kirk A. Johnson, Ph.D.

The current battle over the guest worker provisions of the Senate's Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act (CIRA, S. 2611) centers on the amount of time that guest workers would be allowed to remain in the United States. As Senator Jeff Sessions (R-AL) noted, "There is nothing temporary about this guest worker program," and he is correct.

<http://www.heritage.org/emails/hidden/bluebullet.gif> Courting Chaos: Senate Proposal Undermines Immigration Law

by Kris W. Kobach

Buried deep inside the the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act (CIRA, S.2611) bill-beginning at page 540-are provisions that would radically alter our immigration courts, making them far less likely to enforce and implement the law faithfully.

<http://www.heritage.org/emails/hidden/bluebullet.gif> Congress must weigh cost of amnesty

by *Michael Franc*

Americans, the most recent CBS/New York Times poll found, hold a nuanced set of views on immigration reform.

National Security

<http://www.heritage.org/emails/hidden/bluebullet.gif> Congressional Checklist for Chemical Security

by *James Jay Carafano, Ph.D.*

In addressing the threat from terrorists who would use the chemical industry to attack Americans, standards that focus on the greatest threats make sense, but they should be implemented with safeguards that protect the private sector from undue burdens that not only add little real security, but also undermine competition, cost jobs, and make goods and services more expensive.

<http://www.heritage.org/emails/hidden/bluebullet.gif> Congress Should Accelerate Submarine Procurement

by *Baker Spring and David D. Gentilli*

The Department of Defense must prepare to meet the wide variety of challenges of the long war against terrorism. Congress should increase the portion of the defense budget spent on acquisition, allocate funds to reduce per-unit costs, and invest in platforms that provide the greatest range of capabilities.

<http://www.heritage.org/emails/hidden/bluebullet.gif> Nuclear India and the Non-Proliferation Treaty

by *Dana R. Dillon and Baker Spring*

The Bush Administration's initiative to sell civilian nuclear technology to India will have a lasting effect on the international nonproliferation regime. To deal with the growing impact of de facto nuclear-weapon states on U.S. security, policymakers should pursue a two-track policy for nuclear nonproliferation and develop criteria-based policies for emerging nuclear technology relationships with these states.

<http://www.heritage.org/emails/hidden/bluebullet.gif> When Should the Government Use Contractors to Support Military Operations?

by *Alane Kochems*

Decisions regarding military contractor support should involve an examination of the risks, mitigation techniques, and benefits provided. To ensure oversight and transparency in the contracting process, the DOD Inspector General should be involved from the beginning, and the Defense Department should create a corps of reserve contracting officers that is trained in meeting the military's contracting needs.

<http://www.heritage.org/emails/hidden/bluebullet.gif> U.S. should spell it out: Iran can't go nuclear

by *Edwin J. Feulner, Ph.D.*

Washington should make it clear that if Iran presses ahead with its nuclear research, the United States will invoke its right to self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

<http://www.heritage.org/emails/hidden/bluebullet.gif> Trashing NSA's Hayden

by *Helle Dale*

At some news organizations, timing is everything. That is certainly the impression one gets from the publication of USA Today's front-page story on the National Security Agency's "massive database of Americans' phone calls," which ran last Thursday.

Middle East

<http://www.heritage.org/emails/hidden/bluebullet.gif> Living with the Crazy Colonel

by *Peter Brookes*

So why reopen diplomatic relations with such a despicable regime? It comes down to significant, measurable progress on matters of great importance to U.S. interests.

International Organizations

<http://www.heritage.org/emails/hidden/bluebullet.gif> Keeping the Pressure on Sudan

by *Brett D. Schaefer*

Despite the seriousness of the situation in Darfur, response has been limited to narrow U.N. sanctions, humanitarian support, and a woefully inadequate peacekeeping mission from the African Union. While the Bush Administration should

be applauded for helping secure the Darfur Peace Agreement and providing humanitarian relief, it is past time to push for more robust U.N. action and expose the real culprits behind the failure to act in Darfur.

<http://www.heritage.org/emails/hidden/bluebullet.gif> A Progress Report on U.N. Reform
by *Brett D. Schaefer*

The United States should encourage controversial reforms intended to improve the organization. Otherwise, America will be forced to expend greater treasure and effort to resolve problems that could otherwise be assigned to the U.N.

<http://www.heritage.org/emails/hidden/bluebullet.gif> U.N. is still wrong on human rights
by *Brett D. Schaefer*

U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan calls the new U.N. Human Rights Council "a great opportunity to make a fresh start." He's right. What a shame, then, that it appears the opportunity is going to waste.

Homeland Defense

<http://www.heritage.org/emails/hidden/bluebullet.gif> Bush Sends Troops to the Border
by *James Jay Carafano, Ph.D.*

Even though current National Guard forces are deployed overseas and others are needed at home for disaster response, the number required for support at our nation's border is neither unreasonable nor an undue burden on the force. Deploying military forces, however, is not an efficient or effective long-term solution.

<http://www.heritage.org/emails/hidden/bluebullet.gif> After Dubai Ports: Getting CFIUS Reforms Right
by *Daniella Markheim and James Jay Carafano, Ph.D.*

In the wake of the Dubai ports controversy, debate has centered over how much control Congress should wield over foreign direct investment (FDI). The bipartisan House legislation sponsored by Rep. Roy Blunt (R-MO) and others would strengthen the CFIUS process without unduly delaying or politicizing FDI deals. This approach meets national security needs while promoting foreign investment in America.

Upcoming Events

- **An Assessment of the U.S. Military and Its Global Impact**
Daniel Goure, Ph.D., Vice President, Lexington Institute
Wednesday, May 24, 2006, 10:00 a.m. | [RSVP](#)
- **Taking Care of Our Troops**
Colonel Virgil T. Deal, Commander, Walter Reed Army Medical Center
Brigadier General William Leszczynski, American Battlefield Monuments Commission
Joyce Raezer, National Military Families Association
Wednesday, May 24, 2006, 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon | [RSVP](#)
- **An Unconstitutional Act Is Back: The Return of the Native Hawaiian Sovereignty Act**
The Honorable Lamar Alexander (R-TN), United States Senate
John Fund, Editorial Board Member, The Wall Street Journal
Friday, May 26, 2006, 12:00 noon | [RSVP](#)

Mike Franc

Vice President, Government Relations

Contact: **(b)(2)** *Virginia Thomas*

Director, Executive Branch Relations

Contact: **(b)(2)** *Abigail Dowd*

Deputy Executive Branch Liaison

Contact: **(b)(2)**

<http://www.heritage.org/emails/hidden/pda.gif>

(b)(6)



(b)(6)

From: Iraq Update [iraq.update@(b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, May 23, 2006 7:30 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: IN CASE YOU MISSED IT: Revisionist History

In Case You Missed It ...

Revisionist History

By Peter Wehner

The Wall Street Journal

May 23, 2006

Iraqis can participate in three historic elections, pass the most liberal constitution in the Arab world, and form a unity government despite terrorist attacks and provocations. Yet for some critics of the president, these are minor matters. Like swallows to Capistrano, they keep returning to the same allegations – the president misled the country in order to justify the Iraq war; his administration pressured intelligence agencies to bias their judgments; Saddam Hussein turned out to be no threat since he didn't possess weapons of mass destruction; and helping democracy take root in the Middle East was a postwar rationalization. The problem with these charges is that they are false and can be shown to be so – and yet people continue to believe, and spread, them. Let me examine each in turn:

The president misled Americans to convince them to go to war. "There is no question misled the nation and led us into a quagmire in Iraq," according to Ted Kennedy. Jimmy Carter charged that on Iraq, "President Bush has not been honest with the American people." And Al Gore has said that an "abuse of the truth" characterized the administration's "march to war." These charges are themselves misleading, which explains why no independent body has found them credible. Most of the world was operating from essentially the same set of assumptions regarding Iraq's WMD capabilities. Important assumptions turned out wrong; but mistakenly relying on faulty intelligence is a world apart from lying about it.

Let's review what we know. The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) is the intelligence community's authoritative written judgment on specific national-security issues. The 2002 NIE provided a key judgment: "Iraq has continued its [WMD] programs in defiance of U.N. resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of U.N. restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade."

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Beyond that, intelligence agencies from around the globe believed Saddam had WMD. Even foreign governments that opposed his removal from power believed Iraq had WMD: Just a few weeks before Operation Iraqi Freedom, Wolfgang Ischinger, German ambassador to the U.S., said, "I think all of our governments believe that Iraq has produced weapons of mass destruction and that we have to assume that they continue to have weapons of mass destruction."

In addition, no serious person would justify a war based on information he knows to be false and which would be shown to be false within months after the war concluded. It is not as if the WMD stockpile question was one that wasn't going to be answered for a century to come.

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Mr. Wehner is deputy assistant to the president and director of the White House's Office of Strategic Initiatives.

You are currently subscribed to White House Iraq Update - Administration as:
eric.ruff@(b)(6)

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From: (b)(6) LTC OSD PA
Sent: Monday, May 22, 2006 4:05 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: Transcript

Sir,

I saw you on (b)(6) distro for the Military Analysts transcript you asked me for.

R/

(b)(6)
LTC, US Army
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
The Pentagon, Room (b)(2)
Washington, DC 20301-1400

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, May 22, 2006 3:46 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: Smith, Dorrance Hon OSD PA; Whitman, Bryan Mr OSD PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; Thorp, Frank, RDML, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC OSD PA; (b)(6)
(b)(6) (b)(6)
(b)(6) (b)(6)
Subject: transcript - Rodman China report
Attachments: 05-22-06 China Rodman.doc



05-22-06 China
Rodman.doc (58 ...)

Attached is the transcript from this morning's conference call with Mr. Peter Rodman and the military analysts regarding the 2006 China Military Report.

As you announced, the call was on background and the information is embargoed until 1500 Tuesday.

Transcript:

Peter Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Monday, May 22, 2006

Host: (b)(6) OSD-Public Affairs

OSD-Public Affairs staff: LTC (b)(6)

Trancriber: (b)(5) (digital)

Room: (b)(2)

Topic: 2006 China Military Report

On Background

(b)(6) We are going to go ahead and get started. I will just remind you quickly we are on background so you are free to quote a senior DoD official. All of the information that you get here today we ask that you embargo until 1500 tomorrow. So with that I am going to go ahead and turn it over to the assistant secretary of defense, Peter Rodman.

Mr. Rodman: Good morning. Good morning and thank you for coming in, or tuning in, or whatever the phrase is. I think you are familiar with the origins of this report. I'll just say a brief word about that and then secondly, what we think some of the highlights are. And I think we should try to get – well we don't post, I guess we won't post the full text.

LTC (b)(6) Sir, it will be an active link on it tomorrow morning, or tomorrow afternoon.

Mr. Rodman: Okay. But anyway, you know, this is a congressional mandate. We have done this every year for a number of years. And the Congress asks us a number of questions about China's not only China's military programs but its long-term strategy. So the report, as in past years, has a lot of discussion about the underlying factors in China's military policy and so it ranges – you know, it isn't just nuts and bolts. It's about strategy, it's about economic factors, a little bit about political context, and so forth.

The – I would mention before I get into this report a couple of important quotes in some other reports. The president's National Security Strategy Report in March had a very important sentence in it about hedging. You may remember that sentence. (")Our strategy seeks to encourage China to make the right strategic choices for its people while we hedge against other possibilities.(") That's from the president's National Security Strategy Report, and that pretty well encapsulates what our strategy toward China is. We try to put a constructive – we try to shape developments in a constructive direction but obviously, particularly in this department, our job is to watch closely what China is doing, and to be the one to be prepared to do what's necessary to carry out our commitments in the Asia-Pacific region. And part of that task is to watch closely what China is doing.

The QDR (Quadrennial Defense Review) also had an important discussion about China, and it talked about China having the greatest potential to compete militarily with the U.S., and to field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages. That's the QDR in February. You may have copies of that.

So that gets us into the subject here, which is what China is doing. That's – I can now get into some of the specific highlights. A lot of what's in the report is not new, because a lot of what we're talking about has been a trend that we have spotted in previous reports. But some of the things that we highlighted in this report are China's strategic forces modernization.

We've mentioned this before, it's not brand new; but it's something that we are really commenting on that I think we should call your attention to. There are at least 10 varieties of ballistic missiles deployed or in development – at least 10 varieties of ballistic missiles either deployed or being developed. We see qualitative improvements as well as quantitative improvements. So, you know, the qualitative improvements include improved range, mobility and accuracy. You know,

ICBMs, for example, are the most advanced, they're solid fuel road mobile ICBMs that can reach the United States.

Again, this is not new, but we're struck by the strength of these programs. Shorter range missiles opposite of Taiwan – they have continued to build about 100 new ones a year, and so the total is up, you know, close to 800. That again is not new, but it's just inexorably growing, that missile force opposite Taiwan, about 100 a year.

We see very capable cruise missiles, land attack cruise missiles and anti-ship weapons. Again, it's not new, but we are, you know, calling attention to some of these developments and these are giving the Chinese new options. Five submarine programs, five different submarine acquisition programs.

Now what does this mean strategically? Well, we see a number of things. We see, as we mentioned last year, a lot of these things are – they go beyond Taiwan in their significance. It's obvious that much of China's military development is focused on a Taiwan contingency. But we see both in their statements by some of their strategists and in some of their procurement that China is beginning to develop – again, I emphasize beginning – to think in terms of it to develop the capability to project power. They're only at the beginning of it, but I think this seems to be part of their long-range intention. And this could relate to contingencies – for example related to resources or territorial disputes, of which there are many in the region.

So, again, this is worth noting. We have noted it before but it continues to be worth noting.

Another issue – well, another issue we've called attention to before is about their use of nuclear weapons. There seems to be a debate going on about the no first-use doctrine. The Chinese say that they're committed to a doctrine of no first-use weapons, but we've seen a few stray comments by more than one strategic thinker calling this in to question. Now, they have reassured us, I repeat – when Secretary Rumsfeld was there, he was reassured by the Chinese that they adhere to the no first-use doctrine, and we take them at their word. But they say there is – we see these occasional comments as an indication of a possible debate that is going on among Chinese strategists and we think it is worth of note that there may be this debate going on.

But the issue gets to another big issue about transparency, which is how we often state our concern. China is a sovereign country, it has a right to build up its defense capability as it chooses, but the lack of transparency is clearly a concern for not only us, but China's neighbors.

This lack of transparency is reflected in a number of things; we talk in this report as in the past about the defense budget. We think their defense budget understates their real defense spending by a factor of two or three. In other words, their real defense programs are we think two or three times what their declared defense budget is because of --probably because of different accounting methods, probably because a lot of things -- they just do not include a lot of their research and development, a lot of their foreign purchases, they just don't include in their defense budget. But in any case the lack of transparency adds to the concern of China's neighbors.

Another aspect of this is a surprise factor. We mention in this report, as in the past, that every once in a while we encounter a new program of theirs that we didn't know about. You know, a new submarine or some program that, you know, has reached a mature stage that we just didn't know about. And that's a concern, obviously. And that is a continuing concern, and that is mentioned in this report.

Another problem is we worry about the dangers of miscalculation. I mean it's – we don't want to overestimate Chinese capability, we don't want to underestimate Chinese capability. And we don't want them to make a misjudgment, you know, to overestimate their capability. And so, you know, one of our objectives of our military exchanges with China is to try to illuminate a little more what they're up to, get them to disclose more of what they are thinking. They publish a white

paper every couple of years, which is a step forward, but it's not anything like what we do. I mean, we have our QDR for example, as well as, you know, every year, SecDef goes and testifies. We are incredibly transparent about our assumptions, our planning, our strategies, you know, as well as the procurement that supports those.

And Taiwan, by the way, came up with a recent with a recent statement that their national security strategy which – again, reflects the fact that it's a government accountable to a legislature and – but the Chinese have – are only at the beginning of, you know, disclosing what their real thinking is, and that, as I say, is the problem.

We are concerned about the specifics of their build up, but as I said, the lack of transparency gives a whole new dimension to the problem.

I would mention just a couple – well, a couple of other nuggets in the report. There's a famous quotation from Deng Xiao Ping -- this is in previous reports -- it's called the 24-character strategy. And it's a maxim of his that goes back about 15 years but – it has been often quoted by senior Chinese strategists. And it's about – you may have seen it before, but I'll read it again. (")Observe calmly, secure our position, cope with affairs calmly, hide our capacities and bide our time. Be good at maintaining a low profile, and never claim leadership(").

The phrase that strikes me of course is hide our capacities and bide our time. I think this encapsulates what China's strategy is – they're very patient, they know their weaknesses. And our report, by the way, is very clear about China's weaknesses; we're not trying to portray them as 10 feet tall.

But the Chinese are – seem to be aware of their limitations, but they are patiently and systematically building up their options so that five years from now, 10 years from now, they will have significant options that they don't have now. And that the balance of forces may be shifting if we are not careful to be, you know, to respond in our own planning.

So I think the Chinese have a strategy. They talk about comprehensive national power. You know, there's a debate in the west – oh, are they focusing on economic development versus military. Well, in a way they are doing all of the above. Clearly their economic growth is the foundation of everything else and their defense budget – their declared defense budget is rising faster than their GDP. They recently announced 14.7 increase in their defense budget. And that's a lot more than their economic growth rate, and that also reflects a recent trend. So they are modernizing their military rapidly, systematically. It certainly lacks – there are a lot of things they can't do. Their power projection capability is very, very limited right now. And again, we are very aware of China's weaknesses and China's vulnerabilities. But they have a patient long-term strategy and I think we have to recognize that.

Anyway, let me stop there, and I am happy to answer some questions.

Q: Mr. Rodman, Jed Babbin, American Spectator.

Mr. Rodman: Jed, how are you?

Q: Well, not bad for a grumpy old guy. Hope you're well. The issue that pops into my head is the question of Taiwan's investment in their own defense. The last I heard the legislative yuan (juan? Taiwanese legislature?) had turned down the appropriations for the 2001 arms package 50-some odd times. Is there any change in that or any change or modification or spending?

Rodman: Well, you're absolutely right to raise that. We discuss that in this report, at least to some degree it's clear that if it doesn't get serious about national defense and the balance of forces it's going to tilt even more radically. We had a – well, first of all the Chinese issued their – I mean the

Taiwanese issued their – the government issued its own national security report, which is a good thing. And we hope that there's a serious national debate beginning in Taiwan.

The government has committed itself to a three percent – a three percent of GDP by 2008. In other words, whatever happens to the special budget – you know, whether it's done by special budget or just the regular defense budget, (Taiwanese) President Chen has said that they ought to be spending three percent of GDP on defense. The mayor of Taiwan was in this country a few weeks back and Mayor Ma, he's the mayor of Taipei. And we had a chance to talk to him about this – you know the KMT (Kuomintang), the opposition party has to be serious about defense. I mean, we just indicated, you know, without taking any sides in their politics that the United States as a friend, you know, expects them to be carrying a significant load for their own self defense, and he said he agrees with that, and he said it's, you know, at some point as his party or his campaign, you know – as his campaign develops that he'll come out with his own defense program. And we certainly emphasize what the American view is and as I say he may -- he gave us some reassurance, and we just hope that will be reflected. You know they, you know, there ought to be a national consensus in Taiwan about facing up to the threat that they face. And we'll see, we'll see how it unfolds, but at least we delivered the message – we deliver the message to both sides, you know, to both parties or both the major parties whenever we get a chance.

(b)(6) Gentlemen, any other questions for Mr. Rodman?

Q: Well, if nobody else is going to jump in, let me jump back in.

Mr. Rodman: Please.

Q: A couple of things that struck me in last year's report. Again, their dedication to asymmetric weapons such as anti-satellite weapons, cyberwarfare and so forth.

Mr. Rodman: Yes.

Q: Is there any change in your assessment from last year or, and if so, what is it?

Mr. Rodman: No – well, they're highlighted again, both of those things. So you're right, we don't have a concrete development to point to except they're among the developments that we highlight. They're still working on those things.

I mean a lot of things – I mean the report is – every year a lot of it is not new, a lot of it is cumulative information, but as I say, there's a section that highlights what some of the new developments are, at least the highlights that we think are worth pointing to, and those things – cyberwarfare, anti-satellite, R&D, they're still in there.

Q: Don't mean to just dominate the whole conversation, but in terms of Adm. Fallon's (PACOM commander) visit a week or so ago, he was, I think doing what you suggest needs to be done, trying to leverage them into being a little bit more open. Is that having an effect, do you notice an effect on the openness question?

Mr. Rodman: Well we – it's incremental. When Secretary Rumsfeld was there in October, we visited the 2nd artillery headquarters. And that was a bit of a breakthrough. And we had their command brief and they didn't disclose a whole lot, but it was an interesting contact. And we have now, we have invited – you know, that's their missile forces -- and we invited the commander to visit STATCOM, to come to the U.S. as a guest of STRATCOM, and they have accepted that invitation. When Hu Jintao was here they let us know.

So that's an interesting contact. We want to continue -- develop a dialogue with them about strategic contact and so forth; you know, the no first use issue, or any other issue. So that's

useful. You know, we're always pressing to see new places, we're always making that point we're -- you know, we're trying to invite interesting Chinese here.

Another focus is junior officers -- educational exchanges. It's something that President Bush is particularly interested in. And we think we're making some headway in some of these areas. Secretary Rumsfeld talks about, you know, demystifying each other. You know, we don't want to exaggerate this because, you know, there are some laws of geopolitics that aren't going to be repealed here, but it certainly helps if more Chinese younger officers get some exposure to us and vice versa. So we think we're making some headway in doing that since Secretary Rumsfeld's trip there.

Q: Last question for me then I'll shut up. There's -- one of the things that I think came up in a previous conversation we had was your statement, or words to the effect, that one of the principal lessons of Mr. Rumsfeld's visit was that we could have, I think you said, very candid discussions with the Chinese and it wouldn't blunt the relationship. Is that still true? And who is having very frank talks with these guys?

Mr. Rodman: Well, the president raised a lot of these issues when he saw Hu Jintao. I am going over there in early June for our defense consultative talks and we -- these are high-level strategic discussions and we talk about everything. And, you know, I am not going to be inhibited about raising questions about things they do that are disturbing.

But I think you are absolutely right, when Secretary Rumsfeld was there in both his public remarks and private remarks, you know, he listed things they are doing that are disturbing, and you know, not in a lecturing way but in a very calm way, and, you know, they are perfectly able to debate. But I think that is the right tone for a discussion.

Q: Thank you very much.

(b)(6) Gentlemen, any other questions for the secretary?

Mr. Rodman: Let me mention one other small thing. It's not in the news right now. This is the EU arms embargo and we discuss this and this report as before. The Europeans have backed away from, you know, the attempt to lift their arms embargo. Now, they haven't killed this, but it hasn't -- has not been a live issue for them, and we hope it won't be. We have not changed our position that we would strongly oppose it.

Similarly with Israel. We've had more successful discussions with the Israelis to shut down their arms trade with China. We think we've reached a good understanding with them. And then finally we've put this on the agenda of our discussions with the Russians, who are the -- of course, the biggest source of weapons.

But the importance of the European embargo is that the Chinese, we expect, would seek technology, dual-use technology in Europe, things they could not they could not get from the Russians. And we are convinced that the Chinese would exploit any opening very effectively and, you know, their technological development is their focus, and we would, you know, not want the Europeans to be contributing to that.

But anyway, the good news there is the Europeans have -- yeah, it's software -- I think what they would get from the Europeans is not, you know, jet fighters but dual-use technologies of different kinds that would help them qualitatively upgrade. But anyway, the good news is that the Europeans have backed off. I mean, our president made a very strong -- began a strong campaign last year, and the Europeans seem to have backed away. But, anyway, we reiterate in this report our strong feelings on that matter.

Anything else?

(b)(6) Okay. Gentlemen, thank you very much for joining us. We appreciate your time.

Q: Thank you very much.

(b)(6) If you have follow-up questions, please don't hesitate to email me as always and we'll get some documents out to you over email.

Q: Let's have another one of these when Mr. Rodman gets back from his June trip.

Mr. Rodman: Okay.

(b)(6) Okay, great. All right gentlemen, have a good day.

Q: Good bye.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, May 22, 2006 3:15 PM
To: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Subject: Fwd: Re: Who's who in Iraq's new cabinet?

What the hell is (b)(6) doing?

--- (b)(6)
wrote:

> From: (b)(6)
> To: (b)(6)
> (b)(6)
> "Goodwin Robert SES SAF/MRM"
> <Robert.Goodwin@(b)(6)>
> (b)(6)

> "dallaslawrence"
> <dallaslawrence@(b)(6)> "Dan Senor"
> <dansenor@(b)(6)>

> (b)(6)

> (b)(6)
> Date: Mon, 22 May 2006 17:13:07 +0000
> Subject: Re: Who's who in Iraq's new cabinet?

> We always pay taxes its the only way to rebuild this country
> everything is respected here specifically the black Mombos and other
> killer snakes chillin in the bush.
> In future please dont make comments like that on a mass mail. Conflict
> diamonds are highly illegal and unethical not to mention you cheat the
> future of a country.
> I hope your child is doing well send my regards to your lovely wife.

> (b)(6)
>
>

> > -----Original Message

> > From: (b)(6)

> > (b)(6)

> > Sent: Monday, May 22, 2006 05:05 PM

> > To: (b)(6)

> > (b)(6)

> > 'Goodwin Robert SES SAF/MRM', (b)(6)

> > 'dallaslawrence',

> > 'Dan Senor', (b)(6)

> > (b)(6)

> > Subject: Re: Who's who in Iraq's new cabinet?

> > Conflict diamonds?

> > --- (b)(6) wrote:

> > > Thank you (b)(6) this is quite interesting. It looks

> > > as if everyones hardwork and sacrifice is starting

> > > to come to fruition. Glad to see everyone still keeps in touch.

> > > I want to wish you all greetings from the Central

> > > African Republic capital Bangui. I am living here

> > > now as the company I started is busy mining commodities here. I live 2 weeks at a time in

> > > the jungle it is quite an experience. Central Africa has

> > > similarities to Iraq, accept much safer and everyone

> > > speaks French.

> > > I hope you are all doing well, please keep in touch.

> > > Best,

> > > AP

> > > www.caiww.com

> > > Website UNDER CONSTRUCTION PLEASE CHECK BACK OFTEN

> > > FOR PHOTOS

> > > -----Original Message-----

> > > From: (b)(6)

> > > [mailto:

> > > Sent: Monday, May 22, 2006 04:27 PM

> > > To: (b)(6) 'Goodwin Robert SES SAF/MRM',

> > > (b)(6)

> > > (b)(6) 'dallaslawrence', 'Dan Senor',

> > > (b)(6)

(b)(6)

> > > Subject: Re: Who's who in Iraq's new cabinet?

> > > What about a minister for food, so that tabs
> can
> be kept on the chicken Gordon blew?

> > > I hear it is starting to get a big head and
> > feeling very self important.

> > > (b)(6)
> > > National Association of Realtors

> > > (b)(2)

> > > ----- Original Message -----

> > > From: (b)(6)
> > > Sent: 05/22/2006 11:23 AM
> > > To: Goodwin Robert SES SAF/MRM
> > > <Robert.Goodwin@(b)(6)>

(b)(6)

> > > dallaslawrence@(b)(6) dansenor@(b)(6) (b)(6)

> > (b)(6)

> > > Subject: Re: Who's who in Iraq's new cabinet?

> > > I know this may come as a surprise, but I'm up
> for
> > Minister of Sun Tanning.....I'm kind of a big
> deal
> > out here.

> > > Goodwin Robert SES SAF/MRM
> > > <Robert.Goodwin@(b)(6)> wrote:
> > > I heard (b)(6) is being considered for
> > > Interior.

> > > Robert J. Goodwin, DAS, USAF
> > > Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

> > > -----Original Message-----

> > > From: (b)(6)
> > > To: Al Elsadr ; (b)(6) (personal) ;

> (b)(6)

> > > (b)(6) (personal) ; (b)(6) (personal) ; (b)(6) (personal)
> > > ; Goodwin Robert SES SAF/MRM; (b)(6) (personal)
> > > ; (b)(6)
> > > ; (b)(6) (personal) ; (b)(6)
> (b)(6)
> > > (personal) ; Dallas Lawrence (personal) ; Dan
> Senior
> > > (b)(6)
> > > (b)(6) (personal) ; (b)(6) (personal) ; (b)(6)
> > >
> ;
> > > (b)(6) (personal) ; (b)(6) (work) ;
> (b)(6)
> > > (b)(6) (personal) ; (b)(6)
> > > ; (b)(6) (work) ; (b)(6) (personal) ;
> (b)(6)
> > > (b)(6) (work) ; (b)(6) (personal) ;
> > >
> > > (b)(6) (personal) ; (b)(6)
> > > (personal)
> > > Sent: Mon May 22 11:05:15 2006
> > > Subject: FW: Who's who in Iraq's new cabinet?
> > >
> > > FYI, for those who haven't seen the list.
> > >
> > > you'll be glad to know (b)(6) is not on the
> list.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > NOURI MALIKI (SHIA) - PM & ACTING INTERIOR
> > > MINISTER
> > >
> > > Mr. Maliki is a stalwart of the Dawa party,
> the
> > > Shia political group that for years led an armed underground
> > > resistance to the secular Baathist leadership of Saddam Hussein.
> > > Mr. Maliki fled
> the
> > > country in 1980 and eventually finding refuge in Syria, returning
> > > after Saddam Hussein's
> > > overthrow.
> > >
> > > BARHAM SALIH (KURD) - DEPUTY PM & ACTING
> NATIONAL
> > > SECURITY MINISTER
> > >
> > > An official of President Jalal Talabani's
> > > Patriotic Union of Kurdistan since 1998, Mr
> Salih
> > > became prime minister of the PUK-led regional government in
> > > January 2001. He survived an assassination attempt at his home in
> > > April 2002.
> He
> > > joined the Iraqi transitional government in June
> > > 2004 as deputy prime minister for security
> affairs.
> > >
> > > SALAM ZIKAM AL-ZUBAIE (SUNNI) - DEPUTY PM &
> ACTING
> > > DEFENCE MINISTER
> > >
> > > Mr. Zubaie's political group is part of the
> main
> > > Sunni coalition, the Iraqi Accordance Front.
> > > Although from a well-known tribe, he has not
> been

> > > high profile. He heads the Agriculture Engineers Union.
> > >
> > > HUSSAIN AL-SHAHRISTANI (SHIA) - OIL MINISTER
> > >
> > > > Dr. Hussein Shahrستاني, a Shia nuclear
> scientist,
> > > was once director of research at the Iraqi
> Atomic
> > > Energy Commission. Whilst director he was
> imprisoned
> > > for possessing a subversive leaflet condemning
> the
> > > repression of Iraqi Shias. He fled Iraq in 1991 after being
> > > imprisoned for refusing to work in Saddam Hussein's nuclear
> > > programme and worked
> for
> > > human rights organisations in Iran and London thereafter..
> > >
> > > HOSHIYAR ZEBARI (KURD) - FOREIGN MINISTER
> > >
> > > > Mr. Zebari was the foreign spokesman for the
> > > Kurdistan Democratic Party for more than 10
> years.
> > > He frequently represented the KDP in meetings
> with
> > > US State Department officials throughout the
> 1990s.
> > > He was born in 1953 in the Kurdish town of
> Aqrah,
> > > but grew up in the mainly Arab city of Mosul. He
> is
> > > a graduate of the University of Essex in the UK.
> > >
> > > > HASHIM AL-SHEBLI (SUNNI) - JUSTICE MINISTER
> > >
> > > > Previously appointed human rights minister, he
> > > rejected the post after being approved by
> parliament
> > > on 8 May, saying he had not been consulted.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > > OTHER MINISTERS
> > >
> > > > Ali al-Shemari (Shia) - Health minister Khudayer al-Khuzai
> > > > (Shia) - Education
> minister
> > > > Bayan Jabr (Shia) - Finance minister Abed Falah al-Sudani (Shia)
> > > > - Trade minister Karim Waheed (Shia) - Electricity minister
> > > > Fawzi al-Hariri (Kurd) - Industry minister Latif Rashid (Kurd) -
> > > > Water resources minister Bayan Dazee (Kurd) - Housing and
> > > > construction
> > > > minister
> > > > Yarrub Nazim (Shia) - Agriculture minister Abed Theyab (Sunni) -
> > > > Higher education
> minister
> > > > Karim Mahdi (Shia) - Transport minister Abdul-Samad Rahman
> > > > (Shia) - Migration minister Adel al-Assadi (Shia) - Minister of
> > > > state for
> > > > civil society affairs
> > > > Safa al-Safi (Shia) - Minister of state for
> House
> > > > of Representatives' affairs
> > > > Jassim Mohammed Jaafar (Shia) - Youth and
> sports
> > > > minister
> > > > Liwa Semeism (Shia) - Minister of state for

> > > tourism
> > === message truncated ===
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, May 22, 2006 10:11 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: Re: Conference call CANCELLED

Actually, they turned it back on. Rodman wanted to go ahead after all. Only have babbin and greer on the line..... No idea why he wanted to have it anyway.

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Mon May 22 10:08:44 2006
Subject: Re: Conference call CANCELLED

What's behind this? Think it's the right way to go, given travel. Thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Mon May 22 09:25:15 2006
Subject: FW: Conference call CANCELLED

Gentlemen,

We are unable to hold the conference call this morning. I apologize for the inconvenience and will let you know if we are able to reschedule it.
Thanks for your flexibility,

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, May 19, 2006 4:51 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Conference call on Monday

MEMORANDUM

To: Retired Military Analysts

From: Dallas Lawrence

Director, Community Relations and Public Liaison

Date: May 19, 2006

Re: Conference Call with Senior DoD Officials

We invite you to participate in a conference call, MONDAY, May 22, 2006, from 9:45-10:30 a.m.

The Honorable Peter Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, will brief you on the 2006 China Military Report. Mr. Rodman's Biography can be found at: http://www.defenselink.mil/bios/rodman_bio.html. This call will be on Background. In order to participate in the call you must agree to EMBARGO the information until 3:00 PM TUESDAY, MAY 23, 2006.

To participate in this conference call, please dial (b)(2) or (b)(2) and ask the operator to connect you to the Analysts conference call.

Please R.S.V.P. to (b)(6) or call her at (b)(2)

We hope you are able to participate.

(b)(6)
OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison
(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301
(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, May 22, 2006 9:25 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: Conference call CANCELLED

Attachments: att6cc05.gif



att6cc05.gif (8 KB)

Gentlemen,

We are unable to hold the conference call this morning. I apologize for the inconvenience and will let you know if we are able to reschedule it.
Thanks for your flexibility,

(b)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, May 19, 2006 4:51 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Conference call on Monday

MEMORANDUM

To: Retired Military Analysts

From: Dallas Lawrence

Director, Community Relations and Public Liaison

Date: May 19, 2006

Re: Conference Call with Senior DoD Officials

We invite you to participate in a conference call, **MONDAY, May 22, 2006, from 9:45-10:30 a.m.**

The Honorable Peter Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, will brief you on the 2006 China Military Report. Mr. Rodman's Biography can be found at: http://www.defenselink.mil/bios/rodman_bio.html. This call will be on Background. In order to participate in the call you must agree to EMBARGO the information until 3:00 PM TUESDAY, MAY 23, 2006.

To participate in this conference call, please dial (b)(2) and ask the operator to connect you to the Analysts conference call.

Please R.S.V.P. to (b)(6) or call her at (b)(2)

We hope you are able to participate.

(b)(6)
OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison
(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301
(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, May 22, 2006 8:39 AM
To: (b)(6), CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Military Analysts

How many do we have?

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
To: (b)(6) CDR, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC OSD PA
CC: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Sent: Mon May 22 07:17:16 2006
Subject: Re: Military Analysts

i've learned over the weekend that quite a few of the analysts are at a conference in europe and won't be able to participate in the conference call. suggest we might postpone, and/or send the report to them with talking points via email. please advise.
thx,

(b)

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@(b)(6)
Sent: Monday, May 22, 2006 8:21 AM
To: tmcinerney@(b)(6); paulvalley@(b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: China's Chavez: Today's Spectator

Americans are suffering a new disorder: news induced numbness. But there's no time to nap. China is up to a lot of no good.

The American Spectator

Jed Babbin

(b)(6) (home office)
(b)(6) (home fax)
(b)(6) (mobile)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) LTC OSD PA
Sent: Monday, May 22, 2006 7:54 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CDR, OASD-PA
Cc: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Military Analysts

(b)(6) Let's go with who we have and send information to the ones who cannot make the conference call.
Thanks,

(b)(6)
LTC, US Army
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs The Pentagon, (b)(2)
Washington, DC 20301-1400
(b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, May 22, 2006 7:17 AM
To: (b)(6) CDR, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC OSD PA
Cc: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Military Analysts

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To: (b)(6) CDR, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC OSD PA
Cc: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
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thx,

(b)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, May 22, 2006 6:40 AM
To: (b)(6) Barber, Allison,
CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6) Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD; (b)(6) DuBois, Ray F Acting
Under Secretary of the Army (USA); DVI COMCAM; (b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6) Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA;
Lessel Erwin F III Brig Gen SAF/CM; (b)(6)
(b)(6) Merritt, Roxie, AFIS-HQ; 'MLA dd-OASD-PA AFIS'; MLA dd-OASD-PA PA-
(b)(b)(6)
(b)(
Smith, Dorrance Hon OSD PA; (b)(6)
(b)(6) Thorp, Frank, RDML, OASD-PA; (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: Morning Report
Attachments: (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA.vcf

PUBLIC AFFAIRS MORNING REPORT – 22 May 06

Issues for the Day

Formation of the Iraqi Government
U.S. Missile Sites in Europe
China Military Power Report

Public Affairs Events

- Conference: Defense Senior Public Affairs Leadership Conference beginning @ 0715 in room (b)(2)
- Interview: Mr. Peter Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, will discuss the annual China Military Power report with Jay Solomon (Wall Street Journal) @ 0900
- Interview: Mr. Peter Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, will discuss the annual China Military Power report with Military Analysts @ 0945
- Interview: Ms. Nancy Weaver, Director of the Defense Foreign Language Office, with the Pentagon Channel on foreign language proficiency pay @ 1100
- Interview: Mr. Peter Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, will discuss the annual China Military Power report with Ann Scott-Tyson (Washington Post) @ 1115
- Interview: Ms. Allison Barber, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Community Relations and Public Liaison with VFW National Defense Radio on America Supports You @ 1640

The White House

President Bush

11:35 a.m. Delivers remarks on the Global War on Terror at Chicago, Ill.

Congress

Senate

Nothing Significant to Report

House

No Scheduled Events

General

6 p.m. The DOD-sponsored Third "Energy Conservation about Our National Addiction" will focus on the hydrogen economy. Contact: (b)(2)

(b)(6)

Captain (b)(6)
Military Assistant to the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Public Affairs
1400 Defense Pentagon (b)(2)
Washington, DC 20301-1400

(b)(2)



(b)(6)

Capt. USMC, OASD.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD-LA
Sent: Friday, May 19, 2006 8:11 PM
To:
Subject: Re: Conference call on Monday

With everything else going on the oversight committees don't seem interested. (b)(6) told me that himself. I conveyed this to General Allen in Policy tonight. Will try again on Monday.

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
To: (b)(6) CIV, OSD-LA
Sent: Fri May 19 19:48:05 2006
Subject: Fw: Conference call on Monday

(b)(6) is there any urgency to get the china rpt briefed on the hill on monday? Recall from roundtable that we discussed w/e edelman the idea that we may want to hold this a few days b/c of iraq events.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Sent: Fri May 19 18:57:03 2006
Subject: Re: Conference call on Monday

Ok. Will wait for further guidance from you. I would offer, tho, that it's going to the hill, regardless of if we have a call on it, I presume. We may want to brief them anyway so that if asked they're still smart on it..... All of this may be moot, however, as I've had exactly zero positive rsvp's. I'm assuming babbin will be interested, but am doubtful we'll get much more than him.

Thx

(b)

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Fri May 19 18:49:33 2006
Subject: RE: Conference call on Monday

we may want to hold this a day or two. this briefing will be part of a p/a plan, i guess. there may be some interest in keeping china of the screen while folks try to talk more about the standing up of the iraqi gov't. the call can always be resked but don't do anything yet. obviously there needs to be some discussion with peter and policy. thanks.

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, May 19, 2006 4:51 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Conference call on Monday

MEMORANDUM

To: Retired Military Analysts

From: Dallas Lawrence
Director, Community Relations and Public Liaison

Date: May 19, 2006

Re: Conference Call with Senior DoD Officials

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Please R.S.V.P. to (b)(6) or call her at (b)(2)

We hope you are able to participate.

(b)(6)
OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison
(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301
(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, May 19, 2006 6:57 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: Re: Conference call on Monday

Ok. Will wait for further guidance from you. I would offer, tho, that it's going to the hill, regardless of if we have a call on it, I presume. We may want to brief them anyway so that if asked they're still smart on it..... All of this may be moot, however, as I've had exactly zero positive rsvp's. I'm assuming babbins will be interested, but am doubtful we'll get much more than him.

Thx

(b)(6)

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From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Fri May 19 18:49:33 2006
Subject: RE: Conference call on Monday

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(b)(6)
OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison
(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301
(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: Paul Vallely [paulvallely@(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, May 19, 2006 6:42 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Conference call on Monday

Dallas (b)(6) Thanks for the heads up. Gen. McInerney and I will be in France meeting the some of the leadership of the Iranian dissident groups, May 21-26th. Hopefully, we will have a good report for you. Should be interesting.

Paul E Vallely
paulvallely@(b)(6)
www.soldiersmemorialfund.org

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, May 19, 2006 2:51 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Conference call on Monday

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Director, Community Relations and Public Liaison

Date: May 19, 2006

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We hope you are able to participate.

(b)(6)
OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison
(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301
(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, May 19, 2006 4:51 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Conference call on Monday

Attachments: att6cc05.gif



att6cc05.gif (8 KB)

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(b)(6)
OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison
(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301
(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) TSgt OSD PA
Sent: Friday, May 19, 2006 12:21 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Cc: (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Sgt OSD PA
Subject: Jed Babbin called at 1218. Subj: your latest email. (b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@NYA
Sent: Friday, May 19, 2006 10:43 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: Haditha

Is anything releasable? Can't beat something with nothing. But you knew that.

Jed Babbin

(b)(2) (home office)
(home fax)
(mobile)

(b)(6)

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, May 18, 2006 4:34 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: mil analyst call

Let's give it a shot.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
To: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
CC: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thu May 18 16:21:37 2006
Subject: mil analyst call

hi. ltc (b)(6) just advised that rodman would like to do a call on monday with the analysts re. the china military report. i know that jed babbin will be all over it, but not sure how much more interest we will get. more than happy to set it up with your ok. will send out the invite tomorrow and then remind them on monday morning?
thanks

(b)(6)

(b)(6)
OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison
(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@**(b)(6)**
Sent: Thursday, May 18, 2006 7:50 AM
To: tmcinerney@**(b)(6)** paulvalley@**(b)(6)** nashct@**(b)(6)**
(b)(6) **(b)(6)**
Subject: Today's RCP: The Base vs. Bush

This isn't a pretty picture, but it's the reality we face. My new column in RealClearPolitics.com began today. I'll begin as a biweekly, and may go to a weekly later.

[RealClearPolitics - Articles - The Base vs. Bush](#)

Jed Babbin
(b)(2) (Home Office)
(Fax)
(Mobile)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) TSgt, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, May 16, 2006 2:59 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: Jed Babbitt called. Subj: New Column. (b)(2)

(b)(6) TSgt, USAF
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
Public Affairs

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@**(b)(6)**
Sent: Monday, May 15, 2006 8:14 AM
To: tmcinerney@**(b)(6)** paulvalley@**(b)(6)** nashct@**(b)(6)**
(b)(6) **(b)(6)**

Subject: The producers of intelligence - Today's Spectator

I am, regretfully, concluding that Mr. Bush's presidency, like Mr. Blair's prime ministership, is over in all but name.

The American Spectator

Jed Babbin

(b)(6) (home office)
(b)(6) (home fax)
(b)(6) (mobile)

(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD
Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2006 10:44 AM
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; Smith, Dorrance, CIV, OSD
Subject: FW: Email making the rounds...

Fyi, this is the e-mail exchange I had with Galloway that's making the circuit. I imagine it'll leech into the press at some point. Looks like General McCaffrey may be stoking it a bit; I have gotten the exchange from a few people and it always includes that Barry McCaffrey lede.

Ugh.

From: BARRY MCCAFFREY [mailto:b.r.mccaffrey@**(b)(6)**]
Sent: Sunday, May 07, 2006 8:49 PM
To: Undisclosed-Recipient;
Subject: EMAIL Exchange---- noted Author and Journalist Joe Galloway (We Were Soldiers Once and Young) -----and Rumsfeld DOD PR Rep Larry DaRita

Ã

DaRita No. 1:

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD [mailto:larry.dirita@**(b)(6)**]
Sent: Friday, April 28, 2006 6:58 AM
To: Galloway, Joe
Subject:

Your column about Gen Van Riper is just silly, Joe.Ã To tag the Secretary of Defense with being responsible for every sparrow that falls out of every tree is just ludicrous.

General Kernan, who was commander of the Joint Forces Command when Van Riper's wargame occurred, had very pointed things to say about Van Riper when Van Riper made his first notoriety on this whole thing.

To tag Rumsfeld with a wargame when there were about three or four layers of the chain of command between Rumsfeld and the wargamers just misunderstands the way the world works.

Let's at least be honest about this: there is a lot of change taking place, and that change forces people to re-examine the way we have always done things.Ã That is bumpy, and that can make people anxious.

I don't have any idea what might have happened in Van Riper's experience with this wargame, but to blame the Secretary of Defense for it just sounds crazy.

You talk about "Rumsfeld's fondest ideas and theories" as if you have the first clue as to what those are.Ã I have worked with him side-by-side for five years, and I wouldn't even try to divine what his fondest ideas and theories are.

The debate about defense transformation was going on long before Rumsfeld showed up at the Pentagon.Ã I'd wager that the war game Van Riper was so offended by probably began in planning before Rumsfeld showed up.

Van Riper has never even met the Secretary to my knowledge.Ã For him to make such sweeping comments as he did in your piece is just irresponsible.

As a journalist, don't you think you owe it to your readers to challenge when people say things like that as though they have firsthand knowledge. Also, you ought to talk with Buck Kernan, who commanded JFCOM at the time.

You're just becoming a johnny one-note and it's only a couple of steps from that to curmudgeon!!

Best....

From galloway in response to DaRita No. 1:

larry:

i am delighted that folks over in OSD continue to read my columns with great attention. Who knows, it might make a difference one day.
i've always understood that the guy in charge takes the fall for everything that goes wrong on his watch. this is why the u.s. navy court martials the captain of any ship that is involved in an accident or is sunk for whatever reason.
this is why a President, Harry Truman, always kept a sign on his desk in the oval office that said simply: The Buck Stops Here. trouble with this administration is the buck never stops anywhere, on anybody's desk. Â Â Â Â "victory has many fathers; defeat is an orphan" --Count Ciano, Mussolini's son-in-law in 1945

Last I knew Mr. Rumsfeld was the Secretary of Defense. His is the ultimate responsibility. And I am damned if I can understand how you could work for the man for as long as you have without knowing what he likes and doesn't like in the way of strategy and tactics and fighting wars.

In the meantime, I hope you will take note of the fact that throughout the discussion of this and other columns with you I have never once implied that you were "silly" or "crazy" or "ludicrous" or even a "johnny one-note." I will be leaving this town in three weeks, Larry, and there's a lot of people and places I will miss. You aren't exactly at the top of that list.}

Joe Galloway

Darita No. 2:

That's not what you're describing, though, in your van riper piece.Â

I also served long enough to know that officers who hide behind anonymity and complain to you and other journalists about what they don't like are causing great harm to the institutions they serve and to the country.

Anyway, I think your columns have been representative of a school of thought within military circles that I don't believe is particularly widespread.Â

The army is so much more capable and suitable for the nation's needs that it was 5 or 10 years ago.Â To my mind, the voices your columns represent missed the forest for the trees.Â

I regret you took offense at our exchanges.Â Apparently people can tell a journalist the most damnable things about rumsfeld or myers or franks or the president and it's okay, but a little feisty email exchange in response you find offensive!!

Best wishes.

Galloway Response to DaRita No. 2:

Subj: Re:Â
Date: 5/3/2006 4:56:42 PM Eastern Daylight Time
From: Jlgalloway2
To: larry.dirita@(b)(6)

larry:

the army you describe as "so much more capable" than it was 5 or 10 years ago is, in fact, very nearly broken. another three years of the careful attention of your boss ought to just about finish it off.

this is not the word from your anonymous officers; this is from my own observations in the field in iraq and at home on our bases and in the military schools and colleges.

you can sit there all day telling me that pigs can fly, with or without lipstick, and i am not going to believe it.

seemingly the reverse is also true.

one of us is dead wrong and i have a good hunch that it would be you. you go flying blind through that forest and you are going to find those trees for sure.

whether or not paul van riper has ever met Secretary Rumsfeld is not at issue. one does not have to be a personal acquaintance to find that a public figure's policies and conduct of his office are wanting. Secretary Rumsfeld spent a good number of years as the CEO of various large corporations. He knows about being responsible for the bottom line in that line of work. So too is he responsible in his current line of work; actually even more so given the stakes involved.

So grasp that concept harder, friend Larry. Urge your boss to step up to the plate and admit it when he's gotten it wrong at least as quickly as he steps up to run those famous victory laps with Gen Meyer back in the spring of '03.

best

joe galloway

DaRita No. 3:

Subj: Re:

Date: 5/3/2006 5:09:59 PM Eastern Daylight Time

From: larry.dirita@**(b)(6)**

To: Jlgalloway2@**(b)(6)**

Time will tell. The army is faster, more agile, more deployable, more lethals. At least that's what schoemaker thinks. The army of 2000 could not have sustained rotational deployments indefinitely. Retention is above 100 percent in units that have frequently deployed. Would all those soldiers be rushing to join a "broken" army. Do you really believe we were better off with tens of thousands of soldiers in fixed garrisons, essentially non-deployable, in germany and korea? I appreciate your depth of feeling. What bugs me though is your implication that rumsfeld doesn't care about it as much as you do. Also, if van riper et al confined their "analysis" to the issue at hand, your comment would be valid. Their comments were ad hominem, and that is a neat trick for someone they never met.

Anyway, time will tell. Best..

Galloway response to DaRita No. 3:

larry:

[You say]<the army of 2000 could not have sustained indefinite deployments>

my response: neither can the army of 2003 or the army of 2005 or 2006. it is grinding up the equipment and the troops inexorably. recruiting can barely, or hardly, or not, bring in the 80,000 a year needed to maintain a steady state in the active army enlisted ranks...and that is WITH the high retention rates in the brigades.

and neither figure addresses the hemorrhaging of captains and majors who are voting with their feet in order to maintain some semblance of a family life and a future without war in it. and what do we do about a year when average

93 percent of majors are selected for Lt Col in all MOSs...and 100 plus percent in critical MOSs.

the army is scraping the barrel.

then there is the matter of 14 pc Cat IV recruits admitted in Oct 05 and 19pc in Nov...against an annual ceiling of 4 percent???

the returning divisions, which leave all their equipment behind in iraq, come home and almost immediately lose 2,000 to 3,000 stop-loss personnel.

then tradoc goes in and cherry picks the best NCOs for DI and schoolhouse jobs. leaving a division with about 65 percent of authorized strength, no equipment to train on, sitting around for eight or nine months painting rocks. if they are lucky 90 days before re-deploying the army begins to refill them with green kids straight out of AIT or advanced armor training.

if they are even luckier they have time to get in a rotation to JROTC or NTC and get some realistic training for those new arrivals. if not so lucky they just take them off to combat and let em sink or swim.

this is not healthy. this is not an army on the way up but one on the way to a disaster. we need more and smarter soldiers. not more Cat IVs.

so far it is the willingness of these young men and women to serve, and to deploy multiple times, and to work grueling and dangerous 18 hour days 7 days a week that is the glue holding things together.

all the cheap fixes have been used; all the one-time-only gains so beloved of legislators trying to balance a budget and get out of town. the question is what sort of an army are your bosses going to leave behind as their legacy in 2009? one that is trained, ready and well equipped to fight the hundred-year war with islam that seems to have begun with a vengeance on your watch? or will they leave town and head into a golden retirement as that army collapses for lack of manpower, lack of money to repair and replace all the equipment chewed up by iraq and afghanistan, lack of money to apply to fixing those problems because billions were squandered on weapons systems that are a ridiculous legacy of a Cold War era long gone (viz. the f/22, the osprey, the navy's gold plated destroyers and aircraft carriers and, yes, nuclear submarines whose seeming future purpose is to replace rubber zodiac boats as the favorite landing craft of Spec Ops teams, at a cost of billions) meanwhile the pentagon, at the direction of your boss, marches rapidly ahead with deployment of an anti-missile system whose rockets have yet to actually get out of the launch tubes. at a cost of yet more multiple billions. you say i blame your boss for things 3 or 4 levels below him that he can't possibly be controlling and quote accusations from present and former flag officers who he has never eyeballed personally.

well the above items are things that he directly controls, or should; things he came into office vowing he was going to fix or change drastically. and in the latest QDR, his last, he made none of the hard choices about wasted money on high dollar weapons systems that make no sense in the real world today. the same QDR quite correctly identifies an urgent need for MORE psyops and civil affairs and military police and far more troops who have foreign language training appropriate to where we fight. and we budget a paltry 191 million, i say MILLION, bucks to do all that. not even the cost of the periscopes on those oh-so-necessary submarines, or the instruments on one of those f22s.

this is what has my attention; this is what has me in a mood to question over and over and over, waiting for answers that never come, change that never comes, course corrections that never come.

you wanted some specifics. there are some specifics.

joe galloway

PS: those <tens of thousands of soldiers in fixed garrisons in germany who could not deploy> were called VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War. they deployed. they formed the armored spear that penetrated kuwait and broke the republican guard. the garrisons were guarded, while they were gone, by the german army and police. they would have been so guarded in OIF too had we tried a bit of diplomacy instead of bitch-slapping Old Europe as your boss did at a crucial moment.

those bases in germany were paid for by germany; still are. and they are a good deal closer to the action at present and in the foreseeable future than fort riley, kansas. now we envision counting on rough and crude forward bases, occupied only occasionally, in places where we have such good friends and allies like the fellow who just ordered us to get out because we harumphed when he slaughtered a few hundred or thousand peaceful demonstrators against his theft of yet another democratic election. you say that by doing this we are positioning ourselves better for the wars of the future. but what if, once again, a curtain of iron descends across Europe and once again the Fulda Gap must be guarded against the new Red Army of our good friend and ally Putin.

your boss is fond of saying that this or that thing is "unknowable." the most unknowable thing of all is who your enemy is going to be next time and where you are going to need allies and bases from which to attack or defend. pulling out of europe and south korea may be one of the larger mistakes charged off against your boss five years from now or ten, if we are lucky enough to have a whole decade to repair some of the damage he has done while congress turned a blind eye, too busy doing earmarks for flea circus museums in dubuque and bridges to nowhere, alaska, to do the necessary oversight and questioning of cockamamy ideas with even more dubious estimates of future savings of billions that begin dropping

like a rock before the ink is even dry on the report.
all i can say is what the hell are you doing questioning my columns when you ought to be
in there at the elbow of your boss reading those columns aloud to him every wednesday
afternoon and urging him to pay attention to them. best wishes joe galloway

DaRita No. 4:

Thanks for these insights, joe.Â none of this is easy.Â Your perspective seems pretty
fixed but I do appreciate the experience you bring to it.

Again, what bothers me most about your coverage is your implication that the people
involved in all of this are dumb or have ill-intent or are so sure of what they know that
they don't brook discussion.Â That's the part you're just way off on, friend.

This is tough stuff, and we're all hard at it, trying to do what's best for the country.

Best wishes.

Galloway response to DaRita No. 4:

i like to think that is what i am doing also, and it is a struggle that grows out of my
obligation to and love for america's warriors going back 41 years as of last month.
there are many things we all could wish had happened.
i can wish that your boss had surrounded himself with close advisers who had, once at
least, held a dying boy in their arms and watched the life run out of his eyes while they
lied to him and told him, over and over, "You are going to be all right. Hang on! Help is
coming. Don't quit now..." Such men in place of those who had never known service or
combat or the true cost of war, and who pays that price, and had never sent their children
off to do that hard and unending duty.
i could wish for so much.
i could wish that in january of this year i had not stood in a garbage-strewn pit, in deep
mud, and watched soldiers tear apart the wreckage of a kiowa warrior shot down just
minutes before and tenderly remove the barely alive body of WO (b)(6) and the
lifeless body of his fellow pilot. they died flying overhead cover for a little three-
vehicle Stryker patrol with which i was riding at the time.
i could wish that (b)(6) widow (b)(6) had not found, among the possessions of her late
husband, a copy of my book, carefully earmarked at a chapter titled Brave Aviators, which
(b)(6) was reading at the time of his death. That she had not enclosed a photo of her
husband, herself and a 3 year old baby girl.
those things i received in the mail yesterday and they brought back the tears that i wept
standing there in that pit, feeling the same shards in my heart that i felt the first time
i looked into the face of a fallen american soldier 41 years ago on a barren hill in Quang
Ngai Province in another time, another war.
someone once asked me if i had learned anything from going to war so many times. my reply:
yes, i learned how to cry.
Jg

DaRita No. 5:

I appreciate what you are saying but your continued implication that rumsfeld does not
understand all that is at stake is wrong and offensive.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) Col OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, May 09, 2006 4:28 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: Jed Babbin called (b)(2)

No need to return call unless you have a suggestion for constructive mischief his words since he is guest hosting the Hugh Hewitt Show ...v/r

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@**(b)(6)**
Sent: Monday, May 08, 2006 7:41 AM
To: tmcinerney@**(b)(6)** paulvalley@**(b)(6)** nashct@**(b)(6)**
(b)(6) **(b)(6)**
Subject: Val for DCI: Today's Spectator

The Goss departure proves only that the CIA is still unable to do its job, and that Congress made things worse in the way it created the Director of National Intelligence.

The American Spectator

Jed Babbin

(b)(6) (Home Office)
(b)(6) (Fax)
(b)(6) (Mobile)

(b)(6)

From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, May 05, 2006 2:20 PM
To: Smith, Dorrance Mr OSD PA
Cc: Johnson, Hollen CIV OSD PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: FYI - SECDEF on cover of new National Journal

Given this cover story by Kitfield, I don't think we need to find any time for Kitfield on the Secretary's calendar.

SECDEF on cover of the May 6 National Journal. Cover headline: "Behind The Revolt" (You can see it at <http://nationaljournal.com/njcover.htm>) Cover story below. It will not be in the Bird.

National Journal
May 6, 2006

The Generals' Case

By James Kitfield

The matter of Rumsfeld v. the Generals bears close scrutiny. The controversy represents the worst breach in civil-military relations since Harry Truman dismissed Gen. Douglas MacArthur in 1951 for his conduct and his criticism of the president during the Korean War. It has proven an unwelcome distraction for Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and the Joint Chiefs, and has added to the already considerable woes of President Bush in his role as a wartime commander-in-chief. Notably, the calls from a group of recently retired generals that Rumsfeld should resign has also thrust senior military leaders and, by proxy, the uniformed services into the middle of a hyperpartisan political argument -- territory from which the U.S. military rarely escapes unscathed.

Given the nearly unprecedented nature of the controversy, what is perhaps most remarkable is how utterly unsurprising it is to anyone who has spent time with senior military officers, in the field, over drinks at the officers' club, or especially on the ground in Iraq. The fact that the Army chief of staff came out of retirement to take the job after sources say at least three active-duty generals declined it, and reports that the Marine Corps commandant, Gen. Michael W. Hagee, may retire before his term is up, speak volumes about the frayed state of civil-military relations in today's Pentagon.

Practically from the moment they first occupied the E Ring, Rumsfeld and his tight circle of senior aides demonstrated a dismissive attitude that has grated on uniformed leaders. In the view of Bush's civilian team, President Clinton had allowed the generals and the admirals to run roughshod. Rumsfeld and his band of reformers were a rude awakening for senior military leaders conditioned to expect a measure of courtesy from civilian bosses as a privilege of their rank; instead, Bush's team set out to show the generals who was boss.

Rumsfeld's incessant needling of the Army, in particular, to more rapidly reshape itself into an expeditionary force, at a time when the service has been run nearly ragged by back-to-back-to-back deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq, added insult to injury. From the beginning, the Rumsfeld reformers have also considered themselves bold revolutionaries who deal only in transformative ideas, and their "roll the dice" spirit in nearly all things has often been at odds with the more cautious nature of a uniformed military pledged to securing the Republic.

In response to Pentagon policies -- set by Rumsfeld and his inner circle -- pushing the envelope on prisoner treatment, for instance, eight retired generals and admirals have written to Bush asking for an independent, 9/11-type commission to investigate detainee abuse. Two of those senior officers, including the Navy's former judge advocate general, have joined a lawsuit seeking to hold Rumsfeld directly accountable for policies that gave rise to torture and abuse of U.S.-held prisoners.

Above all, the other eight (and counting) retired generals who have called for Rumsfeld's resignation are wrestling to win the narrative of the Iraq war. Privately, most generals will tell you that a new Defense secretary is unlikely to change the dynamics of an Iraqi campaign now mostly defined by missed opportunities and foreclosed options. Notably, two of the eight served as division commanders in Iraq and saw firsthand how decisions made by their civilian bosses limited their military choices. Whatever the final outcome of the conflict, they and a large number of senior officers on active duty believe that the Office of the Secretary of Defense -- Rumsfeld and his top civilian advisers -- is responsible for the most poorly analyzed and mismanaged U.S. military intervention since Vietnam.

For these commanders, who have returned home with 2,400 fewer troops than they led into Iraq, that calls for some accountability.

"My primary issue with Secretary Rumsfeld's leadership is accountability, because I grew up in a culture where the captain of the ship or the commander of the unit is held responsible, and Rumsfeld has committed acts of gross negligence and incompetence," retired Marine Corps Gen. Anthony Zinni told National Journal. As head of U.S. Central Command, which oversees all American troops in the Middle East, Zinni and his staff planned and war-gamed an invasion of Iraq for years, plans that active-duty officers assured him were constantly updated right up to the moment that Rumsfeld discarded them.

"We knew that you would need a lot of troops to establish law and order over a traumatized population, and to combat all kinds of troublemaking elements coming from outside Iraq," Zinni said. "We knew that you had to secure the infrastructure and that reconstruction would be a huge and expensive task. We knew that Iraqi exiles like Ahmad Chalabi had zero credibility in the region. All of that was foreseeable, and yet our warnings were brushed aside and we were personally attacked," the general continued. "Rumsfeld said our planning was 'old and stale.' That this was going to be a 'cakewalk,' with 'shock and awe' and flowers in the streets, and Iraqi oil paying for reconstruction. Those were wild-eyed and patently ridiculous ideas."

High-Stakes Showdown

Regardless of the emotional content of the generals' arguments, the stakes of the controversy could hardly be greater. On a strategic level, the issues raised go to the fundamental judgment and competence of those entrusted with the nation's most lethal levers of power at a time of great uncertainty. The dangers include a potential confrontation with Iran over its supposed pursuit of nuclear weapons, while North Korea is waiting in the wings. And the war on terrorism continues.

The U.S. military is also poised to attempt the delicate process of extricating itself from Iraq within the next two years without setting the scene for that country, and the region, to descend into sectarian war. Meanwhile, another military manpower crunch is coming late this year and early next as planners search for soldiers and marines to deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan for their third -- and in some cases fourth -- combat tours, an effort necessitated by Rumsfeld's stubborn refusal to increase the size of U.S. infantry forces from pre-9/11 levels permanently, despite wars on multiple fronts and urgings from some in Congress.

In breaking with two centuries of military tradition, the retired generals asking for the head of Donald Rumsfeld have essentially gone around their former civilian bosses to put the question directly to the American people: Do you want to confront the crises ahead led by the person who brought you Iraq?

"My own decision to speak out goes back to watching firsthand the arrogant and contemptuous attitude of Rumsfeld as he ignored the advice of military experts during preparations for war, and then living with the impact of those strategic blunders as a division commander in Iraq," retired Army Maj. Gen. John Batiste said in an interview. After serving in the Pentagon as chief military aide to then-Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz -- where he was privy to many high-level meetings -- and then commanding the 1st Infantry Division in Iraq, Batiste declined promotion to lieutenant general and command of an Army corps. "That was a gut-wrenching decision for me, but at some point I realized that in order to try and change course and have this debate, I had to retire," he said. "Secretary Rumsfeld and his team turned what should have been a deliberate victory in Iraq into a prolonged challenge. My concern now is that we still have a long way to go in the Iraq war, and other monumental decisions are coming just around the corner. Don't the

American people deserve senior leaders whose instincts and judgments they can trust?"

Not surprisingly, Bush has vigorously defended his Defense secretary, having already declined the resignations that Rumsfeld tendered in 2004 over the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. The era when President Clinton's Defense secretary, Les Aspin, resigned over a single bad day in Somalia and a controversy over gays in the military now seems almost quaint. One irony of the current controversy, however, is that in speaking out the generals may have actually helped secure Rumsfeld's job. No wartime president can bow to such public pressure from senior military voices without appearing weak, and firing Rumsfeld would also amount to an admission by Bush that the defining issue of his presidency was fraught with strategic mistakes.

Yet the seriousness of the controversy warrants at least an examination of the generals' writ. It's not just that the military leaders have called for Rumsfeld's resignation, it's that they cite specific decisions that they say he got terribly, terribly wrong. The list of particulars was perhaps best summarized by retired Lt. Gen. Greg Newbold, the top operations officer on the Joint Staff in the run-up to the Iraq war. Before he stepped down, Newbold was a strong candidate for future commandant of the Marine Corps. "What we are living with now is the consequences of successive policy failures," Newbold wrote in Time magazine. "Some of the missteps include: the distortion of intelligence in the buildup to the war, McNamara-like micromanagement that kept our forces from having enough resources to do the job, the failure to retain and reconstitute the Iraqi military in time to help quell civil disorder, initial denial that insurgency was at the heart of the opposition to occupation, alienation of allies who could have helped in a more robust way to rebuild Iraq, and the continuing failure of other agencies of U.S. government to commit themselves to the same degree as the Defense Department." Here are the details behind the generals' specific complaints.

The Intelligence

The failure to find Saddam Hussein's stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, President Bush's casus belli for the invasion, still tops many after-action assessments. As was detailed in the bipartisan Robb-Silberman report on intelligence regarding weapons of mass destruction, an intelligence failure of that magnitude has many fathers. The question posed by the generals is whether Rumsfeld and his top aides were prominent among them.

In fact, despite the general assumption within the vast U.S. intelligence network that Saddam almost certainly retained some residual or reconstituted chemical and biological (but not nuclear) weapons capabilities, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were not satisfied with the often qualified and inconclusive intelligence on Iraq's WMD programs that filtered up through the intelligence bureaucracy. Nor was Rumsfeld's confidant, Vice President Cheney. So Wolfowitz had the Pentagon's No. 3 civilian, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, establish a new intelligence shop on Iraq called the Office of Special Plans.

OSP operated outside normal intelligence channels and was known to have very close ties to Cheney's office and to Iraqi exile Ahmad Chalabi and his network of Iraqi defectors, who had a vested interest in overthrowing Saddam. The vice president's chief of staff and top national security adviser, I. Lewis (Scooter) Libby, was a former protege of Wolfowitz's, having worked with him in the Pentagon in the early 1990s on issues involving weapons of mass destruction.

Many experts believe that OSP circumvented the normal vetting and filtering process by which intelligence made its way up the pyramid of collection and analysis, and instead relayed essentially raw intelligence gathered from Chalabi's defectors directly to the vice president's office, where it found its way into Cheney's speeches. In August 2002, for instance, Cheney proclaimed, "There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction" and is pursuing "an aggressive nuclear weapons program" that Cheney surmised would soon produce a weapon. Nor was there any doubt, Cheney said, that "he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us." In his address to the United Nations in October 2002, Bush thus posited the case for pre-emptive war against Iraq: "We cannot wait for the final proof -- the smoking gun -- that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud."

Notably, at the time of Cheney's speech the Pentagon, and not the CIA, was circulating a detailed intelligence briefing on Baghdad's nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs to key allies and members of Congress, and was reportedly working on a report

that would show links between Al Qaeda and Iraq. The Pentagon official spearheading that briefing was J.D. Crouch, Rumsfeld's assistant secretary of Defense for international security policy.

The Robb-Silberman report concluded that two Chalabi-supplied Iraqi defectors were "fabricators." The use of another serial liar, a source code-named "Curveball," who was behind reports of Iraqi mobile biological weapons labs, was, the report noted, "at bottom, a story of Defense Department collectors who abdicated their responsibility to vet a critical source...." The 9/11 commission report, meanwhile, found no credible operational links between Al Qaeda and Saddam's regime. Since the reports' release, both Bill Luti, who ran the Pentagon's Office of Special Plans, and Crouch have gone on to work for the National Security Council, in the White House.

"As someone doing consulting work for the CIA right up until the war started, I saw the intelligence on Iraq's WMD, and I can tell you that the administration's talk of an imminent danger of 'mushroom clouds' wasn't just a stretch," Zinni said. "Quite frankly, it was outright bullshit. I asked the CIA analysts where that was coming from, and they just stared at their shoes."

McNamara-Like Micromanagement

Did Rumsfeld micromanage the Iraq operation to the degree that Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and President Johnson did with Vietnam? ("I won't let those Air Force generals bomb even the smallest outhouse without checking with me!" Johnson used to brag.) Bush asked about Rumsfeld's management approach when talking to the Pentagon's top civilian in Iraq, Paul Bremer, who headed the Coalition Provisional Authority in 2003-2004. "I like Don, Mr. President. I've known him for 30 years, admire him, and consider him highly intelligent. But he does micromanage," Bremer recalls in his book *My Year in Iraq*. "Don terrifies his subordinates, so that I can rarely get any decisions out of anyone but him."

From a military standpoint, Exhibit A in the micromanagement charge is Rumsfeld's insistence in the critical period leading up to the Iraq invasion that the Joint Staff and the Central Command jettison the Time Phased Force and Deployment List. What the military calls the "Tip Fid" is the matrix by which theater commanders identify the forces needed for a specific campaign and the services prioritize the deployment of those forces and requisite support units. The methodical, timed, and phased nature of such a deployment scheme assaulted Rumsfeld's notions of "transformational war," and he derided the Tip Fid as part of the military's "Industrial Age" thinking. Rumsfeld and his aides favored a "just in time" buildup to war fashioned more on the FedEx model -- hold everything back until you absolutely need it.

War is not package delivery, however, and the Pentagon civilians' insistence on scuttling the Tip Fid infuriated commanders in the Middle East, who were ordered to move into Iraq even as units needed to guard their exposed supply lines were still pouring off ships in Kuwait. Often those forces arrived in the wrong order of priority and with inadequate supplies and transport.

"Rumsfeld insists that the Tip Fid process is too ponderous and slow, and it may well be, but it's the only process we have for managing the flow of forces into theater and matching them with needed lift and support," a senior general involved in planning the invasion told *National Journal* at the time. "Since we've been ordered to abandon the Tip Fid, it would be really nice if those of us responsible for executing this campaign knew and understood what the hell is supposed to replace it. And we don't!"

Too Few Troops

When then-Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki told Congress before the Iraq war that it would take on the order of "several hundred thousand" troops to stabilize the country, the general was actually being conservative. Central Command's war plan for Iraq originally called for a minimum of 380,000 troops to topple the regime and secure the country. Studying force-to-population ratios in seven previous occupations, ranging from Germany and Japan in the 1940s all the way to Somalia and the Balkans in the 1990s, the Rand think tank prepared a report shortly before the Iraq war that was brought to Rumsfeld's attention. Rand put the number of troops needed to stabilize Iraq at 500,000.

Yet Wolfowitz derided Shinseki's "notion of hundreds of thousands of American troops" as "way off the mark," and OSD made Shinseki a lame duck by naming his replacement more than

a year before his scheduled retirement. After constant pressure from Rumsfeld prompted Central Command's Gen. Tommy Franks to whittle the invasion force down to roughly 140,000 U.S. troops, it became clear that in their overriding focus on transformation and bold new ideas, Pentagon civilians had ignored the lessons of even recent history.

Rumsfeld has never acknowledged that those forces proved manifestly inadequate to the task of taming an ethnically fractious country of 27 million inhabitants. Ultimately, there were too few troops to stop the looting and the growing sense of anarchy and lawlessness that took hold in the weeks and months after Saddam's regime fell, or to guard abandoned Iraqi army ammo dumps from raids by the nascent insurgency. As a result, the U.S. military saw its critical honeymoon of liberation cut short in Iraq, and some senior commanders have never forgotten it.

The generals are, however, at least partly responsible for the lack of sufficient troops in Iraq. Knowing after the Shinseki affair that OSD would deem a request for more troops most unwelcome, and understanding that if a larger force were committed to Iraq it would hasten the day when deployments would break the back of their Army and National Guard combat and support units, the generals kept mum or played word games in public. In early September 2003, for instance, the senior commander in Iraq, Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, insisted that he had enough troops for the mission "currently assigned." At the time that mission did not include fighting an all-out insurgency, confronting renegade militias, training a new Iraqi army, securing the porous border against terrorist infiltration, or holding ground cleared of insurgents by U.S. military sweeps. "If a militia or internal conflict of some nature were to erupt ... that would be a challenge out there that I do not have sufficient force for," Sanchez said then.

When those challenges and more arose in the fateful spring of 2004, however, the generals still bit their tongues in public about the need for more troops. They did so even after Rumsfeld pulled what many of them saw as a bait and switch. He originally assured uniformed leaders that the Army's 1st Cavalry Division was in the pipeline to reinforce the U.S. invasion force, and then he abruptly canceled the deployment.

So, did Rumsfeld fail to supply his generals with adequate forces in Iraq? The Bush administration's top man there certainly thought so. As early as July 2003, well before the insurgency had fully coalesced, Bremer spoke with then-National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, as he recalls in his book. "In my view, the coalition's got about half the number of soldiers we need here," Bremer told her. "And we run the risk of having this thing go south on us."

Disbanding Iraq's Army

When Bremer signed Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 2 on May 23, 2003, formally dissolving all Iraqi military formations, he had some compelling reasons. Iraqi security forces were an instrument of Saddam's brutal repression; they were viewed as a threat by both the Kurds and the Shiite Iraqi exiles like Chalabi who were so favored by OSD; and, anyway, those uniformed forces had largely melted away after the regime collapsed. After discussing the idea with his civilian staff, Bremer vetted his plan to abolish all Iraqi intelligence, security, and military forces with Rumsfeld and Feith. Both approved the idea.

For many military commanders in Iraq, however, the idea was pure folly. As opposed to Saddam's brutal Republican Guard, the regular Iraqi army was a relatively respected institution into which many Iraqis had been conscripted and had served honorably, especially during the Iraq-Iran war. Because the Iraqi army also had its own command-and-control systems and mobility, U.S. military experts believed that if the force were reconstituted quickly, it could prove critical in establishing security and helping with reconstruction.

Did military experts share their concerns with Bremer? One who did was retired Army Lt. Gen. Jay Garner, the head of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, the initial American postwar overseer in Baghdad. Bremer later replaced Garner. The retired general advised Bremer that abolishing the Iraqi army would be a huge mistake. Once again, however, military advice went unheeded. With Iraq's long, hot summer of occupation just beginning in 2003, the second edict of Bremer's Pentagon-led occupational authority threw hundreds of thousands of military-age Iraqi men out of work, with every last one of them nursing a grudge and trained to bear arms.

The CPA's first edict? Feith's "De-Baathification of Iraqi Society" order. Perhaps not surprisingly, the process was eventually entrusted to Chalabi, who predictably took the purge to draconian levels and further inflamed the Sunni-based insurgency. That may be why Franks, the top U.S. commander of the Iraq war, wrote in his autobiography that Feith was "getting a reputation around here as the dumbest [expletive] guy on the planet."

"Why de-Baathification was handed to Chalabi was one of the great mysteries to all of us, because it was absolutely the wrong thing to do," said a senior active-duty general who was in Iraq at the time. "Chalabi had a vested interest in the total elimination of the Baathist structure in Iraq as a way of clearing the political field. To say that his de-Baathification efforts undercut our attempts to bring the Sunnis into the political process would be an understatement."

No New Iraqi Army

If U.S. military commanders in Iraq were outraged at the formal dissolution of the Iraqi army, they were absolutely confounded by the CPA's noted lack of urgency in training a force to take its place. Because Saddam had used the Republican Guard to keep his boot on the necks of the Iraqi people, Bremer believed that any new army should have only external security responsibilities -- guarding borders and the like. With the old Iraqi army formally dissolved, no new one on the horizon, and growing signs of an organized insurgency by fall 2003, however, U.S. commanders viewed that plan as sentencing U.S. troops to indefinite service in Iraq.

U.S. commanders in Iraq understood better than most that raising an army from scratch was a mammoth enterprise likely to take years. In the end, they won approval to create a small number of "Iraqi National Guard" battalions, but the training and equipping of even these units had to come out of the hides of coalition forces in Iraq, already stretched thin. A year after the invasion, there were not enough personal weapons for even the new Iraqi National Guard battalions.

Meanwhile, Bremer assigned responsibility for overseeing creation of the New Iraqi Army to a civilian on his staff, Walter Slocombe, who announced the rather modest first-year objective of forming a single army division of roughly 12,000 troops. Even that effort, according to U.S. military commanders, was plagued by chronic underfunding and a lack of adequate manpower, resources, and high-level attention.

"History will have to sort out the pros and cons of disbanding the Iraqi army, but even proponents of the idea understood that you would have to immediately devote a lot of resources and manpower to replacing it, and the fact that never happened is a damning indictment of Secretary Rumsfeld's leadership," retired Army Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton, who led the initial effort to create a New Iraqi Army, told National Journal. "Instead, I fell in on a staff of five guys borrowed from Central Command's staff, and we were supposed to build an army for a country of 27 million people. And I never did get the people and money that were promised to execute the mission, and that same lack of urgency persists even today."

When some of the Iraqi National Guard battalions and units of the New Iraqi Army were thrown into battle in the simultaneous Sunni and Shiite uprisings in spring 2004 -- what Bremer called "the most critical crisis of the occupation" -- most of the poorly trained and ill-equipped Iraqis went AWOL or refused to fight. That left the mission of quelling the uprisings to U.S. forces in Iraq. At the time, those forces included one of Paul Eaton's two sons in uniform.

"Some people have criticized my comments as counterproductive to the war effort, but with two children in uniform this is very personal for me," said Eaton, who called for Rumsfeld's resignation in a recent op-ed in The New York Times. "I looked at the terrible path Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has led us down, and I thought two and a half more years of that leadership was too long for my nation, for my Army, and for my family."

Alienating Allies

From the beginning, the Rumsfeld team viewed NATO and other venerable U.S. alliances in a suspect light. A multilateral alliance might be useful for nation-building operations in the Balkans and for keeping the peace in Europe, but such mundane missions held no allure for the Rumsfeld reformers. Certainly in terms of combat, OSD viewed such alliances as too much of a constraint on its vision of transformational warfare. This opinion comported

with some air-power advocates in uniform who derided the "war by committee" character of NATO's 1999 campaign in Kosovo.

So when NATO proudly invoked its collective defense clause for the first time in history to come to America's aid after the 9/11 attacks, allied nations were stunned by the Pentagon's reply of "thanks, but no thanks." As Rumsfeld memorably told NATO members when the U.S. set out unilaterally to topple the Taliban and take the fight to Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, "The mission will define the coalition."

Even when that mission entailed invading and occupying a country of 27 million people, however, OSD seemed remarkably cavalier about the need for a broad coalition. Rumsfeld infuriated European allies when he responded to German and French reluctance to invade Iraq by rhetorically dividing the Continent into "old Europe" and "new Europe." Wolfowitz's suggestion that the Turkish military should help overcome civilian resistance there to the war upset many civilians in the Ankara government, which eventually denied a U.S. request to launch a northern front in Iraq from Turkish territory. After Saddam's regime fell, the Pentagon further alienated allies by suggesting that French and German contractors would be barred from the anticipated spoils of Iraqi reconstruction.

Did the Pentagon's incursions into prewar diplomacy help alienate venerable U.S. allies? One person who thought so was the official frequently tasked with trying to mend those frayed relations. "Terms like 'old Europe' didn't exactly have a confidence-building effect, and clearly helped turn public opinion in Europe against us," former Secretary of State Colin Powell told the German magazine Stern in an interview last year.

Although the Bush administration eventually cobbled together a coalition of some 30 nations in Iraq, the generals have always understood that their support from allies is a mile wide and an inch deep. The lack of allied help denied them the much-desired northern front during the invasion, cost them a multinational division planned for fall 2003, and left them without the legitimacy that major Arab allies might have bestowed on a genuine coalition operation. Several key allies have announced plans to pull their forces out of Iraq this year. Perhaps most important, polls taken before the war clearly showed that the American public would have been much more supportive of the war if the U.S. were perceived as being part of a broad coalition.

None of that would have mattered if OSD's optimistic assumptions going into Iraq -- that U.S. forces would be viewed overwhelmingly and lastingly as liberators, that the basic structures of government would remain intact, that Iraqi oil would pay for the country's reconstruction, that democratic reforms could surmount long-standing ethnic divisions -- had proven true. But because those assumptions proved wrong, and with the U.S. military entering its fourth year in Iraq, that lack of broad and deep support at home and abroad matters a lot.

"I have nothing personal against Rumsfeld; I've never even met him," said Zinni, who has a son in uniform serving in Afghanistan. "But how can we change course, move forward, and win allies back to our cause when the same person who put us on this disastrous path and burned those allies in the past is still at the helm, saying nothing has changed and no mistakes have been made? I just don't think you can be open to new ideas and courses of action if you have a vested interest in constantly defending old decisions."

Not Fading Away

Rumsfeld is reportedly worried that the revolt of the generals has weakened the principle of civilian control of the military, and in that concern he has much company. Whatever blame Rumsfeld shares for a civil-military relationship in tatters, the active-duty and retired flag officers who have rushed to his defense recognize that their comrades have violated an important tradition. One reason that the U.S. military consistently polls as the most respected institution in America is that it's viewed as being above politics.

In particular, the Joint Chiefs, hand-picked by Rumsfeld, understand the implied criticism in the generals' writ against their boss: that the chiefs have too often acted as "yes men," insulating Rumsfeld in an echo chamber.

"I haven't noticed any shrinking lilies among the Joint Chiefs, and we all understand our responsibility to state our advice, and for the chairman [of the Joint Chiefs] to take that advice to the secretary of Defense and the president," Gen. Peter Schoomaker, the Army chief of staff, said recently to defense reporters. "That doesn't mean our bosses

always agree with our advice. At the end of the day, you have to ask yourself: Is a decision legal, ethical, and can I live with the consequences? If you can't, then you do have a responsibility to do something about it; but in my opinion, you should do it while still in uniform. If you've gone through the debate and lived with the decision, I think it's inappropriate to go around cleansing your conscience in public after the fact. I certainly don't want civil authorities distrusting military advice because they're worried about what someone is going to say publicly down the road."

By tradition, old soldiers who can no longer in good conscience obey their civilian masters are supposed to state their case in private, offer their resignation, and then quietly fade away. Air Force Chief of Staff Ron Fogleman did that in 1997 over disagreement with the Clinton administration's military drawdown and OSD's disciplining of one of his generals over the Khobar Towers terrorist attack in Saudi Arabia. Despite being treated shabbily, Shinseki in retirement has largely declined to publicly criticize Rumsfeld. Ever the old soldier, Colin Powell, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs, has refused to directly criticize Rumsfeld and Cheney for their largely successful efforts to marginalize him in the Iraq debate.

Especially for the post-Vietnam generations of officers, however, this burden of silence weighs uneasily. Nearly all of them have read *Dereliction of Duty*, a seminal book by Army Col. H.R. McMaster, published in 1997, that was once on the chairman of the Joint Chiefs' required reading list. In it, McMaster excoriates the Vietnam-era Joint Chiefs and other senior military leaders for not speaking out more forcefully against misguided policies that many in uniform believed cost them a war and the lives of tens of thousands of American soldiers. President Johnson's "plan of deception depended on the tacit approval or silence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," McMaster wrote. "LBJ had misrepresented the mission of U.S. ground forces in Vietnam, distorted the views of the chiefs to lend credibility to his decision against mobilization, grossly understated the numbers of troops General [William] Westmoreland had requested, and lied to the Congress about the monetary cost of actions already approved and of those awaiting final decision.... The 'five silent men' on the Joint Chiefs made possible the way the United States went to war in Vietnam."

Retired Army Gen. Barry McCaffrey was one of the most decorated combat veterans of Vietnam and a division commander in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. "You know, when people ask me whether Secretary Rumsfeld should resign, I tell them it would be inappropriate for me to comment on such a personal matter, but I will provide my objective view on some of his policies that have gotten this country and our military into serious trouble," he told *National Journal*. "I still think our national leadership has the unquestioned loyalty of our senior military leaders in uniform. These retired generals who are speaking out, however, I view as combat veterans with the full rights of U.S. citizens to talk about the security challenges they see facing the country."

For the Vietnam generation of officers and those who mentored at their shoulder, the quintessential model of a leader struggling with the dilemma of divided loyalties is not Gen. George Catlett Marshall, but rather Gen. Edward (Shy) Meyer. Given that the Senate Armed Services Committee recently announced possible hearings on the matter of Rumsfeld v. the Generals, his case is worth contemplating.

In the spring of 1980, the Soviet Union had just invaded Afghanistan, U.S. diplomats were still being held hostage in Iran, and the U.S. military was reeling from a post-Vietnam decade of poor morale and defense cutbacks. As Army chief of staff, Meyer knew that speaking out publicly on that sorry state of affairs would be viewed as an act of disloyalty by his civilian bosses in the Pentagon and by President Carter, who was entering a difficult re-election campaign.

A veteran of Vietnam, Meyer was also mindful that the United States military was nearly unique in taking its oath of allegiance not to an individual leader, political party, or monarch, but rather to the principles and ideals in the Constitution. The Constitution prescribed not only civilian control of the military but also a separation of powers, establishing the president as commander-in-chief but giving Congress the responsibility for the raising of armies. So when members of Congress asked the general in public testimony about the state of their army, Meyer told them that the United States had a "hollow Army."

Pointedly, Meyer did not directly criticize the commander-in-chief or call for the resignation of the secretary of Defense. He privately offered his own resignation. It was

not accepted. When the secretary of the Army, his civilian boss, demanded that Meyer rescind his comments about a "hollow Army," however, he flatly refused. Gen. Shy Meyer just told the truth and trusted in the Constitution. The American people did the rest.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, May 05, 2006 11:49 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: CENTCOM Trip Report from General Barry McCaffrey
Attachments: interest.pdf

From the net...courtesy of (b)(6)

Very interesting CENTCOM trip report from General Barry McCaffrey, USA(Ret)...see attached file...

4/10/2008



Adjunct Professor of International Affairs

April 25, 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR: COLONEL (b)(6)
DEPARTMENT HEAD, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY

COLONEL CINDY JEBB
DEPUTY DEPARTMENT HEAD, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY

Subject: Academic Report- Trip to Iraq and Kuwait
Thursday 13 April through Thursday 20 April 2006

1. PURPOSE: This memo provides follow-on feedback reference visit 13-20 April 2006 to Iraq and Kuwait. Look forward to doing a faculty seminar with Department of Social Sciences at your convenience in the Fall semester.

2. SOURCES – IRAQ:

- a. General George Casey, Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I): One-on-one discussions and briefings.
- b. LTG Peter Chiarelli, Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I): One-on-one discussions and briefings.
- c. LTG Martin Dempsey, Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command: One-on-one discussions and briefings.
- d. British three-star General LTG Rob Fry (UK Army), Deputy to General George Casey, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I): Update Briefings.
- e. Acting Chief-of-Mission U.S. Embassy, DCM David Satterfield: One-on-one discussions and briefing.
- f. MG James Thurman, Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division, Multi-National Division – Baghdad (MND-B): One-on-one discussions and briefings.
- g. MG Thomas Turner, Commanding General, 101st Abn Div. Multi-National Division-North (MND-N): One-on-one discussions and briefings.
- h. MG Rick Lynch, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) Strategic Effects: One-on-one discussions and briefing.
- i. MG Timothy Donovan, USMC, Chief-of-Staff Multi-National Forces-Iraq: One-on-one discussions and out brief.
- j. MG Joseph Peterson, Chief of Iraqi Police Transition: Discussion and briefing.

- k. **Mr. David Harris, Acting Chief Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO):** One-on-one lunch and discussions.
- l. **MG Bob Heine, Deputy Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO), Director of Operations:** One-on-one discussions and briefings.
- m. **BG (P) William H. McCoy, Commanding General, Gulf Region Division Project and Contracting Office:** Full Staff Briefings.
- n. **BG John Cantwell (Australian Army):** MNF-I Operations Brief.
- o. **BG Alessio Cecchetti (Italian Army):** Coalition Operations Update Briefing.
- p. **Mr. Russ Thaden, Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Multi-National Force-Iraq:** Intelligence briefing on threat.
- q. **Briefing:** Multi-National Force-Iraq Battlefield Update.
- r. **Briefing:** MNF-I Effects and Synchronization Board.
- s. **Division Battle Staff Briefing:** 4th Infantry Division.
- t. **Division Battle Staff Briefing:** 101st Airborne Division.
- u. **Briefing:** Infantry Brigade Commander, 4th Infantry Division.
- v. **Briefing:** Acting Infantry Battalion Commander, 4th Infantry Division.
- w. **Briefing:** Infantry Company Commander, 4th Infantry Division.
- x. **Lunch Sensing Session:** Soldiers and junior NCOs, 4th Infantry Division.
- y. **Dinner Discussion:** General Officers and Division Command Sergeant Major, 101st Airborne Division.
- z. **Briefing:** Infantry Brigade Commander, 101st Airborne Division.
- aa. **Briefing:** Maneuver Effects Brigade Commander (Engineers), 101st Airborne Division on Counter-IED Campaign.
- bb. **Briefing:** Aviation Brigade Commander, 101st Airborne Division.
- cc. **Briefing:** Maneuver Battalion Commander and Company Commanders, 101st Airborne Division.
- dd. **Lunch Sensing Session:** Aviation Company Commander and Leaders, 101st Airborne Division.
- ee. **Dinner Sensing Session:** Soldiers and junior NCOs, 101st Airborne Division.
- ff. **Visit and Briefings:** Brigade Detention Center and Intelligence interrogators.
- gg. **Visit and Briefings:** Special Operations Intelligence Fusion Center.
- hh. **Night Movement:** To 101st Maneuver Battalion Headquarters for pinning ceremony, Combat Infantry and Combat Action Badges. Discussion with junior soldiers.

3. SOURCES – KUWAIT:

- a. **Ambassador Richard LeBaron, US Ambassador to Kuwait:** Office call and discussions with U.S. Ambassador and DCM.
- b. **Staff Briefings:** Colonel David Cordon, Acting Chief, Office of Military Cooperation - Kuwait.
- c. **Briefings:** U.S. Embassy Political Officer.
- d. **Briefings:** U.S. Embassy DAO - LTC Robert Friedenber.
- e. **MG James Kelley, Acting Commanding General, Coalition Land Component Command:** One-on-one discussions.
- f. **Full Staff Briefing:** (3rd U.S. Army), Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC).
- g. **Dinner Discussion:** CFLCC General Officers, Chief-of-staff, Command Sergeant Major.

4. THE BOTTOM LINE - OBSERVATIONS FROM IRAQI FREEDOM, APRIL 2006:

1st - The morale, fighting effectiveness, and confidence of U.S. combat forces continue to be simply awe-inspiring. In every sensing session and interaction - I probed for weakness and found courage, belief in the mission, enormous confidence in their sergeants and company grade officers, an understanding of the larger mission, a commitment to creating an effective Iraqi Army and Police, unabashed patriotism, and a sense of humor. All of these soldiers, NCOs and young officers were volunteers for combat. Many were on their second combat tour - several were on the third or fourth combat tour. Many had re-enlisted to stay with their unit on its return to a second Iraq deployment. Many planned to re-enlist regardless of how long the war went on.

Their comments to me were guileless, positive, and candidly expressed love for their fellow soldiers. They routinely encounter sniper fire, mortar and rocket attacks, and constantly face IED's on movement. Their buddies have been killed and wounded. Several in these sessions had also been wounded. These are the toughest soldiers we have ever fielded. It was a real joy and an honor to see them first-hand.

2nd - The Iraqi Army is real, growing, and willing to fight. They now have lead action of a huge and rapidly expanding area and population. The battalion level formations are in many cases excellent - most are adequate. However, they are very badly equipped with only a few light vehicles, small arms, most with body armor and one or two uniforms. They have almost no mortars, heavy machine guns, decent communications equipment, artillery, armor, or IAF air transport, helicopter, and strike support. Their logistics capability is only now beginning to appear. Their Institutional Army (Military Schools, logistics base, manufacturing) is beginning to show encouraging signs of self-initiative.

The Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior have shown dramatic and rapid growth in capacity and competence since LTG Dempsey took them under his care. However, the corruption and lack of capability of the ministries will require several years of patient coaching and officer education in values as well as the required competencies. The Iraqi people clearly want a National Army. The recruiting now has gotten significant participation by all sectarian groups to include the Sunni. The Partnership Program with U.S. units will be the key to success with the Embedded Training Teams augmented and nurtured by a U.S. Maneuver Commander. This is simply a brilliant success story. We need at least two-to-five more years of U.S. partnership and combat backup to get the Iraqi Army ready to stand on its own. The interpersonal relationships between Iraqi Army units and their U.S. trainers are very positive and genuine.

3rd - The Iraqi police are beginning to show marked improvement in capability since MG Joe Peterson took over the program. The National Police Commando Battalions are very capable - a few are simply superb and on par with the best U.S. SWAT units in terms of equipment, courage, and training. Their intelligence collection capability is better than ours in direct HUMINT.

The crux of the war hangs on our ability to create urban and rural local police with the ability to survive on the streets of this incredibly dangerous and lethal environment. The police must have fortified local stations (more than a thousand), local jails (more than a thousand), armored Humvees (more than 3000), a nationwide command and control system, embedded U.S. contractor trainers, and in the key battleground areas of Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, and Kirkuk - they need a remote area camera monitoring system such as we now have in most of our major cities.

The police are heavily infiltrated by both the AIF and the Shia militia. They are widely distrusted by the Sunni population. They are incapable of confronting local armed groups. They inherited a culture of inaction, passivity, human rights abuses, and deep corruption.

This will be a ten year project requiring patience, significant resources, and an international public face. This is a very, very tough challenge which is a prerequisite to the Iraqis winning the counter-insurgency struggle they will face in the coming decade. We absolutely can do this. But this police program is now inadequately resourced.

4th - The creation of an Iraqi government of national unity is a central requirement. We must help create a legitimate government for which the Iraqi security forces will fight and die. If we do not see the successful development of a pluralistic administration in the first 120 days of the emerging Jawad al-Maliki leadership - there will be significant chance of the country breaking apart in warring factions among the Sunnis and Shia - with a separatist Kurdish north embroiled in their own potential struggle with the Turks.

The incompetence and corruption of the interim Iraqi Administration has been significant. There is total lack of trust among the families, the tribes, and the sectarian factions created by the 35 years of despotism and isolation of the criminal Saddam regime. This is a traumatized society with a malignant political culture. There is a huge "brain drain" taking place with educated and wealthy Iraqis getting out with their money. This is a loss of the potential leadership to solve the mess that is Iraq today. The pot is also being stirred from the outside Iraq by six neighboring states - none of which have provided significant economic or political assistance.

However, in my view, the Iraqis are likely to successfully create a governing entity. The intelligence picture strongly portrays a population that wants a federal Iraq, wants a national Army, rejects the AIF as a political future for the nation, and is optimistic that their life can be better in the coming years. Unlike the Balkans—the Iraqis want this to work. The bombing of the Samarra Mosque brought the country to the edge of all-out war. However, the Iraqi Army did not crack, the moderates held, Sistani called for restraint, the Sunnis got a chill of fear seeing what could happen to them as a minority population, and the Coalition Forces suddenly were seen correctly as a vital force that could keep the population safe in the absence of Iraqi power. In addition, the Shia were reminded that Iran is a Persian power with goals that conflict with the Shia Arabs of southern and central Iraq.

It is likely that the Iraqis will pull together enough political muscle to get through the coming 30 day crisis to produce a cabinet to submit to the Parliament - as well as the four month deadline to consider constitutional amendments. The resulting government is likely to be weak and barely functional. It may stagger along and fail in 18 months. But it is very likely to prevent the self-destruction of Iraq. Our brilliant and effective U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad will be the essential ingredient to keeping Iraq together. If the U.S. loses his leadership in the coming year, this thing could implode.

5th - The foreign jihadist fighters have been defeated as a strategic and operational threat to the creation of an Iraqi government. Aggressive small unit combat action by Coalition Forces combined with good intelligence - backed up by new Iraqi Security Forces is making an impact. The foreign fighters remain a serious tactical menace. However, they are a minor threat to the heavily armed and wary U.S. forces. They cannot successfully stop the Iraqi police and army recruitment. Their brutal attacks on the civil population are creating support for the emerging government. The foreign fighters have failed to spark open civil war from the Shia. The Samarra bombing may well have inoculated the

country to the possible horror of total war. The Iraqis are rejecting the vision of a religious state. The al Qaeda in-Iraq organization is now largely Sunni Iraqi - not foreign fighters. U.S. Marine and Army combat effectiveness - combined with very effective information operations--- has taken the fun out of Jihad.

6th - The U.S. Inter-Agency Support for our strategy in Iraq is grossly inadequate. A handful of brilliant, courageous, and dedicated Foreign Service Officers have held together a large, constantly changing, marginally qualified, inadequately experienced U.S. mission. The U.S. influence on the Iraqi national and regional government has been extremely weak. U.S. consultants of the IRMO do not live and work with their Iraqi counterparts, are frequently absent on leave or home consultations, are often in-country for short tours of 90 days to six months, and are frequently gapped with no transfer of institutional knowledge.

In Iraq, nothing is possible without carefully managed relationships between the U.S. officials and their Iraqi interlocutors. Trust between people is the prerequisite and basis of progress for this deeply Arab culture. The other U.S. agencies of government such as Justice, DHS, Commerce, Agriculture, and Transportation are in Iraq in small numbers for too short time periods. The U.S. Departments actually fight over who will pay the \$11.00 per day per diem on food. This bureaucratic nonsense is taking place in the context of a war costing the American people \$7 billion a month - and a battalion of soldiers and Marines killed or wounded a month.

The State Department actually cannot direct assignment of their officers to serve in Iraq. State frequently cannot staff essential assignments such as the new PRTs which have the potential to produce such huge impact in Iraq. The bottom line is that only the CIA and the U.S. Armed Forces are at war. This situation cries out for remedy.

7th - We face a serious strategic dilemma. Are U.S. combat troops operating in a police action governed by the rule of Iraqi law? Or are they a Coalition Military Force supporting a counter-insurgency campaign in a nation with almost no functioning institutions? The situation must remain ambiguous until the Iraqi government is actually operating effectively. We currently have excellent rules of engagement (ROE) governing the use of lethal force. These rules are now morphing under the pressures of political sensitivity at tactical level.

Many U.S. soldiers feel constrained not to use lethal force as the option of first instance against clearly identified and armed AIF terrorists - but instead follow essentially police procedures. Without question, we must clearly and dramatically rein in the use of lethal force - and zero out the collateral killing or wounding of innocent civilians trying to survive in this war zone. However, the tactical rules of engagement will need constant monitoring to maintain an appropriate balance.

8th - Thanks to strong CENTCOM leadership and supervision at every level, our detainee policy has dramatically corrected the problems of the first year of the War on Terrorism. Detainee practices and policy in detention centers in both Iraq and Afghanistan that I have visited are firm, professional, humane, and well supervised. However, we may be in danger of over-correcting. The AIF are exploiting our overly restrictive procedures and are routinely defying the U.S. interrogators. It is widely believed that the US has a "14 day catch and release policy" and the AIF "suspect" will soon be back in action.

This is an overstatement of reality, however, we do have a problem. Many of the AIF detainees routinely accuse U.S. soldiers of abuse under the silliest factual situations knowing it will trigger an automatic investigation. In my view, we will need to move very rapidly to a policy of the Iraqis taking legal charge of the detainees in our Brigade Detention Centers--- with us serving a support not lead role. We may need to hire U.S. contractor law enforcement teams at U.S. tactical battalion level to support the function of "evidentiary packages" as well as accompanying prisoners to testify in court in Baghdad.

9th - The stateside Army and Marine Corps needs significant manpower augmentation to continue the Iraq counter-insurgency and Iraqi training mission. In my judgment, CENTCOM must constrain the force level in Iraq or we risk damaging our ground combat capability which we will need in the ongoing deterrence of threat from North Korea, Iran, Syria, China against Taiwan, Venezuela, Cuba, and other potential flashpoints.

The stateside Army and Marine Corps also must rapidly create an enhanced Arabic language capability in the Armed Forces. We need to take 20% of each Leavenworth class and 10% of each advanced course class and put them through a 90 day total immersion Defense Language Institute Arabic course using only native speakers.

10th - CENTCOM and the U.S. Mission are running out of the most significant leverage we have in Iraq - economic reconstruction dollars. Having spent \$18 billion - we now have \$1.6 billion of new funding left in the pipeline. Iraq cannot sustain the requisite economic recovery without serious U.S. support. The Allies are not going to help. They will not fulfill their pledges. Most of their pledges are loans not grants.

It would be misguided policy to fail to achieve our political objective after a \$400 billion war because we refused to sustain the requirement to build a viable economic state. Unemployment is a bigger enemy than the AIF. It is my view that we will fail to achieve our political-military objectives in the coming 24 months if we do not continue economic support on the order of \$5-10 billion per year. This is far, far less than the cost of fighting these people.

11th - We need to better equip the Iraqi Army with a capability to deter foreign attack - and to have a leveraged advantage over the Shia militias and the AIF insurgents they must continue to confront. The resources we are now planning to provide are inadequate by an order of magnitude or more. The cost of a coherent development of the Iraqi security forces is the ticket out of Iraq - and the avoidance of the constant drain of huge U.S. resources on a monthly basis.

12th - There is a rapidly growing animosity in our deployed military forces toward the U.S. media. We need to bridge this gap. Armies do not fight wars - countries fight wars. We need to continue talking to the American people through the press. They will be objective in reporting facts if we facilitate their information gathering mission. The country is way too dangerous for the media to operate in any other manner than temporarily imbedded with U.S. or Iraqi security forces. The enormous good will already generated by the superb performance of U.S. combat forces will ebb away if we do not continue to actively engage media at every level. We also cannot discount 2000 IED's a month, hundreds of US casualties a month, or the chaos of the central battlefield of the insurgency - which is Baghdad.

13th - U.S. public diplomacy and rhetoric about confronting Iranian nuclear weapons is scaring neighbors in the Gulf. They will not support another war. They have no integrated missile and interceptor air defense. They have no credible maritime coastal defense system to protect their ports and oil production facilities. Our Mid-East allies believe correctly that they are ill-equipped to deal with Iranian strikes to close the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. They do not think they can handle politically or militarily a terrorist threat nested in their domestic Shia populations.

A U.S. military confrontation with Iran could result in Sadr attacking our forces in Baghdad - or along our 400 mile line of communications out of Iraq to the sea. The Iranian people have collectively decided to go nuclear. The Chinese and the Russians will not in the end support serious collective action against Iran. The Iranians will achieve their nuclear weapon purpose within 5-10 years.

Now is the time for us to create the asymmetrical alliances and defensive capabilities to hedge the Iranian nuclear threat without pre-emptive warfare. We can bankrupt and isolate the Iranians as we did the Soviet Union and create a stronger Gulf Alliance that will effectively deter this menace to our security.

5. SUMMARY:

The U.S. will remain in a serious crisis in Iraq during the coming 24 months. There is decreasing U.S. domestic support for the war; although in my view the American people understand that we must not fail or we risk a ten year disaster of foreign policy in the vital Gulf Oil Region. U.S. public opinion may become increasingly alienated by Iraqi ingratitude for our sacrifice on their behalf (huge percentages of both the Shia and Sunni populations believe that the MNF Coalition forces are the single greatest threat to safety and security in Iraq today) ---and by astonishingly corrupt and incompetent Iraqi management of their own recovery. (Much of the national oil and electricity problem is caused by poor maintenance or deliberate internal sabotage of the infrastructure for reasons of criminal corruption ---or to prevent energy from flowing away from the production facilities to Baghdad.)

The situation is perilous, uncertain, and extreme - but far from hopeless. The U.S. Armed Forces are a rock. This is the most competent and brilliantly led military in a tactical and operational sense that we have ever fielded. Its courage and dedication is unabated after 20,000 killed and wounded. The U.S. leadership on the ground is superb at strategic level - Ambassador Khalilzad, General Abizaid, and General Casey. The Iraqi security forces are now surging into a lead role in internal counter-insurgency operations.

The Iraqi political system is fragile but beginning to play a serious role in the debate over the big challenges facing the Iraqi state - oil, religion, territory, power, separatism, and revenge. The neighboring states have refrained from tipping Iraq into open civil war. The UN is cautiously thinking about re-entry and doing their job of helping consolidate peace. The Iraqis are going to hold Saddam and his senior leadership accountable for their murderous behavior over 35 years. The brave Brits continue to support us both politically and militarily. NATO is a possible modest support to our efforts.

There is no reason why the U.S. cannot achieve our objectives in Iraq. Our aim must be to create a viable federal state under the rule of law which does not: enslave its own people, threaten its neighbors, or produce weapons of mass destruction. This is a ten year task. We should be able to draw down most of our combat forces in 3-5 years. We have few alternatives to the current US strategy which is painfully but gradually succeeding. This is now a race against time. Do we have the political will, do we have the military power, will we spend the resources required to achieve our aims?

It was very encouraging for me to see the progress achieved in the past year. Thanks to the leadership and personal sacrifice of the hundreds of thousands of men and women of the CENTCOM team and the CIA - the American people are far safer today than we were in the 18 months following the initial intervention.

Barry R McCaffrey
General USA (Ret)
Adjunct Professor of International Affairs
United States Military Academy
West Point, New York

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA
Sent: Friday, May 05, 2006 10:43 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD; Thorp, Frank
Cc: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA; (b)(6) CTR, OASD-PA
Subject: FYI - SECDEF on cover of new National Journal

(b)(6) and I thought you would want to know about this for situational awareness' sake.

SECDEF on cover of the May 6 National Journal. Cover headline: "Behind The Revolt" (You can see it at <http://nationaljournal.com/njcover.htm>) Cover story below. It will not be in the Bird.

National Journal
May 6, 2006

The Generals' Case

By James Kitfield

The matter of Rumsfeld v. the Generals bears close scrutiny. The controversy represents the worst breach in civil-military relations since Harry Truman dismissed Gen. Douglas MacArthur in 1951 for his conduct and his criticism of the president during the Korean War. It has proven an unwelcome distraction for Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and the Joint Chiefs, and has added to the already considerable woes of President Bush in his role as a wartime commander-in-chief. Notably, the calls from a group of recently retired generals that Rumsfeld should resign has also thrust senior military leaders and, by proxy, the uniformed services into the middle of a hyperpartisan political argument -- territory from which the U.S. military rarely escapes unscathed.

Given the nearly unprecedented nature of the controversy, what is perhaps most remarkable is how utterly unsurprising it is to anyone who has spent time with senior military officers, in the field, over drinks at the officers' club, or especially on the ground in Iraq. The fact that the Army chief of staff came out of retirement to take the job after sources say at least three active-duty generals declined it, and reports that the Marine Corps commandant, Gen. Michael W. Hagee, may retire before his term is up, speak volumes about the frayed state of civil-military relations in today's Pentagon.

Practically from the moment they first occupied the E Ring, Rumsfeld and his tight circle of senior aides demonstrated a dismissive attitude that has grated on uniformed leaders. In the view of Bush's civilian team, President Clinton had allowed the generals and the admirals to run roughshod. Rumsfeld and his band of reformers were a rude awakening for senior military leaders conditioned to expect a measure of courtesy from civilian bosses as a privilege of their rank; instead, Bush's team set out to show the generals who was boss.

Rumsfeld's incessant needling of the Army, in particular, to more rapidly reshape itself into an expeditionary force, at a time when the service has been run nearly ragged by back-to-back-to-back deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq, added insult to injury. From the beginning, the Rumsfeld reformers have also considered themselves bold revolutionaries who deal only in transformative ideas, and their "roll the dice" spirit in nearly all things has often been at odds with the more cautious nature of a uniformed military pledged to securing the Republic.

In response to Pentagon policies -- set by Rumsfeld and his inner circle -- pushing the envelope on prisoner treatment, for instance, eight retired generals and admirals have written to Bush asking for an independent, 9/11-type commission to investigate detainee abuse. Two of those senior officers, including the Navy's former judge advocate general, have joined a lawsuit seeking to hold Rumsfeld directly accountable for policies that gave rise to torture and abuse of U.S.-held prisoners.

Above all, the other eight (and counting) retired generals who have called for Rumsfeld's

resignation are wrestling to win the narrative of the Iraq war. Privately, most generals will tell you that a new Defense secretary is unlikely to change the dynamics of an Iraqi campaign now mostly defined by missed opportunities and foreclosed options. Notably, two of the eight served as division commanders in Iraq and saw firsthand how decisions made by their civilian bosses limited their military choices. Whatever the final outcome of the conflict, they and a large number of senior officers on active duty believe that the Office of the Secretary of Defense -- Rumsfeld and his top civilian advisers -- is responsible for the most poorly analyzed and mismanaged U.S. military intervention since Vietnam.

For these commanders, who have returned home with 2,400 fewer troops than they led into Iraq, that calls for some accountability.

"My primary issue with Secretary Rumsfeld's leadership is accountability, because I grew up in a culture where the captain of the ship or the commander of the unit is held responsible, and Rumsfeld has committed acts of gross negligence and incompetence," retired Marine Corps Gen. Anthony Zinni told National Journal. As head of U.S. Central Command, which oversees all American troops in the Middle East, Zinni and his staff planned and war-gamed an invasion of Iraq for years, plans that active-duty officers assured him were constantly updated right up to the moment that Rumsfeld discarded them.

"We knew that you would need a lot of troops to establish law and order over a traumatized population, and to combat all kinds of troublemaking elements coming from outside Iraq," Zinni said. "We knew that you had to secure the infrastructure and that reconstruction would be a huge and expensive task. We knew that Iraqi exiles like Ahmad Chalabi had zero credibility in the region. All of that was foreseeable, and yet our warnings were brushed aside and we were personally attacked," the general continued. "Rumsfeld said our planning was 'old and stale.' That this was going to be a 'cakewalk,' with 'shock and awe' and flowers in the streets, and Iraqi oil paying for reconstruction. Those were wild-eyed and patently ridiculous ideas."

High-Stakes Showdown

Regardless of the emotional content of the generals' arguments, the stakes of the controversy could hardly be greater. On a strategic level, the issues raised go to the fundamental judgment and competence of those entrusted with the nation's most lethal levers of power at a time of great uncertainty. The dangers include a potential confrontation with Iran over its supposed pursuit of nuclear weapons, while North Korea is waiting in the wings. And the war on terrorism continues.

The U.S. military is also poised to attempt the delicate process of extricating itself from Iraq within the next two years without setting the scene for that country, and the region, to descend into sectarian war. Meanwhile, another military manpower crunch is coming late this year and early next as planners search for soldiers and marines to deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan for their third -- and in some cases fourth -- combat tours, an effort necessitated by Rumsfeld's stubborn refusal to increase the size of U.S. infantry forces from pre-9/11 levels permanently, despite wars on multiple fronts and urgings from some in Congress.

In breaking with two centuries of military tradition, the retired generals asking for the head of Donald Rumsfeld have essentially gone around their former civilian bosses to put the question directly to the American people: Do you want to confront the crises ahead led by the person who brought you Iraq?

"My own decision to speak out goes back to watching firsthand the arrogant and contemptuous attitude of Rumsfeld as he ignored the advice of military experts during preparations for war, and then living with the impact of those strategic blunders as a division commander in Iraq," retired Army Maj. Gen. John Batiste said in an interview. After serving in the Pentagon as chief military aide to then-Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz -- where he was privy to many high-level meetings -- and then commanding the 1st Infantry Division in Iraq, Batiste declined promotion to lieutenant general and command of an Army corps. "That was a gut-wrenching decision for me, but at some point I realized that in order to try and change course and have this debate, I had to retire," he said. "Secretary Rumsfeld and his team turned what should have been a deliberate victory in Iraq into a prolonged challenge. My concern now is that we still have a long way to go in the Iraq war, and other monumental decisions are coming just around the corner. Don't the American people deserve senior leaders whose instincts and judgments they can trust?"

Not surprisingly, Bush has vigorously defended his Defense secretary, having already declined the resignations that Rumsfeld tendered in 2004 over the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. The era when President Clinton's Defense secretary, Les Aspin, resigned over a single bad day in Somalia and a controversy over gays in the military now seems almost quaint. One irony of the current controversy, however, is that in speaking out the generals may have actually helped secure Rumsfeld's job. No wartime president can bow to such public pressure from senior military voices without appearing weak, and firing Rumsfeld would also amount to an admission by Bush that the defining issue of his presidency was fraught with strategic mistakes.

Yet the seriousness of the controversy warrants at least an examination of the generals' writ. It's not just that the military leaders have called for Rumsfeld's resignation, it's that they cite specific decisions that they say he got terribly, terribly wrong. The list of particulars was perhaps best summarized by retired Lt. Gen. Greg Newbold, the top operations officer on the Joint Staff in the run-up to the Iraq war. Before he stepped down, Newbold was a strong candidate for future commandant of the Marine Corps. "What we are living with now is the consequences of successive policy failures," Newbold wrote in Time magazine. "Some of the missteps include: the distortion of intelligence in the buildup to the war, McNamara-like micromanagement that kept our forces from having enough resources to do the job, the failure to retain and reconstitute the Iraqi military in time to help quell civil disorder, initial denial that insurgency was at the heart of the opposition to occupation, alienation of allies who could have helped in a more robust way to rebuild Iraq, and the continuing failure of other agencies of U.S. government to commit themselves to the same degree as the Defense Department." Here are the details behind the generals' specific complaints.

The Intelligence

The failure to find Saddam Hussein's stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, President Bush's casus belli for the invasion, still tops many after-action assessments. As was detailed in the bipartisan Robb-Silberman report on intelligence regarding weapons of mass destruction, an intelligence failure of that magnitude has many fathers. The question posed by the generals is whether Rumsfeld and his top aides were prominent among them.

In fact, despite the general assumption within the vast U.S. intelligence network that Saddam almost certainly retained some residual or reconstituted chemical and biological (but not nuclear) weapons capabilities, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were not satisfied with the often qualified and inconclusive intelligence on Iraq's WMD programs that filtered up through the intelligence bureaucracy. Nor was Rumsfeld's confidant, Vice President Cheney. So Wolfowitz had the Pentagon's No. 3 civilian, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, establish a new intelligence shop on Iraq called the Office of Special Plans.

OSP operated outside normal intelligence channels and was known to have very close ties to Cheney's office and to Iraqi exile Ahmad Chalabi and his network of Iraqi defectors, who had a vested interest in overthrowing Saddam. The vice president's chief of staff and top national security adviser, I. Lewis (Scooter) Libby, was a former protege of Wolfowitz's, having worked with him in the Pentagon in the early 1990s on issues involving weapons of mass destruction.

Many experts believe that OSP circumvented the normal vetting and filtering process by which intelligence made its way up the pyramid of collection and analysis, and instead relayed essentially raw intelligence gathered from Chalabi's defectors directly to the vice president's office, where it found its way into Cheney's speeches. In August 2002, for instance, Cheney proclaimed, "There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction" and is pursuing "an aggressive nuclear weapons program" that Cheney surmised would soon produce a weapon. Nor was there any doubt, Cheney said, that "he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us." In his address to the United Nations in October 2002, Bush thus posited the case for pre-emptive war against Iraq: "We cannot wait for the final proof -- the smoking gun -- that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud."

Notably, at the time of Cheney's speech the Pentagon, and not the CIA, was circulating a detailed intelligence briefing on Baghdad's nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs to key allies and members of Congress, and was reportedly working on a report that would show links between Al Qaeda and Iraq. The Pentagon official spearheading that

briefing was J.D. Crouch, Rumsfeld's assistant secretary of Defense for international security policy.

The Robb-Silberman report concluded that two Chalabi-supplied Iraqi defectors were "fabricators." The use of another serial liar, a source code-named "Curveball," who was behind reports of Iraqi mobile biological weapons labs, was, the report noted, "at bottom, a story of Defense Department collectors who abdicated their responsibility to vet a critical source..." The 9/11 commission report, meanwhile, found no credible operational links between Al Qaeda and Saddam's regime. Since the reports' release, both Bill Luti, who ran the Pentagon's Office of Special Plans, and Crouch have gone on to work for the National Security Council, in the White House.

"As someone doing consulting work for the CIA right up until the war started, I saw the intelligence on Iraq's WMD, and I can tell you that the administration's talk of an imminent danger of 'mushroom clouds' wasn't just a stretch," Zinni said. "Quite frankly, it was outright bullshit. I asked the CIA analysts where that was coming from, and they just stared at their shoes."

McNamara-Like Micromanagement

Did Rumsfeld micromanage the Iraq operation to the degree that Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and President Johnson did with Vietnam? ("I won't let those Air Force generals bomb even the smallest outhouse without checking with me!" Johnson used to brag.) Bush asked about Rumsfeld's management approach when talking to the Pentagon's top civilian in Iraq, Paul Bremer, who headed the Coalition Provisional Authority in 2003-2004. "I like Don, Mr. President. I've known him for 30 years, admire him, and consider him highly intelligent. But he does micromanage," Bremer recalls in his book *My Year in Iraq*. "Don terrifies his subordinates, so that I can rarely get any decisions out of anyone but him."

From a military standpoint, Exhibit A in the micromanagement charge is Rumsfeld's insistence in the critical period leading up to the Iraq invasion that the Joint Staff and the Central Command jettison the Time Phased Force and Deployment List. What the military calls the "Tip Fid" is the matrix by which theater commanders identify the forces needed for a specific campaign and the services prioritize the deployment of those forces and requisite support units. The methodical, timed, and phased nature of such a deployment scheme assaulted Rumsfeld's notions of "transformational war," and he derided the Tip Fid as part of the military's "Industrial Age" thinking. Rumsfeld and his aides favored a "just in time" buildup to war fashioned more on the FedEx model -- hold everything back until you absolutely need it.

War is not package delivery, however, and the Pentagon civilians' insistence on scuttling the Tip Fid infuriated commanders in the Middle East, who were ordered to move into Iraq even as units needed to guard their exposed supply lines were still pouring off ships in Kuwait. Often those forces arrived in the wrong order of priority and with inadequate supplies and transport.

"Rumsfeld insists that the Tip Fid process is too ponderous and slow, and it may well be, but it's the only process we have for managing the flow of forces into theater and matching them with needed lift and support," a senior general involved in planning the invasion told *National Journal* at the time. "Since we've been ordered to abandon the Tip Fid, it would be really nice if those of us responsible for executing this campaign knew and understood what the hell is supposed to replace it. And we don't!"

Too Few Troops

When then-Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki told Congress before the Iraq war that it would take on the order of "several hundred thousand" troops to stabilize the country, the general was actually being conservative. Central Command's war plan for Iraq originally called for a minimum of 380,000 troops to topple the regime and secure the country. Studying force-to-population ratios in seven previous occupations, ranging from Germany and Japan in the 1940s all the way to Somalia and the Balkans in the 1990s, the Rand think tank prepared a report shortly before the Iraq war that was brought to Rumsfeld's attention. Rand put the number of troops needed to stabilize Iraq at 500,000.

Yet Wolfowitz derided Shinseki's "notion of hundreds of thousands of American troops" as "way off the mark," and OSD made Shinseki a lame duck by naming his replacement more than a year before his scheduled retirement. After constant pressure from Rumsfeld prompted

Central Command's Gen. Tommy Franks to whittle the invasion force down to roughly 140,000 U.S. troops, it became clear that in their overriding focus on transformation and bold new ideas, Pentagon civilians had ignored the lessons of even recent history.

Rumsfeld has never acknowledged that those forces proved manifestly inadequate to the task of taming an ethnically fractious country of 27 million inhabitants. Ultimately, there were too few troops to stop the looting and the growing sense of anarchy and lawlessness that took hold in the weeks and months after Saddam's regime fell, or to guard abandoned Iraqi army ammo dumps from raids by the nascent insurgency. As a result, the U.S. military saw its critical honeymoon of liberation cut short in Iraq, and some senior commanders have never forgotten it.

The generals are, however, at least partly responsible for the lack of sufficient troops in Iraq. Knowing after the Shinseki affair that OSD would deem a request for more troops most unwelcome, and understanding that if a larger force were committed to Iraq it would hasten the day when deployments would break the back of their Army and National Guard combat and support units, the generals kept mum or played word games in public. In early September 2003, for instance, the senior commander in Iraq, Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, insisted that he had enough troops for the mission "currently assigned." At the time that mission did not include fighting an all-out insurgency, confronting renegade militias, training a new Iraqi army, securing the porous border against terrorist infiltration, or holding ground cleared of insurgents by U.S. military sweeps. "If a militia or internal conflict of some nature were to erupt ... that would be a challenge out there that I do not have sufficient force for," Sanchez said then.

When those challenges and more arose in the fateful spring of 2004, however, the generals still bit their tongues in public about the need for more troops. They did so even after Rumsfeld pulled what many of them saw as a bait and switch. He originally assured uniformed leaders that the Army's 1st Cavalry Division was in the pipeline to reinforce the U.S. invasion force, and then he abruptly canceled the deployment.

So, did Rumsfeld fail to supply his generals with adequate forces in Iraq? The Bush administration's top man there certainly thought so. As early as July 2003, well before the insurgency had fully coalesced, Bremer spoke with then-National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, as he recalls in his book. "In my view, the coalition's got about half the number of soldiers we need here," Bremer told her. "And we run the risk of having this thing go south on us."

Disbanding Iraq's Army

When Bremer signed Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 2 on May 23, 2003, formally dissolving all Iraqi military formations, he had some compelling reasons. Iraqi security forces were an instrument of Saddam's brutal repression; they were viewed as a threat by both the Kurds and the Shiite Iraqi exiles like Chalabi who were so favored by OSD; and, anyway, those uniformed forces had largely melted away after the regime collapsed. After discussing the idea with his civilian staff, Bremer vetted his plan to abolish all Iraqi intelligence, security, and military forces with Rumsfeld and Feith. Both approved the idea.

For many military commanders in Iraq, however, the idea was pure folly. As opposed to Saddam's brutal Republican Guard, the regular Iraqi army was a relatively respected institution into which many Iraqis had been conscripted and had served honorably, especially during the Iraq-Iran war. Because the Iraqi army also had its own command-and-control systems and mobility, U.S. military experts believed that if the force were reconstituted quickly, it could prove critical in establishing security and helping with reconstruction.

Did military experts share their concerns with Bremer? One who did was retired Army Lt. Gen. Jay Garner, the head of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, the initial American postwar overseer in Baghdad. Bremer later replaced Garner. The retired general advised Bremer that abolishing the Iraqi army would be a huge mistake. Once again, however, military advice went unheeded. With Iraq's long, hot summer of occupation just beginning in 2003, the second edict of Bremer's Pentagon-led occupational authority threw hundreds of thousands of military-age Iraqi men out of work, with every last one of them nursing a grudge and trained to bear arms.

The CPA's first edict? Feith's "De-Baathification of Iraqi Society" order. Perhaps not

surprisingly, the process was eventually entrusted to Chalabi, who predictably took the purge to draconian levels and further inflamed the Sunni-based insurgency. That may be why Franks, the top U.S. commander of the Iraq war, wrote in his autobiography that Feith was "getting a reputation around here as the dumbest [expletive] guy on the planet."

"Why de-Baathification was handed to Chalabi was one of the great mysteries to all of us, because it was absolutely the wrong thing to do," said a senior active-duty general who was in Iraq at the time. "Chalabi had a vested interest in the total elimination of the Baathist structure in Iraq as a way of clearing the political field. To say that his de-Baathification efforts undercut our attempts to bring the Sunnis into the political process would be an understatement."

No New Iraqi Army

If U.S. military commanders in Iraq were outraged at the formal dissolution of the Iraqi army, they were absolutely confounded by the CPA's noted lack of urgency in training a force to take its place. Because Saddam had used the Republican Guard to keep his boot on the necks of the Iraqi people, Bremer believed that any new army should have only external security responsibilities -- guarding borders and the like. With the old Iraqi army formally dissolved, no new one on the horizon, and growing signs of an organized insurgency by fall 2003, however, U.S. commanders viewed that plan as sentencing U.S. troops to indefinite service in Iraq.

U.S. commanders in Iraq understood better than most that raising an army from scratch was a mammoth enterprise likely to take years. In the end, they won approval to create a small number of "Iraqi National Guard" battalions, but the training and equipping of even these units had to come out of the hides of coalition forces in Iraq, already stretched thin. A year after the invasion, there were not enough personal weapons for even the new Iraqi National Guard battalions.

Meanwhile, Bremer assigned responsibility for overseeing creation of the New Iraqi Army to a civilian on his staff, Walter Slocombe, who announced the rather modest first-year objective of forming a single army division of roughly 12,000 troops. Even that effort, according to U.S. military commanders, was plagued by chronic underfunding and a lack of adequate manpower, resources, and high-level attention.

"History will have to sort out the pros and cons of disbanding the Iraqi army, but even proponents of the idea understood that you would have to immediately devote a lot of resources and manpower to replacing it, and the fact that never happened is a damning indictment of Secretary Rumsfeld's leadership," retired Army Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton, who led the initial effort to create a New Iraqi Army, told National Journal. "Instead, I fell in on a staff of five guys borrowed from Central Command's staff, and we were supposed to build an army for a country of 27 million people. And I never did get the people and money that were promised to execute the mission, and that same lack of urgency persists even today."

When some of the Iraqi National Guard battalions and units of the New Iraqi Army were thrown into battle in the simultaneous Sunni and Shiite uprisings in spring 2004 -- what Bremer called "the most critical crisis of the occupation" -- most of the poorly trained and ill-equipped Iraqis went AWOL or refused to fight. That left the mission of quelling the uprisings to U.S. forces in Iraq. At the time, those forces included one of Paul Eaton's two sons in uniform.

"Some people have criticized my comments as counterproductive to the war effort, but with two children in uniform this is very personal for me," said Eaton, who called for Rumsfeld's resignation in a recent op-ed in The New York Times. "I looked at the terrible path Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has led us down, and I thought two and a half more years of that leadership was too long for my nation, for my Army, and for my family."

Alienating Allies

From the beginning, the Rumsfeld team viewed NATO and other venerable U.S. alliances in a suspect light. A multilateral alliance might be useful for nation-building operations in the Balkans and for keeping the peace in Europe, but such mundane missions held no allure for the Rumsfeld reformers. Certainly in terms of combat, OSD viewed such alliances as too much of a constraint on its vision of transformational warfare. This opinion comported with some air-power advocates in uniform who derided the "war by committee" character of

NATO's 1999 campaign in Kosovo.

So when NATO proudly invoked its collective defense clause for the first time in history to come to America's aid after the 9/11 attacks, allied nations were stunned by the Pentagon's reply of "thanks, but no thanks." As Rumsfeld memorably told NATO members when the U.S. set out unilaterally to topple the Taliban and take the fight to Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, "The mission will define the coalition."

Even when that mission entailed invading and occupying a country of 27 million people, however, OSD seemed remarkably cavalier about the need for a broad coalition. Rumsfeld infuriated European allies when he responded to German and French reluctance to invade Iraq by rhetorically dividing the Continent into "old Europe" and "new Europe." Wolfowitz's suggestion that the Turkish military should help overcome civilian resistance there to the war upset many civilians in the Ankara government, which eventually denied a U.S. request to launch a northern front in Iraq from Turkish territory. After Saddam's regime fell, the Pentagon further alienated allies by suggesting that French and German contractors would be barred from the anticipated spoils of Iraqi reconstruction.

Did the Pentagon's incursions into prewar diplomacy help alienate venerable U.S. allies? One person who thought so was the official frequently tasked with trying to mend those frayed relations. "Terms like 'old Europe' didn't exactly have a confidence-building effect, and clearly helped turn public opinion in Europe against us," former Secretary of State Colin Powell told the German magazine Stern in an interview last year.

Although the Bush administration eventually cobbled together a coalition of some 30 nations in Iraq, the generals have always understood that their support from allies is a mile wide and an inch deep. The lack of allied help denied them the much-desired northern front during the invasion, cost them a multinational division planned for fall 2003, and left them without the legitimacy that major Arab allies might have bestowed on a genuine coalition operation. Several key allies have announced plans to pull their forces out of Iraq this year. Perhaps most important, polls taken before the war clearly showed that the American public would have been much more supportive of the war if the U.S. were perceived as being part of a broad coalition.

None of that would have mattered if OSD's optimistic assumptions going into Iraq -- that U.S. forces would be viewed overwhelmingly and lastingly as liberators, that the basic structures of government would remain intact, that Iraqi oil would pay for the country's reconstruction, that democratic reforms could surmount long-standing ethnic divisions -- had proven true. But because those assumptions proved wrong, and with the U.S. military entering its fourth year in Iraq, that lack of broad and deep support at home and abroad matters a lot.

"I have nothing personal against Rumsfeld; I've never even met him," said Zinni, who has a son in uniform serving in Afghanistan. "But how can we change course, move forward, and win allies back to our cause when the same person who put us on this disastrous path and burned those allies in the past is still at the helm, saying nothing has changed and no mistakes have been made? I just don't think you can be open to new ideas and courses of action if you have a vested interest in constantly defending old decisions."

Not Fading Away

Rumsfeld is reportedly worried that the revolt of the generals has weakened the principle of civilian control of the military, and in that concern he has much company. Whatever blame Rumsfeld shares for a civil-military relationship in tatters, the active-duty and retired flag officers who have rushed to his defense recognize that their comrades have violated an important tradition. One reason that the U.S. military consistently polls as the most respected institution in America is that it's viewed as being above politics.

In particular, the Joint Chiefs, hand-picked by Rumsfeld, understand the implied criticism in the generals' writ against their boss: that the chiefs have too often acted as "yes men," insulating Rumsfeld in an echo chamber.

"I haven't noticed any shrinking lilies among the Joint Chiefs, and we all understand our responsibility to state our advice, and for the chairman [of the Joint Chiefs] to take that advice to the secretary of Defense and the president," Gen. Peter Schoomaker, the Army chief of staff, said recently to defense reporters. "That doesn't mean our bosses always agree with our advice. At the end of the day, you have to ask yourself: Is a

decision legal, ethical, and can I live with the consequences? If you can't, then you do have a responsibility to do something about it; but in my opinion, you should do it while still in uniform. If you've gone through the debate and lived with the decision, I think it's inappropriate to go around cleansing your conscience in public after the fact. I certainly don't want civil authorities distrusting military advice because they're worried about what someone is going to say publicly down the road."

By tradition, old soldiers who can no longer in good conscience obey their civilian masters are supposed to state their case in private, offer their resignation, and then quietly fade away. Air Force Chief of Staff Ron Fogleman did that in 1997 over disagreement with the Clinton administration's military drawdown and OSD's disciplining of one of his generals over the Khobar Towers terrorist attack in Saudi Arabia. Despite being treated shabbily, Shinseki in retirement has largely declined to publicly criticize Rumsfeld. Ever the old soldier, Colin Powell, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs, has refused to directly criticize Rumsfeld and Cheney for their largely successful efforts to marginalize him in the Iraq debate.

Especially for the post-Vietnam generations of officers, however, this burden of silence weighs uneasily. Nearly all of them have read *Dereliction of Duty*, a seminal book by Army Col. H.R. McMaster, published in 1997, that was once on the chairman of the Joint Chiefs' required reading list. In it, McMaster excoriates the Vietnam-era Joint Chiefs and other senior military leaders for not speaking out more forcefully against misguided policies that many in uniform believed cost them a war and the lives of tens of thousands of American soldiers. President Johnson's "plan of deception depended on the tacit approval or silence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," McMaster wrote. "LBJ had misrepresented the mission of U.S. ground forces in Vietnam, distorted the views of the chiefs to lend credibility to his decision against mobilization, grossly understated the numbers of troops General [William] Westmoreland had requested, and lied to the Congress about the monetary cost of actions already approved and of those awaiting final decision.... The 'five silent men' on the Joint Chiefs made possible the way the United States went to war in Vietnam."

Retired Army Gen. Barry McCaffrey was one of the most decorated combat veterans of Vietnam and a division commander in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. "You know, when people ask me whether Secretary Rumsfeld should resign, I tell them it would be inappropriate for me to comment on such a personal matter, but I will provide my objective view on some of his policies that have gotten this country and our military into serious trouble," he told *National Journal*. "I still think our national leadership has the unquestioned loyalty of our senior military leaders in uniform. These retired generals who are speaking out, however, I view as combat veterans with the full rights of U.S. citizens to talk about the security challenges they see facing the country."

For the Vietnam generation of officers and those who mentored at their shoulder, the quintessential model of a leader struggling with the dilemma of divided loyalties is not Gen. George Catlett Marshall, but rather Gen. Edward (Shy) Meyer. Given that the Senate Armed Services Committee recently announced possible hearings on the matter of Rumsfeld v. the Generals, his case is worth contemplating.

In the spring of 1980, the Soviet Union had just invaded Afghanistan, U.S. diplomats were still being held hostage in Iran, and the U.S. military was reeling from a post-Vietnam decade of poor morale and defense cutbacks. As Army chief of staff, Meyer knew that speaking out publicly on that sorry state of affairs would be viewed as an act of disloyalty by his civilian bosses in the Pentagon and by President Carter, who was entering a difficult re-election campaign.

A veteran of Vietnam, Meyer was also mindful that the United States military was nearly unique in taking its oath of allegiance not to an individual leader, political party, or monarch, but rather to the principles and ideals in the Constitution. The Constitution prescribed not only civilian control of the military but also a separation of powers, establishing the president as commander-in-chief but giving Congress the responsibility for the raising of armies. So when members of Congress asked the general in public testimony about the state of their army, Meyer told them that the United States had a "hollow Army."

Pointedly, Meyer did not directly criticize the commander-in-chief or call for the resignation of the secretary of Defense. He privately offered his own resignation. It was not accepted. When the secretary of the Army, his civilian boss, demanded that Meyer

rescind his comments about a "hollow Army," however, he flatly refused. Gen. Shy Meyer just told the truth and trusted in the Constitution. The American people did the rest.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, May 04, 2006 3:47 PM
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Smith, Dorrance Mr OSD PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; Thorp, Frank, RDML, OASD-PA; Turner, James, CIV, OASD-PA; Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD
Subject: CNN wants a comment.

CNN.com is writing a story about THIS, and wants to know if the Pentagon will comment on it, or even give a "no comment". Do you have a response?

A seven-page assessment of the status of the war in Iraq by retired Gen. Barry McCaffrey, who's now an adjunct professor at West Point. McCaffrey concludes that the United States "will remain in a serious crisis in Iraq during the coming 24 months," that achieving U.S. goals there is a 10-year task and most combat troops won't be coming out for 3-5 years. The American strategy is "painfully but gradually succeeding," but requires more reconstruction money, greater commitment by the State Department and more funding for Iraqi police.

He also concludes that U.S. rhetoric on Iran is scaring away the neighbors, and recommends a long-term strategy to "bankrupt and isolate" Iran the way the West brought down the Soviet Union.

Here's what Slate posted.

<http://img.slate.com/media/57/AAR%20General%20McCaffrey%20Visit%20to%20Iraq%20April%202006%20USMA.pdf>

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, May 03, 2006 6:30 PM
To: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: you up for a drink?

Hey, sorry, stuck at work. We're doing a telephone town hall meeting tonight - we call 30,000 constituents, some get a voicemail, some answer and hear a message from (b)(6) and some click in to participate in a conf call.

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA [mailto:Dallas.Lawrence@(b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, May 03, 2006 6:23 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: you up for a drink?

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, April 19, 2006 10:04 AM
To: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: McClellan

She would be good. And a woman would be a good choice.

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA [mailto:Dallas.Lawrence@(b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, April 19, 2006 10:00 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: McClellan

My money is on (b)(6). She is hard nosed, doesn't take shit and will eat the press crosop alive.

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, April 19, 2006 9:58 AM
To: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: McClellan

Well, that sounds impressive. Here's the Fox article --

FOX News' Tony Snow Among Possible White House Spokesman Candidates

Wednesday, April 19, 2006

WASHINGTON — With a few personnel shifts going on in the White House, there's speculation that presidential spokesman Scott McClellan may be looking to step down.

One of the people the White House has approached as a possible replacement for McClellan is FOX News Radio host Tony Snow. The White House discussed the possibility with Snow as recently as this week.

Snow, who hosts "The Tony Snow Show," once served as a speechwriter for President George H.W. Bush.

Other people have also been approached about the position, including former Pentagon spokeswoman Victoria

Clark and Dan Senior, the former Coalition Provisional Authority spokesman in Iraq, who served the U.S. civil administrator in Iraq, Paul Bremer.

McClellan, who has been press secretary for two years, refuses to speculate about his own future. But he has acknowledged that he has held the job for "a long time."

A spokesman switch would come as new White House Chief of Staff Josh Bolten is looking to solidify a staff by meeting with all personnel members individually about their futures in the Bush administration.

Bolten, who took over for Andy Card as White House chief of staff late Friday, told staffers on Monday that if they thought they would leave their posts in the near future, they should do so soon.

On Tuesday, President Bush tapped U.S. Trade Representative Rob Portman for the head of the Office of Management and Budget. Susan C. Schwab, a deputy USTR, has been chosen to take over for Portman. Also, Jim Towey, head of the White House office of faith-based and community initiatives, resigned to become president of St. Vincent College in Pennsylvania. Several former high-ranking U.S. military generals have in recent weeks called for Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's resignation, but Bush has stepped in and said he has the utmost confidence in his Pentagon chief.

FOX News' Carl Cameron contributed to this report.

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA [mailto:Dallas.Lawrence@**(b)(6)**]
Sent: Wednesday, April 19, 2006 9:56 AM
To: **(b)(6)**
Subject: RE: McClellan

Only chance of that is if senior gets the post. I have been asked to interview for the position of director of communications for the national security council. Not too interested but will consider it

From: **(b)(6)**
Sent: Wednesday, April 19, 2006 9:50 AM
To: **(b)(6)**
Subject: McClellan

Sheesh, it's about time. **(b)(6)** gets props for this. If you end up over at the white house I want you to hire me! :)

(b)(6)
Communications Director
Representative Marsha Blackburn
509 Cannon House Office Building
ph: **(b)(2)**
fax **(b)(6)**
www.house.gov/blackburn

<< File:**(b)(6)**.vcf >>

(b)(6)

From: WSSInter@aol.com
Sent: Wednesday, May 03, 2006 10:10 AM
To: alan.colmes@foxnews.com; brian.kilmeade@foxnews.com; brian.wilson@foxnews.com; bruce@wbal.com; donovan.grannum@foxnews.com; Elizabeth.Rhodes@foxnews.com; nate.fredman@foxnews.com; gavin.gibbons@foxnews.com; Hannity@aol.com; mikejerrick@yahoo.com; kim.bell-simensky@foxnews.com; lauren.clabby@FOXNEWS.COM; Mary.Ragsdale@FOXNEWS.COM; michael.skrzenski@foxnews.com; rob.monaco@foxnews.com; rsmith@wbal.com; Tara.New@FOXNEWS.COM; (b)(6) Bill_cowan@ny (b)(6) PAULVALLELY@ (b)(6) tmcinerney@ (b)(6) JedBabbin@ (b)(6) gordon@ (b)(6) (b)(6) Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Subject: Simmons - SOUTH AMERICAN OIL AND GAS CRISIS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

The inevitable has begun to pick up speed and shows no signs of slowing down. Hugo Chavez the President of Venezuela and Bolivian President EVO MORALES along with their merry band of Bolivarian thieves have shown that they have no reservations about Nationalizing oil and gas reserves leaving companies like BP and Exxon Mobil, just to name a few, fighting for their economic lives. Using military forces Boliva and Venezuela have captured billion dollar investments owned by multinational corporations. Poor oil companies you say? Without the billions invested in foreign oil fields their would be no oil for the US. The Socialist/Communist governments of virtually all of South America including Argentina, Brazil and Ecuador will certainly follow suit. The alliance between Hugo, Evo and our favorite despot, Castro will continue to grow by leaps and bounds. Castro and China are drilling for oil only 45 miles from US mainland. As my good friend Jed Babbin reminded me today, at least 18% of US oil comes from Venezuela. Now that Hugo has aligned himself with President Hu Jintao of China, imagine what will happen when Hu decides that he needs that 18% currently slated for the US? It will bring the US to its knees. Forget that our gas prices could reach \$10.00 a gallon and most Americans would have to seriously consider curbing our transportation habits. Our military would be in serious jeopardy. Our ability to protect our nation would be in dire straights. We are facing a national security issue of catastrophic proportions. If the President and Congress do not take immediate action to relax current drilling and refining laws, our nation could be faced with taking military action in South America in order to secure the black gold that keeps our economy blazing. The Liberal Left was successful during the 1990's (the Clinton years) in using the environmental laws to try to destroy our military. We are still suffering from those asinine environmental laws now. I was right about the Narco terrorist's impacting the US years ago for we are now awash in narcotics and crime. I will be right about this oil crisis too if our legislators do not quickly recognize and act to develop our own vast fields.

Take care.
Wayne

(b)(6)

From: Paul Vallely [paulvallely@(b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, May 02, 2006 8:47 AM
To: Thomas G McInerney; Wayne Simmons; JedBabbin@ (b)(6)
Subject: Zarqawi in Syria

Attachments: image001.gif



image001.gif (311 B)

Abu Musab al Zarqawi's April 25 videotape was made in Syria

May 2, 2006, 3:04 PM (GMT+02:00)

US and Israeli intelligence experts traced the location where the rare tape was filmed to a former Red Crescent army base on Jabal Tanaf, 5 kilometers from the border of Iraq's Anbar Province. They believe that after the US 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Syrian military handed the base over to Zarqawi's men as a hideout and haven. Of late, he has established a rear headquarters at the rugged mountain site.

Middle East sources note that proof that the al Qaeda in Iraq's chief is currently operating out of Syria coincides with the easing of US, French and UN pressure on Syrian president Bashar Assad to desist from meddling in Lebanon and sponsoring terror, to cooperate with the UN Hariri investigation and to seal his border to insurgent and al Qaeda incursions of Iraq. The Syrian-Iraqi border is patently still in free use for the smuggling of manpower, arms, explosives and funds.

We Trust Fox News
Fox News Channel
Paul E Vallely
Military Analyst
paulvallely@ (b)(6)

(b)(2)

www.soldiersmemorialfund.org

Add me to your address book... Want a signature like this?

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@ (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, May 01, 2006 7:41 AM
To: tmcinerney@ (b)(6); paulvalley@centurytel.net; nashct@ (b)(6)
(b)(6) (b)(6)

Subject: The CIA Mess: Today's Spectator

Can the CIA be fixed? Doubtful, given its people and its culture.

The American Spectator

Jed Babbin

(b)(2) (home office)
(home fax)
(mobile)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OSD PA
Sent: Friday, April 28, 2006 6:59 PM
To: 'paulvallely@(b)(6)'; 'gordon@(b)(6) Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Cc: 'David.Tabacoff@FOXNEWS.COM'
Subject: Re: any news on transport via dod?

Dates are helpful. I will look into it and get back to you asap.
thx

(b)(1)

-----Original Message-----

From: Paul Vallely
To: 'Gordon Cucullu'; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; (b)(6) OSD PA
CC: 'Tabacoff, David'
Sent: Fri Apr 28 18:42:34 2006
Subject: FW: any news on transport via dod?

10th and 17th of June are clear for Bill O'Reilly and me.....Can we make any of those work with Southcom and Gitmo?

Fox News Channel
Paul E Vallely
Military Analyst
paulvallely@(b)(6)

(b)(2)

www.soldiersmemorialfund.org

-----Original Message-----

From: Tabacoff, David [mailto:David.Tabacoff@FOXNEWS.COM]
Sent: Friday, April 28, 2006 11:04 AM
To: Paul Vallely
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: any news on transport via dod?

i am told by bill's assistant, (b)(6) that the weekends of 10th & 17th are clear right now for bill. let me know if this is workable and know that bill's plans are always very fluid.

-----Original Message-----

From: Paul Vallely [mailto:paulvallely@(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, April 28, 2006 12:59 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: any news on transport via dod?

Not yet... They are still working it. We need to give them a few suggested dates Sat, Sun, Mon that they can work with for scheduling. Get those to me as soon as possible. I am open in June..... They will backward plan from those dates.

Fox News Channel
Paul E Vallely
Military Analyst
paulvallely@(b)(6)
tel: (b)(2)
fax: (b)(2)

mobile: (b)(2)
www.soldiersmemorialfund.org

-----Original Message-----

From: Tabacoff, David [mailto:David.Tabacoff@FOXNEWS.COM]
Sent: Friday, April 28, 2006 8:17 AM
To: Paul Vallely (E-mail)
Subject: any news on transport via dod?

David Tabacoff
Executive Producer
The O'Reilly Factor
The Radio Factor with Bill O'Reilly
(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, April 26, 2006 10:30 AM

Subject: [U] 26-APR-06 MOC S.C.O.R.P.I.O.N.

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



THE S.C.O.R.P.I.O.N.
DAILY WESTERN MEDIA ANALYSIS
THE BATTLE FOR MEDIA SPACE

26 APR 2006

(&EB denotes article is also in the Early Bird)

HIGHLIGHTS INCLUDE: ZARQAWI VIDEO; RESPONSE TO AMZ; MALIKI INTERVIEW

I. MOC FLASHPOINTS

Rumsfeld, Rice in surprise visits to Baghdad

Television and wire services covered the surprise visits to Baghdad by **SECDEF Rumsfeld** and **SECSTATE Rice**, calling them a “show of support for Iraq’s emerging government.” News of Rumsfeld’s trip broke first, early in the day; outlets began reporting Rice’s visit at approx. 1330 local time. Her arrival changed the tone and content of earlier reports from a discussion of security issues and US troop presence to a discussion of governance issues. The **NY Times** characterized the dual visit as a bid by the secretaries to “put past differences behind them” and “mobilize diplomatic and security forces and bolster the new government of Prime Minister **Jawad al-Maliki**.” In addition, it was branded as a sign the DoD and DoS would “try harder to work together” for the sake of Iraq. **AP** quoted Rice: “We just want to make sure there are no seams between what we’re doing politically and what we’re doing militarily... A lot of the work that has to be done is at that juncture between political and military.” NYT said there was an atmosphere in Rice’s entourage that the visit could mark a last chance to correct mistakes and keep Iraq on course. **Jim Wilkinson**, an advisor to Rice, said, “Clearly this new Iraqi government must perform on behalf of the Iraqi people... But the new government also gives us a chance to correct our mistakes and do our part to make Iraq work.” Rice herself said, “The turning point here is that Iraq now has its first permanent government, and that it is a government of national unity, and it gives Iraq a real chance to deal with the real vexing problems that it has faced.” Television coverage of both DV’s arrivals was prominent across networks, running opposite footage of the AMZ video.

SECDEF tackles security...

AP reported **SECDEF Rumsfeld** would hold meetings with PM **Jawad al-Maliki** and other new Iraqi leaders, as well as with **GEN George Casey**. According to **Reuters**, in laying out the agenda for his trip Rumsfeld said talks would cover: the ongoing formation of an Iraqi cabinet; expansion of anti-corruption efforts; expansion of central government influence; and defining the status and long-term presence of US forces in Iraq, including basing. Despite the broad agenda, the focus of much reporting was on US troop levels. According to **AFP**, Rumsfeld said, “The question of our forces’ levels here will depend on conditions on the ground and discussions with the Iraqi government which will evolve over time.” **AP** noted Casey had said in 2005 that if the insurgency did not worsen and the Iraqis remained on

4/10/2008

track toward establishing a government of national unity, then fairly substantial reductions in the US troop presence were likely this year. It also noted the Rumsfeld visit coincides with a recent surge in American casualties, and said the expectation had been US casualties would decline as security responsibility was transitioned to the ISF. When asked if he remained on track to recommend troop cuts, Casey said, "I'm still on my general time line... We are seeing the situation a little clearer, I'd say -- and the clearer I see it, the better I can make my recommendations." He did not specify how large of a reduction he might seek or when he would seek it. Rumsfeld defended the progress of the ISF, however, saying "They are increasing their capabilities every day just as we predicted they would." (FOX carried video of Rumsfeld's press appearance with Casey)

... while SECSTATE tackles governance

The NY Times reported SECSTATE Rice sought to prepare the GoI to operate independently and successfully as soon as the Cabinet was finalized. "We really want to be ready to hit the ground running with this new government when it's ready to go," she said. Part of her efforts would involve staffing and fielding provincial reconstruction teams as a means of helping Iraq's ministries deliver services. On the MoD and MoI in particular, Rice said she believed that PM **Jawad al-Maliki** understands the importance of appointing ministers that would be not allied with militias. "They understand and they want ministries that are not sectarian, because that's the only way they can govern the country." Asked about the latest video by AMZ, Rice observed: "I think Zarqawi knows very well that 11 million people went out and voted for this government." She said the GoI's legitimacy posed "the greatest threat to his efforts" in Iraq.

Zarqawi faces the West

Wires, networks and major papers all reported on the **first video ever released** in which Jordanian-born AQI leader **Abu Musab al-Zarqawi** shows his face. Posted on the Internet on 25 APR, Zarqawi is shown walking in what NBC called the western Iraqi desert, surrounded by his followers in black masks, much like UBL's earlier videos. In the video dated 21 APR, Zarqawi fires an American-made rifle and taunts the US, calling President Bush a liar and dismissing the new GoI as an American "stooge" and a "poisoned dagger" in the heart of the Muslim world. He also warned of more attacks to come. The message appeared to be an attempt by Zarqawi to rally Iraqis and foreign fighters to his side and show his strength at a time when US and Iraqi officials are touting political progress as a setback to insurgents. NY Times reported many experts believe that there are elements of a rivalry between Zarqawi and UBL, despite the declaration in 2004 that Zarqawi was submitting himself to UBL's leadership. AP and WashPost reported that a US counterterrorism official said it was equally likely that Zarqawi's message was designed to reassert his preeminence among Iraq's dozen or more recognized Sunni insurgent groups and "to give the impression of unity." Similar reporting was carried by BBC, The Guardian and The Times (UK).

Iraqi, US leaders respond to AMZ

AP reported on 26 APR that members of the GoI condemned the AMZ video, **calling Zarqawi a foreigner determined to destroy their country**. **Sheik Khalid al-Attayah**, the new first deputy speaker, said the video shows Zarqawi remains determined "to inflame a civil war," but also indicates Zarqawi fears the new government will unify Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds. **Azzat al-Shahabandar**, a spokesman for former PM Ayad Allawi, also condemned Zarqawi, but said he took the threats seriously. "Al-Zarqawi is the poisoned dagger in the Islamic world. This dagger will eventually turn and stab al-Zarqawi himself because he is crippled and unable to appear in public," he said. However, he predicted AQI would now target civilian establishments such as restaurants and schools. From the US side, AFP carried a response from **BG Rudy Wright**. The general noted the tape was likely legitimate, but said, "This appears to be a direct reaction to the progress of forming a legitimate and permanent government for the people of Iraq, a process Al-Qaeda in Iraq has always tried to undermine by every means

4/10/2008

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@[b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, April 25, 2006 10:04 AM
To: tmcinerney@[b)(6)] paulvalley@[b)(6)] nashct@[b)(6)]
(b)(6) (b)(6)
Subject: More on Rumsfeld

From today's Washington Examiner:

[Jed Babbin: Keep the Big Dog running - Examiner.com](#)

Jed Babbin

(b)(6) (home office)
(b)(6) (home fax)
(b)(6) (mobile)

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@**(b)(6)**
Sent: Monday, April 24, 2006 2:56 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: Washington Examiner

Is going to run an op-ed I wrote about Mr. Rumsfeld. Don't know when, probably in the next couple of days.

Jed Babbin

(b)(2) (home office)
(home fax)
(mobile)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OSD PA
Sent: Monday, April 24, 2006 12:18 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: RE: Gitmo Fox O'Reilly

Attachments: image001.gif



image001.gif (296
B)

i'm happy to, mr. press secretary to the secretary... :)

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Sent: Monday, April 24, 2006 11:51 AM
To: (b)(6); OSD PA
Cc: 'paulvalley@'(b)(6)
Subject: FW: Gitmo Fox O'Reilly

tara, please connect with gtmo and start working this. as this has a media component, please loop in
lcdr (b)(6) let's keep everyone on the same page. thanks.

From: Paul Valley [mailto:paulvalley@'(b)(6)']
Sent: Monday, April 24, 2006 9:50 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Cc: 'Gordon Cucullu'; 'Tabacoff, David'
Subject: Gitmo Fox O'Reilly

Eric: It looks like most of the weekends are OK and open for the trip to Gitmo for our team. Is it possible to get military transportation out of Andrews for us to go in and out? Transportation is always the biggest challenge. Since they have a new Command Group at Gitmo now, can your office get the clearance for us to go into Gitmo from Southcom and Gitmo to do the Fox Special. (briefings, filming, interviews, etc.). We will try to keep as low a profile as possible. I'll let you know the total team members as I coordinate with Bill O'Reilly and Fox. If we can get the best Sat, Sun and Monday dates in June, then we can focus on the detailed planning. We are looking forward to this opportunity to get the truth out to the American people.

We Trust Fox News
Fox News Channel
Paul E Vallely
Military Analyst
paulvallely@**(b)(6)**
tel: **(b)(2)**
fax **(b)(2)**
mobile: **(b)(2)**
www.soldiersmemorialfund.org

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(b)(6)

From: Paul Valley [paulvalley@(b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, April 24, 2006 9:50 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Cc: 'Gordon Cucullu'; 'Tabacoff, David'
Subject: Gitmo Fox O'Reilly

Eric: It looks like most of the weekends are OK and open for the trip to Gitmo for our team. Is it possible to get military transportation out of Andrews for us to go in and out? Transportation is always the biggest challenge. Since they have a new Command Group at Gitmo now, can your office get the clearance for us to go into Gitmo from Southcom and Gitmo to do the Fox Special. (briefings, filming, interviews, etc.). We will try to keep as low a profile as possible. I'll let you know the total team members as I coordinate with Bill O'Reilly and Fox. If we can get the best Sat, Sun and Monday dates in June, then we can focus on the detailed planning. We are looking forward to this opportunity to get the truth out to the American people.

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Fox News Channel
Paul E Valley
Military Analyst
paulvalley@(b)(6)
tel: (b)(2)
fax (b)(2)
mobile: (b)(2)
www.soldiersmemorialfund.org

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(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@**(b)(6)**
Sent: Monday, April 24, 2006 8:30 AM
To: tmcinerney@**(b)(6)**; paulvalley@**(b)(6)**; nashct@**(b)(6)**
(b)(6)
Subject: CIA Leakers: Today's Spectator

If the CIA is ever to be effective, it must be transformed like DoD is being transformed. And our press is transforming too: from nuisance to enemy of freedom.

The American Spectator

Jed Babbin

(b)(6) (home office)
(b)(6) (home fax)
(b)(6) (mobile)

(b)(6)

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Sent: Saturday, April 22, 2006 6:36 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: Fw: Inside the Wire Gitmo

Attachments: image.jpg; image.jpg

Need to print out.

-----Original Message-----

From: Thomas McInerney
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Sent: Sat Apr 22 18:44:16 2006
Subject: FW: Inside the Wire Gitmo

Eric



image.jpg (860 B)

FYI

This is an important project that MG Paul Vallely has gotten Fox News involved with.

Please support when they ask.

Also keep CLOSE HOLD until they ask. They do not know I have forwarded to you but want to make sure someone doesn't nix it.

Thanks for all your support.

Tom

Thomas G. McInerney
Lt. Gen. USAF (Ret)

(b)(2)

Voice (b)(2)

Cell:

Fax:

----- Forwarded Message

From: Thomas McInerney <tmcinerney@(b)(6)>

Date: Sat, 22 Apr 2006 15:40:39 -0700

To: Paul Vallely <paulvallely@(b)(6)>

(b)(6) (b)(6) Bill Cowan <Bill.Cowan@(b)(6)> Chuck Nash

<nashct@(b)(6)> John Crosby (b)(6)

<JedBabbin@(b)(6)> WAYNE SIMMONS <WSSInter@(b)(6)>

Subject: Re: Inside the Wire Gitmo

Paul

Congratulations!

1.GITMO ideal location for all the right reasons. You know them!

2. We need to move out faster on the process and military tribunals just as we did in WW II. They are terrorists captured on field of battle and should be treated accordingly just as we did in WWII.

3. We should put all these Islamic Radicals we capture down there and cross fertilize info plus continue to develop our skills in interrogation. Now we are losing those skills and not training enough new players. This should be our cadre training center for Strategic Interrogation.

4. YES, Lets not apologize for this. We are losing the initiative in the IO campaign on this subject. Must aggressively show why it is so important to our overall Forward Strategy.

5. I am deeply impressed with the professionalism and results attained down there. It is in fact Club Gitmo. We treat them far too good especially when they do some of the despicable acts. This project could be a powerful start to turn this perception around! As we told Sec DEF Tues he and the Administration have to be far more proactive in telling America and the world WHY WE FIGHT!

GREAT WORK!

Tom

Thomas G. McInerney
Lt. Gen. USAF (Ret)

(b)(2)

Voice: (b)(2)
Cell:
Fax:



image.jpg (860 B)

Gentlemen: Bill Shine at Fox has asked Bill O'Reilly to do a Fox Special with me on Gitmo...Inside the Wire - Torture, Abuse or the Truth. I know everyone is busy but if you can give me your thoughts on Gitmo and the process there - The Why of Gitmo - I would appreciate it. Good and Bad. We may take a camera crew into GITMO in June to shoot and interview.

Some questions to address:

1. Was it a good decision to select Gitmo? If not Gitmo for the Detainees - where?
2. What do you think of the process? Should we have had swifter processes and Military tribunals
3. GITMO is now are only strategic interrogation center for Islam Radicals policed up on the battlefields. Do we need it for further detainees,
4. Gitmo is a "Detention and Interrogation" Center - Official title
5. Myths and truths that you know about Gitmo/////

Any additional perspectives will be appreciated. Thanking you in advance.

We Trust Fox News
Fox News Channel
Paul E Vallely
Military Analyst
paulvallely@centurytel.net <mailto:paulvallely@**(b)(6)**>
tel: **(b)(2)**
fax:
mobile: **(b)(2)**
www.soldiersmemorialfund.org

Add me to your address book... <https://www.plaxo.com/add_me?u=12885160593&v0=511355&k0=745169159&v1=0&k1=511356> Want a signature like this?
<<http://www.plaxo.com/signature>>

----- End of Forwarded Message

(b)(6)

From: Paul Valley [paulvalley@(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, April 21, 2006 11:11 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: RE: Inside the Wire Gitmo Fox Special

Will do!!!!

Fox News Channel
Paul E Valley
Military Analyst
paulvalley@centurytel.net
tel: (b)(2)
fax: (b)(2)
mobile: (b)(6)
www.soldiersmemorialfund.org

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD [mailto:Eric.Ruff@(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, April 21, 2006 7:54 PM
To: paulvalley@(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: Re: Inside the Wire Gitmo Fox Special

Paul, this sounds very promising. Let us know how or when we can be of assistance.
Thanks, eric

-----Original Message-----

From: Paul Valley
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Sent: Fri Apr 21 20:48:06 2006
Subject: Inside the Wire Gitmo Fox Special

Eric: It appears we are moving with the Gitmo Project that involves the book; repairing the gold course at Gitmo for the troops; and doing a Fox Special for TV. Bill Shine, the top boss at FNC now has asked Bill O'Reilly to do the special with me. I think this will be terrific special to get the story out just as we are doing on Sharon this Sunday night on Fox. We would like DOD and Gitmo clearance to do this (probably sometime in June). Concept is that we go into Gitmo (maybe private aircraft again), interview and film for 2 days. It will show this summer sometime.

Let me know your thoughts. I may have mentioned this to General Craddock when I met him in Gitmo during my last visit there. Hopefully, we will get your support to do this important special to get the truth out.

All my best.

PS: We will be completing the book. We have a major NY publisher to do the book.

PV

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Fox News Channel

Paul E Vallely
Military Analyst
paulvallely@centurytel.net <mailto:paulvallely@**(b)(6)**>
tel: **(b)(2)**
fax: **(b)(2)**
mobile: **(b)(2)**
www.soldiersmemorialfund.org

Add me to your address book...
<https://www.plaxo.com/add_me?u=12885160593&v0=511355&k0=745169159&v1=0&k1=511356> Want a signature like this? <<http://www.plaxo.com/signature>>

(b)(6)

From: Paul Vallely [paulvallely@(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, April 21, 2006 8:48 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: Inside the Wire Gitmo Fox Special

Attachments: image001.gif



Image001.gif (285
B)

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All my best.

PS: We will be completing the book. We have a major NY publisher to do the book.

PV

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Paul E Vallely
Military Analyst
paulvallely@(b)(6)
tel: (b)(2)
fax (b)(2)
mobile: (b)(2)
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(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA
Sent: Friday, April 21, 2006 1:45 PM
To: Smith, Dorrance, HON, OASD-PA
Cc: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Di Rita, Larry; Thorp, Frank, RDML, OASD-PA; (b)(6)
Capt. USMC, OASD-PA
Subject: More media coverage from the Military Analysts about their Meeting with the Secretary]
Attachments: MilitaryAnalysts 4 21 06 (2).doc

Bottom line: Straightforward comments, essentially supportive.



MilitaryAnalysts 4
21 06 (2).d...



**Military Analysts in Coverage Regarding Their Meeting With The Secretary
April 19 – 21 (as of 11:00 am on the 21st)**

Summary

Retired Major General Donald W. Shepperd and retired General Tom Wilkerson both received additional airtime on CNN's Anderson Cooper. They were both on a roundtable discussion with retired Lieutenant General Dan Christman, generating about 5 minutes of airtime. Overall, there has been a noticeable drop in coverage of the military analysts meeting with the Secretary.

Comments by Thomas McInerney, William Nash, Jed Babbin and Don Shepperd were reference in the April 19 edition of the National Journal's Hotline. Out of those four, Jed Babbin wrote an article for the Family Security Foundation focused primarily on the "generals' revolt" but referenced Tuesday's meeting.

On the issue of the meeting, all of the analysts commented that the Secretary did not act overly concerned with the criticism and was focused on more pressing matters. They all expanded their analysis to include thoughts concerning the reasons and impact of the so-called "generals' revolt" - generally agreeing that the issue of "ruffled feathers" over the Secretary's effort to transform the military probably played a significant role in the public criticism.

Highlights

Jed Babbin

- Calls for the resignation was not the focus of the meeting
- Babbin essentially argues that the "generals' revolt" is motivated those in the Pentagon frustrated by the Secretary's efforts to transform the military
- At Tuesday meeting, he describes the SecDef as "relaxed, war, intense, responsive" and more "ebullient" than "beleaguered"
- He also argues that the so called generals' revolt has "blown itself out without noticeable effect"

Frank B. Campbell

- No comments found

(Tim) J. Eads

- No comments found

John Garrett

- No comments found

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William F. "Buck" Kernan

- No comments found

Robert L. Maginnis

- No comments found

Jeff McCausland

- No comments found

Thomas McInerney

- No comments found

Chuck Nash

- No comments found

William L. Nash

- He said, "it was love-in"

Robert H. Scales, Jr.

- No comments found

Donald W. Shepperd

- Surprised that the focus was not on the generals' controversy -- focus was on Iraq
- Asked about a recent Thomas Friedman op-ed that questioned the Secretary's effectiveness, particularly dealing with the Iran - Shepperd argued that the primary issue was not about Secretary Rumsfeld but that "we're tied up in Iraq"

Wayne Simmons

- No comments found

Martin Strong

- No comments found

Tom Wilkerson

- Reported that the criticism was at least a temporary distraction to the Secretary in that it took time away from prosecuting the war in Iraq and the global war on terror
- Noted that the meetings happened regularly and were not geared for supporters of the Secretary, but rather for former military people frequently commenting in the media
- Asked whether generals at the Pentagon were annoyed at the Secretary because of military transformation, Wilkerson replied that he doesn't see a large number of officers "standing at the gate to take their uniforms off and then publicly disagree with him"

- He pointed out that if the President asked the Secretary to resign it would “abrogate the policy that took him to war” and label the military transformation a “failure”

SOURCES

Jed Babbin

Keep the Big Dog Running – April 20

(Family Security Foundation)

I was among the military analysts who met with Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Peter Pace and Rumsfeld on Tuesday. I've seen Mr. Rumsfeld when he's been agitated, pressured and even a bit down. But on Tuesday, he was relaxed, warm, intense, responsive in his normal rapid-fire way and even a bit funny. Ebullient is not the word one normally uses to describe a cabinet officer. But for Mr. Rumsfeld – when I met with him on Tuesday -- it was much more accurate description than the *New York Times*' "beleaguered."

National Briefing: RUMSFELD - Ch-Ch-Changes - 19 April 2006

(National Journal: The Hotline)

Ex-Reagan defense official Jed Babbin: "That certainly was not the central focus of the meeting."

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National Briefing: RUMSFELD - Ch-Ch-Changes - 19 April 2006

(National Journal: The Hotline)

According to McInerney, the calls for Rumsfeld's resignation “came up only briefly.” McInerney: “We didn't waste the secretary's time with that” (AP, 4/19)...McInerney said that “much of the meeting” focused on discussions with Rumsfeld and Pace about the global war on terrorism, and “improving communications about the effort” (Bloomberg, 4/18).

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(National Journal: The Hotline)

Nash: “It was a love-in.”

Donald Shepperd

CNN: Anderson Cooper 360 – April 19, 11:17:53 PM

** Note: This clip is a roundtable discussion with Shepperd and two other military analysts*

COOPER: General Christman, in the "New York Times" today, Thomas Friedman wrote about how the perception of Rumsfeld could affect a possible threat from Iran, possible

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military action in Iran. He wrote, in part, "...we will not have the support at home or abroad for that threat as long as Don Rumsfeld leads the Pentagon. No one in their right mind would follow this man into another confrontation -- and that is a real strategic liability." Rumsfeld supporters would say, look, any secretary of defense has critics. That comes with the job. Why is Rumsfeld any less effective than other tough secretaries of defense?

... **COOPER:** General Shepperd, what do you think?

MAJ. GEN. DON SHEPPERD, U.S. AIR FORCE (RET.): Well, I think Thomas Friedman's op-ed was a little bit off. And it doesn't make any difference who's secretary of defense, but clearly, Iran and the world know that the United States has got to get itself untangled from Iraq before it could ever do anything with Iran. So in that sense, they know that we're shackled. The fact that this is going on is certainly not helpful, but I don't think it centers on Secretary Rumsfeld. It centers on the fact that the war in Iraq is not perceived as going well, and we don't see a light at the end of the tunnel. To take the old phrase from Vietnam, and that's the problem. We're tied up in Iraq. We need to bring it to an acceptable conclusion before we can do anything else meaningful anywhere, especially anything military.

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Shepperd, on the meeting: "I was surprised. I thought the focus of this meeting would be on the generals' controversy. It was not. It was about Iraq, and the things going on there, and the things that they would like to see happen in the future" ("PZ Now," CNN, 4/18)

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COOPER: General Wilkerson, Secretary Rumsfeld has sort of implied in the last couple days that, you know, feathers are ruffled in the Pentagon because he's been transforming the military. My reading is military transformation started before Rumsfeld became secretary of defense. Do you think it is true to say that he's just been so tough about transformation that, you know, a lot of these generals who have their feet in the mud can't deal with transformation and are just kind of annoyed?

WILKERSON: Well, I'm not sure how to describe annoyed. I don't see them all standing at the gate to take their uniforms off and then publicly disagree with him. There's no doubt that he's a strong personality. But they have to put that in a context. And I think Don did it earlier. The context is, whether the American public sees us as moving forward in the war on terrorism. And if they don't see that, it doesn't make any difference who's secretary of defense. The other part, though, in calling for the resignation of the secretary of defense, think about that for a second because it's very important. The president, in order to ask the secretary to resign, would essentially have to abrogate the policy that took him to war in the first place, and not coincidentally as a subset, decide that the transformation that SecDef had been putting through the Defense Department was also a failure. That's not a casual decision.

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(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CTR, OASD-PA

Sent: Friday, April 21, 2006 1:42 PM

To: (b)(6)

(b)(6) Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA;

(b)(6)

Merritt, Roxie,

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(b)(6) Ballesteros, Mark J, LTC, OASD-PA; (b)(6)

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(b)(6) Merritt, Roxie (b)(6)

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(b)(6) Vician, Todd M LtCol OSD PA; (b)(6)

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Cc: (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA

Subject: Update: What the military analysts were saying about the Secretary

Attachments: MilitaryAnalysts 4.21.06.doc

This report covers the period April 19 – 21 (as of 11 am on the 21st)

4/10/2008

**Military Analysts in Coverage Regarding Their Meeting With The Secretary
April 19 - 21 (as of 11:00 am on the 21st)**

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(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, April 21, 2006 9:42 AM
To: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Subject: Fw: Slate has a copy of the military analyst factsheet on its website

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CTR, OASD-PA
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Sent: Fri Apr 21 08:23:40 2006
Subject: Slate as a copy of the military analyst factsheet on its website

Rummy's <<http://www.slate.com/id/2140105/entry/2140106/?nav=tap3>> Body Count - Slate

<http://www.slate.com/id/2140105/entry/2140106/?nav=tap3>

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, April 20, 2006 2:08 PM
To: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6); Lawrence,
Dallas, OASD-PA; (b)(6)

Merritt, Roxie, AFIS-HQ; (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6) Ballesteros, Mark J, LTC, OASD-PA; (b)(6)

(b)(6) Carpenter, Joe, LCDR OASD-PA; (b)(6)

(b)(6)

CIV, OASD-PA; Merritt, Roxie (b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: What the military analysts were saying about the Secretary

Attachments: MilitaryAnalysts_4.19.06.doc

This report covers the period April 18 – 19 (as of noon on the 19th)

We will most likely do a follow up report tomorrow.

4/10/2008



**Military Analysts in Coverage Regarding Their Meeting With The Secretary
April 18 – 19 (as of noon on the 19th)**

Summary

Retired Major General Donald W. Shepperd received the most airtime of the 15 attending military analysts, generating about 13 minutes of clips on CNN and Headline News on the 18th. Shepperd was followed by:

- Robert H. Scales appeared on NPR for roughly four minutes
- Robert Maginnis, who appeared on MSNBC for approximately three minutes
- Thomas McInerney, who appeared on Fox News for roughly three minutes
- Tom Wilkerson, who was on CNN's American Morning for about three minutes. Wilkerson was also quoted in a front page New York Times article by David S. Cloud

Generally speaking, all five of the analysts interviewed thought the meeting was productive and shared similar views. They agreed that:

- The Secretary was positive and not overly concerned with the generals' criticism
- The Secretary and General Pace felt they had consulted with military and other experts frequently and sufficiently on war strategy/plans
- The focus of the meeting was not on the generals' criticism, but on the more important topics at hand regarding Iraq – including forming a new government and getting the right messages out to the American public
- The meeting was productive, a chance to share ideas and the Secretary clearly listened to the analysts

Don Shepperd provided the most insight on details discussed during the meeting, followed by Tom Wilkerson and Robert H. Scales, while Thomas McInerney focused specifically on the Secretary's concern about setting up an Iraqi government. By comparison, Robert Maginnis spoke less about meeting specifics, including Iraq, and more about the generals' criticism of the Secretary.

Highlights

Jed Babbin

- No comments found

Frank B. Campbell

- No comments found

(Tim) J. Eads

- No comments found

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John Garrett

- No comments found

William F. "Buck" Kernan

- No comments found

Robert L. Maginnis

- Secretary was both "forthcoming" and "energized"
- Secretary wondered "why these generals didn't, while they were on active duty, push back and ask these questions that they're raising after retirement"
- General Pace primarily talked about transformation and its necessity
- Repeated General Pace's point that troops on ground have not raised concerns about the civilian leadership and feel that generals do represent their best interest in Washington
- Pointed out that commanders have plenty of opportunities to express their opinions
- In response to questions of "being arrogant and dismissive" Maginnis reported that the Secretary was a "tough cookie," but a "reasoning man"

Jeff McCausland

- No comments found

Thomas McInerney

- The Secretary is "very concerned" that an Iraqi government is not yet formed, and knows things will "fall into place" after this happens.

Chuck Nash

- No comments found

William L. Nash

- No comments found

Robert H. Scales, Jr.

- In a "fairly unusual" occurrence, the Secretary spent a lot of time listening to the dialogue between himself and the analysts... it was a "very engaged give-and-take"
- The focus was not on the criticism of the Secretary, but on moving forward in Iraq
- The next "big thing" in Iraq as a sign of progress will be the formation of an Iraqi government
- While the Secretary has certainly instituted change, military changes began before his arrival – transformation, for example, began in the mid '90s – he was just continuing the efforts

Donald W. Shepperd

- The focus was on Iraq, and “things of concern” around the world – Afghanistan, piracy in the Pacific, things in the Southern Command
- Little focus on the generals’ controversy. However, although the Secretary and General Pace were in good moods, the Secretary is “clearly distracted” by it. He and General Pace are “puzzled” about where it’s coming from, as they thought they had been extremely “consultive” about strategy
- The analysts discussed the need to better communicate to the public about the importance of the war, and a “forward strategy”
- The analysts asked what are the next things coming up in terms of a milestone to mark progress – the answer was clearly setting up an Iraqi government and training Iraqi security forces
- General Pace reiterated the level of collaboration on war plans with the generals, combatant commanders, General Franks and others, who all “made their inputs, voiced their concerns...talked it out...we all had a hand in this”
- The Secretary and General Pace definitely see progress thus far in Iraq, and are hopeful that a new government will be in place soon
- This was the 16th meeting between the Secretary and analysts, of which the Secretary has attended all but one. The analysts also have regular teleconferences with briefers for Iraq background and Q and A sessions

Wayne Simmons

- No comments found

Martin Strong

- No comments found

Tom Wilkerson

- To call this a “firestorm” of criticism is an exaggeration. There are some 7-8,000 retired Generals
- The criticism is at least a temporary distraction to the Secretary in that it takes time away from prosecuting the war in Iraq and the global war on terror
- The criticism misses the point because we are at a crucial stage in the change needed to bring Iraq back to self-sufficiency; that’s far more important than what happened in the past to an individual
- The meeting was a good exchange of views, with tough questions asked
- The Secretary appeared energized at the meeting rather than chastened
- The Secretary and General Pace emphasized that the big event to watch for in Iraq is the formation of the government there