

Military Analysts Conference Call
Wednesday, July 13, 2005, Room 2E572 The Pentagon
Host: Ms. Allison Barber
Briefers: [REDACTED]
Subject: FBI allegations of abuse at GTMO
Transcriber: Murphy
ON BACKGROUND

Ms. Barber: Hi, it's Allison Barber, Department of Defense. Thank you for joining us today for the call. We're going to open it up with [REDACTED] who will make some opening remarks, and then [REDACTED] will give us a briefing on the findings. And then we'll turn it back over to [REDACTED] to talk about the results of that and our actions and then we'll open it up for questions.

Just as a reminder, this is on background. We're also joined by [REDACTED]. We'll be happy to take your calls after we go through the opening remarks. So with that, [REDACTED], thank you for joining us today.

[REDACTED] Thank you Allison. I appreciate it. I am going to give you a truncated version of what we used this morning in the SASC (Senate Armed Services Committee) hearing, with a little background, and I'll turn it over to [REDACTED] and he'll talk about his findings, recommendations, and I'll close with my decision on those recommendations.

The allegations in the FBI emails came to light as a result of a FOIA request last year, late in the year. After review of the emails, following their release – I believe it was in December – I determined that the allegations merited a detailed examination in order to establish the truth, and ascertain what, if any, actions needed to be taken.

So I ordered a 15-6, Army Regulation 15-6 investigation, and appointed Brigadier General John Furlow, who is the deputy commander for U.S. Army South, my component command for the Army, as the investigating officer. I told John to address eight allegations that were drawn from the FBI emails. I will not articulate each of them. If there's questions later on, I can do that.

Subsequent to that initial appointment of Furlow, I directed John to investigate two additional allegations that came up and were brought to light. One concerned a female military interrogator allegedly performing a lap dance on a detainee. Second was the use of red ink as fake menstrual blood during an interrogation.

Now those allegations came from a separate document. In my instructions to John Furlow, I did not limit him to just those allegations. I gave him the flexibility to bring into his investigation any additional allegations of detainee abuse that he might discover during the course of his work.

Now on 28 February, 2005, after two months of investigation, John advised me that he needed to interview officers who were senior in rank to him. As a result of that, I appointed Lieutenant General Mark Schmidt, who is the commander of my Air Force component command, AFSouth, and 12 Air Force, as the senior investigating officer. Then, Generals Schmidt and Furlow conducted their investigation. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Their report reflects the combined findings and conclusions of the initial effort that Furlow did, and the combined investigative efforts that they both did.

General Schmidt submitted his initial report to me on the first of April this year. After a review, I directed on the 5th of May the investigation be reopened to consider two memos from the December 2004 time frame that had been recently discovered. And they were with regard to a special interrogation plan on a detainee.

While the team was completing that additional task, I further directed on the 2nd of June that General Schmidt address a second set of new allegations made by a detainee that also concerned a special interrogation plan. General Schmidt completed his investigation on the 9th of June, and my staff judge advocate began a legal review of the report. I have completed my review, taken my actions with regard to the findings and recommendations. I will inform you of those actions after [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Thank you, sir. [REDACTED] I am going to go through the scope of this review and try to give, as [REDACTED] did, a truncated version of the briefing.

The investigation was directed and accomplished under the informal procedures provisions of that regulation, AR 15-6. And the AR 15-6 investigation centered on FBI alleged abuses occurring during interrogation operations. The team found incidents of abuse during detention operations, all of which were appropriately addressed by the command.

The team conducted a comprehensive review of thousands of documents and statements pertaining to any allegations of abuse occurring at Guantanamo, to include the complete medical records of the subjects of what we call the first and second special interrogation plans.

The team interviewed 30 FBI agents, conducted interviews of over 100 personnel, had access to hundreds of interviews conducted by several recent investigations. These interviews included personnel assigned to Guantanamo, U.S. Southern Command, Office of the Secretary of Defense, all during the tenure of JTFs 160, 170 and currently Guantanamo. It included 76 DoD personnel, to include every general officer who commanded the Joint Task Force 160, 170 and Guantanamo. Additionally, we considered abuse allegations made by two high-value detainees themselves.

The investigation team attempted to determine if these allegations in fact occurred, those allegations made by the FBI. During the course of a follow-up investigation, the AR 15-6 also considered allegations raised specifically by the detainees who were the subject of those two special interrogation plans. The investigating team applied a preponderance standard of proof consistent with the guidance contained in the Army Regulation 15-6. Much of the testimony was obtained from witnesses who had served as much as three years earlier, and sometimes for 45 days or less. Civilian witnesses were not required to cooperate, nor under subpoena to answer questions.

The team also applied guidance contained in that regulation, Commander U.S. SOUTHCOM and Secretary of Defense memorandums authorizing special interrogation techniques if deciding if a particular interrogation approach fell properly within an authorized technique.

In those cases in which the team concluded that the allegation had in fact occurred, the team then considered whether the incident was in compliance with interrogation techniques that were approved either at the time of the incident or subsequent to the incident.

In those cases where it was determined that the allegation occurred to not have been an authorized technique, the team then reviewed whether disciplinary action had already been taken and the propriety of that action.

[REDACTED]

We did not review the legal validity of the various interrogation techniques outlined in Army Field Manual 34-52, or those approved by the Secretary of Defense.

I'd like to cover the summary of findings.

There were nine FBI allegations. Two were unsubstantiated. Two were never authorized, and corrective action was taken on those. And there were five that were authorized.

The detention and interrogation operations at JTF-Guantanamo cover a three-year period and over 24,000 interrogations. This investigation found only three interrogation acts to be conducted in violation of interrogation techniques authorized by the Field Manual 34-52 and DoD guidance. And I will cover those three.

The first one – on at least two occasions between February 2002 and February 2003 two detainees were short shackled to the eye bolt on the floor of the interrogation room. And that was an FBI allegation.

Secondly, some time in October 2002, duct tape was used to quiet a detainee. Also an FBI allegation.

Three – military interrogators threatened the subject of the second special interrogation and his family, and that was discovered; that was not part of an FBI allegation.

The inspection team also found that the commander of JTF-Guantanamo failed to monitor the interrogation of one high-value detainee, that is ISN-063. The team found that the individual interrogation techniques, while authorized, resulted in the persistent, cumulative effect of being degrading and abusive treatment.

Finally, the investigation found that the communication of a threat to the second high-value detainee was in violation of SecDef guidance and the UCMJ.

The team found no evidence of torture or inhumane treatment at JTF Guantanamo.

Again, the investigation focused on FBI allegations on aggressive interrogation tactics. That was our focus.

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██████████ Thanks, ██████████. Under Army Regulation 15-6, as the appointing authority for the investigation, my responsibility was to review the report and take action on the findings and recommendations. In taking my action, I accepted or approved all the numbered findings and recommendations included in the written report which was provided to the Committee this morning both in, I believe, unclass and classified format, except for two recommendations that I did not approve.

First, I disapproved recommendation No. 16 which was that Major General (Geoffrey) Miller be held accountable for failing to supervise the interrogation of ISN-063 and that he be admonished for that failure.

Now, in accordance with current procedures and regulations, I forwarded this report to the Department of the Army Inspector General for review and action as he deems appropriate. Even though I disapproved it, under Army regulations any allegation of wrongdoing must be forwarded to the Army IG for information and action as he deems appropriate. And as a Combatant Commander, I could not admonish someone not under my command at this time anyway.

Secondly, I modified recommendation No. 22 to request that the Naval Criminal Investigative Service conduct further investigation into the threat communicated by an interrogator to a particular high-value detainee before forwarding the matter to the current commander of that interrogator for action.

The interrogator admitted communicating a threat, but in his statement he said he believed he had authority to do so because he had asked his servicing staff judge advocate and his supervisor. The interviews with those two individuals were inconclusive with regards to that statement; therefore, rather than sending to the commander that interrogator, I have directed a criminal investigative -- investigation be done, then results of that provided to the Navy commander.

I will now explain the rationale for my decisions. My reason for disapproving recommendation 16 to hold General Miller accountable is that the interrogation of ISN-063 did not result in any violation of any U.S. law or policy and that the degree of supervision provided by General Miller does not warrant admonishment under the circumstances.

As the commander, even in the early days of his assignment, General Miller was responsible for the conduct of his subordinates. However, as all commanders must do to an extent that THEY determine appropriate, General Miller relied on the judgment and experience of his people to carry out their duties in a manner that was both professional and authorized. The evidence shows that he was not misguided in this trust, since there was no finding that U.S. law or policy was violated.

General Miller did supervise the interrogation in that he was aware of the most serious aspects of ISN-063's interrogation -- the length of interrogation sessions, the number of days over which it was conducted, and the length of segregation from other detainees. The evidence does show that General Miller was NOT aware of certain other aspects of the interrogation. However, since there was no finding that U.S. law or policy was violated, there is nothing for which to hold him accountable concerning the interrogation of 063. Therefore, under the circumstances, I do not believe that those aspects of which he was not aware warrant disciplinary actions.

Again, of particular importance to my decision is the fact that there was no finding that the interrogation of 063, albeit characterized as creative, aggressive and persistent, violated U.S. law or policy.

With regard to the rationale for No. 22, again, I believe that further investigation by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service may discover evidence in mitigation and extenuation that should be considered in determining whether disciplinary action is appropriate for the interrogator.

Finally, of the recommendations I approved, recommendations 23 through 27 are not within my authority to implement. Therefore, I forwarded those to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for detainee affairs for review and action as he deems appropriate.

If you are not aware or informed of all these findings and recommendations as they are listed numerically, we can provide that. [REDACTED] you've got that and we can get that out to you. And that concludes my statement.

Ms. Barber: And with that, we'll take your questions.

Mr. Maginnis: [REDACTED] Bob Maginnis. You are running a great program down at Guantanamo, and I was down there with the group that went down on the 24th, so I can't say anything bad about what I saw; I thought it was great.

Question with regard to the female allegation of a lap dance and red ink fake menstrual blood. Can you respond to that?

[REDACTED] Let me turn that over to [REDACTED] because they've got the details on that in their report.

██████████ The substantiated – ah, first of all the lap dance was not substantiated. We could find no evidence, through any witness, that there was ever a lap dance. There was, however, multiple instances of gender coercion where a female would invade the personal space of the detainee, to include touching him, straddling him without putting weight on him, running her fingers through his hair, touching his arm with perfume, and that sort of thing. But no lap dance.

The incident concerning the fake menstrual blood. That incident was not authorized. The occurrence happened while the female interrogator was interrogating this high-value detainee. He spit in her face. She left the room – she was fairly distressed. While she was out of the room she took a marking pen, marked it on her hand – red – went back in the room, approached the detainee, touched his face, or, shoulders, told him that that was menstrual blood and that she was menstruating, and that 'What do you think of that?' and of course he went nuts. Then she left the room. That was an act of revenge; she lost control, lost control of the environment. She was admonished. She was taken off of interrogation duty, retrained, and eventually returned after about 30 days. So that was corrected when it happened. But it was an incident that was reported.

Mr. Sheppard: ██████████, Don Sheppard.

██████████ Hey Don.

Mr. Sheppard: Much has been made in the media about confusion over changing rules, what's to be done, et cetera, between Afghanistan, Iraq, Guantanamo. Did you find that to be the case? Or were the people clear on what they could do at all times?

██████████ I will tell you, Don – first of all, Guantanamo Bay is a separate, closed-loop detention interrogation operation. The connection between any other operation really begins to open up a basket of worms and it does not pertain.

At Guantanamo the rules changed when they had these resistance trained – particularly one high-value – ISN-063 – high-value detainee-- that was resistance trained and they were getting nowhere with him. And they thought, and later proved to be fairly accurate, that he had valuable information on the Global War on Terror.

The Joint Task Force requested additional interrogation techniques from a higher authority, and they went up through the Office of the Secretary of Defense. They did receive that authority on the 2nd of December 03 (*sic*, 2002, see below with Craddock) to open up the envelope a little bit with more aggressive techniques.

Now the techniques at that level look fairly benign. The problem that I encountered was they get down to the application of those techniques, the supervision and the supervisory chain of how you translate a futility technique down to what happens in the interrogation room is where the issues we had sort of resided. And I did find that there was abusive and degrading techniques applied. So that was the problem. However, the authorities to open up interrogation techniques in response to Guantanamo, and it did not mean it went anywhere else, Guantanamo under the closed crucible of the controls they have down there were approved on the 2nd of December. They were rescinded on the 15th of January. A new set came out on the 16th of January through 16 April, and on the 16th of April another set came down that sort of resolved it all and for the 16th of April, that's what's in place right now. And the Field Manual 34-52 is kind of provided as a guide for interrogators. So it changed, but it was not an out-of-control process, and it wasn't a wild bunch of ideas coming from OSD or anything either. So it was fairly controlled.

██████████. Let me just amplify, Don. I think ██████████ said approved December 2, 2003. It's important. It's actually December 2, 2002.

██████████ I'm sorry. I'm sorry. Two thousand two.

But it's important from the perspective of 14 months after 9-11. Look, they found out about end of summer, August – July, August, fingerprint matched up, Khatani, who he really was, 20th hijacker. And there was a lot of angst. And they said this guy has resisted interrogation techniques from the FBI for eight months; we think he's got information on al Qaeda. If he's the 20th hijacker he's in the know; we have to go to find out what he knows. I think the angst, the tension, the anxiety that another attack was going to happen – and we still believe it is, it's a matter of when – was greater then. And the notion was, we have to do something to get inside his head to find out what it is. That's the genesis of these interrogation techniques.

Part two. The techniques still approved on 2 December are largely derived from 34-52. Ego down, futility. Those techniques are a broad banner. And as [redacted] said, in the application developed by the JTF-GTMO interrogation teams becomes where they actually then determine what they are going to do in that interrogation booth.

(Sheppard?) Follow up here. One of the obvious questions we're going to be asked is, OK, so things changed and aggressive – can you characterize a little for us or could you give us something that we can use to characterize what changed, without revealing specific techniques?

Well I think probably techniques are in the open press now. Go ahead [redacted].

Yeah, they are. Let me try to give you an example. I put two examples when we did our testimony. The first one was, for instance, the field manual has – 34-52 -- has an example of futility.

What that means at that level – that broad topic – the interrogator convinces the source that resistance to questioning is futile. Then that goes down through a process. If that technique is chosen by the JTF to be used against a particular detainee, then there's an interrogator, typically an NCO, constructs a written interrogation plan. That plan now is vetted through a team chief or intelligence control element supervisor – that means it's either an O-5 or a DIA GG14 level -- then that's approved or not – adjusted – then an interrogation is conducted with a translator with this NCO, and possibly with another analyst.

What that meant down in the application at Guantanamo – remember, the application is futility, convince the source that resistance to questioning is futile --- that translates into tell the detainee about how al Qaeda's falling apart; everyone's been killed or captured, and we know a lot about this individual.

But it also translates to gender coercion via some domination. It's futile. I'm a female; I'm in your face; you can do nothing about it. Start talking to us.

He was straddled, massaged, touched, that sort of thing. It could be as non-injurious type of touching.

Another example is ego down. And this is the one where we start seeing a different sort of thing, and it gets into possible sexual humiliation. Ego down, that's an approach based on attacking the source's sense of personal worth. Goes through the same process. That NCO, written plan, vets it through the O-5 level, GG14 level, and then conducts the interrogation with translator.

In GTMO, that ego down translated down to telling the detainee that his mother and sister were whores, he was forced to wear women's lingerie, multiple allegations of his homosexuality, he was forced to dance with a male interrogator, he was strip searched for control measures, and he was forced to perform dog tricks on a leash.

Now, the basic line there -- you say that sounds, you know, like I did – that sounds like degrading. Well, we said yes, it could be. The basic line though in the charter for those interrogators was humane treatment. And humane treatment is spelled out by the President. It's a safe, secure

environment that provides medical care, food, water, and the basics of that person's security. Not this. Was this person injured, harmed? No. Were they denied any medical care, anything? No. So there was a line there with don't cross the line between inhumane, and that's where it went, Don.

So, those are some processes we kind of had to wrestle with.

Mr. Babbin: Jed Babbin for [REDACTED] General, we see General Miller's name having popped up before, and I know exactly what's going to be in the New York Times tomorrow, or CBS News tonight. You know, they reprimanded Janice Karpinski, even though Miller had been at some point at Abu Ghraib and had helped developed interrogation techniques, now again, at GTMO. I understand your good answer about the fact that, you know, what happened at GTMO didn't violate law or policy. But we are going to be bombarded tomorrow about why Miller wasn't admonished.

Second question. I was at GTMO yesterday and I saw a really very good operation, and I have no reason to think that anything like this would ever happen at that point down there now, and I would like to have your view on that.

But first, Karpinski versus Miller, please.

[REDACTED] I can't make a comparison with Karpinski and Miller. I only dealt with this situation, with Miller, at GTMO. And I am not read into the situation with Karpinski. The fact is that this special interrogation plan was developed in advance of Geoff Miller showing up. He walked in to GTMO early November. It was approved and went into place the end of that month. He did not develop it. It was in staffing; it left, I believe it left GTMO the 11th of October, got up to SOUTHCOM, SOUTHCOM forwarded it, then later on it was, you know, worked over and staffed in the Pentagon. So he walked in and what he had to do was one, understand what's going on down there.

He was told 'take these two task forces,' one JTF-160 and the other JTF-170; one dealing with detainee operations, the other with intelligence collection, put them into one, meld them into a common operating environment that is compatible, and that they are integrated and fully functioning together.

That kind of translated, based on some of the folks that my investigators talked to, is bring order out of chaos. Secondly, while you're there, coordinate the inter-agency. Let's get all of the inter-agency folks represented down there on board and let's pull together, instead of pulling apart. Third, take a look at the facilities for the detainees and let's see what needs to be done and enhance those. And also, last but not least, we want you to enhance and improve the quality of life for our servicemembers down there, commensurate with what they would expect to have back at their bases, camps, posts and installations in the States. So he had a lot of things he had to do.

My point to you is a difference between the investigators and myself on the degree of supervision required. He did know certain things that I felt that were important that he knew about that investigation, but he did not know everything about what was going on.

If a commander is required to know everything about what is going on in a unit where there is no violation of law, policy or regulation, I am afraid that he is unable to command. So that's the point – and the other thing, keep in mind only one SIP ever implemented, this one, he walked into it essentially in progress.

Babbin: Good. And I appreciate that. And I suspect that what I am going to answer, at the risk of belaboring the point, is you know, your point about the fact that law and policy was not violated I think is the most compelling one and that, you know, that's the difference between Abu Ghraib and here. Second point though, sir, what assurance would you say, what would you give us in terms of what we saw yesterday? We saw a lot of things including all of the camps, including

some of the ongoing interrogations, we had a chance to observe briefly. Do you have confidence that what's going on down there right now is all in accordance with law and policy as well as it should be?

██████████ Absolutely. Look, we're a learning organization – the military is. We learn. There were extraordinary requirements and needs on that SIP based up on the notion, the belief that the 20th hijacker had some information we needed to get. We had him a long time. What was cooking we needed to know.

Now, what we have done is we've got new guidelines, the 16 April memo, they're in place. We understand, we know, that over time building reproachment and rapport with these detainees and then getting information from them is a better way to go. And generally speaking, with this population that's what we've done. We've gotten some successes with that, as you were down there, I am sure you heard. And I am confident in the professionalism of all of JTF-GTMO. I mean that is a very, very well run organization.

Mr. Babbin: Excellent, thank you.

Mr. Valley: Paul Valley. One last question. You know with all of the things that have come about in the (inaudible) down there, do we really provide enough flexibility now on interrogation techniques that we can really get the information from all of these people which is so vital?

██████████ Good question. I would tell you that based upon the procedures in place, there are four techniques that if we feel like we need to use have to be advance notification to the SecDef. There is also guidance that if any of those, or all of those, we believe competent authority – and that's the joint interrogation group chief, and the JTF-GTMO would request it of me -- if we believe that we have a situation that we have someone that is nonresponsive to the current techniques over time that there are processes whereby they can request specialized techniques.

So I think the safeguards in place are adequate. I think that the interrogation techniques are working. But I also know that if a peculiar situation arises, we have avenues to address that.

Mr. Valley: Great. Thank you.

Mr. McCausland: Sir, this is Jeff McCausland. First of all, I'd like to say I'm delighted that Jed knows what CBS is going to do, because I work for them and hell, I don't know what they're going to do (laughter).

But having said that, sir, first of all I would like to say I was also down in Guantanamo yesterday and as an old soldier, I've got to say that's one of the most professional, well-disciplined, highly motivated, well-led units I have had the pleasure to visit, and they should be commended. Jay Hood and his sergeant major and his guys are just doing a bang-up job under pretty tough conditions.

I do have two questions for you, and I think it's kind of a follow-up from Jed's and that is, the question of accountability and will be one we're going to be beat up on. And you've answered that with respect to General Miller quite adequately. But in terms of any other accountability action taken against any other soldier or for that matter any other FBI or any other civilian involved in interrogation, from what I've heard, the only person I've heard who any action was taken against was the one female interrogator who you rightfully described as having lost control, and therefore was removed, retrained for her actions. And that's perfectly appropriate. But, were there any other, based on what was discovered, any other actions of accountability, be it admonishment, be it reprimand, be it Article 15, UCMJ, any other action taken as part and parcel of this investigation?

And second of all, I'd just like your reaction as the regional component commander down there, about this idea now that having done all this is what we really need is a national commission to continue these types of investigations?

Let me turn it over to [redacted] to address the first question about accountability.

Let me first start off with the duct tape. The duct tape was an incident that's contained in the report where it got out of control and they ended up duct taping up a detainee's head. And, obviously, went beyond the limits of what we expected. And the interrogator was brought up and given an oral reprimand. And we're in the process of sending a form on to his current supervisor to make that a little bit more official.

On the interrogation side, whenever an incident would come up, it was addressed by the chain of command, it was documented and they moved on with business. On the detention side, same type of deal. If an individual was determined to exhibit misconduct, he would receive the punishment that was due to fit the crime, and they moved on. As in any type of military organization there is, you know, dealings that the supervision and the leadership has to deal with. But those are the main things; there's accountability there. As you mentioned, you talked to the sergeant major, the command sergeant major and Staff Sergeant Major Mendez who runs the detention center runs and leads and supervises a very active NCO chain and keeps the soldiers informed and accountable for their actions on a daily basis, despite the fact that they are in a very arduous task and the fact that they are often insulted on a daily basis. They are cussed at; they are threatened; they have feces and urine thrown on them; I mean they are doing a great job down there. And so for the accountability, the leadership there, especially at the middle management, is obviously commendable. And I think you folks saw that.

Let me amplify that real quick. On the recommendations from the investigators, one was the duct tape issue. The recommendation is that the individual who told the guard to do that was admonished, but that's not adequate. I agreed. I have sent that recommendation to the director of the Joint Staff to forward to the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency because that individual worked for him for reprimand.

Secondly. I think there was another one there concerning the death threat that was issued to a detainee. What I understood of the situation there was that the interrogator thought he had top cover; he said he did; the two individuals he thought he got it from, when – when we interviewed initially and then went back a second time they refused to talk. I am not convinced, I am skeptical that he acted on his own, so I said let's refer that, and I've sent it to Naval Criminal Investigative Service for a criminal investigation to compel those individuals to talk to the criminal investigators since they wouldn't talk to my informal investigators under 15-6.

Second part. The commission issue. The national commission. Some of the recommendations were we need to clarify procedures, how we coordinate with the interagency, at what point do the combined effects of interrogation applications cross the line into abusive or degrading treatment? I agreed with those, and I approved those. I don't know how to go about that. I sent those recommendations that I approved to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs, Matt Waxman, and said, 'here they are, I recommend approval, I've approved them, I recommend that you initiate them.'

Then Matt, ASD Detainee Affairs, will deal with it through the Policy OSD channel.

I am skeptical, concerned that a national commission – look, I don't know that that's the right way; I don't know that it's the wrong way. But whatever we do ought to be sooner rather than later, if we're going to do it, and it ought to be focused on the future, not the past. We ought not to go back and headhunt, and try to hold people accountable when all these investigations have done that, and folks, to a great extent, it ain't there in my judgment. What we need is we need guidance for the future that commanders can use either specifically or generally so that without guidance

they use their best military judgment and then later on are held accountable or questioned for it because it's not in agreement with someone's perception of what's right and wrong.

Now, I'm off my soapbox.

And a paper that shows you all the findings, recommendations, and the numbering system.

Mr. Babbin: Allison, is there any way that we can get the unclass version of the report itself?

Ms. Barber: Yes, we're going to send that to you Jed.

Voice: What were the dates of the alleged abuses that they covered? Can you give that real quick? The time period.

This is here. Primarily the window of the FBI emails and such started somewhere around August, September 02 and ran to about the end first calendar quarter 2003. Now I say that kind of tentatively because when we started off the investigation we were only able to nail down some of these allegations and events to months, rather than specific date-time groups. So that was one of the things that we had a problem with in going back into a – two, three years into the past. What we would do is visit with an individual that was down there on a 45-day tour. They knew it happened while they were down there 45 days. And what sometimes we ended up getting (was) it was toward the front or toward the back of their 45-day tour.

Yeah, this is – let me give you one alibi. The difference between Miller and Karpinski. Karpinski's situation – the guards maltreated detainees, so there was a violation of law. Not true with Miller. It was a lawful interrogation. That's the difference.

Ms. Barber: Thanks so much for the time on the call. If you have additional questions you can zap those off to Tara: we'll get answers for you. and we'll send you the briefings and the papers.
thank you for your time today as well.

Thank you, Allison.

Call ends:

Now one thing (he?) just told me, the end date was really like August 03.

: 03, yes.

Voice: It's in the report.