

Subject: FW: [U] RE: Thursday Pentagon Brief

Hi (b)(6)

Can you arrange an analysts call with MG Thurman, the Multi-National Division-Baghdad commander? I believe they're looking for the same group that MG Caldwell spoke with last week. MG Thurman is doing a Pentagon press brief from 0900-0930 this Thursday. I assume we could start the analysts call shortly after that.

His PAO is LTC (b)(6) with contact info below.

Thanks,
Todd

Lt Col Todd Vician, USAF
Defense Press Officer
Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

(b)(2)
DSN (b)(2)

From: (b)(6) LTC 4ID PAO [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, November 06, 2006 11:20 PM
To: Vician, Todd M LtCol OSD PA
Cc: Ballesteros, Mark J LTC OSD PA
Subject: RE: [U] RE: Thursday Pentagon Brief

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Todd,
The CG did agree to speak to some military analysts that MG Caldwell approached him about. Do you have any information on who would participate?

v/r

(b)(6)

LTC (b)(6)
Public Affairs Officer
Multi-National Division-Baghdad
Camp Liberty, Iraq

DSN (b)(2)
VOIP (b)(2)
Commercial (b)(2)
IRAQNA Cell (b)(2)

NIPR (b)(6)
SIPR (b)(6)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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From: Vician, Todd M LtCol OSD PA [mailto:todd.vician@(b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, November 07, 2006 12:39 AM
To: (b)(6) LTC 4ID PAO
Subject: RE: [U] RE: Thursday Pentagon Brief

4/9/2008

Thanks (b)(6) we'll stick to the brief. We're 8 hours behind y'all again, so I guess that means we start at 1700.your time on Thursday.

Todd

Lt Col Todd Vician, USAF
Defense Press Officer
Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
(b)(2)
DSN (b)(2)

From: (b)(6) LTC 4ID PAO [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, November 06, 2006 2:01 PM
To: Vician, Todd M LtCol OSD PA
Cc: (b)(6) LTC wV CORPS PAO MNC-I V CORPS PAO; Ballesteros, Mark J LTC OSD PA
Subject: [U] RE: Thursday Pentagon Brief

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Todd,

Thanks. Given the current environment around here, I think we'll decline the radio interviews. We're in the middle of RIP right now. We'll execute from our DVIDS at the MND-B MOC.

Thanks

(b)(6)

LTC Jonathan B. Withington
Public Affairs Officer
Multi-National Division-Baghdad
Camp Liberty, Iraq

DSN (b)(2)
VOIP
Commercial (b)(2)
IRAQNA Cell (b)(2)

NIPR (b)(6)
SIPR

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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From: Vician, Todd M LtCol OSD PA [mailto:todd.vician@(b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, November 06, 2006 9:33 PM
To: (b)(6) LTC 4ID PAO
Cc: (b)(6) LTC wV CORPS PAO MNC-I V CORPS PAO; Ballesteros, Mark J LTC OSD PA
Subject: Thursday Pentagon Brief

Hi (b)(6)

We have all the info on MG Thurman we need for prepping for Thursday's press brief at 0900 EST. Do you need more info from us? Here's the latest list of reporters (a few might have changed since your Boss did the briefing with the press here in September).

4/9/2008

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OSD PA
Sent: Monday, November 06, 2006 5:18 PM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: FW: academic experts

From: (b)(6) mailto:(b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, September 27, 2006 3:18 PM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: RE: academic experts

Category I: Experts

Iraq experts most quoted in the newspaper

- Anthony Cordesman (CSIS -230 hits in last six months)
- Michael O'Hanlon (Brookings -186 hits)

Other experts the experts consult

- Eliot Cohen (SAIS)
- Andy Krepenevich (CBSA 68 -hits)
- Jeff White (Washington Institute for Near East Policy)
- Bruce Hoffmann (RAND)
- Kalev Sepp (Naval Postgraduate School)
- Mike Vickers (CBSA)
- Tom Donnelly (AEI)
- Jeff McCausland (Dickinson College)
- Stephen Biddle (Army War College)
- Noah Feldman (NYU)
- Bob Killebrew (consultant)
- Reul Marc Gerech (AEI)

Category II: General defense/foreign policy "wise men"

- Barry McCaffrey (West Point)
- Robert Scales
- Richard Sinnreich
- John Hamre (CSIS)
- Kurt Campbell (CSIS)
- Loren Thompson (Lexington Institute)
- Sam Nunn
- William Cohen
- Madeleine Albright
- Wesley Clark

Category III Influencers (general pundits)

Influencers who generally support the Iraq war

4/9/2008

- Newt Gingrich
- Charles Krauthammer
- Bill Kristol
- Fred Barnes
- Jim Woolsey
- David Brooks
- Jim Hoagland
- Fouad Ajami
- Victor Davis Hanson
- Norman Podhoretz
- David Ignatius

Influencers who are skeptical but perhaps persuadable

- Fareed Zakaria
- Peter Galbraith
- Lawrence Kaplan
- Tom Friedman
- Fred Hiatt
- Gideon Rose

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) OSD PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, September 13, 2006 7:22 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: Chafin, Claude H.; (b)(6)
Subject: Re: academic experts

Hi, (b)(6)

great way to segment into groups.

At first glance: Emphasis on 1 and 2 for short term, with 3 and 4 in our backpocket, for when needed.

Could I please call you this week to explain?

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
CC: Chafin, Claude H.; (b)(6)
Sent: Wed Sep 13 17:47:05 2006
Subject: RE: academic experts

What are the criteria?

I do not have a formal list, but assemble coalitions of the willing depending on how far across the aisle we are trying to reach.

Are we talking:

4/9/2008

- (1) reliable surrogates
- (2) grudging supporters
- (3) usually fair-minded critics
- (4) unavoidable critics?

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, September 13, 2006 5:34 PM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6)
Cc: Chafin, Claude H.
Subject: RE: academic experts

(b)(6) is the right person to ask. I'm looping him in.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) OSD PA (mailto:(b)(6))
Sent: Wednesday, September 13, 2006 5:27 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: Chafin, Claude H.
Subject: academic experts

Hi, (b)(6) Dorrance wants me to put together a list of military/foreign affairs academic and think tank experts that DoD will periodically bring in for briefings, add to our email list and keep in contact with.

I'm betting (b)(6) are the people to go to at White House? Should I reach out to them?

Please let me know.

4/9/2008

(b)(6)

From: Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA
Sent: Monday, November 06, 2006 10:44 AM
To: Smith, Dorrance HON OSD PA
Cc: Thompson, Jonathan Mr OSD PA
Subject: FW: Visit to JTF GTMO

by way of background, gordon and paul have spoken to several folks in dod about gtmo, and they have visited the facility at least once, strictly to interview people down there. they are very much interested in telling "the other story" about gtmo and believe in its importance. they also have had good chance to interact with the military and believe the guards and interrogation staff, etc., are doing wonderful work. thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) OSD PA
Sent: Sunday, November 05, 2006 8:42 PM
To: Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA
Subject: Fw: Visit to JTF GTMO

Hi. Thought you'd be interested to see that there is movement on the gitmo book. Feel free to weigh in, as rdml harris is asking for pa to sign off. (See gordon's email - first in the chain) Thx (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Harris, Harry B. RDML USSOUTHCOM JTFGTMO <Harry.B.Harris@ (b)(6)>
To: (b)(6) CDR USSOUTHCOM JTFGTMO (b)(6)
Cc: Gordon Cucullu <gordon@ (b)(6)> (b)(6) OSD PA; Leacock, Edward A BG USSOUTHCOM JTFGTMO <Edward.A.Leacock@ (b)(6)> Harris, Harry B. RDML USSOUTHCOM JTFGTMO <Harry.B.Harris@ (b)(6)> (b)(6) CAPT USSOUTHCOM JTFGTMO (b)(6)
Sent: Sun Nov 05 12:57:50 2006
Subject: RE: Visit to JTF GTMO

(b)(6) - dates ok with me, but you will have to run this through SC, DASD/DA and ASD/PA. WRT Commissions, that is not our lane ... Gordon can discuss with BrigGen Tom Hemingway in DC. Coord with Gordon, too, for best dates within the 9-16 window. I will be gone for much of that, but that is OK as BG Leacock will be here while I'm gone.
HH

From: Gordon Cucullu [mailto:gordon@ (b)(6)]
Sent: Sunday, November 05, 2006 11:32 AM
To: (b)(6) CDR USSOUTHCOM JTFGTMO
Cc: Paul E Vallely; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Leacock, Edward A BG USSOUTHCOM JTFGTMO; Harris, Harry B. RDML USSOUTHCOM JTFGTMO
Subject: Visit to JTF GTMO

Hi, (b)(6)

I'd like to start the process on working area clearance and transportation to visit the JTF on 9-16 December 2006. LTC(Ret) John Rudisill will accompany me as he did on our previous visit. I mentioned these dates to Adm Harris and he is comfortable with them.

We've still got some open areas in our research to fill prior to finalizing the manuscript to the publisher. Accordingly if we could meet with the Commander and Deputy, Paul Rester, the new Colonel who is head of the Joint Detention facility, and with the legal people that would be a great start. As is usual, we'll probably discover new leads to follow up once we're on the ground.

Some areas of interest would be any progress on Military commissions or other legal developments.

Please let me know if you will be able to process this request with existing information (i.e., personal data on file from our last visit) or if you will need for us to update it.

We would like to take the Saturday, 9 Dec rotator out of NAS JAX and return there on the 16 Dec flight.

Appreciate your help with this request.

all the best,

Gordon Cucullu

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@ (b)(6)

Sent: Monday, November 06, 2006 7:51 AM

To: tmcinerney@ (b)(6); nashct@ (b)(6); Glenstrae77@ (b)(6); BURM41516@ (b)(6);
 USAGiri1957@ (b)(6); WSStnter@ (b)(6); roberthscales@ (b)(6);
 ladd.wheeler@ (b)(6); twilkerson@ (b)(6); mgroot@ (b)(6); groothousen@ (b)(6)

Subject: After Bush: a new conservative renaissance

There's not a moment to lose: The conservative coalition needs to revive itself now to win in 08.

The American Spectator

Jed Babbin

(b)(6) (home office)
 (b)(6) (home fax)
 (b)(6) (mobile)

4/9/2008

(b)(6)

From: Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA
Sent: Friday, November 03, 2006 12:17 PM
To: 'Thomas McInerney'
Subject: RE: TALK

okay, tom. i'll let the fellow know and i'll give him you phone info.

-----Original Message-----

From: Thomas McInerney [mailto:tmcinerney@(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, November 03, 2006 12:47 PM
To: Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA
Subject: FW: TALK

Eric

Fox says OK on al Arabiya TV if you would like me to.
Tom

Thomas G. McInerney
Lt. Gen. USAF (Ret)

(b)(6)

Voice (b)(6)
Cell:
Fax:

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, November 02, 2006 9:21 AM
To: tmcinerney (b)(6) nashct (b)(6) Glenstrae77 (b)(6) BURM41516 (b)(6)
USAGirl1957 (b)(6) WSSInter (b)(6) roberthscates (b)(6)
ladd.wheeler (b)(6) twilkerson (b)(6) ShepDonald (b)(6) mgroot (b)(6)
groothusen (b)(6)
Subject: Election count down - Today's RCP

If you believe the Washington Post, this election isn't about what John Kerry said. But that's precisely what it's about: the liberal elitist attitude that slanders our troops and belittles what they do.

[RealClearPolitics - Articles - Countdown to Tuesday \(and Wednesday\)](#)

Jed Babbin
(b)(6) (Home Office)
(b)(6) (Mobile)

4/9/2008

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OSD PA
Sent: Wednesday, November 01, 2006 3:03 PM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA; Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA
Cc: (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) LCDR OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: Compliments on the Myths piece

Some ammunition against the nattering nabobs.

Gen. Jack Keane (former vice chief of the Army) appreciated the myths piece Matt K. and Juli worked on.

This is the second nice email he's sent recently (really liked the Newsweek Afghanistan rebuttal also).

(b)(6)

From: Jack Keane [mailto:jkeane@(b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, November 01, 2006 1:11 PM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: RE:

(b)(6)

Excellent piece of work, very useful.

All the best,

Jack Keane

From: Defense-Leaders List on behalf of Pentagon Communications
Sent: Wed 11/1/2006 11:26 AM
To: DEFENSE-LEADERS-L@DTIC.MIL
Subject:

Attached please find the most recent DoD update from the Department of Defense Office of Public Affairs.

<http://www.defenselink.mil/home/dodupdate/index-b.html>

4/9/2008

(b)(6)

From: Paul Valley [valley@ (b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, October 30, 2006 9:11 PM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA; 'JERSEY MIKE'; John Loftus; Justcauses@ (b)(6)
Subject: FW: Iraq - There's Nothing Left to Try; 'End Game' Beyond US Control

Worth Reading//////////

Osprey Media
Paul E Valley
Military Analyst/Radio Host "Stand Up America"
valley@ (b)(6)
tel: (b)(6)
fax: (b)(6)
www.ospreymedia.us

-----Original Message-----

From: Fred Gedrich [mailto:ggedrich@ (b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, October 30, 2006 5:16 PM
To: Thomas G McInerney; Paul Valley; WSSInter; Bill Cowan

Subject: Fw: Iraq -- There's Nothing Left to Try; 'End Game' Beyond US Control

Iraq -- There's Nothing Left to Try; 'End Game' Beyond US Control

** The Shi'ite majority is itself divided -- mostly along personality lines. All of the major Shi'ite political groups are backed by their own militias, and all have very strong ties back to the Iranian Pasdaran predating 2001-03. They are far less dependent upon the US than we like to believe. None of them will support a comprehensive amnesty -- nor should they, since they are being pressed to include the Sunnis in the government without an amnesty and with influence beyond their numbers. Political leaders like al-Maliki also have learned, like Karzai and all past Western clients, that they must distance themselves from if not openly confront Western leaders on behalf of their supposed "national interests" because they are inherently suspect as lackeys and puppets. Whether or not they really are is immaterial -- in politics perceptions matter more than facts, especially in the disinformation age. The only way al-Maliki will change is to further align with and effectively empower the Shi'ite Islamist

(Khomeini'ist) militias that are the only force keeping the security services from completely collapsing, and are at least seen to be the only defenses against the Sunni Islamists, foreign fighters, and Kurdish separatists.

** The Kurds are realizing that they are extremely vulnerable because the great American experiment to craft a secular, pluralistic democracy in Iraq has failed, and that as the most isolated minority and the one most closely associated with secularism, democracy, and the US. They are in danger of being wiped out -- and Washington is largely ignoring this grim reality.

The Kurds could wind up like the Hmong and other mountain folk in S.E. Asia when we bailed out -- forced to flee or brutally repressed. The Kurds would love to "make a (reasonable) deal" -- but aren't being offered one. The Sunnis want to keep everything Saddam grabbed for them, if not more, while not being able or willing to promise anything like security or even cooperation. The Shi'ites are essentially treating the Kurds as if they are a temporary nuisance whom they will deal with as soon as the US leaves.

** The Sunnis are not willing or able to make a deal with the government. The Shi'ite dominated government essentially sees the Sunnis as hated exploiters who are now getting their just desserts. The Sunni tribal chiefs and clerics have proven unable or unwilling to do anything about the insurgents and their attacks on Shi'ite civilians. They demand much, but cannot or do not "deliver the goods." For their part, the Sunnis are demanding far more than their numbers or strength would entitle them to, promise little in return, and can't deliver what they promise. The tribal chiefs don't really control things -- the real leaders among the insurgent/terrorists are widely dispersed and of necessity well-hidden, because they don't trust the government to keep its side of any deal (with good reason), and need to keep their identities secret. The tribal chiefs are

little better than intermediaries. While the Sunnis want amnesty, they won't "settle" for amnesty. They want power and control because that, not majoritarian democracy, is their only avenue to restoring the comparative well-being they had under Saddam.

** The US had MANY chances to avoid this situation.

-- IF the US had "finished the job" in '91 instead of kowtowing to the UN, etc., the Shi'ites back then probably would have welcomed the US as liberators along with the Kurds, as this was before Saddam's post-DS pogroms and the resulting ties between the Arab Shi'a and Iran. But Bush Sr and his team were too infatuated with diplomacy, the UN, and his neo-Wilsonian dreams of "New World Order."

-- By 2003, the US had fewer, costlier, and riskier options, but still had some better options than the absurd COA chosen by the Bush Administration after Congress stupidly granted them a carte blanche. The US had 3 options:

(1) Focus on fundamental continuity while eliminating the Hussein family, the Special Republican Guards, and the Tikriti elite -- leaving the secular Ba'ath regime intact but under new, more malleable military leadership; Or,
(2) Go the "total war" route, occupying and governing Iraq until such future time as a new generation of post-Saddam Iraqis had been trained and educated to lead a pluralistic, market-oriented secular democracy (but this would have been far too costly and time-consuming, not to mention imperialistic, for impatient Americans); Or,
(3) The US could even have conquered the country and broken up into a loose confederation under overall US control, with the Kurds retaining their de facto independence, a Shi'ite Arab semi-autonomous statelet under Allawi but carefully supervised by the US, and a Sunni semi-autonomous statelet perhaps tied to Amman (of course, this would have also required a degree of supervised/controlled ethnic cleansing to move the Shi'ites south & out of Baghdad and the Sunnis south out of the major Kurd cities where they'd been sent by Saddam to Arabize them).

** Sadly, all of those options are essentially foreclosed at this point.

The best the US can now hope for is that the Shi'ite-Sunni sectarian war will absorb the attentions of the Islamists on both sides for a while.

--SteveD

-----Original Message-----

There's One Last Thing to Try

This past August and September were the two deadliest months on record for Iraqis, and October is set to exceed even those levels.

By Fareed Zakaria

Editor, Newsweek International

October 30, 2006

American policy in Iraq over the past two and a half years has been a mixture of nation-building and counterinsurgency, neither with much success.

But the United States is now facing an even more difficult task: ending a civil war.

People in Washington have decided to postpone any policy rethinking until the midterm elections are done, because we don't want politics to interfere with this process. After that, the hope is that the Hamilton-Baker study group will report its findings. Then we can begin making some of the moves it recommends. There's just one problem: conditions on the ground are deteriorating rapidly.

Violence in Iraq has become largely sectarian in nature and has drastically worsened in the past two months. The International Organization for Migration estimates that 9,000 people every week are being driven out of their homes. The Iraq Casualty Coalition, which calculates Iraqi deaths based on local press reports, says that August and September were the two deadliest months on record for Iraqis, and October is set to exceed those levels. One more symbolic explosion-another Samarra bombing, say-could set off a chain reaction that will make things completely uncontrollable.

The rising sectarian violence is poisoning the atmosphere for any possible reconciliation or deal. Every week, new killings mean new reasons for vengeance and diminished prospects for compromise.

Another dangerous new trend is the rapid disintegration of political authority across the country. As the vacuum in security and authority widens, political leaders in Baghdad are losing control of their militias and cadres across the country. Local gangs are asserting power in their neighborhoods and making money in the protection business. They will not easily give it up. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld recently made an analogy to Algeria's civil war, pointing out that it took 13 years before that conflict burned out. But Algeria

had a unified, competent government facing a reasonably unified, competent insurgency. That's simple compared with Iraq's chaos.

Historically, outside forces can do little in such circumstances. The proposal floating around various policy circles, for stepped-up regional diplomacy or a regional conference, is a fine idea and should certainly be tried. But will Syria and Iran really help stabilize a pro-U.S. government in Iraq? And do they really have the power to switch off the violence there?

Iraq's basic problem is an internal one. Its major parties need to commit to a power-sharing agreement. Such a deal appears highly unlikely. Iraq's governing majority-Shiite religious parties and the Kurds seem wholly averse to making significant concessions to the Sunni minority. The Sunnis, beset by their own radical elements and lack of leadership, seem unable to present a united platform or to rein in the insurgents. And the United States seems to lack much power to make either side move.

The most disturbing recent event in Iraq-and there are many candidates for that designation-was the decision by Iraq's single largest political party, SCIRI, to push forward the process of creating a Shiite "super-region" in the South. This was in flagrant defiance of the deal, brokered by U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad before the January elections, that brought major Sunni groups into the political process and ensured Sunni participation in the voting. It is a frontal rebuke to President Bush, who made a rare personal appeal to SCIRI's leader, Abdul Aziz Al-Hakim, on this issue.

Perhaps the most critical element of a deal to end Iraq's violence is a broad and comprehensive amnesty. Almost no civil war or sectarian strife has ever ended without one. And yet every time amnesty gets discussed, powerful Shiite voices veto it. (Congressional Democrats and Republicans also have engaged in demagoguery on the issue, compounding the problem.) Another is an oil-revenue-sharing agreement, along the lines advocated by Joseph Biden and Leslie Gelb. This project moves forward and backward in fits and starts. Additionally, attempts at reversing, even modestly, the massive de-Baathification of Iraq have proved virtually impossible. Overwhelmingly, the evidence suggests that the major players in Iraq have neither the intention nor perhaps the capacity to forge a national compact.

Can the United States regain some leverage to force things forward? There is one last thing to try: privately but forcefully threaten a reduction of U.S. support for the current government. Nothing else-not the promise of aid, arm-twisting by the American ambassador, phone calls from President Bush-seems to have worked. It could be an honest conversation that explains to Iraq's governing coalition that American support cannot be unconditional. Without the American military, this Iraqi government would likely fall, and many of its members' lives might be in danger. Perhaps that will focus their minds.

Of course, there is a good chance that even this won't work. At that point-a few months from now-we will have to be willing to follow through on the threat. That does not mean a complete withdrawal. But American forces should be reduced and repositioned so as to create a much smaller, less active, less ambitious and, one hopes, more sustainable American presence in Iraq.

(b)(6)

From: Dan Senor [dan@ (b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, October 30, 2006 11:54 AM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA; dansenor@ (b)(6)
Cc: Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA
Subject: RE: Guantanamo

Sounds good, (b)(6)

Thanks.

All the best,

-Dan

From: (b)(6) OSD PA [mailto: (b)(6)]
Sent: Mon 10/30/2006 8:39 AM
To: Dan Senor; dansenor@ (b)(6)
Cc: Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA
Subject: RE: Guantanamo

great. I'll keep you posted. glad you're interested. I'll try to give you a little more warning for the next trip!
thanks

(b)(6)

From: Dan Senor [mailto:dan@ (b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, October 30, 2006 8:21 AM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA; dansenor@yahoo.com
Cc: Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA
Subject: RE: Guantanamo

Hi (b)(6)

Many thanks for this invitation. I would like to visit Gitmo, but unfortunately cannot go this Weds. Please let me know when you think the next trip will be as it takes shape.

And apologies for not following up with you sooner.

All the best,

-Dan

From: (b)(6) OSD PA [mailto: (b)(6)]
Sent: Mon 10/30/2006 5:32 AM
To: Dan Senor; dansenor@ (b)(6)
Cc: Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA
Subject: Guantanamo

4/9/2008

hi dan,
i wanted to follow up with you on the previous emails i sent you. we have a seat on our flight down to guantanamo on wednesday, november 1st – if you are interested and available?? i will need to get your information by noon today to submit the country clearance message. please get in touch with me as soon as possible if you'd like to join us.
thank you,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

4/9/2008

(b)(6)

From: Paul Vallely [vallely@(b)(6)]
Sent: Sunday, October 29, 2006 10:10 AM
To: 'Kenneth Timmerman'
Subject: RE: Timmerman/Frontpage: Sabotaging Iraq

Ken: This is a great article and right on target. Have been saying the virtual same things since 2003. It all went downhill (for the most part) when the decision was made to install the CPA and Bremer.....and we became occupiers rather than liberators. The Military then had to pick up the ball and try to recover

Harlan - I have never agreed with him on about anything.....

Osprey Media
Paul E Vallely
Military Analyst/Radio Host "Stand Up America"
vallely@ (b)(6)
tel: (b)(6)
fax: (b)(6)
www.ospreymedia.us

-----Original Message-----

From: Kenneth Timmerman [mailto:timmerman.road@ (b)(6)]
Sent: Thursday, October 26, 2006 9:32 AM
To: KRT 4bis- TV & Talk Radio
Subject: Timmerman/Frontpage: Sabotaging Iraq

The Path to Iraqi "Failure"
By Kenneth R. Timmerman
FrontPageMagazine.com | October 26, 2006

Harlan Ullman, who frequently touts himself as the "academic mentor of Condoleeza Rice," believes that the United States has "lost" the war in Iraq, and that the administration's handling of Iraq has been "a catastrophe" since the U.S. "lost control of events on the ground" in April or May 2003.

In an interview with Australian television earlier this month, Mr. Ullman joined Bob Woodward and Congressional Democrats in accusing the president of refusing to recognize reality. "Iraq is a disaster. It is a disaster at every level, and to think that they've got a functioning government and to think that the situation is better today than it was in 2003 or 2004, or 2005, is unbelievable," Mr. Ullman said.

"We have a catastrophe on our hands," he went on, "and the only guy in town who seems not to be able to recognize that, sadly, is the president." The U.S. was on "a stupid course" in Iraq and needed a radical change of direction, he added.

Harsh words, indeed. They come in the midst of an election season where Republicans are having to defend a war in Iraq that opinion polls say has become widely unpopular.

The only problem is, Mr. Ullman and the war critics are wrong. And this type of pseudo-critique from a man who wants us to believe that he is a treasured advisor to Republican policy-makers raises questions about Mr. Ullman's own political agenda. Is he hoping to convince voters to oust Republicans in November's midterm elections?

No, we have not "lost" Iraq. Anyone who thinks we have never set foot in that country or the Middle East, and thinks we are engaged in some kind of failed law enforcement exercise akin to routing out the mafia in Hudson County, New Jersey (something U.S. Senator Robert Menendez D-NJ, knows quite a lot about, or so I'm told).

Does Mr. Ullman really believe that the Democrats "cut and run" alternative would better serve our national security interests than continuing to train the Iraqi army and the

Iraqi police, than continuing to help them to bridge the sectarian divide and to track down terrorists and kill them?

Does he believe that sitting back and doing nothing in 2002, and allowing Saddam Hussein not only to remain in power but to escape from international sanctions, would have been better than the risks and the costs of war? Because that is the policy that the State Department Arabists and that other protégé he sometimes claims, former Secretary of State Colin Powell? were pursuing at the time, with rousing support from the French. They called it "smart sanctions." But there was nothing smart about it.

The U.S. effort in Iraq is nothing short of historic. It is massively ambitious, and was dramatically necessary, something for which all Americans and all Middle Easterners should be thanking this president for the next five generations.

Not only has the war in Iraq rid the world of a gathering threat, which was that of a Saddam Hussein closely allied to international terrorists, armed with long range missiles and a variety of unconventional weapons. This war has also changed the political landscape of the Middle East.

And that may be what Mr. Ullman and his friends the "pragmatists" and the Arabists at the State Department - fear the most.

Instead of treating the symptoms of the Middle Eastern malady, which State and its Sunni Arab allies have done since the end of World War II, President Bush has gone to the heart of the matter, which he rightly calls "the freedom deficit."

The State Department Arabists and the pragmatists have long argued that Arab dictators are a necessary evil. Islam prepares Muslims for submission, they say. It is not America's mission to change the Arab world. If the Arabs wanted dictators, let them have them. (And besides, some of those dictators pay very well, especially if you are a senior State Department official about to retire and embark on a new life as a talking head, think tanker, or international consultant).

Here's where the real problems began in Iraq. It was not with the Coalition military operation to oust Saddam Hussein. Nor was it with our noble efforts to help freedom-loving Iraqis to stand up a government in the immediate aftermath of Saddam's demise.

It occurred on May 16, 2006, when the State Department Arabists and the CIA ghost-whisperers who stood looking over their shoulder told the seven members of the Iraqi Leadership Council that they were toast.

That meeting was led by L. Paul Bremer, the U.S. "Viceroy," who had just arrived in Baghdad four days earlier.

In his account of the hours that preceded this monumental historic error, for which he takes full credit as if it were a tremendous success, Bremer gloats at the prospect of firing the Iraqi freedom coalition.

Allowing Iraqis to run their own country so soon after Saddam's ouster was a "reckless fantasy," Bremer writes on page 12 of his autobiography (My Year in Iraq, published earlier this year by Simon & Schuster). "I'll let them know that we're not about to turn over the keys to the kingdom," he told his Arabist aide, Ryan Crocker.

In fact, the only "reckless fantasy" at work here was that of the Arabists, the CIA, and Jerry Bremer, who believed the United States could become an imperial power, rather than fulfill our historic destiny as an exporter of freedom and (small-r) republican values.

The seven-man Iraqi Leadership Council had been elected at three successive conferences of hundreds of delegates representing all the major political parties in Iraq, except for Saddam Hussein's Baathists. But that wasn't good enough for the Arabists or the CIA or Jerry Bremer.

Why? Because the ILC was chaired by Ahmad Chalabi, a man who has been accused of every perfidy in the book - Iranian agent, convicted felon, intelligence fabricator, you name it. These allegations are not only a pack of lies: they were motivated by the very people who brought us the "disaster" in Iraq of which Mr. Ullman complains: the State Department

Arabists and their CIA helpers.

Instead of empowering these Iraqis and the established political constituencies they represented (around 80 percent of the Iraqi population), Ambassador Bremer preferred direct, imperial-style rule.

By doing so, he transformed the U.S. liberation of Iraq into an occupation.

If we are paying a price today for "mistakes" made in Iraq, this was the first and the biggest mistake, the one moment that irrevocably changed the way Iraqis viewed the United States.

And it was perfectly foreseeable at the time.

When Chalabi was informed of Bremer's decision to cast aside the Iraqi Leadership Council on May 16, 2003, he turned to Bremer's messenger (British ambassador John Sawers), and said, "OK, in a way you're doing us a favor. Now you're going to have to take the blame for everything that goes wrong."

Prophetic words. Foreseeable future. Tragic failure.

But please, Mr. Ullman: don't wring your hands for a president you say is in a "state of denial."

The only ones in that state are the State Department Arabists and their helpers at CIA, the Democratic party, and the Scowcroft Group.

Is Iraq difficult? You bet. We do difficult. We are the United States of America.

Original article: <http://frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=25138>

--

Kenneth R. Timmerman

President, Middle East Data Project, Inc.

Author: Countdown to Crisis: The Coming Nuclear Showdown with Iran Contributing editor: Newsmax.com

Tel: (b)(6)

Reply to: timmerman.road@

Website: www.KenTimmerman.com

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OSD PA
Sent: Friday, October 27, 2006 2:22 PM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: FW: al qaeda threat to saudi oil fields

fyi

From: Vician, Todd M LtCol OSD PA
Sent: Friday, October 27, 2006 12:01 PM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: RE: al qaeda threat to saudi oil fields

(b)(6)

We are aware of the notice distributed by the Royal Navy Maritime Trade Operations Dubai office, and we support the recommendation that commercial mariners be especially vigilant while transiting the Gulf.

In response to recent threats to oil infrastructure in the Gulf, including public statements by Al Qaeda leadership, coalition forces are taking prudent, precautionary measures and focusing maritime security operations in the Gulf on these possible threats.

Terrorists have demonstrated their intent to attack oil infrastructure in this region through previous attempts such as the attack on Motor Vessel Limburg in 2003, the attempted suicide boat attack on the Iraqi oil terminals in 2004, and the attempted attacks at Abqaiq, Saudi Arabia and in Yemen earlier this year.

These operations are nothing new. Coalition maritime forces routinely conduct maritime security operations in the Gulf. These operations deny terrorists use of the maritime environment as a venue for attack, or to transport personnel, weapons, or other material, and complement the counter-terrorism and security efforts of regional nations.

Coalition forces work closely with all GCC nations on efforts to help set the conditions for security and stability in the maritime environment. We defer to those nations to describe their participation and cooperation with coalition efforts.

Coalition ships conduct MSO throughout the region. In the central and southern Arabian Gulf, coalition maritime forces are led by Commander of Task Force 152, Italian Navy Rear Adm. Emilio Foltzer.

BACKGROUND ONLY:

Acting on information received, Coalition naval forces, operating in support of Saudi and Bahraini forces have deployed units to counter a possible maritime threat to the oil facilities at Ras Tannurah.

Coalition, Saudi and Bahraini units in the general vicinity are focusing on presence and deterrence in the approaches to Ras Tannurah.

4/9/2008

Merchant vessels calling at Ras Tannurah should keep a listening watch and are asked to respond as directed to any instructions from Coalition warships.

Merchant vessels are also advised to maintain a vigilant self protection posture and are encouraged to report any suspicious activity

r/
Todd

Lt Col Todd Vician, USAF
Defense Press Officer
Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
(b)(2)
DSN (b)(2)

From: (b)(6) OSD PA
Sent: Friday, October 27, 2006 11:53 AM
To: Vician, Todd M. LtCol OSD PA
Cc: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: al Qaeda threat to Saudi oil fields

hi. i just got a call from jed babbin. he is going to be on kudlow tonight and want to be prepared if they ask him about the aq threat to Saudi oil fields. have you heard anything on this? anything we could share with him... even background info??

thanks

(b)(6)

(b)(6)
Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense
(b)(2)

4/9/2008

(b)(6)

From: Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA
Sent: Friday, October 27, 2006 10:58 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Smith / Bucci Mtg Notes - 10/26

the fact is, these analysts have contacts all over the building, particularly since most are high level retired officers. that's one take. additionally, when the vice or cno have something that they or their service is driving, these folks do get on and brief the analysts.

access to the sd is what these analysts don't have. it may be that there is not an realization that when the sd takes 20 minutes from his sked to meet with the analysts, he is coming in to see them after they've had a full two to three hour program, filled in by the cjs or vice, service secretary or two, and an undersecretary or two.

my two cents worth, for what it's worth.


From: (b)(6) OSD PA
Sent: Friday, October 27, 2006 9:43 AM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Cc: Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA
Subject: RE: Smith / Bucci Mtg Notes - 10/26

that's a bit of a frustrating answer on the rt. the retired military analysts will not come in the building if they're not meeting with secdef. it's fine for our other groups to focus on other mil/dod leaders, they will be happy as clams. the mil analysts are a different story. they've always only come in to meet with him. i don't see us having success getting interest if they don't have access to the boss.

thanks

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OSD PA
Sent: Friday, October 27, 2006 7:52 AM
To: Whitman, Bryan Mr OSD PA; Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA; Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; Thorp, Frank RDML OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA
Cc: Bucci, Dr. Steven CIV SD; Smith, Dorrance HON OSD PA; Abbott, Catherine COL OSD PA
Subject: Smith / Bucci Mtg Notes - 10/26



Non Responsive

4/9/2008

- American Spectator – Hold
- Instapundit – Dr. B will find an hour in late November or early December
- Stern Magazine – If PA deems attractive and there is a need to do foreign press while at the NATO summit, we may decide to participate. Additionally, PA needs to develop a PA Plan for Riga.
- Military Analysts RT – Will not work for next week. Surrogate team should also reach out to CJCS, VCJCS, ADM Mullen, etc. SD should not be your only focus. We should try these outreach events with other high-level leaders as well.
- SD will tape messages on Tuesday, November 7th. These tapings will include messages for Veteran's Day, Thanksgiving and Christmas/Holiday.

(b)(6)
Confidential Assistant to the
Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Public Affairs
1400 Defense Pentagon (b)(2)
Washington, DC 20301-1400
(main) (b)(2)
(private) (b)(2)
(c) (b)(2)

4/9/2008

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@ (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 26, 2006 8:37 AM
To: tmcinerney@ (b)(6) nashct@ (b)(6) Glenstrae77@ (b)(6) BLIRM41516@ (b)(6)
USAGirl1957@ (b)(6) WSSinter@ (b)(6) robertscales@ (b)(6)
wheelerc@ (b)(6) twilkerson@ (b)(6) ShepDonald@ (b)(6) mgroot@ (b)(6)
groothousen@ (b)(6)
Subject: Today's RCP: Media Drowning in the Election Wave

No matter who's the winner on November 7th, the media will be the losers. They've sacrificed their last bit of credibility, taking sides openly this year.

[RealClearPolitics - Articles - Will the Media Drown in an '06 Election 'Wave'?](#)

Jed Babbin

(b)(6) (Home Office)
(b)(6) (Mobile)

4/9/2008

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OSD PA
Sent: Wednesday, October 25, 2006 3:52 PM
To: Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA; Smith, Dorrance, HON, OSD-PA
Subject: FW: Journalist Lunch

From: (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA
Sent: Wednesday, October 25, 2006 3:44 PM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: RE: Journalist Lunch

We will give you a full sweep, but here's one that I saw earlier today:

A strategic lunch with Mr. Rumsfeld
By Austin Bay
Wednesday, October 25, 2006

A Pentagon press lunch with the secretary of defense is a rare privilege, especially for a columnist from fly-over country.

I've watched Don Rumsfeld perform on television. He treats stand-up press conferences as sparring rings, where he's the heavyweight champ and reporters are lightweight chumps with glass jaws.

Maybe lettuce and tomatoes mellow Big Don. Rumsfeld seems much less combative with a salad plate plopped in front of him. As the lunch and conversation progressed, I noticed he never picked up a knife, but I've no doubt the man can wield sharp cutlery. The glint in the eye is the clue. Sgt. 1st Class Bowen - the Korean War vet who taught Cadet Bay how to use a garrote -- had the same steely gleam.

I left it to the Beltway journalists to ask those personality-juiced queries that generate sensational gossip. Here's an example: "Mr. Rumsfeld, are you going to resign after the election?"

Since my scribbled notes include a splotch of asparagus soup, I'll have to paraphrase the SecDef's snarl, "I certainly wouldn't tell you if I were."

Undeterred, I decided to ask a question that goes to the heart of America's ability (or inability) to win long-term, multidimensional 21st century wars.

My question: "Mr. Secretary, based on our experience in Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the limited interagency and non-governmental organization (NGO) participation in that operation, how do you see 'Unified Action' evolving for future conflicts?"

Forgive the military jargon -- at one time I was Col. Bay -- but the question is essential. It also altered the luncheon ambiance. As I asked it, I saw our very steady chairman of the joint chiefs, Gen. Peter Pace, pass Rumsfeld a careful stare.

4/9/2008

"I'll tell you we're better at it now than we were five years ago," Rumsfeld replied. He acknowledged that "challenges remain" in achieving Unified Action and that effective Unified Action is critical to winning 21st century wars.

He's right -- we are better at it than we were. However, I know we aren't as good at it as we need to be.

The politically deft SecDef finessed the question -- and it was finesse, not dodge. The military jargon masked a heavy political hand grenade I was rolling toward the Beltway. You think Harry Reid's land deal or Mark Foley's messages are big stories? How about a stinging pre-election turf battle between Defense and the departments of State, Treasury, Justice, Commerce and Agriculture, complete with zinger accusations of who is or isn't contributing to the war effort?

I know, that's quite a claim, which is why I need to translate the mil-speak: Unified Action means coordinating and synchronizing every "tool of power" America possesses to achieve a political end -- like winning a global war for national survival against terrorists who hijack economically and politically fragile nations and provinces.

People understand the role of soldiers and cops in a war, but in 21st century wars where economic and political development are determinative, an arborist at the Department of Agriculture and a Commerce Department trade consultant can be powerful contributors to "Unified Action."

Restoring Iraqi agriculture provides an example. Saddam Hussein's economic and political policies damaged agriculture in the land that eight millennia ago spawned the Agricultural Revolution. (Heck of an achievement, huh?) Agriculture, Commerce and several NGOs have expertise and programs that are helping revive Iraqi farms. Still, problems occur when trying to tailor programs to meet specific local needs -- like, who pays for the program and who is ultimately in charge of oversight and coordination.

While serving in Iraq in 2004, I met a young U.S. Army captain who was running a successful small-scale date palm restoration project. What we really need are joint development and security teams, where agricultural and economic specialists work with that captain "in the field" on a sustained, day-to-day basis. We need to decide who is in charge of that team (the captain or the arborist?) and how we fund it.

Our system for "Unified Action" is still largely a Cold War, 20th century relic designed to prop up governments (so often corrupt and ill-led), instead of helping individuals and neighborhoods become economically self-sustaining and self-securing. Winning war in the Age of the Internet means improving neighborhoods and individual lives. The 2006 Nobel Peace Prize winner and micro-finance whiz Muhammad Yunus understands this.

We are in a long, global war, where economic and political development programs must reinforce security and intelligence operations -- and vice versa.

We've been improvising "joint development and security operations," and we've learned from our improvisation (Rumsfeld's "we're better than we were").

But it's time to quit improvising. Effective "Unified Action" requires re-engineering 20th century Beltway bureaucracies -- which means thoughtful, sophisticated cooperation between the executive branch and Congress.

That means getting past the sensational gossip and confronting an essential issue.

4/9/2008

Austin Bay Austin Bay is author of three novels. His third novel, The Wrong Side of Brightness, was published by Putnam/Jove in June 2003. He has also co-authored four non-fiction books, to include A Quick and Dirty Guide to War: Third Edition (with James Dunnigan, Morrow, 1996).

Be the first to read Austin Bay's column. Sign up today and receive Townhall.com delivered each morning to your inbox. Sign up today!

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) OSD PA
Sent: Wednesday, October 25, 2006 10:54 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA, (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA
Cc: (b)(6) CTR, OASD-PA
Subject: Journalist Lunch

Mr. (b)(6)

The Secretary had lunch with the following journalists on Monday (b)(6) asked me to email you their names and ask if you would be on special look-out for anything they may write this week.

Thank you,

(b)(6)

Austin Bay
Jed Babbin
Kate O'Beirne
Mark Steyn
Cal Thomas

4/9/2008

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
 Sent: Tuesday, October 24, 2006 8:13 PM
 To: (b)(6) OSD PA; Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA; Smith, Dorrance, HDN, OSD-PA
 Subject: Jed Babbin's blog

October 24, 2006

Lunch with Rumsfeld and PacePosted by JED BABBIN | [E-Mail This](#) | [Permalink](#) | [Email RCP](#)

Yesterday, along with four other journalists, I lunched with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Gen. Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We had a wide-ranging discussion on North Korea, Iraq, and the reports that there was a coming change in administration policy toward Iraq. Mr. Rumsfeld said that the President had asked him to stay out of politics in this election, and he was determined to do just that. Several of us tried to nudge or kid him into it, and the most we could get was a "nice try" or two.

Rumsfeld explained that the conference the president held last weekend with him and our top generals didn't signal a major shift on Iraq. This conference wasn't something out of the ordinary and in the two or three others held before the president had used this session to talk through ideas with his top advisors. As to the idea that the Congressionally-created Baker-Hamilton "Iraq Study Group" might recommend major policy shifts, Rumsfeld demurred. He said that outside groups such as that one can often be helpful by bringing new viewpoints to the analysis. The Baker group - which interfaces mostly with National Security Advisor Steven Hadley -- has met with Rumsfeld at the White House and will be coming to the Pentagon for more discussions in mid-November.

I asked if the Baker group was trying to answer the right questions. Are we talking about Iraq without talking about a regional solution? Rumsfeld said he wasn't familiar with the mandate Congress had given the Baker group. When I pressed him that too many people want to talk about Iraq without placing it in context he said, "I think it's awfully hard - I know some people would like to do it - but it's awfully hard to look at Iraq and not look at it in the context of the world we live in, and the area that it is in, and the activities of Iran and Syria and the broader question of the Shia-Sunni interaction that's taking place." The problems of the Middle East are, inferentially, regional and cannot be solved within the borders of any single nation.

Asked if he was planning to resign after the elections, Rumsfeld said that if he were, he'd have spoken to the president about it and that no such discussion had taken place.

We talked about North Korea and the ability of the world to achieve its nuclear disarmament. Mr. Rumsfeld said that the problem had been the lack of cohesion among the international community and that the president's approach intended to create that cohesion and thus the leverage to accomplish the necessary solution. Rumsfeld was quick to explain that the problem of nuclear North Korea was much different than the problem posed by Iran. He gave us copies of what is now his favorite picture. It's a night time satellite photo of the Korean peninsula taken (apparently repeatedly or in some time-lapse format) from February 1 - March 31, 2006. It shows nearly half of South Korea bathed in artificial light, and all of North Korea - except the capital, Pyongyang - utterly dark. "If you think of North Korea, it is very different from Iran. There's people who are starving. They have people who are going in the military who are under five feet and less than one hundred pounds. There's a lack of nutrition in the

4/9/2008

country." The sort of deterrence that worked before may work against North Korea, though Rumsfeld said the principal danger from North Korea is proliferation: "He'll sell anything."

Much of the discussion centered around the ability of America to fight a long war. Both Rumsfeld and Pace used the example of the Cold War to illustrate their conviction that America does and will continue to have the ability to stay in the war against terrorists until it's done. Rumsfeld elaborated.

He said that Americans were raised - "socialized" was the word he used - to believe that our military can win any war by going out and defeating a nation or an army. But times have changed. He said of Iraq, "There's no way the military can lose. There's also no way the military can win all alone. That isn't the nature of it... There's no major army, navy, air force to go and attack and destroy." In wars like this, there will be no "clean wins."

How long will it take? How will the American people support a war such as this? Rumsfeld said, "We have to be smart enough and wise enough as we were in the Cold War to recognize the danger, and to recognize that it takes perseverance."

Gen. Pace added, "We're back to the common understanding of the threat. The American people are willing to withstand a long-term challenge as exemplified by the Cold War and the Soviet Union... The good news is that since 9-11 we haven't been attacked here at home. What that means is that some Americans don't yet grasp fully the very real nature of this threat to the survival of the nation."

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4/9/2008

(b)(6)

From: Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA
Sent: Monday, October 23, 2006 9:46 PM
To: jedbabbin@jeb.org
Subject: Re: Thanks

Jed, it has been a pleasure working w/you over the past two years. You and I both know that perserverance pays off. I'm glad you were able to make it today. Feel free to call me is you need amplification, etc. Thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: JedBabbin@jeb.org -JedBabbin@jeb.org
To: Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA
Sent: Mon Oct 23 21:03:41 2006
Subject: Thanks

Eric: Many thanks for including me in the lunch today. It was great. And will be writing/blogging from it tomorrow. Best, Jed.

Jed Babbin

(b)(6)

(Home Office)
(Mobile)

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@ (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, October 23, 2006 8:16 AM
To: Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA
Subject: Re: Rethinking Iraq: Today's TAS

Dallas: Thanks. I'm great, and (b)(6) support is still wonderful. Let's talk soon. Best, Jed.

Jed Babbin

(b)(6) (home office)
(b)(6) (home fax)
(b)(6) (mobile)

4/9/2008

(b)(6)

From: Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA
Sent: Monday, October 23, 2006 8:13 AM
To: 'JedBabbin@'(b)(6)
Subject: RE: Rethinking Iraq: Today's TAS

How are you doing these days my friend?

How has our outreach been in the past month to you guys?

I handed off the outreach to a new person who was brought on board and we sent (b)(6) over there as well to help out. I just wanted to make sure you were still getting the same, if not better, level of outreach from us. Thanks!

Dallas B. Lawrence
Director, Office of Community Relations & Public Liaison
United States Department of Defense

(b)(2)

From: JedBabbin@'(b)(6) [mailto:JedBabbin@'(b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, October 23, 2006 8:11 AM
To: tmcinmey@'(b)(6); nashct@erols.com; Glenstrae77@'(b)(6); BURM41516@'(b)(6);
USAGirl1957@'(b)(6); WSSInter@'(b)(6); robertscales@'(b)(6); wheelerc@'(b)(6);
twilkerson@'(b)(6); ShepDonald@'(b)(6); mgroot@'(b)(6); groothousen@'(b)(6)
Subject: Rethinking Iraq: Today's TAS

Iraq hasn't gone in the direction we planned because we've ignored the fact that it's only part of a much larger war. Revision of policy is a good idea, but only if we base the revisions on answers to the right questions. And that we are not doing.

The American Spectator

Jed Babbin
(b)(6) (Home Office)
(b)(6) (Mobile)

4/9/2008

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) COL STRATEFF (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, October 22, 2006 2:55 PM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA; Thompson, Jonathan SES OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; Ballesteros, Mark J LTC OSD PA; Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA; Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA
Cc: (b)(6) MAJ MNFI STRATEFF; Whitman, Bryan Mr OSD PA
Subject: RE: [U] RE: Conference call with Retired Military Analysts

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Thanks so much, (b)(6)

Stay informed!: <http://www.mnf-iraq.com/>

(b)(6) Colonel, USAF
Deputy Chief, Strategic Communications
Strategic Effects, MNF-I

DSN (b)(2)
Comm (b)(2)
Int'l (b)(2)
MCI (b)(2)

(b)(6)

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From: (b)(6) OSD PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Sunday, October 22, 2006 4:12 PM
To: (b)(6) COL STRATEFF; Thompson, Jonathan SES OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; Ballesteros, Mark J LTC OSD PA; Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA; Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA
Cc: (b)(6) MAJ MNFI STRATEFF; Bryan Whitman
Subject: RE: [U] RE: Conference call with Retired Military Analysts

colonel,
i've attached the rough draft of the transcript of the call. please note, it has not been double checked for accuracy against the tape, and we do not transcribe off-the-record comments.
have a great day,

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) COL STRATEFF [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Sunday, October 22, 2006 7:41 AM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA; Thompson, Jonathan SES OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; Ballesteros, Mark J LTC OSD PA; Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA

4/9/2008

Cc: (b)(6) MAJ MNFI STRATEFF; Whitman, Bryan Mr OSD PA
Subject: [U] RE: Conference call with Retired Military Analysts

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Mr Thompson and (b)(6)

Please email to us soonest the transcript of MG Caldwell's Retired Military Analysts Conference call transcript. We'd like to use it to assist GEN Casey for his PC with Ambassador Khalilzad.

V/R,

(b)(6)

Stay informed! <http://www.mnf-iraq.com/>

(b)(6)

Colonel, USAF
Deputy Chief, Strategic Communications
Strategic Effects, MNF-I

DSN (b)(2)
Comm (b)(2)
Int'l (b)(2)
MCI (b)(2)

(b)(6)

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From: (b)(6) OSD PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, October 20, 2006 3:37 PM
To: (b)(6) COL STRATEFF
Cc: Thompson, Jonathan SES OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA; Caldwell William B MG MNFI DCS STRATEFF; (b)(6) MAJ MNFI STRATEFF; Ballesteros, Mark J LTC OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) AFPS; Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA; Bryan Whitman
Subject: Conference call with Retired Military Analysts

Colonel,
Please find attached (and pasted below) the agenda for the call with Retired Military Analysts in a half hour. The RSVP's I have received so far are on the second page. The dial in number is also on the Agenda. Please let me know if you have any questions.
Thank you for your time.

v/r,

(b)(6)

4/9/2008

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

As of 8:30 a.m.



**Conference Call
Retired Military Analysts
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 20, 2006**

TIME: 9:00 – 9:45 a.m.

AGENDA

9:00 a.m. Welcome and Introduction (GUIDELINES)

- (b)(6) OSD Public Affairs

9:01 a.m. Update on Situation in Baghdad

- Major General William Caldwell

9:30 a.m. Q & A

- Military Analysts

9:45 a.m. Conference Call Concludes (GUIDELINES)

- (b)(6)

Note: Dial-in-telephone numbers are

(b)(2)

4/9/2008

Confirmed Retired Military Analysts:

Mr. Jed Babbin	(USAF, JAG) American Spectator
Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Cucullu	(USA, Retired) Fox News
Lieutenant Colonel Tim J. Eads	(USA, Retired) Fox News
Colonel John Garrett	(USMC, Retired) Fox News
Command Sergeant Major Steven Greer	(USA, Retired) Fox News
General William F. "Buck" Kernan	(USA, Retired)
Major General James "Spider" Marks	(USA, Retired) CNN
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney	(USAF, Retired) Fox News
Major General Paul E. Vallely	(USA, Retired) Fox News

4/9/2008

(b)(6)

From: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA
Sent: Sunday, October 22, 2006 1:32 PM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: Re: [U] RE: Conference call with Retired Military Analysts

Just landed. Ouch.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) OSD PA
To: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA
Sent: Sun Oct 22 13:02:23 2006
Subject: Re: [U] RE: Conference call with Retired Military Analysts

Thanks, ab. Wasn't that so nice of him?? Hopefully we can get him to do more! :) Are you back safe and sound??

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Sent: Sun Oct 22 11:31:18 2006
Subject: Fw: [U] RE: Conference call with Retired Military Analysts

Wow. Way to go (b)(6) what a nice vote of confidence in your work

Ab

-----Original Message-----

From: Caldwell William B MG MNFI DCS STRATEFF <william.caldwell@ (b)(6)>
To: (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) COL STRATEFF (b)(6)
CC: Thompson, Jonathan SES OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA; (b)(6) Ballesteros, Mark J LTC OSD PA; (b)(6) Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA; Whitman, Bryan Mr OSD PA; (b)(6) COL STRATEFF (b)(6) COMMS DIV (b)(6) MAJ MNFI STRATEFF (b)(6) Chief of Staff (b)(6) XO

Sent: Fri Oct 20 23:52:07 2006
Subject: [U] RE: Conference call with Retired Military Analysts

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(b)(6)

thanks for making this all come together. Thought it was a very productive session. Jonathan Thompson was right in recommending this venue - one we need to sustain at some frequency which I will talk with Jonathan about.

Again - appreciated your help, and trust you also received the materials to forward onto the Analysts.

V/r - Bill Caldwell

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY If this e-mail is marked FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY it may be exempt from mandatory disclosure under FOIA. DoD 5400.7R, "DoD Freedom of Information Act Program", DoD Directive 5230.9, "Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release", and DoD Instruction 5230.29, "Security and Policy Review of DoD Information for Public Release" apply.

From: (b)(6) OSD PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, October 20, 2006 3:37 PM
To: (b)(6) COL STRATEFF
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Caldwell William B MG MNFI DCS STRATEFF; (b)(6) MAJ MNFI STRATEFF; Ballesteros,
Mark J LTC OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6)
AFPS; Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA; Bryan Whitman
Subject: Conference call with Retired Military Analysts

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(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

As of 8:30 a.m.

Conference Call

Retired Military Analysts

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 20, 2006

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9:45 a.m. Conference Call Concludes (GUIDELINES)

(b)(6)

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Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney (USAF, Retired) Fox News
Major General Paul E. Vallely (USA, Retired) Fox News

MG Caldwell (from Iraq)
Conference call with military analysts
Friday, Oct. 20, 2006

Note: call was on the record except for some portions on background (those portions not transcribed)

Transcriber: (b)(6)

Caldwell: I guess the first thing to start off with is obviously from the press conference yesterday (Oct. 18) that we did over here in Baghdad. There has been a lot of question about what may or may not have been said, and I just really wanted to help first, clarify that, that there has been a question about whether or not we feel like the plan has been a failure. And that is not the case at all. I think talking to (inaudible) especially everybody understands anytime you devise a plan, you put into implementation of it, you are constantly reassessing and re-evaluating it. That's what we have been doing from the beginning. We are continuing to do that with this plan, and when we said yesterday that we are going back and continuing to refine it, that's exactly what we are doing.

We are going to make adjustments to it. We are talking with the government of Iraq on a weekly basis of what we call the Ministerial Committee for National Security, and then of course the CG (commanding general), General Casey, does it on a even probably informal basis directly with the prime minister, too.

So those are things that are ongoing that perhaps they portrayed it as some kind of just dramatic shift that is going to occur, and it's not. You know I was talking really at the tactical level, tactically what we are looking at within the plan.

We do want to make some adjustments and refinements to it. We are going to do that, and we will continue executing the plan.

Our theme that we keep kind of using is the fact that violence and progress do co-exist here in Iraq. That's something General Casey said back in Washington about two weeks ago. It's something we've recognized over here – that we're not going to have one before the other, that in fact they are both going to have to be worked in parallel to each other.

We're going to have continue working on progress within country – with the rebuilding portion of it, with the governance piece, with the economic piece, simultaneously we're dealing with the levels of violence that we experience at different intensities at different times at different areas.

But obviously, our overall goal is eventually to build the government of Iraq to where it can handle its security itself, where, you know, it's self reliant to handle the levels of violence. And there will be varying levels of violence that are still always going to occur here, even when it reaches a point when we are quote-unquote "successful" and have achieved the desired end state. You'll have heard different people refer to it as, you know, a country that's at peace with its neighbors, lives in peace and security, but in fact we recognize the fact that it's going to be many, many years before this country sees a

level of violence that's more normal to we're used to in America and what Westerners would want to see. There is going to be some sort of level of criminal that is still going to be here, then you're going to have some sort of sectarian violence still at some low level, and you're probably still going to have some level of terrorist activity, insurgent activity that is still going to occur.

What we have to do is develop the Iraqi Security Forces to such that they are able and capable of handling those three various levels of violence, bringing them down to some level to where the security forces are just above them, and can handle it, and that's the point which we'll be allowed – or able – to disengage our forces.

Ultimately what's going on is there's a need for a political solution more than a military solution at this point. Any place we go in and we have conducted operations just as anybody has seen for many, many years, we are able to control the situation where our forces are present. But to ultimately bring the security, the relative security and prosperity this country it's going to take and require a political solution to what's going on.

There is a tremendous amount of dialogue that is occurring. You've heard that the prime minister had this 24-point plan in June; he's had already now two of his national reconciliation conferences, they've announced a third one is going to be on Nov. 4, that they are going to do, we're not sure the final one. We know that he is working his four-point plan he outlined about two weeks ago, figuring out how to put that into place, and working with the various political factions and the different sectarian elements here.

But he is engaged in dialogue and working with all the different sects, and that's exactly what has to occur if we are going to eventually come to some political solution for this country. Because it is ultimately up to the Iraqi people to rebuild and secure their own country; that's not something that we are going to be able to do completely for them; we can only set the stage to allow that to occur.

The prime minister did announce the formation of a special committee here about two days ago – or a couple days ago now – that will address the issue of militias and also take on overseeing the reform of the security ministries, specifically the ministry of defense, interior and the INIS – the Iraqi National Intelligence Service.

And those are ongoing and there was initial reports that were due back out to the prime minister this week. Already we've seen some things occur, such as the two national police division commanders that have been removed from their duties and assigned other duties, which is a very positive step forward with the government doing that type thing, because that needed to occur at the very top in both those cases. It was something we saw that would be a very positive step forward, but they made that on their own. It truly wasn't us forcing anything in the background; that was a decision they took unilaterally and executed. We were in tremendous agreement with the decision they made, obviously, and very supportive of it.

We have said that the spike in violence that we are seeing would occur during the Ramadan period; we announced it well before Ramadan even started. We have seen it for over the last two years; historically, it's about a 20 percent increase in the level of violence in terms of attacks, although that doesn't necessarily equate to casualties, some set number, but it does in terms of the amount of activity. Over the last two years it's increased; we're seeing a 22 percent increase already in the first three weeks of Ramadan compared to the last three weeks before Ramadan. So that is in fact occurring as we thought it would. And we just yesterday got a tremendous spike in VBED (vehicle-borne explosive devices) activity across the country. I want to say it was 17 altogether different activities occurring between vehicle IEDs and suicide-vehicle IEDs. And we can provide more detail – approximately 25 killed, about another I want to say about another 80 wounded, but I can get those exact figures here momentarily for you.

So that did occur, and again, this is on the night of (inaudible) power, and we thought we would see the spike there, in fact we did, just like we thought we did yesterday. But that will (?continue).

You heard what happened at Balad. Initially the press was portraying this as a tough situation that the government showed some kind of failure almost or something when in fact, when it was all finally said and done and I had the opportunity to talk with one of the ground commanders on site, it actually turned out to be a fairly good news story in terms of how the Iraqi leadership in that area reacted and responded to what occurred.

It started with the Iraqi army having killed an AQI (al Qaeda in Iraq) figure – a Sunni AQI member. In retaliation for that about 24 hours later, you know, we found a bunch of Shi'a who were killed in retaliation for that, 14 of them to be exact. And then the very next day we saw 26 Sunni that were killed for that. And right away the mayor of Balad placed the city on a curfew. They called together a meeting with team leaders, started talking about how to diffuse this situation. The next day they saw some indirect fire in the city; one more person was killed. And then on the 18th, they had a major conference of just over a couple hundred – 100, 200 people – that came together, including everybody from the provincial governor, the vice governor of the Salah ad Din Province, to the mayor, to the police chief, to some local sheiks – about seven or so local sheiks came in; they brought in the Iraqi army deputy brigade commander, the local Iraqi army battalion commanders, we were present – the Coalition forces were present but not at all involved. And they all came together and signed a pact and agreed to stop what would have been a cycle of violence that would have continued had there not been immediate response and action by the leadership of that province. They took charge; they stopped it; and we have not had another incident since then.

The numbers were grossly exaggerated initially from what we had heard in the news in terms of what the casualties were. We actually went to the local hospitals and verified the numbers, so it was somewhere around about 14 Shi'a and about 26 Sunni, so about 40 people who were killed in the sectarian violence based on that (one mortar?) from the direct fire.

So there was no real reporting on that, although we did talk it at the press conference yesterday, and then stated in fact we were pleased to see them taking charge and going through that piece.

I could go on. I'd be glad to talk to any specifics you all would like to. I can go everywhere from talking legislative actions the governor of Iraq is working and kind of where we are and how we see that playing out. The president, Talabani, did just post on a web site his legislative actions that they want to accomplish through the rest of this year, 2006, and then what they want to work into the beginning of 2007. It's a timeline of events. In fact, in ties in very closely to everything we've been talking - we being the U.S. mission and Coalition forces - have been talking to the leadership over here about. But it's those kind of activities that when you watch them occurring again gives us tremendous hope and promise for the future - the fact that they're government is functioning; the Council of Representatives is meeting, they're having debate. They're going through the first - their second read, and then voting on these laws. They have passed a couple of key critical pieces of legislative actions, such as the investment law, which was huge, and they're now working out also things like paying back debt they owe to the Turkish government which will allow for the border to be reopened and fuel to come across, which they are going to need throughout this winter time period, but they were in arrears for about 200 million dollars, and they've managed to figure out how to get money out of their system and start paying back the government of Turkey.

We see things like an international exposition that took place in late September up in Irbil; about 800 companies from 20 different countries showed up there for that event, you know, people who were interested in investing and establishing businesses over here.

We know that September they also passed their fuel import liberalization law, which is really, really important that they did, and that should start helping with the black market sales, and improve the fuel supply and reduce corruption by opening more the energy sector to private investment, which is something they desperately needed to do, too, because corruption within the whole fuel business was very - was rampant, and things like the fuel import liberalization law will help set better market prices; it will allow for better distribution so the black market - the lucrateness of doing that will now decreasing over time.

Anyway those are - I mean, and I can go on some other things. We can talk about the regions law if you want, that they did pass, although I am not an expert I can at least talk it some. But the two that we're still focused on very heavily is the hydrocarbon law and the de-Ba'athification. Both of those are going to be very important to be dealt with, and discussed, and hopefully addressed by the Council of Representatives before the end of December when they are scheduled to go out of session again for two more months, and then come back in session in March.

With that, I'll take any questions anybody has, and I'll open it up and try and address things. But we were just a little concerned that after the press conference yesterday that it was kind of portrayed as if we felt that the plan was failing; and I think that anybody in

the military that has served a couple of days at all understands that what we do is we in fact revise, which is nothing new. We constantly reassess where we are; we have taken this overall assessment of whether the conditions are still the same under which we developed the plan; if they are not, we make revisions to our plan to adjust to the conditions that exist. And that's exactly what we're going through right now as we continue doing some detailed analysis of this plan.

So we are very comfortable with where we are. We know that we've got to do some work; we've been doing it. And I think we'll see some minor modifications to the plan here in the very near future.

And with that, I'll take any questions anybody has.

Question: You said you were comfortable with the plan, but there was a report in the AP that a major terror leader had been arrested by American forces, and the prime minister had ordered General Casey to release him, and he had been released. I wasn't aware that (Prime Minister) Maliki could order General Casey to release people suspected of murder.

Caldwell: What the person you are talking about is Sheikh – he has a real long name – Sheik Mazen Abdul Khaliz El Saezi – and we did, we picked him up at about 0330 in the morning of the 17th, for allegedly being involved in illegal activities that are operating outside of the law. And the very next day at the request of the prime minister he was released. And the prime minister made the request and the Coalition forces did release him. I am not sure I would call it being ordered; but the prime minister did make the request that he be released and we released him. He did in fact sign a conditional release form in which he promised to support the government of Iraq and disavow future acts of violence when he was finally released.

But anyway, that did occur, and our position on that is this is a sovereign nation, the prime minister is in charge, if he makes the determination that he wants somebody released from custody and the request comes in, General Casey made the decision, or I should say really, it was probably – I'd have to find out exactly who made it, but it was prime minister, General – I mean the ambassador, General Casey made the decision and (inaudible) their request to go ahead and release the person.

Q: To follow up on that, you know, it has a very bad odor over here, because we understand this guy, you know, has been involved in planning or maybe even making attacks on American soldiers. Is there some protest we made to Maliki? Is there some thing we've said that, you know, you can't demand that we release guys with blood on their hands?

(Off the record)

Q: How would you describe what you are doing right now tactically when we talk about going against the militias? Are you indeed just conducting sweeps for arms and the

torture chambers and that type of thing? Are you actively trying to bring down the militias as U.S. forces?

Caldwell: I'll go back on the back record. I'll tell you, we know that within this city there are, you know, (Army Maj. Gen.) J.D. Thurman probably said it best, there's at least 23 different militia groups that operate within the city of Baghdad. I mean, he's got them all by name, can tell you generally where they are located. We track them as best we can by intelligence to understand who they are, what their goals are and everything else, but we clearly stand by the position that if you are in fact operating outside the law we are going to come after you.

We have a very – we have a special cell that has been formed, put together – General Casey did this several months ago, that does nothing but monitor, track and help us target those who are involved in sectarian violence or extrajudicial killings, specifically within the Baghdad area. And there's a lot of resources that are used in that targeting effort, and that's why on any kind of weekly basis, you are going to find we're picking up several cell leaders and anywhere from 10 to 30 cell members in locations across the Baghdad area. And we do show that normally just about every press conference, or every other press conference, kind of where we are in terms of the operations over the last two weeks.

But I think one of the most important things is we all realize that ultimately this whole militia thing is going to be solved by a political solution, not by a military solution. Kinetically, we'll continue to operate on when we know they're operating outside the law, but we really have are ultimately going to have to have the prime minister, through his efforts, find a political solution to this militia issue here that exists.

Q: As far as the U.S. casualties are concerned, can you give me some estimation of how many of U.S. casualties are a result of IEDs and ambushes and not as a result of direct combat? I mean the questions that we're getting a lot of times are are we killing as many of them as they're killing of us, just to be as plain as we can be?

Caldwell: We don't obviously publicly talk about where the majority of our casualties are coming from, although you could probably put it together by taking all our press releases (inaudible) casualties and you would start seeing a trend that obviously – you know, we are very concerned about IEDs. There are a lot of attacks on us. Most of the attacks that occur against the Coalition forces do not produce many casualties because they're just not very effective against us and it's a variety of factors, you can imagine, from our body armor, to our gear, to our protection, to our responsive, to our suppressive fires, so that – although the largest number of attacks (will?) occur against Coalition forces right now on a daily basis, most are very ineffective in terms of producing the equivalent number of casualties. Although we have seen as we all know as of yesterday there were 73 U.S. casualties – deaths, specifically, already in this month.

We do know that if you go back and you look in the month of September within the Baghdad area detained – I know that the Multi-National Division-Baghdad themselves

detained over 750 people and killed over another 80, but -- in the month of September that is.

But we don't normally go through and talk a lot about the casualty figures; we have been very concerned about not getting into some body count. If you go into this month of October we are in a very high glide path having detained already well over 580 at this point and have already killed over 30 insurgent activities within the city of Baghdad itself; this is not countrywide, obviously we've got other operations that are going on by our specialized forces, our Marines out west, and other places, too.

But that's just within Baghdad city. So there's been a tremendous amount of activity within the Baghdad area when you start looking at those kind of figures, if that helps put some of that into perspective for you.

Q: I think there's been an awful lot of misreporting about what the president's said about Iraq versus Vietnam. I understood him to only say that there's a parallel in that the enemy is trying to influence public opinion. I didn't understand him to say anything more than that. What was your understanding of what he said?

Caldwell: That was my exact understanding, too, and I had carefully read the text. It was a question that was given to him and he didn't come up with that, he was responding to somebody asking about that; he said, yeah, I think you could make that analogy or something like that. When asked a question when he specifically was talking about it in terms of the media and how that can turn public opinion and how it was used back then, in fact did turn public opinion. We have already seen on jihadist web sites within the last week, at least I know of two occasions right now -- there may be more, we're having our teams look, where in fact they have already come out and stated that elections are going to be occurring in the United States next month, and we need to continue to inflict as many casualties as we can on the American forces, because that will force the American people (inaudible -- that will?) want to leave, or something like that, by doing that. So they recognize themselves and are already talking to themselves on their web sites about the importance of the media, inflicting American casualties and how that can be perceived by Americans during the election period. And we did mention that yesterday during our press conference, that we think that's one of the three kind of reasons now why we see an increased focus and effort against Coalition forces in terms of trying to produce casualties against us.

Q: That's great, thanks.

Q: Following up on the detainees, the troops refer to it as the catch-and-release program because something like 80 percent of all the detainees are released within four months. When you're using the word detainee, is that what you mean, that we can expect the vast majority of these people to be released back out on the street? Or do you mean arrests that will actually result in prison terms so these same guys won't be back out in the streets?

Caldwell: Of that number, if you take September and October within Baghdad, you know, we're at 1,300 or so, one thousand three hundred or so that were picked up at least detainees. They will go through the process of producing the evidence that they have against these folks, and if it sufficient then they will put them in the detention system. But you are correct, at this point they are not into the detention system.

I am not quite sure, and I was trying to think – I was talking to Jack Gardner today about where his current statistics stand in terms of how many people – yeah, he right now has about 13,700 people in the detention system. Now those are the folks that are being held because in fact there is sufficient evidence to continue holding for a long period of time and they will not be (immediately?) released.

I think you know that the month of June that we did release – the prime minister did ask and they went through the system and did release quite a few and that's part of the whole reconciliation process, about 1,500 or so as I recall were released. And in fact at that point we were about 14,500, went down to about 13,000.

(Inaudible) how many people do go through the central criminal court of Iraq. They are charged, like last week, they administered one more death sentence and quite a few prison sentences and then they move out of our detention system and into the Iraqi prison system. But right now we do have about 13,000 people in our system.

Q: Do you know how many the Iraqis have?

Caldwell: Boy, I don't know that answer. I can try to find out; I've just not asked that question before. I know we don't readily have it here; I've not seen it in anything before, but we can ask that question.

Q: Thank you.

(cross talk)

Q: Sir, I just want to let you know that everybody back here on this call and all the wounded soldiers I talk to on a weekly basis couldn't be prouder of what you're doing and what the rest of you guys do from over there. We truly appreciate you've got our back and warm hearts and support and regards to what goes on.

Q: Here, here.

Q: Amen.

Caldwell: Well, that's great. I sure appreciate that. You know it does amaze me when you go out and talk to young kids, at least one day a week I get out and spend time with some unit out here just so that I am maintaining my situational awareness and can talk from anecdotal stories from young men and women out there. I am just continually – they see the difference down at their level. When you talk to them, they actually feel like they

are making a difference. They can see it; they can feel it. And as I keep telling them that's the most important thing. Well, that's great to hear. Thanks.

Q: Hooah.

Q: On the other side, you know, I talked to a sergeant the other week, and I am hearing more and more that these rules of engagement have restricted the soldiers far too much; that our forces can't be ruthless enough, even to the point back to releasing these detainees, the sergeant told me he was with the Iraqi forces and they still get fire from mosques and they can't do anything about it. So that's on the other side of the equation, that we are just not ruthless enough on bringing this enemy down. The government leadership over there is so weak that they can't even disarm the militias or order them disarmed to the point where anybody caught with a weapon would be basically eliminated.

So that's the other thing that we're getting back; and that's frustrating to hear that we're running the same routes and getting more wounded and killed by IEDs and there's nobody seizing the momentum or changing the momentum enough. It's visual, anyhow. That's just a comment and observation.

Q: Well you know, you are right. I can understand your frustration. One of the real challenges is the nature has changed over here. In the last six months I've been here it truly has gone from more to a non-kinetic fight to a kinetic fight. And that's a difficult and hard thing because there's still places where you need to be very violent and very kinetic, but there's more than ample other situations where we need to keep asking ourselves do we need to be – do we actually need to bust that door down that house when we go in, or can we knock on the door? I mean, (inaudible) intelligence that unless we blow the door off the hinges and knock it down with a battering ram or whatever the case, we are putting ourselves at grave risk. And when we have seen in Baghdad when different units have done it differently, but one of the Stryker units, I was just amazed at the attitude of the people, the atmospherics. You know we do a lot of internal atmospherics out there in the neighborhoods.

I was amazed at the difference between one and the other, it was truly by the attitude the commander had taken, to the point where he tells his people, look, you're not going to run them off the road, I want you every now and then let them go by first, you don't have to make them always yield to you; exhibit a little more courtesy to the citizenry; do knock on the doors when we are doing these searches, don't batter down the doors. And there was actually some real positive results of that that occurred.

Now, true, there is the risk always that there's going to be that suicide element out there, either a vest or a car, that will take advantage of that ability to have a little in closer contact with the Iraqis themselves. But the payoff from that also at least in this one area does appear to be tremendous for the unit that was operating there. So, the nature is changing and that is hard for some of these young troops that have been operating very kinetically to turn and operate less kinetically. Because it is frustrating, because we move

– as we go towards a more political solution now than a kinetic solution that's also a very difficult mindset to change, and it's a lot more frustrating, I know for those in the uniform down there – it gets hard holding, as we watch this political process try to take hold and the prime minister try to move it forward, he and President Talabani and everybody else as they are making these strides. But there are activities – (inaudible) across the board.

You know the conferences two weeks ago the prime minister had, with all the tribal elements from out in al Anbar sitting on that – the prime minister made some promises and he follows through – already I think we delivered about \$11 million out there since that conference now to projects that the money was promised earlier and now finally has moved in and the people out there are seeing that. We see the tribal elements coming together out there – they do not want al Qaeda out there. We see them in fact taking on al Qaeda and fighting them, we're seeing some of that start to occur.

So the dynamics of this whole thing, let the prime minister work these different elements. As you know yesterday he met Sistani and Sadr both down in Najaf. When you look at the comments Sadr made after that conference some very positive in terms of wanting, or at least stating publicly that he was going to let the system work and support the prime minister.

So the prime minister is reaching out trying to touch all these different elements and come to a political solution which is going to be the ultimate – only way this country is going to achieve that unity that it needs.

Q: Thank you.

Q: Is there any sort of – the Iraqis seem to arise to the occasion whenever they have a date certain. I mean, they did very well in the January elections, they did very well in the December elections. Is there any sort of impetus to having maybe a date imposed on when they turn over – or when they assume control of provinces or other milestones along the way so they do seem to perform better under those circumstances?

Caldwell: You're exactly right. There has been if you look historically (inaudible) milestone, they tend to perform a little better. They seem to get focused (inaudible). We are seeing that with some of their legislative initiatives. This thing that President Talabani posted on to the web site, when you look at that, and we've gone through it in fairly good detail over the last few days. If in fact all of these laws that they say they are going to achieve in 2006 – (inaudible) it's a one-law page thing the council president he discusses the security situation the frame of the political timetables what the heading is, but it's everything from the law for the (IECI?), the elections piece, the law concerning the elections and the governance and specifying the date to hold them, a law concerning oil or as we call the hydrocarbon law, a law concerning de-Ba'athification, a law concerning the flag logo and national anthem, a law approving (inaudible) dealing with militias. I mean, if in fact they meet all these timetables like they have just agreed to and (off the record portion).

Q: Can you give us that web site? (Discussion of web sites.)

(other off-the-record discussion)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OSD PA
 Sent: Wednesday, October 18, 2006 10:53 AM
 To: (b)(6) SSgt SD; (b)(6) CIV SD; Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA; (b)(6) CIV SD; YN1 SD; Whitman, Bryan Mr OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) CIV SD; Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA; 'roxie.merritt@ (b)(6) Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA; Bucci, Dr. Steven CIV SD; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) CIV SD; (b)(6) CIV SD; (b)(6) CIV SD; SD - Protocol AOs; (b)(6) LCDR OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) CDR OSD PA; Smith, Dorrance HON OSD PA; (b)(6) COL OSD PA; (b)(6) Sgt OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; Abbott, Catherine COL OSD PA
 Cc: (b)(6) CDR SD; (b)(6) Col SD
 Subject: Re: "Journalist" Lunch w/SecDef- Attendees

Its jed babbin and mark steyn

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) SSgt. SD
 To: (b)(6) CIV SD; Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA; (b)(6) YN1 SD; (b)(6) OSD PA; Whitman, Bryan Mr OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) CIV SD; Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA; Bucci, Dr. Steven CIV SD; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) CIV SD; (b)(6) CIV SD; SD - Protocol AOs; (b)(6) LCDR OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) CDR OSD PA; Smith, Dorrance HON OSD PA; Bucci, Dr. Steven CIV SD; (b)(6) COL OSD PA; (b)(6) Sgt OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; Abbott, Catherine COL OSD PA
 Cc: (b)(6) CDR SD; (b)(6) Col SD
 Sent: Wed Oct 18 10:46:33 2006
 Subject: "Journalist" Lunch w/SecDef- Attendees

Good Morning All,

We have received the Attendees for the SecDef's "Journalist" Lunch on Mon. 23 Oct @ 12:00pm-1:00.

- Mark Stein
- Cal Thomas
- Ted Babbin
- Kate O'Beirne
- Austin Bay

PA Prep w/D.Smith is still at 11:45am-12:00.

*PA: Please contact attendees with information above.

Thank you,

v/r

//SIGNED//

(b)(6)

SSgt, USAF

Military Admin Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

Staff Writer to Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

Comm: (b)(2)

Fax: (b)(2)

NIPR: (b)(6)

SIPR:

From: (b)(6) CIV SD
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 2:42 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV SD; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) YN1 SD; (b)(6)
(b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6), CIV, OASD-PA;
(b)(6) CIV SD; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; Lawrence,
Dallas, OASD-PA; Bucci, Dr. Steven CIV SD; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6)
(b)(6) CIV SD; (b)(6) CIV SD; (b)(6) CIV SD; SD - Protocol AOs; (b)(6)
(b)(6) LCDR, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CDR, OASD-PA; Smith,
Dorrance, HON, OSD-PA; Bucci, Dr. Steven CIV SD; (b)(6) COL OSD PA; (b)(6)
(b)(6) Sgt OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; Abbott, Catherine COL OSD PA
Subject: RE: "Journalist" Lunch w/SecDef

I am holding Monday 23 October for the next "Journalist" lunch:

11:45am-PA Prep

12:00pm-1:00 - Lunch

SecDef does not plan to depart for TDY until late on Tuesday 24 October.

Let me know if this does not work - thanks,

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV SD
Sent: Friday, September 15, 2006 10:31 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV SD; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) YN1 SD; (b)(6)
(b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6), CIV, OASD-PA;
(b)(6) CIV SD; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; Lawrence,
Dallas, OASD-PA; Bucci, Dr. Steven CIV SD; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6)
(b)(6) CIV SD; (b)(6) CIV SD; (b)(6) CIV SD; SD - Protocol AOs; (b)(6)
(b)(6) LCDR, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CDR, OASD-PA; Smith,
Dorrance, HON, OSD-PA; Bucci, Dr. Steven CIV SD; (b)(6) COL OSD PA; (b)(6)
(b)(6) Sgt OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; Abbott, Catherine COL OSD PA
Subject: RE: "Journalist" Lunch w/SecDef

resend

From: (b)(6) CIV SD
Sent: Thursday, September 14, 2006 3:51 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV SD; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) YN1 SD; (b)(6)
(b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6), CIV, OASD-PA;
(b)(6) CIV SD; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; Lawrence,
Dallas, OASD-PA; Bucci, Dr. Steven CIV SD; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6)
(b)(6) CIV SD; (b)(6) CIV SD; (b)(6) CIV SD; SD - Protocol AOs; (b)(6)
(b)(6) LCDR, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CDR, OASD-PA; Smith,
Dorrance, HON, OSD-PA; Bucci, Dr. Steven CIV SD; (b)(6) COL OSD PA; (b)(6)
(b)(6) Sgt OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: "Journalist" Lunch w/SecDef

As a result of the PA Meeting today Dr. Bucci asked me to find time for a "Journalist" lunch.

First open dates are:

Monday 23 or 30 October 12:00pm-1:00

Or Thursday 2 November 12:30pm-1:30

Let me know which one works best as I won't be able to hold all three - thanks,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, October 17, 2006 2:12 PM
To: Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA
Subject: FW: White House Invitation - Tuesday, October 17, 2006

Just an FYI

From: Steven J. Greer CSM (Ret) [mailto:steven@(b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, October 17, 2006 12:42 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: White House Invitation - Tuesday, October 17, 2006

(b)(6) thanks, much appreciated.

I do have an issue I'd like your professional advice on.

My non-profit foundation presents an award in honor of a very close friend of mine who was KIA hunting terrorists in Afghanistan in Oct 03. MSG William Carlson and I served in the Rangers and Special Forces together and he went on to Delta Force. After 9/11, "Chief" as he was called, was one of the Special Operators who liberated Afghanistan in 01/02 and who fought at Tora Bora and elsewhere. He was in Afghanistan fighting more than year and a half before retiring at 20 years. Instead of enjoying his retirement (like me!) Chief joined the CIA and within in months of leaving the Army, he was back in the same mountains hunting terrorists with a clandestine operations team. He was killed in a very tough fire fight while tracking AQ.

My twin brother was with him in Delta Force and tells me that during the raid on Mullah Omar's home, Chief picked up a small brick from the house and I'm told the brick is in the Oval office today? At any rate, Chief was an irreplaceable warrior. My foundation created the award in 05 to honor his legacy and remind the public that freedom is not free.

Bottom line, we'd like to present the Award to the President.

You can view more info at: <http://www.greerfoundation.org/Awards.html>

A bit long winded...can you point me in the right direction to make this happen? Chief left behind a great wife and two boys. They would be proud to see POTUS receive this award I Chief's honor.

Thanks...hate to toss this at you. Just thought you might know who I might contact.

Thanks (b)(6)

V/r
Steve

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, October 17, 2006 12:25 PM
To: Steven J. Greer CSM (Ret)
Subject: RE: White House Invitation - Tuesday, October 17, 2006

Sir - Thank you for joining us. You are welcome at the White House anytime. Please do not hesitate to contact me if I can ever be of service.

Regards,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

The White House
Office of Public Liaison

(b)(6)

Office: (b)(2)

Cell: (b)(2)

From: Steven J. Greer CSM (Ret) [mailto:steven@(b)(6)]

Sent: Tuesday, October 17, 2006 11:29 AM

To: (b)(6)

Subject: RE: White House Invitation - Tuesday, October 17, 2006

(b)(6)

I'm the guy you spoke with on the way out the door with Wayne Simmons. Just wanted to thank you again for the invite. Keep pressing the fight my man.

V/r
Steve

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 10:22 AM

To: (b)(6)

Cc:

Subject: White House Invitation - Tuesday, October 17, 2006



*You are cordially invited
to attend the bill signing of the
Military Commissions Act of 2006*

*Tuesday, October 17, 2006
The White House
Rose Garden*

*Gates open at 8:30 am.
Arrive no later than 9:00 a.m.*

This invitation is not transferable and space is limited. Please RSVP with your full name, date of birth, and social security number to Ashley Hickey at AHickeyIntern@who.eop.gov or (202) 456-2367 by 12:00 p.m. on Monday, October 16, 2006. Guests should arrive via the Southeast Visitors entrance.

Photo ID is required for admittance onto White House Complex.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) LCDR OSD PA
Sent: Tuesday, October 17, 2006 12:12 PM
To: Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA
Subject: Next GTMO media outreach trip

Mr. Ruff,

As per your request, this is the manifest for the group this week that was bumped till next week.

The plane was bumped due to the Chairman flying to Miami for the SOUTHCOM Change of Command.

VR

(b)(6)

Wed, October 18th

- 1) Blanquita Cullum (Radio America)**
- 2) Leonard Leo, Executive Vice President, The Federalist Society**
- 3) Helena Cobban (Christian Science Monitor)**
- 4) Jed Babbin**
- 5) Dan Suskind, Producer Michael Reagan Show**
- 6) Deroy Murdock, Syndicated columnist, Scripps Howard News Service**

- 7) Matt Labash, Weekly Standard**

- 8) Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, a columnist and senior consultant for the Gerard Group International, a Massachusetts-based counterterrorism and homeland security firm.**

- 9) Tucker Carlson, MSNBC**

(b)(6)

From: Paul Valley [valley@(b)(6)]
Sent: Sunday, October 15, 2006 9:55 AM
To: Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA
Subject: RE: Fallen Heroes Statue

I'll get Denny to join us for the presentation if that will work!!!

Osprey Media
Paul E Vallely
Military Analyst/Radio Host "Stand Up America"
valley@(b)(6)
tel: (b)(6)
fax: (b)(6)
www.ospreymedia.us

-----Original Message-----

From: Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA [mailto:Dallas.Lawrence@(b)(6)]
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 7:16 AM
To: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA; Paul Vallely
Subject: RE: Fallen Heroes Statue

General,

I would love to make this happen, and will begin working on it today. Do you happen to have the full dimensions on the statute? Also, when would you like to display it (for how long)?

I am glad to know you are back up and around, we are all better for it!
Next time you are with Denny Rehberg, my old boss, please give him my best.

Dallas B. Lawrence
Director, Office of Community Relations & Public Liaison United States Department of Defense

(b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 9:07 AM
To: 'Paul Vallely'
Cc: Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA
Subject: RE: Fallen Heroes Statue

Hi paul

This is a beautiful statue. I will ask dallas to get his team engaged so we can find the appropriate venue for a presentation.

More soon
ab

-----Original Message-----

From: Paul Vallely [mailto:valley@(b)(6)]
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 8:59 AM
To: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA
Subject: FW: Fallen Heroes Statue

Allison: See below e-mail that I sent to Eric Was not sure to whom this should go for approval and action.

Best
Pv

Osprey Media
Paul E Vallely
Military Analyst/Radio Host "Stand Up America"
vallely@
tel:
fax:
www.ospreymedia.us

-----Original Message-----
From: Paul Vallely [mailto:vallely@
Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 11:42 AM
To: 'Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD'
Subject: Fallen Heroes Statue

Eric: My wife and I have commissioned the first Bronze statue to honor the Fallen Heroes in the Global War On Terror. See attached Photos. We would like to present this to Department of Defense and have it displayed there on behalf of the Vallely Family and the Soldiers Memorial Fund. This is a half life sized (approximately 3 1/2 feet tall). This is a first class sculptor by the famous sculptor Ken Bjorge.

We would like to present this to the SecDef and JT Chiefs, if it can be arranged. Any time with in the next 90 days will work. The statue is completed and we would ship it ahead of time to the Pentagon.....

We were initially going to present it to the White House and President, but I feel it would be more appropriate for presentation to the Military.

Best

PV

Fox News Channel
Osprey Media
Paul E Vallely
Military Analyst/Radio Host "Stand Up America"
vallely@ <mailto:vallely@>
tel:
fax:
www.ospreymedia.us

Add me to your address book...
<https://www.plaxo.com/add_me?u=12885160593&v0=511355&k0=745169159&v1=0&k1=511356> Want a signature like this? <<http://www.plaxo.com/signature>>

(b)(6)

From: Paul Vallely [vallely@ (b)(6)]
Sent: Saturday, October 14, 2006 9:32 AM
To: Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA
Subject: RE: Fallen Heroes Statue

The measurements on the half size Fallen Heroes sculpture are:
40"H x 32" W x 32"D.

Osprey Media
Paul E Vallely
Military Analyst/Radio Host "Stand Up America"
vallely@ (b)(6)
tel: (b)(6)
fax: (b)(6)
www.ospreymedia.us

-----Original Message-----

From: Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA [mailto:Dallas.Lawrence@ (b)(6)]
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 7:16 AM
To: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA; Paul Vallely
Subject: RE: Fallen Heroes Statue

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I am glad to know you are back up and around, we are all better for it!
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Dallas B. Lawrence
Director, Office of Community Relations & Public Liaison United States Department of Defense

(b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 9:07 AM
To: 'Paul Vallely'
Cc: Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA
Subject: RE: Fallen Heroes Statue

Hi paul

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More soon
ab

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From: Paul Vallely [mailto:vallely@ (b)(6)]
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 8:59 AM
To: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA
Subject: FW: Fallen Heroes Statue

Allison: See below e-mail that I sent to Eric Was not sure to whom this should go for approval and action.

Best
Pv

Osprey Media
Paul E Valleyly
Military Analyst/Radio Host "Stand Up America"
valleyly (b)(6)
tel: (b)(6)
fax: (b)(6)
www.ospreymedia.us

-----Original Message-----

From: Paul Valleyly (mailto:valleyly (b)(6))
Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 11:42 AM
To: 'Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD'
Subject: Fallen Heroes Statue

Eric: My wife and I have commissioned the first Bronze statue to honor the Fallen Heroes in the Global War On Terror. See attached Photos. We would like to present this to Department of Defense and have it displayed there on behalf of the Valleyly Family and the Soldiers Memorial Fund. This is a half life sized (approximately 3 1/2 feet tall). This is a first class sculptor by the famous sculptor Ken Bjorge.

We would like to present this to the SecDef and JT Chiefs, if it can be arranged. Any time with in the next 90 days will work. The statue is completed and we would ship it ahead of time to the Pentagon.....

We were initially going to present it to the White House and President, but I feel it would be more appropriate for presentation to the Military.

Best

PV

Fox News Channel
Osprey Media
Paul E Valleyly
Military Analyst/Radio Host "Stand Up America"
valleyly (b)(6) <mailto:valleyly (b)(6)>
tel: (b)(6)
fax: (b)(6)
www.ospreymedia.us

Add me to your address book...
<https://www.plaxo.com/add_me?u=12885160593&v0=511355&k0=745169159&v1=0&k1=511356> Want a signature like this? <<http://www.plaxo.com/signature>>

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OSD PA
Sent: Friday, October 13, 2006 5:13 PM
To: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA; Smith, Dorrance HON OSD PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: analysts with secdef

Great idea. If it's ok, (b)(6) could test waters and have them save the date.

From: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA
Sent: Friday, October 13, 2006 4:39 PM
To: Smith, Dorrance HON OSD PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: analysts with secdef

Hi

Might consider adding bob scales and don sheppard on the trip with secdef. Fox and cnn military analysts. If interested, someone might want to call them to have them "save the date"

ab

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OSD PA
Sent: Friday, October 20, 2006 3:54 PM
To: Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA
Subject: FW: Outreach Recommendations for 5 weeks
Importance: High

hi. wanted you to have this... but you didn't get it from me! :)

(b)(6)

From: Thompson, Jonathan SES OSD PA
Sent: Friday, October 20, 2006 12:35 PM
To: (b)(6) COL STRATEFF'
Cc: (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) CIV MNFI STRATEFF COMMS DIV; Merritt, Roxie, AFIS-HQ;
(b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: Outreach Recommendations for 5 weeks
Importance: High

(b)(6)

Want to try and prioritize our media and outreach desires between now and the end of November. Priority of course is to have MGC, CG and other leadership there brief/talk/discuss over the next several weeks. Recognize your principals' time constraints, but we need to reach beyond usual suspects, often and in concerted method. For example could we add the following:

Week of 23 October – in addition to MGC Press Brief

- Civilian Defense Academics and Thought Leaders: 20 minute brief by MGC, CG/Zal or MG Cichowski
- Iraq and Defense Bloggers (3-5): 30 minutes with MGC or other senior leader
- Radio: Continue at least 2 GO interviews with National outlets
- Regional Radio: Maintain program

Week of 30 October – in addition to MGC Press Brief

- Media Pundits and Opinion Writers: 20 minute pre-brief by MGC prior to weekly PC
- Iraq and Defense Bloggers (3-5): 30 minutes with MGC or other senior leader
- Radio: Continue at least 2 GO interviews with National outlets
- Regional Radio: Maintain program

Week of 6 November – in addition to MGC Press Brief

- Defense Experts Group (former DoD civilian executives: 30-45 minute brief by MGC, MG Cichowski or CG
- Iraq and Defense Bloggers (3-5): 30 minutes with MGC or other senior leader
- Radio: Continue at least 2 GO Interviews with National outlets
- Regional Radio: Maintain program

Week of 13 November -

- Military Analysts/Talking Heads: 45 minute pre/post brief by MGC, or other senior leadership
- Iraq and Defense Bloggers (3-5): 30 minutes with MGC or other senior leader
- Radio: Continue at least 2 GO interviews with National outlets
- Regional Radio: Maintain program

Jonathan Thompson
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
U.S. Department of Defense

(b)(2) (o)
(Cables - 24/7)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: Abbott, Catherine COL OSD PA
Sent: Friday, October 20, 2006 3:37 PM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Cc: Smith, Dorrance HON OSD PA; Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: FW: "Journalist" Lunch w/SecDef- Attendees

Katie,
 I just checked with your office and they told me that Gen Pace is in the building at this time, but there is something on his schedule in the studio from 1200 – 1230. Is this something that can be rescheduled? Please let me know ASAP. Thanks. (b)(6)

From: (b)(6) SSgt SD
Sent: Friday, October 20, 2006 3:31 PM
To: (b)(6) SSgt SD; (b)(6) CIV SD; Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA; (b)(6) YNI SD; (b)(6) OSD PA; Whitman, Bryan Mr OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) CIV SD; Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA; Merritt, Roxie T, CAPT, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA; Bucci, Dr. Steven CIV SD; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) CIV SD; (b)(6) CIV SD; (b)(6) CIV SD; SD - Protocol AOs; (b)(6) LCDR OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) CDR OSD PA; Smith, Dorrance HON OSD PA; Bucci, Dr. Steven CIV SD; (b)(6) COL OSD PA; (b)(6) Sgt OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; Abbott, Catherine COL OSD PA; (b)(6) CIV, JCS, OCJCS
Cc: (b)(6) CDR SD; (b)(6) Col SD
Subject: RE: "Journalist" Lunch w/SecDef- Attendees

Good Afternoon All,

The SecDef has requested the CJCS' presence at the "Journalist" Lunch on Mon 23 Oct @ 12:00pm-1:00.

*If the CJCS is unavailable/unable to attend, we will have to reschedule.

Attendees are:

- CJCS
- Mark Steyn
- Cal Thomas
- Jed Babbin
- Kate O'Beirne
- Austin Bay

Thanks,

v/r

//SIGNED//

(b)(6) SSgt, USAF

Military Admin Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

Staff Writer to Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

Comm: (b)(2)

Fax: (b)(2)

NIPR: (b)(6)

SIPR:

From: (b)(6) SSgt SD

Sent: Wednesday, October 18, 2006 10:47 AM

To: (b)(6) CIV SD; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) YNI SD; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV SD; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; Bucci, Dr. Steven CIV SD; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV SD; (b)(6) CIV SD; (b)(6) CIV SD; SD - Protocol AOs; (b)(6) LCDR, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CDR, OASD-PA; (b)(6) HON, OSD-PA; Bucci, Dr. Steven CIV SD; (b)(6) COL OSD PA; (b)(6) Sgt OSD PA; (b)(6) (b)(6) OSD PA; Abbott, Catherine COL OSD PA

Cc: (b)(6) CDR SD; (b)(6) Col SD

Subject: "Journalist" Lunch w/SecDef- Attendees

Good Morning All,

We have received the Attendees for the SecDef's "Journalist" Lunch on Mon. 23 Oct @ 12:00pm-1:00.

- Mark Stein
- Cal Thomas
- Ted Babbin
- Kate O'Beirne
- Austin Bay

PA Prep w/D.Smith is still at 11:45am-12:00.

*PA: Please contact attendees with information above.

Thank you,

v/r

//SIGNED//

(b)(6) SSgt, USAF

Military Admin Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

Staff Writer to Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

Comm: (b)(2)

Fax: (b)(2)

NIPR: (b)(6)

SIPR:

From: (b)(6) CIV SD
Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 2:42 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV SD; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) YN1 SD; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV SD; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; Buccl, Dr. Steven CIV SD; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV SD; (b)(6) CIV SD; (b)(6) CIV SD; SD - Protocol AOs; (b)(6) LCDR, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CDR, OASD-PA; Smith, Dorrance, HON, OSD-PA; Buccl, Dr. Steven CIV SD; (b)(6) COL OSD PA; (b)(6) Sgt OSD PA; (b)(6) (b)(6) OSD PA; Abbott, Catherine COL OSD PA
Subject: RE: "Journalist" Lunch w/SecDef

I am holding Monday 23 October for the next "Journalist" lunch:

11:45am-PA Prep

12:00pm-1:00 – Lunch

SecDef does not plan to depart for TDY until late on Tuesday 24 October.

Let me know if this does not work – thanks,

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV SD
Sent: Friday, September 15, 2006 10:31 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV SD; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) YN1 SD; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-

PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV SD; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; Bucci, Dr. Steven CIV SD; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV SD; (b)(6) CIV SD; (b)(6) CIV SD; SD - Protocol AOs; (b)(6) LCDR, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CDR, OASD-PA; Smith, Dorrance, HON, OSD-PA; Bucci, Dr. Steven CIV SD; (b)(6) COL OSD PA; (b)(6) Sgt OSD PA; (b)(6) (b)(6) OSD PA; Abbott, Catherine COL OSD PA

Subject: RE: "Journalist" Lunch w/SecDef

resend

From: (b)(6) CIV SD
Sent: Thursday, September 14, 2006 3:51 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV SD; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) YN1 SD; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV SD; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; Bucci, Dr. Steven CIV SD; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV SD; (b)(6) CIV SD; (b)(6) CIV SD; SD - Protocol AOs; (b)(6) LCDR, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CDR, OASD-PA; Smith, Dorrance, HON, OSD-PA; Bucci, Dr. Steven CIV SD; (b)(6) COL OSD PA; (b)(6) Sgt OSD PA; (b)(6) (b)(6) OSD PA

Subject: "Journalist" Lunch w/SecDef

As a result of the PA Meeting today Dr. Bucci asked me to find time for a "Journalist" lunch.

First open dates are:

Monday 23 or 30 October 12:00pm-1:00

Or Thursday 2 November 12:30pm-1:30

Let me know which one works best as I won't be able to hold all three - thanks,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA
Sent: Friday, October 20, 2006 10:52 AM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: RE: Conference call with Retired Military Analysts

(b)(6) we've got to get better at giving me and sgt (b)(6) a heads up on the calls with the analysts. i haven't spoken to (b)(6) about whether she knew of the call and it's entirely possible that somebody told the pa principals' meeting yesterday that this call was on. that doesn't help me if i'm traveling and don't hear it. i know your circumstances have you doing a ton of work so i understand the challenge. but... thanks. (btw, is there a transcript?)

From: (b)(6) OSD PA
Sent: Friday, October 20, 2006 8:37 AM
To: (b)(6) COL STRATEFF
Cc: Thompson, Jonathan SES OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA; William Caldwell (b)(6) (b)(6) Ballesteros, Mark J LTC OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) AFPS; Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA; Whitman, Bryan Mr OSD PA
Subject: Conference call with Retired Military Analysts

Colonel,
Please find attached (and pasted below) the agenda for the call with Retired Military Analysts in a half hour. The RSVP's I have received so far are on the second page. The dial in number is also on the Agenda. Please let me know if you have any questions.
Thank you for your time.

v/r
(b)(6)

(b)(6)
Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense
(b)(2)

As of 8:30 a.m.



Conference Call
Retired Military Analysts
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 20, 2006

TIME: 9:00 – 9:45 a.m.

AGENDA

9:00 a.m. Welcome and Introduction (GUIDELINES)

- (b)(6) OSD Public Affairs

9:01 a.m. Update on Situation in Baghdad

- Major General William Caldwell

9:30 a.m. Q & A

- Military Analysts

9:45 a.m. Conference Call Concludes (GUIDELINES)

- (b)(6)

Note: Dial-in-telephone numbers are

(b)(2)

Confirmed Retired Military Analysts:

Mr. Jed Babbin	(USAF, JAG) American Spectator
Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Cucullu	(USA, Retired) Fox News
Lieutenant Colonel Tim J. Eads	(USA, Retired) Fox News
Colonel John Garrett	(USMC, Retired) Fox News
Command Sergeant Major Steven Greer	(USA, Retired) Fox News
General William F. "Buck" Kernan	(USA, Retired)
Major General James "Spider" Marks	(USA, Retired) CNN
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney	(USAF, Retired) Fox News
Major General Paul E. Vallely	(USA, Retired) Fox News

(b)(6)

From: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA
Sent: Friday, October 13, 2006 4:39 PM
To: Smith, Dorrance HON OSD PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: analysts with secdef

Hi

Might consider adding bob scales and don shepperd on the trip with secdef. Fox and cnn military analysts. If interested, someone might want to call them to have them "save the date"

ab

4/9/2008

(b)(6)

From: Kimmitt, Mark T CIV OSD POLICY
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 8:12 PM
To: (b)(6) Thomas J. Basile; 'Jared Young'; 'Hilary White'; 'Gary Thatcher'; Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA; 'Dan Senor'; 'Dan Senor'; 'Rob Tappan'; Kimmitt, BG Mark T. (USA); 'Mark Kimmitt'; 'Tom Basile'; 'Joe Pally'; 'Beth Marple'; 'Dave Mingey'; 'Mike Spiros'; 'Al Elsadr'; Goodwin Robert SES SAF/MRM; 'Robert Goodwin'; 'Greg Edgar'; 'Gordon James'; 'Brian Leventhal'; 'Brian (work) Leventhal'; 'Lisa Gates'; (b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY; (b)(6) CIV OSD LA; 'Rob Tappan'; 'Al El Sadr'; 'Lisa Gates'; 'Kristi Clemens'; 'Kristi Clemens'; 'Kristi Clemens'; 'Dave Mingey'; elizalm@ (b)(6) hfwhite@ (b)(6)
Cc:
Subject: RE: Rajiv's response to Dan

(b)(6)

Jim "What's-his-name" was Jim Krane

Kimmitt

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 3:50 PM
To: (b)(6) Thomas J. Basile; 'Jared Young'; 'Hilary White'; 'Gary Thatcher'; Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA; 'Dan Senor'; 'Dan Senor'; 'Rob Tappan'; Kimmitt, BG Mark T. (USA); 'Mark Kimmitt'; 'Tom Basile'; 'Joe Pally'; 'Beth Marple'; 'Dave Mingey'; 'Mike Spiros'; 'Al Elsadr'; Goodwin Robert SES SAF/MRM; 'Robert Goodwin'; 'Greg Edgar'; 'Gordon James'; 'Brian Leventhal'; 'Brian (work) Leventhal'; 'Lisa Gates'; (b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY; (b)(6) CIV OSD LA; 'Rob Tappan'; 'Al El Sadr'; 'Lisa Gates'; 'Kristi Clemens'; 'Kristi Clemens'; 'Kristi Clemens'; 'Dave Mingey'; elizalm@ (b)(6)
Cc: hfwhite@ (b)(6)
Subject: Rajiv's response to Dan

Rajiv responded today to Dan's op-ed by writing a post on a super-liberal blog, Talking Points Memo Cafe, edited by Bush-bashing uber-liberal Josh Marshall. It seems that Rajiv is now a "guest blogger" on Marshall's blog, which makes Rajiv's liberal bias no longer a question but a certifiable fact. It'd be like a Washington Post assistant managing editor guest hosting for Rush Limbaugh. I cannot believe that the Post allowed him to write on such an openly partisan blog...I suppose he's just the sort that makes a great assistant managing editor at the Post these days.

Anyway, here's Rajiv's response:

http://tpmcafe.com/blog/tableforone/2006/oct/11/my_response_to_dan_senors_washpost_op_ed

--- (b)(6) wrote:

> I watched Rajiv talk about this on C-Span's "Book Notes" recently and remember a conversation we had
> in
> Baghdad.
>
> Rajiv questioned me about the resumes of the
> Strat-Comm staff in particular, saying we looked
> more
> like political loyalists rather than experienced
> communicators, even after I told him that I was a

> former newspaper reporter, a public affairs
> specialist
> in the Army, was deployed to Bosnia and came to Iraq
> directly from working in a Abu Dhabi-based Middle
> East
> think tank. Still, since I also happened to have
> worked for a Republican congressman and a governor,
> and supported President Bush, I was a partisan who
> had
> no business in the CPA.
>
> I then asked Rajiv and that AP reporter, Jim
> whatever-his-name-was, why their editors sent them
> to
> Iraq rather than more experienced reporters. The
> answer: they didn't want to come.
>
> Bottom line: Many of the low-level to middle
> management appointees in the CPA were in their late
> 20s and early 30s because, with a few exceptions,
> older folks with families didn't want to voluntarily
> leave their wives and kids and head to a war zone.
> Again, with a few exceptions, many of the other CPA
> officials there were a little bit older, already
> raised their families and didn't have any children
> at
> home. The same can be said of the reporters who
> covered the CPA.
>
> And of course people who volunteered to serve in a
> war
> zone would believe it the mission. The same cannot
> be
> said for the reporters who were there.
>
> Rajiv's book only showed the world what bias we had
> to
> deal with everyday.

> (b)(6)

> --- "Thomas J. Basile"

> <tbasile@ (b)(6)

> > Great piece. Thanks for sending.

> > Thomas J. Basile

> > Principal

> > Empire Solutions Consulting L.L.C.

> > <<http://www.EmpireSolutionsLLC.com>>

> > www.EmpireSolutionsLLC.com

> > 518-573-1589

> > 518-729-4471 fax

> > From: Jared Young [mailto:jaredyoung@ (b)(6)]

> > Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 9:55 AM

> > To: Hilary White; (b)(6) Gary Thatcher;

> > Dallas Lawrence - Work; Dan

> > Senor; Dan Senor; Rob Tappan; Mark Kimmitt; Mark
> > Kimmitt; Tom Basile; Joe
> > Pally; Beth Marple; Dave Mingey; Mike Spiros; Al
> > Elsad; Robert Goodwin;
> > Robert Goodwin; Greg Edgar; Gordon James; Brian
> > Leventhal; Brian (work)
> > Leventhal; Lisa Gates; (b)(6) (b)(6)

> (b)(6)
> > Tom Basile; Rob Tappan;
> > Al El Sadr; Lisa Gates; Kristi Clemens; Kristi
> > Clemens; Kristi Clemens; Dave
> > Mingey; elizalma(b)(6)
> > Cc: hfwhite(b)(6)
> > Subject: Response to Rajiv

> >
> >
> >
> > Hey all,

> > Thought you guys would be interested in seeing
> > Dan's
> > piece in the Wash Post
> > today responding to Rajiv's book on the Green
> > Zone:

> >
> >
> >
> > The Realities Of Trying to Rebuild Iraq

> > By Dan Senor
> > Tuesday, October 10, 2006; A21

> >
> > A recent excerpt from a new book by Rajiv
> > Chandrasekaran of The Post paints
> > a highly distorted portrait of the postwar
> > administration of Iraq. Given
> > that the article has prompted some senators to
> > call
> > for a government
> > investigation into the hiring practices of the
> > Coalition Provisional
> > Authority (CPA), it's important to correct the
> > record.

> >
> > Chandrasekaran's thesis is that young and
> > inexperienced neoconservative
> > political hacks and Bush loyalists ran and ruined
> > the occupation of Iraq. In
> > pinning the shortcomings of the reconstruction
> > effort on the mishaps of a
> > handful of low-level political appointees, he
> > virtually ignores the fact
> > that the senior tiers of the CPA were populated
> > with
> > a bipartisan and
> > generally nonpolitical corps of experts.

> >
> > His book makes no mention, for example, of Richard
> > Jones, who was the CPA's
> > chief of policy and Ambassador Paul Bremer's top
> > deputy. A career diplomat,
> > Jones had served as President Bill Clinton's
> > ambassador to Lebanon and
> > Kazakhstan, and he was ambassador to Kuwait when
> > he
> > relocated to Baghdad. He
> > was at the center of practically every decision

> and
> > every meeting about the
> > Iraqi political process from the moment he
> arrived.
> > Indeed, during the first
> > major crisis in Fallujah, Jones was the CPA's lead
> > negotiator with the
> > city's Sunni leadership, as was reported widely.
> >
> > Nor does Chandrasekaran discuss Ryan Crocker, a
> > striking omission since
> > Chandrasekaran once described Crocker as Bremer's
> > "top political aide" [news
> > story, July 13, 2003]. Crocker, the senior State
> > Department official with
> > responsibility for Iraq before the war, led the
> > CPA's political
> > reconstruction team. A fluent Arabic speaker
> widely
> > regarded as among the
> > State Department's most distinguished Arabists,
> > Crocker had served as
> > ambassador to Syria and Kuwait under Clinton. He
> is
> > a consummate
> > professional diplomat, neither inexperienced nor
> an
> > ideologue. And he was
> > extraordinarily influential in the early months of
> > the occupation; along
> > with Bremer and senior British envoy John Sawers
> > (another Middle East
> > expert, who had come to the CPA from his post as
> > ambassador to Egypt),
> > Crocker played the most influential role in
> > selecting the Iraqi Governing
> > Council in July 2003. But reading Chandrasekaran's
> > book, you would be left
> > with the impression that Crocker had nothing to
> with
> > Iraq -- he does not
> > even get a mention.
> >
> > Chandrasekaran ignores countless other CPA leaders
> > who also fail to
> > substantiate his one-sided thesis, including Gen.
> > Keith Kellogg, the CPA's
> > chief of operations. Kellogg is a retired
> lieutenant
> > general whose 32-year
> > Army career included two tours in Vietnam and
> > service as the 82nd Airborne
> > Division's chief of staff during Operations Desert
> > Shield and Desert Storm.
> > He was succeeded by Vice Adm. Scott Redd, who
> served
> > as director of
>
=== message truncated ===

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 6:12 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: RE: Transcript - CSA roundtable (UNCLASSIFIED)

i let him know that we have contacted col hunt in the past and offered to put him on the list. he declined.

thanks
(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) COL OCPA
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 6:10 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC OCPA; 'DHunt12348@'(b)(6)
Cc: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) COL CSA; (b)(6) OCPA; (b)(6) LTC CSA
Subject: RE: Transcript - CSA roundtable (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Caveats: NONE

(b)(6)

FYI - not sure of the methodology for putting this list together, but I noticed that COL (Ret) David Hunt - Fox News was not on your list. His email is DHunt12348@'(b)(6)

Phone is (b)(6)

He's my former battalion commander and I know he is appreciative of any info you folks provide.

VR, (b)(6)

COL (b)(6)
*Chief, Media Relations Division
Office of the Chief of Public Affairs
1500 Army Pentagon, Rm (b)(2)
Washington D.C., 20310-1500
Work (b)(2)*

From: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 5:58 PM
To: (b)(6) LTC OCPA
Cc: Ruff, Eric SES OASD-PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) COL CSA; (b)(6) OCPA; (b)(6) COL OCPA; (b)(6) LTC CSA
Subject: RE: Transcript - CSA roundtable (UNCLASSIFIED)

sir,
no problem. here is a list of those it went to.

4/9/2008

Transcript - send to (b)(6) when done!! Thanks Sir (UNCLASSIFIED)

Page 2 of 3

thanks

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) LTC OCPA
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 5:34 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) COL CSA; (b)(6) OCPA; (b)(6) COL OCPA; (b)(6) LTC CSA
Subject: RE: Transcript - CSA roundtable (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Caveats: FOUO

(b)(6)

I don't have an issue with this. What I sent was the raw transcript that didn't correct some of the grammatical errors or fill in some of the inaudibles. Could you send me the list of who you send it out to?

Thanks,

LTC (b)(6)
(b)(2)

From: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 2:45 PM
To: (b)(6) LTC OCPA
Cc: Ruff, Eric SES OASD-PA; (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: RE: Transcript - CSA roundtable (UNCLASSIFIED)

sir,
thanks for sending (and for scrambling to get the transcript done!). osd-pa would like to send this out to the military analysts (retired talking heads). understand your request not to use the material in briefings, etc., however it was on the record and has been quoted (and misrepresented) by the media. it would be incredibly helpful to send it out to the military analysts who can quote it in the correct context and correct the record.
please let me know if you have concerns with this and i will bring them to the attention of my leadership.
thanks

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) LTC OCPA
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 2:19 PM
To: (b)(6) LTC OCPA; (b)(6) MAJ OCPA; (b)(6) COL OCPA; Keck, Gary L Col OSD PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col. OCICS/PA; Cucolo, Anthony A BG OCPA; (b)(6) COL OCPA; Abbott, Catherine COL OSD PA; (b)(6) COL CSA; (b)(6) COL CSA
Cc: (b)(6) LTC CSA; (b)(6) Ms OCPA; (b)(6) COL CSA; (b)(6) LTC CSA; (b)(6) L LTC CSA; (b)(6) Mr OCPA; (b)(6) LTC OCLL; (b)(6) MSG SMA
Subject: RE: Transcript - CSA roundtable (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

4/9/2008

Transcript - send to (b)(6) when done!! Thanks Sir (UNCLASSIFIED)

Page 3 of 3

Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

All,

Here is the full transcript of the CSA's media roundtable yesterday. Just a reminder that this information is to be used as background and preparatory material only. If there are any quotes or soundbites that you wish to use in presentations or briefings attributed to the CSA please contact myself in order for me to verify that the information is still accurate and valid.

Thank you for your patience.

LTC (b)(6)
(b)(2)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Caveats: NONE

4/9/2008

(b)(6)

From: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 6:09 PM
To: (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA
Subject: Re: 3 FYIs

Great. Thanks on all 3.

Ab

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA
To: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA
Sent: Thu Oct 12 17:50:56 2006
Subject: 3 FYIs

FYI #1 - re: attachment below - We continue to help (b)(6) just as we did when she worked for Dallas. We know that when she asks for something it's always for a good reason. If we're swamped, we negotiate the deadline.

FYI #2 - I had a good conversation with (b)(6) (she works for (b)(6)) after the All Hands mtg. She is enthusiastic that IRM now reports to a DASD and that there will be some direction.

Non
Responsive

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CTR OSD PA
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 5:41 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CTR, OASD-PA
Subject: Mil Analysts

Hi (b)(6)

Attached are two clips with Col. McCausland and Gen. Grange. We'll continue to monitor for any additional coverage with the military analysts. Please let us know if you need anything else.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 2:16 PM
To: Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA
Subject: RE: analyst

ok, i'll ask if we can add him... can you find out if he's available on the 18th? or i'm happy to call him if you want me to.
thanks

(b)(6)

From: Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 1:22 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: analyst

Ahh I didn't know you were here. I'd like to send dan senior, fox news analyst

Dallas B. Lawrence
Director, Office of Community Relations & Public Liaison
United States Department of Defense

(b)(2)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 1:12 PM
To: Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA
Cc: (b)(6) CTR, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: analyst

next trip to gitmo is the 18th. who is the analyst you'd like to send? cully stinson has been driving the list of invites, so i'm not sure if they are willing to invite anyone else. i can make the pitch, but basically, pa has not been calling the shots on these trips.
let me know when you're avail tomorrow and i'll stop by.
thanks

(b)(6)

From: Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 12:59 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: analyst

When you get back Friday can you please stop by to discuss the foia issue. Also, when is the next analyst trip to gitmo, ive got someone from fox to send. Thanks!

Dallas B. Lawrence
Director, Office of Community Relations & Public Liaison
United States Department of Defense

(b)(2)

4/9/2008

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OSD PA
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 1:53 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Cc: (b)(6) Sgt OSD PA
Subject: Please call Jed Babbin, (b)(6)

(b)(6)
Confidential Assistant to the
Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Public Affairs
1400 Defense Pentagon (b)(2)
Washington, DC 20301-1400
(main) (b)(2)
(private) (b)(2)
(c) (b)(2)

4/9/2008

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OSD PA
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 11:39 AM
To: Smith, Dorrance HON OSD PA
Cc: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: Journalist lunch

I hear a snowflake is coming on this – asking for details.

Confirmed to date:
Austin Bay
Jed Babbin
Cal Thomas

(b)(6)

Director, OSD Advance and Media Relations
The Pentagon, (b)(2)
Washington, DC 20301

Office: (b)(2)
Cell:

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 11:11 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Cc: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: RE: schoomacher comments

on hold with schoomacher's office now. there is no transcript, but i think they are working on one as we speak. will get it out asap.

thanks

(b)(6)

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 11:10 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: RE: schoomacher comments

my advice would be to go to the source -- schoomacher's press people. they must have a tape. and, it might be on the army website. he spoke at a newsmaker breakfast, i believe. if you don't have luck with these, try bg tony cuculo's office. thanks.

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 10:55 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Cc: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: RE: schoomacher comments

eric.

i have several people looking for his comments. no one seems to know where he said them or to whom exactly he was speaking. none of the stories i'm seeing say, either. i have (b)(6) team looking to see if there is a transcript, but from what i can tell, it wasn't a press briefing, so there may not be a full transcript. as soon as we find something, i will let you know.

thanks

(b)(6)

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 9:22 AM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA, (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: schoomacher comments
Importance: High

we need to get the transcript of schoomacher's comments to the military analysts. his comments about planning for the possibility that the army will need to have force levels in 2010 about where they are today have been mischaracterized by some media reports. hoping that fran harvey is going to be able to get on brian and the judge and/or laura ingraham's show. that transcript would be helpful for those analysts as well, but we shouldn't wait to get those guys schoomacher's. the analysts will be able to read what pete said and b/c they are military, they'll get it. please let me know when gen schoomacher's words have been sent. thanks.

4/9/2008

(b)(6)

From: Paul Valley (valley@^{(b)(6)})
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 9:12 AM
To: Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA
Subject: Radio Show Today

"Stand Up America Radio Show" hosted by Paul Valley -----
today at 1 PM Eastern. Then streams for 24 hours on
Righttalk.....

Subject: Beginning of our "People Who Care" Series..... Surprise
Guests

Tune in on the Internet at www.righttalk.com or
www.ospreyradio.us

Call in number is 1 866 884 8255

Fox News Channel
Osprey Media
Paul E Valley
Military Analyst/Radio Host "Stand Up America"
valley@^{(b)(6)}
tel: ^{(b)(6)}
fax ^{(b)(6)}
www.ospreymedia.us


Add me to your address book.. Want a signature like this?

4/9/2008

(b)(6)

From: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 9:07 AM
To: Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA
Subject: FW: Fallen Heroes Statue

Attachments: image001.gif; Fallen Heroes Statue 1.jpg; Speaker Hassert and Rehberg with Fallen Heroes Statue.jpg; Fallen Heroes Bronze 2.JPG


image001.gif (289 B) Fallen Heroes Statue 1.jpg (24...
Speaker Hassert and Rehberg wl...
Fallen Heroes Bronze 2.JPG (2 ...

Hi

Here is the rest of the emails with photos attached.
ab

-----Original Message-----

From: Paul Vallely [mailto:vallely@
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 8:59 AM
To: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA
Subject: FW: Fallen Heroes Statue

Allison: See below e-mail that I sent to Eric Was not sure to whom this should go for approval and action.

Best
Pv

Osprey Media
Paul E Vallely
Military Analyst/Radio Host "Stand Up America"
vallely@
tel:
fax:
www.ospreymedia.us

-----Original Message-----

From: Paul Vallely [mailto:vallely@
Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 11:42 AM
To: 'Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD'
Subject: Fallen Heroes Statue

Eric: My wife and I have commissioned the first Bronze statue to honor the Fallen Heroes in the Global War On Terror. See attached Photos. We would like to present this to Department of Defense and have it displayed there on behalf of the Vallely Family and the Soldiers Memorial Fund. This is a half life sized (approximately 3 1/2 feet tall). This is a first class sculptor by the famous sculptor Ken Bjorge.

We would like to present this to the SecDef and JT Chiefs, if it can be arranged. Any time with in the next 90 days will work. The statue is completed and we would ship it ahead of time to the Pentagon....

We were initially going to present it to the White House and President, but I feel it would be more appropriate for presentation to the Military.

Best


PV


Fox News Channel
Osprey Media
Paul E Vallely
Military Analyst/Radio Host "Stand Up America"
vallely(b)(6) <mailto:vallely(b)(6)>
tel: (b)(6)
fax: (b)(6)
www.ospreymedia.us

Add me to your address book...

<https://www.plaxo.com/add_me?u=12885160593&v0=511355&k0=745169159&v1=0&k1=511356> Want a signature like this? <<http://www.plaxo.com/signature>>







(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 9:06 AM
To: tmcinerney (b)(6) nashct (b)(6) Glenstrae77 (b)(6) BLIRM41516 (b)(6)
USAGIr1957 (b)(6) WSSInter (b)(6) robertscales (b)(6)
wheelerc (b)(6) twilkerson (b)(6) mgroot (b)(6)
groothouse (b)(6)
Subject: No Partial Credit: Today's RCP

The North Korean situation has to be solved, and halfway measures can't be allowed. What say you?

RealClearPolitics - Articles - No Partial Credit

Jed Babbin

(b)(6) (home office)
(b)(6) (home fax)
(b)(6) (mobile)

4/9/2008

(b)(6)

From: Paul Valley [valley (b)(6)]
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2006 9:02 AM
To: Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: thbxx (b)(6)
Subject: FW: Gitmo commissioners

From Col Tom Taylor for consideration..... He knows that I am involved in the Gitmo Project. See below. I have copied his e-mail as well.

Osprey Media
Paul E Valley
Military Analyst/Radio Host "Stand Up America"
valley (b)(6)
tel: (b)(6)
fax: (b)(6)
www.ospreymedia.us

-----Original Message-----
From: [mailto:thtxxx (b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, October 11, 2006 9:34 PM
To: paulvalley (b)(6)
Subject: Gitmo commissioners

Hi Paul,

Enjoy your postings. Presuming that your politics give you some unusual access to policy makers, I wonder if you would express this opinion, if you agree with it, to DOD. Here's a suggested letter to Rummy (might as well get to the top!):

Dear Mr. Secretary,

With the commissions for Guantanamo detainees soon to be formed, may I suggest that they be comprised entirely of retired field grade officers from all services. There is already a DOD procedure in place for bringing them back on active duty.

The advantages of retired commissioners would be threefold. First, their experience would not include combat service in the battle areas where the detainees were captured; whereas those of active duty officers quite likely would, grounds for possible challenge by defense attorneys. Second, the services need every active duty officer for current operations. Like all good officers they don't want to be sidetracked from assignments where they feel they can do the most and for which they are trained. From personal experience I can relate that to be appointed to a court martial meant rolling my eyes. Third, retired officers -- their careers completed -- would be immune from any allegation of command influence.

Yours faithfully,

P.V.

Thanks for your help, Paul. Sometime I'd like to communicate with you about how PSYOP must be our foremost weapon against Al Qaeda.

Tom Taylor

Check out the new AOL
<<http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/1615326657x4311227241x4298082137/aol?redir=ht tp%3A%2F%2Fwww%2Eaol%2Ecom%2Fnewaol>>. Most comprehensive set of free safety and security tools, free access to millions of high-quality videos from across the web, free AOL Mail and more.

(b)(6)

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Sent: Wednesday, October 11, 2006 4:35 PM
To: (b)(6) OSD PA
Subject: FW: Today's TAS: Republicans at Bay?

here to serve.

From: JedBabbin (b)(6) [mailto:JedBabbin (b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, October 09, 2006 10:03 AM
To: tmcinerney (b)(6) nashct (b)(6) Glenstrae77 (b)(6) BURM41516 (b)(6)
USAGirl1957 (b)(6) WSSInter (b)(6) roberthscales (b)(6) wheeler (b)(6)
twilkerson (b)(6) ShepDonald (b)(6) mgroot (b)(6) groothouse (b)(6)
Subject: Today's TAS: Republicans at Bay?

It's like the lottery, guys. You can't win if you don't play. As Casey Stengel woulda said, "can't anybody here play this game?"

The American Spectator

Jed Babbin

(b)(6) (Home Office)
(b)(6) (Mobile)

4/9/2008

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OSD PA
Sent: Wednesday, October 11, 2006 3:29 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: jed babbie

Do you have his contact info?

(b)(6)

*Director, OSD Advance and Media Relations
The Pentagon, (b)(2)
Washington, DC 20301*

*Office: (b)(2)
Cell:*

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA
Sent: Wednesday, October 11, 2006 10:13 AM
To: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA; Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA
Subject: Dan Senor's piece ran yesterday and it was in the Bird-first opinion item

The Realities Of Trying To Rebuild Iraq <e20061010460881.html>
*(Washington Post)...*Dan Senor

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) COL MNFI CMD GRP PAO (b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 10:52 PM

To: Casey George GEN MNF-I CG; Caldwell William B MG MNFI DCS STRATEFF; Wright Rudy BG MNFI STRATEFF

Cc: (b)(6) MAJ MNF-I CG Aide-de-Camp; (b)(6) COL MNF-I CMD GRP XO; (b)(6) COL MNFI CMD GRP (CIG); (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; (b)(6) LTC MNFI STRATEFF COMM DIV

Subject: Transcripts from Defense Analysts interview with General Casey 061010

Attachments: General Casey Defense analysts interview 061010.doc

Sir, transcripts from today's interview. Key comments are bolded. vr. (b)(6)

(General Casey opening statement)

The situation is more complex now than in the two-plus years I've been there. What we have been seeing since the elections, especially since the bombing of the Samarra mosque, is the primary conflict is evolving from an insurgency against us to a struggle over the division of the political and economic power among the Iraqis. There are several different groups that are trying to influence that process in negative ways. The Sunni extremists, al Qaeda and the Iraqis that are supporting them, the Shiite extremists, the death squads and some of the more militant Shiite militia.

Then the resistance. When people talk about the insurgency, primarily the Sunni resistance, the ones fighting us, and then Syria and Iran are being are being unhelpful in a lot of different ways. Iran in a more active role, Syria in a more passive role. All of that together makes for a very difficult situation. Add the intensities of Ramadan and the struggle for control there in the Baghdad area and it's a very difficult situation and probably will be a difficult situation for a couple more months.

That's it. **Violence and progress co-exist in Iraq.** If you think it's all just violence you are making a mistake.

The new government has been on the ground here a little under 150 days. And I think you all recognize having three government transitions in two years didn't help with continuity problems. They are working hard building the capacity to govern with our help but it is a slow process. **The Prime Minister is focused on what I think is the most important thing his administration can do and that is and that is reconciliation.** When we talk we talk about three things: unity, prosperity and security. If you want prosperity you have to have security, and if you want security you have to have unity. The prime minister recognizes that and he is moving out and trying to achieve that.

Just a couple of words on the development of the security forces and other growing, positive, concerns there. Right now we have six of the 10 Iraqi Divisions are in the lead. Thirty of 36 brigades and almost 90 of 112 battalions are in the lead. That's a good thing. **I'll remind everybody that puts us a little over 75 percent through what I would say is the second step in a three step process:** First step being the training and equipping. You form them, organize them and give them their weapons; you make units out of them. Then you make them better. You put them in a position where they can conduct counter insurgency operations with our support. Then the next step is what is going to take place over the better part of '07 is putting them in a position where they can do it independently and that will continue to go on. On the police side we're doing OK at the local level in most of the places in the country. Two of the provinces have transferred to provincial Iraqi control. What that says is the police

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are able to maintain domestic control in that province. We just started the National Police Reform program where we took the 1st Brigade off line and had them training down in Numaniyah where they were basically being re-blued. You'll remember that the National police were formed basically as infantry and didn't have any police training. We're going back and doing that. Unfortunately, I think you saw where approximately 400 of them got poisoned. We've sent some VET teams down there. It looks to be the water, but they are continuing to go through it. There are also some rumors that people have died. Nobody has died; at least that's what I was told this morning. It was a classic case of food poisoning. They gave everybody 96 hours off and we'll restart the training and continue the program. The other thing about the national police I think you read the Iraqi Minister pulled a brigade, the 8th Brigade off line because they were found to be complicit in the kidnapping—or some of the people were found to be complicit in the murder and kidnapping of some people just in the last week or so. That's a big step by the Minister. They have already replaced the brigade commander and he is already having an impact. So that process is continuing

So, bottom line, tough situation. And I suspect through Ramadan and over the next couple of months it's going to continue to be a difficult situation. That said, we continue to make progress at the political level and at the security level all around the country. Tough business, but I think the great Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines are well up to it and doing a magnificent job. With that I'll turn it over to you guys for questions.

(Jeff McCauslin) It was great to see you out there and you're doing well. Question for you: are we moving toward a real confrontation with al Sadr and his militias. We've done a lot of neighborhoods; patrol those neighborhoods in Baghdad. We haven't gone into Sadr City yet. We have this on-going situation in Diwaniyah, which seems, at least the way it's reported over here, focused on Sadr and the Medhi army. Without giving away anything operational, is that the way we are going, is that the next big step to confront his militia?

(General Casey) One, **all militias have to be confronted and disbanded over time.** The prime minister and the leaders in Iraq understand that until the Iraqi security forces are the dominant security forces in the country that they are not going to have the kind of country that they want. That said, the strategy for dealing with the militia is at least two tracks. One is a political track and one is a military track. I think you'll find with the PM as with any political leader is going to try and use all the political means possible to resolve things and use force as a last resort. We'll continue to work with him on that. **My personal view is there are enough of these guys on the militia side that are just hard guys and they are going to fight on until they realize they don't have any military options. So I think force is going to be a part of it.** We are not chomping at the bit to do it and we are working hand in hand with the prime minister so that we have a balanced approach, but it's got to be done.

(Bing West) Thanks again for your gracious hospitality. I just got back from another month in country. I was on the road with 9 battalion and 9 police units, and a universal complaint they had was about the current rules of evidence and the difficulty in arresting insurgents and making the arrest stick. Are there going to be any movements politically to suspend habeas corpus and make it easier to arrest some of these guys?

(General Casey) Bing, I don't know that there are any specific initiatives to remove habeas corpus, but they do have some expanded authority under their emergency law and under their anti-terrorists law that they are using. That said, the rule of law institutions are very under developed. It is difficult to get a guy, with evidence, get him to jail, get him to trail, get him convicted. It happens; I think you have read where they executed the death penalty on a few of these folks. Until we an the Iraqi government make some strides on the rule of law institutions, the court system and then do some work on eliminating corruption at the local level, I mean I'm sure they told you they put a guy in jail, they pay a bribe and the

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guy is back on the street. We have a lot of work to do there with the rule of law program with the Iraqis but I don't know of any initiative to suspend habeas corpus.

(Don Sheppard) The question I get most often – everybody realizes things are going very tough and it takes approaches both on the political and military side. They keep asking, “what new is going to be done” and I tell them there isn't much left that's new to be done. There is no magic bullet. Its steady pressure and sticking with it. Go after these guys and the militias in concert with the politics and the military.

(General Casey) **We are constantly evaluating, re-evaluating and asking ourselves “is what we started out doing six months ago still applicable to the situation that we have now.** We have to balance that for the need for a broad, overarching scheme that gets us where we are going. I started back in July '04. There was like on battalion in the Iraqi Army. Now you got these guys out there, almost 90 battalions leading the effort. That process has got to continue. **Frankly, we are on a developmental timeline with the military and the police and the security institutions and ministries where I think the Iraqis are going to be pretty close to be able to assume security responsibilities I think by the end of '07.** They recognize that and it's part of this Joint Committee for Achieving Iraqi Security Self Reliance (JCAISR) we are work through with the Iraqi's right now. Obviously, conditions based and all the rest of that. The way the process has been moving that's going very well. Now, is anything new and different? We continue to adapt our tactics, techniques and procedures. If you guys have anything idea about a new approach I would be happy to listen to them.

(unknown analysts) A follow up to that, what should we make of the rhetoric attributed to Sen. Warner about the 2-3 months? Is there anything magic about two to three months (referring to a comment that the Iraqi leaders need to get their arms around the problem or Congress might be forced into a situation.

(General Casey) I haven't seen all of Sen. Warner's comments. I talked to him when he was there. I certainly didn't say anything about 2-3 months. **So, there is nothing magic about 2-3 months.** I think if he is expressing a sentiment that the Government needs to get their arms around the sectarian violence problem quickly – I would very much agree with that. **But, I don't think you can put any specific timelines on that and I don't know where that came from.**

(Jeff McCausliin) I don't have any magic solutions for you, but our problem I can tell you is in describing this changed, complex environment. We all keep getting beat up I'm sure by the comment that “as the Iraqis build up we were supposed to build down.” Well, the Iraqi's are building up and we all know the Iraqi Army is a good news story, but we are not building down. The trick is to explain, as you just did, that this is the most complex security situation and that's a tough thing for people to understand back over here. In the short term at least, to you expect an up tick in U.S. forces? We saw where the 172d was extended, at least one other brigade was extended, we are moving one other brigade of the 1st Cav. out early. Is there a possibility in the next few months of an up tick in U.S. force levels to try and get our arms around this sectarian violence problem?

(General Casey) I don't have any plans to do it right now. But, as we've said many times we are constantly looking at this and watching it. I hear the same thing about “standing up and standing down” and “we're not doing anything” I want to remind everybody that: one, we have already off-ramped two brigades with associated support—that's about 12,000 folks less. People get all lost in the rotations. **We are in a state of rotations through December. You'll see the number drop back under 130 thousand once we get done with all the rotations.** One of the things the Iraqi Security Force development allowed us to do is reposition force in Iraq away from areas they had taken control over. So, we were able to do this without increasing the total number of brigades in Iraq. **The other thing to remind them is the “stand up” is a three-part process and we are only 75 percent through the**

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second step. There is more to do.

Frankly, what happened as I look at the situation in late June early July it became clear to me that both the security forces and the government were not at the level they needed to be at to have a quick impact on the overall sectarian situation in Baghdad. Under our own mantra that "we are going to do what it takes to help the Iraqis win here" I reversed myself and put three more brigades into Baghdad and it did have an immediate impact on the situation there.

(Jeb Babbitt) What are you hearing back, Maliki and any of his guys in terms of their concerns? Are they worried about our politics, do they see a threat coming up in reductions and so forth being forced on them. Are they feeling the pressure?

(General Casey) **I think they recognize the patience, at least among the American public, may be waning. And that contributes to a sense of urgency that, frankly they already have.** They recognize that this is their best chance here to put their country on an irreversible road to democracy and economic development and they need to take advantage of it in this window. There is a general sense that they need to get on with things and frankly they are stepping up and taking a lot of initiative here and it's hearting to see.

(Jeb Babbitt) To follow up on that, in your opening comments you said our great friends in Syria and Iran were being either actively or passively unhelpful, can you give us any more specifics about that?

(General Casey) **I would say the situation coming out of Syria is about the same as it's been. They are giving safe haven to Ba'athists and they are allowing terrorists and foreign fighters to transit Syria and come in to Iraq. We think that is the primary route for terrorists and foreign fighters to come into Iraq. They are not doing anything to stop it that we can see. Frankly, when you talk to Iraqis who have lived in Syria and know what the government is capable of they tell you they could stop it if they wanted to.**

On the Iranian side, again there is no doubt they are providing weapons, training, money to Shiite extremist groups that are being used against the Coalition and against the Iraqi security forces and frankly to kill Iraq civilians.

(Bing West) Relative to reconciliation with the Sunni resistance, throughout al-Anbar you keep hearing the Iranian Shiites and the Iranian Prime Minister. Can we expect over the next months that Maliki will demonstrate something publicly to allay the concerns throughout al-Anbar that he really doesn't care about them?

(General Casey) I think you can Bing. He just chaired a session on Saturday with some al-Anbar Sheiks where he addressed them; he's released some of the money to them that had been promised by the previous government. In my discussions with him he recognizes that bringing al-Anbar into the fold is an important part of the reconciliation strategy. That said, you have been out to al-Anbar as much as anyone, it's going to take a lot of convincing to bring some of those folks in.

(Chuck Nash) Got a friend of mine who was working over there right after the fall of Baghdad. He spent about a year over there, transition over to the State as a contractor. Came back to the states for nine months and he just when back for a three-week trip. His assessment is that the reconstruction efforts are wrapping up and that the Army is packing up and pulling back. It gives him the impression that everybody is packing up to come home. Have we changed anything over there that would give some who was familiar with the way things were several years ago that kind of impression?

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(General Casey) I think probably. We just finished obligating all of the IRRF money by the end of the fiscal year. We have started 3,500 of the total 3,900 projects and finished 2,800-plus of the projects that were paid for by the IRRF. One, we don't need the numbers of people to go out and inspect the projects because there are just less projects going on. I think we will have started all of the projects by next summer. Some of the projects are large-scale projects that require a little more work up front. But yes, we have made very good progress frankly in executing the economic projects. What you are seeing is some down-sizing, but we are going to keep what we need on the ground so we continue to monitor the projects all the way through to completion. That may have been what he was seeing.

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General Casey interview with Defense Analysts
October 10, 2006

(General Casey opening statement)

The situation is more complex now than in the two-plus years I've been there. What we have been seeing since the elections, especially since the bombing of the Samarra mosque, is the primary conflict is evolving from an insurgency against us to a struggle over the division of the political and economic power among the Iraqis. There are several different groups that are trying to influence that process in negative ways. The Sunni extremists, al Qaeda and the Iraqis that are supporting them, the Shiite extremists, the death squads and some of the more militant Shiite militia.

Then the resistance. When people talk about the insurgency, primarily the Sunni resistance, the ones fighting us, and then **Syria and Iran are being are being unhelpful in a lot of different ways. Iran in a more active role, Syria in a more passive role.** All of that together makes for a very difficult situation. Add the intensities of Ramadan and the struggle for control there in the Baghdad area and it's a very difficult situation and probably will be a difficult situation for a couple more months.

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General Casey interview with Defense Analysts
October 10, 2006

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General Casey interview with Defense Analysts
October 10, 2006

under their anti-terrorists law that they are using. That said, the rule of law institutions are very under developed. It is difficult to get a guy, with evidence, get him to jail, get him to trial, get him convicted. It happens; I think you have read where they executed the death penalty on a few of these folks. Until we and the Iraqi government make some strides on the rule of law institutions, the court system and then do some work on eliminating corruption at the local level, I mean I'm sure they told you they put a guy in jail, they pay a bribe and the guy is back on the street. We have a lot of work to do there with the rule of law program with the Iraqis but I don't know of any initiative to suspend habeas corpus.

(Don Sheppard) The question I get most often – everybody realizes things are going very tough and it takes approaches both on the political and military side. They keep asking, "what new is going to be done" and I tell them there isn't much left that's new to be done. There is no magic bullet. Its steady pressure and sticking with it. Go after these guys and the militias in concert with the politics and the military.

(General Casey) **We are constantly evaluating, re-evaluating and asking ourselves "is what we started out doing six months ago still applicable to the situation that we have now.** We have to balance that for the need for a broad, overarching scheme that gets us where we are going. I started back in July '04. There was like on battalion in the Iraqi Army. Now you got these guys out there, almost 90 battalions leading the effort. That process has got to continue. **Frankly, we are on a developmental timeline with the military and the police and the security institutions and ministries where i think the Iraqis are going to be pretty close to be able to assume security responsibilities I think by the end of '07.** They recognize that and it's part of this Joint Committee for Achieving Iraqi Security Self Reliance (JCAISR) we are work through with the Iraqi's right now. Obviously, conditions based and all the rest of that. The way the process has been moving that's going very well. Now, is anything new and different? We continue to adapt our tactics, techniques and procedures. If you guys have anything idea about a new approach I would be happy to listen to them.

(unknown analysts) A follow up to that, what should we make of the rhetoric attributed to Sen. Warner about the 2-3 months? Is there anything magic about two to three months (referring to a comment that the Iraqi leaders need to get their arms around the problem or Congress might be forced into a situation.

(General Casey) I haven't seen all of Sen. Warner's comments. I talked to him when he was there. I certainly didn't say anything about 2-3 months. **So, there is nothing magic about 2-3 months.** I think if he is expressing a sentiment that the Government needs to get their arms around the sectarian violence problem quickly – I would very much agree with that. **But, I don't think you can put any specific timelines on that and I don't know where that came from.**

(Jeff McCausliin) I don't have any magic solutions for you, but our problem I can tell you is in describing this changed, complex environment. We all keep getting beat up I'm sure by the comment that "as the Iraqis build up we were supposed to build down." Well,

General Casey interview with Defense Analysts
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the Iraqi's are building up and we all know the Iraqi Army is a good news story, but we are not building down. The trick is to explain, as you just did, that this is the most complex security situation and that's a tough thing for people to understand back over here. In the short term at least, to you expect an uptick in U.S. forces? We saw where the 172d was extended, at least one other brigade was extended, we are moving one other brigade of the 1st Cav. out early. Is there a possibility in the next few months of an uptick in U.S. force levels to try and get our arms around this sectarian violence problem?

(General Casey) I don't have any plans to do it right now. But, as we've said many times we are constantly looking at this and watching it. I hear the same thing about "standing up and standing down" and "we're not doing anything" I want to remind everybody that: one, we have already off-ramped two brigades with associated support—that's about 12,000 folks less. People get all lost in the rotations. **We are in a state of rotations through December. You'll see the number drop back under 130 thousand once we get done with all the rotations.** One of the things the Iraqi Security Force development allowed us to do is reposition force in Iraq away from areas they had taken control over. So, we were able to do this without increasing the total number of brigades in Iraq. **The other thing to remind them is the "stand up" is a three-part process and we are only 75 percent through the second step.** There is more to do.

Frankly, what happened as I look at the situation in late June early July it became clear to me that both the security forces and the government were not at the level they needed to be at to have a quick impact on the overall sectarian situation in Baghdad. Under our own mantra that "we are going to do what it takes to help the Iraqis win here" I reversed myself and put three more brigades into Baghdad and it did have an immediate impact on the situation there.

(Jeb Babbin) What are you hearing back, Maliki and any of his guys in terms of their concerns? Are they worried about our politics, do they see a threat coming up in reductions and so forth being forced on them. Are they feeling the pressure?

(General Casey) **I think they recognize the patience, at least among the American public, may be waning. And that contributes to a sense of urgency that, frankly they already have.** They recognize that this is their best chance here to put their country on an irreversible road to democracy and economic development and they need to take advantage of it in this window. There is a general sense that they need to get on with things and frankly they are stepping up and taking a lot of initiative here and it's hearting to see.

(Jeb Babbin) To follow up on that, in your opening comments you said our great friends in Syria and Iran were being either actively or passively unhelpful, can you give us any more specifics about that?

(General Casey) **I would say the situation coming out of Syria is about the same as it's been. They are giving safe haven to Ba'athists and they are allowing terrorists and foreign fighters to transit Syria and come in to Iraq. We think that is the primary**

General Casey interview with Defense Analysts
October 10, 2006

route for terrorists and foreign fighters to come into Iraq. They are not doing anything to stop it that we can see. Frankly, when you talk to Iraqis who have lived in Syria and know what the government is capable of they tell you they could stop it if they wanted to.

On the Iranian side, again there is no doubt they are providing weapons, training, money to Shiite extremist groups that are being used against the Coalition and against the Iraqi security forces and frankly to kill Iraq civilians.

(Bing West) Relative to reconciliation with the Sunni resistance, throughout al-Anbar you keep hearing the Iranian Shiites and the Iranian Prime Minister. Can we expect over the next months that Maliki will demonstrate something publicly to ally the concerns throughout al-Anbar that he really doesn't care about them?

(General Casey) I think you can Bing. He just chaired a session on Saturday with some al-Anbar Sheiks where he addressed them; he's released some of the money to them that had been promised by the previous government. In my discussions with him he recognizes that bringing al-Anbar into the fold is an important part of the reconciliation strategy. That said, you have been out to al-Anbar as much as anyone, it's going to take a lot of convincing to bring some of those folks in.

(Chuck Nash) Got a friend of mine who was working over there right after the fall of Baghdad. He spent about a year over there, transition over to the State as a contractor. Came back to the states for nine months and he just when back for a three-week trip. His assessment is that the reconstruction efforts are wrapping up and that the Army is packing up and pulling back. It gives him the impression that everybody is packing up to come home. Have we changed anything over there that would give some who was familiar with the way things were several years ago that kind of impression?

(General Casey) I think probably. We just finished obligating all of the IRRF money by the end of the fiscal year. We have started 3,500 of the total 3,900 projects and finished 2,800-plus of the projects that were paid for by the IRRF. One, we don't need the numbers of people to go out and inspect the projects because there are just less projects going on. I think we will have started all of the projects by next summer. Some of the projects are large-scale projects that require a little more work up front. But yes, we have made very good progress frankly in executing the economic projects. What you are seeing is some down-sizing, but we are going to keep what we need on the ground so we continue to monitor the projects all the way through to completion. That may have been what he was seeing.

(b)(6)

From: Gordon Cucullu [colonelgordon@(b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 8:38 PM
To: gordon@(b)(6)
Subject: Gordon on N Korean nuclear

Hi, Friends, here's a link to a piece that ran today on Front Page Mag addressing the North Korean nuclear issue.

Be sure also and read Frank Gaffney's excellent article in the same issue.

All the best, Gordon

link here: <http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=24838>

Be sure to visit my web site at <http://www.colonelgordon.com>
*Subscribe and Read the latest copy of my FREE Email Newsletter - *The Right Approach*
*Order a Signed Copy, and read the latest reviews on my new book
Separated at Birth: How North Korea became the Evil Twin

4/9/2008

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) COL MNFI CMD GRP PAO (b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 4:16 PM

To: Casey George GEN MNF-I CG; Caldwell William B MG MNFI DCS STRATEFF; Wright Rudy BG MNFI STRATEFF; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD

Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) MAJ MNF-I CG Aide-de-Camp; (b)(6) COL MNF-I CMD GRP XO; (b)(6) COL MNFI CMD GRP (CIG)

Subject: FW: agenda

Sir,

Your interview today, 1440-1505, with approximately 11 Defense Analysts via telephone conference. Highlighted areas are notable quotes, should make news. Following is a summary of the Qs and As (transcript to follow):

- General started with saying how this is the most complex environment he has seen since taking command. Has evolved from terrorists threat to sectarian violence since the bombing of the mosque in February.
 - Syria and Iran are being unhelpful. Add to that the intensity during Ramadan and the threat is very high
- Reminded everyone the GoI has only been in place less than 150 days. The Prime Minister is focused on reconciliation and rightfully so. He understands you have to have security-prosperity-unity for the country to work.
- Violence and progress coexist in Iraq. Making progress against a backdrop of violence.
- Asked if military operations were moving toward a showdown with Sadr forces, CG said all militias need to be confronted via a political and military track. The PM is trying to use all the political means possible before using military options. The military is not "chomping" at the bit, but there are some hard liners and eventually they will need to be engaged.
- Reference removing "habeas corpus" in order to allow Soldiers to arrest, and convict, criminals (current rules too stringent), General Casey said no. Said it's more than just that, there needs to be more work done in the area of Rule of Law such as functioning courts, lawyers, judges. More work there will greatly help.
- Asked what new can be done to win the battle, General Casey said he is constantly adjusting the plan and making adjustments as necessary. He sees the ISF assuming security responsibility by the end of 2007. Processes such as the JICASIR (sp) where provinces and functions are turned over to Iraqis are working and need to continue.
- Regarding Sen. Warner's comments about a change possible in 2-3 months if the situation does not improve, General Casey mentioned there is nothing magic about 2-3 months timeline. He had just met with Sen. Warner in Iraq and that timeline never came up.
- As to the "As they stand up, we'll stand down" saying; seems as if they are standing up and we are staying—CG mentioned we already did two brigade "off ramps" last December. Thinks many people are confused by the "churn" in theater. With all the current transitions. Said that troop levels will drop below 130k in December once dust settles. Right now has not intention of asking for more troops. However, under the mantra "We'll do what it takes" he will do what is necessary.
- Concerning the GoI feeling the pressure to perform as a government, General Casey said they are very aware and they already have a sense of urgency. They realize this is their last best chance to form a government.
- Regarding Syria and allowing T/FF into Iraq and Iranian influence, General Casey said that Syria

4/9/2008

is allowing the T/FF into the country and they could stop it if they wanted to, they have control of their borders. Iran is providing money, weapons and training that ultimately kills Iraqi citizens.

Here are the attendees for today's call.

Colonel Ken Allard (USA, Retired) MSNBC
Mr. Jed Babbin (AF, Former JAG) American Spectator, Real Clear Politics, national radio
Dr. James Jay Carafano (LTC, USA, Retired) Heritage Foundation
Lieutenant Colonel Tim J. Eads (USA, Retired) Fox News
Lieutenant Colonel Rick Francona (USAF, Retired) NBC
Brigadier General David L. Grange (USA, Retired) CNN
Command Sergeant Major Steven Greer (USA, Retired) Fox News
Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis (USA, Retired) Fox News, CNN, NPR, Moody Radio
Dr. Jeff McCausland (Colonel, USA, Retired) - CBS
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney (USAF, Retired) - Fox News
Major General Michael J. Nardotti, Jr. (USA, Retired)
Captain Chuck Nash (USN, Retired) - Fox News
Major General Donald W. Shepperd (USAF, Retired) - CNN
Mr. Wayne Simmons (USN, Retired) - Fox News
Major General Paul E. Valley (USA, Retired) - Fox News
Mr. Bing West (Fmr ASD, Retired) - National Review, Atlantic Monthly
Major General Tom Wilkerson (USMC, Retired) - U.S. Naval Institute

(b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

4/9/2008

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 10:48 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: RE: Conference call on TUESDAY

there won't be, sorry, for two reasons. first is: we don't have anyone to do the transcribing, second is: the recorder fritzed out about 2 minutes into the call... i've fixed it for the casey call this afternoon and will have a back up! ugh.

thanks

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 7:07 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Conference call on TUESDAY

is there a transcript? thanks

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, October 06, 2006 7:19 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Subject: RE: Conference call on TUESDAY

i asked if you had been contacted, but i did not get a response. i should have called you myself. sorry about that.
you didn't miss anything. dr. gilroy gave the good news and then maginnis asked how come the influencers (moms, counselors, coaches, etc.) were reluctant to recommend military service. he said the impression is that it's mostly moms who are concerned about the war, and we are working on marketing products that talk about the nobility of service. that was the extent of the call. only lasted about 15 minutes or so.

thanks

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Sent: Friday, October 06, 2006 7:15 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Conference call on TUESDAY

Did you guys try and call me today for the other call? Thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Fri Oct 06 19:04:00 2006
Subject: Conference call on TUESDAY

MEMORANDUM

To: Retired Military Analysts

From: (b)(6)

Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Date: October 6, 2006

Re: Conference Call with Senior DoD Officials

We invite you to participate in a conference call, TUESDAY, October 10, 2006, from 2:30-3:00 p.m.

General George Casey will brief you on current operations in Iraq. His biography is attached for your review. This call will be On Background.

To participate in this conference call, please dial (b)(2) and ask the operator to connect you to the Analysts conference call.

Please R.S.V.P. to (b)(6) at (b)(6) <mailto:(b)(6)> or call her at (b)(2)

We hope you are able to participate.

(b)(6)
Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense
(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: Brookes, Peter [Peter Brookes] (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 7:37 AM
To: Brookes, Peter
Subject: Brookes' Newest Column: "Korean Fallout"

NEW YORK POST

KOREAN FALLOUT

By PETER BROOKES

October 10, 2006 -- IT appears that North Korea's kooky leader, Kim Jong Il, did exactly what he said he'd do: conduct Pyongyang's first nuclear-weapons test.

Sadly, we've got more than Pyongyang's (worthless) word on this: Seismic data seems to confirm the explosion, though some suggest it was a ruse - a large conventional explosion, not an actual underground nuclear blast.

If it was a nuke, what's the likely global fallout? The consequences are deadly serious for American interests - and a watershed event for international security as Pyongyang becomes the ninth member of the once-exclusive nuclear-weapons club.

Take Northeast Asia. Relations among the regional major powers - Japan, China and South Korea - were already tense. North Korea's atomic firecracker certainly won't help.

Japan and South Korea may feel obligated to go nuclear themselves. Japan, with a large nuclear power industry and a top-notch scientific community, could go nuclear in a flash.

South Korea similarly. While the South Korean government is generally conciliatory toward the North, if Seoul's historical rival Tokyo goes nuclear, it might feel compelled to do so as well out of pride as much as for security.

The U.S. pledge to consider an atomic attack on either Japan or South Korea by North Korea as an attack on America was clearly intended to deter Kim as well as to encourage the others to hold off on splitting daily atoms. But even if Japan and South Korea decide against the nuclear option, they might instead engage in a conventional arms buildup to deter North Korea.

Such a significant arms buildup would affect the security policy of other Northeast Asia powers. China, Taiwan and/or Russia might respond in kind - resulting in a dangerous conventional (or nuclear) arms race.

And we have a lot at stake in the region's stability with 70,000 troops based in Japan/South Korea, and another 10,000 sailors at sea in the western Pacific at any one time. (And major economic interests, too.)

A North Korean bomb also encourages other rogue states - and stateless groups - to try to follow suit; indeed, Kim might help out. Iran is the biggest concern. Pyongyang has worked closely with Tehran on ballistic missiles and nuclear issues in the past. The sharing of scientific data from North Korea's underground blast might shorten the timeline for Iran to achieve nuclear statehood. (Heck, Syria could conceivably become a North Korean nuclear client, too.)

Of course, the worst scenario of all is for al Qaeda or another nuke-seeking terrorist group to come knocking on indigent North Korea's door with a wheelbarrow of cash. While transferring a fully functional nuclear weapon to terrorists is extremely risky business for any state, the possibility isn't limited to the realm of pulp-fiction thrillers.

North Korean nukes also expose us to a growing threat. Pyongyang must still "weaponize" its test rig into a bomb/warhead - as well as perfect missiles capable of reaching the United States. But it may be able to do this in the coming years.

At this point, diplomacy or even economic sanctions are unlikely to walk North Korea back. When it comes to nukes, few nations have ever disarmed. The only practical answer is containment, military deterrence - buttressed by missile defense - and strong regional alliances.

Heritage Foundation Senior Fellow Peter Brookes is the author of "A Devil's Triangle: Terrorism, WMD and Rogue States."

peterbrookes (b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@ (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, October 09, 2006 10:03 AM
To: tmcinerney@ (b)(6); nashct@ (b)(6); Glenstrae77@ (b)(6); BURM41516@ (b)(6); USAGirl1957@ (b)(6); WSSInter@ (b)(6); roberthscales@ (b)(6); wheeler@ (b)(6); twilkerson@ (b)(6); ShepDonald@ (b)(6); mgroot@ (b)(6); groothousen@ (b)(6)
Subject: Today's TAS: Republicans at Bay?

It's like the lottery, guys. You can't win if you don't play. As Casey Stengel woulda said, "can't anybody here play this game?"

The American Spectator

Jed Babbin

(b)(6) (Home Office)
(b)(6) (Mobile)

4/9/2008

(b)(6)

From: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA
Sent: Sunday, October 08, 2006 11:09 PM
To: Whitman, Bryan SES OSD PA
Subject: Re: Hi

Thanks for the help

Ab

-----Original Message-----

From: Whitman, Bryan SES OSD PA
To: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA
Sent: Sun Oct 08 23:07:59 2006
Subject: Re: Hi

Just talks to (b)(6) too. We have not confirmation. Any statement on this would come from other parts of the government first.

-----Original Message-----

From: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan SES OSD PA
Sent: Sun Oct 08 23:05:47 2006
Subject: Re: Hi

Hi bryan
Do we have an official line for the military analysts on this?

Thanks
Ab

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
To: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA
Sent: Sun Oct 08 22:56:07 2006
Subject: Hi

Are you up?? :) jeff mccausland just called. Cbs says so korean news agency is reporting nk tested their nuclear weapon. He wants to know if we have confirmation..... I called the duty phone, but it's off. Any idea who I could call??

Thx

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OSD PA
Sent: Saturday, October 07, 2006 10:05 AM
To: Whitman, Bryan SES OSD PA; Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; (b)(6)
(b)(6) SES OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; Lawrence, Dallas Mr OSD PA; (b)(6)
CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Thorp, Frank RDML OSD PA; (b)(6)
OSD PA
Cc: Bucci, Dr. Steven CIV SD; Smith, Dorrance HON OSD PA; Abbott, Catherine COL OSD PA
Subject: Smith / Bucci Mtg Notes - 10/5

- Washington Times – Hold until later
- Leaders Magazine – Hold until later
- Instapundit – Timing issue, Hollen to contact Fran Harvey on his interest level
- WH Radio Day – SD’s participation will remain from 1300-1400 on Oct. 24
- WSJ, Chris Rhoades – Bucci will check on its status in front office
- CBS, Charles Osgood – Decline
- CBS Letterman – Decline
- Austin Bay / Cal Thomas / Kaplan – Journalist Lunch is scheduled for Monday, 10/23. Please provide potential guest names to Smith for review.
- MSNBC, Rita Cosby – Decline
- Blum Piece – Decline
- Sunday Times of London – Not at this time
- Brad Graham – Add Bucci to list of interviewees. Also please confirm the planned publishing date.
- Ayma Ent. – Decline
- Inauguration of House of Sweden Ceremony & Gala – Decline
- Military Analysts – Tentative on SD calendar. Smith / Bucci need proposal to review

(b)(6)
Confidential Assistant to the
Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Public Affairs
1400 Defense Pentagon (b)(2)

4/9/2008

Washington, DC 20301-1400

(main) (b)(2)

(private) (b)(2)

(c)(b)(2)

4/9/2008

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, October 06, 2006 7:04 PM
Subject: Conference call on TUESDAY
Attachments: Casey, General George W 2006.doc



MEMORANDUM

To: Retired Military Analysts
From: (b)(6)
Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Date: October 6, 2006
Re: Conference Call with Senior DoD Officials

We invite you to participate in a conference call, **TUESDAY, October 10, 2006, from 2:30-3:00 p.m.**

General George Casey will brief you on current operations in Iraq. His biography is attached for your review. This call will be On Background.

To participate in this conference call, please dial (b)(2) and ask the operator to connect you to the Analysts conference call.

Please R.S.V.P. to (b)(6) at (b)(6) or call her at (b)(2)

We hope you are able to participate.

(b)(6)
Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense
(b)(2)

4/9/2008



**General George W. Casey, Jr.
Commanding General
Multi-National Force - Iraq**

General Casey became the Commanding General, Multi-National Force - Iraq, July 2004.

General Casey was commissioned a second lieutenant of Infantry from the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in 1970. Throughout his career, he has served in operational assignments in Germany, Italy, Egypt and the United States. He has

commanded at every level from platoon to Division. His most recent assignment was as the 30th Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.

His principal staff assignments have been as a: Congressional Liaison Officer; Special Assistant to the Army Chief of Staff; Chief of Staff, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas; Operations Officer and Chief of Staff, V (US/GE) Corps, Heidelberg, Germany; Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs, Joint Staff, J5; Commander, Joint Warfighting Center/J7, US Joint Forces Command; Director, J5, Joint Staff; and Director of the Joint Staff. He has also served as a United Nations Military Observer in Cairo, Egypt, with the UN Truce Supervision Organization.

General Casey; commanded a mechanized infantry battalion - 1st Battalion 10th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colorado; commanded a mechanized infantry brigade - 3rd "Grey Wolf" Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas; served as Assistant Division Commander for Maneuver and Support in the 1st Armored Division in Bosnia and Germany; and commanded the 1st Armored Division in Bad Kreuznach, Germany. General Casey assumed command of Multi-National Force-Iraq on July 1, 2004.

General Casey holds a Masters Degree in International Relations from Denver University and has served as a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council of the United States.

U.S. Decorations and Badges:

Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal
Army Commendation Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Expert Infantryman Badge
Master Parachutist Badge
Ranger Tab
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
Army Staff Identification Badge

(Updated 30 August 2006)

(b)(6)

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
Sent: Friday, October 06, 2006 1:22 PM
To: (b)(6) Sgt OSD PA
Subject: Fw: Recruiting Stories

Attachments: Recruitment Opinion Stories.doc

(b)(6) please print these out in color and keep a copy for me. Please deliver a copy to army secretary fran harvey and tell his mil aid that fran and I discussed and he is expecting the articles. Please give copies to dorrance and latimer as well. Thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CTR OSD PA
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD
CC: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Fri Oct 06 11:28:03 2006
Subject: Recruiting Stories



Recruitment
Opinion Stories.do...

Dear M Ruff,

Per your request, attached are several editorial/commentary pieces saying that the Army recruiting shortfall in 2004-2005 may be a reflection of the war's unpopularity. Relevant sections and statements are highlighted in the pieces. Please let us know if there is anything else you need.

Thank you,

(b)(6)

Uncle Sam Wants You in the Worst Way - August 22, 2005

(BusinessWeek)...David Kiley

Ten-Hut!: The Army's Bungling Recruitment - June 12, 2005

(Washington Post)...Don Edwards

Too few good men/ Prolonged Iraq war might explain Army and Marines falling short of recruiting goals - May 29, 2005

(Orange County Register)...Commentary

The Focus at the Defense Department Has Been On Desperate Recruiters - May 26, 2005

(Chicago Sun-Times)...Robert Novak

The Army's Recruiting Trouble - May 13, 2005

(St. Petersburg Times)...Editorial

Recruitment met with Disinterest - March 30, 2005

(Seattle Post-Intelligencer)...Helen Thomas

Rebuilding the Army - February 6, 2005

(Washington Post)...Editorial

News: Analysis & Commentary: DEFENSE

UNCLE SAM WANTS YOU IN THE WORST WAY; The Army is boosting its marketing and trying new tactics to close a recruiting gap

By David Kiley in New York

801 words

22 August 2005

BusinessWeek

40

Volume 3948

English

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John Burns thought he would be in Baghdad or Basra by now, perched in a Humvee gun turret. Burns was "juiced" to join up after the 2001 terrorist attacks. But when a friend of his older brother returned from two tours in Iraq and described in gruesome detail "the absolute hell" over there, Burns balked. His parents were decidedly cool on the idea, too. So Burns signed up for community college in Paterson, N.J., instead. Says the 19-year-old, second-year business student: "It was the right decision for me. Besides, I'm not sold that Iraq is the place to fight terrorism."

With an insurgency raging in Iraq and casualties rising, the U.S. Army faces one of the toughest marketing challenges around. Turned off by an increasingly unpopular war, thousands of young men and women who might typically have joined the military to get an education, jump-start their careers, or simply to defend their country are standing down. As a result, when the Army completes fiscal 2005 on Sept. 30, it is expected to be 7,000 short of its 80,000-person recruiting goal.

The shortfall has prompted top brass to pump in millions of extra marketing dollars and to rethink how they go about convincing young Americans -- and increasingly, their parents -- that the benefits of enlisting outweigh the risks. "We've been recruiting during an armed conflict," says Ray DeThorne, executive vice-president of Leo Burnett, the Army's advertising agency. "It's a complicated sale."

TOWN HALL MEETINGS

The army acknowledges its traditional approach -- paeans to patriotism and machismo, and selling military service as a career booster -- is no longer enough. And it's not just the rising body count. Wary parents have laid down some withering fire of their own. "Many grew up during the Vietnam War and have different ideas about the military than the grandparents of today's recruits," says chief recruiting marketer Colonel Thomas Nickerson.

So how does the Army change attitudes and get recruitment back on track? Throw a lot of money at the problem, for one. The Army will spend about \$320 million next fiscal year on recruitment marketing, up from \$240 million this year and \$200 million in fiscal 2004. That's \$4,000 per recruit if they sign up 80,000 next year -- or more than twice what Toyota Motor Corp. spends to attract a new customer.

A major shift in message is also under way. While some TV ads continue to push patriotism and adventure, a chunk of the budget increase is going in to ads whose real target is the parents. One, for example, features a mother reading a letter to her kid's commanding officer about how the Army brought out the best in her son.

At the same time, the Army is keenly aware that TV is a less effective medium than it once was. So, more spending is going to public-relations efforts. In one key initiative, the Army is gearing up this fall for a series of 15 televised town hall meetings in which carefully selected soldiers will tell positive stories about military accomplishments in Iraq and Afghanistan and answer questions. Nickerson says that the town hall audiences won't be prescreened -- a risky strategy since anyone could sound off about the war.

Like every advertiser these days, the Army is also struggling to cut through all the clutter to reach 18- to 24-year-olds. It is increasingly turning to product placement or other ways of ensuring a favorable portrayal. On the Discovery Channel's *Monster Garage*, a show about customizing cars, host Jesse James worked with Army mechanics to trick out a Jeep. And in next year's ESPN reality show *Bound For Glory: The Montour Spartans*, former football star Dick Butkus will try to turn around a high school football team with the help of a real retired Army drill sergeant.

With polls showing that a majority of Americans have turned against the war, the Army's marketing corps can expect to see plenty of action.

Selling to Mom and Dad

Army ads now focus on convincing parents that the benefits of enlisting outweigh the risks

MOM'S VOICE-OVER "Thanks for bringing out the best in my child."

FATHER TO SON "You're a changed man...Where did that come from?"

SON "It's time for me to be the man." MOM "O.K., tell me more."

THE STAT

\$320 MILLION

U.S. Army spending on recruitment marketing for fiscal 2006, up from \$200 million in '04.

Ten-Hutt; The Army's Bungling Recruitment

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Nearly every day, anywhere from one to several U.S. soldiers or Marines die in Iraq, and even more are wounded. The news doesn't always make the front pages anymore, but the casualty rate has apparently registered deeply in the consciousness of young Americans and their families. The result is a dangerous decline in new enlistments that is depleting U.S. military resources and weakening our capacity to face additional conflicts or threats from abroad.

To keep our forces strong, every soldier we lose or who leaves the service has to be replaced by a new recruit. Their leaders, meanwhile -- the men who take them into combat and help determine the outcome of many battles -- can only be replaced by soldiers who gain experience and undertake many years of leadership training. For 20 years, the all-volunteer Army, with its enlistment bonuses and generous scholarships, succeeded magnificently at filling its manpower and leadership needs. Recruits sought entry in such numbers that for a decade it was running annual surpluses that could be held over to succeeding years.

But when the Iraq war began to stretch from months into years, the view of the military as an attractive option for young Americans gradually began to change. Recruiting for the Army, the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve, as well as the Marines, has become increasingly difficult, and recruiters point to the casualties from Iraq and Afghanistan as the primary cause of the unusual resistance -- including parental threats -- that they're confronting in trying to attract new enlistees.

The recruiting problems first became apparent in the late summer of 2003, when the surplus of enlistees disappeared and the Army went into the next fiscal year without any cushion. Since then, recruiting numbers have been declining. An alarming trend -- fewer young people signing up than the Army needs to maintain its strength -- began to develop last fall. Now, the Army has failed to meet its monthly recruiting goals since February. On Friday, it said that in May it reached only 75 percent of a goal it had already reduced from 8,050 to 6,700. The National Guard and Reserve, which provide more than 40 percent of the Army forces in Iraq, are experiencing even more trouble; so far, the National Guard has reached only 76 percent of its recruiting goals for this year.

Historically, recruiters have had to contact more than 100 prospects for every recruit. This year, those numbers are going up daily. The Army added 1,200 recruiters last month, and it has significantly increased its advertising budget and enlistment bonuses, from \$6,000 for most recruits to \$20,000. At the same time, it has raised the eligible age for the Army National Guard or the Reserve from 35 to 39. Even more telling, the Army is also accepting more recruits who are not high school graduates. This year, the percentage of high school graduates among those enlisting dropped from 92.4 to barely 90 percent, the Army's stated floor for the number of recruits who must have a high school diploma.

With recruiting goals seemingly out of reach for the present, recruiters, who are selected from among the best junior leaders in the noncommissioned officer corps, are experiencing high levels

of stress. More and more, they appear to be bending the rules to meet their goals. The Army has become so concerned about recruiting ethics that it suspended all recruiting on May 20 to conduct a full day of ethics training.

But the real concern for all Americans is the effect that a continuing drop in enlistments will have on the military's quality. If there aren't enough recruits over the coming months, the Army will not be able to keep its units at fully combat-ready strengths. A classic solution to those shortages is to take soldiers from other units to bring up the personnel strength of units deploying to combat. But this causes turbulence in the deploying unit and undermines the unit from which the soldiers have been taken. When the time arrives to deploy the latter unit, even more soldiers must be transferred to bring it to combat strength. The result is units whose soldiers don't know each other — exactly the situation the Army has worked so hard to avoid for the last two decades.

Now, the Army's latest desperate attempt to gain recruits is a shortened, 15-month enlistment policy. A 15-month enlistment means that soldiers will receive only basic and advanced individual training, but none of the team and unit training our premier soldiers traditionally receive. These recruits will be shipped off to war after only five months of training, deployed to units in combat where they know no one. These inexperienced soldiers will be at an enormous disadvantage and the casualties among them will be bound to reflect that disadvantage.

The 15-month enlistment is exactly the replacement policy the Army has proudly rejected since the Vietnam War. This flawed approach was instituted then because of the urgent need to replace casualties. We ended up with units of inadequately trained soldiers who didn't know each other and weren't fully cohesive teams. The result was high casualties among the newly arrived, inexperienced soldiers -- and it will likely be the result again. It would probably be better to maintain high standards and not reduce training time, even if this leads to temporary shortages.

Meanwhile, the decision to ease standards and accept soldiers who are less-able to operate many complex weapons has the potential to weaken fighting capability. The Army already has a manpower shortage in certain critical skills, such as languages and military police. It has responded with short-term solutions like the "Stop Loss" program, which retains soldiers on active duty involuntarily after their period of enlistment is over. Soldiers who have left active Army service have also been involuntarily recalled. Both these solutions have been implemented to provide a limited number of soldiers, and they will not be effective in offsetting the shortfall in thousands of new recruits.

Ironically, these stop-gap measures further contribute to the recruiting challenge, as potential enlistees are deterred by the prospect of involuntary service on top of the fear of combat casualties.

An equally dangerous challenge facing the Army is the loss of experienced soldiers who leave the service after undergoing the demands of combat multiple times over several years. Currently, soldiers expect to get a year away from combat after serving in Iraq or Afghanistan. But this expectation is violated as soldiers returning from combat are transferred to new units, which are then sent to the front well before a year is up.

I recently chatted with one such soldier, who told me that after participating in the invasion of Iraq, he remained there for a year and then returned to the United States, where he was transferred to a different unit. Only four months after he got home, his new unit deployed to Iraq. He has just