

(b)(6)

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**From:** JedBabbin (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, January 18, 2007 9:11 AM  
**To:** tmcinerney (b)(6) nashct (b)(6) BURM41516 (b)(6) USAGirl1957@ (b)(6)  
WSSInter (b)(6) roberthscales (b)(6) ladd.wheeler (b)(6) twilkerson (b)(6)  
ShepDonald (b)(6) mike.delong (b)(6) mgroot (b)(6)  
goothousen (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Obamarama: Today's RCP

This is too much fun. These columns sometimes just write themselves.

[RealClearPolitics - Articles - Fear and Loathing on Hillary's Trail](#)

**Jed Babbin**

(b)(6) (Home Office)  
(b)(6) (Mobile)

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) OSD PA  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 17, 2007 7:40 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) CTR OSD PA  
**Subject:** Re: Latest MMC Talking Points and Q&A

Please resend it to me so that I can forward to the ret mil guys.  
Thanks again. Have a great night.

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** (b)(6) CTR OSD PA  
**To:** (b)(6) OSD PA  
**Sent:** Wed Jan 17 19:38:19 2007  
**Subject:** RE: Latest MMC Talking Points and Q&A

I just shipped it out. I also just found out that the meeting between casa blanca and Caldwell has shifted again. Apparently (b)(6) doesn't have my office number. I really thought he did. Anyway, he left me a vm on my blackberry which I just figured out how to use. I normally only use my cell or office phone for everything. I've tried calling him to discuss the change but I can't seem to connect with him. Oh well, I left him a vm with my cell phone number. I'm going to get outta here within the next hour.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** (b)(6) OSD PA  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 17, 2007 7:35 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) CTR OSD PA  
**Subject:** Re: Latest MMC Talking Points and Q&A

Send it. We can always follow up with phone calls in the am.  
Thx

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** (b)(6) CTR OSD PA  
**To:** (b)(6) OSD PA  
**Sent:** Wed Jan 17 19:07:59 2007  
**Subject:** RE: Latest MMC Talking Points and Q&A

Haven't heard a thing. Thanks for the proof.

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** (b)(6) OSD PA  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 17, 2007 7:06 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) CTR OSD PA  
**Subject:** Re: Latest MMC Talking Points and Q&A

Hi. Thanks for running with this...

One typo. Look at the sentence re bgh's bio...

Let me know if you don't hear from them soon.

Thx

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----  
**From:** (b)(6) CTR OSD PA  
**To:** (b)(6) CTR OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA  
**CC:** (b)(6) OSD PA

Sent: Wed Jan 17 18:40:42 2007  
Subject: RE: Latest MMC Talking Points and Q&A

(b)(6)

Can you please let me know if the language in this invite is ok for tomorrow? I've pasted it below.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

MEMORANDUM

To: Civilian Defense Experts and Retired Military Analysts

From: (b)(6)  
Public Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense

Date: January 17, 2007

Re: Conference Call with Senior DoD Officials

We invite you to participate in a conference call, TOMORROW, January 18, 2006, from 12:30-1:00 p.m.

Mr. Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel, and Brig. Gen. Thomas L. Hemingway, Legal Adviser to the Convening Authority in the Department of Defense Office of Military Commissions, will brief you on the Military Commissions Manual. This call will be On Background.

For your convenience, Mr. Dell'Orto's Biography can be found at:  
<http://www.defenselink.mil/Bios/BiographyDetail.aspx?BiographyID=42>  
You can also find Brig. Gen. Hemingway's Biography can be found at:  
<http://www.af.mil/bios/bio.asp?bioID=7760>

To participate in this conference call, please dial (b)(2) and ask the operator to connect you to the Analysts conference call.

Please R.S.V.P. to (b)(6) at (b)(6) or call at (b)(2)

We hope you are able to participate.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CDR OSD PA  
Sent: Wednesday, January 17, 2007 1:07 PM  
To: (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA  
Cc: (b)(6) CTR OSD PA; (b)(6) Maj, DoD OGC  
Subject: RE: Latest MMC Talking Points and Q&A

(b)(6)

Attached are the talking points and Q&A.

Yes, we are planning for 0800 tomorrow for the military analysts. You are going to be the one placing the call along with (b)(6), right? Recommended location would be from Mr. Dan Dell'Orto's office, I believe, with Brig. Gen. Hemingway in attendance.

(b)(6)

Can you please zap (b)(6) the electrons for Brig. Gen. Hemingway bio? Believe Mr. D's bio is on Defenselink, no?

If this is not correct, please let me know right away. Thanks.

Regards,

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) OSD PA

Sent: Wednesday, January 17, 2007 1:01 PM

To: (b)(6) CDR OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA

Cc: (b)(6) CTR OSD PA

Subject: FW: Latest MMC Talking Points and Q&A

hi (b)(6)

could we get the latest mmc talking points and q&a?? it would be great to have that before the analyst call in the morning. i understand we're now shooting for 0800?? is that a solid time?? the sooner we can get the invite out, the better. the analysts will be informed that they must embargo the info.

(b)(6) is going to be the lead on that conference call. (b)(6) can send you a list of who will be invited. also, will it just be general hemingway and dan dell'orto?? is it possible to get bios on all the speakers to send out with the invite??  
thanks!

(b)(6)



(b)(6)

**From:** Paul Vallely [vallely@(b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 17, 2007 5:13 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: Way to go Gordon !!!

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Osprey Media  
Paul E Vallely  
Fox Military Analyst/Radio Host "Stand Up America"  
vallely@(b)(6)  
tel: (b)(6)  
tel2: (b)(6)  
fax: 406 837 0996  
www.ospreymedia.us  
-----

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Fred Gedrich [mailto:ggedrich@(b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 17, 2007 3:06 PM  
**To:** Gordon Cucullu  
**Cc:** Thomas G McInerney; Paul Vallely; WSSinter  
**Subject:** Way to go Gordon !!!

Better, Faster, Smarter  
By Lt. Col. Gordon Cucullu  
<<http://frontpagemagazine.com/Articles/authors.asp?ID=2535>>  
FrontPageMagazine.com | January 17, 2007

Much is being made, and properly so, of President Bush's changes to top-level military and intelligence service leaders. In some ways such moves follow logically from the replacement of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. It makes sense that with a new strategy being formulated and implemented the new Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, will want his own team on the ground. In time of war when dealing with scarce resources and even more precious soldier's lives, who wouldn't want people who supported his strategy at the point of the spear?

It is important to note that the generals who are replaced - John Abizaid and George Casey - are solid, intelligent, brave, highly decorated soldiers who performed at a level they considered their best both in physical effort and professional judgment. But their attitudes, particularly that of Casey who was said to be more focused on withdrawal than victory, apparently do not conform with the new strategy promulgated by the president. British journalist Melanie Phillips noted "[it] has long been apparent that [Bush] has been ill-served by his top brass in Iraq."

Admiral William Fallon is being brought in from Hawaii, where he commanded all U.S. forces in the Pacific, to Central Command. LTG David Petraeus, who was considered outstanding in his leadership role of the 101st Airmobile Division in Operation Iraqi Freedom and in his latest role of training up Iraqi forces, is replacing Casey as head of all Coalition forces in Iraq.

Will these personnel changes matter?

Again, Phillips observes, "the fight in Washington has not just been over whether more or fewer troops are needed in Iraq. It's also been over a major difference in strategic perception." It is that same strategic conundrum that Fred Gedrich and Paul Vallely question. "The United States has to transition from a conventional to an unconventional war footing," the authors write. They further note that "in January 2003, former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld designated the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) as the lead military organization to prosecute the global war on terror but unfortunately that has not materialized." [Emphasis added.]

Columnist Ralph Peters agrees that the strategy has been misdirected. In a piece praising the professional character of General Petraeus, he worries that "the counterinsurgency doctrine produced under [Petraeus'] direction remains far too mired in failed 20th century models. Winning hearts and minds sounds great, but it's useless when those hearts and minds turn up dead the next morning."

So where to go?

Till now the war - whether known as the Global War on Terror or the more appropriate designation by Frank Gaffney as the "War for the Free World" - has been fought by conventional, geographically oriented commands. Despite the 2003 memo Gedrich and Vallely cite, Central Command (USCENTCOM) has maintained the lead in combating Islamofascist terrorists. Other geographical commands such as Pacific Command and Southern Command have had a piece of the action, all supported by SOCOM and the special operations community. This is considered by many to be exactly the reverse of what is needed. "President Bush and the new U.S. defense secretary, Robert Gates," according to Gedrich and Vallely, "could deliver an effective change in current Iraq war strategy and the wider global war by placing experienced unconventional warfare leaders in charge of the war effort." In other words, perhaps it is past time to do what seemed to most of us to have been decided more than three years ago.

Why does this seem like such a big deal? For starters, the CENTCOM leaders work primarily in a restricted, albeit large geographical area. While CENTCOM's area of responsibility covers 27 different countries across the Middle East and Central Asia even down to the Horn of Africa, it is by definition limited. Conversely the SOCOM community has a global perspective. When al-Qaeda terrorists like the Bali bombers, for example, transit from Afghanistan to Malaysia to Indonesia and return, they cross two major command areas. SOCOM on the other hand, has responsibility for them the entire time because it is focused on the functionality of the war, not merely artificially imposed geographical delineations.

SOCOM's basic mission statement says it plainly enough:

SOCOM leads, plans, synchronizes, and, as directed, executes global operations against terrorist networks.. [SOCOM] deploys combat-ready special operations forces.. [that] are organized with a regional focus to take advantage of language and political skills. [Emphasis added]

In other words, the special operators have a global strategic view reinforced with highly specialized regional capabilities. Doesn't that mission statement sound like exactly what is needed to win this war?

Use Operation Enduring Freedom, the liberation of Afghanistan from Taliban and al-Qaeda terror as an example. Once given the mission, SOCOM was able to use its varied internal resources supported by external conventional military units to bring down an enemy that had been described by former military officers, analysts, and the media as virtually invincible. And they accomplished it all in the midst of the "fierce Afghan winter" against which our forces were deemed unsuited to prevail. Further, the mission was accomplished relying on a tactic that special operators alone bring to the table, a principle known as "economy of force." This means American spec ops troops use indigenous soldiers to do what conventionally-minded strategists would rely on American units to accomplish - better, cheaper, faster, and with fewer casualties.

To Peter's point, special operations units understand the need for "the defiant use of force." They realize that with some opponents the only solution is the application of controlled, deliberate, and irresistible violence. For example, when a special task force confronted Uday and Qusay Hussein barricaded inside a house, they took it down with such force that the example affected other terrorists. It has been repeated as necessary with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and other terrorists who know they can run but cannot hide. Special operations forces are able to think more creatively, operate more freely, and use more flexibility than conventional forces that are tied to legalistic, unrealistic, and often self-defeating rules of engagement drawn up by Pentagon JAG lawyers or imposed timid unit commanders who wish, as Peters comments "to pretend we're not at war."

Because they can operate across service lines (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard) and agency lines (CIA, FBI, DEA, police, and others), as well as across international lines, the special operations forces are better able to accomplish a mission by sharing intelligence information, coordination appropriate inter-agency missions, and understanding the "big picture" threat that faces America and its allies. For example, special operations forces in South America see the links between Colombian narco-terrorists in the FARC, al-Qaeda infiltrators, rogue state support from Venezuela, and Cuban influence and work hand-in-glove with DEA and CIA along with local forces to counter these mutual enemies.

The most important point is that this "War for the Free World" is not a conventional war. This war, other than for brief interludes in which set-piece battles were fought and won as during the early weeks of Operation Iraqi Freedom, is a dark, shadowy war. It must be fought against an enemy adept at using a mixed-strategy of ideology, propaganda, terrorism, money-laundering, non-state combatants, rogue state sponsors, and irregular, conscience-less brutality to conduct operations against America.

By restricting ourselves to artificial, bureaucratic geographical division of responsibility, by thinking only in terms of conventional battlefields, and by relying on gentle, media-friendly tactics we are trying to fight our sworn enemies with unacceptable - indeed potentially fatal - mental and physical constraints. If victory is our objective then we must fight the war to win, using forces specially configured and trained to employ an effective strategy to defeat this terrible an enemy. Those forces are found in the special operations community and the sooner we call on them to take charge the better chance we have of winning this war.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OSD PA  
Sent: Wednesday, January 17, 2007 1:52 PM  
To: (b)(6) Maj, DoD OGC; (b)(6) CDR OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA  
PA  
Cc: (b)(6) CTR OSD PA  
Subject: Re: Latest MMC Talking Points and Q&A

(b)(6) thanks. Good to know.  
All, we cannot invite until there is a solid time. In order for people to have enough time to work it into their calendars, we should probably have the invite out by 1600. Is there someone who can confirm with all parties and let us know??

Thx  
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----  
From: (b)(6) Maj, DoD OGC  
To: (b)(6) CDR OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA  
Cc: (b)(6) CTR OSD PA; (b)(6) Maj, DoD OGC  
Sent: Wed Jan 17 13:47:21 2007  
Subject: RE: Latest MMC Talking Points and Q&A

<http://www.af.mil/bios/bio.asp?bioID=7760>

The link above is to BG Hemingway's bio. He just received an email from Mr. Dell'Orto's office for 0900 tomorrow morning.

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----  
From: (b)(6) CDR OSD PA [mailto:(b)(6)]  
Sent: Wednesday, January 17, 2007 01:07  
To: (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA  
Cc: (b)(6) CTR OSD PA; (b)(6) Maj, DoD OGC  
Subject: RE: Latest MMC Talking Points and Q&A

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thanks!

(b)(6)

## Talking Points – Manual for Military Commissions

### Top Line Messages:

- Today, the Secretary of Defense is submitting to Congress a comprehensive Manual for the full and fair prosecution of alleged alien unlawful enemy combatants by military commissions, in accordance with the Military Commissions Act of 2006.
- The overriding consideration reflected in the Manual for Military Commissions is fairness. The draft Manual will ensure that alien unlawful enemy combatants who are suspected of war crimes and certain other offenses are prosecuted before regularly constituted courts affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized people.
- This Manual for Military Commissions closely follows the Manual for Courts-Martial and applies the laws and rules of evidence applicable to general courts-martial with only limited exceptions necessary to comport with the careful balancing of interests reflected in the Military Commissions Act of 2006.
- It is critically important that the United States ensure that alien unlawful enemy combatants face justice under procedures and rules of evidence that promote respect for the rule of law, and draw a stark and compelling distinction between societies that afford judicial rights and procedural safeguards to even the worst of alleged criminals, and those bent on terrorism who intentionally target the innocent and defenseless in violation of all normative rules of decency, honor, and respect for humanity.

### Manual for Military Commissions

- Implements the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), in which the Congress and President, acting together, established the most comprehensive legal framework for the prosecution of war criminals in U.S. history.
- Under the MCA, the Secretary of Defense is authorized, in consultation with the Attorney General of the United States, to prescribe rules of procedure and evidence for military commissions.
- Under the MCA, the Secretary's rules and procedures apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence used in general courts-martial, with only those exceptions required to be:
  - practicable and consistent with military and intelligence activities, and
  - consistent with the terms of the MCA itself.

- The new Manual for Military Commissions closely follows, both in organization and substance, the Manual for Courts-Martial, which is prescribed by the President under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
- Principally military judge advocates and attorneys from the Departments of Defense and Justice, using the Manual for Courts-Martial as a guide, undertook the drafting of the new Manual. Drafts were then coordinated with other relevant agencies to ensure that specific rules and procedures reflect the careful consideration of our nation's intelligence activities, as called for in the MCA.
- The Manual should be considered in its entirety, for it is a comprehensive legal document that will ensure that alleged war criminals, including those who were allegedly responsible for the attacks on 9-11, receive full and fair trials.
- The Manual provides:
  - Discretion and deference to independent military judges who will serve as presiding officials and ensure fairness.
  - An independent defense function to zealously represent defendants and protect against even the appearance of influence or conflict of interest.
  - The presumption of innocence and requirement for the prosecution to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
  - A jury system comparable to that used in general courts-martial.
  - Requirement that the accused be provided, in advance, evidence to be introduced against him or her at trial.
  - Prohibition against admitting classified evidence outside the presence of the accused.
  - A reasonable opportunity for the accused to obtain evidence and witnesses.
  - Formal rules of evidence, consistent with federal and courts-martial practice, with only those exceptions required to be consistent with the MCA itself.
    - Among other things, this will ensure that an accused is not convicted based on hearsay evidence unless the judge determines that the evidence is reliable and that the accused has been given a reasonable opportunity to confront the evidence.
  - Safeguards to protect the rights of confrontation, protection from self-incrimination, and most common law evidentiary privileges.
  - An exclusionary rule allowing the judge to suppress statements obtained by torture or in violation of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.
  - A requirement for the prosecution to provide exculpatory evidence to an accused consistent with federal and courts-martial practice.
  - Requirement for a unanimous verdict by 12 members in capital cases.
  - A thorough, comprehensive, and independent appellate system. An accused will have access to the Court of Military Commission Review, the

Circuit Court for the District of Columbia, and the Supreme Court of the United States.

The way ahead

- We will work closely with Congress to meet both the requirements and spirit of the Military Commissions Act, which clearly includes an important oversight role for the Congress.
- Government counsel will carefully review evidence and make case assessments under the rules of procedure and evidence provided for in the Manual. Upon their recommendations, a new Convening Authority will make decisions on whether to refer for trial before military commissions, individuals now held at Guantanamo Bay Cuba, including the 14 high value detainees transferred to Guantanamo Bay last year.



## Military Commissions Rules Q&A

Jan. 16, 2007

Q. Wasn't the Military Commissions Act already signed by the President? What is this new announcement?

The Military Commissions Act of 2006 authorized the Secretary of Defense to promulgate rules implementing the Act. These **robust rules** provide more **comprehensive trial guidelines** on exactly how to conduct a trial by military commission, how evidence will be introduced at trial, and spell out the elements of the crimes punishable by military commission. These **extensive, comprehensive rules** were developed through the **interagency process** to ensure **full and fair trials**.

Military commissions provide a forum for captured terrorists to **face justice**. These rules provide **comprehensive guidance** for the government in prosecuting captured terrorists for war crimes.

Q. Where are the rules? What do they look like?

The rules and procedures for these war crimes trials are made up of three separate sections: The Rules for Military Commissions, the Military Commission Rules of Evidence, and the Crimes and Elements. The Rules for Military Commissions set forth the procedural rules for Military Commissions. The Military Commission Rules of Evidence provide evidentiary rules to govern the admissibility of evidence at trial. The Crimes and Elements section lays out the crimes punishable by Military Commission and the elements of those crimes.

Q. Why were the rules submitted to Congress? Does Congress have to approve them now?

The MCA states in section 950w that not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of the MCA, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report setting forth the procedures for military commissions. The President signed the Military Commissions Act on 17 October 2006, so a copy of the rules was submitted to Congress on January 15<sup>th</sup> in accordance with the requirement in the MCA.

The rules have been signed by the Secretary of Defense and are effective upon his signature. These rules provide **comprehensive guidance** for the government in prosecuting captured terrorists for war crimes.

The way that these new Military Commissions rules implement the provisions of the MCA is similar to the way that the Military Rules of Evidence and Rules for Courts-Martial implement the statutory provisions of the UCMJ.

Q. How are these rules different from the old rules under the PMO?

These promulgating rules are consistent with the Military Commissions Act of 2006, which requires significantly more **procedural protections (rights?)** for the accused. For example, the accused may now **represent himself** (pro se representation), and the accused **may not be excluded** from the proceedings. In addition, a consensus of **12 members is required for the death penalty**. The appellate procedures are significantly expanded as well. Appellate review of each case will be by a **Court of Military Commission Review**, with subsequent review by the **U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit**. Ultimately, cases may be heard by the **Supreme Court of the United States**.

Q. Would you try a U.S. Soldier under these same rules?

These new rules provide **extensive expanded protections** for the accused. For a war-time trial during an ongoing conflict, these rules are an unprecedented expansion of **procedural protections** for the accused.

Q. Were the TJAGs consulted in this process? How? Do they fully support these rules?

These rules were developed throughout an exhaustive interagency process. The service TJAGs are a part of that process. The deliberative process always involves intense debate and deliberation over such important matters involving the administration of justice and preserving national security.

Q: Can an accused represent himself?

Yes. The Military Commission Procedures allow pro se representation. This is a significant change from the former procedures. In addition, the new rules provide that the accused may not be excluded from the proceedings, 12 members are required in a death penalty case, and the appellate procedures include review by a Court of Military Commission Review and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.

Q: Why not bring the detainees to the US for their Military Commissions?

It is imperative that we create a safe and secure environment for the accused and all parties involved while at the same time protecting classified and sensitive information. In addition, bringing detainees to the US would result in a change in their legal status such that they may no longer be eligible for a military commission based on the way the law is written. The risk of legal complications outweighs any benefit to bringing the detainees to the US for military commissions.

Q. Is there still an RTB process?

The Military Commissions Act of 2006 no longer requires the process under the former procedures known as the RTB or Presidential "Reason to Believe."

Q. Do these rules prohibit the military commission from waiting for the appeal of a CSRT before commencing with trial by military commission? Could a detainee be tried, convicted, and possibly executed before the appellate courts review his CSRT determination?

The MCA provides that detainees may appeal their enemy combatant determination through the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. This appeal, however, is limited to an administrative review for procedural defects or factual insufficiency.

Q. Members of Congress have said that the MCA requires procedures similar to military courts-martial. The MCA itself requires the SecDef's rules to follow the principles of law and rules of evidence of courts-martial unless impracticable or inconsistent with military or intelligence activities. If courts-martial rules are omitted, are they impracticable?

The U.S. continues to wage the war against terror. The MCA authorized the SecDef to derogate from the rules for courts-martial in order to protect military or intelligence activities.

Q. The rules follow the MCA by providing a very wide hearsay exception for both sides but only the accused can be forced to testify if he uses the rule. Why can't the defense force the government to provide their hearsay declarants for testimony?

These rules take into account the very nature of these trials as **war crimes trials** under the **law of war**, not domestic criminal trials. Procedures and rules are adapted to accommodate both the presentation of evidence and the preservation of **national security**.

Q. Why do these rules appear to favor the government?

These rules take into account the very nature of these trials as **war crimes trials** under the **law of war**, not **domestic criminal trials**. Procedures and rules are adapted to accommodate both the presentation of evidence and the preservation of **national security**.

Q. Can the prosecutor now file charges?

These rules provide **extensive, comprehensive guidance** for the conduct of trials by military commission. The crimes triable by military commission are enumerated, along with the elements of each of those crimes. The prosecution will most likely need to review the elements of the offenses in light of the evidence against the accused and determine which specific charges are appropriate.

Q. How soon will you have charges against the detainees? Who will you charge first?

The prosecution is also just now seeing these rules and procedures for the first time. The prosecution needs time to review and understand the rules, and examine how the rules require charges to be brought forward. The rules lay out the elements of each crime, and the prosecution must be prepared to charge offenses appropriately.

Q. After charges are brought, when will the trials actually begin?

The chief prosecutor has stated that the first detainees to be tried will likely be the ones whose trials were previously in the preliminary hearings phase. Once charges are brought against the detainees, the Military Judges will control the trial schedule.

While there is no specific timeline for the Military Commissions, the Department will announce trial terms as they are finalized. To date, no decisions have been made about the order in which individual detainees will be tried or about the timing of any individual detainee's commission.

Q. Who is the current Convening Authority? Didn't Mr. Altenburg quit?

Mr. Altenburg submitted his resignation on 27 October and his last duty date was 10 November. The original plan for him was to remain 12-18 months to establish the system and refer initial cases to trial. He stayed much longer than that - 32 months - and was committed and dedicated to his job as the Appointing Authority. General Altenburg took a leave of absence from his civilian law firm to devote his efforts full time to the Military Commissions.

Currently there is no replacement for Mr. Altenburg. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is the appropriate contact for any further information on the position.

Q: How do commissions compare to federal courts?

Many of the same principles apply. For example: presumption of innocence, proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, representation by counsel. Certain rules provide greater flexibility to account for the wartime scenario: greater protection of classified and other sensitive information, greater flexibility in location, and panels with greater education and subject matter expertise than the average jury.

Q: How is a Military Commission expected to hear a case impartially, when the accused has already been designated as an enemy combatant - that he is or was a member of al Qaeda or the Taliban; engaged in hostilities against the U.S. or materially supported hostilities against the U.S.?

The CSRT's "enemy combatant" designation is an administrative determination made to determine whether continued detention is appropriate. The military commission process is separate and distinct from the CSRT process. There is no reason to believe that

Military Commission panel members, (commissioned officers who know how to follow an order), will not follow their oaths to presume the accused innocent until proven guilty.

Q: Why do Commissions need more flexible rules of trials than normal courts?

Military Commissions will adjudge cases that arise from a very different set of circumstances than most trials. The fluid and extremely dangerous battlefield environment does not lend itself well to search warrants. Similarly, it may be difficult for an Accused to secure direct testimony from distant locations. More flexible rules will allow for fuller and fairer trials.

Q: Are the procedures consistent with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)?

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is a human rights instrument drafted primarily for a peacetime scenario. The applicable body of law for military commissions is the international law of war. Nevertheless, military commission procedures are consistent with American notions of fairness and due process. In this regard, you will find they are consistent with the principles of the ICCPR.

Q: Are the procedures consistent with Protocol I, Article 75?

The United States is not party to Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Nevertheless, the norms found in article 75 of that Protocol are consistent with American notions of fairness and due process. You will find that the military commission procedures are consistent with the principles found in Article 75 of Protocol I.

Q: Is this list of elements of offenses triable by military commissions is new?

Publication of the Crimes & Elements does not equate to creating new law. Law of War and Law of Armed Conflict violations have long been recognized by customary international law and the elements of those crimes already exist in international law. Those elements are articulated in various treaties, operational manuals and judicial opinions. Publication of the Crimes & Elements merely provides the Military Commissions with the elements of proof for these well-established offenses.

Q: Doesn't publication of such elements after the acts were committed violate the ex post facto clause of the Constitution?

Ex post facto concerns will not be implicated, because the crimes and elements correspond to well-established offenses.

Q: When will the accused detainees get notice of these elements by which they will be judged?

They should have notice already. These are not new crimes. In a more concrete way, the accused will be provided elements sufficiently in advance of trial so that he can prepare a defense.

Q: Why does the Convening Authority get to decide who will be prosecutors and panel members?

The Secretary of Defense has not yet designated a new Convening Authority. The rules permit him to do so and also to outline the role of the Convening Authority. In essence, the Convening Authority would be the responsible official for the whole military commission system. Of course, he or she would appoint the members of the panel, as well as the prosecutors. This does not significantly differ from the statutory formula for courts-martial, however. A very similar organizational structure is used in the military justice system. Of course, as the ultimate arbiter for much of the military commission system, the Convening Authority will be neutral as to the outcome of any particular case. In fact, one of the UCMJ articles that specifically applies to military commissions prohibits any attempts to coerce or improperly influence the proceedings.

Q: The procedures indicate hearsay will be admissible. Doesn't that violate the "full and fair" requirement?

No, it does not. There is nothing inherently improper about admitting hearsay. Most nations and international courts admit hearsay—as do U.S. courts in certain circumstances. There is no reason military commissions should have stricter rules.

Most nations of the world, as well as international courts, admit hearsay. We use it in our daily lives. If a friend says to you as you are leaving today, "I heard that it's raining outside," that is hearsay. Still, unless you have reason to doubt your friend, you would probably grab an umbrella, or at least look out the window before you leave the building. In the same way, these regulations trust the fact-finders to weigh the evidence presented to them. A compelling document or photograph should not be excluded from a trial merely because its chain-of-custody has been broken. This rule, of course, is neutral: there is no doubt that a military commission may examine and evaluate much evidence that would be kept from a jury in a criminal trial. The rule allowing hearsay is not limited to prosecution evidence, however; exculpatory statements relayed by a third party could be admitted on behalf of an Accused.

Q: Do the rules allow the accused to request witnesses and produce evidence? Isn't this a meaningless right considering that the witnesses and evidence the defense will need produced are most likely in Afghanistan or another country not subject to military commission subpoena power?

The accused may have difficulty obtaining evidence and compelling testimony from witnesses who are located in Afghanistan, but this problem is not unique to military commissions. The accused would have similar difficulty even if tried in a federal court in the United States. Under the military commission rules and procedures, a military commission's power to summon witnesses, seek production of evidence, and to designate a special master to take evidence can be exercised on its own initiative or at the request of the prosecution or defense. These rules are intended to provide a basic structure and basic procedural and evidentiary rules. They are not intended to address every issue that may arise in each military commission. Under the rules, individual military commissions will have the authority to address evidentiary issues on both sides as they arise.

Q: How can the United States be against the International Criminal Court (ICC), yet in favor of having trials for war crimes? Aren't these positions inconsistent?

To the contrary, United States policy with respect to military commissions is completely consistent with our position regarding the ICC. United States criticism of the ICC is, and always has been with the jurisdictional regime established by the Rome treaty—a jurisdictional regime that encourages political manipulation. Conversely, no one can realistically question the jurisdiction of United States forces over offenses against United States citizens and United States interests, and perhaps even on United States territory.

(b)(6)

**From:** Paul Valley [valley@(b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 17, 2007 9:54 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) OSD PA  
**Cc:** Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA  
**Subject:** RE: Conference call tomorrow

I will be on!!!! Need to talk to Dallas also regarding the Presentation of the Fallen Heroes Statue to Mr. Gates in March. C

-----  
Osprey Media  
Paul E Valley  
Fox Military Analyst/Radio Host "Stand Up America"  
valley@(b)(6)  
tel: (b)(6)  
tel2 (b)(6)  
fax: 406 837 0996  
www.ospreymedia.us  
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----- Original Message -----  
**From:** (b)(6) OSD PA [mailto:(b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, January 16, 2007 5:54 PM  
**Subject:** Conference call tomorrow

MEMORANDUM

**To:** Retired Military Analysts

**From:** (b)(6)  
Public Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense

**Date:** January 16, 2007

**Re:** Conference Call with Senior DoD Officials

We invite you to participate in a conference call, TOMORROW, January 17, 2006, from 4:00-4:30 p.m.

Lieutenant General Douglas Lute, Director of Operations for the Joint Staff, will brief you on the execution of the new Iraq strategy. For your



convenience, his Biography can be found at:  
[http://www.jcs.mil/bios/bio\\_lute.html](http://www.jcs.mil/bios/bio_lute.html)  
<[http://www.jcs.mil/bios/bio\\_lute.html](http://www.jcs.mil/bios/bio_lute.html)> . This call will be On Background.

To participate in this conference call, please dial (b)(2)  
(b)(2) and ask the operator to connect you to the Analysts conference  
call.

Please R.S.V.P. to (b)(6) at (b)(6)  
<mailto:(b)(6)> or call her at (b)(2)

We hope you are able to participate.

(b)(6)

Public Affairs

Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OSD PA  
Sent: Tuesday, January 16, 2007 12:18 PM  
To: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA  
Cc: (b)(6) CTR OSD PA; (b)(6) Maj OSD PA  
Subject: FW: Pentagon Channel Interview with LTG Lute

hi. (b)(6) tells me your schedule is free at 1600 tomorrow. would it be ok with you if we use your office for a mil analyst call re. iraq strategy with general lute??

thanks

(b)(6)

p.s. still waiting to see how mg caldwell's schedule shakes out on thurs. morning. we have him tentatively on your schedule at 0800 re. why we serve, but may or may not work with morning meeting... and he wants to meet with dorrance, which may or may not work. i've let his pao know the challenge...

-----  
From: (b)(6) Lt Col, OCJCS/PA  
Sent: Tuesday, January 16, 2007 10:03 AM  
To: (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA  
Cc: News Desk/Pentagon Channel; (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/NEWS; (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/AFRTS-D; (b)(6) OSD PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) C. LTC OCJCS/PA  
Subject: RE: Pentagon Channel Interview with LTG Lute

(b)(6) here's what I've been able to schedule on LTG Lute's calendar:

Tomorrow, Wed, 17 Jan:  
1530-1600 -- Pentagon Channel Interview  
1600-1630 -- Military Analyst Call

I'll escort him down to the small studio for the interview and then to Ms Barber's office for the telecon.

I'm assuming his Army ACU is OK for the uniform? He prefers this uniform.

Please let me know right away if this will work or not. Thanks!

vr, (b)(6)

----- Original Message -----

From: (b)(6) [Stone, Paul, CIV, OASD-PA]  
Sent: Thursday, January 11, 2007 12:50 PM  
To: (b)(6) Lt Col, OCJCS/PA  
Cc: Channel, News Desk/Pentagon@pentagonchannel.mil [News Desk/Pentagon Channel]; (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/NEWS; (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/AFRTS-D; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA  
Subject: Pentagon Channel Interview with LTG Lute

LTC (b)(6) - please accept this e-mail as a formal request for a Pentagon Channel interview early next week with LTG Lute on the new deployments and surge in Iraq. Although the news is already out there, given the enormous changes and the number of people they will impact, we believe that more is better when it comes to our senior leaders talking directly to the troops. Please advise on the general's willingness to do the interview and his availability. Let me know if you need additional information prior to advancing this request, and thanks for your help.

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) OSD PA  
**Sent:** Tuesday, January 16, 2007 8:03 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA; (b)(6) OSD PA  
**Cc:** Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA; Whitman, Bryan Mr OSD PA; Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) CTR OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) CTR OSD PA; (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/Web Operations; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) Merritt, Roxie, AFIS-HQ; (b)(6) CTR OSD PA; (b)(6) CTR OSD PA; (b)(6) Mr OSD PA; (b)(6) CTR OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) CTR OSD PA  
**Subject:** unused items of interest

LA Times -- editorial on DASD Stimson criticism of Gitmo lawyers  
 Chicago Tribune -- editorial calls for end to "don't ask, don't tell" policy  
 Defense News -- editorial says SECDEF needs to think ahead on Pentagon budget  
 National Review -- cover story by Bing West on Iraq strategy ("Do Or Die In Iraq")

Los Angeles Times  
 January 16, 2007

**Sliming The Defense**

A Pentagon official's overboard criticism of Gitmo lawyers is consistent with one bad strain of White House thought.

The Pentagon has disavowed some offensive criticism by one of its officials regarding American lawyers who have represented accused terrorists imprisoned at the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. But the crankish comments of Charles "Cully" Stimson, the deputy assistant secretary of Defense for detainee affairs, reflect a more pervasive reluctance by the Bush administration to acknowledge that injustices have occurred at Guantanamo.

Sounding more like a first-time caller than a government official, Stimson told a radio interviewer last week that "when corporate CEOs see that those firms are representing the very terrorists who hit their bottom line back in 2001, those CEOs are going to make those law firms choose between representing terrorists or representing reputable firms." Not content to float the idea of a boycott, Stimson, a lawyer too, speculated darkly that although some attorneys representing detainees may be doing so as a public service, "others are receiving monies from who knows where, and I'd be curious to have them explain that." In an earlier period in U.S. history, that sort of hit-and-run insinuation was called McCarthyism.

Amid condemnation of Stimson's remarks from the legal profession, a Pentagon spokesman said they "do not represent the views of the Department of Defense or the thinking of its leadership." (Apparently a deputy assistant secretary is not part of the leadership.) For good measure, Atty. Gen. Alberto R. Gonzales said that "good lawyers representing the detainees is the best way to ensure that justice is done in these cases."

But contradicting Stimson - or, even better, firing him - can't alter the fact that his comments in one sense reflect the administration's attitude. Stimson referred not to "accused terrorists" or "suspected terrorists" but to "terrorists." From President Bush on down, the administration has downplayed the possibility that some of the more than 700 people who have been confined at Guantanamo were imprisoned unjustly (not to mention treated inhumanely). Never mind that about half of the original detainees have been released.

Before the U.S. Supreme Court ruled otherwise, the administration insisted that detainees at Guantanamo had no right to challenge their confinement in a U.S. court. The administration devised its own rules for military commissions to try them for alleged war crimes, until the high court ruled that Congress had to be involved. (Even then, the administration was able to convince Congress that detainees shouldn't be allowed to file habeas corpus petitions.)

These policies bespoke an exaggerated understanding of executive power, even in wartime, but they also reflected a certitude bordering on smugness that has characterized too much of the administration's conduct of the war on terror.

Many of the lawyers involved in detainee issues on a pro bono basis are motivated by loyalty to the Constitution, which the administration has sometimes appeared eager to overlook. Advocacy on behalf of due process is a form of patriotism and public service. Criminal prosecutors aren't usually in the business of tarnishing defense attorneys, for good reason, and it's important that the government maintain the same professionalism when prosecuting the war on terror.

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Chicago Tribune  
January 15, 2007

Time To Tell

For President Bush and others who would like to ramp up the size of the U.S. armed forces, this step is a no-brainer: Get rid of the "don't ask, don't tell" policy, which has cost the country more than 11,000 military personnel in the last 14 years.

Last year, 742 men and women who had signed up to serve their country were kicked out for being gay. Besides the money it costs to replace and retrain gay personnel who are discharged--a 2005 Government Accountability Office report put that figure at \$191 million since the policy began--"don't ask, don't tell" robs the armed forces of untold numbers of qualified candidates who never enlist.

Such a policy makes zero sense in times of peace and less than zero when the country is at war. Several U.S. House members have made clear their intention to revisit "don't ask, don't tell" this session.

John M. Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1993 to 1997, said in a recent New York Times piece that while he supported the policy in 1993, the time may be right to reconsider.

"Don't ask, don't tell" was a compromise forged in 1993, after President Bill Clinton learned the hard way that the country wasn't ready to lift the longstanding ban on gays in the armed forces. The military mindset at the time was that allowing openly gay troops would compromise combat readiness by lowering morale, recruitment and unit cohesion. The policy, Shalikashvili wrote, was "a useful speed bump that allowed temperatures to cool for a period of time while the culture continued to evolve."

Under the compromise, gays are allowed to serve in the military as long as they keep quiet about their sexual orientation. At that point, apparently, the culture's attitude toward gays had evolved only from "Uncle Sam doesn't want you" to "Uncle Sam doesn't want to know."

Happily, we have evolved further. Last month, a Zogby poll of service members returning from Iraq and Afghanistan found that 73 percent said they were comfortable serving alongside gays; 23 percent said they knew for sure there was at least one gay person in their unit. A Gallup poll in 2004 found that 63 percent of Americans favored letting gays serve in the military; the same year, the Urban Institute estimated 65,000 already were. The 24

countries that allow gays to serve have had few problems integrating their armies. Last year, Britain's Royal Navy began a drive to recruit gays.

Mindful of the 1993 backlash--and of the fact that they probably don't have the votes--those who favor repeal are in go-slow mode. Though she is among more than 120 members of Congress who signed onto such a bill last year, Speaker Nancy Pelosi says the House has more pressing national security needs at the moment. In his op-ed piece, Shalikhvili called for a "measured, prudent approach to change." But it would be a mistake to put off hearing the issue.

Most measures that could be taken to add more troops would take several years to make a difference. By that time it's not at all clear we'll need them. But eliminating "don't ask, don't tell" would have an impact right away. And it would remove, finally, the cruel and unfair burden placed on gay patriots who are forced to lie about who they are for the privilege of serving their country.

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Defense News  
January 15, 2007  
Pg. 20

#### Think Ahead

Now that the White House is backing a larger U.S. Army and Marine Corps, the question is whether the nation really needs 92,000 more troops - roughly the size of the entire British Army.

Since the end of the Cold War, ground forces advocates have argued against Pentagon transformation theorists who stressed capital-intensive systems at the expense of Army and Marine units. Their calls for additional forces have become more urgent with 150,000 troops garrisoned in Iraq and Kuwait, and another 20,000 in Afghanistan.

The need to post so many people in nations coming unglued by civil war for so long threatens to break post-Cold War Army and Marine people and equipment.

But opponents of permanent troop increases fear that by the time these new soldiers and Marines are recruited, trained and deployed, they may no longer be needed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Adding 10,000 troops requires more than \$1 billion per year, money that is likely to come at the expense of modernization.

Once DoD goes back to a real budget - a day many suspect will come immediately after the 2008 presidential election - it will be stuck with too many people, too much broken equipment and too much planned spending. Strategists say real defense spending will decline as government entitlement costs spike, starting in 2010 with the retirement of the baby boomers.

No matter what happens to troop levels in Iraq in the next few years, U.S. forces will long remain engaged in the region, and absent more troops, it won't have the capacity to fight elsewhere, such as Somalia.

So if you're going to increase the number of people in uniform, then you have to make sure that they are equipped to do the job. When the cuts start, as they did after the Cold War, either procurement or people have to give. In the early 1990s, the Army traded modernization spending to preserve force structure, and in the end hurt itself by losing both people and programs.

That's why it's going to take a great deal of forethought to make sure that when the inevitable cuts do come, the damage is eased. Emergency wartime purchases of legacy equipment could force rethinking of future modernization efforts. For example, to better protect forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, there has been a mad rush to field better armored vehicles, but the

helter-skelter approach - while good for testing and learning - threatens a logistical nightmare as so many different types of military gear remain in service for decades.

Wartime creates challenges, but also opportunities to change. Every organization reflexively wants to be bigger, and that is especially true of the U.S. Army. The service is using its high profile in Iraq to get more of the Pentagon budget, but not thinking long term.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates must resist that urge. He must think strategically and assess the likelihood that the nation can and will support a costly buildup, reset today's degraded equipment and adequately modernize - simultaneously. No one service is superior to another, in this or any other war. The Army can't fight, move, talk or see without the Air Force and Navy. Without the Army, all the naval and air power in the world are useless.

Gates also must realize that the days of endless budgets won't last forever. It's better to have a smaller, well-armed and trained force that is the product of strategic thought than a larger, poorly equipped one that is born of tactical expediency.

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National Review  
January 29, 2007  
Pg. 32

#### Do Or Die In Iraq

Where we've been; where we should go

By Bing West

It is difficult to determine precisely what is new about President Bush's new strategy toward Iraq. Exhortations about lowering unemployment, sharing oil revenues, and reconciling with the Sunnis are already part of the strategic repertoire of Gen. George W. Casey Jr., who is being replaced as commander of coalition forces in Iraq.

What are the additional American soldiers expected to do? Increasing their numbers is a temporary input. Every surge ebbs. Keeping U.S. forces in very large numbers in Iraq is an approach that probably can't be sustained for longer than a year. We are simply running out of time in Iraq, because the American public has already seen our soldiers dying for almost four years, without progress. Economic incentives, meanwhile, of the kind that alter people's perceptions and draw support away from the insurgents, require multiyear persistence. Political reconciliation requires refractory Iraqi politicians to reach reasonable compromise - again, a multiyear task.

Strategy in Washington is only tenuously connected to the realities of the violence in Iraq. The U.S. manages crises from the top down: The White House, the diplomats, and the generals seek to motivate Iraq's political leaders, who will presumably cajole the shadowy leaders of the Sunni insurgency and the Shiite militias. This is the model of the Washington policymaker: Power speaks to power, based on rank. Our best and brightest will craft a strategy calculated to persuade Nouri al-Maliki, the prime minister of Iraq, who putatively influences those below him.

The insurgents and the death squads, on the other hand, have no such hierarchical pyramid. An insurgency grows from the bottom up. A guerrilla who doesn't know his neighborhood stands out as though he were wearing a uniform. Indeed, if the insurgents did wear uniforms, the war would be over in a week. A few years ago, when Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi bumped into a checkpoint near Ramadi, he asked his driver what tribe controlled the area. He then leaped from his car and escaped via a local contact. Only later did our intelligence cells in Baghdad learn what had happened in that

remote city. Insurgent militias survive by putting down local roots.

To put it bluntly, the philosophical convictions of 60-year-old executives have no point of contact with the tribal nihilism of the 20-year-old killers embedded like ticks in local villages and city neighborhoods. The latter don't give a tinker's damn what the Gucci politicians cluck about in Baghdad. Maliki, coddled in the Green Zone, is a party politician installed by American force of arms. Unlike our Founding Fathers, he and his ilk were handed a democracy they did not fight to establish. The streets outside the Green Zone are controlled by their enemies: killers whose souls have been corroded, and who will continue to murder, because that's what they do. They're not going to be won over by jobs cleaning streets or promises of oil-revenue sharing. Like the mafia, they have tasted power and they're not giving it back. They have to be put down, in jail or in the earth.

That's the role of our soldiers. They're the ones out on the streets. Putting aside the economics and the politics, what is "new" about what they will be told to do? The starting point is to examine where we stand today, and how we got there.

#### THE MAKING OF A MESS

Our military troubles began in May 2003, when Gen. Tommy Franks, the overall commander in the region, applauded the president's decision to fire Franks's deputy in Iraq, Lt. Gen. Jay Garner, and to appoint L. Paul Bremer to administer Iraq in his stead. The White House gave Bremer control over the mission, structure, and budget for Iraqi security forces, while Central Command remained responsible for security until the Iraqis were ready to take over. Thus President Bush, cheered on by General Franks, abolished the core principle of unity of command in war. Bremer brusquely dissolved the Iraqi army, dismissed most Baathist officials, and antagonized both the Iraqis and the U.S. military at all levels.

In July 2003, Gen. John Abizaid, who had taken over regional command after Franks retired, declared that Iraq was in the throes of an insurgency. But Abizaid permitted his deputy in Iraq, Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, to persist with offensive operations that alienated the population and contradicted the basic tenets of counterinsurgency.

Iraq boiled over in April 2004. The president, angered by the horrific pictures of the lynching of four American contractors in Fallujah, ordered the Marines, against their advice, to assault the city. At the same time, Bremer moved to arrest a deputy to the radical Moqtada al-Sadr, who then told his Mahdi Army militia to rebel. Thus the Americans ended up fighting both Sunnis and Shiites.

Several days later, faced with adverse Iraqi political actions, Bremer and Abizaid reversed course. President Bush ordered the astounded Marines to stop, when they were just two days from concluding the battle. When Sadr was trapped in mid-April, the American civilian and military commands could not bring themselves to order him either killed or captured. By the end of April, the Iraqis believed the Americans had lost decisive battles against both the Sunni insurgents and the Shiite radicals.

That was the moment for the president to review the performances of the generals and a military strategy that was in disarray. It didn't happen, because the abuses of Abu Ghraib seized everyone's attention.

In July 2004, after Sanchez had been allowed to operate out of his depth for over a year, Army Gen. George Casey took over. Casey worked collegially first with Ambassador John Negroponte, then with Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, and directed a counterinsurgency campaign aimed at clearing and holding key cities, while training an Iraqi army. After wresting control of the police from an incompetent U.S. State Department jealous of its bureaucratic turf, the U.S. military intended to train the wretched Iraqi police by 2006. The effort would be three years too late, but better late than never. Casey envisioned withdrawing U.S. forces in late 2007, as Iraqi

forces took over.

That plan was shattered by the cumulative effect of years of mass slaughter of Shiites by Sunni killers. Because the U.S. had not trained and controlled the police and had not removed Sadr before, the Shiite community in Baghdad was dominated by gangs that retaliated by killing and driving out Sunnis. Prime Minister Maliki responded by shielding Sadr and his deputies from arrest by American forces. The U.S. was caught in the worst of worlds: Shiites believed the Americans were aiding the Sunnis, while the Sunni insurgents were killing Americans.

At the end of 2006, the Sunni insurgency was still raging, no insurgent groups had agreed to stop fighting, Sunni insurgents were blowing up innocents in Baghdad, and Shiite death squads were retaliating with a slow but steady ethnic cleansing. The Iraqi army at the battalion level, with American advisers, was progressing, but the ministries in Baghdad were unresponsive. The police in the Sunni Triangle were intimidated, while those in Baghdad were penetrated by the militias and untrustworthy.

General Casey's strategy was based on "standing up" a professional Iraqi army while persuading the Shiite politicians to disarm the Shiite militias and reconcile with the Sunnis. The problem wasn't that the Iraqis couldn't provide better security; it was that they wouldn't. "The longer we in the U.S. forces continue to bear the main burden of Iraq's security, it lengthens the time that the government of Iraq has to take the hard decisions about reconciliation and dealing with the militias," the New York Times quoted Casey as saying. "And the other thing is that they can continue to blame us for all of Iraq's problems." Casey's straightforward assessment was similar to that of the Iraq Study Group: He identified senior Iraqi sectarian leaders as the main impediment.

#### THE BUSH PLAN

Politically, after the defeat in the midterm elections, the president had to take action perceived as drastic. Shifting personnel - Rumsfeld, Abizaid, Casey, and Khalilzad - brought some respite, while requesting more money and sending in more troops signaled resolve. But what was the new strategy?

On the surface, it seemed a rebuke of Casey's approach: American soldiers would now do more of the heavy lifting while requiring little of the Iraqi government. The focus would be on Baghdad and its 7 million residents. The political component sought to reassure Maliki and shore up support for him in the National Assembly, while decreasing Sadr's power. Presumably Maliki would then use force against Sadr's militia, while the assembly proffered reconciliation and amnesty terms acceptable to the Sunni "honorable resistance," leaving extremists like al-Qaeda in Iraq isolated.

There were two holes in the strategy. First, we didn't control the strategy; Maliki and other Iraqi politicians did. The president's effort to impose a Western-style democracy depended on a political elite that had proven feckless. His old-new strategy left the U.S. hostage to Maliki, a middling politician. General Abizaid told Congress that by April at the latest, Maliki "will take on the militias" and lead his armed forces. But so far, Maliki has protected Sadr and neglected his own army. The president has been giving Maliki extraordinary reassurances and support, and Maliki may end up seeing the light. In any case, it's a fair bet that by April violence in Baghdad will markedly decrease, owing to the determination of American soldiers.

The second hole in the strategy was a neglect of the practicalities of war. Counterinsurgency manuals stress that the proper path to quelling an insurgency is to remove the defects that caused the rebellion and bring security to the people. This approach appeals to American moral instincts: If someone rebels, he must have a reason that can reasonably be addressed. In the Iraq case, on this view, the essential defect in 2003 was proclaiming a democracy that shifted power from Saddam's Baathists to the Shiites. Rescind that power, and the Sunnis will stop killing Americans and Shiites.



Clearly, that's absurd. Yet it has become American military mantra to assert that countering an insurgency is "80 percent non-kinetic" - in other words, what it requires is robust employment, free electric power, decent governance, and political reconciliation. In reality, though, the argument that, e.g., increasing employment will decrease support for the insurgency is based more on hope than on experience. In any case, it is an appropriate task not for the U.S. military, but for the civilian agencies that never showed up in Iraq. As long as our troops are in places like Ramadi and Haditha, they will be seen as the infidels who destroyed houses, killed Sunnis, and handed power to the Shiites. The brave Iraqis who learned pidgin English watching soaps on television and serve as our interpreters consistently say they are outcasts - unable to trust Iraqi soldiers, police, or neighbors, scorned because they are assisting Americans.

Although our generals say they do not want a "Shiite occupying army" inside the Sunni Triangle, that is what exists today and will not be much changed in a year. Yes, the number of Sunni soldiers and police is increasing and some Sunni tribes are moving away from al-Qaeda. But for the next several years, the majority of Iraqi soldiers in the Sunni Triangle will be Shiite, and most Sunnis will resent their presence. Winning hearts and minds takes decades, even centuries. The Catholics in Northern Ireland resented the presence of British soldiers over the decades, regardless of placatory words from Whitehall. Union troops occupied the American South from 1865 to 1877, and ushering in racial equality took another century.

In Iraq, the time for the counterinsurgency strategy of "clear, hold, and build" has passed. We are not going to stay in Baghdad and a dozen Sunni cities for four more years in order to build sound economies and governing councils. The U.S. military cannot convert the insurgents or win the allegiance of the Sunni population, no matter how nice we are. As long as we are there, we will be attacked.

Our strategy has lagged a year behind changes on the battlefield. In 2003, we charged to Baghdad, employing fire and maneuver. We persisted with that conventional approach until 2005, giving the insurgency 18 months to grow. Then, too late, we changed to counterinsurgency. The mission was not to destroy the enemy, but instead to secure and win over the Sunni population. The primary mission of Casey's subsequent strategy has been to train and advise the Iraqi security forces that will hold the Sunni cities and challenge the Shiite militias. This would require about 15,000-20,000 U.S. advisers, 20,000 more in support, and 30,000 in combat units, remaining in Iraq for years.

This last, though, reflects Casey's "old" strategy. What is the new strategy? The president is leaving that largely to the new commander, Lt. Gen. David Petraeus. American troops are to surge into Baghdad, but what are they to do there? There are two choices: defense or offense. Defense means our soldiers will patrol the streets with Iraqi soldiers, search houses, hand out money to clean away the trash, and gradually turn control over to the Iraqis (again).

The Sunni extremists responsible for the mass car bombings will persist, albeit with fewer terrorist successes. A crackdown on al-Qaeda in Iraq will require clearing thousands of square kilometers of isolated farms northeast and especially southwest of Baghdad. That will take years.

The Shiite death squads, moreover, cause more than half the deaths in Baghdad, and they are not foolhardy. They will leave Baghdad or stay in their lairs in Shiite areas, especially Sadr City. As events in early 2005 showed, a live-and-let-live de facto understanding between American forces and the Mahdi Army is indeed possible. By late summer of 2007, or earlier, Baghdad will experience less violence if American and Iraqi soldiers increase their presence. This defensive strategy has a very high chance of succeeding for at least six months after the American troops leave.

The obvious risk is that the killers will return in 2008. Our military

strategy, therefore, cannot assume that the Sunni insurgents or Shiite militias will decide to stop killing. The alternative, then, is to adopt an offensive strategy - one that seeks to kill or capture the enemy.

The Viet Cong in South Vietnam sustained huge losses because they chose to stand and fight the American units, a decision that reached its nadir in the tactically disastrous Tet offensive of 1968. In contrast, the Sunni insurgents have learned not to engage American units. Consequently, the insurgents are taking only light casualties.

A few months ago, I accompanied Marine squads on patrols in the violent Fallujah-Ramadi area. Forty grunts on their second tour estimated that they had shot a grand total of about seven insurgents. These experienced riflemen described the insurgents as "ghosts" who emplaced roadside bombs or fired a few shots and fled. American firepower was not diminishing the ranks of the Sunni insurgents, because the insurgents chose not to engage. Nor were American units engaging the Shiite militias. Put simply, we were not killing the enemy.

#### SUPPORT YOUR LOCAL POLICE

Military force can be used to identify and imprison the insurgents. But in Iraq, we aren't doing this. In Chicago and elsewhere, police carry palmtop devices that take fingerprints and send them to HQ - and in two minutes the patrolmen have a reply. If the suspect is not in the database, he is automatically entered. Our border police routinely use this system. But for some reason we have not provided such a simple system for Iraq. An insurgency cannot be quelled if the insurgents hiding among the civilians cannot be identified. The lack of an identification system, of the kind many American police forces use, is the greatest technical failure of the war.

The problem is also one of numbers. U.S. and Iraqi battalions arrest at a rate about one-eighth that of U.S. law-enforcement agencies; Iraqi police make even fewer arrests. If Iraqi police had the same arrest and imprisonment rate for violent crime as the U.S., there would be 85,000 inmates in Iraqi jails, instead of 14,000. The Iraqi court system in Baghdad imprisons 10 to 24 criminals and insurgents each week - one-twentieth the number in New York City. It is unlikely that a resident of Baghdad believes his neighbors are 20 times more law-abiding than those in New York.

In Iraq, the "rule of law" is another factor aiding the insurgency. An enemy soldier in uniform is imprisoned for the duration of the hostilities - but an insurgent in civilian clothes can kill an American soldier and, unless the evidence is airtight, walk free in a few days to kill again. Iraqi and American forces have been in the same locations for four years. They know the usual suspects. But to make more arrests, we would have to stop releasing so many detainees.

This last will be hard for the U.S. to do. Currently, the U.S. military processes every detainee through four layers of review and releases eight out of every ten. Everyone knows why this "catch and release program" persists: It's driven by an overreaction to the abuses at Abu Ghraib in 2003. But the Iraqi security forces cannot win if the insurgents cannot be identified, arrested, and imprisoned for the long haul. If current arrest and imprisonment rates persist under the "new" strategy, the American effort in Iraq is in deep peril.

#### THE SOLDIERS' STORY

It's also essential that we use our troops more wisely. American troops in American battalions are less vital than American troops in Iraqi battalions. We have now about 4,000 advisers in the Iraqi forces; a better number is closer to 20,000. They do not have to be of the caliber of our Army Special Forces. The Marines in Vietnam successfully inserted rifle squads into villages to form Combined Action Platoons with local forces. Many more advisers are needed to go out on patrol with the Iraqis, and to extract resources for the Iraqi troops from the sclerotic ministries in Baghdad.

In return for our assistance, we must demand joint U.S.-Iraqi boards that appoint Iraqis to key police and military positions and remove officers for malfeasance. Maliki is pushing for full control over the Iraqi army by the summer. To grant him that would be a huge mistake: He hasn't earned it. The ministries in Baghdad have been unable to support their own forces. If a Shiite government could do what it pleased with the Iraqi army, we would lose all leverage. For sectarian interests to pack the top ranks with loyalists would destroy morale.

The insurgents, death squads, and common thugs now have the initiative; they choose when to attack. Iraqi soldiers and police dare not wear a uniform when they visit their own homes. That tells you who is in charge.

Clear benchmarks for performance under the new strategy can be easily instituted. It is not sufficient to report only incidents of violence. In the early '90s, New York City substantially increased its police force and instituted tough standards. The same can be done in Baghdad. Arrest and incarceration rates can be tracked. So can the location and criminal affiliation - Sunni insurgent or Shiite death squad - of the culprits.

We face two different military challenges. The first is curbing the Sunni bombers and Shiite death squads in Baghdad: The goal is to destroy the Sunni insurgents and to stop the Shiite militias who are murdering and driving out the non-insurgent Sunnis. The U.S. military has the information and the operational skills to break the death squads. This must include moving into Sadr City. The Shiite militias are frightened by what might be coming; that fear should be backed by action. If Moqtada al-Sadr responds by urging a third rebellion by the Mahdi Army, he must be seized, imprisoned, and not released. There is no way of avoiding the risk of citywide chaos for a few days. But things will settle down.

The second challenge is destroying the Sunni insurgents in Anbar province. Anbar, the size of North Carolina, is the lair of the Islamic extremists. These murderers are an especially tough problem, because a few car bombs wreak so much carnage, provoking Shiite rage and revenge. Al-Qaeda in Iraq must be destroyed in Anbar, if we want to keep the bombings in Baghdad from resuming after American forces pull out. The key in Anbar is allying tough local cops or Iraqi battalion commanders with the local tribes, providing a robust adviser corps, and situating American battalions in bases for quick strikes and on-call reinforcement.

A short-sighted consensus is forming to play defense and to concentrate on neighborhoods where the Shiite militias are not strong. Maliki has argued that this would give the death squads a chance to redeem themselves: If they don't disband, we will supposedly move against them in the summer. But they are killers, not patriots, and murderers persist in their trade. Sadr and his followers have to be hit - and hit hard. They have consistently folded under attack in the past, and they are scared now: Sadr has begun betraying his own. If we are serious as New York City was in the '90s, the arrest and long-term incarceration rate in Baghdad will exceed 2,500 per month, of whom 50 percent or more will be members of Shiite death squads. The only institution, finally, that can bring stability to Iraq is not the under-performing office of the prime minister or the fractious national assembly. It is the Iraqi Army. Casey knew what he was doing; that's why Sadr feared him.

In sum, we need a coherent, aggressive military strategy on the local level as well as a top-down political strategy. If we are serious about a military strategy, we will take the following actions immediately:

- \*Deploy hand-held identification devices to fingerprint all military-age males and deprive the insurgents of the ability to move about and blend in with the population.

- \*Shift platoons from our battalions to Iraqi army and police units.

\*Train our units and advisers in tough police techniques.

\*Give cash to our battalions and advisers to buy the loyalty of tribes and reward Iraqi battlefield performance.

\*Take the offense in Baghdad, with no area off-limits.

\*Imprison insurgents and militia leaders for the duration of hostilities - period.

\*Insist on joint U.S.-Iraqi boards for key appointments and removal for malfeasance.

The Iraqi army is the least sectarian organization in Iraq. President Bush should keep open the possibility that the army will control Iraq, as the military did in South Korea and in Turkey in decades past. A stable Iraq under military rule - overt or behind-the-scenes - is preferable to a failed state.

Mr. West, a former Marine and former assistant secretary of defense, has accompanied more than 30 U.S. and Iraqi battalions on operations over the past four years and has written two books about the combat.

(b)(6)

**From:** Paul Valley [valley@ (b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Monday, January 15, 2007 9:13 AM  
**To:** TDCAnalyst@ (b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: Monday's Show

-----  
Osprey Media  
Paul E Vallely  
Fox Military Analyst/Radio Host "Stand Up America"  
valley@ (b)(6)  
tel: (b)(6)  
tel2 (b)(6)  
fax: 406 837 0996  
www.ospreymedia.us  
-----

-----Original Message-----  
From: Paul Vallely [mailto:valley@ (b)(6)]  
Sent: Sunday, January 14, 2007 7:58 AM  
To: agitator@ (b)(6); 'Andy Miller'; Jerry and Pat Molen; 'Rush Computing'; 'Marcia Daigle'  
Cc: 'Paul Vallely'; 'Alireza Jafarzadeh'; tmcinerney@ (b)(6); 'Muffin Vallely'  
Subject: Monday's Show

www.righttalk.com <<http://www.righttalk.com/>>

Stand Up America

Monday January 15th

1-2 PM EST

Guests: LTG Tom McInerney 1:10 PM Call (b)(6) (cell) Discuss the Presidents Plan - Military Option with the Surge

Alireza Jafarzadeh - 1:30 PM EST Call (b)(6) (cell). He may call with a land line.  
Subject: His new book "The Iran Threat"

Fox News Channel  
Osprey Media  
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Fox Military Analyst/Radio Host "Stand Up America"  
valley@ (b)(6) <[mailto:valley@ \(b\)\(6\)](mailto:valley@ (b)(6))>  
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(b)(6)

**From:** Paul Valley [valley@osprey.com] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 13, 2007 8:41 AM  
**To:** 'Dennis J. Dodson'; 'don morris'; 'Daveed Gartenstein-Ross'; 'Louis Rene Beres'  
**Subject:** FW: Column One: From Jenin to Baghdad

Excellent discourse by Caroline on understanding the nature of the broader war in the Middle East.

-----  
Osprey Media  
Paul E Valley  
Fox Military Analyst/Radio Host "Stand Up America"  
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-----Original Message-----

**From:** Caroline Glick [mailto:caroline.glick@nytimes.com] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 13, 2007 2:44 AM  
**Subject:** Column One: From Jenin to Baghdad

The Jerusalem Post Internet  
Edition<<http://static.jpost.com/images/2002/site/jplogo.gif>>

Column One: From Jenin to Baghdad

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Caroline Glick, THE JERUSALEM POST Jan. 11, 2007  
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The average Israeli is not particularly interested in the US-led war in Iraq. As far as most Israelis are concerned, that war, going on just a few hundred kilometers from our borders, might as well be taking place in outer space. It simply doesn't seem connected to our local reality of the Palestinian-Iranian and Lebanese-Iranian jihad. Although greeted with sadness, the daily news updates on US and Iraqi casualties seem to bear no tangible relation to us.

Conversely, most Americans do not think that the war being fought against Israel is linked to the war in Iraq. Both the Bush administration's efforts to limit IDF operations against the Palestinians and Hizbullah and the US media's generally hostile portrayal of the war against Israel lead most Americans to share the Israeli view that the wars our nations fight are separate, distinct ones. And so, as far as most Israelis and Americans are concerned, Americans have nothing to learn from Israel's war and Israelis have nothing to learn from their war.

But the truth is far different. Indirectly, US President George W. Bush's address Wednesday night on the new direction the war in Iraq will soon take was a testament to this truth.

Although expected to announce a radical change in his administration's strategy in Iraq, in Wednesday's speech Bush did no such thing. In essence the president restated his long held view that victory in Iraq will come with the stabilization of a unified, democratic Iraqi regime and the parallel defeat of both the Sunni and Shi'ite insurgencies. Conversely, the enemy forces, operating under Syrian and Iranian sponsorship, fight precisely to prevent the stabilization of the regime and undermine the unity of the multi-ethnic, multi-religious Republic of Iraq.

Bush's plan to implement a "surge and hold" strategy for taking and maintaining control

over Baghdad and the al-Qaida infested Anbar Province is based on a new realization that establishing and maintaining a modicum of security for the country's citizens is a precondition for any subsequent moves towards stabilizing Iraq politically.

FOR ISRAELI ears, the most notable aspect of Bush's "surge and hold" strategy is its striking

There is little doubt that the US has much greater leeway in its operations in Iraq than the IDF enjoys in its efforts against the Palestinians or Hizbullah. Their ability to cultivate and empower Iraqis who share their strategic outlook while weakening others who oppose them is far greater than Israel's ability today to influence the Palestinians or the Lebanese.

But for all that, the fact is that after nearly four years fighting in Iraq, the US essentially embraced the counter-insurgency strategy that Israel adopted in Judea and Samaria five years ago. And similar to the US operations in Iraq until now, Israel only adopted its surge and hold strategy in Judea and Samaria after two years of absorbing unrelenting and ever-escalating Palestinian terrorist attacks. Until Defensive Shield, Israel responded to the war being waged against its society by carrying out brief incursions into Palestinian towns, conducting arrests and swiftly retreating.

Indeed, if the Americans want to get a sense of the president's new plan's prospects for success they would do well to study developments in Israel since Operation Defensive Shield.

Bush warned that his new plan will not end the violence in Iraq. As he put it, "This new strategy will not yield an immediate end to suicide bombings, assassinations, or IED attacks. Our enemies in Iraq will make every effort to ensure that our television screens are filled with images of death and suffering. Yet over time, we can expect to see Iraqi troops chasing down murderers, fewer brazen acts of terror, and growing trust and cooperation from Baghdad's residents."

Ariel Sharon's voice echoes deeply in Bush's statement. After Defensive Shield failed to end Palestinian terrorist attacks, Sharon repeatedly stated that we couldn't expect for terror to end. And it is not surprising that the president's message was so familiar. His plan for Baghdad gives the same opportunities and places the same strategic limitations on success in Iraq that Defensive Shield placed on Israel's chances of ending the Palestinian jihad.

In both cases, the chosen strategy works to prevent terrorists located in specific, limited areas from rebuilding their capabilities by first defeating them and then remaining in place to block them from rearming or operating openly. Israel's experience since April 2002 in Judea and Samaria demonstrates its success. By maintaining IDF control over the areas, Israel has succeeded in limiting and delaying the development of the Palestinians' fighting capabilities in Judea and Samaria.

If US forces do surge and hold Baghdad, the Americans can safely assume that in the months to come Baghdad will experience a steep and sustainable drop in violence.

But by the same token, the Israeli experience also informs us of the price of adopting a strategy limited to an isolated front. Neither the war in Iraq, which is sponsored by Iran and Syria, nor the Palestinian war against Israel, which is sponsored by Iran, Syria and Egypt, are isolated, singular campaigns. And yet both the Israeli and the American surge and hold strategies treat them as if they are isolated, distinct, non-regional wars.

While IDF units capably tie down the Palestinians in Judea and Samaria, they are incapable of wiping out the Palestinian terror infrastructure. Outside of Judea and Samaria, in places like Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and Iran, our enemies continue to develop and diversify their capabilities and today those capabilities span the terror and weapons of mass destruction spectrums.

Indeed, by refusing to attach its operations in Judea and Samaria to a regional strategy for victory, the government has rendered the forces in Judea and Samaria powerless to achieve true victory in the areas. If the Israeli government is ever foolish enough to order the IDF to stand down, those terror forces will immediately rebuild their capabilities.

Israel's refusal to recognize the regional nature of the Palestinian war against it stems

from the strategic blindness of Israel's leaders. Sharon and his successors Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, together with the opinion makers in the local media who back them, all refuse to recognize the regional nature of the war being waged against us. Ignoring the overwhelming evidence that the Palestinians - from Hamas to Islamic Jihad to Fatah - take their marching orders from Teheran, our leaders irrelevantly and dangerously work to establish a Fatah-led terror state in Judea and Samaria. That is, they seek to create a new Iranian-run terror state that will operate side-by-side with the Hamas-led Iranian-run terror state in Gaza.

While the Olmert government's decision to fork over guns, ammunition and \$100 million to Fatah makes clear that it will not change its current course, Bush's address Wednesday gave hope that his administration may actually not ignore the regional character of the war it faces in Iraq.

After presenting his plan for Baghdad and the Anbar Province, Bush spoke forthrightly about the ideological and regional nature of the war. Pointing an accusatory finger at Iran and Syria for their support for the insurgents in Iraq, Bush announced his intention to take action to end to their interference. He even hinted that the US may take military action against Iran's nuclear facilities saying, "I recently ordered the deployment of an additional carrier strike group to the region."

BUT THERE is also cause for concern. As Bush gave a clear warning to Iran and Syria, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was preparing her next trip to the Middle East. Thursday Ma'ariv reported that Rice will devote her time here next week to pressuring Israel to agree to withdraw its forces from Judea and Samaria and so enable Fatah to establish a terror state there.

Rice's reported plans indicate that far from acknowledging the regional nature of the war, the administration continues its slavish adherence to the view that war's various fronts are wholly unrelated, and that an Israeli defeat will either not impact or advance the chances for an American victory in Iraq.

In addition to the battlefield constraints the limited strategic approach imposes, it also causes damage on the home front. During Operation Defensive Shield, the Sharon government prevented the IDF from destroying the Palestinian Authority or even mounting a similar operation in Gaza. By so acting, the government ensured that the Palestinian war against Israel would continue on.

Yet at the same time, the unprecedented scale of the IDF's counter-terror offensive and Sharon's own rhetoric led the Israeli public to believe that after two years of stalling during which war had been waged against Israeli society, the government was finally ordering the IDF to win the war and defeat our enemies and so secure us from yet more massacres and terror. When the limited offensive did not bring about a sustained victory, Israeli society began to lose faith in the IDF's ability to defend it.

Similarly, the humiliating results of last summer's war with Hizbullah caused the public immense disappointment which only served to intensify its sense of despair. That disillusionment and despair also goes a long way towards explaining how the Kadima Party - which ran its election campaign last year under the banner of "pragmatic" defeatism - was able to win in the general elections. And it is the same despair that feeds our enemies' growing faith in their ultimate ability to destroy Israel.

In the US, the fact that the Bush administration's limited strategy in Iraq has taken a toll on the public's faith that victory will ultimately be achieved was demonstrated even more starkly in last November's Congressional elections. The Democrats won those elections while running as the anti-war party that will "Bring the Boys Home," from Iraq. Bush's attempt Wednesday to lower the public's expectations for victory by including statements like, "There will be no surrender ceremony on the deck of a battleship," in his speech, risked making the Democrats' defeatist message for them.

At the same time, by finally acknowledging the Iranian and Syrian role in the war in Iraq and implicitly widening the battlefield to encompass them, Bush's address presented the first cause for hope in recent memory that the US may actually stop its current policy of acting like Israel and fighting a regional war by playing defense on one front. For the first time since 2004, Bush gave reason to believe that Iran should be worried today.

Sadly, as long as Israel's current government remains in power, Israel has no chance of sharing what may well be America's new clarity of vision.

<<http://media.fastclick.net/w/click.here?sid=16372&m=1&c=1>>



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(b)(6)

**From:** Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA  
**Sent:** Friday, January 12, 2007 6:59 PM  
**To:** Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA  
**Subject:** Re: Looking for soldier who can speak to media about training Iraqis

No. I went to see bryan and he had no ideas.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA  
**To:** Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA  
**Sent:** Fri Jan 12 18:50:29 2007  
**Subject:** Re: Looking for soldier who can speak to media about training Iraqis

Did you ever hear back from anyone? I'm at home once again. Thanks.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA  
**To:** Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA; Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA; Whitman, Bryan Mr OSD PA  
**CC:** Smith, Dorrance HON OSD PA  
**Sent:** Fri Jan 12 15:39:42 2007  
**Subject:** FW: Looking for soldier who can speak to media about training Iraqis

FYI, please let me know if you'd like me to help one of our analysts out and if you have any suggestions...

Dallas B. Lawrence  
Director, Office of Community Relations & Public Liaison United States Department of Defense

(b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** robertmag73@<sup>(b)(6)</sup> [mailto:robertmag73@<sup>(b)(6)</sup>]  
**Sent:** Friday, January 12, 2007 3:29 PM  
**To:** Robert Maginnis  
**Subject:** Looking for soldier who can speak to media about training Iraqis

I'm helping a network findr someone who helped train Iraqis and would be willing to do an on-camera interview (this Sunday) about the likelihood that we can complete that training by November 2007.

Ideas?

Robert L. Maginnis

(b)(6)

robertmag73@<sup>(b)(6)</sup>  
<http://home.comcast.net/><sup>(b)(6)</sup>

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) CTR OSD PA**Sent:** Wednesday, January 10, 2007 11:07 PM

**To:** (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA; Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6)  
 (b)(6) OSD-ATL; (b)(6) (b)(6) CTR OSD PA; (b)(6) AFIS-  
 HQ/PIA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) AFIS-  
 HQ/PIA; (b)(6) CTR OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA;  
 Merritt, Roxie, AFIS-HQ; (b)(6) CTR OSD PA; (b)(6) CTR OSD PA; (b)(6)  
 Mr OSD PA; (b)(6) Mr OSD PA; Rangel, Robert CIV SD; Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA; (b)(6)  
 (b)(6) OSD PA; Thorp, Frank RDML OSD PA; Whitman, Bryan Mr OSD PA; Wilkie, Robert  
 HON., OSD-LA; (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6)  
 OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) CTR OSD PA

**Subject:** CNN Reaction to President Bush's Speech

Reaction to President Bush's speech on CNN focused on his "difficult admission." DoD-related reactions focused on the figure of 20,000 troops, and Gen. Petraeus counter insurgency doctrine. The majority of sentiments expressed were towards President Bush's management of the war and skepticism over Prime Minister Malaki's ability to "live up" to the newly given benchmarks. Many Congress members voiced reactions that ranged from strong support to strong criticism.

Several Congress members expressed strong support for Gen Petraeus and Admiral Fallon, with Gen. Petraeus dubbed "one of the best we have." There was also strong opposition from some that 20,000 troops would not be enough to achieve the goals laid out. Those opponents quoted Gen. Petraeus' counter-insurgency doctrine, and claimed that the situation would require from 100,000-250,000 troops.

Analysts also disagreed about the effectiveness of 20,000 troops. Lt Gen Dan Christman Ret. and Andrew Sullivan argued that this surge could "break" the army. Brig. Gen. James Marks thought that the 20,000 troop number would "provide value" and supported the plan. Costs of the war were also discussed, in which Maj Gen Donald Sheppard claimed that costs of the war could go up 50%. Anderson Cooper also asked if President Bush's speech was a repudiation of former Secretary Rumsfeld's policy, but this did not receive a response.

#### Key Sentiments

- Sen. John McCain: "I think it's an excellent strategy... I am very confident in General Petraeus and Admiral Fallon"
- Sen. Mitch McConnell: "Clearing and holding the neighborhoods with Iraqi troops is the only chance for this to work"
- Andrew Sullivan Time.com blogger: "I don't think that's a serious figure... it just nudges us deeper into the morass."
- Andrew Sullivan discussing the opinions of "Pentagon counter insurgency experts": "A number of them think this commitment will totally break the army."
- Lt Gen Dan Christman Ret. "The bottom line is we are shooting our bolt for those contingences across the globe."
- Brig. Gen. James Marks: "The 20,000 will provide value, and how you define the mission set, and I think President Bush did a very good job."

(b)(6)

Media Analyst, OSD/PARA  
 The Pentagon, Room (b)(2)

Washington, DC 20301-1400

Phone: (b)(2)

Email: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OSD PA

Sent: Wednesday, January 10, 2007 6:06 PM

To: (b)(6)

(b)(6) Chafin, Claude, CIV, OSD-LA;

(b)(6)

(b)(6) Eder, Mari Gen. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6) Jones, Nathan, Admiral, (b)(6)

(b)(6) Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA;

(b)(6)

(b)(6) Merritt, Roxie, AFIS-HQ, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

PA; Vician, Todd M LtCol OSD PA

Subject: Pre-Speech reaction by military analysts

Attachments: Military Analysts - Surge excerpts 1.10.07.doc; Military Analysts and the Surge 1.10.07.ppt

You have two documents here - a quick overview the powerpoint) and then one with more complete excerpts.

FYI - We will be trying to give you one network's post speech reactions around 11 p.m. our time and then the others in the morning.

EXCERPTS

Jed Babbin ..... 1  
 Gen. Wayne A. Downing ..... 2  
 Lt. Col. Rick Francona ..... 3  
 Brig. Gen. David L. Grange ..... 4  
 Lt. Gen. Thomas McInerney ..... 5  
 Mr. Bing West ..... 6  
 Col. Jack Jacobs ..... 6  
 Lt. Col. Robert L. Maginnis ..... 7  
 Major General James Marks ..... 7  
 Major General Donald Shepperd ..... 8

**Jed Babbin**

HDLN Glenn Beck 01/10/07 00:04:57

**Beck:** Jed, what is the president going to say tomorrow to the American people to explain the needs of a troop surge?

**JED BABBIN, FORMER DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE:** Well, I think he's going to try to say this is the only way to secure Baghdad so that the people of Baghdad, the government there, can actually secure itself and make progress in developing their country and making deals politically that they need to make. I don't know that that's going to prove to be true.

CNBC: Kudlow & Company, 01/05/07 17:26:28

**KUDLOW:** Jed, you don't favor a troop surge. I say, to you, that if we don't have a troop surge, there's no other option but to leave because the American public has already said the status quo is unacceptable. Will you please tell me why you oppose a troop surge, Jed?

**Mr. BABBIN:** I don't oppose a surge if we do it the right way for the right purpose. I have yet to hear...

**KUDLOW:** What is the right way? And is Petraeus the right guy to do it the right way?

**Mr. BABBIN:** Petraeus is absolutely the right guy, but it's got to be dependent on what the president wants to do. I don't believe 30,000 more Americans troops going into Sadr City are going to change much for very long. If we're going to close down the ratlines, we're going to attack the people from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard who are coming in with IEDs. If we're going to do that, I'm all for it. But the point of the matter is if we're just going to put them on foot patrol in Sadr City, I don't think that's a very good idea. I want to hear what the president has to say.

CNBC: Kudlow & Company 01/02/07 17:39:33

**Kudlow:** OK, Jed Babbin, have you come around to the troop surge or are you still opposed to it?

**Mr. JED BABBIN (Former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense):** I'm still pretty much opposed to it, Larry. I don't know what we're going to do with another 10 or 20 or 30,000 troops there. You're not going to clear and hold Sadr City. It's 2.4 million people. You're not going to clear and hold rest of Baghdad. I want to know what we're going to do before we send more folks into that milieu. I don't see that the president has defined victory in a way that is reachable and even in a way realistic. To achieve victory there, and I've said it a hundred times, I'll keep saying it until it

happens, we have to take on both Syria and Iran and defeat the nations that are sponsoring terrorism against us.

...**KUDLOW**: I want to come back to the troop surge because General Keane and Fred Kagan say, 'Look, we need to clear and hold. We can't clear and turn it over to the Iraqi army yet. We need to have Americans do that,' and it seems to me, as a potential prescription for some kind of victory there, which I personally favor, it's a good idea. Why are you so intransigent, Jed?

**Mr. BABBIN**: Well, I don't think I'm intransigent, Larry, at all. I'm just realistic. I think if you want to clear and hold, and if you want to do that as a predicate to pursuing security in Iraq, which we all would like to see, you can't do it with 30 or 40,000 troops. You're going to have put 100 or 120,000 more troops in there. Clear and hold. The Iraqis, we can clear. The Iraqis can't hold. That's the problem we have right now. And if you want to wait and have clear and hold work, you may have to wait forever because the Iraqis are not coming around to the capability to actually be able to hold what we have cleared. You're not going to be able to clear out the Muqtada al-Sadr forces from Sadr City 'cause Maliki won't let you. What are we going to do with these troops? Either they're way too many to do nothing or they're many, many too few to actually do what we could do.

#### **Gen. Wayne A. Downing**

**CNBC: Kudlow & Company - 12/13/06 17:40:27 - December 13**

**KUDLOW**: It--when you get--parse through the various Washington gossip and leaks and so forth, here's what I hear. The National Security Council's Steve Hadley wants a troop surge. Senator John McCain wants a troop surge. The State Department wants a troop surge. Middle level planners in the Pentagon want a troop surge. We're talking temporary surge to try to stabilize Baghdad. But General Peter Pace, the head of the Joint Chiefs, and General Abizaid and General Casey over at CENTCOM do not want a troop surge. What is your view on this, sir?

**Gen. DOWNING**: Well, my view is that putting more United States troops over in Iraq right now, more combat formation, is going to raise false expectations back here in the United States, Larry. It's also going to put more Americans on the street, which are going to further infuriate the Iraqis. I do not believe we should put more US combat units in there. I do believe that some point, six months from now, we need to start a drawdown, but the emphasis, Larry, has to be on the--building the Iraqi army. And, Larry, unfortunately, we've got to start over with the Iraqi police. The Iraqi police have traditionally been corrupt. They're not trusted by the people. The new police that we've put in have fallen back into those same old ways. And we cannot have a pacification campaign. We cannot actually clear these neighborhoods and make them peaceful until we get decent police in there. So I say no more US troops. That's my recommendation.

**NBC News: Today - 12/12/06 18:35:05 - December 12**

**WILLIAMS**: And, General Downing, same question: Were these mostly points that have been brought to the public debate as a result of the Iraq Study Group?

**GEN. WAYNE DOWNING (RET.) (NBC News military analyst)**: I think they were, Brian. They were, as Barry said, widely divergent. I know I, for one, made the point not only no more U.S. forces but I also believe that the key to this thing is going to be the Iraqi security forces. My comment to the President was, is we've gotta look at this long war on terrorism - this ideological struggle we're in with al Qaeda, radical Islam, through the prism of Iraq. We just can't look at Iraq and Afghanistan. We've got to think much beyond that. And then, the last point I made, Brian, is the perception of the American people. They've got to be told what's going on. They've got to be able to understand it. They don't right now. And a subset of that, Brian, is the American fighting man and woman and their loved ones around the United States. They've made great sacrifices. They believe in what they've done. They're proud of it. We cannot do anything that's going to marginalize them, make them feel bad.

**Lt. Col. Rick Francona**

**MSNBC: Hardball 01/05/07 17:35:17**

**CHRIS MATTHEWS:** What's the significance Rick of all those changes (including talk of a troop surge)?

**LT. COL. RICK FRANCONA (RET), MSNBC MILITARY ANALYST:** Well, I think the President understands what he's doing right now is not working and this looks like a clean sweep. He got rid of the top guy at the Pentagon. He's bringing in Bob Gates to do that. He's also removing John Negroponte as head of the DNI. I think that's also significant. So, he's starting with a clean slate...

**MATTHEWS:** ...Now the Americans, the outsiders who don't speak Arabic and don't know the neighborhoods are being sent into the neighborhoods of Baghdad to look for Sunni insurgents, Shia militias, death squads. What an assignment!

**FRANCONA:** ...What you're doing is you are interposing an American military force between two warring sides. Both of which are going to try to kill you, so it's a very difficult problem. So I think, when these 40 thousand or 30 thousand, whatever the number turns out to be, show up -- is General Petraeus going to put them in Baghdad or is he going to put them around Baghdad? This won't work unless we get some cooperation from the Iraqi government. Those Iraqi troops have got to be involved, but more importantly, Maliki has to give us a commitment that he's going to go after these Shia militias.

**MATTHEWS:** Well, he never shows any sign of wanting to do that. Aren't the -- isn't the worst of the militia guys, as we said in the last segment, Muqtada al-Sadr, the guy that they were saluting and singing praises to during the execution of Saddam, isn't he behind this current government?

**FRANCONA:** That's exactly right. The relationship between Maliki and al-Sadr is so strong, it's almost inconceivable that he's going to be willing to take that step. So, if he's not willing to do that, interposing any number of U.S. forces into Baghdad, I think is really unwise... without the commitment from the Iraqi government and a real plan, sending troops over there is not going to do any good.

**MSNBC News Live 01/10/07 11:29:27**

**David Gregory:** It is important to say that while we talk about a troop surge, as Sen. Reid pointed out this morning, it's really not a surge. It will take weeks to get to that level. What difference can U.S. troops make at this point?

**Francona:** If you're going to put 15,000 into Baghdad, in the absence of any commitment of Maliki to do anything about the Shia militias and the ongoing violence, I don't think 15,000 troops will do anything at all. They'll just be in the way. We have to have a commitment from the Maliki government that they'll go after the militias. That's the first step. I don't see a willingness or capability of Maliki to do that.

**Gregory:** We were told of a situation in which Iraqis would play a more predominant role and U.S. troops would move out to the periphery -- now we have a change...

**Francona:** Yeah, I hope the President will tell us the mission of what the troops are going to do in Baghdad. Are they going to put a cord around the city? Provide logistics support? I'm not sure what they are doing. Are they bolstering Maliki's determination to do something about the militias? They have to go to Sadr City. We don't even know if the Maliki government is capable of doing this and surviving.



**Brig. Gen. David L. Grange**

**CNN: CNN Newsroom -- 01/09/07 09:34:46**

**HEIDI COLLINS:** It may be one of the most fierce fire fights of the entire war, 1,000 U.S. and Iraqi forces battling insurgents in the heart of Baghdad. The running gun battle lasted more than ten hours. So intense our camera crews, of course, kept at a safe distance. U.S. military sources say dozens of insurgents have been killed or wounded. The president expected to call for more troops in Iraq. Where would they be sent, and what will they do when they get there? These are all questions for CNN military analyst and retired U.S. Army Brigadier General David Grange. General Grange, nice to see you today. Talk about this plan for us a little bit. As we know, there are many meetings taking place. President Bush talking with some House Democrats, and White House briefing Congress on this new plan. There's a lot to understand, a lot to absorb. Is 20,000 troops, as far as what the recommendation that we have heard, enough?

**BRIG. GEN. DAVID GRANGE (RET.), CNN MILITARY ANALYST:** Well, those that did the troops at task. In other words, what are the requirements? What are the tasks for the military part of this, and how does that equate to how many troops are required for those tasks? If they say it's 20,000, then it's 20,000. The guys on the ground made that assessment, those commanders, and I'm sure they know what they're talking about.

**COLLINS:** Well, I think that's a great point. And talk to us a little for people who don't understand the process of how you go about determining how many troops would be needed in a case like this?

**GRANGE:** Well, for an example, right now there's several major operations going on in Iraq. You have what's known as holding operations with some offensive moves on a counterinsurgency front. In other words, trying to either contain or hold down the insurgency while Iraqi military are being trained. Which is the other task -- training the Iraqi military to a level of proficiency where they can take over many of these duties, realizing that many of them are infiltrated or have loyalties to militia instead of the local government. But now we have a situation where more offensive operations must take place to gain superiority on the adversaries where they have the upper hand. Anbar province is an example, and the other is the city of Baghdad. That's going to require more troops, used in offensive operations, in order to handle that threat.

**COLLINS:** Right. And Baghdad being where we just saw video from this morning. Very fierce gun battle there. Let's talk about this "Washington Post" report. I'm talking about the mission that includes the understanding that joint U.S. and Iraqi forces will confront the Mehdi Army that you just spoke about. What kind of army are we talking about here? And how do you flush them out?

**GRANGE:** Well, we're talking about an enemy that's grown considerably in size. Several years ago, there was only a few hundred militiamen. Now there are 40,000 or whatever the case may be. It's hard to count, of course, because one could join tomorrow, one can leave today. Who knows. But the point is, something must be done at the militia, or you're going to have a situation in Baghdad similar to the Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. So they have to take on the militia if the militia will not work with the elected government. And that's going to require going in to built-up areas in the city and taking out, in other words, eliminating, the core militia, hopefully a lot of the periphery militia will then decide it's not the way to go, and that's going to take offensive operations with additional troops to do that properly.

**COLLINS:** What about intelligence on that? How do you learn who's the right guy?

**GRANGE:** Well, there's intelligence on core leaders, there's intelligence on Iranian influence inside Baghdad as an example. Many of these targets are not approved by the elected Iraqi government for U.S. or Iraqi forces to go after. That's one of the issues that we have. Since it's a sovereign nation, we need to do this together with the Iraqi government. But most of the information and who the insurgent -- the militiamen are comes from Iraqis themselves, because many of the Americans, of course, don't know, cannot tell.

**COLLINS:** And I know you're not the political man on this, and in a few minutes I'll speak with someone who is, but as a military man here, we've been reporting this morning, if Democrats continue to want to send more troops, and they don't want to send more funding to the Iraq war, what is the way to win?

**GRANGE:** You know, this bothers me, and it's OK that I'm a military guy, because, you know, war's an extension of politics anyway. But the issue here is, if you cap the force -- and I remember this happening to me in Bosnia. When you cap the force, you do it regardless of the tasks required to, and troops to do those tasks to accomplish the mission. You put those soldiers in harm's way. If you cut the funding, the resources, you put those soldiers and Marines in harm's way. Look, if we want to win this thing, if we want to leave honorably, if we want to leave with conditions that are acceptable to the United States of America, you must let those running the war have the resources and the personnel needed to be successful. If you cap it, you ensure defeat.

**COLLINS:** CNN military analyst and U.S. Army retired General David Grange. Nice to see you this morning, General Grange. Appreciate it.

**CNN: Lou Dobbs Tonight - 12/28/06 18:35:08**

...**CHRISTINE ROMANS:** Returning to our top story tonight, it's been an extremely violent month for American forces in Iraq as the president works on his plan for our next step there. Joining me now to discuss the latest developments is General David Grange. Welcome to the program, sir.

**GEN. DAVID GRANGE, (RET.) CNN MILITARY ANALYST:** Thank you.

**CHRISTINE ROMANS:** You've got the president with his top advisers talking about the Iraq strategy, talking about their next move. Any changes in troop levels, any kind of fallout you expect from these most recent meetings?

**GRANGE:** Well, there's not too many good options left for Iraq because a lot of the mistakes were made in the past. Because that's water under the bridge what to do now. I think what's really important is that the American G.I. gave the Iraqis a chance for freedom, and to do something with that freedom. It's up to the Iraqis. So I think whatever comes out of this puts a lot of pressure on the Iraqi government even if it's behind closed doors. And I think what you're going to see is the increase in the advisers to the Iraqi military and police. You're going to see an increase in some forces for no other reason than to show resolve and to be a rapid reaction force in case things get worse than they are today. But in Iraq, whatever Americans decide to do, whatever we end up doing with the direction from the administration, is in the Middle East it's nice to be liked, but more importantly with the adversary, you have to be feared.

**Lt. Gen. Thomas McInerney**

**Fox News: Special Report with Brit Hume - January 4**

...**EMANUEL:** ...More importantly, perhaps, than adding U.S. troops, Pentagon sources say the strategy for Iraq is expected to include more job opportunities, economic progress and a focus on responsible government, issues that military commanders and some experts have repeatedly said are keys to reducing violence.

**LT. GEN. TOM MCINERNEY, USAF (RET):** So just throwing troops at the problem, as I have said, is not going to solve the problem.

Mr. Bing West

ABC News: World News with Charles Gibson - January 8

**MARTHA RADDATZ (ABC NEWS)**

Some of those answers are already known. The military objective for the expected 20,000 additional troops? To secure Baghdad. How does the Iraqi government fit in? The President is expected to call for benchmarks, goals for reconciliation that the Iraqi government will be expected to meet. The international community. Countries will be encouraged to help with reconstruction and jobs programs, although the President will likely ask for more than \$1 billion additional US tax dollars. Part of the plan for adding troops could mean sending some troops in early and holding others longer. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Bing West says the troops deserve an explanation.

**FRANCIS "BING" WEST (FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE)**

I don't mean to be flip but any surge has an ebb, so the question is, what do you expect will change in six months that hasn't changed in four years?

Col. Jack Jacobs

MSNBC: Tucker with Tucker Carlson 01/08/07 16:01:33

**CARLSON:** Colonel Jacobs, what is the maximum, do you think, the U.S. military could spare at the moment in Iraq?

**JACOBS:** Well, it depends on what you're willing to give up and how long you're talking about deploying them to Iraq. I mean, the fact is that we could probably deploy 100,000 troops, 150,000 troops. If we're willing to take people out of Korea, where we have 37,000 troops, turn -- turn sailors into infantrymen and trainers of Iraqi ground units and so on, we could contribute large numbers of troops. But, of course, we're not going to do that.

And as John was mentioning, readiness is the thing that's vitally important here. Part of the problem around the world is that we have denigrated our capability worldwide for other missions because we have made such a commitment to what's taking place in Iraq. And on top of that, the equipment is not doing very well.

The Army needs \$75 billion right now to fix all the stuff that's broken. So I -- despite the fact it would take -- it really would take a large number of troops to really do the job over an extended period of time, I think a small number of troops, 20,000 to 30,000 or so is probably all that's going to be coughed up.

MSNBC: Tucker with Tucker Carlson 01/05/07 18:15:20

**CARLSON:** Well, that's right, but at this point -- I mean, I guess my question is, are they in favor of a surge?

**JACOBS:** Oh, I think they are in favor -- let me put it this way. The large majority of them are in favor of articulating an end game that is going to be satisfactorily -- that can be satisfactorily completed.

The military has not done that, the White House hasn't done that, nobody has done that yet. I think they are -- they are -- would be satisfied with a surge as long as the purpose of the surge is to give the military enough time to train some more Iraqis so that we can make a graceful exit. But anybody who thinks that a surge of up to 10,000 to 20,000, 30,000, 50,000 troops, even if all of them were in Baghdad, anybody who thinks that that's going to have a positive effect ultimately on the outcome of the conflict in Iraq doesn't have any military experience. All it -- this is a fight basically now between Shia and Sunni, and among the Shia, between Muqtada al-Sadr, who has the best army in Iraq, and everybody else. And I don't think that the Americans can have any effect on that.

**MSNBC: Tucker with Tucker Carlson 12/28/06 18:33:37**

**BUCHANAN:** I'm joined once again by Jim Vandehei, Frank Donatelli, and MSNBC's Colonel Jack Jacobs. Colonel Jacobs, let me come to you first. It seems clear right now that the president is planning, and everything you hear, is planning on a surge somewhere upwards of maybe 30,000 troops into Iraq for at least a brief period of time. Do you think this will work?

**JACOBS:** Well, it depends on the objective is. If the objective is to establish some short period of time in Sunni areas where there's going to be some peace, where we're going to be able to kill some bad guys and so on, sure, it's going work. But if the objective is to bring peace to all of Iraq, separate the Sunni and Shia, keep further deterioration in the control of the central government from occurring, to make sure that the police and the Iraqi army are up to speed in short order, it's not going to do any of those things.

**Lt. Col. Robert L. Maginnis**

**CNN HDLN: Headline News -- Glenn Beck 01/08/07 19:37:33**

**MAGINNIS:** Well, it really does. You know, the opinion in the military, Glenn, follows the general population, and it shows up first generally in our National Guard and Reserves. So we're beginning to see attrition rates that are somewhat unacceptable.

You know, I know Charlie Rangel talks about draft and so forth. That's not the answer, I don't believe. But clearly we need a volunteer force that we have to sustain.

And this is the third-longest war as -- soon, perhaps, if we're not careful, to be the second-longest war we've ever fought. So the reality is that these young people need a very clear mission.

They need to know what they need to do, when they need to do it. And they need to see crystal clear how they're going to get out of there. And the president has to make it perfectly clear why we're there and why this is linked to our national security.

I expect he'll try to do that on Wednesday night. I just hope he does.

**Major General James Marks**

**CNN: This Week at War 12/31/06 10:11:47**

**Anchor:** General Marks, part of what the White House is looking at is a surge in troops temporarily, maybe weeks, a few months, 20,000 to 30,000 additional troops in there by crossing over rotations, delaying other rotations out of the country. Is this a strategy that's going work? It's been met with resistance by military leaders although they do seem to be sort of coming around to the White House's, perhaps under pressure.

**MARKS:** Well, a surge, I think, frankly, is not going solve the problem and you have to define -- if the surge is 18 months, is that a surge? You have to sustain your presence, if you're going to clear, hold and build. You got to hold. The ability to clear, you can do that precisely and with very small force. You have to hold and you have to hold and then build with a pretty sizeable force.

What are you going to achieve if that is in fact your operational objective to clear, hold and build? How are you going to do that with a surge -- 90 days, 120 days? I don't know how that's defined. So my point is that you're going go big, go big and stay and make it work. I don't know that 20,000 is enough and I don't know that bringing them in and kind of disrupting the readiness and the deployment schedules that exist. This is a very thin force, back in the states waiting to support the operations in southwest Asia.

**CNN: American Morning 12/22/06 08:15:43**

**ROBERTS:** Defense Secretary Robert Gates is flying back from Iraq right now. A number of U.S. commanders there telling him over the past three days that troop levels should not be increased. But enlisted forces spoke up and asked for more help. Brigadier General James "Spider" Marks, U.S. Army retired is with us now to talk more about this. Let me ask you first of all Spider, where do you come down on this idea of a surge in troops for Iraq?

**BRIG. GEN. JAMES "SPIDER" MARKS, U.S. ARMY (RET.):** Frankly, I don't think it's going to work with the numbers that are being suggested. It sounds like it's a considerable amount, but let's be frank, 15 to 30,000 with the size of the mission sets that are required, I don't think that's going to make a difference. That's point number one. Point number two is a surge requires an extension of those that are there and then an acceleration of those that are coming in. What that affects is a number of readiness postures of those units that are there that really need to be ex-filled and reset and those that are coming in.

**Major General Donald Shepperd**

**CNN: CNN Live Sunday 12/23/06 17:07:31**

**Anchor:** But, General Shepperd, it's still not enough. The president of the United States now considering a temporary surge of American forces, particularly in Baghdad to try to get a hold of security there. Is that a good idea?

**MAJ. GEN. DON SHEPPERD, USAF, (RET):** Probably not a good idea to send additional U.S. forces into Baghdad. The reason for injecting U.S. forces, in my opinion, should be to train the Iraqis, to train them faster to take over. The training of the Iraqi military is going pretty well but it's not just training and equipment. It's getting them competent and getting them to work together over time. That comes through success and confidence in their leaders which takes time. The police, the police force which is another important part of security are an absolute disaster, probably two years behind the army. But trying to put American troops on the streets with 20 or 30,000 more troops that we would have to interject in there to try to take on the militias is just not going to improve the security in Baghdad, John.

**CNN: Newsroom 12/14/06 10:24:19**

**HARRIS:** So you've been talking to folks at the Pentagon. If the president said to Generals Casey and Abizaid, we're sending in an additional 20,000 to 30,000 troops on the ground, would they be able, can they come up with a plan to make that a successful deployment?

**SHEPPERD:** No, I don't think they can. And that's the danger of sending additional troops. If you send them in and nothing improves, it's perceived as a huge failure, a second failure, if you will. The president needs to start working our way out of there and the commanders on the ground, at least as of last week, have said American troops are not the solution. Only Iraqis fighting for their country, taking over their country, over time, us training them up over time and giving them backbone and help is the way to go. And I certainly believe that's true, Tony.

**CNN: Newsroom 12/14/06 10:22:45**

**HARRIS:** So let me see if I can paraphrase this. You wouldn't send in additional troops of the number that we keep hearing kicked around, 20,000 to 30,000 to 40,000 additional boots on the ground there unless you were talking about taking on the militias. And if you did that, that would be very dangerous and very risky to the stability of the whole country.

**SHEPPERD:** Indeed. I would take the 20,000 or 40,000 that we're talking about and embed them with Iraqis, bring them up to speed, send some of our combat troops home, about 70,000 of our 140,000 American troops that are in the country are combat troops. I'd start sending some of them home. I would embed the others. I would try to rapidly train the Iraqi forces, turn over areas as soon as they're ready and slowly work our way out. I don't think there's any other way, Tony.



**MILITARY ANALYSTS  
PRE-SPEECH REACTION TO THE "SURGE"**

JANUARY 10, 2007



## SNAPSHOT!

Commentary by analysts over the past month has speculated on the President's new strategy for Iraq, particularly focusing on the issue of a "surge" in troops. In large part, analysts have refrained from outright rejecting the utility of a "surge," but connected any troop increases with the need to reinforce the political and economic components of the Iraq strategy. More specifically, the general consensus was that the mission had to be clearly defined for the U.S. forces and that the key to success was the Iraq security forces. The analysts offered a variety of views regarding the possible new course of action in Iraq:

### What is the mission objective?

- Opinion of a surge depends on the goal
- Troops deserve an explanation

### What is the value of more troops?

- "Clear and hold" strategy requires more troops
- More advisors to train the Iraqi security forces
- More offensive operations need more troops

### What is the Iraqis' role?

- More troops won't make a difference without Iraqi cooperation
- More troops will increase the pressure on Iraqis to rejuvenate the political process

### Other views

- Commanders on the ground know best – follow their assessment and requests
- Limited options
- More troops will not solve the problem
- No more combat troops
- Time to prepare for a drawdown
- More troops on the streets will infuriate the Iraqis

# Overview of Key Analysts

**Former JAG Jed Babbin** advocated a much larger number of troops to hold security in the country than what the President is expected to suggest. Mr. Babbin also believed that it is necessary to engage Syria and Iran to "achieve victory."

**Retired Lt. Col. Rick Francona** stressed the importance of commitment from Maliki's government and Iraqi forces in order for the troop surge to work. Lt. Col. Francona expects the President to announce that this is the "only way to secure Baghdad" but he does not know if this will "prove to be true."

**Retired General Wayne Downing** expressed back in mid-December that in a meeting with the President he had stressed "the point not only no more U.S. forces," but highlighted that the key to success was with the Iraqi security forces. He also noted that putting more troops in Iraq would "raise false expectations" in the U.S. and "infuriate" the Iraqis. He stated on Dec. 13 that a drawdown should begin within six months and the U.S. should start over with the Iraqi police – create police that are trustworthy.

**Retired Brig. General David Grange** - In response to whether a surge of 20,000 additional troops was enough, retired Brig. General David Grange opined that if the "guys on the ground made that assessment" then it must be the appropriate number to accomplish the mission the troops were being sent to do. Brig. Gen. Grange did not directly express support or criticism of the planned "surge," but stressed the point that commanders on the ground best understood the military side of the tasks at hand and their requests would accurately represent what was needed to succeed. He did note that there weren't "too many good options left for Iraq," but if the U.S. wanted to "win this thing" then "you must let those running the war have the resources and the personnel needed to be successful."

**Retired Lt. General Thomas McNerney** was cited on Fox's "Special Report with Brit Hume" as saying "just throwing troops at the problem, as I have said, is not going to solve the problem."

**Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Bing West** stated that the troops deserved an explanation for the surge.

**Retired Col. Jack Jacobs** stated that the solution to Iraq cannot come completely from the military, and that U.S. troops will need to have a sustained presence in Baghdad in order to help train Iraqi units. Col. Jacobs warned of the stress the surge could have on the readiness of U.S. troops worldwide.

**Retired Lt. Col. Robert L. Maginnis** hoped that President Bush will state a clear mission for the military in his speech in order to help boost morale. He also expressed confidence in Gen. David Petraeus' ability to direct the surge.

**Retired Major Gen. James Marks** does not believe that the current plan for the surge will "solve the problem" and stated that the military needs to "hold and build" in the country. He stated that the President is sharing a "healthy discourse" and listening to generals in Iraq.

**Major Gen. Don Shepperd** warned of the dangers if the surge is unsuccessful, an outcome he portrayed as very likely. Major Gen. Shepperd suggested embedding U.S. forces into Iraqi units and then gradually withdrawing when they seem ready to handle security.



# Notable Quotes

**Mr. Jed Babbin**

## **Speculation about tonight's speech**

- The President will try to say a surge is the only option for securing Baghdad – “I don't know that that's going to prove to be true”

## **Opinion of a surge depends on the goal**

- “I don't oppose a surge if we do it the right way for the right purpose
- “Petraeus is absolutely the right guy” to head the surge, “but it's got to be dependent on what the President wants to do.”
- “I don't believe 30,000 more Americans troops going into Sadr City are going to change much for very long. If we're going to close down the ratlines, we're going to attack the people from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard who are coming in with IEDs. If we're going to do that, I'm all for it. But the point of the matter is if we're just going to put them on foot patrol in Sadr City, I don't think that's a very good idea.”
- “I don't see that the President has defined victory in a way that is reachable and even in a way realistic. To achieve victory there...we have to take on both Syria and Iran and defeat the nations that are sponsoring terrorism against us”

## **“Clear and hold” strategy requires more troops**

- “If you want to clear and hold, and if you want to do that as a predicate to pursuing security in Iraq, which we all would like to see, you can't do it with 30 or 40,000 troops. You're going to have put 100 or 120,000 more troops in there... The Iraqis, we can clear. The Iraqis can't hold.
- “What are we going to do with these (additional) troops? Either they're way too many to do nothing or they're many, many too few to actually do what we could do.”

**Lt. Col. Rick Francona**

## **More troops won't make a difference without Iraqi cooperation**

- “Well, I think he's going to try to say this is the only way to secure Baghdad so that the people of Baghdad, the government there, can actually secure itself and make progress in developing their country and making deals politically that they need to make. I don't know that that's going to prove to be true.”
- We are “interposing an American military force between two warring sides. Both of which are going to try to kill you... it's a very difficult problem”
- “When these 40 thousand or 30 thousand, whatever the number turns out to be, show up -- is General Petraeus going to put them in Baghdad or is he going to put them around Baghdad?”
- “This won't work unless we get some cooperation from the Iraqi government. Those Iraqi troops have got to be involved, but more importantly, Maliki has to give us a commitment that he's going to go after these Shia militias.”
- 15,000 troops will “just be in the way” – we need a commitment from Maliki, but I don't see a willingness or capability” of him to help
- “I hope the President will tell us the mission of what the troops are going to do”

**Gen. Wayne A. Downing**

**No more combat troops**

- "I do not believe we should put more US combat units in there"

**Drawdown**

- "I do believe that some point, six months from now, we need to start a drawdown, but the emphasis, Larry, has to be on the--building the Iraqi army"

**Raise expectations in the U.S.**

- "...putting more United States troops over in Iraq right now, more combat formation, is going to raise false expectations back here in the United States"

**Anger Iraqis**

- "It's also going to put more Americans on the street, which are going to further infuriate the Iraqis"

**Brig. Gen. David L. Grange**

**Commanders know best**

- "If they say it's 20,000, then it's 20,000. The guys on the ground made that assessment, those commanders, and I'm sure they know what they're talking about"
- "Look, if we want to win this thing, if we want to leave honorably, if we want to leave with conditions that are acceptable to the United States of America, you must let those running the war have the resources and the personnel needed to be successful"

**Limited options**

- "Well, there's not too many good options left for Iraq because a lot of the mistakes were made in the past. Because that's water under the bridge what to do now"

**Pressure on Iraqis**

- "So I think whatever comes out of this puts a lot of pressure on the Iraqi government even if it's behind closed doors"

**More advisors**

- "And I think what you're going to see is the increase in the advisers to the Iraqi military and police"

**Show of resolve**

- "You're going to see an increase in some forces for no other reason than to show resolve and to be a rapid reaction force in case things get worse than they are today"

**More operations/more troops**

- "But now we have a situation where more offensive operations must take place to gain superiority on the adversaries where they have the upper hand"
- "Anbar province is an example, and the other is the city of Baghdad. That's going to require more troops, used in offensive operations, in order to handle that threat"

**Lt. Gen. Thomas McInerney**

**More troops will not solve the problem**

- "So just throwing troops at the problem, as I have said, is not going to solve the problem."

**Mr. Bing West**

**Troops deserve an explanation**

- "I don't mean to be flip but any surge has an ebb, so the question is, what do you expect will change in six months that hasn't changed in four years?"

## Col. Jack Jacobs

**Effectiveness of surge**

- Surge has to have a sustained troop presence
- Get troops into specific area in Baghdad and "hold on to it long enough to increase their capability economically... and bring qualified Iraqi units"
- 20,000 troops "not enough", "500,000... is what you really need if you want a military solution to the problem"
  - Surge will work to establish short period of time in Sunnia areas

**Military's view of surge**

- U.S. military leaders "have bought on to" President Bush's speech
  - Military will be satisfied with a surge as long as purpose of the surge is "to give the military enough time to train some more Iraqis."

**Solution is not military**

- "The Defense Department can't do it all. You have to have diplomacy involved. You have to have economic development involved."
- Believes the objective is now to "make it easier for us to say that it's time for us to go, we've done all we can do."

**Praise for Gen. Petraeus**

- "Good trainer" for the Iraqis

**Effect on military internationally**

- "Part of the problem around the world is that we have denigrated our capability worldwide for other missions because we have made such a commitment to what's taking place in Iraq."

## Lt. Col. Robert L. Maginnis

**President's speech needs to reassure public**

- President needs to "make it perfectly clear why we're there and why this is linked to our national security" to give the military a clear mission and morale
- Victory is in the "Iraqi security forces" and government's providing critical services and jobs

**Gen. Petraeus' influence on surge**

- Gen. David Petraeus "aggressive enough" to take on new phase of combat

## Major Gen. James "Spider" Marks

**Need for a "hold and build" of troops**

- Surge "is not going to solve the problem"
  - Have to sustain presence and "hold and build"
  - If "you're going to go big, go big and stay and make it work."
  - Requires an "extension of those that are there and then an acceleration of those that are coming in" – affects readiness of units

**Disconnect between generals and troops**

- Troops "always want more" – but "can you achieve more, by repositioning that which you have in theater?"
- "Healthy discourse" between generals and President

## Major Gen. Don Sheppard

**Surge is "extremely risky"**

- Surge will not improve Baghdad security
- If surge is unsuccessful, it's "another stake in the heart of this war"
- Does not recommend surge unless talking about taking on the militias - but too risky
- "If you send them in and nothing improves, it's perceived as a huge failure, a second failure, if you will."
- Doesn't believe that commanders can come up with a plan to make the deployment successful

**Increase of troops should be used to train of Iraqi forces**

- "The reason for injecting U.S. forces, in my opinion, should be to train the Iraqis, to train them faster to take over. The training of the Iraqi military is going pretty well but it's not just training and equipment. It's getting them competent and getting them to work together over time. That comes through success and confidence in their leaders which takes time."

(b)(6)

From: Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA  
Sent: Tuesday, January 09, 2007 12:38 PM  
To: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA  
Subject: FW: Soldiers "Down on the War" - CNN interview

These keep coming in. Just fyi

Dallas B. Lawrence  
Director, Office of Community Relations & Public Liaison United States Department of Defense

(b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: robertmag73 (b)(6) [mailto:robertmag73 (b)(6)]  
Sent: Tuesday, January 09, 2007 12:38 PM  
To: Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA  
Subject: RE: Soldiers "Down on the War" - CNN interview

Dallas

I'd encourage you to do what you can to help the analysts with information leading up to the President's announcement tomorrow evening.

Thanks.

Bob

--  
Robert L. Maginnis

(b)(6)

robertmag73 (b)(6)  
<http://home.comcast.net/> (b)(6)

----- Original message -----

From: "Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA" <Dallas.Lawrence (b)(6)>

> I thought it might be interesting for you to head up to walter read to  
> maybe meet with some wounded troops and get their feedback first. Any  
> interest?

>  
>  
> Dallas B. Lawrence  
>  
> Director, Office of Community Relations & Public Liaison  
>  
> United States Department of Defense

> (b)(2)

> -----Original Message-----

> From: robertmag73 (b)(6) [mailto:robertmag73 (b)(6)]  
> Sent: Monday, January 08, 2007 12:12 PM  
> To: Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA  
> Subject: RE: Soldiers "Down on the War" - CNN interview

> Dallas- I leave at 3PM today. Thanks. Bob

> Robert L. Maginnis

> (b)(6)

> robertmag73@ (b)(6)

> http://home.comcast.net/(b)(6)

> ----- Original message -----

> From: "Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA"

> > Bib, when is your interview.

> > Dallas B. Lawrence

> > Director, Office of Community Relations & Public Liaison

> > United States Department of Defense

> > (b)(2)

> -----Original Message-----

> > From: robertmag73@ (b)(6) [mailto:robertmag73@ (b)(6)]

> > Sent: Monday, January 08, 2007 10:51 AM

> > To: Robert Maginnis

> > Subject: Soldiers "Down on the War" - CNN interview

> > Today, I'll be interviewed on CNN concerning the following

> > Army Times

> > poll that indicates our Soldiers are "Down on the War." I'd

> > like your

> > comments. What ought to be said? Thanks.

> > < BR>>

> > Down on the war

> > Poll: More troops unhappy with Bush's course in Iraq

> > By Robert Hodierne

> > Senior managing editor

> > The American military - once a staunch supporter of President  
> Bush and

> > the Iraq war - has grown increasingly pessimistic about

> > chances for

> > victory.

> > For the first time, more troops disapprove of the president's  
> handling

> > of the war than approve of it. Barely one-third of service  
> members

> > approve of the way the president is handling the war,

> > according to the

> > 2006 Military Times Poll.

> > When the military was feeling most optimistic about the war -  
> in 2004 -

> > 83 percent of poll respondents thought success in Iraq was

> > likely. This

> > year, that number has shrunk to 50 percent.

> >

> > Only 35 percent of the military members polled this year said  
 > they  
 > > approve of the way President Bush is handling the war, while  
 > 42 percent  
 > > said they disapproved. The president's approval rating among  
 > the  
 > > military is only slightly higher than for the population as a  
 > whole. In  
 > > 2004, when his popularity peaked, 63 percent of the military  
 > approved of  
 > > Bush's handling of the war. While approval of the president's  
 > war lead  
 > > er ship has slumped, his overall approval remains high among  
 > the  
 > > military.  
 > >  
 > > Just as telling, in this year's poll only 41 percent of the  
 > military  
 > > said the U.S. should have gone to war in Iraq in the first  
 > place, down  
 > > from 65 percent in 2003. That closely reflects the beliefs of  
 > the  
 > > general population today - 45 percent agreed in a recent USA  
 > > Today/Gallup poll.  
 > >  
 > > Professor David Segal, director of the Center for Research on  
 > Military  
 > > Organization at the University of Maryland, was not surprised  
 > by the  
 > > changing attitude within the military.  
 > >  
 > > "They're seeing more casualties and fatalities and less  
 > progress," Segal  
 > > said.  
 > >  
 > > He added, "Part of what we're seeing is a recognition that the  
 >  
 > > intelligence that led to the war was wrong."  
 > & t;  
 > > Whatever war plan the president comes up with later this  
 > month, it  
 > > likely will have the replacement of American troops with  
 > Iraqis as its  
 > > ultimate goal. The military is not optimistic that will happen  
 > soon.  
 > > Only about one in five service members said that large numbers  
 > of  
 > > American troops can be replaced within the next two years.  
 > More than  
 > > one-third think it will take more than five years. And more  
 > than half  
 > > think the U.S. will have to stay in Iraq more than five years  
 > to achieve  
 > > its goals.  
 > >  
 > > Almost half of those responding think we need more troops in  
 > Iraq than  
 > > we have there now. A surprising 13 percent said we should have  
 > no troops  
 > > there. As for Afghanistan force levels, 39 percent think we  
 > need more  
 > > troops there. But while they want more troops in Iraq and  
 > Afghanistan,  
 > > nearly three-quarters of the respondents think today's  
 > military is  
 > > stretched too thin to be effective.  
 > >

> > The mail survey, conducted Nov. 13 through Dec. 22, is the  
> fourth annual  
> > gauge of active-duty military subscribers to the Military  
> Times  
> > newspapers. The results should not be read as representative  
> of the  
> > military as a whole; the survey's respondents are on average  
> older,  
> > more experienced, more likely to be officers and more  
> career-oriented  
> > than the overall military population.  
> >  
> > Among the respondents, 66 per cent have deployed at least once  
> to Iraq  
> > or Afghanistan. In the overall active-duty force, according to  
> the  
> > Department of Defense, that number is 72 percent.  
> >  
> > The poll has come to be viewed by some as a barometer of the  
> > professional career military. It is the only independent poll  
> done on an  
> > annual basis. The margin of error on this year's poll is plus  
> or minus 3  
> > percentage points.  
> >  
> > While approval of Bush's handling of the war has plunged,  
> approval for  
> > his overall performance as president remains high at 52  
> percent. While  
> > that is down from his high of 71 percent in 2004, it is still  
> far above  
> > the approval ratings of the general population, where that  
> number has  
> > fallen into the 30s.  
> >  
> > While Bush fared well overall, his political party didn't. In  
> the three  
> > previous polls, nearly 60 percent of the respondents  
> identified  
> > themselves as Republicans, which is about double the  
> population as a  
> > whole. But in this year's poll, only 46 percent of the  
> military  
> > respondents said they were Republicans. However, there was not  
> a big  
> > gain in those identifying themselves as Democrats - a figure  
> that  
> > consistently hovers around 16 percent. The big gain came among  
> people  
> > who said they were independents.  
> >  
> > Similarly, when asked to describe their political views on a  
> scale from  
> > very conservative to very liberal, there was a slight shift  
> from the  
> > conservative end of the spectrum to the middle or moderate  
> range.  
> > Liberals within the military are still a rare breed, with less  
> than 10  
> > percent of respondents describing themselves that way.  
> >  
> > Seeing media bias  
> >  
> > Segal was not surprised that the military support for the war  
> and the  
> > president's handling of it had slumped. He said he believes  
> that

> > military opinion often mirrors that of the civilian  
 > population, even  
 > > though it might lag in time. He added, "[The military] will  
 > always be  
 > > more pro-military and pro-war than the civilians. That's why  
 > they are in  
 > > t his line of work."  
 > >  
 > > The poll asked, "How do you think each of these groups view  
 > the  
 > > military?" Respondents overwhelmingly said civilians have a  
 > favorable  
 > > impression of the military (86 percent). They even thought  
 > politicians  
 > > look favorably on the military (57 percent). But they are  
 > convinced the  
 > > media hate them - only 39 percent of military respondents said  
 > they  
 > > think the media have a favorable view of the troops.  
 > >  
 > > The poll also asked if the senior military leadership,  
 > President Bush,  
 > > civilian military leadership and Congress have their best  
 > interests at  
 > > heart.  
 > >  
 > > Almost two-thirds (63 percent) of those surveyed said the  
 > senior  
 > > military leadership has the best interests of the troops at  
 > heart. And  
 > > though they don't think much of the way he's handling the war,  
 > 48  
 > > percent said the same about President Bush. But they take a  
 > dim view of  
 > > civ illian military leadership - only 32 percent said they  
 > think it has  
 > > their best interests at heart. And only 23 percent think  
 > Congress is  
 > > looking out for them.  
 > >  
 > > Despite concerns early in the war about equipment shortages,  
 > 58 percent  
 > > said they believe they are supplied with the be st possible  
 > weapons and  
 > > equipment.  
 > >  
 > > While President Bush always portrays the war in Iraq as part  
 > of the  
 > > larger war on terrorism, many in the military are not  
 > convinced. The  
 > > respondents were split evenly - 47 percent both ways - on  
 > whether the  
 > > Iraq war is part of the war on terrorism. The rest had no  
 > opinion.  
 > >  
 > > On many questions in the poll, some respondents said they  
 > didn't have an  
 > > opinion or declined to answer. That number was typically in  
 > the 10  
 > > percent range.  
 > >  
 > > But on questions about the president and on war strategy, that  
 > number  
 > > reached 20 percent and higher. Segal said he was surprised the  
 >  
 > > percentage refus ing to offer an opinion wasn't larger.  
 > >



> > "There is a strong strain in military culture not to criticize  
> the  
> > commander in chief," he said.  
> >  
> > One contentious area of military life in the past year has  
> been the role  
> > religion should play. Some troops have complained that they  
> feel  
> > pressure to attend religious services. Others have complained  
> that  
> > chaplains and superior officers have tried to convert them.  
> Half of the  
> > poll respondents said that at least once a month, they attend  
> official  
> > military gatherings, other than meals and chapel services,  
> that began  
> > with a prayer. But 80 percent said they feel free to practice  
> and  
> > express their religion within the military.

> >  
> >  
> > --  
> > Robert L. Maginnis  
> > (b)(6)

> > robertmag73 (b)(6)  
> >  
> > http://home.comcast.net/ (b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA  
Sent: Tuesday, January 09, 2007 10:57 AM  
To: (b)(6) OSD PA  
Cc: (b)(6) Maj OSD PA  
Subject: RE: Fox News Radio coverage of Pres Bush's address Wed PM

Great, why don't you shoot him and email and connect matt and I to him and we can schedule it with him. thanks

Dallas B. Lawrence

Director, Office of Community Relations & Public Liaison

United States Department of Defense

(b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) OSD PA  
Sent: Tuesday, January 09, 2007 10:55 AM  
To: Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA  
Subject: RE: Fox News Radio coverage of Pres Bush's address Wed PM

ok. i'll let him know. i've only talked to him about mg caldwell's schedule, not his own, so i have no idea what that looks like. i'll shoot him and email and see what we can work out.  
thanks

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA  
Sent: Tuesday, January 09, 2007 10:42 AM  
To: (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) Maj OSD PA  
Subject: FW: Fox News Radio coverage of Pres Bush's address Wed PM

(b)(6)

Allison would like to set up a meeting with Major (b)(6) and myself with the pao to discuss this program. Please let the pao know we will be standing by for the best time next week.

Thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) OSD PA  
Sent: Tuesday, January 09, 2007 6:15 AM  
To: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA  
Subject: RE: Fox News Radio coverage of Pres Bush's address Wed PM

hi. (b)(6) is working it for me. he said the plan is to have someone brief them before the president's speech on wed...

break. break.

i mentioned to gen caldwell's pao that he might want to meet with you and major morgan re. why we serve. they have a new initiative called "share the story" that they want to brief to the vfw and am legion, and possibly the military analysts. they want to engage the american public from within iraq and want to make sure the programs mesh. make sense?

he's in town next week thurs and fri i believe.  
thanks

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV MNFI STRATEFF COMMS DIV (b)(6)  
 Sent: Tuesday, January 09, 2007 9:51 AM  
 To: Fox Mark | RDML MNFI STRATEFF COMMS DIV Chief  
 Cc: (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) COL MNFI COMMAND GROUP; (b)(6)  
 (b)(6) CAPT MNFI STRATEFF; (b)(6) COL MNFI STRATEFF; (b)(6) Col  
 MNFI STRATEFF; (b)(6) CDR MNFI STRATEFF; (b)(6) MAJ MNFI  
 STRATEFF  
 Subject: [UNCLASSIFIED] FW: Please review notes!

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//LIMDIS

RDML Fox:

Here are notes from NSC teleconference call I participated on today along with Claude Chafin (NSC), (b)(6) (NSC), (b)(6) (NSC), (b)(6) (State), (b)(6) (State), (b)(6) (OSD).

I'm asking State to give me more visibility on which networks they're setting things up with.

One change from phone call yesterday was timing of joint media event with OSD, JSC, State, from 0930 to 0830 Thursday.

Congressional testimony:

Thursday, 11 Jan, 1000 ET  
 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations - The Administration's Plan for Iraq Sec State Rice

Thursday, 11 Jan, 1300 ET  
 House Armed Services Committee - Way forward in Iraq Sec Def Gates / Chairman, JCS, Gen Pace

Thursday, 11 Jan, 1400 ET  
 House Committee on International Relations - Iraq Sec State Rice

Friday, 12 Jan, 0930 ET  
 Senate Armed Services Committee - Way forward in Iraq Sec Def Gates / Chairman, JCS, Gen Pace

These will drive a lot of media coverage both Thursday and Friday.

Sec State leaves on Middle East trip Thursday, announced by State already.

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

Notes from conference call:

Pre-speech limited to White House - possibly Steven Hadley (NSA), with exception of State (Rice?) doing Fox Tong

Briefing to Baker-Hamilton group by Hadley today

(b)(6) (b)(6) and Brig Gen Kevin Bergner (all of NSC) working surrogates from White House

- Super surrogates
- Hill calls
- Hill meetings

Military analysts (tomorrow ahead of the speech)

Maybe calls to governors after the speech

Tony Snow may do a series of calls

Morning press conference on Thursday with Gates, Rice, (0830) at White House

State working internet pieces and working Arabic translation of the speech. (Will it be done before the speech for our use here?)

State has pitched all TV and radio shows, including cable. Hasn't pitched for Sunday shows.

State has long list of Pan-Arabic media being worked, along with other media.

MOH ceremony (0950 ET, White House) and President's trip to Ft Benning (1240 lunch, 1400 ET Demo there) Thursday along with Congressional testimony to take up most of media space.

Excerpts will be available early afternoon tomorrow (ET).

NSC working a fact sheet.

With everything going on Thu/Fri, suggestion for Baghdad to do media event on Saturday before Sunday talks shows is good. There is nothing planned yet by Washington for that day.

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//LIMDIS

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(b)(6)

**From:** Paul Vallely [vallely@(b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, January 09, 2007 9:25 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Update

Iran is using an increasingly vast network of fake import-export companies to funnel weapons and money to terrorist groups in Iraq, U.S. intelligence officials and other Iraq experts revealed Sunday. Iran and its proxy group Hizbullah have put together an extensive infrastructure to train, support, and finance Shiite militias and even some Sunni insurgent groups in Iraq.

The Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards - the shock troops of the ayatollahs - operates 82 phony import-export businesses in Sunni-dominated Anbar Province, according to Michael Rubin, a former Pentagon official now with the American Enterprise Institute. "It's a classic money-laundering operation," he said. (New York Post)

\* U.S. Strike in Somalia Targets Al-Qaeda Figure

<<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/08/AR2007010801635.html>> - Karen DeYoung

A U.S. Air Force AC-130 gunship attacked suspected al-Qaeda members in southern Somalia near the Kenyan border on Sunday, and U.S. sources said the operation may have hit senior terrorist figure Abu Talha al-Sudani. (Washington Post)

Fox News Channel  
Osprey Media  
Paul E Vallely  
Fox Military Analyst/Radio Host "Stand Up America"

vallely@ (b)(6)  
tel: (b)(6)  
tel2 (b)(6)  
fax: 406 837 0996  
www.ospreymedia.us

Add me to your address book... Want a signature like this?

4/8/2008

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) OSD PA  
**Sent:** Tuesday, January 09, 2007 9:24 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) CIV SD  
**Cc:** (b)(6) OSD PA  
**Subject:** RE: Contact number - General Zinni

All (b)(6) --she works with the military analysts.

-----Original Message-----  
**From:** (b)(6) CIV SD  
**Sent:** Tuesday, January 09, 2007 9:22 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) OSD PA  
**Cc:** (b)(6) OSD PA  
**Subject:** RE: Contact number - General Zinni

One more --- John Batiste?

Thanks!

-----Original Message-----  
**From:** (b)(6) OSD PA [mailto:(b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, January 09, 2007 9:14 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) CIV SD  
**Cc:** (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** RE: Contact number - General Zinni

I do not know him, but (b)(6) is your girl!

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----  
**From:** (b)(6) CIV SD  
**Sent:** Tuesday, January 09, 2007 9:07 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) OSD PA  
**Subject:** Contact number - General Zinni

Good morning (b)(6)  
I'm trying to track down contact information for General Zinni. By any chance, do you have a phone number and/or email address? I understand he's attended military analyst luncheons in the past...

Thanks so much!

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OSD PA  
Sent: Tuesday, January 09, 2007 6:55 AM  
To: 'Gordon Cucullu'  
Cc: Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA  
Subject: RE: From Gordon Cucullu

hi sir,  
happy new year! glad to hear things are moving forward. i will see what i can do to get you in touch with general hood.  
i'll be in touch,

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Gordon Cucullu [mailto:gordoncucullu@osd.mil] (b)(6)  
Sent: Monday, January 08, 2007 9:50 AM  
To: (b)(6) OSD PA  
Subject: From Gordon Cucullu

Hi, (b)(6)

Hope you had a nice holiday. I was back in time from Guantanamo and spent it in FL.

I wonder if it might be a good idea for me to speak with MG Jay Hood now that he's out of GTMO. I understand that he's in the MDW area (Ft Meade?). I'll be up there in late Jan if he might be available for a short meeting. No more than an hour I would think but I can go longer if he thinks it best.

Can you contact him to ascertain his availability and willingness to have the meeting, please?

Thanks, all the best,

Gordon



(b)(6)

**From:** Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA  
**Sent:** Monday, January 08, 2007 12:08 PM  
**To:** Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA  
**Subject:** Re: Soldiers "Down on the War" - CNN interview

Interesting. I haven't seen it either.

We ought to get bob up to walter reed to do his interview there after talking to wounded troops who want to get back. Wouldn't that be interesting.

Is he in touch with dr chu?

Ab

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA  
**To:** Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA  
**Sent:** Mon Jan 08 12:04:17 2007  
**Subject:** FW: Soldiers "Down on the War" - CNN interview

Interesting, I had not seen this....

Dallas B. Lawrence  
Director, Office of Community Relations & Public Liaison United States Department of Defense  
W) 703-695-2733 C) 571-309-8450 F) 703-697-2577

-----Original Message-----

**From:** robertmag73@ (b)(6) [mailto:robertmag73@ (b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Monday, January 08, 2007 10:51 AM  
**To:** Robert Maginnis  
**Subject:** Soldiers "Down on the War" - CNN interview

Today, I'll be interviewed on CNN concerning the following Army Times poll that indicates our Soldiers are "Down on the War." I'd like your comments. What ought to be said? Thanks.

Down on the war  
Poll: More troops unhappy with Bush's course in Iraq

By Robert Hodierne  
Senior managing editor

The American military — once a staunch supporter of President Bush and the Iraq war — has grown increasingly pessimistic about chances for victory.

For the first time, more troops disapprove of the president's handling of the war than approve of it. Barely one-third of service members approve of the way the president is handling the war, according to the 2006 Military Times Poll.

When the military was feeling most optimistic about the war — in 2004 — 83 percent of poll respondents thought success in Iraq was likely. This year, that number has shrunk to 50 percent.

Only 35 percent of the military members polled this year said they approve of the way

President Bush is handling the war, while 42 percent said they disapproved. The president's approval rating among the military is only slightly higher than for the population as a whole. In 2004, when his popularity peaked, 63 percent of the military approved of Bush's handling of the war. While approval of the president's war leadership has slumped, his overall approval remains high among the military.

Just as telling, in this year's poll only 41 percent of the military said the U.S. should have gone to war in Iraq in the first place, down from 65 percent in 2003. That closely reflects the beliefs of the general population today — 45 percent agreed in a recent USA Today/Gallup poll.

Professor David Segal, director of the Center for Research on Military Organization at the University of Maryland, was not surprised by the changing attitude within the military.

"They're seeing more casualties and fatalities and less progress," Segal said.

He added, "Part of what we're seeing is a recognition that the intelligence that led to the war was wrong."

Whatever war plan the president comes up with later this month, it likely will have the replacement of American troops with Iraqis as its ultimate goal. The military is not optimistic that will happen soon. Only about one in five service members said that large numbers of American troops can be replaced within the next two years. More than one-third think it will take more than five years. And more than half think the U.S. will have to stay in Iraq more than five years to achieve its goals.

Almost half of those responding think we need more troops in Iraq than we have there now. A surprising 13 percent said we should have no troops there. As for Afghanistan force levels, 39 percent think we need more troops there. But while they want more troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, nearly three-quarters of the respondents think today's military is stretched too thin to be effective.

The mail survey, conducted Nov. 13 through Dec. 22, is the fourth annual gauge of active-duty military subscribers to the Military Times newspapers. The results should not be read as representative of the military as a whole; the survey's respondents are on average older, more experienced, more likely to be officers and more career-oriented than the overall military population.

Among the respondents, 66 percent have deployed at least once to Iraq or Afghanistan. In the overall active-duty force, according to the Department of Defense, that number is 72 percent.

The poll has come to be viewed by some as a barometer of the professional career military. It is the only independent poll done on an annual basis. The margin of error on this year's poll is plus or minus 3 percentage points.

While approval of Bush's handling of the war has plunged, approval for his overall performance as president remains high at 52 percent. While that is down from his high of 71 percent in 2004, it is still far above the approval ratings of the general population, where that number has fallen into the 30s.

While Bush fared well overall, his political party didn't. In the three previous polls, nearly 60 percent of the respondents identified themselves as Republicans, which is about double the population as a whole. But in this year's poll, only 46 percent of the military respondents said they were Republicans. However, there was not a big gain in those identifying themselves as Democrats — a figure that consistently hovers around 16 percent. The big gain came among people who said they were independents.

Similarly, when asked to describe their political views on a scale from very conservative to very liberal, there was a slight shift from the conservative end of the spectrum to the middle or moderate range. Liberals within the military are still a rare breed, with less than 10 percent of respondents describing themselves that way.

Seeing media bias

Segal was not surprised that the military support for the war and the president's handling

of it had slumped. He said he believes that military opinion often mirrors that of the civilian population, even though it might lag in time. He added, "[The military] will always be more pro-military and pro-war than the civilians. That's why they are in this line of work."

The poll asked, "How do you think each of these groups view the military?" Respondents overwhelmingly said civilians have a favorable impression of the military (86 percent). They even thought politicians look favorably on the military (57 percent). But they are convinced the media hate them — only 39 percent of military respondents said they think the media have a favorable view of the troops.

The poll also asked if the senior military leadership, President Bush, civilian military leadership and Congress have their best interests at heart.

Almost two-thirds (63 percent) of those surveyed said the senior military leadership has the best interests of the troops at heart. And though they don't think much of the way he's handling the war, 48 percent said the same about President Bush. But they take a dim view of civilian military leadership — only 32 percent said they think it has their best interests at heart. And only 23 percent think Congress is looking out for them.

Despite concerns early in the war about equipment shortages, 58 percent said they believe they are supplied with the best possible weapons and equipment.

While President Bush always portrays the war in Iraq as part of the larger war on terrorism, many in the military are not convinced. The respondents were split evenly — 47 percent both ways — on whether the Iraq war is part of the war on terrorism. The rest had no opinion.

On many questions in the poll, some respondents said they didn't have an opinion or declined to answer. That number was typically in the 10 percent range.

But on questions about the president and on war strategy, that number reached 20 percent and higher. Segal said he was surprised the percentage refusing to offer an opinion wasn't larger.

"There is a strong strain in military culture not to criticize the commander in chief," he said.

One contentious area of military life in the past year has been the role religion should play. Some troops have complained that they feel pressure to attend religious services. Others have complained that chaplains and superior officers have tried to convert them. Half of the poll respondents said that at least once a month, they attend official military gatherings, other than meals and chapel services, that began with a prayer. But 80 percent said they feel free to practice and express their religion within the military.

--

Robert L. Maginnis

(b)(6)

robertmag73@b(6)

http://home.comcast.net/b(6)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OSD PA  
Sent: Monday, January 08, 2007 11:01 AM  
To: (b)(6) OSD PA  
Subject: FW: Trip Invitation

not so much on the "official" side, but this is the one i sent out. i'll see if i have more to send you.

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
Sent: Wednesday, June 29, 2005 3:51 PM  
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA  
Subject: Trip Invitation

MEMORANDUM

To: Retired Military Analysts  
From: Dallas Lawrence  
Director for Community Relations and Public Liaison  
Date: June 29, 2005  
Re: Trip to Guantanamo Bay

Secretary Rumsfeld would like to offer another opportunity for those of you who did not participate in the last trip to visit Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The date currently being looked at is July 11, 2005. If you are interested and if this trip would fit into your schedule, please respond to (b)(6) at (b)(6) or call her at (b)(2) by COB Thursday, June 30, 2005.

Instructions concerning logistics and the specifics of the trip-including the confirmed date and time-will follow via email or phone shortly.

We hope you are able to participate.

Respectfully,

(b)(6)

OSD Public Affairs  
Community Relations and Public Liaison  
(b)(2) The Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301-1400

(b)(2)

[www.AmericaSupportsYou.mil](http://www.AmericaSupportsYou.mil)

(b)(6)

From: Paul Valley [valley@ (b)(6)]  
Sent: Monday, January 08, 2007 10:44 AM  
To: Jerry and Pat Molen; 'Fred Gedrich'; tmcinerney@ (b)(6)  
Subject: FW: Plummer Sends

To: valley@ (b)(6)  
Subject: Plummer Sends

Paul: Just in case you didn't get this article ... it mentions your article ... Mike

- Melanie Phillips's Diary - <http://www.melaniephillips.com/diary> -

The war against the free world

Posted By Melanie On January 5, 2007 @ 2:53 pm In Diary | Comments Disabled

Those who said, when the Democrats routed the Republicans in the US mid term elections, that the celebrations by the surrender brigade were premature and that President Bush was made of sterner stuff, may be in the course of being proved correct. There are now signs of a debate taking place in Washington, which might just move the US away from self-delusion and towards hard-edged sanity. The outcome of this debate could not be more critical.

Encouragingly, there are signs that Bush may have now accepted what has long been apparent - that he has been ill-served by his top brass in Iraq. The US commander-in-chief wants to win - but has realized that his generals merely want to manage a retreat. Now there's been a shake-up. The head of US Central Command, General Abizaid, was retiring anyway.

According to this story in the New York Times <[http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/02/washington/02war.html?\\_r=1&oref=slogin](http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/02/washington/02war.html?_r=1&oref=slogin)>, General Casey, the general commanding the coalition forces in Iraq, is also to leave Iraq very soon and earlier than planned. Gen Casey, it appears, wanted America to leave Iraq before the country was secured. Now it's Gen Casey who is leaving Iraq instead.

The fight in Washington with the army top brass has not just been over whether more or fewer troops are needed in Iraq. It's also been over a major difference in strategic perception. In order to win in Iraq, it is essential to defeat Iran. This is for the blindingly obvious reason that the principal instigator of the war in Iraq is Iran. I have never understood how anyone could think that you can win a war by refusing to fight the aggressors and instead running around trying vainly to put out the fires they are starting.

As I said last month here <<http://www.melaniephillips.com/diary/?p=1416>> and on many other occasions, the coalition cannot secure Iraq without first defeating Iran.

It has also long been clear that Iraq is merely a front in wider regional - and indeed, global - war. Iran declared war on the west in 1979, when Ayatollah Khomeini announced his intention of conquering the west for Islam.

The response of the west has been to ignore the fact that war was thus declared upon it, as was demonstrated by attacks upon it ever since by Iran - along with the Sunni/Wahhabi Islamists, who were both its deadly theological rivals for regional hegemony and at the same time its allies in the war against the free world. Ahmadinejad is the true heir to Khomeini; and is it any wonder that he feels able to cock a snook at the west on the assumption that it is toothless and will not prevent him from acquiring nuclear weapons, when for more than two decades the west refused to defend itself against Iranian aggression - and even now, when Iran is fighting the west through proxies in Iraq, it is still flinching from taking the fight to the enemy?

The problem has been, however, that the American generals have been resistant to such a strategic analysis. They have refused both to extend the war in Iraq to Iran and to reconceive their tactics away from the use of conventional to unconventional forces. The argument that it is essential for the west to fight what is an unconventional war against it by unconventional means is made in this article

<<http://www.navyseals.com/community/articles/article.cfm?id=10391>> by two security analysts, Fred Gedrich and Paul Vallely:

Unlike U.S.-led coalition troops, the adversaries in this war do not carry arms openly, wear uniforms or insignias and abide by other laws and customs of wars specified in Geneva Conventions and protocols. They instil fear in military opponents and local populations through use of suicide bombings, improvised explosive devices, kidnappings and beheadings. And they disguise themselves as civilians and hide among civilian populations with weapons stored and discharged from mosques, schools, hospitals, marketplaces, private residences and public roads.

To prevail, the United States has to transition from a conventional to an unconventional war footing and make the enemy pay a heavy price for its despicable tactics. In Iraq and elsewhere, traditional troops, weapons and tactics are less useful than tools of influence, covert operations and intelligence brought to the battlefield by special operators working harmoniously with indigenous forces and local populations. The prime objective is to create a climate of fear within enemy ranks that breaks its will to continue the armed insurrection against the freely elected Iraqi government.

Special Operations Forces (Rangers, Seals, Delta Force and other special units) leaders and troops are uniquely qualified for this mission. Special operators played prominent and successful roles in removing Afghanistan's Taliban regime from power and disrupting al Qaeda's terror base. In Iraq, they have spent most of their time searching for the infamous 'deck of cards,' the elusive WMD arsenal, and high-value insurgents and terrorists. Joint special operators (from all military branches) are also trained in local cultures and languages, making it easier for them to embed in local populations and Iraqi security forces and collect information which in turn may be used to 'hunt and kill' hostile forces. In addition, they can win 'hearts and minds' of local populations through civil affairs work and performance of psychological operations against enemies of the freely elected Iraqi Government.

In January 2003, former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld designated the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) as the lead military organization to prosecute the global war on terror but unfortunately that has not materialized. Although stellar Army commanding Gens. John Abizaid (retiring early next year) and George Casey continue to lead Middle East war operations and troops in Iraq respectively, they are products of the traditional warfare school. Moreover, nearly all of the 140,000 U.S. troops in Iraq are, too. It's time to alter U.S. strategy by putting USSOCOM generals and admirals truly in command of the global war.

The question now is whether the change in military brass will bring about a change in strategy. In the New York Post, <[http://www.nypost.com/seven/01052007/postopinion/opedcolumnists/king\\_david\\_returns\\_opedcolumnists\\_ralph\\_peters.htm](http://www.nypost.com/seven/01052007/postopinion/opedcolumnists/king_david_returns_opedcolumnists_ralph_peters.htm)> Ralph Peters extols the brilliance of Casey's replacement, Gen David Petraeus, but enters a disturbing caveat:

In my contacts with Petraeus, we've sometimes agreed and sometimes argued. But we diverged profoundly on one point: The counterinsurgency doctrine produced under his direction remains far too mired in failed 20th-century models. Winning hearts and minds sounds great, but it's useless when those hearts and minds turn up dead the next morning.

Gen. Petraeus truly is a brilliant talent. Faced with the reality of Iraq, he may be able to shake off the Pollyanna thinking in which our government and military have become mired. God knows, we all want the general to succeed. Of course, even three- or four-star generals can only do what our civilian leaders order and allow. Half of Petraeus' struggle is going to be with Washington's obsolete view of the world, with our persistent illusions about the Middle East and mankind.

There, in that last sentence, lies the rub. All depends on whether Bush has finally got it, or whether he will continue to be influenced by people who clearly haven't got a clue.

And it's not just the military strategy that has been misconceived. Once again, American intelligence has been shown to be woefully - and lethally - useless. It has now been discovered that - surprise, surprise - Iran is far more involved in Iraq than had been thought. The admirable Eli Lake reports in the New York Sun <<http://www.nysun.com/article/46032>> that secret Iranian documents, seized when the US captured Iranians last month in Iraq, have revealed that Iran is working closely with both

Shi'ite and Sunni militias.

The news that Iran's elite Quds Force would be in contact, and clandestinely cooperating, with Sunni Jihadists who attacked the Golden Mosque in Samarra (one of the holiest shrines in She's) on February 22, could shake the alliance Iraq's ruling Shiites have forged in recent years with Tehran. Many Iraq analysts believe the bombing vaulted Iraq into the current stage of its civil war.

Michael Ledeen <<http://pajamasmedia.com/xpress/michaelledeen/>> , who says this is a good moment to exploit the power struggle going on in Iran through the illness and now death of President Khamenei, also reports that US officials have been shocked - shocked! - at the vast scale of Iranian activity in Iraq revealed by these documents.

It seems that our misnamed Intelligence Community had grossly underestimated the sophistication and the enormity of the Iranian war campaign. I am told that this information has reached the President, and that it is part of the body of information he is digesting in order to formulate his strategy for Iraq. I am told that, at first, there was a concerted effort, primarily but by no means exclusively from the intel crowd, to sit on the evidence, to prevent it from reaching the highest levels. But the information was too explosive, and it is now circulating throughout the bureaucracy. We are in a big war, and we cannot fight it by playing defense in Iraq. That is a sucker's game. And I hope the president realizes this at last, and that he finds himself some generals who also realize it, and finally demands a strategy for victory.

Indeed; but the President also needs an intelligence service that actually delivers the goods. The chaos in US intelligence - and the resulting Beltway in-fighting - that has characterised this entire saga has clearly not been resolved by the even more chaotic new structure imposed on the intelligence community to sort it out. Now the official appointed to oversee this new structure, John Negroponte, is also being moved, as the New York Times <<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/04/washington/04secretary.html?hp&ex=1167973200&en=27716b5853f73de5&ei=5094&partner=homepage>> reports. But will this presage the long overdue clearing out of the clandestine Augean stables - or will the CIA continue to play the lethal role of America's rogue shadow foreign service, continuing to mire the defence of the west in serial incompetence and even (see the stream of books and briefings against the President by former agents) rank treachery? How can the free world be defended when its principal intelligence agency is surprised by developments which are obvious to anyone with eyes to see?

None of this is necessarily irreparable. Wars are often characterised by mistakes in analysis and strategy. This one can be won - provided the President now understands the strategic and operational errors that have been made, and puts them right. Putting more troops into Iraq will not be enough unless the Iranian regime is taken out. Clearly, this is not a great prospect. But it is a prospect which as time goes on will become even less palatable as it becomes ever more unavoidable. The longer it is left, the more difficult it will be. We are now in a world where the only calculation to be made is between rocks and hard places. There are no good options. The only sane course of action is the least worst option.

There will be scant support for this, it goes without saying, from the British media which remains largely on a different planet. Thus Anatole Kaletsky <<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,6-2530313,00.html>> in the Times thinks war with Iran would be

a disaster on [sic] the Middle East, beside which the war in Iraq would be a mere sideshow. What now seems to be in preparation at the White House, with the usual unquestioning support from Downing Street, is a Middle Eastern equivalent of the Second World War. The trigger for this all-embracing war would be the formation of a previously unthinkable alliance between America, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Britain, to confront Iran and the rise of the power of Shia Islam.

The fact that the 'Middle Eastern equivalent of the Second World War' has already been declared and is being waged upon the west does not seem to occur to him. No, the war-crazy villains of the piece are 'trigger-happy' Israeli 'hotheads' who are 'hell-bent' on stopping Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Yes, these are actually the terms he uses. Clearly, on planet Kaletsky it is those who seek to protect their country from the nuclear genocide that is being openly prepared for it - of which he makes no mention whatever - who are to be blamed for 'trigger-happy'

aggression rather than those who are planning such a holocaust. No mention, either, of the fact that Iran has directly threatened America, has for years attacked America and in Iraq is currently waging war on America, which all might be thought to constitute a somewhat overdue reason for a response by America. But no, it's those wretched Jews again. What moral and intellectual sickness is this?

Alas, it is the default position in British media and political circles. It is also rampant in the US, but there at least there is now an argument going on. On the outcome of that argument the course of this war - and the fate of the free world - now depends.

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Article printed from Melanie Phillips's Diary:  
<http://www.melaniephillips.com/diary>

URL to article: <http://www.melaniephillips.com/diary/?p=1429>



(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)  
Sent: Monday, January 08, 2007 10:20 AM  
To: Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA  
Cc: (b)(6) OSD PA  
Subject: RE: are you around to chat?

Dallas / (b)(6) - we were looking to have the ASY groups on a conference call so we could reach a wider audience. We are working on setting up a time and date this week and would like to send out an invitation as soon as possible for the call. Can you please email me the compiled list of names you think should participate. Thank you so much for your help and guidance on this.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

The White House  
Office of Public Liaison

(b)(2) (w)  
(c)

-----Original Message-----

From: Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA [mailto:Dallas.Lawrence@(b)(6)]  
Sent: Monday, January 08, 2007 10:01 AM  
To: (b)(6)  
Cc: (b)(6) OSD PA  
Subject: RE: are you around to chat?

(b)(6)

Also, as for the military analyst piece, (b)(6) is the Department's point person on organizing those groups. I was not clear if you all were hoping for an in person meeting (which could be arranged with a dozen or so in the area) or a conference call that would reach a wider audience. In either case, I have spoken with (b)(6) and she is ready to proceed with whichever option you folks prefer.

Dallas B. Lawrence  
Director, Office of Community Relations & Public Liaison United States Department of Defense

(b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) [mailto:(b)(6)]  
Sent: Monday, January 08, 2007 8:27 AM  
To: Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA  
Cc: (b)(6)  
Subject: Re: are you around to chat?

Dallas - pls follow up with (b)(6) on your list you are sending over

-----Original Message-----

From: Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA  
To: (b)(6)  
Sent: Fri Jan 05 17:46:58 2007  
Subject: Re: are you around to chat?

Hi there. Apologies for the late reply I've been in a meeting since 330.

Are you free now for me to call?

Hope you had a wonderful new year!

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)  
To: Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA  
Sent: Fri Jan 05 16:05:58 2007  
Subject: are you around to chat?

(b)(6)

**From:** Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA  
**Sent:** Monday, January 08, 2007 9:53 AM  
**To:** Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA  
**Subject:** Re: white house requests

Great. Go for it.

Put it in a brief memo and give to (b)(6) so dorrance is aware

Thx

I will only be on the call for 30 min today

Ab.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA  
**To:** Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA  
**Sent:** Mon Jan 08 09:52:01 2007  
**Subject:** white house requests

hi there.

Sorry we didnt connect, hope you had a nice weekend with the family.

This is what the white house has aksed for with regard to the roll out:

- 1) inviting the regional asy members to a meeting at the white house, possibly with potus, on wednesday
- 2) retired military analyst conf call.
- 3) jcoc conferece call (i pitched this, they agreed)

wanted to make sure you were in the loop!

Dallas B. Lawrence

Director, Office of Community Relations & Public Liaison

United States Department of Defense

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: Thompson, Jonathan Mr OSD PA  
Sent: Saturday, January 06, 2007 11:42 AM  
To: (b)(6) OSD PA; Claude H. Chafin@ (b)(6)  
Cc: (b)(6) OSD PA (b)(6) (PACE)  
Subject: Possible SMEs

Here's a cut of Military and Civilian SMEs for this week's festivities. We'll remove Kagan and O'Hanlon since both are on your lists.

Recommend, depending upon DS's approval, have USD-P and Kimmlt background these folks. Timing TBD based upon your green lighting.

j

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) OSD PA  
Sent: Friday, January 05, 2007 5:51 PM  
To: Thompson, Jonathan Mr OSD PA  
Subject: RE: Civilian Defense Experts Travel Plans

here are a few names to consider for the briefing.

thanks

(b)(6)

Mr. Jed Babbin (Former DUSD) American Spectator, Real Clear Politics General Wayne A. Downing (USA, Retired) MSNBC Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis (USA, Retired) Fox News, CNN, BBC, Radio Dr. Jeff McCausland (Colonel, USA, Retired) - CBS Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr. (USA, Retired) - Fox News Major General Donald W. Shepperd (USAF, Retired) CNN

Mr. James Dobbins, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND Dr. Daniel Goure, Senior Fellow, Lexington Institute John Hamre, President and CEO, CSIS Mr. Michael J. Horowitz, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute Fred Kagan, American Enterprise Institute Mr. Robert Kaplan, National Correspondent, Atlantic Monthly Dr. Michael O'Hanlon, Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institute

-----Original Message-----

From: Thompson, Jonathan Mr OSD PA  
Sent: Friday, January 05, 2007 5:26 PM  
To: (b)(6) OSD PA

4/8/2008

Subject: FW: Civilian Defense Experts Travel Plans

Can you socialize with the suspects that matter in OARDEC, Policy, etc.

First blush wouldn't we want to include Kagan at AEI, and Jack Keane?

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CTR OSD PA

Sent: Wednesday, December 06, 2006 5:13 PM

To: Thompson, Jonathan Mr OSD PA

Cc: (b)(6) OSD PA

Subject: Civilian Defense Experts Travel Plans

Jonathan--

(b)(6) and I made some changes to the travel lists. I attached the latest and greatest. Please let me know if you need anything else.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

Jonathan Thompson  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs  
U.S. Department of Defense

(b)(2) (o)  
(Cables - 24/7)  
(b)(6) (SIPR in CONUS)  
(b)(6) (when in Iraq)  
(b)(6) (SIPR when in Iraq)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY If this e-mail is marked FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY it may be exempt from mandatory disclosure under FOIA. DoD 5400.7R, "DoD Freedom of Information Act Program", DoD Directive 5230.9, "Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release", and DoD Instruction 5230.29, "Security and Policy Review of DoD Information for Public Release" apply.

4/8/2008

(b)(6)

**From:** JedBabbin@ (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 06, 2007 10:05 AM  
**To:** tmcinerney@ (b)(6) nashct@ (b)(6) BURM41516@ (b)(6) LISAGirl1957@ (b)(6)  
WSSinter@ (b)(6) robertscales@ (b)(6) ladd.wheeler@ (b)(6) twilkerson@ (b)(6)  
ShepDonald@ (b)(6) mike.delong@ (b)(6) mgroot@ (b)(6)  
groothouse@ (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Mitch McConnell, Exorcist? RealClearPolitics

Sorry this is late, gents. Am in Tahoe for the week with too much family. Back tomorrow pm.

RealClearPolitics - Articles - President Bush Can Still Sink the Democrats

Best, Jed.

**Jed Babbin**

(b)(6) (Home Office)  
(b)(6) (Mobile)

4/8/2008

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2006 12:11 AM

To: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA; Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA; Whitman, Bryan Mr OSD PA; (b)(6)  
 OSD-ATL (b)(6) CTR OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA (b)(6) OSD  
 PA; (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/Web Operations (b)(6) OSD PA; rmerrit@ (b)(6)  
 (b)(6) CTR OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6)  
 Mr OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) CTR OSD PA; (b)(6) CTR  
 OSD PA; (b)(6) CTR OSD PA

Subject: Evening Clips from 12/29

There were 20 DoD-related news segments tonight. CNN (9) led tonight, followed by FOX News (6), MSNBC (1), CBS (1), PBS (2), ABC (1), CMDY (0), and NBC (0). Overall, DoD-related coverage was light due to the overwhelming coverage of the impending Hussein execution. In coverage similar to earlier in the week, commentary on a troop surge remained critical. While the Hussein execution dominated coverage tonight, there were a few direct references to the Pentagon. Leading non-DoD stories tonight included: President Gerald Ford's funeral, and updates on the Duke case.

CNN reported tonight that the military had "prepared a course of action" in which they would keep Marine brigades in Iraq longer, as well as "rush" Army brigades into Iraq ahead of schedule. Pat Buchanan, who anchored "Tucker" this week, reprised last week's notion of a quid pro quo arrangement between the Pentagon and White House, which consisted of a troop surge for an increase in the overall military size. Previous comments regarding a troop surge creating "more targets" and "more casualties" were reiterated on several programs. Favorable opinions of a surge came from Brig. Gen. James Marks Ret. who said that "you can use more forces there (Baghdad)" and some analysts on FOX News also gave favorable views of a short term surge.

Mentions of the Pentagon and military in connection to the Hussein execution quoted Mr. Whitman and said, "forces are on a high state of alert." Reports were agreed in that a spike in violence is likely, but will not be prolonged or severe. The reports argued that it is unlikely the Hussein execution will incite any new violence and that the insurgents "have never needed an excuse before."

In minor DoD-related stories, CNN had a report discussing the contracting process, specifically citing the Pentagon and Hamilton Sunstran. This report argued against government overspending and used the Pentagon's contract with Hamilton Sunstran as an example. CNN ran its weekly segment "Heroes," where they highlighted the courage of Senior Chief Hospital Corpsman Reginald Dean. CNN also carried a short news brief that said according to sources in Iraq, the Iranian prisoners were released.

#### Key Sentiments:

- Ed Henry (CNN) after a report about a troop surge: " an already stretched thin military being stretched further."
- Col. Jack Jacobs Ret. (MSNBC) had a slightly different opinion of a troop surge from his stance last night: "It might stabilize the military situation at least for a little while."
- Richard Wolfee of Newsweek claimed his sources said a troop surge would be a "much more long term commitment" than the six month troop increase that has been discussed.
- Barbara Starr (CNN): "At least two Senior Commanders in very separate locations said this week they think there is one important step, and that is that the administration, the political side of Washington, needs to either make a commitment to this war or get out. They do believe at this point that they really have to

4/8/2008

decide they want to prosecute the war and go forward or find a way to get out. The military believes right now that they are still in the world of half measures."

- Rich Lowry of National Review (PBS): "the notion of a surge" is something of an "illusion"
- Gen. Don Shepherd Ret. (CNN) while he discussed the "3000" causality mark: "the longer we're there, and the longer we stay, the more casualties there will be."

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(b)(6)

**From:** Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA  
**Sent:** Friday, December 29, 2006 4:17 PM  
**To:** Whitman, Bryan Mr OSD PA  
**Cc:** Smith, Dorrance HON OSD PA; Rangel, Robert CIV SD  
**Subject:** readiness hearing

Bryan, following up on our brief conversation this a.m., here is the latest info on Congressman Murtha's defense appropriations subcommittee hearing on readiness of U.S. ground forces:

Hearing date is now Jan. 16 and the witnesses are slated to be CSA Schoomaker and USMC Commandant Conway. At this time we have been told that these are the only two witnesses. Recall that when this was first brought up a few weeks ago, the hearing was anticipated to fall on the week of Jan. 8.

Mike Dominguez and Dave Patterson have been organizing folks to try and determine how and when we can inform the decision-making process. I'm not certain how many meetings have been held but I have attended two (last Friday and Monday). Lisa-Marie was at the Monday meeting as well and there was discussion about developing an LA-PA outreach effort in the weeks before the actual hearing. Mike's shop has compiled material that can be refined, etc., and distributed to the Hill and the media, etc. Note that I asked Mike for the electrons and understand from him that the papers are what was provided to Secretary Gates for his confirmation hearing prep.

Meantime, there are additional factors that are likely to influence the debate and may all occur before the Jan. 16 hearing. 1) As we know, the President may deliver his anticipated Iraq strategy speech before that date and 2) there will be hearings shortly thereafter on his proposed way forward. 3) The CJCS annual "risk assessment" report is due for release next month and 4) the 4th quarter DOD "readiness report" for FY 06 will be delivered in January as well.

Dominguez and Patterson are the civilian subject matter experts and we should consider at least one of them, probably Mike since Dave is knee deep in 08 Budget matters, for talking to the journalists.

Below are just a few suggestions I offer for the good of the order in the event it is decided that PA should engage the media component before the actual hearing. Please don't hesitate to get in touch (preferably Wednesday!) if you have any questions.

**GOAL:** To inform the public of the multiple efforts undertaken by DOD to promote military readiness.

**OBJECTIVES:** Raise awareness of the substantial progress DOD has made to fund and modernize the military  
Raise awareness of the significant differences between a soldier of 1990, 2000 and 2006

**STRATEGY:** To disseminate information to journalists and/or news organization representatives.

**TACTICS:**

- Editorial board meetings with WSJ, USA Today and Washington Times
- Military Analysts Briefing(s)
- Fact Sheets (that can be used on the Hill as well as provided to reporters and ed writers)
- Phone or in-person briefings to a small number of columnists who regularly send to the blogosphere (Jed Babbin, Salena Zito, e.g.)
- Charts that have been used in previous budget hearings that illustrate the levels of funding for DOD since the early 1990s

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- Charts that point out the modernization of military equipment, particularly the gear of a soldier and marine
- National talk radio (one or two programs)
- Regional talk radio (stations that reach primarily U.S. Army or USMC audiences)

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(b)(6)

**From:** JedBabbin (b)(6)

**Sent:** Friday, December 29, 2006 8:48 AM

**To:** tmcinerney (b)(6) nashct (b)(6) BURM41516 (b)(6) USAGirl1957 (b)(6)  
WSSinter (b)(6) roberthscales (b)(6) ladd.wheeler (b)(6) wilkerson (b)(6)  
ShepDonald (b)(6) mike.dejong (b)(6) mgroot (b)(6)  
groot (b)(6)

**Subject:** The New Years' Eve Rant

My traditional New Years' Eve column, albeit a few days early so my editor can have the weekend off. Thus, a pre-emptive Happy New Year to all. Best, Jed.

The American Spectator

**Jed Babbin**

(b)(6) (home office)  
(b)(6) (home fax)  
(b)(6) (mobile)

4/8/2008

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA  
 Sent: Friday, December 29, 2006 7:35 AM  
 To: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA; Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA; Whitman, Bryan Mr OSD PA (b)(6)  
 OSD PA (b)(6) CTR OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD  
 PA (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/Web Operations; (b)(6) OSD PA; Merritt, Roxie, AFIS-HQ  
 (b)(6) CTR OSD PA; (b)(6) CTR OSD PA (b)(6) OSD PA (b)(6)  
 (b)(6) OSD PA (b)(6) OSD PA (b)(6) (b)(6)  
 CTR OSD PA (b)(6) CTR OSD PA (b)(6) CTR OSD PA

Subject: Evening Clips from 12/28 - Main Topic: Troop Surge; Sub-Theme: Analysts say "Gates privately opposed"

## Evening News Broadcast Coverage Report December 28, 2006

### Summary

There were 19 DoD-related news segments tonight, as CNN led in coverage (6), followed by FOX (5), MSNBC (3), NBC (2), CBS (2), ABC (1), and PBS (0). Overall, DoD-related coverage was light, as Iraq and comments made by the late President Ford were discussed on many networks, but focused on the White House. The primary DoD-related story covered the strategy session held at Crawford, Texas with President Bush and his "war cabinet" which led into reports about the potential troop surge. Straightforward coverage of Secretary Gates' recent trip to Iraq, and his meetings with U.S. military commanders and enlisted troops, was included in the context of the Texas session with the President. The leading non-DoD stories tonight were: the deaths of former President Gerald Ford and James Brown, and winter weather problems. All networks carried President Ford's criticism of the war in Iraq.

Reports on the President's meeting with the "war cabinet" focused primarily on the President, with just passing mentions of Secretary Gates. Commentary on a troop surge continued to be highly skeptical of its usefulness and questioned whether it would be sending "the wrong message." Reports suggested and included comments by military analysts saying that Secretary Gates was "privately opposed" to the idea of a troop surge. Outlets also noted that, during John Edwards' Presidential run announcement, he strongly disagreed with the idea of a troop surge.

A minor topic of discussion was the conflict in Somalia, in which reports said that U.S. commanders "want to see peace brought to Somalia" and also reported that Somalia has harbored al-Qaeda terrorists.

### Key Sentiments:

- CNBC Host Bob Pisani: "I understand that Defense Secretary Robert Gates is also presenting plans that would include a jobs creation program in Iraq--not in the United States--to open as many as 10 state-owned factory around Iraq by end of January. Clearly this administration is trying to take a bit more comprehensive approach to the problem"
  - P.J. Crowley responded: "It's a good idea - we should have done it three years ago"
- Joe Scarborough on a troop surge: "His (President Bush) Defense Secretary and soldiers in Iraq oppose the move"
- Joshua Green of MSNBC: "So Gates may be a small voice of opposition down in Crawford... but to all outward appearance it looks as if the President has made up his mind and is now looking for a rationale"
- Maj. Gen. Don Shepperd (Ret.):
  - "He'll (Gates) be more collegial with Congress; he'll be easier to work with the military. But he's got a tough load on his shoulders he's been dealt a very difficult thing"
  - On the Secretary's trip to Iraq: "When he was over there... he basically heard from the commanders... don't just send us troops, tell us what you want. But from the troops themselves he

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heard, yes, we could use more troops. So you have these conflicting views within the military”

- Gen. Barry McCaffrey (Ret.): On a troop surge: “Do we believe that will change the nature of the civil war... no it won't”
- Col. Jack Jacobs (Ret.): On a troop surge: “It doesn't matter if we go in with 30,000 or 3”
  
- Juan Williams of NPR on Secretary Gates: “He was doing less listening than selling” referring to the notion of a troop surge to the commanders in Iraq
- Barbara Starr on Afghanistan: Noted positive progress in the reconstruction effort, but also noted, “the Taliban can readily move in and take over”
  - o “Many, many Afghans are against the Taliban. They want jobs, they want progress. And... on my second trip to Afghanistan. Traveling the road between Kabul, the capital, and the north, to Bagram, we passed two gas stations on the road, under construction, a very small sign but that's part of the new Afghanistan”
- John Edwards at his presidential candidacy announcement: “It is a mistake for America to escalate its role in Iraq. It's a mistake to surge troops into Iraq. It sends exactly the wrong signal to the Iraqis and the rest of the world about what our intentions are.”
- David Martin on the CBS Evening News noted at the end of a report on a possible troop surge that it “would almost certainly mean more American casualties.”

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(b)(6)

**From:** JedBabbin@ (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, December 28, 2006 9:50 AM  
**To:** tmcinerney@ (b)(6) nashct@ (b)(6) BURM41516@ (b)(6) USAgirl1957@ (b)(6)  
WSSinter@ (b)(6) robertscales@ (b)(6) ladd.wheeler@ (b)(6) twilkerson@ (b)(6)  
ShepDonald@ (b)(6) mike.delong@ (b)(6) mgroot@ (b)(6)  
groothouse@ (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Death, Taxes and McCain: Today's RCP

There's not a lot of good comedy these days, but our presidential campaigns - as continuous as the drone of the news -- is always a good source. Those who say that the 2008 nominations are already locked up should look at a bit of political history and smile. Best, Jed.

[RealClearPolitics - Articles - Death, Taxes and McCain?](#)

**Jed Babbin**

(b)(6) (home office)  
(b)(6) (home fax)  
(b)(6) (mobile)

4/8/2008

(b)(6)

**From:** JedBabbin@ (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Saturday, December 23, 2006 1:07 PM  
**To:** tmcinerney@ (b)(6) nashct@ (b)(6) BURM41516@ (b)(6) USAGid1957@ (b)(6)  
WSSinter@ (b)(6) robertscales@ (b)(6) ladd.wheeler@ (b)(6) twilkerson@ (b)(6)  
ShepDonald@ (b)(6) mike.delong@ (b)(6) mgroot@ (b)(6)  
groothousen@ (b)(6)  
**Subject:** al-Jubeir

Guys: Apparently the Saudis have presented al-Jubeir's name to State as their next ambassador. Baghdad Bob in Armani. What the heck is going on in Saudi? Could be significant sign of change.

**Jed Babbin**

(b)(6) (home office)  
(b)(6) (home fax)  
(b)(6) (mobile)

4/8/2008

(b)(6)

From: Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA  
Sent: Thursday, December 21, 2006 11:56 PM  
To: (b)(6)  
Subject: Fw: Adel al-Jubeir

Know anything about this?

-----Original Message-----

From: JedBabbin (b)(6) <JedBabbin (b)(6)>  
To: tmcinerney (b)(6) <tmcinerney (b)(6)>, nashct (b)(6) <nashct (b)(6)>, BURM41516 (b)(6) <BURM41516 (b)(6)>, USAGirl1957 (b)(6) <USAGirl1957 (b)(6)>, WSSInter (b)(6) <WSSInter (b)(6)>, roberthscales (b)(6) <roberthscales (b)(6)>, ladd.wheeler (b)(6) <ladd.wheeler (b)(6)>, twilkerson (b)(6) <twilkerson (b)(6)>, ShepDonald (b)(6) <ShepDonald (b)(6)>, mike.delong (b)(6) <mike.delong (b)(6)>, maroot (b)(6) <maroot (b)(6)>, groothouse (b)(6) <groothouse (b)(6)>  
Sent: Thu Dec 21 19:38:56 2006  
Subject: Adel al-Jubeir

Guys: Heard a short report that Saudi flack Adel al-Jubeir -- known to be as forthright and truthful as Baghdad Bob -- will be their new ambassador to the US. Have any heard this? Is it confirmed? If so, big news. He's as hard core a Wahhab as you'll ever find. And there may be some bigger shakeup among the Saudi royals. Please let me know what you hear. Best, Jed.

Jed Babbin

(b)(6) (Home Office)  
(b)(6) (Mobile)



(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OSD PA  
Sent: Thursday, December 21, 2006 3:23 AM  
To: (b)(6)  
Cc: (b)(6) OSD PA  
Subject: Re: [U] FW: Can you help determine if this is accurate?

Hey (b)(6) sorry, I was out of pocket all day...traveling thru snowy mountains. Please thank general caldwell for his time and interest! But, unless you hear otherwise from mark, I don't believe we'd be able to make a call happen today. I am out of the office for the rest of the week, but still available on email.

(b)(6) if you are able to engage and turn a call on, all the how-to is on the share drive. Plus, (b)(6) knows the drill.  
Thx  
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) MAJ MNFI STRATEFF (b)(6)  
To: (b)(6) OSD PA  
Sent: Wed Dec 20 08:13:39 2006  
Subject: RE: [U] FW: Can you help determine if this is accurate?

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(b)(6)  
Looks like Fox ran the story already.

On a separate note, due to the Sec Def visit MG Caldwell cancelled his weekly PC. Therefore, he was wondering if he should do a conference call with a group tomorrow. We would have from 1615-1640 for the call if you think someone might be interested. Please let me know what you might have available and I will get his approval.

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) OSD PA [mailto:(b)(6)]  
Sent: Tuesday, December 19, 2006 5:22 PM  
To: (b)(6) MAJ MNFI STRATEFF; Ballesteros, Mark J LTC OSD PA  
Subject: RE: [U] FW: Can you help determine if this is accurate?

(b)(6) is there any way to confirm or at least not deny that it is being broadcast from syria as the article states??  
thanks

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) MAJ MNFI STRATEFF  
[mailto:(b)(6)]  
Sent: Tuesday, December 19, 2006 8:42 AM  
To: (b)(6) OSD PA; Ballesteros, Mark J LTC OSD PA  
Subject: FW: [U] FW: Can you help determine if this is accurate?

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Sir (b)(6)  
Response from one of our intel guys.

According OCSINT Yes it is a real media network. The GOI shut it down here in Iraq though. Know some bigger efforts are ongoing to

deal with this.

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) MAJ MNFI STRATEFF  
Sent: Tuesday, December 19, 2006 9:50 AM  
To: (b)(6) MAJ MNF-I C2 LNO  
Subject: [U] FW: Can you help determine if this is accurate?

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(b)(6)

Any truth to this statement?

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) OSD PA [mailto:(b)(6)]  
Sent: Monday, December 18, 2006 10:28 PM  
To: (b)(6) MAJ MNFI STRATEFF; Ballesteros, Mark J LTC OSD PA; todd.viciano (b)(6)  
Subject: FW: Can you help determine if this is accurate?

gentlemen,

do any of you know if the following article is accurate?? fox news has asked one of the military analysts whether there is in fact a new AQI broadcast network operating from syria. the article outlines the network. can we confirm or deny??

thanks.

(b)(6)

Al-Qaeda leader Abu Ayyub al-Masri has "big plans" for new propaganda vehicle.

BY DAVEED GARTENSTEIN-ROSS & NICK GRACE

Broadcasting from a secret location in Syria, Al-Qaeda and its allies now have their own 24-hour television station, Pajamas Media has learned.

Known as Al-Zawraa, Arabic for "first channel," the station broadcasts enemy propaganda and rebroadcasts of Western anti-war material, including Michael Moore's Fahrenheit 9/11. It is not connected with Al-Jazeera.

Abu Ayyub al-Masri, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, is delighted by al-Zawraa. A U.S. military intelligence officer told Pajamas Media that the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, al-Masri, "has long-term and big plans for this thing." Previous attempts by al-Qaeda to set up media propaganda outlets have been limited to satellite radio and the Internet. Al-Zawraa, however, is seemingly well financed and striving for a broader appeal.

From that secret studio somewhere in Syria, al-Zawraa TV's signal extends to the entire Arab world thanks to a satellite owned by Egypt, Pajamas Media has learned.

Egypt is officially an ally of the United States in the war on terror. It receives more than \$1 billion a year in U.S. foreign aid, more than any other country on Earth except Israel.

The channel's reach is not limited to Iraq—a fact that highlights the Egyptian government's apparent permissiveness. Al-Zawraa is broadcast on Nilesat, a satellite administered by the Egyptian government. Through Nilesat, al-Zawraa's signal blankets the Middle East and North Africa, thus ensuring that the insurgents' message reaches the entire Arab world.

Al-Zawraa TV began broadcasting on November 14. The channel was set up by the Islamic Army of Iraq, an insurgent group comprised of former Baathists who were loyal to Saddam Hussein and now profess a conversion to a bin Laden-like ideology, according to Middle East-based

media monitor Marwan Soliman.

The Islamic Army of Iraq is subordinate to the Mujahideen Shura Council, an umbrella organization of Sunni insurgent groups, a military intelligence officer told Pajamas Media. The al-Zawraa network is viewed as "credible" by users of established jihadist internet forums.

Al-Zawraa's content is heavy with insurgent propaganda, including audio messages from Islamic Army of Iraq spokesman Dr. Ali al-Na'ami and footage of the group's frontline operations. The station openly calls for violence against Shia Iraqis and the Iraqi government. News anchors appear in military fatigues to rail against the ruling government, and news crawls urge viewers to support the Islamic Army of Iraq and "help liberate Iraq from the occupying U.S. and Iranian forces," Marwan Soliman told Pajamas Media.

Sitting in the Fallujah Government Center in Fallujah, Iraq, military analyst Bill Roggio, who is embedded with the Military Transition Team, watched al-Zawraa with two soldiers from the Iraqi army and a pair of interpreters. Roggio reports that songs mourned Iraqi victims of the "U.S. occupiers," and that images featured on al-Zawraa included "destroyed mosques, dead women and children, women weeping of the death of their family, bloodstained floors, the destruction of U.S. humvees and armored vehicles, and insurgents firing mortars, RPGs, rockets and AK-47s." These pictures were meant to be provocative to jihad-minded youth. His complete account can be found on his blog.

Roggio told Pajamas Media that the station's strategic role for insurgent and al-Qaeda information operations is clear: "Al-Zawraa is designed to recruit for and prolong the insurgency in Iraq. It openly espouses violence, particularly against the Shia, but also against the Iraqi government and security forces and Coalition troops."

Radio Netherlands' media analyst Andy Sennitt told Pajamas Media that al-Zawraa's broadcasts on Nilesat creates questions about the Egyptian government's role. "Nilesat is mostly Egyptian owned," Sennitt said, "so it means they will turn down any customer who is thought to produce material against Egypt's national interest. So apparently the Egyptian authorities are happy with al-Zawraa."

The programming originates from Syria, where its main backer, Mishaan al-Jabouri, a well-known Sunni Baathist agitator and former Iraqi parliamentarian, recently fled to escape an Iraqi arrest warrant for suspected corruption and embezzlement. He initially set the station up in Tikrit, Iraq, but in early November its studio was raided by authorities and closed down for incitement.

Al-Jabouri, who in Damascus during the final years of Saddam Hussein's rule, is widely believed to have forged close ties with Saddam's intelligence services. More recently, he has been linked to al-Qaeda.

The speed with which al-Zawraa was able to resume its transmissions from Syria and Nilesat after the raid on the Tikrit station is unusual, according to Sennitt. Moreover, the reach of al-Zawraa's broadcasts indicates that the station is attempting to influence viewers far beyond Iraq.

Government officials tell Pajamas Media that they are trying to remove al-Zawraa from the airwaves. Jim Turner, deputy director of Defense Press Operations, told Pajamas Media in an e-mail that this is the State Department's decision because "they are the department of the US Government that would interact with another country on such an issue."

In turn, a State Department official told Pajamas Media, "We are strongly supporting the Iraqi efforts to work with the Egyptians to get this off the air." The State Department's comment seems designed to avoid diplomatic fallout, since Egypt's control of Nilesat would allow it to stop al-Zawraa's signal.

Turning off al-Zawraa without Egypt's help would be nearly impossible. Jamming its signal may prove difficult since the physical location of the signal's feed would need to be located and, according to Sennitt, it could be anywhere. "All that's needed is a dish pointing at the satellite, and a transmitter on the correct uplink frequency. The satellite will carry whatever signal it receives."

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross is the author of My Year Inside Radical Islam (Tarcher/Penguin 2007). Nick Grace is the founder of ClandestineRadio.com, a site that tracks subversive broadcast media, and producer of the Global Crisis Watch radio podcast.

Robert L. Maginnis

(b)(6)

robertmag73(b)(6)

http://home.comcast.net/(b)(6)

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(b)(6)

**From:** Gordon, Jeffrey D CDR OSD PA  
**Sent:** Wednesday, December 20, 2006 5:25 PM  
**To:** Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA; Thompson, Jonathan Mr OSD PA; Turner, James Mr OSD PA;  
(b)(6) LCDR OSD PA; Keck, Gary L Col OSD PA (b)(6) LCDR OSD PA;  
Bryan Whitman (bryan\_whitman@ (b)(6))  
**Subject:** MILITARY COMMISSIONS - KEY THEMES AND NOTABLE COMPARISONS  
**Attachments:** Military Commissions - Notable Comparisons.doc

Gentlemen,

For your ready reference, attached is handy one-pager which outlines our key themes and notable comparisons for military commissions and related proposed construction. I have shared these points with quite a number of media, however most of those already in our corner have not seemed to think this was much of a story. Our detractors, meanwhile, have largely glossed over what I've passed along to them.

Perhaps we can market to some military analysts and columnists, like the ones who visited Guantanamo today with Cully Stimson... or others who have recently visited.

Also, I received some feedback from Mr. Geren's exec today (LTC (b)(6)). On our PA/LA roll-out plan for military commissions regulations, this a.m.'s guidance from the DSD was to wait until the week of 8-12 JAN to brief the Hill on the military commissions regulations (due to Congress within 90 days of 17 OCT bill signing) and the press later that same day. We can include the CSRT Media Policy brief as part of that roll-out. We will update PA Plan accordingly.

V/R,

JDG

4/8/2008

## Military Commissions at Guantanamo

Due to the extensive size, scope and complexity of the trials by military commission, additional infrastructure and personnel will be required at Guantanamo to proceed with justice as expeditiously as possible.

The Department of Defense will continue working with the Congress to bring unlawful enemy combatants to justice. We want these procedures to be full and fair, and do not want the lack of facilities to be a reason to delay the process. Only those detainees who will be charged with law of war violations and other grave offenses, estimated at roughly 80 unlawful enemy combatants, will be subject to commissions.

Proposed additional infrastructure encompasses projects from the construction of courtrooms and secure facilities for the prosecution and defense attorneys, media and witnesses, while improving Guantanamo's capacity to provide power and utilities. The current total estimated cost is approximately \$115 million. With only existing facilities capable of single defendant trials, military commissions could take up to 10 years.

### Notable Comparisons

- **Trials at Nuremberg:** Over 100 Nazis were tried in a period of four years including 21 high-value detainees: 1945—1949
- **Pan Am 103 Lockerbie Trial:** Two Libyan defendants were tried at a cost of 75 million British pounds, according to 13 March 2002 BBC report. Roughly equivalent to USD \$163 million adjusted for inflation.
- **Zacharias Moussaoui trial for conspiracy, terrorism and murder**  
"Tens of millions of dollars": estimate of CBS legal analyst Andrew
- **O.J. Simpson murder trial**  
\$9 million; Los Angeles trial lasted 9 months and involved 126 witnesses
- **Court Costs: International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)**

<http://www.un.org/icty/cases-e/factsheets/generalinfo-e.htm>

#### *Annual Budgets*

1999: \$94,103,800  
2000: \$95,942,600  
2001: \$96,443,900  
2002-2003: \$223,169,800  
2004-2005: \$271,854,600  
2006-2007: \$276,474,100

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OSD PA  
Sent: Tuesday, December 19, 2006 8:55 AM  
To: (b)(6) LTC MNC-I V CORPS PAO  
Cc: (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) CIV MNFI STRATEFF COMMS DIV; (b)(6) MAJ MNFI STRATEFF; Ballesteros, Mark J LTC OSD PA; Vician, Todd M LTCd  
Subject: RE: [U] FW: Surrogates Program  
Attachments: Chiarelli Column



Chiarelli Column

hi (b)(6)

one of the military analysts, colonel ken allard, an old colleague of MG chiarelli's, wrote an article based on a conversation they had shortly before he left. he sent it to gen chiarelli, but doesn't have his new email address, so it bounced back. i've attached the message. would you mind forwarding to gen chiarelli??  
thanks!

(b)(6)

included you in case MG caldwell might be interested in seeing some of the outcome from the calls. continue to reap results!  
thanks

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV MNFI STRATEFF COMMS DIV [mailto:(b)(6)]  
Sent: Tuesday, November 28, 2006 12:38 AM  
To: (b)(6) LTC MNC-I V CORPS PAO  
Cc: (b)(6) LTC MNC-I PAO Chief Media Relations; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA  
Subject: FW: [U] FW: Surrogates Program

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(b)(6)

What is it? 16 days now? I know you have a gazillion things to wrap up.

I'm following up on the request from (b)(6) per note from MG Wright. I know you and your folks are working LTG Chiarelli's end of tour plans.

I agree with (b)(6) this is an important group to engage because they can effectively get our messages out as third party endorsers.

(b)(6) runs the Surrogates Program with great support from (b)(6) (both cc'd here) so I'll defer to them on working details out with you and not jump in the middle.

If this is something you will add to LTG Chiarelli's plans for the 8th let me know and I'll brief MG Wright and MG Caldwell to close the loop here.

Many thanks!

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Wright Rudy MG MNFI STRATEFF  
Sent: Tuesday, November 28, 2006 6:40 AM  
To: (b)(6) CIV MNFI STRATEFF COMMS DIV  
Cc: (b)(6) COL STRATEFF; (b)(6) COL MNFI STRATEFF; (b)(6) LTC MNFI STRATEFF COMM DIV; (b)(6) LTC MNFI CPIC; (b)(6) COL MNFI STRATEFF  
Subject: FW: [U] FW: Surrogates Program

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(b)(6)

FYA for coord with Shelly..

Thx

(b)(6)

Stay informed!: <http://www.mnf-iraq.com/>

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) MG MNFI DCS STRATEFF  
Sent: Tuesday, November 28, 2006 6:30 AM  
To: Wright Rudy MG MNFI STRATEFF  
Cc: (b)(6) COL STRATEFF  
Subject: [U] FW: Surrogates Program

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Will let you all work .....

-----Original Message-----

From: Thompson, Jonathan Mr OSD PA [mailto:Jonathan.Thompson@ (b)(6)]  
Sent: Tuesday, November 28, 2006 2:57 AM  
To: (b)(6) Mr OSD PA  
Cc: Caldwell William B MG MNFI DCS STRATEFF; (b)(6) MAJ MNFI STRATEFF; (b)(6) LTC MNC-I V CORPS PAO; Wright Rudy MG MNFI STRATEFF; (b)(6) COL STRATEFF  
Subject: Surrogates Program

Can we include LTG Chiarelli with military analysts on his 8 Dec planned briefing?

These are enormously valuable interactions.

J

Sent from the Blackberry of Jonathan Thompson

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(b)(6)

**From:** Allardck@ (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, December 14, 2006 5:26 PM  
**To:** peter.chiarelli@ (b)(6) mccaustj@ (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(6) OSD PA  
**Subject:** Chiarelli Column

[http://www.mysanantonio.com/opinion/columnists/kallard/stories/MYSA121406\\_2Q\\_allard.2246d60.html](http://www.mysanantonio.com/opinion/columnists/kallard/stories/MYSA121406_2Q_allard.2246d60.html)

As promised!

Ken

4/8/2008

(b)(6)

**From:** JedBabbin@ (b)(6)

**Sent:** Monday, December 18, 2006 7:59 AM

**To:** tmcinmey@ (b)(6); nashct@ (b)(6); BURM41516@ (b)(6); USAGir1957@ (b)(6);  
 WSSInter@ (b)(6); robertscales@ (b)(6); ladd.wheeler@ (b)(6); twilkerson@ (b)(6);  
 ShepDonald@ (b)(6); mike.delong@ (b)(6); mgroot@ (b)(6);  
 groothousen@ (b)(6)

**Subject:** George W. Canute: Today's Spectator

I'm hopeful - but not very - that the president will consider and present his new Iraq policy in terms of the rest of the region, and the world. If he doesn't, it will surely fail. Best, Jed.

The American Spectator

**Jed Babbin**

(b)(6) (home office)  
 (b)(6) (home fax)  
 (b)(6) (mobile)

4/8/2008

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OSD PA  
Sent: Saturday, December 16, 2006 4:06 PM  
To: (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA  
Subject: RE: Stand Up

here is the list of military analysts who have accepted the invitation to have lunch with the secretary on tuesday.

thanks

(b)(6)

Colonel Ken Allard (USA, Retired) - MSNBC Mr. Jed Babbin (AF, Former JAG) - American Spectator, Real Clear Politics Lieutenant General Michael P. DeLong (USMC, Retired) - Fox News Colonel John Garrett (USMC, Retired) - Fox News Command Sergeant Major Steven Greer (USA, Retired) - Fox News Dr. Jeff McCausland (Colonel, USA, Retired) - CBS (radio) Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney (USAF, Retired) - Fox News Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr. (USA, Retired) - Fox News Major General Donald W. Shepperd (USAF, Retired) - CNN Mr. Wayne Simmons (CIA, Retired) - Fox News

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) Mr OSD PA  
Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2006 4:29 PM  
To: (b)(6) OSD PA  
Subject: Fw: Stand Up

As predicted. Plse see below...

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) OSD PA  
To: Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) CTR OSD PA  
CC: Abbott, Catherine COL OSD PA  
Sent: Sun Dec 10 14:55:33 2006  
Subject: Fw: Stand Up

Please see numbers 3 and 4 below. Can you send me this info by 0700 tomorrow? Thank you

(b)(6)

Confidential Assistant to the  
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs  
Sent from my Blackberry

-----Original Message-----

From: Smith, Dorrance HON OSD PA  
To: (b)(6) OSD PA; Abbott, Catherine COL OSD PA  
Sent: Sun Dec 10 13:10:50 2006  
Subject: Stand Up

I'm going to need the following first thing in the am

1. Hard copies of Sat-Sun Early Bird
2. Any late wire copy on SecDef trip
3. Latest list of military analysts who are ATTENDING Tuesday lunch
4. Latest info on ASY event

Thx

(b)(6)

**From:** Paul Valley [valley@(b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Friday, December 15, 2006 1:29 PM  
**To:** 'Thomas McInerney'; Newt Gingrich; 'Fred Gedrich'; WSSInter@(b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: Diana West--Let the Muslims fight it out Paul E Valley

**Importance:** High

All should read this. Fits into what Newt calls the Third Campaign. I, particularly, like Diana's comments, criticisms and views about this being a 100 year or "long war" as one General said last week and the Bush Administration constantly reflects. Ridiculous. Establish an Endgame and bring these bastards and infidels down. The American people deserve to have our forces defeat these radical Muslims and their supporting countries post haste.

-----  
Osprey Media  
Paul E Valley  
Fox Military Analyst/Radio Host "Stand Up America"  
valley@(b)(6)  
tel: (b)(6)  
tel2: (b)(6)  
fax: (b)(6)  
www.ospreymedia.us  
-----

-----Original Message-----  
From: Andrew Bostom [mailto:abostom@(b)(6)]  
Sent: Friday, December 15, 2006 5:21 AM  
To: Undisclosed-Recipient;;  
Subject: Diana West--Let the Muslims fight it out  
Importance: High

I propose two options, neither of which has occurred to Iraq Study Groupies calling for peace parleys with Hezbollah boosters and Holocaust deniers, or to hawkish proponents of "winning" Iraq (or at least Baghdad) with more troops. But maybe that's because neither group dares to reckon with the two greatest obstacles to our efforts in the region: namely, Islam (culturally unsuited to Westernity) and our own politically correct ROE, or rules of engagement (strategically unsuited to victory).

So, the military solution - which isn't the same as boosting ROE-cuffed troop levels in Baghdad - is out, unless or until our desperation level rises to some unsupportably manic level. The great paradox of the "war on terror," of course, is that as our capacity and desire to protect civilians in warfare grows, our enemy's capacity and desire to kill civilians as a means of warfare grows also. Our fathers saved us from having to say, "Sieg Heil," but what's next - "Allahu akbar"?

There's another Middle Eastern strategy to deter expansionist Islam: Get out of the way. Get out of the way of Sunnis and Shi'ites killing each other. As a sectarian conflict more than 1,000 years old, this is not only one fight we didn't start, but it's one we can't end. And why should we? If Iran, the jihad-supporting leader of the Shi'ite world, is being "strangled" by Saudi Arabia, the jihad-supporting leader of the Sunni world, isn't that good for the Sunni-and-Shiite-terrorized West?

With the two main sects of Islam preoccupied with an internecine battle of epic proportions, the non-Muslim world gets some breathing room. And we sure could use it - to plan for the next round.

<http://www.washingtontimes.com/op-ed/dwest.htm>

Let the Muslims fight it out

<<http://www.washingtontimes.com/op-ed/20061214-080029-3104r.htm>>

By Diana West  
THE WASHINGTON TIMES  
Published December 15, 2006

Funny thing about the recent op-ed by Nawaf Obaid in The Washington Post outlining likely Saudi actions if the United States withdraws from Iraq: namely, that Saudis would both support Sunnis in Iraq (versus Shi'ites supported by Iran) and manipulate the oil market to "strangle" the Iranian economy.

I think it sounds peachy, this let-them-devour-each-other strategy - which I'm guessing many Americans mutter to one another in frankness, if not also in confidence.

After the column appeared, not only did the Saudi government disavow it, but Mr. Obaid was fired from his job advising the Saudi ambassador to the United States, Prince Turki al-Faisal. Hmmm, thought Saudi-ologists.

Before anyone could say, "shifting desert sands," Mr. Turki resigned his post in Washington, hightailing it back to the so-called kingdom for reasons unknown but possibly concerning machinations related to securing the post of foreign minister long held by Mr. Turki's ailing brother, Prince Saud al-Faisal. The post is also coveted by former Saudi ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar bin Sultan. Hmmm again.

But now it seems the Obaid column "reflected the view of the Saudi government," after all. At least, that's the way the New York Times tells it. Meanwhile, the Associated Press is reporting that "private" Saudi money is already supporting Sunni forces in Iraq. According to the New York Times, this private funding could easily become official Saudi policy. While Saudi leaders say they have so far withheld support from al Qaeda-led Sunni groups in Iraq, the newspaper explains, "if Iraq's sectarian violence worsened, the Saudis would line up with Sunni tribal leaders" - al Qaeda or no al Qaeda. Meanwhile, we already know Iran is backing, if not guiding, Iraqi Shi'ites.

So what should we do?

I propose two options, neither of which has occurred to Iraq Study Groupies calling for peace parleys with Hezbollah boosters and Holocaust deniers, or to hawkish proponents of "winning" Iraq (or at least Baghdad) with more troops. But maybe that's because neither group dares to reckon with the two greatest obstacles to our efforts in the region: namely, Islam (culturally unsuited to Westernity) and our own politically correct ROE, or rules of engagement (strategically unsuited to victory).

The first option is military, but it carries a seemingly insurmountable cultural override. The fact is, the United States has an arsenal that could obliterate any jihad threat in the region once and for all, whether that threat is bands of IED-exploding "insurgents" in Ramadi, the deadly so-called Mahdi Army in Sadr City, or genocidal maniacs in Tehran. In other words, it's a disgrace for military brass to talk about the 21st-century struggle with Islam as necessarily being a 50- to 100-year war. Ridiculous. It could be over in two weeks if we cared enough to blast our way off the list of endangered civilizations.

As a culture, however, the West is paralyzed by the specter of civilian casualties, massive or not, that accompanies modern (not high-tech) warfare, and fights accordingly. It may well have been massive civilian casualties in Germany (40,000 dead in Hamburg after one cataclysmic night of "fire-bombing" in 1943, for example) and Japan that helped end World War II in an Allied victory. But this is a price I doubt any Western power would pay for victory today.

So, the military solution - which isn't the same as boosting ROE-cuffed troop levels in Baghdad - is out, unless or until our desperation level rises to some unsupportably manic level. The great paradox of the "war on terror," of course, is that as our capacity and desire to protect civilians in warfare grows, our enemy's capacity and desire to kill civilians as a means of warfare grows also. Our fathers saved us from having to say, "Sieg Heil," but what's next - "Allahu akbar"?

Not necessarily. There's another Middle Eastern strategy to deter expansionist Islam: Get out of the way. Get out of the way of Sunnis and Shi'ites killing each other. As a sectarian conflict more than 1,000 years old, this is not only one fight we didn't start, but it's one we can't end.

And why should we? If Iran, the jihad-supporting leader of the Shi'ite world, is being "strangled" by Saudi Arabia, the jihad-supporting leader of the Sunni world, isn't that good for the Sunni-and-Shiite-terrorized West?

With the two main sects of Islam preoccupied with an internecine battle of epic proportions, the non-Muslim world gets some breathing room. And we sure could use it - to plan for the next round.

(b)(6)

**From:** Jed Babbin (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, December 14, 2006 8:45 AM  
**To:** Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA  
**Subject:** For Gen. P

Eric: You may want to shoot a copy of this up to Gen. Pace. I think he'll be interested in the EFP part. Best, Jed.

RealClearPolitics - Articles - Intrusive Facts

**Jed Babbin**

(b)(6) (home office)  
(b)(6) (home fax)  
(b)(6) (mobile)

4/8/2008

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@ (b)(6)

Sent: Thursday, December 14, 2006 8:28 AM

To: tmcinerney@ (b)(6); nashct@ (b)(6); BURM41516@ (b)(6); USAGiri1957@ (b)(6);  
 WSSinter@ (b)(6); robertscales@ (b)(6); ladd.wheeler@ (b)(6); twilkerson@ (b)(6);  
 ShepDonald@ (b)(6); mike.delong@ (b)(6); mgroot@ (b)(6);  
 groothouse@ (b)(6)

Subject: Today's RCP: Iran and Syria

The facts about Iran and Syria make negotiations over Iraq impossible. I think the Baker Boys just didn't listen when they were briefed.

RealClearPolitics - Articles - Intrusive Facts

**Jed Babbin**

(b)(6) (home office)  
 (b)(6) (home fax)  
 (b)(6) (mobile)

4/8/2008



(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA  
**Sent:** Thursday, December 14, 2006 8:05 AM  
**To:** Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA; Whitman, Bryan Mr OSD PA; Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA (b)(6);  
 (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) CTR OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6)  
 (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/Web Operations; (b)(6) OSD PA;  
 Merritt, Roxie, AFIS-HQ; (b)(6) CTR OSD PA; (b)(6) CTR OSD PA; (b)(6)  
 (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA;  
 (b)(6) Thorp, Frank RDML OSD PA; Wilkie, Robert, HON., OSD-LA;  
 Rangel, Robert CIV SD; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA  
**Subject:** Wednesday evening clips  
**Attachments:** Wednesday Clips.doc

Overview:

MSNBC Scarborough Country – Michael Crowley, the New Republic: If the President “doubles down” on the number of troops in Iraq, we’ll see a reaction in the U.S. that will “involve people on the streets and protesting in a way that we haven’t seen since Vietnam”

CNN Lou Dobbs – Ed Henry: There’s discussion at the White House to increase the size of the military, getting them more resources – but “there’s already a deficit.” Questions surround whether we have enough troops to even increase the force only for a few months in Iraq

CNBC Kudlow & Company: (Note: during this clip, the new recruiting numbers were shown on the screen)

- Gen. Wayne Downing: Does not believe in increasing U.S. troops in Iraq - and thinks we need to start drawing down within six months.
- Gen. McCaffrey: One thing that’s “been sadly lacking in this whole effort is appropriately equipping these Iraqi battalions. You know, they’ve got 30 Toyota light trucks, a bunch of small arms”

4/8/2008

MSNBC Scarborough Country – Michael Crowley, the New Republic: If the President “doubles down” on the number of troops in Iraq, we’ll see a reaction in the U.S. that will “involve people on the streets and protesting in a way that we haven’t seen since Vietnam”

CNN Lou Dobbs – Ed Henry: There’s discussion at the White House to increase the size of the military, getting them more resources – but “there’s already a deficit.” Questions surround whether we have enough troops to even increase the force only for a few months in Iraq

CNBC Kudlow & Company: (Note: during this clip, the new recruiting numbers were shown on the screen)

- Gen. Wayne Downing: Does not believe in increasing U.S. troops in Iraq - and thinks we need to start drawing down within six months.
- Gen. McCaffrey: One thing that’s “been sadly lacking in this whole effort is appropriately equipping these Iraqi battalions. You know, they’ve got 30 Toyota light trucks, a bunch of small arms”

MSNBC Scarborough Country 12/14/06 04:08:46

MICHAEL CROWLEY, "THE NEW REPUBLIC": Well, look, Joe, you know, I’m not an expert on military strategy, but it does seem to me that -- I have yet to see someone explain convincingly how a lot more troops are going to solve what seems to me like an intractable problem. And it’s really sort of alarming. I mean, I feel like if Bush doubles down and calls for a lot more troops over there, there’s going to be a reaction to that in this country that will involve people on the streets and protesting in a way that we haven’t seen since Vietnam.

CNN Lou Dobbs 12/13/06 18:05:02

DOBBS: A number of divisions of our troops are now serving in Iraq for a third time. The head of the Marine Corps saying he desperately needs more Marines. The Army acknowledging it needs more troops.

Equipment breaking down, wearing out after almost four years of warfare. Is there a discussion at the White House, as far as you know, about increasing the size of the U.S. military? Is there any discussion about, perhaps, putting in place a path to a draft?

HENRY: Well, not about the draft, but there certainly is a discussion about increasing the size of the military, getting them more resources. But as you know, there are limited resources for this government.

There’s already a deficit. And that’s one of the most controversial portions of whether or not to send more troops to Iraq, whether it’s on a short-term basis or not.

Do we have enough troops to actually go there, even if it's for only three months, six months, are there enough? And also, what does that end up leaving the U.S. vulnerable in other parts of the world, if, in fact, more U.S. troops are in Iraq? That obviously could show some more vulnerability in other parts of the world -- Lou.

CNBC Kudlow & Company 12/13/06 17:40:16

Gen. DOWNING: Well, my view is that putting more United States troops over in Iraq right now, more combat formation, is going to raise false expectations back here in the United States, Larry. It's also going to put more Americans on the street, which are going to further infuriate the Iraqis. I do not believe we should put more US combat units in there. I do believe that some point, six months from now, we need to start a drawdown, but the emphasis, Larry, has to be on the--building the Iraqi army. And, Larry, unfortunately, we've got to start over with the Iraqi police. The Iraqi police have traditionally been corrupt. They're not trusted by the people. The new police that we've put in have fallen back into those same old ways. And we cannot have a pacification campaign. We cannot actually clear these neighborhoods and make them peaceful until we get decent police in there. So I say no more US troops. That's my recommendation.

KUDLOW: General McCaffrey, is it politically palatable, and I don't mean political in a--in a--in a partisan sense. I mean in a national sense. If we stay in Iraq and we do the kinds of things that you gentlemen are talking about, but we don't seem to be doing anything different, no new troops, no immediate pullout. In other words, I'm concerned that the Peter Pace position, that the General Abizaid position, is--it sounds like nothing's changing, Mr. McCaffrey.

TEXT:

Pentagon: Army achieved 105% of it goal

Pentagon: Army and Navy Reserves fell short of Nov. recruiting goals

Pentagon: Army Reserves recruited only 79% of their target

Pentagon: Navy Reserve recruited 91% of their goal

Gen. McCAFFREY: Right. Right.

KUDLOW: That's a problem that I have with that scenario, and I'm reaching for the McCain scenario, only because it sounds like we're doing something different. As you and I well know, I'm not a military expert. But what's your response to that status quo sounding?

Gen. McCAFFREY: Well, I don't think it can be a status quo. I couldn't agree with you more. I think one of the things that's been sadly lacking in this whole effort is appropriately equipping these Iraqi battalions. You know, they've got 30 Toyota light

trucks, a bunch of small arms. We got to leave Iraq almost entirely with our combat power I think within the next three, four, five years. We got to build the helicopter force. We got to give them five thousand light armored vehicles. I think Wayne Downing and I probably agree on one thing, we don't want a lot more embedded trainers. We want better embedded trainers.

Gen. DOWNING: Right.

Gen. McCAFFREY: You got to get kids and give them 90 days of Arabic language. You know, I did that with the Vietnamese airborne. It took me eight months to get trained up to go do my main line military job with the Vietnamese unit. Those are the ways to exploit. Plus, Larry, we got to do economic reconstruction.

KUDLOW: Right.

Gen. McCAFFREY: If we don't--if we don't have \$10 billion a year for five years, all we're doing is fighting these people.

KUDLOW: This is--I--sir, I think you are so dead in the water right on this. This is something I've never understood why we've fallen so far behind the eight ball on all the economic reconstruction. Heck, you know what? If we had to do an FDR, new deal, CCC kind of thing, at least in the short run to get them paid, I heard General Garner say that on C-SPAN. I think it was quite sensible.

Mr. Downing, please take us out. General McCaffrey talked about three, four, five more years. Is that also your view?

Gen. DOWNING: Oh, yes, Larry, it's going to be at least three or four, five more years. You know, and I want to go back to something that Barry said. The military, the security component is what you need for this counterinsurgency campaign to work. But let's not forget, Larry, this is political. We're fighting here, the insurgents are fighting for political stakes, Maliki has got political stakes. If Mal--if Premier Maliki, prime minister, could bring the factions together and could solve these very, very difficult issues, people estimate 90 percent of this insurgency would go away. So let's not forget the political component of this, and if Maliki can't do this, then I think the Iraqis are going to have to get a leader who can.

KUDLOW: Yeah, there's a lot of talk about replacing him, inside his own coalition. Not the United States.

Gen. DOWNING: Absolutely.

KUDLOW: The Shias in his coalition. And the other part we didn't have time with.

Gen. DOWNING: That's exactly right.

(b)(6)

From: Jed Babbin (b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, December 13, 2006 10:27 PM

To: (b)(6) CAPT OVCJCS/PA; Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA

Subject: Re: (no subject)

(b)(6) Sounds great to me. We'll talk soon. Best, Jed.

**Jed Babbin**

(b)(6) (home office)  
(b)(6) (home fax)  
(b)(6) (mobile)

4/8/2008

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) CAPT OVCJCS/PA  
**Sent:** Wednesday, December 13, 2006 3:51 PM  
**To:** JedBabbin (b)(6) Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA  
**Subject:** RE: (no subject)

Jed -- Thanks for your note. Let's chat soon and see if we can come up with some topics; the holidays are a tough window, but we can start planning now for January...

Cheers, and Thanks (b)(6)

vr (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
Captain, U.S. Navy  
Special Assistant for Public Affairs  
to the Vice Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

comm (b)(2)  
dsn (b)(6)

---

**From:** JedBabbin (b)(6) [mailto:JedBabbin (b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, December 13, 2006 2:26 PM  
**To:** Ruff, Eric (b)(6) [Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD]; (b)(6) CAPT OVCJCS/PA  
**Subject:** Re: (no subject)

Eric (b)(6) thanks. I'll be doing a lot of radio in the next couple of weeks. Would love to get the admiral on the air. I'll call. Best, Jed.

**Jed Babbin**  
(b)(6) (home office)  
(b)(6) (home fax)  
(b)(6) (mobile)

4/8/2008

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) OSD PA  
**Sent:** Wednesday, December 13, 2006 1:55 PM  
**To:** Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA  
**Cc:** (b)(6) CTR OSD PA, (b)(6) OSD PA  
**Subject:** AEI Iraq Military Exercise

hi colonel,  
as discussed:

AEI has conducted an iraq military exercise and has produced a report with substantive recommendations for a way ahead. fred kagan, general jack keane (usa, ret) and ken pollack from the brookings institute will present the findings at a public event tomorrow. it is open to the media. they will hand out the executive summary and then the full report will be posted on their website.

they wanted to make the brief available to the highest levels of government and the military before they go public with it. from what i understand, much of the government has been briefed on it. they would now like to offer it to the chairman and his staff at any time that is convenient for him. realize this is incredibly short notice, but if at all possible, i know they would like to come in either later today or early tomorrow.

let me know and i will be happy to work with whoever necessary to set it up.  
thanks

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Public Affairs  
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

4/8/2008

(b)(6)

**From:** Abbott, Catherine COL OSD PA  
**Sent:** Wednesday, December 13, 2006 10:20 AM  
**To:** Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA  
**Cc:** (b)(6) Sgt OSD PA  
**Subject:** Please call Jed Babbin, (b)(6) re. rumbblings he's been hearing

Col Catherine Abbott  
Senior Military Assistant to the  
Assistant Secretary of Defense (PA)  
Rm (b)(2) The Pentagon  
400 Defense  
Washington, DC 20301-1400

(b)(2)  
DSN: (b)(2)  
FAX: (b)(2)

4/8/2008



First Name	Last Name	Street Address	City	State	Zip Code	Organization
Colonel Ken	Allard					VFW
Jed	Babbin					Civ Def Experts
						Ret Mil Analysts
						Ret Mil Analysts
						Civ Def Experts
						Civ Def Experts
						OP Leaders
						Civ Def Experts
						Civ Def Experts
						Civ Def Experts
Dr. James Jay	Carafano					Ret Mil Analysts
						Civ Def Experts
						OP Leaders
						OP Leaders
						Civ Def Experts
						Civ Def Experts
Lieutenant Colonel Gordon	Cuculu					Ret Mil Analysts
						OP Leaders
						Civ Def Experts
						OP Leaders
Lieutenant General Michael P.	DeLong					VFW
						Ret Mil Analysts
						Civ Def Experts
						Civ Def Experts
General Wayne A.	Downing					Ret Mil Analysts
						OP Leaders
						VFW
						Civ Def Experts
Lieutenant Colonel Tim J.	Eads					Ret Mil Analysts
						Civ Def Experts
						VFW
						Civ Def Experts
						VFW
						OP Leaders
						OP Leaders
						Civ Def Experts
						Civ Def Experts
General Ronald	Fogelman					Ret Mil Analysts
Lieutenant Colonel Rick	Francona					Ret Mil Analysts
						Civ Def Experts
						Civ Def Experts
						Civ Def Experts
						Civ Def Experts
						OP Leaders
Colonel John	Garrett					Ret Mil Analysts
						VFW
						Civ Def Experts
						VFW
						OP Leaders
						OP Leaders
						Civ Def Experts
						Civ Def Experts

Brigadier General David L. Grange	435 North Michigan Avenue, Suite 770	Chicago	IL	60611	Ret Mil Analysts VFW Ret Mil Analysts Civ Def Experts Civ Def Experts Civ Def Experts; OP Leaders VFW Civ Def Experts Civ Def Experts Civ Def Experts VFW Ret Mil Analysts Civ Def Experts Civ Def Experts VFW Civ Def Experts Civ Def Experts; OP Leaders OP Leaders VFW Ret Mil Analysts Civ Def Experts; OP Leaders VFW OP Leaders VFW Civ Def Experts VFW VFW VFW Ret Mil Analysts Ret Mil Analysts Civ Def Experts Civ Def Experts OP Leaders Ret Mil Analysts OP Leaders OP Leaders Civ Def Experts Ret Mil Analysts Ret Mil Analysts Civ Def Experts Ret Mil Analysts Ret Mil Analysts Civ Def Experts Ret Mil Analysts Ret Mil Analysts Civ Def Experts Civ Def Experts OP Leaders Civ Def Experts
Command Sergeant Major Steven Greer					(S)
Colonel Jack Jacobs					
General William F. "Buck" Kernan					
Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis					
Major General James "Spider" Marks					
Dr. Jeff McCausland					
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney					
Major General Burton R. Moore					
General Thomas S. Moorman, Jr.					
Major General Michael J. Nardotti, Jr.					
Captain Chuck Nash					

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			(b) (6)	OP Leaders
General Joseph	Ralston		(b) (6)	Civ Def Experts
			(b) (6)	Ret Mil Analysts
			(b) (6)	Civ Def Experts
Major General Robert H.	Scales, Jr.		(b) (6)	OP Leaders
Major General Donald W.	Shepperd		(b) (6)	VFW
Wayne	Simmons		(b) (6)	Ret Mil Analysts
			(b) (6)	Ret Mil Analysts
			(b) (6)	Ret Mil Analysts
Major General Perry	Smith		(b) (6)	Civ Def Experts
			(b) (6)	Civ Def Experts; OP Leaders
Maunce	Sonnenberg		(b) (6)	Ret Mil Analysts
			(b) (6)	Civ Def Experts
			(b) (6)	Ret Mil Analysts
Captain Martin L.	Strong		(b) (6)	VFW
			(b) (6)	Civ Def Experts
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Captain Robert R.	Timberg		(b) (6)	OP Leaders
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			(b) (6)	VFW
			(b) (6)	Civ Def Experts
Major General Paul E.	Valley		(b) (6)	OP Leaders
			(b) (6)	Ret Mil Analysts
Colonel John	Warden		(b) (6)	Civ Def Experts
			(b) (6)	Ret Mil Analysts
			(b) (6)	OP Leaders
General Larry D.	Weld		(b) (6)	VFW
			(b) (6)	Ret Mil Analysts
			(b) (6)	VFW
Bing	West		(b) (6)	Ret Mil Analysts
General Charles E.	Wilhelm		(b) (6)	Ret Mil Analysts
General Tom	Wilkerson		(b) (6)	Ret Mil Analysts
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**From:**  
**Sent:**  
**To:**

(b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA  
Tuesday, December 12, 2006 4:36 PM

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Abbott, Catherine COL OSD PA (b)(6)

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**Subject:** This is a two page review of coverage afforded the military analysts who visited the White House yesterday.

**Attachments:** MediaCov MilitaryAnalysts 12 12 06.doc

  
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## MEDIA COVERAGE: PRESIDENT BUSH'S MEETING WITH MILITARY ANALYSTS DECEMBER 12, 2006

### Print Summary

Six of the top 10 newspapers mentioned President Bush's meeting on Dec. 11 with retired four-star Army generals, John Keane, Barry McCaffrey, and Wayne Downing, and analysts Eliot Cohen and Stephen Biddle. All coverage reported the meeting in conjunction with the President's "Iraq war listening tour" (NYT) this week and included reporting on the State Department meeting the President held prior to the meeting with the generals/analysts. Nearly all reports focused on the generals' previous public criticism of the recently released Iraq Study Group report.

The Washington Post had the most descriptive piece on the meeting, reporting that the experts handed President Bush a "blunt and dismal assessment of his handling of Iraq." The Post quoted one of the participants as saying that the group advised that "alternative approaches must be considered" and that the President should review his national security team. The paper also reported that all the experts agreed that the Army and Marine Corps need to be bigger with bigger budgets, while all except for Gen. Keane disagreed with the notion that additional troops could improve Baghdad security.

USA Today and the Los Angeles Times reported that the advisers also disagreed with the recommendation to enter in discussions with Iran and Syria. The New York Times noted that the meeting indicated "that the White House is distancing itself from the [ISG] report."

### Experts Advise Bush Not To Reduce Troops

(Washington Post)...Michael A. Fletcher and Thomas E. Ricks

Bush Advisers Dispute Study's Findings  
(Houston Chronicle)...Washington Post Reprint

Bush gathers ideas on Iraq  
(Los Angeles Times)...James Gerstenzang

### In Advance of Speech, Bush Seeks Iraq Advice

(New York Times)...Jim Rutenberg

President discusses strategy this week with military, diplomatic, Iraqi leaders  
(USA Today)...David Jackson

Bush meets on war plan  
(New York Daily News)...Kenneth R. Bazinet

### Broadcast Summary

NBC Nightly News featured interviews with Gen. McCaffrey and Gen. Downing following their meeting with President Bush. Gen. McCaffrey noted that the President asked for each participant's viewpoint, which both generals agreed were "widely divergent." Gen. McCaffrey recommended economic reconstruction aid and more Special Forces troops to work with the Iraqi security forces. Gen. Downing also advocated focus on the Iraqi security forces and believed that the "long war on terrorism" needs to be fought beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. Gen. Downing praised the troops for their "great sacrifices" and said that "we cannot do anything that's going to marginalize them, make them feel bad." The generals stated that, based on the President's comments, the administration appears open to ideas and to a change in strategy. MSNBC described the meeting as an "open-mike night."

Both ABC and Fox News noted that the experts the President chose to meet with were known for their "withering criticism" of the ISG report. Fox News showed video of White House Press Secretary Tony Snow denying that the experts were brought in to "shoot down the ISG recommendations." ABC White House correspondent Martha Raddatz reported that experts in the meeting want to see a surge of U.S.

OSD  
Public Affairs Research and Analysis



troops into Baghdad and Al Anbar province and that the President was "most animated...when people talked about victory in Iraq."

**WNBC - NY (NBC) Nightly News with Brian Williams 12/11/06 18:34:04**

**WILLIAMS:** General McCaffrey...How did the president take the rather grim message you had to deliver at the White House today?

**McCAFFREY:** Well, I think they were very open to these ideas. The vice president was there, took copious notes. They had their senior White House staff there; they didn't participate, they listened intently. I thought he was signaling what I believe is the case, in the coming 90 days you're going to see a new secretary of defense -- thank God -- Bob Gates. Josh Bolton as White House chief of staff and Secretary Rice have got to craft a pragmatic way forward. And I expect they'll do that.

**WILLIAMS:** And General Downing, a few seconds left. If you were a betting man, major changes in policy to come?

**DOWNING:** Well, I think there's going to be modifications. I think it was very clear from the president's comments, Brian, that things are going to change, there is going to be something different. How major that is, I don't know. We're going to have to see.

**WABC-NY (ABC): World News with Charles Gibson 12/11/06 18:31:52**

**RADDATZ:** In fact, what the people in the room are known for is their withering criticism of the Baker-Hamilton report released last week. Retired General Jack Keane, who met with the president today, gave the report an "F".

**GEN. JACK KEANE (RET.)** [ABC News consultant, on "Nightline"]: I think it's wholly inadequate. It's a cover story to accept defeat.

**RADDATZ:** What Keane and others in the meeting said they would like to see is a surge of thousands of U.S. forces into Baghdad and Al Anbar province. Others talked of sending in Special Forces or turning more responsibility over to the Iraqis.

**MICHAEL GREEN** [former National Security Council aide, Center for Strategic and International Studies]: By meeting with them, it's a core demonstration from the White House that the Iraq Study Group is part of this conversation but not the answer in itself.

**Fox News: Special Report 12/11/06 18:10:50**

**Host:** Late in the afternoon, the President hosted a handful of what the White House called outside Iraq experts, three retired army generals, a historian, and a regional expert. In recent days, four of the five have been very critical of the Iraq study group's report on Iraq. Retired General Barry McCaffrey called the report's recommendation for a 2008 withdrawal of U.S. combat brigades while leaving embedded U.S. trainers with Iraqi units a "recipe for national humiliation." White House spokesman Tony Snow denied the experts were being brought in to shoot down the ISG's recommendations.

[Begin Clip]

**Tony Snow:** They're being brought in because they're smart people and know how to get things done. They're not brought in to do a book review on Baker-Hamilton, that is not the point.

[End Clip]

**MSNBC: Countdown with Keith Olbermann 12/12/06 00:02:05**

**OLBERMANN:** Good evening. Retired four-star general and MSNBC and NBC News analyst Barry McCaffrey did not use the term, but judging by what he and his colleague, General Wayne Downing, reporting this evening, day one of the President's listening tour about Iraq might better have been described as open-mike night. Our fifth story on the COUNTDOWN, Bush in the bubble, any number of publications reporting this week on the President's underwhelming response to the Iraq Study Group. And now the generals saying, in essence, that when they met with the President today, he essentially asked them only to give their own viewpoint.

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**From:** Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA  
**Sent:** Tuesday, December 12, 2006 10:46 AM  
**To:** 'Di Rita, Lawrence'  
**Subject:** FW: Monday TV clips

**Attachments:** 12 11Clips (2).doc



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the hannity interview with the sd. toward the begining there is discussion about the sd's resignation decision.

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**From:** (b)(6) OSD PA  
**Sent:** Tuesday, December 12, 2006 7:45 AM  
**To:** Smith, Dorrance HON OSD PA; Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA; Whitman, Bryan Mr OSD PA; Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA; Thorp, Frank RDML OSD PA; Thompson, Jonathan Mr OSD PA; Wilkie, Robert, HON, OSD-LA  
**Cc:** (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) ; Abbott, Catherine COL OSD PA; (b)(6) CTR OSD PA; (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/Web Operations; (b)(6) OSD PA; Merritt, Roxie, AFIS-HQ; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA; (b)(6) CTR OSD PA  
**Subject:** Monday TV clips

Fox Hannity & Colmes - Interview with Secretary Rumsfeld in Iraq

NBC Nightly News - Gen. Barry McCaffrey: Belives we need to increase economic aid for reconstruction, and have less of a direct combat role and less imbedded trainers - "you want less people who speak Arabic who ars special forces, who come from elite active duty units. This isn't numbers, it's quality"

NBC Nightly News - Gen. Wayne Downing: Told the President we need more U.S. forces and stronger Iraqi security forces, and that the American people need "to be told what's going on." Also - the troops in Iraq have made many sacrifices - "we cannot do anything that's going to marginalize them, make them feel bad"

Fox Hannity & Colmes - Major Scott Kish, U.S. Marines Civilian Affairs (Interview with Hannity from Iraq): We've made significant process. You were with us at the school the other day, and you saw the two women that wanted support. They've opened up a new school two blocks away from our base, and progress is significant.

Fox Hannity & Colmes - Col. Oliver North: It's the guys like Major Kish and his troops, the guys out there -- and they call them military transition teams, the police transition teams, the Mitts and the Pitts, as they call them, that really are winning over the hearts and minds.

Fox Hannity and Colmes 12/11/06 21:01:27  
<http://mms.tveyes.com/Transcript.asp?StationID=130&DateTime=12%2F11%2F06+21%3A01%3A27&term=rumsfeld&PlayClip=FALSE>

Interview with Secretary Rumsfeld in Iraq

SEAN HANNITY, CO-HOST: And welcome to a very special edition of "Hannity & Colmes." I'm Sean Hannity.

Now, over the weekend, I had the privilege of traveling to Iraq along with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Now, it was his final visit to go see the troops before he leaves office, and that's at the end of this week. Now, the trip was so secret that I didn't even tell the staff of this television program that I was going.

Now, we began by applying into the Al-Asad Air Force Base, some 180 kilometers west of Baghdad. Secretary Rumsfeld conducted a town hall meeting with the soldiers, and some Marines, and even a few sailors. He then visited with a Marine fighter attack squadron.

Now, we had the chance to visit with some of the troops along the way, and you see that video, if you're a FOX Fan, by the way, by logging onto FOXFan.com.

We then flew east to the Balad Air Force Base. That's northeast of Baghdad. There, the secretary met with airmen, and MedEvac crews, and visited a hospital with wounded soldiers. And after we left Balad, we flew to Baghdad International Airport, where we boarded helicopters and flew over Baghdad and headed right into the Red Zone.

We met with embedded soldiers who are working along with Iraqi troops in one of the hottest zones in all of Iraq. They told us about the sectarian violence and how the Iraqis are working with our troops in joint efforts to control the area.

Then we choppered back to the Green Zone in Camp Victory, where I got a chance for a behind-the-scenes tour of one of Saddam Hussein's palaces. And then on Sunday morning, we boarded our C-17. We flew north to the town of Mosul, where Secretary Rumsfeld held another town hall meeting with soldiers and took some of their questions.

I have the chance for my own town hall meeting in the back of the room after the secretary was finished speaking. We got some unbelievably candid moments with the troops.



(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP) UNIDENTIFIED MALE: ... more intellectual, smarter force today. These are soldiers who think on their feet. (END VIDEO CLIP)

HANNITY: We're going to have more of that impromptu town hall meeting a little bit later in the show. First, before we spent the night in Baghdad, I had the chance to speak exclusively with Secretary Rumsfeld.

(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE) HANNITY: Why did you come back one more time?

DONALD RUMSFELD, U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: I had been scheduled to come this weekend, and I decided that I wouldn't about, oh, shortly after we announced my departure. And the more I talked to people, the more people said, "You simply can't do that. You really should go, that those troops are people you've sent over there and that are risking their lives, and it is important for you to go and say thank you to them."

And I began thinking about it hard. And, you know, it's a tough question when your successor is named and confirmed and you have the flow of business. And you say to yourself, "Well, what should I do or what should I defer doing?" Because you don't want to intervene in things that he ought to be doing.

But the other day, a former retired general named Gus Pagonis came in to see me. He's been chairman of our business board, and he just said, "I've got a son over there, and they want you to come over there, and you should go over there." And I said, "By golly, I'll do it."

HANNITY: What happened? You had offered your resignation how many times before?

RUMSFELD: Oh, goodness, three times, I guess, total and...

HANNITY: What happened this time, though?

RUMSFELD: I think that this time the outcome of the election, just to put it right up on the table, created a situation where I personally believe, and the president agrees, it is better for someone else to be leading this department with that new Congress. And it's better for the military; it's better for the department; and it's better for the administration. And I feel comfortable with that.

HANNITY: And you both -- this was a consensus between the two of you?

RUMSFELD: Well, during the period before the election, it was very clear to

me that I felt that way. And I let others know that I felt that way.

HANNITY: The president?

RUMSFELD: And he, well, he put it -- you've been sending signals, but, no, I feel good about it. I hate to not be doing what I've been doing because I care so much about what we've doing, and I'm convinced what we're doing is right, and that it will ultimately succeed, and that the country needs to better understand it. It has to become more familiar to the people.

This is the first war of the 21st century. It's new. It's strange. It doesn't have the benefit of major armies, and navies, and air forces clashing one with another, and an outcome that's clear.

There's only so much the military can do. The military can do the military tasks, but ultimately it will take a political solution. But the danger to our country is real, it's present, it's lethal, and it's growing. And that is a hard thing for people to understand, because we've been so successful in not having an attack in this country for five years.

And this president is almost a victim of the success he has had in preventing another attack in our country, because people have allowed the nature of the threat to diminish in their minds. And I think that we ought not to.

We ought to understand -- what was it that Winston Churchill said -- the gathering storm. It wasn't clear. It was ambiguous, and there were various signals. But, by golly, we're in a period where there is a gathering storm. And the threats of chemical and biological and radiation and nuclear weapons are real. The seriousness of these people is unambiguous, and we need to be vigilant.

HANNITY: Have you had an opportunity to read the ISG report?

RUMSFELD: No.

HANNITY: Will you read it?

RUMSFELD: I've skimmed it.

HANNITY: You skimmed it?

RUMSFELD: Yes.

HANNITY: But part of their solution -- for example, they offer two ideas. One of them is one that I watched you have a very interesting conversation about, embeds and expediting the training of the Iraqi troops along with the American forces, guiding them. And you had a great conversation earlier.

But they talk about, OK, as part of the political solution, negotiate, talk with, discuss issues with Iran and Syria. How do you have a discussion with a man who denies the Holocaust happened, and wants to annihilate another country, and is seeking nuclear weapons? Do you think that's possible?

RUMSFELD: I think that your question is an important one. I don't want to be critical of a report that I have not had a chance to read in detail, but the -- I would say that it -- you have to ask yourself: Why is it that they would want to help us?

HANNITY: Haven't they been fomenting the terror?

RUMSFELD: They've been contributing to the violence in Iraq. They have been unhelpful. They clearly have agents operating, and they are using funding in this country to not allow it to be successful.

And so were one to decide they wanted to talk to somebody, you would have to first understand, well, why is it you would want to talk to them? Have you decided that there's some reason they would want to have some sort of similarity of interest or commonality of interest?

And it's hard, in the case, as you point out, when you have leadership in Iran that says what they say, believes what they believe, and behaves the way they're behaving.

(END VIDEOTAPE)

HANNITY: We'll have more of my exclusive interview with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld from Iraq in just a moment.

Also coming up tonight, Ollie North will bring us a live report from the front lines. He's in Ramadi tonight. And then we'll show you some of my unscripted, completely candid conversation with our troops that are fighting in Iraq, from Mosul.

Plus, former Majority Leader Tom DeLay is here with a big announcement about his political future.

And Cindy Sheehan said she won't stop at just impeaching President Bush.

We'll play you that tape.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK) ALAN COLMES, CO-HOST: Welcome back to "Hannity & Colmes." We now continue with Sean's exclusive interview in Iraq with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE) HANNITY: Secretary-designate Gates said during his hearing, "We're not winning the war; we're not losing the war."

RUMSFELD: Yes.

HANNITY: Your thoughts on him, those comments, and do you have any advice for him?

RUMSFELD: No, I don't have any advice for him. I wish him well. It's a tough job, and I have every confidence he'll do a good job at it.

I said it differently a couple of years ago in a memorandum I sent to the president and ended up in the press. And I said something to the effect that we can't -- the metrics for winning or losing are very difficult. Today, the president's being measured on the amount of violence in Iraq, and basically in Baghdad. It's three or four provinces out of 18 in one country.

That is not the measure; that is the wrong measure. If that were to be the only metric or measure of success or failure, my goodness, then you've given the game to the enemy. All they have to do is keep violence up in Baghdad, and the media that's there will say, "Oh, my goodness, the terrorists are winning and everyone else is losing." That's not it.

But, regrettably, there are not good metrics to determine how it's actually going on, what's happening. The kinds of things one would want to know, if you really wanted to have your finger on the pulse of who's winning and who's losing in this global struggle against violent extremism, you would want to know how the terrorists and the extremists are doing in raising money.

How are they doing in recruiting? Are the things that are happening in the world advantaging them so that the cadre of people that support their position is increasing or is it decreasing?

We know we are killing -- the president has done a fascinating job of getting some 80 countries into a global coalition against extremists. And we know we're putting pressure on them around the globe. We know it's harder for them to do things; it's harder to raise money; it's harder to transfer money; it's harder to move between countries; it's harder to recruit; it's harder to move weapons, but they still do it.

And the question is, is the pressure that's being put on them greater than they are able to apply, in terms of raising money and recruiting? And because it is -- you know, this is -- it would be easier if you had big armies, big navies, and big air forces contesting each other. We don't.

These people are determined. They are not going to sign a surrender on the USS Missouri in the Pacific Ocean someday. They're not going to surrender. They're going to have to be put down over time in a long struggle, much more like the Cold War than World War II or World War I.

HANNITY: All right. So these are your final nine days. How do you feel? I don't know if you're a guy that would say I feel -- do you feel sad? Do you feel...

RUMSFELD: No, no, not at all. Not at all.

HANNITY: ... like you have achieved a lot?

RUMSFELD: I do.

HANNITY: Are you proud of everything you've done?

RUMSFELD: I feel very...

HANNITY: Are you misunderstood by the media and maybe some of your political opponents?

RUMSFELD: Well, no. My guess is my political opponents are probably -- have reason to disagree. We've done a lot. We've moved a great deal in that department, and people don't like that. The contractors don't like it; congressmen don't like it; pieces of the bureaucracy don't like it.

When you make those kinds of changes, somebody's not going to like it. Now, you can go ahead and be secretary of defense and have nobody be unhappy about it. All you have to do is not do anything. Who wants to live that kind of a life?

HANNITY: The media, you know, they want to say this civil war has broken out in Iraq. They've taken a position. We've got politicians out there publicly saying, "We can't win the war," et cetera. They've undermined the president, I would argue, in a lot of ways.

How has that impacted the whole ability to fight a war?

RUMSFELD: It makes it more difficult. That's one of the natures of a democracy. People can say what they want. They can be right. They can be wrong. They can be harmful. They can be helpful.

But we've survived that kind of partisan political debate. We saw it during the Revolutionary War. We saw it during the Civil War. We saw it during World War I and II. We certainly saw it during the Vietnam War, Korean War. My goodness, yes.

No, if you're secretary of defense during a war, no war is popular, except in retrospect. They aren't popular at the time. They're ugly things. They're terrible things. And people die, and people are wounded, and people are heartbroken. And there's inevitably going to be criticism, and that goes with the territory, and I accept that.

HANNITY: You know what you said earlier today? You actually were addressing the troops, and you said, "Some of you guys weren't even born 30 years ago when I left my first stint as secretary of defense."

RUMSFELD: That's right. A lot of them weren't.

HANNITY: And you said, "What will history show in 30 years" is your measure.

RUMSFELD: Sure.

HANNITY: So what will history show in 30 years from now?

RUMSFELD: I'll leave it to the historians, but I think that history has to look at this period as a period that is new, where there is no roadmap, where there is no guidebook that said, "Here's how you do this," and that an awful lot of right decisions were made.

The recognition that a terrorist can attack at any place in any location using any technique in any time of the day or night, there's no way to defend in every location at every minute of the day or night against every conceivable technique. It can't be done.

You have no choice but to go after the terrorists, the extremists, where they are. You cannot wait to be hit. And that concept was central to the president's position, and it's the right one. (END VIDEOTAPE)

COLMES: Coming up, we're going to go live to Iraq for an update for our own Colonel Oliver. And then we'll show you what the troops had to say when we continue with Sean's special trip to Iraq on "Hannity & Colmes."

WNBC Nightly News with Brian Williams 12/11/06 18:34:04  
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General BARRY McCaffrey, Retired (NBC News Military Analyst): Clearly the big issues, Brian, are should we reinforce with more US combat units? I think my answer clearly is no. I argued (to the President) for economic reconstruction aid, \$10 billion a year for clearly downplaying the direct US combat role, get US troops out of the city in the coming two years, and then I think the second issue was how about imbedded trainers? Do we actually want 20,000 US sergeants and captains at company level in the Iraqi army and police? I argued no. You want less people who speak Arabic who are special forces, who come from elite active duty units. This isn't numbers, it's quality.

WILLIAMS: And, General Downing, same question. Were these mostly points that have been brought to the public debate as a result of the Iraq Study Group?

General WAYNE DOWNING, Retired (NBC News Military Analyst): I think they were, Brian. They were, as Barry said, widely divergent. I know I for one really made the point not only no more US forces, but I also believe that the key to this thing is going to be the Iraqi security forces. My comment to the president was, is we've got to look at this long war on terrorism, this ideological struggle we're in with al-Qaeda, radical Islam through the prism of Iraq. We can't just look at Iraq and Afghanistan. We've got to think much beyond that.

And then the last point I made, Brian, was the perception of the American people. They've got to be told what's going on. They've got to be able to understand it. They don't right now. And the other--and a subset of that, Brian, is the American fighting men and women and their loved ones around the United States. They've made great sacrifices. They believe in what they've done. They're proud of it. We cannot do anything that's going to marginalize them, make them feel bad.

WILLIAMS: General McCaffrey, you are both a couple of patriotic guys. West Point-educated, both wounded in service to your nation, veterans of more than one war. How did the president take the rather grim message you had to deliver at the White House today?

Gen. McCaffrey: Well, I think they were very open to these ideas. The vice president was there, took copious notes. They had their senior White House staff there. They didn't participate. They listened intently. I thought he was signaling what I believe is a case. In--on the coming 90 days, you're going to see a new secretary of defense, thank God, Bob Gates. Josh Bolten

as White House chief of staff and Secretary Rice have got to craft a pragmatic way forward, and I'll expect they'll do that.

WILLIAMS: And, General Downing, few seconds left. If you were a betting man, major changes in policy to come?

Gen. DOWNING: Well, I think there's going to be modifications. I think it was very clear from the president's comments, Brian, that things are going to change. There's going to be something different. How major that is, I don't know. We're going to have to see.

Fox News Hannity & Colmes

HANNITY: Joining us now from Ramadi is the host of "War Stories" right here on the FOX News Channel, Colonel Oliver North.

Colonel, I know I missed you at Saddam's palace -- and we'll show this tomorrow night -- by about 24 hours, my friend. And I'm sorry I did. I've got to tell you, though, Colonel, as you fly in on a C-17, we went through three mid-air refuelings on this trip.

You meet the troops. They're there for one-year tours. The level of commitment, sacrifice, risk, and commitment to the mission, I've got to tell you, it was very inspiring being there.

OLLIE NORTH, HOST OF "WAR STORIES": It is, indeed, and it is because of people like Major Scott Kish standing right here next to me that this war is going to be won. You know, people ask me, "Can you win this war?" Well, Sean, you've been here. You've seen this. The folks I'm living with out here are the ones who are making the difference in Ramadi, and they're going to make that kind of difference around the rest of the country.

Major Kish is the head of the CAG, the Civil Affairs Group. And I talk to these young Marines out here, and we go on patrol with them. We've been out to schools with them. We've seen the projects that they're working on, winning over -- and don't be cynical, Alan Colmes -- the hearts and minds of the people of Ramadi, Iraq, one of the most violent cities on the planet Earth, a place that's been the heart of the Sunni Triangle.

And Major Kish's job is to convince these people that they really do want to support democracy, and stop throwing bombs at the Americans, and work together, Sunni and Shia, to have a better country. Is it going to work?

MAJOR SCOTT KISH, U.S. MARINES CIVILIAN AFFAIRS: Absolutely. We've made significant process. You were with us at the school the other day, and you



saw the two women that wanted support. They've opened up a new school two blocks away from our base, and progress is significant.

NORTH: I look at the young Marines you've got here, all Reservists, all guys who've volunteered to come here and serve in this capacity. And the smiles of the little Iraqi kids when -- this is a school, Alan, that didn't have any heat, no electricity, little tiny pieces of chalk, and little girls going to school learning long division standing right at the chalkboard, working with the teachers wrapped in an overcoat. I mean, it was powerful.

KISH: It's simply amazing. And like I told the principal, those are the heroes of this conflict.

NORTH: Well, it's the guys like Major Kish and his troops, the guys out there -- and they call them military transition teams, the police transition teams, the Mitts and the Pitts, as they call them, that really are winning over the hearts and minds.

HANNITY: You know, Colonel, one of the things, without fail, wherever the secretary went, you know, he was greeted like a rock star. I mean, the troops love him.

And the one theme that kept coming back to me -- and they watch TV regularly; they had FOX News on almost everywhere I went -- is that the media they feel is not portraying this accurately, and they did mention quite often the disdain and the disgust at the portrayal of their efforts and the politics that's going on behind here in America.

I assume that, you know, this, now your eighth trip to Iraq, you're hearing a lot of the same thing.

NORTH: Well, you know, I look at these guys, and I watch what they do day in and day out. One of the things that occurred the other day, when the famous Hamilton-Baker report came out, there was a comment in there that they needed to start training the Iraqi troops.

And one of the folks on one of the military transition teams said to me, "I wonder what the devil they think I've been doing over here." I mean, the fact that you've got Iraqi policemen, who are primarily Sunni in this city, and Iraqi army personnel, who are primarily Shia in this city, sitting next each other, with Major Kish at the table, working together.

The battalion commander from this unit, the First Battalion, Sixth Marines, the Army brigade commander, all working together to make a better city ought to be great news. Somehow it just doesn't get transmitted through the airwaves to the folks or the masters in the media.

COLMES: Colonel, it's Alan. Welcome back to our show. It was reported over the weekend in the "New York Times" that the Sunnis are being targeted by the Shias, almost for revenge before of all the years that Sunnis ran Iraq, that every checkpoint is a threat to Sunnis, who are being killed at checkpoints by Shias, and that that is one of the big problems that's going on, and our troops are in the middle of all that.

Does the major with whom you're speaking see it that way? And has that been his experience?

NORTH: Do you feel yourself caught in an internecine war between the Sunnis and the Shias here in Ramadi?

KISH: Absolutely not. Here we have Sunni and Shia. There is no violence between the two. They work hand in hand. Like you said, the Iraqi army and the Iraqi police go on patrols together. We've done food distributions with both the Iraqi and the police. Sometimes the Iraqi army leads the patrols; sometimes the Iraqi police lead the patrols.

NORTH: And I think, Alan, one of the things that has happened out here that I've seen in the six trips or my eight trips to Iraq -- six of them here to Ramadi -- is that the people of this city, very violent, still very dangerous, have decided they've had enough of Al Qaeda. And working with the sheiks, the local imams, getting them involved in the process is making a difference out here.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OSD PA  
Sent: Tuesday, December 12, 2006 9:50 AM  
To: (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) Maj SD; (b)(6) YN1 SD; (b)(6)  
Cc: (b)(6) CTR OSD PA  
Subject: Seating Chart for SecDef lunch with mil analysts  
Importance: High

Was this seating list below finalized?

Need to get to (b)(6) in OSD-PA to show SecDef before meeting.

Thanks.

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) OSD PA  
Sent: Tuesday, December 12, 2006 9:47 AM  
To: (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA  
Subject: RE: needs for tomorrow

Can this be put into a document for (b)(6) to take to his prep? He can't show this to SD. Did protocol finalize it?

(b)(6)

Confidential Assistant to the  
Assistant Secretary  
of Defense for Public Affairs  
1400 Defense Pentagon (b)(2)  
Washington, DC 20301-1400  
(main) (b)(2)  
(private) (b)(2)  
(c) (b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) OSD PA  
Sent: Tuesday, December 12, 2006 9:46 AM  
To: (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA  
Subject: FW: needs for tomorrow

(b)(6) sent this to secretary's office (protocol?) to be finalized last night...

for the seating at the lunch table... here is my best guess (assuming they're sitting at one table?):  
to the right of the secretary (he's sitting in the middle, right?):

- Mr. Jed Babbin (Former DUSD)
- Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney (USAF, Retired)
- Major General Donald W. Shepperd (USAF, Retired)
- Dr. Jeff McCausland (Colonel, USA, Retired)
- Mr. Wayne Simmons (CIA, Retired)

to the left of secdef:

· Lieutenant General Michael P. DeLong (USMC, Retired)

· Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr. (USA, Retired)

· Colonel John Garrett (USMC, Retired)

· Command Sergeant Major Steven Greer (USA, Retired)

hope that helps. feel free to change it all around if i'm way off on that.

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) CTR OSD PA  
**Sent:** Monday, December 11, 2006 10:37 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) OSD PA  
**Cc:** (b)(6) OSD PA  
**Subject:** RE: Ret. Mil Analysts Briefings

Jed Babbin has also confirmed.

-----  
**From:** (b)(6) CTR OSD PA  
**Sent:** Monday, December 11, 2006 10:32 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) OSD PA  
**Cc:** (b)(6) OSD PA  
**Subject:** Ret. Mil Analysts Briefings

Here's what I have been able to confirm in regards to getting everyone here at 1000. I'm going to let (b)(6) know Dr. Winkenwerder is on at 1030.

Colonel Ken Allard (USA, Retired) - MSNBC (Left a message)

Mr. Jed Babbin (AF, Former JAG) - American Spectator, Real Clear Politics (Left a message)

Lieutenant General Michael P. DeLong (USMC, Retired) - Fox News (Flight lands at 9:30, he'll be asap)

Colonel John Garrett (USMC, Retired) - Fox News (Confirmed)

Command Sergeant Major Steven Greer (USA, Retired) - Fox News (Confirmed)

Dr. Jeff McCausland (Colonel, USA, Retired) - CBS (radio) (Confirmed)

Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney (USAF, Retired) - Fox News (Confirmed)

Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr. (USA, Retired) - Fox News (Confirmed)

Major General Donald W. Shepperd (USAF, Retired) - CNN (Confirmed)

Mr. Wayne Simmons (CIA, Retired) - Fox News (Confirmed)

(b)(6)

**From:** Paul Vallely [vallely (b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Monday, December 11, 2006 9:56 AM  
**To:** Thomas G McInerney; Wayne Simmons  
**Cc:** 'Bill Cowan'  
**Subject:** Israel

See latest out of the ME. Israel and US should immediately exercise military option to provide air and UW support to the Lebanese Government to deny Hizbollah, Syria and Iran from taking over Lebanon and establish a radical Islam Theocracy. The Chess move game is on!

IDF: Syria Preparing for War with Israel, Al-Qaeda in Lebanon May Attack Foreign Peacekeepers > - Gideon Alon and Amos Harel (Ha'aretz)

The head of the research division of Military Intelligence, Brig.-Gen. Yossi Baidatz, told the Cabinet Sunday that Syrian President Bashar Assad is preparing for a war with Israel.

Assad has ordered increased production of long-range missiles and instructed the Syrian army to position its anti-tank missiles closer to the Syrian border with Israel, on the Golan Heights.

Baidatz also said Iran is continuously operating in Lebanon to reinforce Hizballah, while also working to strengthen Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Palestinian territories.

He also noted, "There are major signs of a Global Jihad [al-Qaeda] presence in Lebanon, especially the refugee camps, and one of their intentions is to attack the foreign peacekeepers.... They see the peacekeepers as symbols of the West."

See also IDF: Syria Not Planning for War This Summer > - Amos Harel and Gideon Alon (Ha'aretz)

The Israel Defense Forces announced Saturday night it has no intelligence regarding Syrian plans to initiate a war against Israel next summer.

---

Report: Hamas to Join with Hizballah in Prisoner Release Talks

Hamas has decided to link any deal for the release of abducted Israel Defense Forces soldier Gilad Shalit with Hizballah's negotiations for the release of two IDF

reservists kidnapped in a July raid, a senior Palestinian source said Sunday.

Until now, Hamas has negotiated separately with Israel through Egyptian intermediaries.

The source, who is close to PA Chairman Abbas, claimed Hamas decided to link its efforts with those of Hizballah following Syrian and Iranian pressure.

Fox News Channel  
Osprey Media  
Paul E Vallely  
Fox Military Analyst/Radio Host "Stand Up  
America"

vallely (b)(6)

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tel2

fax: 406 837 0996

[www.ospreymedia.us](http://www.ospreymedia.us)

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(b)(6)

**From:** Paul Valley (valley) (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, December 11, 2006 9:58 AM  
**To:** 'Jim Lynch'  
**Subject:** Lebanon

See latest out of the ME. Israel and US should immediately exercise military option to provide air and UW support to the Lebanese Government to deny Hizbollah, Syria and Iran from taking over Lebanon and establish a radical Islam Theocracy. The Chess move game is on!

IDF: Syria Preparing for War with Israel, Al-Qaeda in Lebanon May Attack Foreign Peacekeepers > - Gideon Alon and Amos Harel (Ha'aretz)

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Fox News Channel  
Osprey Media  
Paul E Valley  
Fox Military Analyst/Radio Host "Stand Up  
America"  
valley (b)(6)



tel: (b)(6)  
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(b)(6)

**From:** JedBabbin (b)(6)

**Sent:** Monday, December 11, 2006 8:34 AM

**To:** tmcineirney (b)(6) nashct (b)(6) Glenstrae77 (b)(6) BURM41516 (b)(6)  
USAGirl1957 (b)(6) WSSinter (b)(6) robertscales (b)(6)  
ladd.wheeler (b)(6) twilkerson (b)(6) mgroot (b)(6) groothousen (b)(6)

**Subject:** Today's Spectator: The Beirut in Baghdad

Ok, two in one day? If the Washington Redskins were worth watching, and the results of so doing not so depressing, my output would be lessened.

The American Spectator

**Jed Babbin**

(b)(6) (home office)  
(b)(6) (home fax)  
(b)(6) (mobile)

(b)(6)

**From:** JedBabbin@ (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, December 11, 2006 8:20 AM  
**To:** tmcinorney@ (b)(6) nashct@ (b)(6) Glenstrae77@ (b)(6) BURM41518@ (b)(6)  
USAGin1957@ (b)(6) WSSinter@ (b)(6) roberthscales@ (b)(6)  
ladd.wheeler@ (b)(6) twilkerson@ (b)(6) mgroot@ (b)(6) groothousen@ (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Today's RCP: Return of the Black Dog

Iraq is in extremis. But it will be much worse, and America will be paralyzed, if we follow the ISG's path.

[RealClearPolitics - Articles - Don't Give in to Defeat in Iraq](#)

**Jed Babbin**

(b)(6) (home office)  
(b)(6) (home fax)  
(b)(6) (mobile)

(b)(6)

**From:** Caldwell William B MG MNFI DCS STRATEFF (william.caldwell@ (b)(6))  
**Sent:** Friday, December 08, 2006 9:51 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) OSD PA; Wright Rudy MG MNFI STRATEFF; (b)(6) COL STRATEFF  
**Cc:** Thompson, Jonathan Mr OSD PA; (b)(6) CIV MNFI STRATEFF COMMS DIV  
**Subject:** [U] RE: follow up from call

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Great --

-----Original Message-----

**From:** (b)(6) OSD PA (mailto:(b)(6))  
**Sent:** Friday, December 08, 2006 10:56 PM  
**To:** Caldwell William B MG MNFI DCS STRATEFF; Wright Rudy MG MNFI STRATEFF; (b)(6) COL STRATEFF  
**Cc:** Thompson, Jonathan Mr OSD PA; (b)(6) CIV MNFI STRATEFF COMMS DIV  
**Subject:** Fw: follow up from call

Good feedback from LTG Chiarelli's conf call with Military Analysts today.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----  
**From:** (b)(6) OSD PA  
**To:** (b)(6) LTC MNC-I V CORPS PAO'  
**CC:** (b)(6) Mr OSD PA; (b)(6) MAJ MNFI STRATEFF'  
(b)(6) CTR OSD PA; Ballesteros, Mark J LTC OSD PA; Vician, Todd M LtCol OSD PA  
**Sent:** Fri Dec 08 13:49:25 2006  
**Subject:** follow up from call

<<list osd liaison 167.doc>>

hi (b)(6)

please pass along our thanks to ltg chiarelli for his taking the time today for the conference call with the military analysts. attached is the list of participants from the call, for your review, although i think most of them identified themselves. we have gotten some great feedback. these sessions are enormously beneficial and i know they greatly appreciated the general's candor.

would you please forward me a copy of his opening comments at the press conference this morning to pass along, as they requested?? that would be great.

thanks again,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Public Affairs  
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)

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---

To: (b)(6)  
Date: Friday, December 08, 2006 9:30AM ET  
E-Mail Address: On file  
Company Name: OSD  
Host's Name: (b)(6) Lt. Gen. Chiarelli  
Conference Name: OSD/PA Liaison (9:30A) (b)(6)  
Conference Title: "OSD Military Analyst"

---

**Participant Information**

- |                                |                             |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. Major General Robert Scales | Colgen Inc.                 |
| 2. LTC Robert Maginnis         | BCP International           |
| 3. Honorable Bing West         | Atlantic Magazine           |
| 4. Mr. Wayne Simmons           | Fox News                    |
| 5. LTC Rick Francona           | NBC                         |
| 6. Col Ken Allard              | MSNBC - NBC                 |
| 7. Lt.Gen. McInerney           | Fox News                    |
| 8. Col. Jeff McCausland        | CBS News                    |
| 9. Mr. Jed Babbin              | American Spectator Magazine |
| 10. CSM Steve Greer            | Fox News                    |
| 11. C/Lt. Gen. Chiarelli       |                             |
| 12. C (b)(6)                   |                             |

(b)(6)

**From:** Paul Vallely [vallely@(b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Friday, December 08, 2006 12:52 PM  
**To:** Dennis Dodson; Neal I. Goldman C.F.A.  
**Subject:** Saudis

Private Saudi citizens are giving millions of dollars to Sunni insurgents in Iraq and much of the money is used to buy weapons, including shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, according to key Iraqi officials.

The U.S. Iraq Study Group report said "funding for the Sunni insurgency comes from private individuals within Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states."

Several truck drivers interviewed by the Associated Press described carrying boxes of cash from Saudi Arabia into Iraq, money they said was headed for insurgents.

Overall, the Iraqi officials said, money has been pouring into Iraq from Saudi Arabia, a Sunni bastion, since the fall of the Sunni regime of Saddam Hussein in 2003.

They all have paid extraordinary fees to the Baker- Boggs firm in DC \_ Jim Baker and the Bush One crowd plus many General Officers,...More to come on Dubai and the Saudis and their peddling influence on high level Americans.

---

Fox News Channel  
Osprey Media  
Paul E Vallely  
Military Analyst/Radio Host "Stand Up  
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(b)(6)

**From:** Abbott, Catherine COL OSD PA  
**Sent:** Friday, December 08, 2006 11:17 AM  
**To:** Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA  
**Cc:** (b)(6) Sgt OSD PA  
**Subject:** SD PA Events NExt Week

Sir,

Below are the events currently on the calendar:

**Tuesday, 12 December**  
1140 - 1155 Laura Ingraham  
1200 - 1245 Lunch with Military Analysts

**Wednesday**  
1045 - 1115 ASY Summit

**Thursday**  
1145 - 1205 Brit Hume

v/r (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) CIV SD  
**Sent:** Friday, December 08, 2006 9:33 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) CIV SD; Barber, Allison Ms OSD PA; (b)(6) YN1 SD; (b)(6) OSD PA; Whitman, Bryan Mr OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) CIV SD; Ruff, Eric Mr OSD PA; Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA; Buccl, Dr. Steven CIV SD; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) CIV SD; (b)(6) CIV SD; (b)(6) CIV SD; SD - Protocol AOs; (b)(6) LCDR OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) CDR OSD PA; Smith, Dorrance HON OSD PA; Buccl, Dr. Steven CIV SD; (b)(6) COL OSD PA; (b)(6) Sgt OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; Abbott, Catherine COL OSD PA; (b)(6) Ms OSD PA; (b)(6) CIV SD

**Subject:** RE: Sean Hannity

I am told this interview is now canceled - no resked - thanks,

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) CIV SD  
**Sent:** Tuesday, December 05, 2006 11:24 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) CIV SD; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) YN1 SD; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV SD; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; Buccl, Dr. Steven CIV SD; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV SD; (b)(6) CIV SD; SD - Protocol AOs; (b)(6) LCDR, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CDR, OASD-PA; Smith, Dorrance, HON, OSD-PA; Buccl, Dr. Steven CIV SD; (b)(6) COL OSD PA; (b)(6) Sgt OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; Abbott, Catherine COL OSD PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV SD

**Subject:** Sean Hannity

We would also like to add on Tuesday 12 December a radio interview w/Sean Hannity:

3:00pm-3:15 - Radio Interview w/Hannity, SD Ofc (no extra prep)

Let me know if this works also - thanks,

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) CIV SD  
**Sent:** Tuesday, December 05, 2006 11:22 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) CIV SD; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) YN1 SD; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV SD; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; Buccl, Dr. Steven CIV SD; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV SD; (b)(6) CIV SD; SD - Protocol AOs; (b)(6) LCDR, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CDR, OASD-PA; Smith, Dorrance, HON, OSD-PA; Buccl, Dr. Steven CIV SD; (b)(6) COL OSD PA; (b)(6) Sgt OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; Abbott, Catherine COL OSD PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV SD

**Subject:** RE: PA Lunch w/Secretary Rumsfeld. And Laura Ingram

We would like to add Laura Ingram to the line up on Tues. 12 Dec:

11:25am-11:40 - PA Prep w/D. Smith  
11:40am-11:55 - Radio Interview w/Laura Ingram (SD Ofc)



12:00pm-12:45 - Luncheon w/Military Analysis, DRm

Let me know if this works - thanks,

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV SD

Sent: Tuesday, November 28, 2006 4:19 PM

To: (b)(6) CIV SD; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) YN1 SD; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV SD; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; Bucci, Dr. Steven CIV SD; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV SD; (b)(6) CIV SD; SD - Protocol AOs; (b)(6) LCDR, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CDR, OASD-PA; Smith, Dorrance, HON, OSD-PA; Bucci, Dr. Steven CIV SD; (b)(6) COL OSD PA; (b)(6) Sgt OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; Abbott, Catherine COL OSD PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA

Subject: RE: PA Lunch w/Secretary Rumsfeld.

We would like to do the military analysts luncheon on TUESDAY 12 December:

11:45am-12:00 - PA Prep w/D. Smith  
12:00pm-12:45 - Military Analysts Luncheon

Thanks (b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV SD

Sent: Tuesday, November 28, 2006 11:44 AM

To: (b)(6) CIV SD; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) YN1 SD; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV SD; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; Bucci, Dr. Steven CIV SD; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV SD; (b)(6) CIV SD; SD - Protocol AOs; (b)(6) LCDR, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CDR, OASD-PA; Smith, Dorrance, HON, OSD-PA; Bucci, Dr. Steven CIV SD; (b)(6) COL OSD PA; (b)(6) Sgt OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; Abbott, Catherine COL OSD PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA

Subject: RE: Lunch w/Secretary Rumsfeld.

I have been told to cancel this lunch (7 Dec) and instead SecDef wants to do a luncheon with military analysts on Monday 11 December, let me get back to you to confirm the date and time for 11 Dec -

Thanks (b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV SD

Sent: Friday, November 17, 2006 10:24 AM

To: (b)(6) CIV SD; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) YN1 SD; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV SD; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; Bucci, Dr. Steven CIV SD; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV SD; (b)(6) CIV SD; SD - Protocol AOs; (b)(6) LCDR, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CDR, OASD-PA; Smith, Dorrance, HON, OSD-PA; Bucci, Dr. Steven CIV SD; (b)(6) COL OSD PA; (b)(6) Sgt OSD PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; Abbott, Catherine COL OSD PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA

Subject: Lunch w/Secretary Rumsfeld.

Secretary Rumsfeld mentioned this morning about getting the "talking heads" in for lunch - wondering if Thursday 7 December would work? What is a better name for them??

11:30am-11:45-PA Prep

RE: Sean Hannity

Page 3 of 3

11:45am-12:45 - Talking Heads Luncheon

Let me know - thanks,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, December 07, 2006 8:10 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Exit Rumsfeld, Smiling (Babbin)

Thoughtful article about Rumsfeld by Jed Babbin.



December 07, 2006

## Exit Rumsfeld, Smiling

By Jed Babbin

One day in the next two weeks there will be a departure ceremony at the Pentagon. Flags will fly, bands will play and the liberal media will calumniate. Should the president choose to add the Presidential Medal of Freedom to the other honors rendered, it's entirely possible that some newsrooms will have to bring in trauma therapists. The 527 Media will indulge themselves in one last feeding frenzy over the man they love to hate, Donald Rumsfeld. Mr. Rumsfeld's departure will feature a revival of the political fables that have been written about him, and provide a cautionary tale for his successor, Robert Gates.

Mr. Rumsfeld will probably walk out of the Pentagon smiling at the thought of a job well done. His tenure has been colored by an onslaught of media attacks, but Rumsfeld knows that American history is enriched by men who suffered the same treatment at the hands of the press and were later judged to be some of our greatest leaders. Grant, Sherman, and Lincoln endured appalling media attacks throughout the Civil War (Lincoln the incompetent baboon, Grant the drunk, Sherman the crazy man) but historians were better able to judge them.

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*Bonnie*

"You never really lose until you quit trying"

- Mike Ditka

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OSD PA  
Sent: Thursday, December 07, 2006 5:07 PM  
To: (b)(6) OSD PA  
Subject: RE: Conference call tomorrow

a few. not a ton. will make some calls. compiling the list now.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) Mr OSD PA  
Sent: Thursday, December 07, 2006 5:00 PM  
To: (b)(6) OSD PA  
Subject: RE: Conference call tomorrow

Any rsvps?

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) OSD PA  
Sent: Thursday, December 07, 2006 2:49 PM  
Subject: Conference call tomorrow

MEMORANDUM

To: Retired Military Analysts

From:

(b)(6)

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs

Date: December 7, 2006

Re: Conference Call with Senior DoD Officials

We invite you to participate in a conference call, FRIDAY, December 8, 2006, from 9:30-10:00 a.m.

Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, Commander of Multi-National Force, Iraq, will brief you on the progress in Iraq. For your convenience, his biography is here:  
[http://www.mnci.centcom.mil/leaders/Biography-ChiarelliPeterW\\_2006-01.doc](http://www.mnci.centcom.mil/leaders/Biography-ChiarelliPeterW_2006-01.doc)  
<[http://www.mnci.centcom.mil/leaders/Biography-ChiarelliPeterW\\_2006-01.doc](http://www.mnci.centcom.mil/leaders/Biography-ChiarelliPeterW_2006-01.doc)> . This call will be On-the-Record.

To participate in this conference call, please dial (b)(2) and ask the operator to connect you to the Analysts conference call.

Please R.S.V.P. to (b)(6) at (b)(6) <mailto:(b)(6)> or call her at (b)(2)

We hope you are able to participate.

(b)(6)

Public Affairs  
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(2)



(b)(6)

---

**From:** JedBabbin (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, December 07, 2006 8:55 AM  
**To:** Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA  
**Subject:** Re: Exit Rumsfeld, Smiling: Today's RCP

Cool; thanks.

**Jed Babbin**

(b)(6) (home office)  
(b)(6) (home fax)  
(b)(6) (mobile)

(b)(6)

**From:** Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA  
**Sent:** Thursday, December 07, 2006 8:55 AM  
**To:** 'JedBabbin@'(b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Exit Rumsfeld, Smiling: Today's RCP

I just sent it around dod, and sent a copy up to the secdef.

Dallas B. Lawrence

Director, Office of Community Relations & Public Liaison

United States Department of Defense

(b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** JedBabbin@'(b)(6) [mailto:JedBabbin@'(b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Thursday, December 07, 2006 8:54 AM  
**To:** Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA  
**Subject:** Re: Exit Rumsfeld, Smiling: Today's RCP

thanks. Feel free to toss it anywhere you'd like.

Jed Babbin

(b)(6)

(home office)  
(home fax)  
(mobile)

(b)(6)

**From:** Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA  
**Sent:** Thursday, December 07, 2006 8:53 AM  
**To:** 'JedBabbin'(b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Exit Rumsfeld, Smiling: Today's RCP

Great piece my friend. Fantastic in fact. Would love for this to get some more play.

Dallas B. Lawrence

Director, Office of Community Relations & Public Liaison

United States Department of Defense

(b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** JedBabbin(b)(6) [mailto:JedBabbin(b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Thursday, December 07, 2006 8:24 AM  
**To:** tmcinerney(b)(6); nashct(b)(6); Glenstrae774(b)(6); BURM415164(b)(6);  
USAGirl1957(b)(6); WSSInter(b)(6); robertscales(b)(6); ladd.wheeler(b)(6);  
twilkerson(b)(6); mgroot(b)(6); groothouser(b)(6)  
**Subject:** Exit Rumsfeld, Smiling: Today's RCP

I do believe that when the histories are written, they'll be far kinder to Rumsfeld than the press is today. Best, Jed.

RealClearPolitics - Articles - Exit Rumsfeld, Smiling  
<[http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2006/12/exit\\_rumsfeld\\_smiling.html](http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2006/12/exit_rumsfeld_smiling.html)>

Jed Babbin

(b)(6) (home office)  
(b)(6) (home fax)  
(b)(6) (mobile)

(b)(6)

**From:** Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA  
**Sent:** Thursday, December 07, 2006 8:52 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) OSD PA  
**Cc:** (b)(6) OSD PA  
**Subject:** this is a good one for the read ahead review...



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December 07, 2006

## Exit Rumsfeld, Smiling

By [Jed Babbin](#)

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Director, Office of Community Relations & Public Liaison  
United States Department of Defense

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

**From:** Lawrence, Dallas B Mr OSD PA  
**Sent:** Thursday, December 07, 2006 8:51 AM  
**To:** Bucci, Dr. Steven CIV SD  
**Subject:** i think the boss would enjoy this piece...

**REAL  
CLEAR  
POLITICS**

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December 07, 2006

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**By Jed Babbin**

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All of those myths combined, in the minds of some defeated Republicans, to blame Mr. Rumsfeld for the election debacle of November. But that overlooks the facts presented by the Zogby poll in late October that showed 49% of Americans wanted the president to retain Rumsfeld, against 42% who wanted him gone. When that poll was taken, the president's job approval numbers were about ten points lower than Rumsfeld's "stay or go" polls.

In his Tuesday confirmation hearing, Dr. Gates said he was surprised at how much transformation of the military had actually been accomplished. He will be more surprised at how the media has transformed itself since he last served in government. He can learn a lot from studying how the media has treated his predecessor. If he studies no other lesson, he should look at the "Rumsfeld refuses to testify" story that the AP manufactured last summer. (There's another story in that incident, too. Rahm Emanuel used to issue press releases calling for people's resignations. Whose idea was the AP string of stories, centered around Hillary Clinton, culminating in her call for Rumsfeld's resignation? Did AP reporters - or editors - collude with Democrats to write and time the stories?)

Gates will have a very short media honeymoon. If he doesn't bring the Iraq war to a quick close - which he, the Pentagon and the White House agree can't be done without surrendering it to the enemy - he'll soon enough be the subject of the same kind of contrived news stories. Welcome to the world of the 527 Media, Dr. Gates. If you don't toe the Baker-Hamilton line, you'll soon be subject to the same treatment your predecessor received. You may even so enrage NYT columnist Maureen Dowd that she will write a poem excoriating you, as she did about Rumsfeld two Decembers ago. It's a badge of honor you may yet earn.

Dr. Gates will realize, as Mr. Rumsfeld undoubtedly has, that the daily media-bashing comes from the ankle-biters, the politically-active media that history will ignore. And that's why Rumsfeld will be smiling when he takes his leave.

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