

(b)(6).

From: Bucci, Steven, Dr., OSD
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2005 5:57 PM
To: SecDef Cables ESO
Subject: FW: No Military Analysts Read Ahead sent to SD

Importance: High

Attachments: Read Ahead.doc



Read Ahead.doc
(44 KB)

Sorry

Dr. Steven P. Bucci
Staff Director
Immediate Office of SecDef

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2005 5:36 PM
To: Bucci, Steven, Dr., OSD
Cc: SecDef Cables
Subject: FW: No Military Analysts Read Ahead sent to SD
Importance: High

Sir,
Allison Barber would like to make sure that the attached read ahead goes out to the plane. It should go to Eric Ruff and Delonnie Henry. Could I get your approval for Cables to send it? It's for tomorrow's SecDef call with the Analysts. Thank you (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2005 5:24 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Richard, Joseph, Col OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Fw: No Military Analysts Read Ahead sent to SD

Hi
Did you get this to the plane??? You need to. And the read ahead needs to go out to normal channels.

Thx

-----Original Message-----

From: Richard, Joseph, Col OASD-PA <joseph.richard (b)(6)>
To: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA <Allison.Barber (b)(6)>
Sent: Wed Jul 27 16:47:01 2005
Subject: No Military Analysts Read Ahead sent to SD

Allison Cables advises that no read ahead on the Military Analysts has been sent to the plane only Dallas Trip and the events there. Joe

Colonel Joe Richard, USA
Senior Military Assistant
to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
Rm (b)(2) Pentagon

(b)(2)

Updated July 27, 2005

**READ AHEAD FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD RUMSFELD
TELECONFERENCE WITH RETIRED MILITARY ANALYSTS**

Date/Time: Thursday, July 28, 2005 10:30 a.m. to 11:00 a.m.

Location: Secretary of Defense Office (3E880)

Audience:

Confirmed are:

Colonel Ken Allard	(USA, Retired)
Mr. Jed Babbin	(USAF, JAG)
Lieutenant General Frank (Tcd) Campbell	(USAF, Retired)
Dr. James Jay Carafano	(LTC, USA, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Bill Cowan	(USMC, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Cucullu	(USA, Retired)
Major Dana R. Dillon	(USA, Retired)
Command Sergeant Major Steven Greer	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis	(USA, Retired)
Major General Michael J. Nardotti, Jr.	(USA, Retired)
Captain Chuck Nash	(USN, Retired)
General William L. Nash	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant General Erv Rokke	(USAF, Retired)
Major General Donald W. Shepperd	(USAF, Retired)
Major General Paul E. Vallely	(USA, Retired)
General Tom Wilkerson	(USMC, Retired)

- You last met with roughly this same group June 16, 2005.

Media:

- Call is closed to the media.
- Comments should be considered on background. However, you may go off-the-record as you see fit.

Timeline:

- 10:30 a.m. Welcome and Introduction
Larry Di Rita
- 10:31 a.m. SecDef comments on recent trip, Iraq Transition, Afghanistan Progress, update on Detainee Related Activities
- 10:45 a.m. Open for Q&A

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
 Sent: Monday, May 23, 2005 4:23 PM
 To: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
 Subject: Today's Spectator (Babbin)

Bedtime for Bashar

By Jed Babbin

Published 5/23/2005 12:07:25 AM

It is the gravest of mistakes to think of Iraq -- or any other nation -- in isolation. And it is willfully ignorant to ask when Iraqis will be able to defeat the insurgency, when Americans will withdraw, or when the violence in Iraq will abate. Would you measure the safety of one family's home without examining the neighborhood it's in? The security of every nation depends on the actions of its neighbors, and Iraq sits in one of the world's worst neighborhoods. It can't be stable and democratic unless and until its neighbors -- Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iran -- end their interference. Unless we abandon Iraq, Americans will continue to die as a direct result of these nations' actions until they are compelled to behave.

On that terrible morning of September 11, 2001, there was no way to get out of Washington. Sitting in my office about two blocks from the White House and seeing nothing more constructive to do such as run through a subway tunnel, I sat down at my computer and wrote about how we should respond to the most deadly attack on our soil since Pearl Harbor. The article was published in the *Washington Times* the following day.

The article made two points. First, that we couldn't allow ourselves to be weakened by empty rhetoric urging a "proportional response." Our response to the 9-11 attacks had to be decisive, and to be so our counterattack had to be in proportion to our strength and not the enemy's relative size or weakness. Second, that no matter who the enemy was, and no matter where he chose to seek refuge, we could allow him no sanctuary. We would have had to attack the al Qaeda stronghold wherever it was. Had it not been Kabul but Damascus, Tehran, Beijing, Pyongyang or Moscow our action would have had to be the same. If we had learned anything from Vietnam it was that to allow sanctuary is to hand the means of victory to the enemy.

President Bush took much this same position in his tough speech to Congress a week later. Nations had to choose, he said then, to be with us or with the terrorists. Since then something has been lost. Syria has chosen to be with the terrorists, and we have done nothing decisive about the regime of Bashar Assad. We are paying too high a price -- in the lives of our soldiers -- for this to continue one moment longer.

Commencing weeks before American forces slashed into Iraq in March 2003, our reconnaissance forces saw a steady flow of cars and trucks going into Syria along the Baghdad-Damascus highway. About ten days into the fighting, there was an intense fight near the border city of al-Qaim where our special forces took on a sizeable Iraqi force moving through al-Qaim into Syria. The fierceness of the fight there -- as intense as any other before Baghdad fell -- told us that the Iraqis were moving something they thought was of tremendous value. Was it money, weapons or people the Iraqis

moved then? It matters not. What matters is that Syria chose to provide first a sanctuary for members of Saddam's regime and its assets and then comprehensive support for the Sunni insurgents who fight only to prevent Iraq from becoming stable and free, and kill as many Americans as they can in the process.

We know that the majority of the suicide bombers killing people in Iraq come from Saudi Arabia to Syria where they are helped to cross into Iraq. We know that money and weapons flow from Syria to the insurgents in Iraq. We know sufficient details about where the insurgents meet and train in Syria to target those places for attack. "Operation Matador," the week-long fight along the Syrian border that ended on May 14, disrupted the insurgents' ability to cross into Iraq. At the cost of at least nine Marine lives, we stopped them but only for a while.

The President has too much on his mind, and his advisers are divided. The CIA and the State Department point to the small amount of cooperation we have been getting from Syria, and insist that we can compel them to do more without taking firm action. The Defense Department is less tolerant. It wants to act, but apparently hasn't even been allowed to ask the Iraqis for permission to mount an attack into Syria. Our failure to take decisive action costs too much. The time has come to act.

First, either Vice President Cheney or the President himself needs to knock heads together, because no one else can. CIA, State, and Defense have to be brought into line and resolved to action. Then State should deliver a final ultimatum to Assad. If he fails to end his regime's support for terrorism forthwith -- and that means not only the Iraqi insurgents, but Hezbollah and all the others that have operated from Damascus for decades -- he must be told we will end it for him. The Iraqi government should be consulted, but its reluctance -- if it has any -- to a cross-border attack must be dispelled or politely ignored. As soon as it is, special operations forces should cross into Syria covertly, to lead a combined air and ground attack against the terrorists and whatever Syrian assets are supporting them, from Qaim to Damascus. Whatever it takes, that is what we must do.

Syria is the immediate problem regarding Iraq. (Iran is no less immediate; but because of its nuclear program, not its present involvement in Iraq.) Saudi Arabia is a different kind of problem.

The Saudis have, perhaps too late to save themselves, come to realize the dangers of terrorism. But because the Saudis are Wahabis, and because the Wahabi version of Islam is insecure, violent, and hostile, they still don't take sufficient steps to stop the export of terrorists and terrorism. We can't disregard the power Saudi oil gives them over our economy. But we can't be afraid of it either. Their insecurity is our handiest weapon.

Our cadre of evil geniuses can think of many ways to motivate Saudi behavior, and we should be using them all. For example, cautious people that we are, the Pentagon should commission a secret study of how we might intervene to restore order in the former Saudi Arabia after some massive terrorist attack annihilates the Saudi royals, taking some of the oil infrastructure up with them. When that study is leaked (to Bob Novak, of course, not the *New York Times*) how much more uneasy will rest the heads on which the Saudi crowns lie? Enough, perhaps, to make some greater effort against those Saudis whose business it is to exhort and export terrorism?

The Saudis are crude in their manipulation of us. We should compel them to conclude that Machiavelli was a wimp.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Researcher

Department of Defense

OSD Writers Group, Room (b)(2)

Telephone: (b)(2)

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The American Spectator
Jed Babbin

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@ (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, May 23, 2005 8:09 AM
To: tmcinerney@ (b)(6) paulvalley@ (b)(6) nashct@ (b)(6) Glenstrae77@ (b)(6)
BURM41516@ (b)(6) (b)(6) WSSInter@ (b)(6) roberthscales@ (b)(6)
Subject: Today's Spectator

Syria, not the Senate, should be on our minds today.

The American Spectator

Jed Babbin

(b)(6) (home office)
(b)(6) (home fax)
(b)(6) (mobile)

(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, May 19, 2005 6:23 PM
To: 'Dan Senor'
Subject: RE: tonight

I'm watching you on t.v. just now and realizing I never got back to you. Oops.

-----Original Message-----

From: Dan Senor [mailto:dansenor@(b)(6)]
Sent: Thursday, May 19, 2005 3:38 PM
To: larry.dirita@(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6); dbartlett@(b)(6)
Subject: tonight

larry,

i've got to go on brit hume tonight regarding the
nyt's 'iraq is going to hell' story.

any talkers?

also, lots of buzz at FOX about how NO iraqis
participated in the most recent operation along the
syrian border. if true, can you give me examples of
other recent operations where iraqis played an
important role?

i want to challenge this conventional wisdom that the
iraqi security forces are impotent.

thanks!

-dan

(b)(6)

From: Felth, Douglas, HON, OSD-POLICY
Sent: Tuesday, May 17, 2005 4:43 PM
To: O'Connell, Thomas, HON, OSD-POLICY
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY; (b)(6) COL, OSD-POLICY; (b)(6) COL, OSD POLICY; (b)(6) MSGT, OSD-POLICY
Subject: Re: Osama's Pseudo-Islamic Scam -- (Key to his recruitment of suicide bombers)

Tom - good item. I re-sent this to Rodman. Let's discuss at staff meeting.

DJF

Sent from my BlackBerry Handheld.

-----Original Message-----

From: O'Connell, Thomas, HON, OSD-POLICY <Thomas.O'Connell@(b)(6)>
To: Felth, Douglas, HON, OSD-POLICY <Douglas.Felth@(b)(6)>
CC: (b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY (b)(6) Rodman, Peter, HON, OSD-POLICY <Peter.Rodman@(b)(6)> Flory, Peter, CIV, OSD-POLICY <Peter.Flory@(b)(6)> (b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY (b)(6) OASD-PA (b)(6) Brown Bryan D. GEN <brownb@(b)(6)> Olson Eric T. VADM <olsone@(b)(6)> Dailey Dell L. MG <daileyd@(b)(6)>
Sent: Tue May 17 08:56:19 2005
Subject: FW: Osama's Pseudo-Islamic Scam -- (Key to his recruitment of suicide bombers)

-----Original Message-----

From: Thomas McInerney [mailto:tmcinerney@(b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, May 17, 2005 11:26 AM
To: O'Connell, Thomas, HON, OSD-POLICY
Subject: FW: Osama's Pseudo-Islamic Scam -- (Key to his recruitment of suicide bombers)

Tom

FYI below.

This is a very important POLICY ISSUE.

We are calling the FOREIGN TERRORISTS foreign fighters which plays directly into their hands. Washington Post on Sunday called them Martyrs when they are TERRORISTS and unholy warriors (See below).

Your staff's view would be interesting. This should be part of our IO Campaign.

See you at 0930.

Tom

Thomas G. McInerney
Lt. Gen. USAF (Ret)

(b)(6)

Voice (b)(6)
Cell:
Fax:

----- Forwarded Message -----

From: Justcauses@(b)(6)
Date: Fri, 13 May 2005 16:42:26 EDT
To: RobertHScales@(b)(6)

Cc: TMCinerney (b)(6) JackHPryor (b)(6)
Subject: Osama's Pseudo-Islamic Scam -- (Key to his recruitment of suicide bombers)

Dear General Scales: Thanks to our friend Tom McInerney, and believing that our thinking is already in sync, I am pleased to call to your attention a work-in-progress essay of mine about the new "Hirabah (unholy war) by mufsideon (evildoers) destined for Jahannam (Eternal Hellfire)" frame of reference. It involves a mere 3-5 new Arabic and Islamic words which we should all begin using as a powerful disincentive to al Qaeda-style suicide mass murder and other forms of genocidal violence and hatred.

Fortunately, but with virtually no follow-up from the Administration or from academia or the media, the anti-al Qaeda fatwa issued on March 11, 2005 by numerous Muslim clerics in Spain contains similarly truthful and appropriate Islamic religious words. It refers to Osama bin Laden as an "apostate" and an "infidel" and as guilty of "istihlal" (the sinful arrogance of concocting one's own self-serving version of Islamic Law, Sharia) -- rather than condemning him in Western secular words only. Subsequent fatwas most certainly should do at least as much, and hopefully more.

In this regard, please check carefully the FreeMuslims.org website under "Press Corner" and under the following dates:
March 13 for my op-ed draft of a very tough Resolution of Condemnation which contains what I consider to be five very important such words;
March 22 for the text of the historic Spanish Muslim clerics' fatwa condemning bin Laden and al Qaeda in at least three additional Islamic religious terms;
March 30 for the Free Muslims' sharply worded Resolution, also condemning al Qaeda in powerfully negative Islamic religious terms;
April 10 for a related op-ed essay of mine, entitled "Bush to Muslims: A Declaration of Dignity."

Moving along to the central purpose of this communication, the narrative presented below -- "Osama's Pseudo-Islamic Scam -- The al Qaeda Blasphemy" -- ties together my concerns about the vital "war of words" aspect of the broader War of Ideas. It does so by promoting a simple truth-in-language and truth-in-Islam alternative to al Qaeda's patently false and, indeed, blasphemous language of so-called "Jihadi martyrdom" -- which currently dominates both the English and Arabic lexicons and attracts so many religiously motivated young Muslims into suicide mass murder and thus, according to Quranic Islam, into Satan's Eternal Hellfire.

As I hope we will be discussing at your convenience, our parrot-like addiction to the latter places us squarely in the "Great Satan" role so cynically concocted for us by Osama bin Laden. For who, indeed, other than the Great Satan would be warring against "Jihad" (holy war) and hunting down and killing "mujahiddin" (holy warriors) and "shahiddin" (martyrs) on their way to Paradise?

(No wonder so much of the "Arab Street" hates us. By our own careless parroting of al Qaeda's self-sanctifying words, we carelessly classify them as holy and godly and ourselves as satanic and, therefore, worthy of both hatred and even death.)

But imagine how much more difficult it would be for the young recruits, for the Arab media, for the "moderate" Muslim clergy and for any authentic Muslims whatever to remain complacent, accepting, forgiving and supportive of al Qaeda and its satanic scam

- a) if their genocidal terrorism were not so falsely known as "Jihad" but became known as Hirabah (unholy war, forbidden "war against society"), instead;
- b) if they themselves were not so routinely spoken of as "mujadiddin" and "martyrs" but as mufsideon (evildoers), instead;
- c) if their suicide deaths were not called "martyrdom" but simply deaths, instead;
- d) if their likely destiny were to be seen not as Paradise (with or without the sex-orgy factor) but as Jahannam (Eternal Hellfire), instead -- unless, of course, they repent their sins and earnestly seek and actually receive Allah's forgiveness; and
- e) if their suicide mass murder, hatred, crimes and sins would be seen not as coming from "Soldiers of Allah" and from the "Mahdi Army" but from ungodly Servants of Satan (Abdul Shaitan), instead.

Hoping that we might be able to confer soon again about this truth-in-language and truth-in-Islam initiative and that in the interim you will feel free to share this thesis with anyone in your circle of influence who might benefit from its recommendations, I remain,
Sincerely yours,

JIM GUIRARD -- TrueSpeak Institute

(b)(6)

Justcauses@

(b)(6)

Osama's Pseudo-Islamic Scam -- THE AL QAEDA BLASPHEMY (or APOSTASY)

From its inception in the form of unauthorized and un-Islamic fatwas (religious edicts) in 1996 and 1998, Osama bin Laden's so-called "Jihad Against America and the West" is nothing but a pseudo-Islamic scam. It is no more "holy" than the genocidal killers who concocted and are fomenting it.

Its more appropriate name is The Al Qaeda Blasphemy -- a perversion of authentic Islam which (in the name of Allah, of course) threatens to turn that religion into nothing but a perpetual killing machine. Beneath its false labels it is a satanic, cultic violation of many of the fundamental precepts of Qur'anic Islam -- including such sinful transgressions as:

- o Wanton killing of innocents and noncombatants, including many peaceful Muslims
- o Decapitating the live and desecrating the dead bodies of perceived enemies
- o Committing and enticing others to commit suicide for reasons of intimidation
- o Fomenting hatred among communities, nations, religions and civilizations
- o Ruthless warring against nations in which Islam is freely practiced
- o Issuing and inspiring unauthorized and un-Islamic fatwas (religious edicts)
- o Using some mosques as weapons depots and battle stations, while destroying others
- o Forcing extremist and absolutist versions (and perversions) of Islam on Muslims, when the Quran clearly says that there shall be "no compulsion in religion"
- o Distorting the word "infidels" to include all Christians, all Jews and many Muslims, as well -- when the Qur'an calls them all "Children of the Book" (the Old Testament) and "Sons of Abraham," and calls Jesus one of Islam's five main Prophets
- o Deliberate misreading, ignoring and perverting of passages of the Qur'an and the Islamic Jurisprudence (the Fiqh)

All of this constitutes a gigantic blasphemy (or apostasy, choose your word) against the "peaceful, just, compassionate and merciful" Allah of the Qur'an. And, of course, the penalty for blasphemy in Islam is death. Ask poor old Salman Rushdie who has been under a fatwa of death for over a decade -- for allegedly mistranslating certain verses of the

Prophet in his famous book, "The Satanic Verses."

But, wonder of wonders, Osama's multiple perversions of Islam -- which are a thousand times worse than Rushdie's alleged offenses -- are shielded from a death warrant by the halo of so-called "Jihad." While that halo is a patently false one, it is made to seem true by the fact that so many of us (its intended victims) mindlessly parrot bin Laden in calling it holy "Jihad."

Surely, if it were something else, its harshest critics (particularly our PsyOP and public diplomacy experts on the subject) would be calling it by some other more truthful Islamic term -- particularly if that much needed name were the exact opposite of the so-called "holy" and "godly" war it is alleged to be.

Now, more than three years after the suicide mass murders of September 11, 2001, it is high time that we discover the correct Islamic word for such sinful atrocities and proactively begin using that name -- rather than continuing to lip-sync with Osama bin Laden, at the risk of our lives and those of our children and grandchildren.

The Word Is "Hirabah" -- Forbidden War Against Society

Of course, there is a word for the kind of warfare which violates all of the Qur'anic prohibitions listed above, despite our sophomoric inability to have found it by now. It is the ancient word Hirabah (pronounced hee-RAH-bah), which the Islamic Jurisprudence (the Fiqh) defines as a forbidden "war against society" -- or what in modern parlance would be called "genocidal terrorism" or "crimes against humanity."

In his seminal article on Hirabah in the Fall 2001 issue of Muslim World, the renowned University of Michigan scholar of Islam, Prof. Abdul Hakim (a.k.a., Sherman Jackson), confirms this interpretation as follows:

"In the end, however, Hirabah assumes its place as an effective super-category hovering above the entire criminal law as a possible remedy to be pressed into service for the more sensational, heinous or terrifying manifestations of these and other crimes. In this capacity, Hirabah appears, again, to parallel the function of terrorism as an American legal category. Its function is not so much to define specific crimes but to provide a mechanism for heightening the scrutiny and/or level of pursuit and prosecution in certain cases of actual or potential public violence.

"In sum, we may conclude that it is terror, or the spreading of fear and helplessness, that lies at the heart of Hirabah. From this perspective, Hirabah speaks to the same basic issue as does terrorism in American law. As mentioned earlier, however, Hirabah actually goes beyond the FBI definition of terrorism, inasmuch as Hirabah covers both directed and coincidental spreading of fear... Hirabah, as it turns out, [once was and should be seen again as] the most severely punished crime in Islam, carrying mandatory criminal sanctions."

But, looking back in history, we find that the widespread killing and pillaging of entire communities and tribes by ruthless barbarians and brigands gradually subsided in the Middle Ages. And the powerful Islamic word which had been used since the 10th and 11th centuries to condemn such atrocities gradually faded from use, as well.

Obviously, it must now be rediscovered and resuscitated. It must become the keystone of both truth-in-language and truth-in-Islam in the war against al Qaeda-style suicide mass murder and related forms of hatred and violence.

Indeed, it is only by the assertive and insistent use of this truthful term, along with four others which follow from it, that the false and blasphemous language of so-called "Jihadi martyrdom" (a bunch of holy guys destined for Paradise as a reward for murdering people like us) can eventually be defeated. These other essential words are as follows:

mufsidoon (evildoers) -- the Islamic word for those who are fomenting and waging unholy Hirabah and who, therefore, cannot be either the mujaheddin (holy warriors) or the "martyrs" they claim to be.

Jahannam (Eternal Hellfire) -- which is authentic Islam's destiny for unrelenting and unrepentant mufsidoon who will not cease their evildoing and who will, therefore, not be destined for Paradise but for Shaitan's eternal Hellfire.

tajdeef (blasphemy) -- which is what these Jahannam-bound mufsidoon are engaged in when they ruthlessly kill innocents and noncombatants, foment hatred, commit and entice others to commit suicide, condemn everyone but themselves as "infidels," etc.

shaitaniyah (satanic) -- which is the fundamental character of the willful and mortally sinful Osaman Blasphemy described at the beginning of this essay.

Logically, now that our scholarly experts, our public diplomacy spokespersons and our national leaders know the word Hirabah and the name mufsidoon for those who are fomenting and waging this forbidden "war against society," we should be using these words aggressively and without fail.

Cold War Parallels

To continue a mindless repetition of Osama bin Laden's preferred labels of "Jihad by mujaheddin on their way to Paradise" and to go about condemning "Jihadists" (holy warriors) is as naive and as self-destructive as it was when we mindlessly parroted such preposterous Soviet, Maoist and Castroite labels as "people's democracies" and "progressive fronts" and so-called "wars of national liberation."

Truth be known, there were no such "wars of national liberation," because no liberty was ever involved. And today, there is no so-called "Jihad," because there is neither any holiness nor any "peaceful, compassionate, merciful and just" Will of Allah of the Qur'an involved -- but only the Osaman Blasphemy, Qur'anic Islam's punishment for which is death in this life and Jahannam (eternal Hellfire) in the next.

As outlined above, this is reminiscent of the subtle but deadly Cold War problem identified in the 1970s and 80s by Dr. Fred Charles Ikle and Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan as "semantic infiltration" -- which the late Senator defined as follows:

"Simply put, semantic infiltration is the process whereby we come to adopt the language of our adversaries in describing political reality. The most totalitarian regimes in the world would call themselves 'liberation movements.' It is perfectly predictable that they should misuse words to conceal their real nature. But must we aid them in that effort by repeating those words? Worse, do we begin to influence our own perceptions by using them?"

Of course, we do! The problem is as real and as deadly dangerous today as it was then. Bin Laden and his murderous ilk say "Jihad and Holy War," and we repeat these words thousands of times over -- thus endorsing and confirming their claim to a holy and godly purpose. They say "mujaheddin" (holy warriors) and "shuhada" or "shahiddin" (martyrs) on their way to Paradise and we dutifully copy-cat those words, as well. Back in Cold War days, that sort of naiveté was called "useful idiocy" and should still be.

Recall, please, how the perfidious Soviets and their surrogates, Fidel Castro in particular, successfully co-opted the powerfully positive word "liberation" and turned it into a lovely but patently false label for adding colonies -- euphemistically known as "satellites," of course -- to the Evil Empire.

Truth be known, those bloody wars of Soviet colonial conquest (properly defined) had absolutely nothing to do with either national independence or personal liberty -- no more than today's so-called "holy wars" of al Qaeda, Hamas, Hizbollah, Islamic Jihad and their pseudo-Islamic ilk have anything to do with godliness or holiness.

In addition to the words of wisdom from Prof. Abdul Hakim of the University of Michigan cited above, here are quotations from three more (of about twenty-five) distinguished scholars of Islam and Middle Eastern affairs who are now embracing this truthful Hirabah (unholy war, "war against society") frame of reference, and sharply rejecting the false and un-Islamic language of so-called "Jihadi martyrdom:"

o PROF. AKBAR AHMED (Chair of Islamic Studies, American University) "Properly understood, this is a war of ideas within Islam -- some of them faithful to authentic Islam, but some of them clearly un-Islamic and even blasphemous toward the peaceful and compassionate Allah of the Qur'an.... As a matter of truth-in-Islam, both the ideas and the actions they produce must be called what they actually are, beginning with the fact that al Qaeda's brand of suicide mass murder and its fomenting of hatred among races, religions and cultures do not constitute godly or holy "Jihad" -- but, in fact, constitute the heinous crime and sin of unholy "Hirabah".... In its worst excesses, particularly in the wanton killing of innocents -- both non-Muslim and Muslim alike -- as a method of terrorizing the entire community, such ungodly "war against society" should be condemned as blasphemous and un-Islamic."

o DR. AKHTAR EMON (President, Arabic Language Institute Foundation) "Hirabah represents an Unholy War against innocent civilians. The truth stands clear from falsehood. Hirabah can never be confused as 'Jihad' (Holy War), as much as al-Qaeda would like to label their heinous acts against humanity as Jihad... Hirabah is forbidden and sanctioned not only by the teachings of Qur'an, but also by the Bible and Torah -- all three Abrahamic faiths (Islam, Judaism, and Christianity) agree on this, and so also other major faiths such as Buddhism, Hinduism, Sikhs, Zoroastrians, Bahai's, and the New Age religions addressing "mind, body and soul".... TrueSpeak efforts are highly commendable in educating the world citizenry with truth-in-language and expanding the lexicon, e.g., to distinguish a good guy with a bad guy (mufsidoon), a good act with an act of blasphemy (tajdeef), etc."

o DR. ROBERT D. CRANE (Chairman, Center for Understanding Islam, and a convert to Sufi Islam): "Today there are many alienated extremists who rely on their own resort to violence in protest against perceived injustice, rather than relying on the jihads of akbar, saghrir and kabir with the help of Allah and ecumenical cooperation in peacefully building a better world. In effect, these extremists rely on and worship themselves. They are exhibiting the most serious crime condemned in the Qur'an, which is the root of almost all the other crimes -- namely, arrogance. This leads them to commit the crime of hirabah and to justify it in the name of Islam. There can be no greater evil and no greater sin. If there is to be a clash of civilizations, a major cause will be the muharibun [a synonym for mufsidoon] those who commit inter-civilizational hirabah."

A Ticket to Hellfire, Not to Paradise

No matter how much time and money the Public Diplomacy people in the White House, the Voice of America, the State Department and the Department of Defense spend in the effort to "make America look good in the Muslim World" and elsewhere abroad, we will be missing the proverbial boat if we do not also focus equal attention on the need to make the "mufsidoon Saddam" (Saddam's evildoers) and the "mufsidoon Osama" (Osama's evildoers) look BAD in the eyes of authentic, Qur'anic Islam -- namely, like the sinful blasphemers against the "peaceful, compassionate, merciful and just" Allah of the Qur'an who they actually are.

Of course, this antidote to the Osaman Blasphemy is best delivered in Islamic religious words -- just like the seductive al Qaeda mantra is. As explained above, the latter proposes to impressionable and religiously motivated young Muslims that they "Join the Jihad, become mujaheddin and martyrs, enter into Paradise."

But imagine, please, how much more difficult it will be for al Qaeda and their ilk to inspire and to sustain the suicidal zealotry of young Muslims -- or the approval of any truly devout "authentic" Muslims whatever -- once they begin to view themselves as mufsidoon (evildoers) engaged in Hirabah (unholy war) and in tajdeef (blasphemy) against Allah and, therefore, on their way to Jahannam (eternal Hellfire), instead.

As one can see from the growing number of distinguished scholars of Islamic and Middle Eastern affairs who are proactively endorsing this initiative, it represents a new vocabulary and the start of a new anti-terrorism mentality in the "moderate Muslim" community.

At long last, these good people -- and the rest of us, too -- can begin using the correct

semantic tools with which to draw a truly sharp distinction between the good-guy Muslims and the satanic blasphemers who are attempting to transform authentic Islam into nothing but a perpetual killing machine of all Christians, all Jews and all Muslims who happen to disagree.

That is what ungodly "Hirabah" (Unholy War, sinful crimes against humanity) is all about.

Jim Guirard -- TrueSpeak Institute . 703-768-0957 Justcauses@aol.com

Jim Guirard is a Washington, DC-area lawyer, writer and national security consultant. He was longtime Chief-of-Staff to U.S. Senators Allen Ellender and Russell Long. His TrueSpeak Institute is devoted to truth-in-language and truth-in-history in public discourse.

----- End of Forwarded Message

(b)(6)

From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, May 16, 2005 9:50 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: Stanley, Daniel, CIV, OSD-LA
Subject: RE: surety issue

I think we are the same place we were last week -- pretty much a stand-off.

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, May 16, 2005 9:16 AM
To: Stanley, Daniel, CIV, OSD-LA
Cc: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: surety issue

i'm relatively sure (pun intended) i'll get a call today from jed babbin regarding the surety issue. is this something he should pursue, dan? thanks, eric

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
 Sent: Monday, May 16, 2005 9:45 AM
 To: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
 Subject: Today's Spectator: How Saddam bought the Russians

Saddam's Bought Russians

By Jed Babbin

Published 5/16/2005 12:16:42 AM

Russia's stubborn pro-Saddam stance in the UN Security Council brought Vladimir Putin's party and political machine enormous financial rewards in the form of bribe money coming from the UN Oil for Food Program, according to two detailed reports being released today by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI). Those bribes have fueled Putin's drive to restore authoritarian government in Russia. It is more than just corruption. Senate investigators say Saddam's penetration of the Russian political system was so deep that it could -- and did -- cause the passage of pro-Iraqi measures in the Russian Duma.

Senators Norm Coleman (R-MN) and Carl Levin (D-MI) sent their investigators to Iraq where they interviewed 16 former top officials of Saddam's regime. The staffers and their Senate bosses have been digging through thousands of documents in Iraq and here, including the corporate records of Texas oil trader Bayoil. And they have struck investigative gold.

From the speed with which the Senate investigators hit paydirt, it's easy to see why the Volcker team hasn't even attempted to chase the leads that were staring them in the face. If Volcker's crew had been serious, they could have pursued the big smell emanating from the Russian side of the oil transactions Saddam had been making. The Senate investigators detected the strong odor of rotting fish when they reached the obvious conclusion that Russia -- an oil exporter -- had somehow been the recipient of about 30% of the oil allocations (i.e., oil contracts awarded) under the Oil for Food scam without a drop of the OFF Program oil being delivered to Russia. The Senate investigation to date has concluded that one of the Russian government's most capable "fixers" -- one Vladimir Zhirinovskiy -- was only the most visibly corrupted Russian official. Digging a bit deeper, the PSI folks found that the Russian Presidential Council, Putin's Unity Party (latterly named the "United Russia Party"), the Congress Party and Russia's minister of foreign affairs all received massive oil allocations from the UN program.

Cut back to the Iraqi side of the ledger. According to the PSI reports, the large oil transactions were doled out to those doing Saddam's bidding and those he wanted to seduce. Saddam approved many of the transactions personally, while others were approved by his chief henchmen including his veep, Taha Yasin Ramadan, and Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. According to the PSI reports, Ramadan said that the oil allocations -- which could be sold for large commissions -- often resulted in profits for the recipients and were intended as "compensation for support" in the UN Security Council. (Tariq Aziz told the PSI that Putin's party received a large number of oil allocations because Russia was taking positions in the Security Council that favored Iraq. Those positions pressured the

4/4/2008

Security Council to end the sanctions regime without forcing the completion of the WMD inspections.)

When Saddam got a bit greedier the allocations also resulted in "surcharges" paid back to Saddam's regime. These "surcharges" (in the Bronx, we called them "kickbacks") of up to 30 cents per barrel were paid into special bank accounts that were under the control of Saddam's regime and were used to fund terrorism, weapons purchases, and pretty much everything else Saddam was forbidden under the 1991 cease-fire agreements that granted him a reprieve he didn't deserve. (PSI plans more reports on how the funds were used to pay for terrorism and arms purchases.)

TO BE FAIR TO PUTIN, it's likely that the oil allocations to ensure his loyalty to Saddam only began after he began, in the summer of 2000, to pressure the UN for an end to the sanctions against Saddam. But once Putin and his cronies began receiving this "compensation for support," they were loath to see it end. And they put their pay to good use. The Russian Presidential Council the PSI report names is, according to Senate investigators, the mechanism Putin has used to consolidate power over local governments in his drive to return Russia to autocracy. (PSI says that the RPC has been referred to by other names by other sources. It is apparently the Presidential State Council established by Putin about a year after he was elected in 1999.) Funded by Iraqi bribe money, Putin has used the Council to bring pressure on regional officials to surrender power to the Kremlin. This is part and parcel of Putin's anti-democracy campaign that saw ballot alterations and pressure on media in the 2003 Duma election, increased Putin's control of the judiciary, and may yet end the direct election of regional governments.

The RPC apparently began receiving oil allocations at the behest of Aleksandr Stalevitch Voloshin, who is credited with a large role in Putin's rise to power. Voloshin ran Putin's first presidential campaign, helped create the "Unity Party" and -- as the PSI report says -- has been described as "a guide for those who needed things 'fixed' at the Kremlin." According to one source PSI quotes, "the Putin-Voloshin link is the strongest link in the [Russian] political game." Voloshin, himself a recipient of oil allocations, sent a friend, Sergei Isaakov, to Iraq to sign many of the oil allocation contracts for the Russian Presidential Council.

According to the PSI report on the Russian Presidential Council, the RPC received oil allocations amounting to 90 million barrels. These allocations were passed through Russian government intermediaries (strawman companies appointed and apparently controlled by the RPC) and sold through the Texas oil trader Bayoil. Bayoil, in turn, paid commissions to the Russian government middlemen which amounted to millions of dollars. In just the period of August through October 2000, Bayoil paid \$1.9 million to two named strawman companies, "Haverhill" and "Rusnaftaimpex" on oil allocations to the Russian Presidential Council. On one allocation contract, PSI estimates the payments to RPC -- aside from what was paid to the strawmen -- amounted to about \$850,000. Multiplied over the 90 million barrels, the profits to Putin's political machine could easily amount to tens of millions of dollars.

The Senate PSI will hold hearings on these reports tomorrow, and more and more details of how Saddam's bought Russians served him in the UN will come out. PSI's investigation will continue and -- because Coleman and Levin won't let this go -- will penetrate deeper and

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deeper into the swamp of Oil for Food. And while they do, the UN remains adamant in its coverup of the scandal. It's still business as usual in Turtle Bay. Even on the most important issue we face today.

WHILE OIL FOR FOOD GRABS the headlines, the Iran nuclear problem festers. The EU-3 are about to be forced to admit the utter demolition of their diplomacy by the Iranian mullahs. The negotiations have come to naught, and the Iranians are threatening to resume the enrichment of uranium (which they probably never stopped) if the Eunuchs don't cave in. Thankfully, Britain is on the brink of agreeing with us to demand that Iran be brought before the UN Security Council for sanctions. British realism, albeit a little late, is welcome. But shall we trust the UN with the most urgent threat to our security, knowing the Security Council's members are for sale?

Some say Iran will be able to manufacture nuclear warheads in six months. Others say two years. In short, we have no damned idea when the mullahs will be armed with nukes, but we do know that a nuclear Iran is a risk the civilized world can't take. We know the only thing the UN will do is debate and delay. It is incapable of decision or action. There will be demands for inspections, and arguments about how they shall be done. Iran will go back and forth, cooperating and refusing, standing on its "rights" as a sovereign nation, a UN member in good standing. The debate will end when Iran announces its nuclear arsenal. Why should the UN debate further, *mon ami*? The game, she is over, yes?

TAS contributing editor Jed Babbin is the author of *Inside the Asylum: Why the UN and Old Europe Are Worse Than You Think* (Regnery, 2004).

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Researcher

Department of Defense

OSD Writers Group, Room (b)(2)

Telephone: (b)(2)

Fax: (b)(2)

4/4/2008

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@ (b)(6)

Sent: Monday, May 16, 2005 8:43 AM

To: tmcinerney@ (b)(6) paulvalley@ (b)(6) nashct@ (b)(6) Glenstrae77@ (b)(6)
BURM41516@ (b)(6) (b)(6) WSSinter@ (b)(6) roberthscales@ (b)(6)

Subject: Today's Spectator: How Saddam bought the Russians

More on the UN oil-for-food-for-bribes-for-weapons scam. Dynamite stuff from Sen. Coleman's PSI.
Best, Jed.

The American Spectator

Jed Babbin

(b)(6) (home office)
(b)(6) (home fax)
(b)(6) (mobile)

4/4/2008

(b)(6)

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, May 13, 2005 7:46 PM
To: (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA; Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Intial media reaction to today's BRAC announcement

Nice work, per usual, (b)(6) Thanks.

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA (b)(6)
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA <larry.dirita@(b)(6)> Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA <Bryan.Whitman@(b)(6)>; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA <allison.barber@(b)(6)>
Ruff, Eric, CIV, OASD-PA <eric.ruff@(b)(6)>
Sent: Fri May 13 16:56:15 2005
Subject: Intial media reaction to today's BRAC announcement

The attachment includes an examination of media coverage from the top 10 news outlets by circulation and national television broadcast stations following the BRAC announcement. Early online coverage consisted primarily of a reprinted AP story announcing the number of closures and cost savings. Later updates included more original commentary and reaction from state officials and legislators. National television had similar coverage and included commentary by military analysts.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, May 13, 2005 4:56 PM
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Initial media reaction to today's BRAC announcement
Attachments: BRAC Post Briefing- Media Reaction - 051305.doc

The attachment includes an examination of media coverage from the top 10 news outlets by circulation and national television broadcast stations following the BRAC announcement. Early online coverage consisted primarily of a reprinted AP story announcing the number of closures and cost savings. Later updates included more original commentary and reaction from state officials and legislators. National television had similar coverage and included commentary by military analysts.

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BRAC Base Realignment and Closure 2005

BRAC - POST PRESS CONFERENCE ANNOUNCEMENT **MEDIA REACTION** **FRIDAY 13, 2005**

The following includes an examination of media coverage from the top 10 news outlets by circulation and national television broadcast stations following the BRAC announcement. Early online coverage consisted primarily of a reprinted AP story announcing the number of closures and cost savings. Later updates included more original commentary and reaction from state officials and legislators. National television had similar coverage and included commentary by military analysts.

ONLINE HIGHLIGHTS

Immediate coverage of the announcement:

- The NYT, WP, USA Today, NY Daily News and WSJ reprinted an AP story, without adding original reporting.
- Denver Post, Houston Chronicle tailored the AP piece for a local slant
- The L.A. Times, Chicago Tribune and Atlanta Journal-Constitution ran original stories.

Updated stories included:

- A WP piece on the proposal to shut down Walter Reed
- A NYT piece by Eric Schmitt and David Stout on "intense reaction" across the country to the announcement.

Commentary included:

- Reprinted AP stories highlighted overall cost savings, a "massive shift of US forces," employment numbers in affected communities, and part of a written statement by the Secretary: "Our current arrangements, designed for the Cold War, must give way to the new demands of the war against extremism and other evolving 21st Century challenges."
 - Also included several quotes from state legislators who were disappointed in their state's closings. For example, New Jersey's Fort Monmouth was on the list, to which Democratic Rep. Rush Holt vowed to: "Fight like hell to change it" and "the Pentagon's error."
- "Atlanta was a major loser..." but the rest of GA fared well and the state will gain jobs.
- The news that Illinois will lose jobs due to closures, but such major installations as Scott Air Force Base will stay open was greeted with "loud applause."
- That CO has no closures and will gain jobs was called good news for the state by Wayne Allard, R-Colo.

- "California has done very well in this round" of closures, Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-Alpine), the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee said today

Messages and quotes:

- The aim to "promote jointness" – "The Pentagon also proposed eliminating scores of Reserve and National Guard bases, part of Rumsfeld's effort to promote "jointness" between the active-duty and reserve units." (NY Daily News, via an AP article).
- The updated NYT piece on immediate reaction to the closures:
 - Quoted Loren Thompson of the Lexington Institute: "savings are generated more by reorganization than closures"
 - Quoted Gen. Richard Myers: "The degree with which the services coordinate, integrate and operate together will be increased, and it will include how we manage some of our bases and posts."
 - The Secretary "sought to ease fears" about unemployment caused by closed bases.

TELEVISION HIGHLIGHTS

- "Bottom Line – the DoD needs the money. They want to make better use of tax payers money" - (CNN)
- People in congress are saying "the battle starts today" – (Headline News)
- "There is life after closure but it is difficult" – Audience interview (Fox News Dayside with Linda Vester)
- We are going to fight this decision and we have plenty of ways to fight it – (MSNBC - Rep. Rob Simmons)
- Emphasis on which bases have had job gains (rather than losses) – (Fox News)
- BRAC sets-up a national competition between communities...that is what this process is about – (Fox News Dayside with Linda Vester)
- Historically, less than 10% of bases were able to get off the list - (Fox News Dayside with Linda Vester)
- Analyst: General Montgomery Meigs comments:
 - Efficiency is the core principle of this BRAC closure
 - Enhancement of "joint consolidation"
 - More open minded military culture
 - Biggest challenges: communities that lose jobs
 - BRAC is probably a combination of the transformation initiative and the wars overseas

ONLINE EXCERPTS

THE ATLANTA JOURNAL CONSTITUTION

ORIGINAL: Four Georgia bases on closure list

Ron Martz, Bob Kemper

9:24 AM

After surviving four previous rounds of base closings unscathed, metro Atlanta took a major hit on Friday in the latest announcement of facilities the Pentagon wants to shut down.

The Pentagon announced it plans to close three bases in the Atlanta area — Fort McPherson in southwest Atlanta, Fort Gillem in Forest Park and the Naval Air Station in Marietta. That will mean a loss of nearly 6,500 military and civilian jobs and about \$560 million in annual payroll.

While Atlanta was a major loser, the rest of Georgia fared well and the state will actually gain about 7,500 military and civilian positions...

State officials had no immediate word on the list but Gov. Sonny Perdue was holding a news conference and will visit each of the targeted facilities later today.

"We're disappointed. We think the community action group did a great job. ... We're prepared to challenge the recommendation," said Fred Bryant, deputy director, Georgia Military Affairs Coordinating Committee. "We don't know yet what were the key factors in the decision."

THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE

ORIGINAL: Illinois takes job hit but escapes major base closures

Rebecca Carroll, AP

8:56 AM CDT

Illinois would lose nearly 2,700 military and civilian jobs under base closures recommended Friday by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, but the state's major military installations would remain open.

Scott Air Force Base, located about 20 miles east of St. Louis, near Belleville, emerged as the big winner, gaining 797 military and civilian jobs. Great Lakes Naval Training Center in North Chicago is slated to lose 2,022 jobs...

The announcement that Scott would not close was greeted with loud applause and a standing ovation at MidAmerica Airport in Mascoutah, Ill., where Illinois U.S. Sen. Dick Durbin and Reps. Jerry Costello and John Shimkus held a news conference to announce its fate.

DENVER POST

ORIGINAL: Colorado a Winner in Base Closure Plans

Mike Soraghan, Denver Post Staff Writer and The Associated Press

09:31:52 AM, updated at 11:00 AM

...Not only was Colorado spared any base closures, the state stands to gain nearly 5,000 military jobs... Members of Colorado's congressional delegation expressed pleasure over the plan's impact on the state.

"I think it's good news for Colorado and it's great news for the Colorado Springs area," said U.S. Sen. Wayne Allard, R-Colo., who served on the Senate Armed Services Committee until recently.

HOUSTON CHRONICLE

UPDATED: 180 U.S. military bases targeted for closure by Pentagon

AP - 10:08AM, updated at 10:39

...The 147th Fighter Wing of the Air National Guard will remain at Houston's Ellington Field under the plan. Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison said the wing's mission will be shifting from national defense to homeland security.

LA TIMES

ORIGINAL: California Largely Spared in Latest Round of Base Closures

Tony Perry, Times Staff Writer

...The Los Angeles Air Force Base, the language facility at Monterey and major Navy and Marine Corps bases in San Diego were spared in the Pentagon's list of bases proposed for closure, which was unveiled this morning.

"California has done very well in this round" of closures, Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-Alpine), the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee said today...

California's biggest job loss appears to be the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Corona, which employs 900 workers and is listed for closure...

Although the Pentagon's list is meant to be only the beginning of the process, 85% of bases targeted by the Pentagon in the past have been closed

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS

ORIGINAL: Pentagon Plans to Close 33 Major Bases - AP

Liz Sidoti

12:44 PM EDT

NEW YORK TIMES

ORIGINAL: Pentagon Proposal to Include Shutting 33 Major U.S. Bases - AP

11:01 AM

UPDATED: Pentagon Proposes Shutting 33 Major U.S. Bases and Other Cuts

Eric Schmitt and David Stout - 1:11 PM

The bases proposed for closing include some familiar names in military history: the Navy's submarine base in New London, Conn., Fort McPherson in Georgia, Fort

Monmouth in New Jersey and the Pascagoula Naval Station in Mississippi. Scores of smaller installations would also be closed, and others would be consolidated...

While the list of recommended closings was smaller than expected, the reaction from those affected was intense.

Senator Joseph I. Lieberman, Democrat of Connecticut, called the recommendation to close the New London base, which would cost several thousands jobs, "irrational and irresponsible."

"It insults our history and endangers our future," he told The Associated Press...

"The savings projected by this round seem to be generated more by reorganization than outright closures," said Loren Thompson, a military analyst with the Lexington Institute, a consulting firm. "At present, the military is very inefficiently located and organized.

Many facilities are sited in places that made sense a century ago but not now."

After more than two years of exhaustive study, this round of base closings is an integral part of Mr. Rumsfeld's strategy to revamp the military into a leaner, more agile force.

"The degree with which the services coordinate, integrate and operate together will be increased, and it will include how we manage some of our bases and posts," Gen. Richard B. Myers, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said.

Mr. Rumsfeld sought to ease fears in many communities that closings could leave thousands of local employees out of work. He cited examples of closed bases that had been converted into commercial airports and economic centers. And he pledged that the Defense Department would provide retraining for workers and economic aid to help offset the immediate economic impact in communities where bases close.

USA TODAY

UPDATED - Battle over Bases Begins: Pentagon proposes closing of 33 major bases - AP

Updated 12:30 PM

...One major closure Rumsfeld seeks is Ellsworth Air Force Base in South Dakota, home to 29 B-1B bombers, half the nation's fleet of the aircraft, and the state's second largest employer.

Republican freshman Sen. John Thune on Friday called the Pentagon "flat wrong" about Ellsworth, and he vowed to help lead the fight in the Senate to delay the entire round of closures. "We will continue to keep Ellsworth open," Thune said...

Rumsfeld also recommended closing the Naval Station in Pascagoula, Miss., which barely survived previous base closure rounds. The decision was a blow to Sen. Trent Lott, R-Miss., who had fought the 1995 round of closures. At stake are 844 military jobs and 112 civilian jobs...

New England took a major hit, and Connecticut suffered the biggest loss in terms of jobs with the proposed closure of the U.S. Naval Submarine Base in Groton, Conn. Shutting the installation would result in the loss of 7,096 military jobs and 952 civilian jobs. Calling the recommendation "irrational and irresponsible," Sen. Joe Lieberman (D-Conn.) said, "It insults our history and endangers our future."...

WALL STREET JOURNAL

ORIGINAL: Pentagon to Propose Closure - AP

UPDATED: Pentagon Proposes Closure Of About 180 Installations - AP

10:55 a.m.

Later updated with AP piece

WASHINGTON POST

ORIGINAL: Pentagon Proposing to Shut 33 Major Bases - AP

Liz Sidoti

11:01 AM

UPDATED: Pentagon Proposes Shutting Walter Reed

William Branigin and Ann Scott Tyson

12:54 PM

The Pentagon today proposed eliminating about 180 military installations across the country in a new round of base closures and realignments aimed at saving nearly \$49 billion over 20 years. One major proposal calls for essentially moving Walter Reed Army Medical Center from Washington, D.C., to a new state-of-the-art, jointly staffed facility in suburban Maryland...

Housing and some research facilities at the Walter Reed site in Washington would stay open, but the facility as it exists today would practically be shut down, and it would lose 5,630 military, civilian and contractor jobs...

Among the luckiest states on the list is Maryland, which gains 9,293 jobs -- more than any other state. The District loses 6,496 jobs under the proposal -- mainly from the loss of Walter Reed -- while Virginia loses 1,574.

The hardest-hit states include Connecticut, which loses 8,586 jobs; Maine, with a loss of 6,938 jobs; and Alaska, which stands to lose 4,619. Overseas, a total of 13,503 jobs would be cut in the closure or realignment of U.S. military installations in Germany, South Korea and elsewhere. Many of those jobs would move to the United States.

TELEVISION EXCERPTS

MSNBC

5/13/2005 2:19:22 PM

Newscaster: Joining us to talk a little bit more about the strategic implications of today's announcement is MSNBC analyst Montgomery Meigs. Thank you so much for taking the time today. **Meigs:** Good to be on the show. **Newscaster:** It's unusual when you think about closures and the loss of jobs as something that might be helpful and might make a unit or a situation better. But can you explain to us why this realignment will make the military stronger? **Meigs:** Sure. There are three things that I see. First of all as general efficiency, a lot of these face that's are being closed can be consolidated with other functions. And can you get more things done for the equivalent DoD dollar. Efficiency

that is the first principle. Secondly, there is some joint consolidation going on. So, for instance, the third Army headquarters, which is now in Atlanta, is being moved to Shaw Air Force Base where it will consolidate with the Air Force headquarters that also works for U.S. central command. So that will make planning easier, coordination, etc. and enhance jointness. Finally within the Army, Chief of the Staff of the Army is breaking down some of the tribal barriers. He's consolidating the infantry and armor schools, a number of the logistics schools. That way you'll get much more open minded culture in the office corps of the army. **Newscaster:** Knowing Secretary Rumsfeld's vision of a more compact Army, do you think this was something that, perhaps, was always in the planning or is it a result of fighting two wars? **Meigs:** Well, I think it's a combination. For instance, foreman was up for election last time. This time they're going to close it and move the headquarters a little further north in the state of Virginia. And there are some things that have changed as a result of what we've seen in the last 10 years. Now the army is going to have more brigades than it has in the past. You have to have a place to put them. Some of that is deflected in the BRAC numbers. **Newscaster:** We talk about all the positive things that will come out of this. What is the difficult thing? What is the challenging thing? The not so great news today? **Meigs:** Well, you got to have some communities that are going to lose jobs. That's a painful transition process.

Fox News Channel

5/13/2005 1:17:35 PM

Interviews with Tom Markham (Association of Defense Communities) and Jim Saxton (New Jersey, Congressmen)

Those that are losing will be trying to reverse the signatures of the Pentagon. That's what this process is about. **Linda Vester:** Tom, you have been through this. You know what the fight is like when you try to save your base. How often is it a winning fight? **Tom Markham:** Those hit during the first four rounds of closures said less than 10% of the communities were able to get off the list. We don't know about this round but that was the case in the last round. **Linda:** This is democracy in action, but, you know, communities who are supportive of the military are being forced to compete with each other to stay alive. **Rep. Saxton:** That's true. While, less than 10% of the bases may have gotten off before this is not a mission impossible task to get a base off the list. I would point out in 1989 and 1991 both those round of BRAC, Fort Dix was on the list and it got off. In 1993 McGuire Air Force base was on the list and it got off. So, we've got a good record of knowing how to do this in New Jersey, we'll spare no effort to try to make our case. **Linda:** I want to bring a member of the audience. Turn out this fellow is a retired Marine. I would have thought you would say not to close the base. But instead, you said no, close them down. **Audience Member:** I'm assuming all the work that's being done there can be done elsewhere. The reason they are closing them is they are obsolete or not need. If they are not needed they should close. **Linda:** How well do the communities get handled after the fact in terms of retraining and stuff like that? **Tom Markham:** There is some retraining that goes on. However, the main challenge after these bases do close is the economic recovery. As an example, in Denver we have been closed for 10 years. We lost 700 jobs and \$290 million a year spent on the local economy. Today we have 20,000 people living there, new houses, and a \$4 billion economic impact. The message is that there is life after closure but it's difficult.

Headline News

5/13/2005 11:31:50

Newscaster: Tens of thousands of military and civilian personnel could lose their jobs. Jamie McIntyre joins us live from the Pentagon with details. Hi, Jaime. **McIntyre:** Hi Kathleen. It started as a major military operation this morning lone capitol hill as several-inch-thick base closure recommendation report was delivered to capitol hill where lawmakers are very interested to hear whether their particular bases are being closed or scaled back or in some cases actually gaining, according to this Realignment plan released by the pentagon. Lets look at some of the major closures. Thirty-three major bases. Here are some of the top ones around the country. New England would lose the submarine base at New London and also the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard targeted there. The naval station in Mississippi is on the targeted list. Cannon air force base in Texas as well as Ellsworth air force base where they have the b-2 bombers. The Pentagon plans to keep the planes, just move them to other facilities. In some cases some of the bases are gaining in some personnel and responsibility. Again, twenty-nine of thirty-three major closures, twenty-nine bases where they are going to have major reductions. Then another forty-nine bases will be gaining either in personnel or missions under this Pentagon plan, which now goes to the base closure commission over the next couple of months. That begins its work on Monday when the Pentagon will formally present this plan and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld will testify favor of it. One of the arguments they are going to make is that this plan has been carefully worked out, the pieces are interdependent and to change one base could affect the whole plan. The commission is going to have to look at the whole thing in entirety whether it sends recommendation to the president and ultimately to Capitol Hill. **Newscaster:** Is there the possibility that the commission could change its mind about some of these closures or is this really a done deal? **McIntyre:** well, in the past, the base closure commission has made some changes, but the prospect for any particular base is going to be kind of tough. The pentagon has spent a long time working up the rationale for each one of these. They say it is based on military necessity. They say they need the savings that have come from the base closings. The whole reason, there is an independent commission to do this is that if it were left up to congress, no base would ever be closed because members of Congress would simply stall.

CNN

5/13/2005 1:05:03 PM

Newscaster: There's a lot of people crying foul already Jamie. We've received so many e-mails and viewers wanting to know, sort of asking the direct question, during a time of "operation Iraqi freedom" and other ongoing wars, why base closures? What's the strategy, militarily for safety here at home, homeland security and, of course, fighting wars overseas? **Jamie McIntyre:** it's a very simple answer is, they need the money. That savings that I talked about, the Pentagon needs that money for better weapons, better materials, to better use the forces. Right now they're spending a lot of money on facilities they don't really need. They haven't been able to close them since 1995 because of the politics and the very sensitive nature of these kinds of closings. Because in particular, in 1995, there were accusations of people playing politics with the list because of the

presidential election. It made it almost impossible for the Congress to agree to a round.
They want to get as much savings as they can to make better use of the taxpayers' money.
When it comes down to the base in your backyard people don't want to see that go.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, May 10, 2005 5:55 PM
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LCDR, JCS OCJCS\PA; (b)(6) CDR, OSD-ATL; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; Keck, Gary, Col, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA; (b)(6) OASD-PA
Subject: transcript - BRAC military analyst call
Attachments: 05-10-05 BRAC Grone, Hunzeker.doc

FYI for interested parties:

Attached is a transcript of the phone call to the military analysts and service groups this afternoon with Mr. Grone and MG Hunzeker.

The transcript has only been proofed by me - I am sending it along so you can read what was said. (I have the tape.

Note: please do not forward, distribute, etc. The call was on background; listeners were asked to identify the sources as a senior Defense Department official.



05-10-05 BRAC
Grone, Hunzeker...

(b)(6)
(b)(2)

Military analysts, et al, call
10 May 2005
1430
Room (b)(2) (OSD Public Affairs)
BRAC: Mr. Phil Grone, MG Ken Hunzeker
BACKGROUND - NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Lawrence: (in progress) The undersecretary of defense for installations and environment, Mr. Phil Grone, and MG Hunzeker, the vice director of the J-8 on the Joint Staff. For those not familiar with the Pentagon alphabet soup that's force structure, resources and assessment.

For our purposes here on the call, this information is on background. Any information to be quoted or referenced outside of this call should be referenced coming from a senior defense department official. Again, the call is on background.

I am going to go ahead and turn it over to Mr. Grone, who's going to open up with kind of a brief overview. Again, this discussion is on the base realignment and closure process. As the invitation stressed, there will be no specifics as to the recommendations discussed at this meeting. This will lay out the process that's brought us to where we are today, leading to the impending release of the recommendations in the coming weeks.

So, Mr. Grone?

Mr. Grone: Thank you, Dallas. Good afternoon everybody, how are you today? I just wanted to emphasize a couple of key points on both background and process. Many of you are probably aware of some of it, and I know General Hunzeker will wish to make a couple of points, and then frankly we'll leave as much time for questions as we can, because that's certainly always the most valuable point of these exercises.

As you all are very much aware, the secretary will shortly present his recommendations to the Independent Commission on Base Closure and Realignment, chaired by Secretary Principi. And the secretary (Rumsfeld) take this process, and the senior leadership take this process quite seriously. It's a matter of great importance to the department.

As you know, we've had four prior base realignment and closure rounds, and the result of that has been the closure of 97 major installations in the United States; 55 major realignments; and another 235 or so minor actions of one kind or another.

Based on the budget justification documents that (we?) provide to Congress, our net savings for all of those actions through the implementation period - basically through fiscal year 2001 - was about \$18 billion, and annually recurring savings that accrue to the department every year after that of about \$7 billion.

One of the key points about this round certainly, although savings are important and we'll talk a little bit more about this later on, is that military value was as a matter of policy in prior rounds and was mandated by statute for this round to be the highest consideration for the secretary's judgment in terms of what to recommend to the independent commission.

But as we've approached this process pretty consistently over the last two and a half years, we've had a handful of key imperatives that we've tried to guide ourselves by in this process. One, of course, is to further transformation, and a key part of that to rationalize our infrastructure to our force structure and our mission (sets? Sense?) to ensure have our footprint, our physical footprint where we can maximize capability and military efficiency and effectiveness.

A second key imperative for the department has been to find ways to maximize joint utilization of our assets. And really what we're trying to do here in many ways is look at these assets -- these key military installations, not simply as the asset that belonged to the Army, the Navy, the Air Force or the Marine Corps, but they are key national assets and how can we best position them to support the mission and to support the joint warfighter?

Certainly a third element in this will speak to some degree of savings is certainly we're very much interested in -- as we are in all of our programs -- in converting waste to warfighting. That's a bumper sticker, but really what we mean here is to the extent that we have frankly resources that we are expending either in terms of dollars or in terms of people from a force protection, for example, perspective; addressing or taking care of or supporting assets that we no longer require -- those are assets that are not being put on the pointy end of the spear to support the warfighter. So that is an important part of rationalizing our infrastructure.

The basic process is from a -- after the 16th of May remains very much the same it was in the past. It's an independent commission. The president ultimately will approve or disapprove the work of that commission in whole, but not in part. Congress has an opportunity to reject those recommendations in whole, but not in part. The commission can make some changes. The bar's a little bit higher this time.

The commission has to find not only that the secretary deviated substantially from either the force structure plan that we provided to Congress earlier this year, or our selection criteria. But they can only add an installation as a closure candidate and then actually vote to close it if seven of the nine commissioners agree and at least two of them have visited the installation.

But as we sort of have approached this process, you know, we have the joint process we've established -- the Service unique functions, and I'll largely call them the operational functions, have been handled by the military Services and analyzed by them separately in reporting those into the leadership. And then our common business oriented support functions have been handled by these Joint Cross Service Groups that we established.

And I think that this is really quite a key point. A fundamental lesson that we learned from prior rounds of base closure and realignment was that the joint process – the joint cross service group process to be specific – in (19)95 didn't yield much. So what the secretary and the leadership determined was that we would have Joint Cross Service Groups this time, but rather than have them narrowly constructed – in (19)95 we had a group on depot maintenance, so instead of having a group on depot maintenance, we had a group looking at the entire industrial activities of the department. Similarly for the medical world – instead of looking merely at medical – military medical treatment facilities, we're looking at the entirety of the medical asset base, rather than just looking at laboratories, looking at technical, as a business mission area, as well as adding things we have never done before, frankly, on a joint basis. Headquarters and support, our supply and storage activities, our education and training, to look at them in a comprehensive way.

And those groups had real authority to make real recommendations to the leadership, and as a result of that, we ended up with a process that resulted in not guaranteeing that every answer would be joint, but in guaranteeing for the common support structure of the department to support the warfighter, that these functions would get a joint look throughout the process.

Mr. Lawrence: If I could just ask whoever has their phone – if you could just set your phones on mute, we're hearing that you can't quite hear Mr. Grone on the line. So if you could all put your phones on mute, while he continues. And whoever's outside, if you could please put your phone on mute, that'd be great.

Mr. Grone: And so that's the entirety of the list. (Laughter.) No, just kidding. But I hope you can all capture that, because again, the real sort of point here was on the joint process is that we have tried to put an enormous emphasis on the joint and the joint process in this round. I know General Hunzeker has a couple points he'd like to make in that regard.

MG Hunzeker: Well, clearly, and I know you missed some of what Mr. Grone said so I'll reinforce a little bit of it, but as we looked across all the recommendations and the process that we embarked on this year, military value was really the primary consideration in assessing all the military bases.

And if you look at military value, I look at there basically being four pillars that I use to describe that support this process. Mr. Grone talked through those. But as we saw it from the Joint Cross Service Groups, and, you know, I worked with the vice chairman and the members of the infrastructure steering group, which is the ISG, included the service vice chiefs. So basically the same guys that are sitting at the (J-rock?) came over worked the ISG, so they were very familiar with what the requirements going into for the future force needed to be, so it really became a great sounding board for a lot of decisions that were being made.

But the four pillars, really -- enabling transformation, which is critical. And we really looked at doing that by accommodating the redeploying forces both for IDPBS (?) and what's taking place with OIF and OEF, for anticipating and resourcing surge capabilities, because surge is a big issue coming up, and looking at that across operations training and logistics.

The second pillar is really enhancing combat effectiveness. And this is really examining and implementing opportunities for greater joint activity. In many cases this is accomplished by collocating and combining things like training, technology, depot maintenance, and things along those lines.

The third pillar we looked at was clearly cost. It's a huge issue. We looked at recurring annual savings, and converted, and how they could be converted to warfighters' resource savings in the out years, or even in the near years.

And then finally, I think what was really great about this process, is that we tried to work hard to ensure impartiality. It's a balance between what I talked about as far as military value, transformation, jointness, and how you maximize combat effectiveness.

I will tell you that the BRAC DoD organization, and Mr. Grone talked about this earlier, was key to success. They established -- it was established early. It was clearly a unity of effort and a common focus. And from the meetings I was at and we supported and worked through, there was clearly an energy and a willingness to look at different ways of doing things. And the Joint Cross Service Groups I think were the real basis for success here. They allowed the Services to think out of the box, and take solutions that they might not have derived on their own.

And finally, from the joint perspective, we represent the combatant commanders involvement in this process; we went out and saw them on the road; we worked a reading room where they were familiar with every scenario that was being worked. And they were paramount to recommending -- to making sure that we maximize combat effectiveness while preserving surge capability allowed us to continue to help protect the homeland.

I think I am ready for any questions you may have, and I think Mr. Grone is, as well:

Mr. Lawrence: If folks when they ask their questions if they could state their name and who they're representing on the call, that'd be great. With that, we'll open it up to questions.

Question: This is (Col) Jeff McCausland working with CBS News. Great overview. Quick question and (one other? Longer?) question. Quick question is I saw where Mr. Principi had commented about whether or not the governors have to be involved if you decide to close, let's say a National Guard's by like an airfield adjacent to a major airport, where there's a lot of you, we got fighter wings and all that kind of stuff. "A," can you

talk about that, and the longer question, can you talk about the coordination of this effort with the global restationing plan?

Mr. Grone: To the first question, I'll just reiterate what Mr. Wynne said in his letter to a number of members of Congress is that this department will follow all applicable statutes in developing options and recommendations to the leadership and ultimately for the secretary to consider for forwarding to the independent commission, and I wouldn't want to characterize it beyond that.

Your second question – I want to be precise in the answer. Could you repeat for me, please?

Col. McCausland: Yes, could you talk about this process, and how it was coordinated with the global restationing plan, we (balance? Bounce?) out that effort with this effort.

Mr. Grone: Yes. We'll there are a number of misperceptions that have been out there with regard to some of the suggestions that have been made or characterization of the Overseas Basing Commission's work. And I know a lot of folks have had both before and subsequent to the release of their report questions about this.

One of the things bear mentioning is that the roots of the global posture review, the integrated global presence and basing strategy that General Hunzeker referred to both ways, has its roots in QDR one. And so we've been at this for some time. And subsequent to QDR one, the secretary provided directions to the combatant commanders to begin to develop options for the repositioning, resetting the force globally. And we began to work on that process in earnest.

Frankly, that process as it evolved, came together in a way and the decisions were rendered in a way that made them available to inform the BRAC process. And that's important, because to the extent that we were contemplating the return of forces from abroad to the United States, the BRAC process gives us a key opportunity to look at all of our installations and realign our mission sets in order to accommodate returning forces. Yes, that's true, but it gives us an opportunity to ask and answer the question where can returning forces best be positioned? As opposed to the question we'd have to ask and answer without BRAC which is largely where could we fit them?

And the timing of this, the length of time of consideration, the full involvement of the combatant commanders, the State Department, our interagency partners, our consultations with the Congress over the course of some period of time resulted in a fairly comprehensive report to the Congress last year – last September, I believe – that laid out our broad strategy for and decisions for how we would reposition the force globally.

Now certainly a lot of that will – on the things that are overseas related will continue to take the form of negotiations with interested parties and host governments, but those pieces that involve the return of forces to the United States, particularly from Europe, are

strongly supported by the combatant commander, General Jones, and certainly in many ways he initiated a good deal of that. And we believe we're well positioned to implement this effectively.

MG Hunzeker: And Jeff, just to pile on, two points that Mr. Grone made that are critical here is that we had to build a program this fall that really supported what we wanted to do from a positioning our forces from overseas, and so we had to basically set the table for where BRAC could go. And in line with that, we worked with the Services to make sure that they'd build a force structure – put a force structure plan that we've already delivered to Congress that laid out exactly what we thought force structure would look like in the program review that we build simultaneously with the (? POM?)

Question: This is Ken Beaks from BENS (Business Executives for National Security).

Mr. Grone: Ken, how are you?

Mr. Beaks: Great, thanks. When we look at the list on Friday, because I know you don't want to say anything now about which ones are on there obviously, but when we look at the imperatives of furthering transformation and maximizing jointness, should we be looking for a significant number of active, operational joint bases or joint training bases? Is that something that we should expect? And as a second part of that, the secretary's backed off on the 20 to 25 percent excess capacity number to a number that's more like 10 to 12 I think he said the other day. But, we all know that some of the categories had a lot more than that going in. So, should we expect to see more significant cuts in things like depots and some of the labs and P&E facilities? Thanks.

Mr. Grone: Ken, to the first part of your question, I really wouldn't want to characterize what would be in the secretary's recommendations before the secretary makes his recommendations. And I don't think that would be prudent thing to do, even on background.

But once he comes to a final determination and makes his recommendations to the commission, we can talk about that and fully explain it in more detail.

I do want to spend a moment on this 20 to 25 percent excess capacity number because it has its roots in two studies that Congress requested be done over the course of a six-year period, first in 1998 and then in – for 2004, the latter part being part of the secretary's justification for additional round of – proceeding I should say with an additional round of base closure.

Those were perimetric (sp) estimates, based on base-loading constructs, and they were sort of comparative, relational ways of looking at number of people to a certain way of looking at an asset in a very linear, almost arithmetic way. It was NOT a BRAC analysis; it was not a military value analysis; it was simply a force-loading construct that if you had so many people at one point in time to so many acres, and those numbers changed

over time, what's the difference between the two? And assuming that you were optimally organized in the first instance, do you have excess capacity or under capacity?

All those studies were able to show us was that a gross order of magnitude that we had excess capacity throughout the department, in some cases over, in some cases under capacity, but in a lot of cases we had some excess capacity, and that only a true military value oriented analysis would show us how to rationalize that infrastructure in a way that made sense.

The secretary in his recent comments has commented on a couple of things in relation to the effect on the analysis of returning forces from abroad, as well as the requirement which would have been, again, a matter of policy but Congress included in the statute that we have to accommodate for reasonable expectation of surge. And so, when we sort of do all of that, I mean it was his judgment in looking at it that it wouldn't be 20 to 25 percent. And certainly one of the things about that number over time that got misinterpreted was that that somehow got translated into that that means the secretary believes that one in four bases should close. Capacity is not the same as a base. And so, through this process we will have, I hope -- pending the secretary's decision, a robust, transformational BRAC, that we will do some things that are very, very important for the future of the armed forces and for the future of the department and for the future of the country.

But I wouldn't want to sort of characterize numbers or try to give weights, or try to characterize what you should more look for in the report. I think that would be a more fruitful discussion frankly on Friday.

MG Hunzeker: And as you look at the combat effectiveness across all the different Services, I think the answer to your question also Ken is the collocation Mr. Grone's talking about, and the combining of training, technology, laboratories, depot maintenance, supply chain management operation, things along those lines, that's where the Joint Cross Service Groups really came in and made their impact. So basically, they were empowered to go and look at different ways of doing it, either from a business practice or what made sense basically for example, how you might want to do something in education and training. So they were able to look, you know, not only across the department, but at each Service to see what made sense there. And I think when what comes out on Friday that you'll basically see -- that will be the fruits of that product.

Question: David Rodriguez, the national commander of the American (GI?) Forum (?). Basically what you're saying, we're setting up the military to be a brigade-sized unit, or first strike, and limit our division size, so this way we can kind of down-size the Service, and still be able to do the same kind of job. Is that what you're saying?

MG Hunzeker: I think what you're alluding to is basically where the Army is going with modularization. And there are some discussions and decisions that take place not only in the force structure for what the Army's putting in that will impact what could be

submitted in a BRAC submission. But that is germane to where we're headed but that's not really one of the things we're looking at as far as the BRAC process.

Question: Don Sheppard, CNN. What provisions have you made in this list for the homeland security mission?

Mr. Grone: Well the homeland defense mission of the department is covered - is governed by the selection criteria and if I can pull the selection criteria up here it's specifically mentioned here in criterion two, where we have to consider the availability and condition of land facilities and associated air space including, you know, the (?inaudible) number of missions, but to also include the homeland defense missions of the armed forces. So we have to take homeland defense into account, and we have.

Mr. Lawrence: Next question please. Are there any additional questions for the group? Thank you very much. Just to reiterate, this was on background, any quotes to be used should be quoted as senior defense department officials. And we look forward to talking to you folks, in the near future.

(end)

(b)(6)

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, May 10, 2005 9:43 AM
To: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Tomorrow's conference call

yes, plan to attend the meeting. also, can i get the read-ahead? thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, May 10, 2005 8:34 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Tomorrow's conference call

Eric, I certainly hope so. As I mentioned to the cdr last night I thought he was up to speed. But to make sure everyone is comfortable we will do a read ahead for the conf call for grones folks. He will have it by 930. Should I be at the 11 I'm not currently on the invite for those, seems like something I might want to stand in the back for in the event this comes up.

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@^{(b)(6)}>
To: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA <Dallas.Lawrence@^{(b)(6)}>
Sent: Tue May 10 08:24:10 2005
Subject: RE: Tomorrow's conference call

dallas, how does this stand? there is an 11 a.m. brac meeting, the usual meeting led by ldr, and we'll need to know what has been discussed to that point. is phil going to be up to speed? thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, May 09, 2005 9:01 PM
To: ^{(b)(6)} CDR, OSD-ATL; ^{(b)(6)} CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Tomorrow's conference call

Cdr,

Apologies, I'm a bit confused. I was asked to open this call to military analysts (folks usually in our camp) formers, think tankers (this group is a mixed batch) and vso and msos. The format is as we discussed and as I discussed personally with mr grone last week, brief opening remarks that sketch out the process to date (as referenced in the email invite that was cleared by all parties on friday) and an update on where we are in the process. We can have this on background if that makes everyone more comfortable.

Happy to do whatever folks are comfortable with.

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: ^{(b)(6)} CDR, OSD-ATL, ^{(b)(6)}
To: ^{(b)(6)} CIV, OASD-PA, ^{(b)(6)} Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA

<Dallas.Lawrence (b)(6)
CC: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA <Allison.Barber (b)(6); Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
<Bryan.Whitman (b)(6) Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff (b)(6)
Sent: Mon May 09 19:48:07 2005
Subject: RE: Tomorrow's conference call

(b)(6) Dallas,

What exactly is the plan/venue for this conference call? Is this going to be a purely a Q&A session or do you expect Mr. Grone to open with remarks or something else? We should not be shooting from the hip at this point. I need to know so that I can pass to Mr. Wynne's staff to see if he will participate. Without the plan/venue Mr. Grone may not do it...

Looking at the line-up we have a couple of lobbyists and several on the record hostile experts. I believe Mr. Grone will take issue with that with DiRita.

R,

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, May 09, 2005 6:21 PM
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CDR, OSD-ATL;
Grone, Philip, Mr, OSD-ATL; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCS/PA
Cc: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Subject: Tomorrow's conference call

all -

here is the list of those who have rsvp'd to call in tomorrow. i expect there will be more added as the time gets closer. as always, this list is close hold. thanks. (b)(6)

Mr. Jed Babbin	(USAF, JAG)
Colonel Gordon Cucullu	(USA, Retired)
Command Sergeant Major Steven Greer	(USA, Retired)
Colonel Jeff McCausland,	(USA, Retired)
Captain Chuck Nash	(USN, Retired)
Major General Donald W. Shepperd	(USAF, Retired)
General Charley Wilhelm	(USMC Retired)
Ken Beaks	(Bus. Execs. for National Security)
Taite Bergen	(The Cohen Group)
Jim Noone	(The Washington Group)
Susan Naill, Past National President	(Blue Star Mothers of America, Inc.)
Rick Weidman	(Vietnam Veterans of America)
Brigadier General (Ret.) Stephen Koper	(President, NGAUS)
Colonel (Ret) Paula Kougeas	(Legislative director, NGAUS)
Deirdre Parke Holleman, Esq.	(National Legislative Dir., Retired Enlisted Assoc)
Don Peterson	(AFA Executive Director)
Dan Marrs	(AFA Deputy Executive Editor)
Napoleon Byars	(AFA Director of Policy and Communication)
Ken Goss	(AFA Director of Government Relations)
Bob Dudley	(AFA Editor in Chief for Air Force Magazine)

Respectfully,

(b)(6)

OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison

(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1400

(b)(6)

<< OLE Object: Picture (Metafile) >>
www.AmericaSupportsYou.mil

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, May 09, 2005 8:44 PM
To: (b)(6) CDR, OSD-ATL; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Cc: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Tomorrow's conference call

Sir,

The format for these calls is generally brief remarks at the top from the SMEs and then we open it up for q&a. The venue will be allison barber's office (b)(2) center thru (b)(2) I'm not sure who the concern is with, so am unable to address... Hope what I've provided at least is helpful. Thanks, (b)(6)

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CDR, OSD-ATL (b)(6)
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA (b)(6) Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
<Dallas.Lawrence(b)(6)>
CC: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA <Allison.Barber(b)(6)>, Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
<Bryan.Whitman(b)(6)>; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff(b)(6)>
Sent: Mon May 09 19:48:07 2005
Subject: RE: Tomorrow's conference call

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R
(b)(6)

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Grone, Philip, Mr, OSD-ATL; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
CC: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Subject: Tomorrow's conference call

all -

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Command Sergeant Major Steven Greer	(USA, Retired)
Colonel Jeff McCausland,	(USA, Retired)
Captain Chuck Nash	(USN, Retired)
Major General Donald W. Shepperd	(USAF, Retired)
General Charley Wilhelm	(USMC Retired)
Ken Beaks	(Bus. Execs. for National Security)
Taite Bergen	(The Cohen Group)
Jim Noone	(The Washington Group)
Susan Naill, Past National President	(Blue Star Mothers of America, Inc.)

Rick Weidman
Brigadier General (Ret.) Stephen Koper
Colonel (Ret) Paula Kougeas
Deirdre Parke Holleman, Esq.
Assoc)

(Vietnam Veterans of America)
(President, NGAUS)
(Legislative director, NGAUS)
(National Legislative Dir., Retired Enlisted

Don Peterson
Dan Marrs
Napoleon Byars
Ken Goss
Bob Dudney

(AFA Executive Director)
(AFA Deputy Executive Editor)
(AFA Director of Policy and Communication)
(AFA Director of Government Relations)
(AFA Editor in Chief for Air Force Magazine)

Respectfully,

(b)(6)

OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison

(b)(2) The Pentagon

Washington, D.C. 20301-1400

(b)(2)

<< OLE Object: Picture (Metafile) >>
www.AmericaSupportsYou.mil

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, May 09, 2005 9:02 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Subject: Today's Spectator (Babbin)

http://www.spectator.org/dsp_article.asp?art_id=8138

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Researcher
Department of Defense
OSD Writers Group, Room (b)(2)
Telephone: (b)(2)
Fax: (b)(2)

The American Spectator
Jed Babbin

4/4/2008

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@ (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, May 09, 2005 8:40 AM
To: tmcinerney@ (b)(6); paulvalley@ (b)(6); nashct@ (b)(6); Glenstrae77@ (b)(6); BURM41516@ (b)(6); (b)(6); (b)(6); WSSInter@ (b)(6); roberthcales@ (b)(6)
Subject: Today's Spectator

I'm Volckering along nicely, thank you. How's by you?

The American Spectator

Jed Babbin

(b)(6) (home office)
(b)(6) (home fax)
(b)(6) (mobile)

4/4/2008

(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Sunday, May 08, 2005 2:20 PM
To: Henry, Ryan, HON, OSD-POLICY
Subject: Re: Reponse to the OBC Report

Tnx. By friday, it'll be all brac but there may be some cleanup on obc.

We have a regular brac rollout steering group that met and discussed this subckect friday. We'll be regrouping sometime monday if you can be there. Tnx

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Henry, Ryan, HON, OSD-POLICY <Ryan.Henry@^{(b)(6)}>
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA <larry.dirita@^{(b)(6)}>
Sent: Sun May 08 14:16:59 2005.
Subject: Re: Reponse to the OBC Report

Larry -

All week, except Friday. But if there's something critical to do I'll change my Friday speaking engagement on in LA.

Regards -- Ryan
(from my Blackberry gizmo)

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA <larry.dirita@^{(b)(6)}>
To: Henry, Ryan, HON, OSD-POLICY <Ryan.Henry@^{(b)(6)}>; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA <Bryan.Whitman@^{(b)(6)}>; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@^{(b)(6)}>; ^{(b)(6)} CIV, OSD-POLICY <^{(b)(6)}>
CC: Grone, Philip, Mr, OSD-ATL <Philip.Grone@^{(b)(6)}>; 'Ray.DuBois@^{(b)(6)}>
<Ray.DuBois@^{(b)(6)}>
Sent: Sun May 08 14:14:38 2005
Subject: Re: Reponse to the OBC Report

Ryan--we're at the point where we probably will need dod officials, on the record. We're considering next steps. Are you in this week?

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Henry, Ryan, HON, OSD-POLICY <Ryan.Henry@^{(b)(6)}>
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA <Bryan.Whitman@^{(b)(6)}>; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@^{(b)(6)}>; Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA <larry.dirita@^{(b)(6)}>; ^{(b)(6)} CIV, OSD-POLICY <^{(b)(6)}>
CC: Grone, Philip, Mr, OSD-ATL <Philip.Grone@^{(b)(6)}>; 'Ray.DuBois@^{(b)(6)}>
<Ray.DuBois@^{(b)(6)}>
Sent: Sun May 08 14:05:54 2005
Subject: Reponse to the OBC Report

Bryan -

If you're interested we're ready to support a backgrounder to military analyst / talking heads regarding OBC Report - BRAC nexus. You PAfolks know best, but I'm concerned about

what how the weekend shows will play this next Sunday.

I noticed a few misrepresentation on this Sunday's shows regarding the CJCS's Risk Assessment.

Regards -- Ryan
(from my Blackberry gizmo)

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

(b)(6)

From: Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2005 8:04 PM
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Subject: RE: jed babbin/laura ingrahm

Importance: High

I'd prefer not to do this, purely from a time problem...

Frank

Frank Thorp
Captain, USN
Special Assistant for Public Affairs
to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, May 04, 2005 5:29 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OSD; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: Helmick, Frank, BG, OSD; Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
Subject: RE: jed babbin/laura ingrahm

I just got off the phone with him and gave him what I could on Abu Faraj Al-Libi. He mentioned that he would like to have Pace or Myers in the Friday show, so I will pass that request off to Frank Thorp.

From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Sent: Wednesday, May 04, 2005 5:16 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: Helmick, Frank, BG, OSD; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Subject: RE: jed babbin/laura ingrahm

Eric, I just spoke with Jed and told him that PW would not be able to do the interview. He completely understood and said he would be in touch in the future. -(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, May 04, 2005 12:22 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OSD; Helmick, Frank, BG, OSD
Cc: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Subject: jed babbin/laura ingrahm

jed is guest hosting on laura's nationally syndicated radio program tomorrow and friday. can the dsd could do a live interview with jed for 15 minutes tomorrow (he's out of town friday, right?). we can select any time between 10 and noon. subject is up to us - a conversation about the war, a look-back on the dsd's experience here, etc. wide open to us. (b)(6) jed's contact info is (b)(6) can you please take this on and be in touch with jed, yea or nay. thanks.

(b)(6)

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, May 04, 2005 5:14 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Cc: Helmick, Frank, BG, OSD; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Subject: RE: jed babbins/laura ingraham

okay, thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Sent: Wednesday, May 04, 2005 5:16 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: Helmick, Frank, BG, OSD; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Subject: RE: jed babbins/laura ingraham

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From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, May 04, 2005 12:22 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OSD; Helmick, Frank, BG, OSD
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(b)(6)

From: Helmick, Frank, BG, OSD
Sent: Wednesday, May 04, 2005 2:45 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Cc: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; (b)(6)
CIV, OSD
Subject: RE: jed babbin/laura ingrahm

(b)(6)

Thoughts?

(b)(6) - stand by for scheduling change.

FRANK HELMICK
BG USA
SENIOR MILITARY ASSISTANT TO THE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, May 04, 2005 12:22 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OSD; Helmick, Frank, BG, OSD
Cc: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Subject: jed babbin/laura ingrahm

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(b)(6)

From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, May 04, 2005 12:55 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Subject: RE: jed babb

We are gathering info now.

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, May 04, 2005 12:25 PM
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Subject: jed babb

as you may infer from my earlier email, jed has called. he'd like to talk w/someone about the capture of the #3 guy in al queda on friday -- what it means, etc. -- while he is guest hosting the laura ingrahm show. jed says he'll talk with the person anytime between 9 and noon. can your shop please work this? please have whomever you tag cc me so i know what the status of this is. i'm out of the middle but want to be kept apprised, which i'm sure you can appreciate. thanks, eric

(b)(6)

From: McGraw, Richard, CIV, OSD
Sent: Tuesday, May 03, 2005 4:45 PM
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; DuBois, Ray, Mr, OSD-ODA&M; Geren, Pete, CIV, OSD; Grone, Philip, Mr, OSD-ATL; Guzowski, Joseph F SES OCLL; (b)(6) OASD-PA; McGraw, Richard, CIV, OSD; Roggero Frederick Brig Gen SAF/PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Stanley, Daniel, CIV, OSD-LA; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Chafin, Claude, Mr, OSD; DeFrank James Col SAF/PA
Cc: Butler, Paul, CIV, OSD; Potochney, Peter, Mr, OSD-ATL (b)(6) LCDR, OSD; (b)(6) LCDR; Chafin, Claude, Mr, OSD; Chafin, Claude, CIV, OSD-LA; (b)(6) Lt Col, OSD; (b)(6) Lt Col SAF/LLP; (b)(6) CTR, OSD; (b)(6) OCPA; (b)(6) OSD; (b)(6) Lt Col, OSD; (b)(6) Lt Col SAF/PAR
Subject: Steering Group Meeting Today, 5/3 (FOUO)
Attachments: Roll out timeline for May 12 and 13.doc

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Notes/Tasks from Steering Group meeting 5/3

1. Revise timeline to reflect possible SECDEF/OCJCS top line BRAC press brief on 5/12 with details to be in Wynne, Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs press brief on 5/13 and to reflect notification to Congress and base commanders on morning of 5/13--McGraw (suggestion attached)
2. Schedule regional editorial boards via telephone conference call this week--Whitman
3. Prepare dummy state-by-state 1-page document that can be emailed along with press release to state Congressional Delegations--McGraw/Grone
4. Arrange for distribution of email to Members of Congress--Stanley
5. Finalize Hill delivery plan mechanics--Stanley
6. Schedule editorial boards the week after the announcement--Whitman
7. Schedule Roundtable discussions/Seminars with Think Tanks, Military Analysts, MSOs, VSOs
8. Schedule Hill briefs for Members and Staff--two for each side of the Congress--week of 5/9--Stanley
9. Revise master matrix to reflect schedule changes--McGraw
10. Reconsider Town Hall meeting--scope and participants--OASD/PA

Items for consideration for the next meeting, Thursday, May 5, 1230 in room 3E856:

1. SECDEF and CJCS lunches with formers of each
2. Town Hall meeting--scope and participants
3. Phone Call Lists
4. Notification of TAGs and Governors

Dick McGraw



Roll out timeline for May 12 a...

This may contain information exempt from mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

ROLLOUT

MAJOR ACTIVITIES

Prior to 5/13

Roundtable Presentations and/or Discussions focusing on Rationale, Goals and Process

Pentagon Press Corps

Editorial Boards

Congressional Staff

Military Analysts

Veterans Support Organizations

Military Support Organizations

Intergovernmental Affairs Group

Pentagon Channel Interview with SECDEF and CJCS

SECDEF/CJCS Press Brief

After 5/13

Community Outreach—speeches (NAID, e.g.)

Editorial Boards

Town Hall Meeting

Follow-up interviews

DRAFT
Timeline for May 12 and 13

May 12						
	SECDEF	CJCS	Service Secretaries	Service Chiefs	Wynne/duBois/Grone	Staff/Services
1130	Pre Brief for Press Brief	Pre Brief for Press Brief			Pre Brief for SECDEF and CJCS Press Brief	
1200	Press Brief	Press Brief				

May 13						
0900						Email to Members of Congress and drop hard copy on the Hill and to Governors. Set up briefing room for expanded briefing.
1000			Pre Brief for Press Brief	Pre Brief for Press Brief	Pre Brief for Press Brief	Email to Services and Bases (same email that goes to MOC)
1030-1130	Phone Calls	Phone Calls	Press Brief	Press Brief	Press Brief	
1200	Lunch with former SECDEFs	Lunch with former CJCSs	Phone Calls	Phone Calls		
1300					Telephone conference roundtable with MSOs, VSOs,	
1400					Telephone conference roundtable with MSOs, VSOs, Analysts,	

(b)(6)

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, May 02, 2005 3:51 PM
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; McGraw, Richard, CIV, OSD; Stanley, Daniel, CIV, OSD-LA; Geren, Pete, CIV, OSD
Subject: Re: Roll out (FOUO)

I'm trying to be sympathetic but am not there yet. If people don't know how the process was developed and what the context is, the reasons for our decisions and the heavy involvement/coordination btw military and civilians will never get heard. Thanks.

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA <larry.dirita(b)(6)>
To: McGraw, Richard, CIV, OSD <Richard.McGraw(b)(6)> Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff(b)(6)>; Stanley, Daniel, CIV, OSD-LA <Daniel.Stanley(b)(6)> Geren, Pete, CIV, OSD <Pete.Geren(b)(6)>
Sent: Mon May 02 15:45:34 2005
Subject: RE: Roll out (FOUO)

We'll have to discuss it. It's not a very helpful position, and I understand his concern (I think).

Anyway, we can discuss it at this IEC today I suppose? At least at the Secretary's next BRAC meeting.

-----Original Message-----

From: McGraw, Richard, CIV, OSD
Sent: Monday, May 02, 2005 3:43 PM
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Stanley, Daniel, CIV, OSD-LA; Geren, Pete, CIV, OSD
Subject: Roll out (FOUO)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Wynne has said he will not participate in any roundtables before the rollout on 5/13 and he has said he does not want Grone to do so either. We had planned on roundtables with Hill Members, Pentagon Press Corps, Military Analysts, Think Tanks, Military Service Organizations and Veterans Service Organizations.

We either kill them or use someone else (duBois, Potochney). How do you want to handle?

Dick

This may contain information exempt from mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, May 02, 2005 8:11 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Subject: Jed Babbin (American Spectator)

The American Spectator

Pooty-Poot's Middle East

By Jed Babbin

Published 5/2/2005 12:08:45 AM

In what will certainly be her last masterwork, the 2002 Statecraft, Margaret Thatcher insists the West can help Russia become "a real free-enterprise economy based on sound money, low taxes, limited government and above all a rule of law." Thatcher says that, "above all, perhaps, we have to be patient." Which is good counsel regarding Russian internal change. But -- in its external affairs -- Vladimir Putin's Russia is in a hurry. It is working fast and hard to undermine everything we are trying to do to reshape the Middle East. We can have no patience with Putin's efforts to thwart what we must do.

The most painful moment in the President's news conference last Thursday night wasn't when the networks cut him off to chase the May ratings sweeps. It came much earlier when he was describing his relationship with Putin. The President said, "I had a long talk with Vladimir there in Slovakia about democracy and about the importance of democracy. And as you remember at the press conference...he stood up and said he strongly supports democracy. I take him for his word." For a man who supports democracy, far less strongly, the former KGB capo has a funny way of demonstrating it.

One night about two years ago an Israeli alarm clock -- in the form of a pair of F-16s that snapped a sonic boom over his house at about 0300 -- woke Syrian President Bashar Assad with sufficient suddenness to justify a change in bed linens. That wake-up call threw enough fear into him to slow his terrorist surrogates' operations against Israel for a short while. Since then, Assad has come to feel protected. First, by President Bush who -- declining to take action against Syrian support for the Iraq insurgency -- has effectively granted the insurgents a sanctuary in Syria. Second, by Putin who is helping Assad help the terrorists.

Having placated the U.N. by withdrawing about 14,000 Syrian troops from Lebanon, and leaving their intelligence structure behind to continue supporting Hezbollah and their ilk, Putin is selling Syria Igla-8 shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles to deter Israeli or American air attacks. Mr. Bush's reaction was all too tepid. We're protesting the sale of the vehicle-mounted Iglas, not the man-portable ones. The man-portable version is

less capable, but not much. And these missiles are a danger to us as well as the Israelis.

The Pentagon knows where at least some of the terrorist camps in Syria are, from which the insurgents in Iraq are operating. The new Iraqi government hasn't yet given us permission to operate from Iraq against these camps. As tolerant as we are of the Iraqis' struggle to organize their new government, we can no longer allow their indecision to protect the Syrian sanctuary the terrorists now enjoy. If we can't launch our special ops people against these camps from Iraq, we can hit them from the air with cruise missiles and manned aircraft. The Russian sale of the Igla-8 to Syria puts American lives at risk. This missile, relatively new, is capable of penetrating most of the defenses our aircraft have against heat-seeking missiles such as these. There is no other way to put it: Russian sale of these missiles to Syria is meant to deter American and Israeli air strikes.

At the same time Putin is defending democracy by arming Syria, he is also doing everything he can to support Iran's nuclear program. Russia, of course, was the primary builder of the Iranian nuclear program and continues to be its principal supplier. While the EU-3 (Britain, France and Germany) were trying to negotiate Iran out of its uranium enrichment program again last week, Putin offered to supply Iran with nuclear fuel for its reactor and then collect the spent fuel so that Iran couldn't further enrich it into weapons-grade uranium. Mr. Bush said he appreciated Putin's gesture, and that Putin understands the dangers of an Iran with a nuclear weapon. He does, indeed. And we would be absurdly naive to trust Putin to prevent the Iranians from making fissionable material.

CAN ANYONE BELIEVE IT a coincidence that while Putin is allying Russia with both Iran and Syria, those two nations are more or less formalizing the Axis of Evil? Last February, Iranian veep Mohammad Reza Aref said Iran and Syria were forming a "common front." He said, "We are ready to help Syria on all grounds to confront threats." Syria's principal threats are Israel and America, and so they will remain as long as Syria is a state sponsor of terrorism. That the two terrorist states are allying more formally, with Russia playing the third-party co-conspirator, should send chills up every spine in western Europe. The last time this happened, Stalin was signing up to play second violin to Hitler.

While this is going on, Putin is also offering to train "security services" among the Palestinians and selling them helicopters and communications equipment. Unmentioned in Putin's trip to Israel last week were the armored personnel carriers he was also offering the Palestinians. It seems Mr. Bush's pal is eagerly seeking to restore Russian influence in the Middle East, but not in the interests of countering terrorism: only countering America.

In Statecraft, Lady Thatcher also wrote that, "The worst error, as always in dealing with Russia, is naivete." We need to be engaged with Russia, not to it. And whatever

passes between Iran and Syria, Russia must not aid or abet. Uncle Joe, as FDR and Churchill called Stalin, was taught an expensive lesson when Hitler invaded Russia in 1941. Putin would do well to remember that when the Germans retreated, millions of Russians already lay dead. And that as easy as it would be for terrorists to smuggle a nuclear weapon into the United States, it would be just as easy -- and far less a distance -- for them to smuggle one into Russia.

TAS contributing editor Jed Babbin is the author of *Inside the Asylum: Why the UN and Old Europe Are Worse Than You Think* (Regnery, 2004)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Researcher

Department of Defense

OSD Writers Group, Room (b)(2)

Telephone: (b)(2)

Fax: (b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, April 29, 2005 8:37 AM
To: Whitmer, Bob, CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Feith Radio interview

Ok, we go live at 1336 hrs with USDP Feith and Jed Babbín on wmet, part of the IDF national network. The Producer, Seth Unger, is at (b)(6) Bob, could you call him? It's taken me two days to get this guy on the phone and I don't get the impression they're overly organized. He said he'd touch base with you but I'd feel better if you called him. Really appreciate it! See you about 1320 to get set up.

Jed Babbín numbers: (b)(6) (home office)
(b)(6) (home fax)
(b)(6) (mobile)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, April 28, 2005 3:27 PM
To: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA
Cc: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Keck, Gary, Col, OASD-PA; Bob Whitmer (E-mail); Bryan Whitman (E-mail); Roxie T. Merritt (E-mail)
Subject: RE: Feith Radio interview

(b)(6)

We do have ISDN and can reserve the Small Studio for you. Have the producer and technical person call Bob Whitmer at (b)(2) to coordinate the ISDN.

All the best,

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, April 28, 2005 3:18 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Keck, Gary, Col, OASD-PA
Subject: Feith Radio interview

Hey, Mr Ruff set up live radio interview tomorrow with Jed Babbín and Feith. If the small studio is free can we set it up for 1315-1350. Their producer asked if we had an "ISDN."

Producer's number: (b)(6)

4/4/2008

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA

Sent: Monday, April 25, 2005 5:38 PM

To: (b)(6) COL, OSD-POLICY

Cc: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA

Subject: Feith radio

Jed is sitting in for the talk show host on wmet, part of the idf national network. Doug is willing provided there are no questions from the radio listeners. there are not.

4/4/2008

(b)(6)

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, April 28, 2005 3:50 PM
To: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA
Cc: Keck, Gary, Col, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Feith Radio interview

excellente

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, April 28, 2005 3:44 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: Keck, Gary, Col, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Feith Radio Interview

yes and yes--will be at both; Maggie say we're calling 5:15-5:45.

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, April 28, 2005 3:31 PM
To: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA
Cc: Keck, Gary, Col, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Feith Radio interview

for the pre-call tonight with babbin and feith, are you thinking about either monitoring or sitting in? i'm presuming you're doing the show with doug in the small studio so it might be helpful for you to hear the conversation tonight, either via a conference call or in person. thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, April 28, 2005 3:27 PM
To: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA
Cc: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Keck, Gary, Col, OASD-PA; Bob Whitmer (E-mail); Bryan Whitman (E-mail); Roxie T. Merritt (E-mail)
Subject: RE: Feith Radio interview

(b)(6)

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All the best,

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, April 28, 2005 3:18 PM

4/4/2008

To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Keck, Gary, Col, OASD-PA
Subject: Feith Radio Interview

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Producer's number: (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, April 25, 2005 5:38 PM
To: (b)(6) COL, OSD-POLICY
Cc: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA
Subject: Feith radio

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4/4/2008

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, April 28, 2005 3:27 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: Jed Babbitt called. He will not be hosting for Laura Ingraham; does not need DSD (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Attachments: (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA.vcf

Semper Fidelis.
Captain (b)(6) USMC
Military Assistant to the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
Comm: (b)(2)
BlkBry: (b)(2)
Fax: (b)(2)
1400 Defense Pentagon (b)(2)
Washington, DC 20301-1400


(b)(6)
Capt. USMC, OASD..

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, April 28, 2005 3:18 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Keck, Gary, Col, OASD-PA
Subject: Feith Radio interview
Attachments: jlbjournres.doc

Hey, Mr Ruff set up live radio interview tomorrow with Jed Babbin and Feith. If the small studio is free can we set it up for 1315-1350. Their producer asked if we had an "ISDN."

Producer's number: (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, April 25, 2005 5:38 PM
To: (b)(6) COL, OSD-POLICY
Cc: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA
Subject: Feith radio

Jed is sitting in for the talk show host on wmet, part of the idf national network. Doug is willing provided there are no questions from the radio listeners. there are not.

4/4/2008

Jed L. Babbin

Jed Babbin is the best-selling author of, "*Inside the Asylum: Why the UN and Old Europe are Worse than You Think*" (Regnery 2004). He is a former Air Force officer who served as a deputy undersecretary in the first Bush administration (1990-1991).

Mr. Babbin writes regularly for *National Review Online* and for the *American Spectator Magazine*. His weekly column, "Loose Canons", appears in *The American Spectator Online*. Mr. Babbin's expertise is in national security and foreign affairs. However, he also writes about legal matters and for *The American Spectator's* "Saloon" series on subjects such as single barrel bourbon and fine cigars. He also wrote the military adventure novel, *Legacy of Valor*. (Pentland Press, 2000).

Mr. Babbin is a military analyst and appears frequently on the Fox News Channel and MSNBC, on shows such as "The O'Reilly Factor", "Hardball with Chris Matthews", "Scarborough Country" and many others.

For about four years, Babbin served as designated guest host of Oliver North's "Common Sense Radio" when Col. North was unavailable. During the Iraq military campaign in 2003, Babbin subbed for North for nine weeks straight. Since then, Babbin has also subbed for Laura Ingraham and Greg Garrison.

Mr. Babbin is a graduate of Stevens Institute of Technology (B.E. 1970), Cumberland School of Law (J.D. 1973) and the Georgetown University Law School (LL.M. 1978).

(b)(6)

From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, April 28, 2005 9:35 AM
To: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA; (b)(6) COL, OSD-POLICY; (b)(6) CIV.
OSD-POLICY
Cc: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Jed Babbin Bio

yes it is

From: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, April 28, 2005 9:23 AM
To: (b)(6) COL, OSD-POLICY; (b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY
Cc: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: Jed Babbin Bio

Col (b)(6) see bio. It's the same guy. v/r

4/4/2008

(b)(6)

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, April 27, 2005 5:21 PM
To: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Feith radio

(b)(6) feith would like to talkw/jed before the interview, preferrably the day before. I meant to tell you this first thing today. Meantime I'll call jed. Has doug been scheduled? Thanks.

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA (b)(6)
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff(b)(6)>
Sent: Tue Apr 26 15:30:09 2005
Subject: RE: Feith radio

What is Jed's email or phone? Since Feith can't talk China but will talk his normal GWOT strategy, want to make sure this is good with Jed

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, April 25, 2005 5:38 PM
To: (b)(6) COL, OSD-POLICY
Cc: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA
Subject: feith radio

(b)(6) i spoke to doug on friday about doing a live interview with jed babbin while jed is sitting in for the talk show host on wmet, part of the idf national network. doug is willing provided there are no questions from the radio listeners. there are not. i belive (b)(6) has contacted you on this. jed only has three days left, wed, thur and frid, from noon to 2 p.m., so time is a little tight -- which is why i'm weighing in. thanks.

(b)(6)

From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, April 27, 2005 9:54 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: jed babbin/i.g. findings on sanchez, et al

I'll see if he is willing

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, April 27, 2005 9:52 AM
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: jed babbin/i.g. findings on sanchez, et al

agree on both assessments. can someone call alexander and liaise with him and babbin? thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, April 27, 2005 9:51 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: jed babbin/i.g. findings on sanchez, et al

Unfortunately Church is never going to happen -- maybe Alexander?

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, April 27, 2005 9:17 AM
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: jed babbin/i.g. findings on sanchez, et al

jed really wants to take on the post's editorial from yesterday and is looking for a guest on his program this week. he specifically mentioned adm church. any thoughts? thanks.

(b)(6)

From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, April 27, 2005 9:53 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Feith radio

Not specifically, but given we have not military operations in China and that we don't make the China Policy for the USG it is a little out of our lane.

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, April 27, 2005 9:15 AM
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: Feith radio

have folks at nsc given us instructions not to talk about china? i spoke to doug yesterday and conveyed your thoughts that china should not be discussed. he was prepared to talk to j.d. about what he was going to say, which is basically what he has said in speeches here in recent weeks. he asked about nsc having heartburn. thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, April 26, 2005 3:30 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Feith radio

What is Jed's email or phone? Since Feith can't talk China but will talk his normal GWOT strategy, want to make sure this is good with Jed

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, April 25, 2005 5:38 PM
To: (b)(6) COL, OSD-POLICY
Cc: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA
Subject: feith radio

(b)(6) i spoke to doug on friday about doing a live interview with jed babbin while jed is sitting in for the talk show host on wmet, part of the idf national network. doug is willing provided there are no questions from the radio listeners. there are not. i believe tracy has contacted you on this. jed only has three days left, wed, thur and frid, from noon to 2 p.m., so time is a little tight -- which is why i'm weighing in. thanks.

(b)(6)

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, April 26, 2005 3:53 PM
To: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Feith radio

please see below.

(b)(6) (home office)
(b)(6) (home fax)
(b)(6) (mobile)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, April 26, 2005 3:30 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Feith radio

What is Jed's email or phone? Since Feith can't talk China but will talk his normal GWOT strategy, want to make sure this is good with Jed

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From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, April 25, 2005 5:38 PM
To: (b)(6) COL, OSD-POLICY
Cc: LTC, OASD-PA
Subject: feith radio

(b)(6) i spoke to doug on friday about doing a live interview with jed babbin while jed is sitting in for the talk show host on wmet, part of the idf national network. doug is willing provided there are no questions from the radio listeners. there are not. i belive tracy has contacted you on this. jed only has three days left, wed, thur and frid, from noon to 2 p.m., so time is a little tight -- which is why i'm weighing in. thanks.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, April 26, 2005 9:45 AM
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; Keck, Gary, Col, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA, (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA; (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA, (b)(6) LTC OASD-PA, (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA
Subject: FYI-transcript of BG Ham, Mr. Di Rita mil analyst call
Attachments: 04-22-05 BG Ham, Di Rita Iraq.doc

Attached is a transcript of the call with the military analysts last Friday. DoD principals were BG Carter Ham and Mr. Di Rita. Topic was Iraq.

NOTE: Call was ON BACKGROUND. Transcript provided for your information to read what was said. Transcript was not provided to military analysts.

Both AFIS story (Garamone) and Talking Points (partial) were written off the transcript.



04-22-05 BG Ham,
Di Rita Iraq....

OSD Public Affairs – Military Analyst call
With BG Carter Ham, Mr. Di Rita
Friday, April 22, 2005, 1030(b)(2) The Pentagon)
Topic: Iraq
ON BACKGROUND

Military Analysts on call (list provided by conference call company):

Jed Babbin (AF, former JAG)– American Spectator Magazine
Maj. Gen. Bill Nash – Council on Foreign Relations
Col. Ken Allard – MSNBC
Col. Gordon Cucullu – Fox News
CSM Steve Greer – Fox News
CAPT Chuck Nash – Fox News
CAPT Martin Strong – Fox News
Maj. Gen. Paul Vallely – Fox News

Ms. Allison Barber: (in progress) Reminder this is on background and we also have Larry Di Rita with us this morning so he'll open up, and then we'll turn it over to General Ham. Thanks for joining us this morning.

Mr. Di Rita: Good morning. I wanted - the reason I wanted to join you – we're very grateful that General Ham is able to give us an update on kind of current ops in Iraq. General Ham just returned from the theater. He was commanding a task force up in Mosul and is now on the Joint Staff, and so he's got some very good insights, and fairly fresh insights, as to what's going on over there.

But I wanted to spend just a minute or two with you – I don't know if anybody had the opportunity to see the announcement that the president just made regarding the selection of the next chairman and vice chairman. I wanted to just see if there were any questions, but also to the extent that some of you might be out and get asked about it, the president's comments kind of speak for themselves.

These are two – first of General Myers has done a terrific job, and he's a – I was kind of struck by the president's description of him having held four tours as a four star, but he is without question one of the most seasoned and experienced general officers anybody has ever come across just in terms of the jobs he's had.

He's done a terrific job and we're going to miss him greatly, but Pace and Giambastiani are two very well-qualified officers and have had a – my observation of them is that they may be the most – these may be the poster children of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. In other words, when the Goldwater-Nichols Act was – I mean, we all resisted it. I did; I wrote articles about it and probably most of you did, and it was - but it turned to be – have a lot of wisdom in it. And one of the things that it forced was a joint perception about everything we do. And these two guys bring more joint insight into everything going on than perhaps any other four star officers that we have – you know, maybe putting aside Tommy Franks or John Abizaid who are out there on a joint warfighting environment as a four star.

They are highly transformational. They have both worked within the Joint Staff transformation environment, so they understand all the hardware things that people like to get excited about, but more importantly, all the process reforms and all the contingency planning reforms and all the ways that we're trying to fix and improve processes to make the place a lot more capable at the (pointy?) end on the Joint level.

So, it's two terrific choices. They're very independent-minded guys, both of them. They're able to make their independence well understood within an environment where independence is difficult

to come by – in other words, it's a military environment and you have to express independence in a very careful way and they're very good about it. Both of those guys are extremely good at it.

They're very good at kind of calibrating thinking around here so that when an idea pops up they can put it into the proper context and get it on the right track. I have seen them both very closely – particularly Ed (Giambastiani) whom I've worked with now four years very closely, but General Pace as well. And they're two terrific officers who I think are going to be just wonderful selections.

If there's any specific questions – I don't know how much - this kind of leached out a little over the last two or three days – it's kind of out there, but the president's announcement today may generate a little more press interest. If any of you are out and have any insights that you'd like to...

Ken Allard: Hey Larry, Ken Allard.

Mr. Di Rita: Hey Ken.

Ken Allard: I was on the other side at that time. I remember your articles, and yes, I am glad you were wrong.

Mr. Di Rita: I was. And it was – you know, my favorite was 'I went joint but I didn't inhale.' But now I'm breathing deeply, so...

But these are two terrific officers who will be forceful in their views. You know, Ed in particular has done an impressive amount of work about the lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan down at the Joint Forces Command, and has become just prodigiously knowledgeable about what worked, what didn't – everything from battlefield intelligence up to C3I at the command level. He's done a terrific job. And the Joint Staff and the Services are gleaming a lot of knowledge out of that. He is one smart cracker. And Pace of course is just a great leader and a great general. It's a wonderful team and everybody's pretty excited about it.

If there's no – any thoughts or questions about the selection and the announcement, I'd like to ask General Ham if he wants to get into Iraq a little bit and talk about what's going on over there.

BG Ham: Well, thanks Mr. Di Rita. I appreciate the opportunity this morning to discuss this with you. Just a little bit of background. I'm Carter Ham. I've been on the Joint Staff now a little bit less than a month, but this is not my first joint assignment. I had the great experience of serving at the Central Command headquarters for a couple of years, and certainly appreciate that. I've replaced General Dave Rodriguez, who's now in Mosul. I spent just a little bit more than a year in Mosul, returning in late February.

I think as we swapped out that General Rodriguez got the better end of this deal. But I do appreciate you taking time this morning. Some of you I've met before, and others I look forward to what I hope will be a productive and useful partnership.

For today's teleconference, I'd like to give you just a few comments about operations in Iraq, then welcome your questions. I think we have about 30 minutes, so I'd rather talk about what you want to talk about, rather than me giving you a laundry list of things. And I suspect there's some things you'll ask me that I don't know the answers to, and in those cases we'll get you an answer later today.

A few points on Iraq. This week, we went below 140,000 U.S. in Iraq. The major deployment and redeployment operations, that really began in earnest in December for this current rotation are now nearly complete, both 99 percent complete – over 99 percent complete on both deployments and redeployments. And in Kuwait, because this transitional period is now nearly complete, U.S. personnel in Kuwait are also down now to about 14,000.

Having said that, we'll soon start to see the beginning of the next cycle of units into and out of Iraq. And of course, during these transitional periods, the numbers of troops increases in both Kuwait and in Iraq while incoming/outgoing units are both on the ground conducting relief-in-place operations.

Multi-National Forces-Iraq now reports over 155,000 trained and equipped Iraqi Security Forces. Certainly the capability varies from unit to unit. But the trend is clearly positive in the development of the Iraqi Security Forces.

Insurgent activity, as I think most of you know, has increased somewhat over the past few weeks. And that's not particularly significant in and of itself, as the weekly numbers of attacks tend to fluctuate somewhat. And we don't believe this is yet indicative of what some are reporting as increased levels of planning, coordination and sophistication of attack.

The general trend of the number of attacks has been decreasing since the January elections. There is one exception I would like to mention, and that concerns vehicle-borne IEDs. This – so far, this month of April, about 50 percent of the VBIEDs have been suicide attacks. That's a fairly significant change. Most normally we have seen the number of suicide attacks less than 30 percent. Having said that, don't know yet what that means, but that is a particular note that we're watching with great interest.

There's certainly indications of increased ethnic strife. I think you are all aware of the Zarqawi letter of last year that indicates creating ethnic strife as certainly one of his goals, and I certainly – the bodies discovered in Haditha earlier this week (soccer stadium), the attack this morning in Baghdad against a Shiite mosque, and other sites attacked this week bear out the interest in the insurgents creating ethnic strife – Shiite versus Sunni, Arab versus Kurd and (unintelligible). This is clearly going to be a challenge for the Iraqi Transitional Government and clearly for the Iraqi Security Forces in the weeks and months to come.

And finally, yesterday's loss of the 11 persons aboard the Skylink Mi-8 (helicopter) is very regrettable. Many of you have been Iraq, and you know there's a good relationship between most of the private security firms operating there and U.S. and other Coalition forces.

We've all seen the video that's now on the web. Frankly, we're not certain of the veracity of that clip. Was it the same incident – you know, was that the helicopter that was shot down? Was that man who was apparently shot – was that in that particular incident? We're just frankly not certain of that yet. There is an investigation underway to determine those facts and I think when those are known, those will be made available. And with that, I'd welcome your questions. Or none.

Jed Babbin: General, Jed Babbin, American Spectator. Quick question. I know you said you didn't know anything yet about the significance of the increase in VBIEDs being suiciders. Just as an educated guess, does that show you a change in sort of the ethnic makeup or source of the suiciders themselves? Are we seeing more, you know, something out of Muqtada al Sadr, or something from the other side – the Sunnis. I mean these guys apparently have some sort of doctrinal (nocturnal?) change. What do you attribute that to?

BG Ham: Well, it is very difficult to discern. Of course, in a suicide VBIED attack, in most cases, there's not much left of the attacker to – so the forensic business of trying to determine, you know, who was the actual attacker is pretty difficult. And unless you know that, then it's difficult to come to some of the conclusions that you're asking for.

I guess I would just – Jed, just leave it at the way I said it – we don't yet know what to make of it. It is of concern, because it is a fairly significant deviation from what we've seen in the past. And I think that's all we can say. We're trying to figure it out; we just don't have the answers yet.

Jed Babbin: Thank you.

Ken Allard: General, Ken Allard. You may have seen a piece in yesterday's New York Times by a Marine colonel talking about the need for patience in fighting an insurgency. And he was apparently trying to warn both against, you know, people who were too pessimistic as well as people who were overly optimistic.

Can you basically tell us a little bit about whether or not we are continuing to dig in for the long haul here, or are we simply trying to see how quickly we can cut and run?

BG Ham: Well, nobody's interested in cutting and running. The nature of the insurgencies, particularly 20th century insurgencies, are such that they are long-term affairs. I think it's also generally understood that the military is one, but not THE, way to defeat an insurgency. So this is a very, so this has to be a multi-faceted approach.

I think clearly from the U.S. military, the focus is increasingly on helping the Iraqis defeat this insurgency themselves. And that is becoming increasingly the focus of our efforts. And continually the commanders on the scene, General Casey and certainly General Abizaid from a theater perspective, are constantly evaluating the forces that are present, the operational concepts, the tactics that are employed to defeat the insurgency.

So I, I think there is -- clearly, everybody wants to defeat the insurgency as quickly as can possibly be done. But there is a reality: Defeating an insurgency can be a long-term affair. There's no timeline. It's help the Iraqis defeat the insurgents.

Ken Allard: Where the rubber hits the road is when we have to rotate troops in of course. Now is the percentage of Reservists to Active troops about the same in this next rotation as it has been in the current one -- about 40 percent or so?

BG Ham: It actually is done a little bit. In the cyclical nature of things, this past rotation -- this current rotation is fairly high in Reserve component participation. The next rotation, while not all the decisions have been made, is likely to be a little bit less, but not so much less that it will be overwhelmingly noticeable.

The key, again, is not so much is it Active, is it Reserve, but is it right? And is it the right mix of forces to meet the commanders' requirements in theater?

Mr. Di Rita: And Ken, it's Larry. You know, one of things the commanders are trying to balance, as well, is the understandable sense that they have -- or that, you know, that the Iraqis have -- I should say that, you know, the insurgents don't have many -- they have increasing -- they have fewer and fewer claims that anybody in Iraq sees as credible, because there's now a government there and people feel -- generally speaking -- supportive of the government and supportive of the process.

But the only place where the insurgents can claim any solidarity with general public perception is on the desire -- entirely understandable -- that Coalition forces leave Iraq. And so the balancing act that our guys -- that our commanders have is to not have so many Coalition forces to have too high a presence, but keep it at a sufficient level to be able to help make sure these Iraqi Security Forces can actually succeed.

So there's -- I would say there's built-in downward pressure on the size of U.S. forces there, recognizing that it's still going to be a task for some period of time to probably provide most of the, you know, real heavy lifting until the security forces themselves can work more freely around the country in large formation type activity.

So, it's a tough balancing act. But it's something very much on the commanders' mind is that -- we don't -- they're not asking for more forces on that basis, because it's in part they know that there's very little credibility that this insurgency has other than the widespread feel that it would be nice at some point for Coalition forces to leave that country.

Chuck Nash: General, Chuck Nash, Fox News. Got a question about -- you mentioned the forces going over, and making sure they're the right forces. The issue comes down to what we see a lot in the media which is, a recent article that said that we've lost, either total loss or bad enough that we had to ship them back to the States, 80 main battle tanks. We've got Strykers running around up north; the Army is looking at a fairly sizable investment in a thing called FCS (Future Combat Systems) we're told a family of 18 lightly armored vehicles. And we're still getting people whacked on the road to the airport.

Would you just give me your thoughts on where this all goes, and are the lessons that we're learning about armor in Iraq real world? Are those lessons getting picked up and used in the Pentagon? Or are we still sort of keeping the power point slides that we're (were?) in the process still moving?

BG Ham: Well, I think it's clearly the case that the Joint Services, and certainly all the individual Services are adaptive and learning organizations. There's been considerable effort trying to learn everything that we can from the ongoing operations. It's also fair to say that the enemy is learning and adapting. And clearly they adapt their tactics, techniques and procedures as well. So this remains a very, very dangerous, a dangerous area.

My personal experience in the north is that I think we have done a pretty good job of learning from the past two years of operations inside Iraq, and are taking the necessary precautions. I think the Services are making the good material development decisions to counter this threat. But it is a very, very difficult environment, and remains a dangerous environment. So, I mean I guess I would just leave it at that, to say we are learning. I am pretty confident that we are moving ahead and taking the lessons learned both from a material (materiel?) side and from a tactical employment side to do the best that we can.

Again, none of that will ever eliminate the risk entirely; it remains a dangerous place.

Chuck Nash: Thank you.

Col. Gordon Cucullu: General, this is Gordon Cucullu: Back to the 155,000 Iraqis that you mentioned. It seems like that in the past few months we've seen deliberately -- that the insurgents have deliberately targeted the recruiting process. Are we still seeing decent people coming out in proper numbers to fill the security slots, both the paramilitary and the active duty military on the Iraqi side?

BG: Recruiting does remain strong for both the police forces within the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and for the army within the Ministry of Defense. And I think that's a very positive sign. I think you've seen in recent weeks a specific outreach to the Sunni Arab population of Iraq by the Iraqi Transitional Government as it's starting to form, and I think that's a great, a great indicator as well.

It is an interesting phenomena, to watch the -- as Iraqi Security Forces have been attacked in the past -- again I'll speak from my personal experience having seen that, was very worried about the potential negative effect that would have, and it never materialized. Amazing, initially amazingly to me after one of those attacks, the next day there would be, again, many more young Iraqis show up at the recruiting stations than there were positions to accommodate them. So I think that bodes well for the country and bodes well for the security forces.

Gordon x: Yes, I think that's good news. Thank you.

BG Ham: OK, I guess Mr. Di Rita, I'll turn it back to you, sir.

Mr. Di Rita: I don't have anything more. I appreciate you guys carving out a little time for us.

Ms. Barber: Thanks for your time, and we'll be in touch.

(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, April 26, 2005 8:28 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: feith radio

Not sure what you mean.

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@^{(b)(6)}>
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA <larry.dirita@^{(b)(6)}>
Sent: Tue Apr 26 08:22:39 2005
Subject: FW: feith radio

here is where we run into problems.

-----Original Message-----

From: ^{(b)(6)} LTC, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, April 26, 2005 8:12 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; ^{(b)(6)} COL, OSD-POLICY; ^{(b)(6)} COL, OSD
POLICY
Subject: RE: feith radio

I have been told very specifically that Jed is not to ask and Mr Feith is to steer away from all China issues. Given that, I assume we will be prepping Mr Feith on QDR issues-- yes? Any other topics?

v/r

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, April 25, 2005 5:38 PM
To: ^{(b)(6)} COL, OSD-POLICY
Cc: ^{(b)(6)} LTC, OASD-PA
Subject: feith radio

^{(b)(6)} i spoke to doug on friday about doing a live interview with jed babbin while jed is sitting in for the talk show host on wmet, part of the idf national network. doug is willing provided there are no questions from the radio listeners. there are not. i believe tracy has contacted you on this. jed only has three days left, wed, thur and frid, from noon to 2 p.m., so time is a little tight -- which is why i'm weighing in. thanks.

(b)(6)

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, April 25, 2005 10:40 AM
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: jed babbin

you're right about sensitivities, and i think as long as feith stays where the sd has been, which is general observations, no specifics, we're okay. and we can certainly let dos know feith may be talking about this. we can also advise that he contact his counterpart at dos.

-----Original Message-----

From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, April 25, 2005 9:46 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: jed babbin
Importance: Low

We should not be doing China -- before we put Feith out on China we should be conferring with DOS. This is what ruffles feathers.

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, April 25, 2005 9:24 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: jed babbin

that's some good stuff. is this part of that master plan that mcgraw has pulled together with p/a's lead?

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, April 25, 2005 9:23 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: jed babbin

Thanks...fyi, Grone is scheduled to do CBS Radio (Bob Fuss) re BRAC tomorrow at 3:30...

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, April 25, 2005 9:18 AM
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: jed babbin

just exchanged emails with jed. he's not too keen on brac but is on china and qdr. feith is willing to do this provided there are no questions from callers, which is the case with jed -- he's the only questioner. thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, April 22, 2005 2:15 PM
To: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: jed babbin

(b)(6)

Let's check their availability

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, April 22, 2005 1:52 PM
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6), CIV, OASD-PA; Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Subject: jed babbin

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(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, April 25, 2005 9:32 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: jed babbin

not part of plan, request came to me direct... Grone has done several other interviews re BRAC process over the past six months or so.

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, April 25, 2005 9:24 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA
Cc: Wheeler, Hollen Johnson, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: jed babbin

that's some good stuff. is this part of that master plan that mcgraw has pulled together with p/a's lead?

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, April 25, 2005 9:23 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: jed babbin

Thanks...fyi, Grone is scheduled to do CBS Radio (Bob Fuss) re BRAC tomorrow at 3:30...

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, April 25, 2005 9:18 AM
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: jed babbin

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From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, April 22, 2005 2:15 PM
To: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: jed babbin

(b)(6)

Let's check their availability

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, April 22, 2005 1:52 PM
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Subject: jed babbin

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doug feith (qdr, china) and phil grone (brac) as potentials.
and grone's offices. thanks, eric

(b)(6)

i'd like us to work this with feith's

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, April 25, 2005 8:53 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Subject: American Spectator (Babbin)

AMERICAN SPECTATOR

Gilligan's Ghost

By Jed Babbin

Published 4/25/2005 12:06:02 AM

No, our Little Buddy is, at last reports, still in good health. But the other Gilligan -- Andrew, formerly of the BBC, the taxpayer-funded Brit network -- is being honored in practice if not in name. His bias and fabulism have been the foundation upon which the lads and ladies of the Beeb have built their newest and most direct participation in politics.

You remember Andrew. It was he who broadcast Baghdad Bob's line that American troops hadn't been able to capture "Saddam International" whilst the airport bar was being inventoried enthusiastically by our guys. Gilligan later made up the charge that Tony Blair "sexed up" the intel on Iraq, and was eventually allowed to resign. Now, campaigning against Tory Leader Michael Howard, the Gilligan-minded Beeb has managed to outdo CBS.

Gunga Dan and his crew of miscreants used forged documents to campaign against Dubya, but didn't go so far as to plant hecklers at campaign stops. That they left to Michael Moore. About a week ago, concerned that the campaign wasn't going badly enough for the Conservatives, the BBC crew covering a Tory event gave wireless microphones to hecklers in the audience who obliged by shouting, "Michael Howard is a liar," "You can't trust the Tories," and such while the Beeb crew recorded it all for later broadcast. Everyone in the UK who owns a television pays the BBC tax. CBS and the New York Times are horrifically biased, but at least we aren't forced to pay for their upkeep.

Freedom cannot be said to exist where people are forced to pay to support media that are engaged in partisan politics. (You can make the same case against NPR, but not to the degree of clarity that now pertains to the BBC.) If the BBC isn't forced to fire the reporters and producers involved in this episode, their conduct will encourage more political activism at the Beeb, and widen the cracks in British democracy. Why the Tories don't put an end to the BBC tax on their agenda is quite a mystery. Our democracy is in better shape, but not by much. Just ask John Bolton.

I RETRACT THE APOLOGY I made to Sen. Chuck Hagel last week. Hagel turned coat so fast last week it left Dick Lugar's head spinning. Hagel's cover was blown when Sen. George Voinovich (RINO-Ohio) blindsided Foreign Relations Committee chairman Lugar and the White House by saying during last Tuesday's committee meeting on the nomination that he couldn't vote for Bolton. As soon as Voinovich headed to the tall grass, Hagel quickly joined him, as did hopelessly liberal Lincoln Chafee, and later the previously invisible Lisa Murkowski (Daddy's daughter -- Alaska). Neither Hagel nor Chafee had the cojones to be the lone -- or first -- Repub to go south on Bolton, but once Voinovich broke the ice, both were eager to jump in the hole. May it politically re-freeze over both their heads.

Bolton's nomination is in real trouble, enough that it may die in committee or be withdrawn. In this crisis, former Secretary of State Colin Powell is joining in the whispering campaign to sink him. Powell is reportedly "responding" to questions from the Republican defectors, fueling the fires of Bolton's unreasonableness and harsh treatment of staffers. You have to wonder: if Bolton was such a problem when he worked for Powell, why didn't Powell fire him? Maybe because those who were more on board with their president's agenda -- such as former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, who spent ten years working with Bolton -- have a much less skewed view of the man.

Eagleburger made two important points in the Sunday Washington Post. First, that in many years working with Bolton he'd never seen or heard of Bolton abusing staff, and second that Bolton's blunt manner of speaking is just what we need now at the UN. Powell's involvement in the whispering campaign against Bolton is beneath him, or was. I'd thought better of him. I was wrong. But the Prez is right about a couple of other appointments he made last week.

It was more than just a little smart to appoint the first Marine Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the Friday ceremony announcing the appointment of Gen. Peter Pace, the Prez said that all we needed to know about Pace is that he's a Marine. Yes, but we should take the trouble to know more. Like the fact that Pace is a combat vet, a real tough guy with a very large brain, and well respected in all the services. After announcing the Pace appointment, Dubya tried and failed twice to say the name of the man who is to be Pace's deputy. The prez (intentionally?) underestimated the difficulty he'd have in pronouncing Adm. Edmund Giambastiani's name, but he had no problem telling the world that the new team wouldn't stray from the path he and Donald Rumsfeld have set for fighting the war and transforming the sometimes-recalcitrant Pentagon. (That, by the way, is an unnoticed but huge vote of confidence in Rumsfeld.) Henceforth, by presidential order, the newly nominated deputy chairman of the Joint Chiefs will be known as "Admiral G."

BUT BACK TO EUROPE FOR more bad news. The EU-3 -- Germany, France, and Britain -- are readying themselves for another session of negotiations with Iran, slated for later this week. They continue to delude themselves, and anyone else who will

listen, that Iran can be talked out of its desire to build nuclear weapons. The EU nuchs want Iran to give up its uranium enrichment program (which the Iranians supposedly put on hold while the talks go on -- yeah, sure). Iran, in a message designed to turn the heat up on the EU-3, said that if there wasn't progress on the last "compromise" Iran offered -- which, natch, lets them continue enriching some uranium for "peaceful" purposes -- they'd call the talks off. France wants to accept the Iranian promise, while the Brits are holding out for a tougher stance. Not that it means anything other than delaying the covert and overt actions we are going to have to take to force cessation of the Iranian program. It's either act or accept the fact of a nuclear-armed Iran. France, meanwhile, is more concerned with the EU constitution than the prospect of being incinerated by a terrorist nuke.

The week ended, as it had to, with yet another example of French churlishness. It was left to Nicholas Sarkozy, Mr. Bean look-alike and contender for the French presidency, to give the best reason to vote for the EU constitution. He said, "I am 50 years old, and it is the first time in French history that a person my age has not been asked to go to war for his country. That is for one simple reason: Europe." It had nothing to do with six decades of American defense of France. Nope, nothing at all.

TAS contributing editor Jed Babbin is the author of *Inside the Asylum: Why the UN and Old Europe Are Worse Than You Think* (Regnery, 2004).

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Researcher
Department of Defense
OSD Writers Group Room (b)(2)
Telephone: (b)(2)
Fax: (b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, April 22, 2005 4:42 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; Keck, Gary, Col, OASD-PA; Richard, Joseph, Ltc OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: jed babbin

any more details on this request we can provide phil grone? will this be via phone from his office/our studio? will there be call ins? how long on air? etc...

thanks--

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Grone, Philip, Mr, OSD-ATL
Sent: Friday, April 22, 2005 4:27 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) CDR, OSD-ATL; (b)(6) Ms, OSD-ATL
Subject: RE: jed babbin

1x1 or calls?

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, April 22, 2005 3:39 PM
To: Grone, Phillip, Mr, OSD-ATL
Cc: (b)(6) CDR, OSD-ATL; (b)(6) OSD-ATL
Subject: RE: jed babbin

would need about 30 min, probably would be in our studio..

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Grone, Philip, Mr, OSD-ATL
Sent: Friday, April 22, 2005 3:26 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) CDR, OSD-ATL; (b)(6) OSD-ATL
Subject: RE: jed babbin

How long? What is the format?

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, April 22, 2005 2:30 PM
To: Grone, Phillip, Mr, OSD-ATL
Cc: (b)(6) CDR, OSD-ATL; (b)(6) OSD-ATL
Subject: FW: jed babbin

any time next week to do another radio interview re brac process?

tnx--

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, April 22, 2005 2:15 PM
To: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: jed babbin

(b)(6)

Let's check their availability

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, April 22, 2005 1:52 PM
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6), CIV, OASD-PA; Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Subject: jed babbin

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(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, April 22, 2005 2:22 PM
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: jed babbin

will check w/ grone...

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, April 22, 2005 2:15 PM
To: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: jed babbin

(b)(6)

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From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
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(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, April 22, 2005 9:40 AM
To: (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA
Cc: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; Rhyndance, George, COL, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: military analysts call today
Attachments: Picture (Metafile)

good morning.
 here is the most updated list (as of 9:40 a.m.) of those who will be on the call this morning. there is still the possibility that more will join who have not rsvp'd. thanks (b)(6)

- Colonel Carl Kenneth Allard (USA, Retired)
- Mr. Jed Babbin (USAF, JAG) (American Spectator)
- Dr. James Jay Carafano (LTC, USA, Retired)
- Colonel Gordon Cucullu (USA, Retired)
- Major Dana R. Dillon (USA, Retired)
- Colonel (Tim) J. Eads (USA, Retired)
- Lieutenant Colonel Rick Francona (USAF, Retired) (MSNBC)
- Colonel John Garrett (tentative) (USMC, Retired)
- Command Sergeant Major Steven Greer (USA, Retired)
- Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis (USA, Retired)
- Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney (USAF, Retired)
- General William L. Nash (USA, Retired)
- Captain Martin L. Strong (USN, Retired)

Respectfully,
 (b)(6)
 OSD Public Affairs
 Community Relations and Public Liaison
 (b)(2) The Pentagon
 Washington, D.C. 20301-1400
 (b)(2)



www.AmericaSupportsYou.mil

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, April 19, 2005 10:38 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Subject: American Spectator (Babbin)

The American Spectator

Tongsun Redux

By Jed Babbin

Published 4/18/2005 12:07:13 AM

For news junkies, this will be a hectic week. By its end, Catholics may have a new pope, we may have a new UN ambassador, and both Kofi and his bestest buddy Jacques may suffer nervous breakdowns. Things are looking up because, while Volcker fiddles, the FBI and the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York are burning bad guys. Now all we need to find out are the names of Cooperating Witnesses One and Two, and the high-ranking UN officials whom they bribed for Saddam.

CW1 and CW2 may be the first people who have earned the Presidential Medal of Freedom as a result of plea bargains keeping them out of jail. (CW1 has already pled guilty to being an unregistered agent of the Saddam government and is cooperating with U.S. investigators.) They are unindicted co-conspirators -- credited with helping Saddam bribe the UN into setting up the Oil-for-Food-for-Bribes-for-Weapons scam -- in the indictment of one of our all-time faves, Tongsun Park of Koreagate infamy.

For those joining us since 1976, Mr. Park was indicted back then on 36 counts of bribery, influence peddling, and other usual business on Capitol Hill. The charges were eventually dropped after he testified in Congressional hearings about his involvement with dozens of Congressmen, only three of whom were later reprimanded by the House. (Think of this the next time you hear the caterwauling about Tom DeLay.)

Just because Saddam is evil doesn't mean he's a dummy. He did what any good manager would do if he wanted to pay bribes: he hired an expert. According to the March 21 indictment of Mr. Park unsealed last week, and the affidavit stating it signed by FBI special agent Nicholas Panagakos, Saddam paid bribes to and through Park to Cooperating Witnesses One and Two and to at least two high-ranking UN officials in order to get the UN to create the Oil-for-Food program by Security Council in 1996. Just who were they? Not Benon Sevan, who wasn't yet chosen to run the Oil-for-Food scam. There would have been no reason to bribe him before he was chosen to run the scam. Was Annan himself bribed? How about Iqbal Riza, his chief of staff who later ordered the shredding of UN documents for the 1996-1999 period, when the program

was first created and run? Someday soon, we should know.

The bribes apparently continued until 2003 (when Tommy Franks had something to say about Saddam's future plans) to make sure that the program was extended beyond its original expiration date. The indictment says that Park "invested in a company owned by an immediate family member of a high-ranking UN official money paid to him from the Government of Iraq in connection" with the bribe agreement. Park, having agreed to bribe the UN officials for Saddam, got at least \$2 million for himself and distributed millions in bribes, both in cash and in oil vouchers entitling the UN officials to collect more millions from the sale of the vouchers. So how does Kofi respond to the new revelations? By trying to pass the blame to President Bush and Prime Minister Blair, of course.

Last week the sagging Annan said, "The bulk of the money that Saddam made came out of smuggling outside the oil-for-food program, and it was on the American and British watch." Annan added, "Possibly they were the ones who knew exactly what was going on, and that the countries themselves decided to close their eyes to smuggling to Turkey and Jordan because they were allies." Of course, nothing the UN did was wrong.

If Kofi's week weren't sour enough, Secretary of State Condi Rice added to his agony by saying, "It is no secret to anyone that the United Nations cannot survive as a vital force in international politics if it doesn't reform." Note to Kofi: reform or die. It's a great disappointment that we didn't see the appropriate headline in the New York Daily News, in 64-point type, saying: "Condi to UN: Drop Dead." Something to look forward to. Almost as much as the Bolton confirmation, which may come later this week.

THE LEFTIES HAVE MANAGED to delay, but not stop, the nomination of John Bolton to the UN ambassador's post. Thankfully, and my apologies to Sen. Hagel, even he and Sen. Lincoln Chafee seem to be standing with Bolton. If the Dems can't get either of them to vote against Bolton, or at least abstain, Bolton's nomination should be reported out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee early this week. On the floor, it will pass easily. For Kofi and the rest of the Turtle Bay crime family, it will be as much fun as passing a kidney stone. Meanwhile back at le domaine, Jacques is apparently sinking in the congenital contrariness of his own countrymen.

Ah, how le ver turns. Just a year ago, it was a sure bet that France -- one of the chief proponents of the European Union -- would easily pass a referendum on the EU constitution. Now, as the May 29 referendum approaches, polls show the French ready to reject it. That led President Chirac to the most desperate measure. Calculating correctly that the worst thing a Frenchman could think to do was to help Uncle Sam, Chirac said that a "no" vote would weaken the EU and benefit the United States. Chirac, in a carefully scripted "town hall" session with young French voters, issued that dire warning last Thursday, with little or no effect. The French may be content with the status quo which, as the Gipper once said, is Latin for "the mess we're in."

Whether the French vote the EU constitution down remains to be seen. It's unlikely that they will reject it because without the EU agriculture subsidy, much of French farming will end. As John Hulsman of the Heritage Foundation once told me, the EU agricultural subsidy is "really a sop from Germany to pay French farmers to sit around, play boule, and do nothing." The French may just be revolting against ten years of Chiracism or just emoting for the press. Once they get enough attention from the rest of Europe, they may pass the EU constitution to keep their subsidies. You see, that's what it's all about. Like Oil-for-Food, the EU is an economic scam. The French have too much to lose if they reject it. And money is what they're all about. Not everyone in the world is concerned solely with money. From U.S. European Command and the Joint Staff comes word of new strides in building the Iraq Coalition.

From a kinda sorta reliable Navy source comes this bulletin from the Joint Staff quoting one of its lieutenant colonels: "Things are looking up for us here. Papua-New Guinea is thinking of offering two platoons: one of infantry (headhunters) and one of engineers (hut builders). They want to eat any bad Iraqis they kill. We've got no issues with that, but State is being anal about it." Dr. Rice reportedly wants to transform the State Department as Mr. Rumsfeld is doing with the Pentagon. She apparently has a long, hard road ahead.

TAS contributing editor Jed Babbin is the author of *Inside the Asylum: Why the UN and Old Europe Are Worse Than You Think* (Regnery, 2004).

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Researcher
Department of Defense
OSD Writers Group, Room (b)(2)
Telephone: (b)(2)
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(b)(6)

From: USNewsBulletin@bulletinnews.com
Sent: Wednesday, April 13, 2005 7:58 AM
To: larry.dirita@(b)(6)
Subject: Today's Political News From The Editors of US News & World Report and BulletinNews

US NEWS *BULLETIN*

All the Day's Political News From Newspapers, TV, Radio, and Magazines

MEMORANDUM FOR LAWRENCE T. DI RITA

SUBJECT: TODAY'S POLITICAL NEWS

DATE: WEDNESDAY, APRIL 13, 2005 - 8:00 AM

WASHINGTON NEWS

DeLay Lunches With GOP Senators, Trying To Gain Their Backing. House Majority Leader Tom DeLay, under fire for alleged ethical improprieties, "crossed the Capitol on Tuesday to shore up Senate support," appearing at the "weekly closed-door lunch for GOP senators," the Dallas Morning News reports. After the lunch, GOP Sen. Lindsey Graham said, "He's a guy under siege. And he just wanted to personally say, 'I appreciate people hanging in there with me. This is an orchestrated effort; just let time and the process work its way and its will.' I think that's fair." The Washington Post reports that as DeLay left the meeting, he "told reporters that his basic message was 'Be patient; we'll be fine.' Giving a preview of the approach he is likely to take when he appears before reporters this afternoon, DeLay dismissed questions about his travel and his relationships with lobbyists as 'the Democratic agenda.'"

However, as the Houston Chronicle reports, Sen. Lincoln Chafee, "a moderate who has been targeted for defeat by Democrats next year, said DeLay's troubles could play into charges that Republicans are abusing power." Chafee said, "It tends to cast a shadow over the party. That's just the way it is." Still, CNN's Inside Politics reported there "was not a single Senate Republican coming out of that lunch" calling on DeLay to step down.

DeLay Has Assembled "Formal Structure" To Fight Back Against Allegations. The Capitol Hill newspaper The Hill



INSIDE

Washington News
Political News
Political Humor

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reports DeLay has assembled a "formal structure" to counter news stories about his perceived ethical improprieties and ensure the support of Republican lawmakers." The team includes his Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of Staff, Communications Director, general counsel, and a policy adviser. Each day, they coordinate with aides from Speaker Dennis Hastert's office, as well as the National Republican Congressional Committee and the Republican National Committee.

Gingrich Says Burden Of Proof Is On DeLay. In an interview with the CBS Evening News, former House Speaker Newt Gingrich said of DeLay, "I think the burden is on him to prove it at this stage." Regarding DeLay's criticism of the media, Gingrich said, "That's the famous Hillary Clinton defense. That's the 'vast left-wing conspiracy.' ... When you're being attacked, the first thing you naturally do is you describe your attackers. In this case, that won't work. DeLay's problem isn't with the Democrats. DeLay's problem is with the country."

Republicans Lash Out At Shays. Republicans are taking aim at GOP Rep. Chris Shays, a Connecticut moderate who barely won re-election in 2004 and faces another close race in 2006. Shays sharply criticized DeLay as "an absolute embarrassment to me and to the Republican Party" last week. One "senior House Republican Member" told the Capitol Hill newspaper Roll Call, "Chris Shays is loyal, all right. His loyalty just happens to lie with George Soros and the New York Times editorial board, instead of the Republican Party." But the GOP fury is "not enough to jeopardize Shays' financial support from the party for what is likely to be a tough re-election battle next year," Roll Call writes in another article.

Senate Republicans Differ On Fate Of Bush Social Security Plan. Senate Republicans are offering differing assessments on the chances of President Bush's Social Security plan to become law, according to the Washington Times. Sen. Gordon Smith (WA) said of the Bush plan, "It's not dead, but it's on life support." But Sen. Rick Santorum (PA) "wasn't so grim. 'We're making progress,' he said. 'We're early in the game.'"

Meanwhile, Sen. Lindsey Graham, also a Republican, said yesterday the President "needs to offer more specifics to have any chance to win passage this year" of Social Security reform, Reuters reports. Graham said Bush "must offer more details about how to best fix the program's financial problems and insist on a vote in coming months." And Senate Finance Chairman Charles Grassley said that while right now, he could not get a bill through his committee that includes private accounts, "I expect to put a process in place so that we can."

Bush Takes Social Security Campaign To Ohio Friday. President Bush will travel to Kirtland, Ohio, Friday, to discuss his Social Security plan at Lakeland Community College. WSYX-TV in Columbus reported that the "round-table discussion with an invitation-only crowd" is "part of a 60-day, 60-city tour to promote his plan."

Former Official Says Bolton A "Serial Abuser" Of His Subordinates. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday heard the testimony of Carl Ford, a former intelligence official at the State Department. Ford criticized UN Ambassador nominee John Bolton, saying he demeaned and verbally abused subordinates who disagreed with his intelligence analyses and calling him a "serial abuser." Ford's testimony notwithstanding, the media consensus was that Bolton's nomination would be approved by the committee.

berated a lower level intelligence analyst for holding up a speech in which he planned to say Cuba had a biological weapons program." The analyst "kept his job and Bolton's speech was reworked to comply with the intelligence on Cuba," but Ford "said the incident had 'a chilling effect' on State Department analysts."

USA Today reports Ford described Bolton as "a quintessential kiss-up, kick-down sort of guy," while the Los Angeles Times says Ford called Bolton a "serial abuser" of underlings, but "it appeared" his testimony "had not changed any votes on Bolton's nomination." The Washington Times reports, "All 10 Republicans appear ready to vote to approve John R. Bolton's nomination later this week, setting up a floor confirmation vote by the whole Senate." The San Luis Obispo Tribune runs a Knight Ridder story that reports Sen. Lincoln Chafee, "seen as the most likely GOP defector, remained inclined to vote for Bolton."

Ben Nelson Seeks Compromise On Judicial Nominations. The Capitol Hill newspaper The Hill reports this morning Sen. Ben Nelson (D-NE), "who is working on a bipartisan compromise to end the filibuster of judicial nominees, said he believes that his party's practice of blocking confirmation votes on controversial nominees has put him and fellow Democratic centrists in politically difficult positions." Nelson "suggested that a few Democrats in so-called red states might be relieved should the prospect of filibustering the president's nominees be eliminated."

Push To End Filibusters Could Happen Within Next Two Weeks. The New York Times reports Senate Republicans "said Tuesday that they might quicken their push to prevent Democratic filibusters of judicial nominees. Senior lawmakers and party officials said that while Republican leaders had been expected to put off any confrontation over Senate rules until next month at the earliest, they might now force a confrontation within the next two weeks."

Pro-Life, Pro-Gun Groups Oppose Nuclear Option. The AP reports, "Two groups normally allied with Republicans have bolted from the party's effort to ban judicial filibusters -- the first major defections from a conservative push to prevent Senate Democrats from blocking President Bush's judicial nominees." The National Right to Work Committee, "a 2.2 million-member group critical of unions," and the Gun Owners of America, "with 300,000 members, say they fear eliminating judicial filibusters could eventually lead to doing away with filibusters altogether."

Bush Celebrates Second Anniversary Of Baghdad's Fall With Fort Hood Soldiers. President Bush marked the second anniversary of the fall of Baghdad with a visit to Fort Hood, Texas, joining soldiers who will soon ship out to Iraq "for some collared greens and mac'-and-cheese," CNN's Inside Politics reported. The CBS Evening News said Bush thanked them for their service, "and said the role of the US military is changing as Iraqis shoulder more and more of the security burden." Reflecting on Baghdad's liberation, Bush said the "fall of Saddam's statue in Baghdad ranks with the fall of the Berlin Wall as 'one of the great moments in the history of liberty,'" NBC Nightly News reported.

In this morning's newspapers, coverage of Bush's remarks appeared rather skeptical of Bush's assessment of the Iraq mission. Many of the stories noted that the President did not address that fact that no WMD have been found in Iraq. The Dallas Morning News (4/13, Jackson), for example, reports that "some Iraqis celebrated the second anniversary" of Saddam's downfall "in a different way, taking to the streets over the weekend to protest the continuing American presence in Iraq. But Iraqi leaders said American troops need to stay for the foreseeable future."

Bush "did not cite his major initial justification for the Iraq invasion, weapons of mass destruction that have not been found." The Los Angeles Times, meanwhile, says Bush's remarks "showed how he hoped history would view his decision to go to war and reflected Iraq's position as the centerpiece of his agenda to reshape the Middle East." The Washington Post, however, said the President "delivered what has become a fairly standard speech about what the military is accomplishing in Iraq and why, he says, the effort will go down in history."

On the other hand, Bush's visit to Fort Hood received widespread, largely positive local TV coverage across the country. Many reports used footage of Bush telling the troops their success in Iraq will "make America safer for us and for future generations." Typical of the coverage was KYW-TV of Philadelphia, which reported, "Bush thanked troops at Fort Hood, Texas for their valiant service in Iraq." Bush was shown saying, "You have fought the battles of the war on terror and you have served the cause of freedom, and you should be proud of all that you have achieved."

White House Drops Plans To Cut Aid To Farmers. The AP reports the Bush Administration "threw in the towel on the president's proposal to slash farm payments in the face of opposition from lawmakers in both parties."

POLITICAL NEWS

Ensign Unlikely To Have First Tier Democratic Opponent. The Capitol Hill newspaper The Hill reports, "Leading Nevada Democrats say they will give Sen. John Ensign (R-Nev.) a pass when he seeks reelection next year...because of Ensign's close relationship with Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.)." As many Republicans "noted last year, Ensign did little, if anything, to find a candidate to run against Reid in 2004."

Hoyer Concludes Recruitment Trip. The Hill reports House Minority Whip Steny Hoyer "returned from Chicago last night after his second candidate-recruitment trip of the year." Over the Easter recess, Hoyer "was in New York, where he met with state party leaders and legislators to discuss the possibility of mid-decade redistricting in the state to chip away at the GOP majority in Washington. While in Chicago, Hoyer also raised money for his leadership PAC, AmeriPAC."

Mainstream Democrats Increasingly Close To MoveOn.org. The Capitol Hill newspaper Roll Call reports, "Once regarded warily by much of the Democratic establishment, the liberal grass-roots group MoveOn.org is being increasingly courted by Democratic officeholders for its 3 million members - and their deep pockets." MoveOn is described by Roll Call as "by far the left's most potent fundraising operation outside of the Democratic Party itself." Republicans have "pounced on the increased cooperation, seeking to paint Democrats as beholden to their party's liberal wing."

Some Democrats Are Urging Clark To Run For President In 2008. U.S. News and World Report reported in its "Washington Whispers" column on its Website that friends of Wesley Clark "are still after him to run" for president. During the Association of State Democratic Chairs' meeting "last week in Little Rock, Ark., Clark hosted a group from the Alabama Democratic Party for dinner." The group

"included the state director of the Alabama party and about 15 grass-roots folks who traveled from Alabama to meet Clark. The group believes Clark is the only hope the party has to win southern states."

Sharpton Denies Allegations Of Campaign Fraud. The New York Times reports Al Sharpton "said yesterday that his 2004 presidential campaign complied with federal law when raising money, and he lashed out at published reports that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was looking into his campaign's finances." The AP reports, "The Philadelphia Inquirer, citing unidentified sources, reported Monday that the FBI in New York had begun investigating Sharpton's fundraising as a spinoff of an unrelated criminal probe involving city officials and businessmen in Philadelphia."

Challenger Holds Eighteen Point Lead Over Hahn In Los Angeles Mayoral Poll. The Los Angeles Times reports, "Antonio Villaraigosa has opened an 18-point lead over incumbent James K. Hahn in the Los Angeles mayoral race, with nearly every large voting bloc supporting his effort to bounce Hahn from City Hall, according to a new Times poll."

POLITICAL HUMOR

The Latest From Late Night Comedians. The late night comics last night joked about the arrest of a recent immigrant at the Capitol, Tom DeLay, and the papal election, among other topics.

Jay Leno: "Well, a very scary moment in Washington yesterday. ... Capitol Hill police tackled -- tackled and dragged away a desperate man with two suitcases. See that guy? He staged himself in front of the Capitol building, stood there for an hour and demanded to get into the White House. You know, I think John Kerry's starting to lose it."

Jay Leno: "Today, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld warned Iraqis' new leaders against hiring their friends and family members for government jobs. And the Majority Leader Tom DeLay gave the rebuttal. He said, 'It's not that bad.'"

Jay Leno: "Well, as you know, voting will soon take place for a new pope. I understand a number of Cardinals already placed calls to Jeb Bush to see if he could pull a few strings."

David Letterman: "Trouble down in Washington. Yesterday police arrested a man acting strangely. He was carrying two giant suitcases. Security got him and arrested him. He is in jail. President Bush claims that we're winning the war on luggage."

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(b)(6)

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, April 05, 2005 6:43 AM
To: Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
Subject: Re: SD-CJCS deck for 05 April

Thanks again, frank. Good travels. Eric

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA <frank.thorp@(b)(6)>
To: (b)(6); OASD-PA (b)(6); Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA <larry.dirita@(b)(6)>; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@(b)(6)>; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA <Bryan.Whitman@(b)(6)>; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA <George.Rhynedance@(b)(6)>; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA <ellen.haddock@(b)(6)>; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA <Roxie.Merritt@(b)(6)>; Keck, Gary, Col, OASD-PA <gary.keck@(b)(6)>; (b)(6); LTC, OASD-PA (b)(6); Capt. USMC, OASD-PA (b)(6); Chafin, Claude, CIV, OSD-LA <Claude.Chafin@(b)(6)>; (b)(6); CIV, OSD (b)(6); CDR, OCJCS/PA (b)(6); Turenne, Jr. Bill., CIV, OASD-PA <bill.turenne@(b)(6)>; (b)(6); CIV, OASD-PA (b)(6); (b)(6); LCDR, OCJCS/PA (b)(6); Maj, OCJCS/PA (b)(6); CIV OASD-PA (b)(6); CIV, OASD-PA (b)(6); SSgt, OASD-PA (b)(6); TSgt, OASD-PA (b)(6); (b)(6)

Sent: Mon Apr 04 18:27:47 2005
Subject: RE: SD-CJCS deck for 05 April

please put a T next to radio interview...

Frank Thorp
Captain, USN
Special Assistant for Public Affairs
to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, April 04, 2005 5:44 PM
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; Keck, Gary, Col, OASD-PA; (b)(6); (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Chafin, Claude, CIV, OSD-LA; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA; Turenne, Jr. Bill., CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) OASD-PA; (b)(6) LCDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Maj, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) SSgt, OASD-PA; (b)(6) TSgt, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: SD-CJCS deck for 05 April

<< File: SD-CJCS Update 04-05-05.ppt >>
05 April

SecDef: Phone interviews with Veja, Brazilian weekly magazine, and Miami Herald, regarding South America trip (1300).
CJCS: Radio interview with Jed Babbin on the Greg Garrison Show (WIBC, Indianapolis, 1140); addresses JFCOM NDIA Symposium luncheon, media avail (1200-1345, Portsmouth, VA);

attends USO Metro Annual Awards Dinner (1830, Pentagon City).

Issues

England and Edelman nominations; Silberman-Robb Commission report; Iraqi leadership races; U.S. and Coalition troop withdrawal and drawdown; training/number of security forces; size and makeup of insurgency; budget requests; BRAC.

Headlines

* Eleven-year-old David Smith accepts Medal of Honor for his father SFC Paul Ray Smith at a White House ceremony. (AP)

* President Karzai urges nations to speed economic recovery to his country; Ambassador Khalilzad says U.S. aid to increase from \$2.5 billion in 2004 to \$5 billion in 2005; Congress must approve some of increase. (AP)

* Bulgarian soldier death friendly fire from U.S. forces, Army report says. (UPI)

(b)(6)

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, April 04, 2005 8:48 AM
To: Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Cc: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: jed babbin's show

good morning, frank, katie. have you gotten an indication of whether the chairman or vice are available to do a 10 -15 minute guest interview for jed babbin's radio program tomorrow? thanks, eric

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
 Sent: Monday, April 04, 2005 8:35 AM
 To: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
 Subject: Another Good Article (Babbin)

Hello All: In Case You Missed this....

Jed has it right!!!

EXCLUSIVE: Women in Combat?

Date: Saturday, March 19 @ 21:17:46 CST

Topic: FSM FEATURE

By Jed Babbin

Did you know that women in our armed forces are increasingly being pushed into a combat role? Find out why - and how this will affect our troops - in this EXCLUSIVE piece from FSM contributing editor Jed Babbin!

Women in Combat?

Jed Babbin

Everyone has opinions about the war, and no one seems shy about expressing them. Whether it's about Iraq, al-Queda, the military budget or anything else, we all have something to say. And that's a good thing, because American democracy doesn't function without open and honest debate. Social security used to be the "third rail" of American politics. No one dared to touch it because to do so was to commit political suicide. Now, the same can be said of the question of women in combat.

Because politicians and too many military leaders are afraid to talk about it, the question is being decided by default in the incrementalism of the bureaucracy. Army bureaucrats are deciding the issue in small chunks, moving women into combat units by making small changes in obscure policies. These bureaucratic actions must be subjected to the light and heat of politics.

The President has said, "No women in combat." US law, Defense Department policy and everything else the Army is supposed to obey says that women should not serve in infantry units, in special operations, and in the other ground combat forces whose business is killing people and breaking things. Small, slow changes have - for years - allowed women to fly Air Force and Navy combat aircraft, fly Army helos in combat, and serve on most Navy combat ships. Every Army unit - infantry, armor, support, reconnaissance, etc. - has a "gender code" number. The gender codes are supposed to separate those non-combatant units that women can be assigned to from the combat arms. Now, the Army is changing its operating doctrine to include women in more combat units by manipulating the gender codes.

According to the Center for Military Readiness, and confirmed by a Defense Department source, the

Army is juggling unit gender codes to allow women to serve in combat arms such as multiple-launch rocket systems, reconnaissance, and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams. The Army apparently plans to assign women to these units to raise the unit manning numbers to the requisite levels, but plans to withdraw the women if the units are engaging in combat. There are only two results that can obtain, and neither is good for the fighting strength of the army.

First, if this is merely the accounting game it appears, the Army is more in step with the UN than the President. It's trying to increase the number of troops it needs by including troops that won't be there to fight. It's a fraud on the rest of the soldiers who will have to fight short-handed when the women leave. Second, if the Army is violating the ban on women in combat arms, it's more than just an accounting scam. It's a knowing reduction in the Army's combat capability.

Feminists argue that it's discrimination against women to keep them out of combat units because they aren't as likely to be promoted without combat experience. The feminists' argument is premised on fact: there is favoritism in the military promotion system toward those who have served in combat. And there must be because the "glass ceiling" they complain about is smeared with blood. Lessons learned on the battlefield are paid for with soldiers' lives, and as many millennia of war have taught us, those lessons are best applied by military commanders who have learned them first-hand.

The commanders' job is to apply those lessons to win the war in the shortest amount of time by inflicting the greatest damage on the enemy in the shortest period of time. Their principal tool is the people who serve in combat arms. To win battles, the combat arms must be peopled only by those who can perform as well as every other under the stresses of combat. And very few women can qualify under the standards for combat.

For those who still doubt that, the 2002 British Ministry of Defence study, "Women in the Armed Forces," should settle the matter. It begins with a foundational truth: "Combat effectiveness is the ability of a unit...to carry out its mission...The cohesion of a unit is a vital factor in its combat effectiveness." The study finds that only 1% of women can meet the physical standards men do, that they are less aggressive and more prone to injury than men, and that – in the only example where the combat effectiveness of women is measurable, the Israeli army in 1947-48 – "Israeli morale suffered disproportionately when a female soldier was killed or wounded." In short, unit cohesion is reduced significantly by including women in combat arms because the vast majority can't meet the standards men do, and because of the effect on the unit when a woman becomes a casualty. Just what will the effect of the Army's bureaucratic maneuvering be?

A very wise man, the late Capt. H.H. Babbin, USMCR, had words of wisdom for me as my commissioning date approached more than three decades ago. He said that I'd soon be a well-educated and highly-trained junior officer. Which, he said, meant I'd be essentially useless. His advice was to find someone with a lot of stripes on his sleeve and do what he said if I wanted to do my job well live to tell about it. What was good advice for me then is good advice for the Army now. Retired Marine Corps Gunnery Sergeant Jessie Duff was one of those bestripped persons. Having served more than 20 years in the Marines, Duff has some strong opinions about women in combat.

Duff told me that it's not a question of physical fitness. That women have to meet different physical fitness tests in the military is, to Duff, of no relevance to their fitness for combat service. Combat fitness is about the other tests and standards (which include physical capabilities) that have to be met to qualify for combat duty.

I asked Duff about the Brit findings that 1% or so of women who can meet the standards for ground combat. Duff said it's too few, and imposing such a small minority of women will create a lot of internal

friction. Women comprise about 6% of the Marines and, according to Duff, even that number can cause a lot of internal friction. Being a woman – a very attractive one at that – Duff is a pretty good judge of it.

Duff said that if she were talking with the President privately, she'd urge him to stay the course and not allow women – even those who can meet the standards for ground combat – into combat units. "For the women who can meet the standards, I'm not going to say 'go for it' because...it's going to be such a small number...[because it's] going to cause disruption and morale and cohesion issues. We're naïve if we think otherwise."

To Gunny Duff, the standards set for combat service are inviolable. If the Army is allowing women who can't meet those standards to serve in combat units, the Army is degrading its combat capabilities. Unless enough women could qualify to comprise at least 15-20% of a unit's strength, she believes it would be highly disruptive to unit cohesion and morale. Duff told me, "If the Army's going to do this and allow people to go in[to combat units] just to have this equality, they're forgetting what their mission is. Their mission is to win a stinking war..."

We know – from history, from the Brit study, and from Gunny Duff's advice – that women shouldn't be in combat arms. Why, then, is the Army playing games with unit gender codes and thereby threatening unit cohesion? Is it more important to win battles or to give women a greater chance at promotion? All it's about, like Gunny Duff said, is winning the stinking war.

Family Security Matters contributing editor Jed Babbin is also a contributing editor for The American Spectator magazine and the author of Inside the Asylum: Why the UN and Old Europe are Worse than You Think.

(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, April 01, 2005 7:06 PM
To: 'rt54@'(b)(6)
Subject: Re: Fwd: Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz

Raymond...tnx for the note and the info. Paul w. Has a full dance card just now but I'll throw the upi request into the mix. You ought to ask the reporter to put in a standard interview request so we don't miss any steps.. His bureau or he should be familiar with the process.

Regarding your report, I passed it to feith and discussed it with him. It's good you are working on elliot. You might check in with peter-rodman, who handles such matters in the policy operation, and see what follow up if any is desirable. Pls call my office at (b)(2) and ask for a rodman number. When you call, pls let rodman's folks know I asked you to do so. All the best.

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Raymond Tanter <rt54@'(b)(6)>
To: Lawrence DiRita <Larry.DiRita@'(b)(6)>
Sent: Fri Apr 01 10:10:08 2005
Subject: Fwd: Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz

Larry:

As you may know, I worked with Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz when he was at State and I was on the NSC staff and have been with him on several occasions since then.

Would be most grateful if you would forward this request for an interview with him by the International Editor of UPI, Claude Salhani. He is a friend, an excellent journalist, and I expect him to write a story that would be fair to Paul.

With respect to the 10 FEB Iran Policy Committee report I sent to the Secretary via you, recall that you forwarded it to OSD/Policy for staffing. Because I have not heard from Doug's office, what would you advise now?

Following your advice, I contacted Elliott Abrams, with whom I served in the Reagan-Bush days, and expect to meet with him soon.

Attached is another copy of the IPC report for your convenience.

Also attached is an invitation to attend a meeting of the Congressional Iran Human Rights and Democracy Caucus with our Iran Policy Committee 6 April 2005, 11:00 am to 12:00, 2253 Rayburn. Below is a summary of the tentative briefing program:

Raymond Tanter introduces IPC members in attendance and provides a brief overview of threats and options from attached 10 February IPC White Paper, which IPC featured in a rollout at the National Press Center on that date. See bios of the following persons in the White Paper.

Paul Leventhal briefs on the Iranian nuclear threat, using the White Paper as a point of departure, including recent revelations of Tehran's violations of its international obligations.

Neil Livingstone briefs on Iran's state sponsorship of terrorism, including covert activities in Iraq.

Bruce McCole briefs on Iran's violations of human rights, especially in light of current protests by Iranian opposition groups.

Captain Chuck Nash briefs on the diplomatic option, including state of play among the EU3, USG, and Iran.

Colonel Bill Cowan briefs on pros and cons of the military option.

Clare Lopez briefs on Iranian opposition efforts to destabilize Iran, while diplomacy and military planning continue.

Please note that IPC has briefed on Parliament Hill in Ottawa; Canadian Embassy in Washington; had meetings with diplomats from several countries in the Middle East, including the Embassy of France; and held press conferences throughout the country, e.g., in Washington, Dallas, and Miami.

IPC is also holding talks with the staff of the Congressional Iran Working Group about briefing its Members following a meeting the Group plans to have with the EU3 Ambassadors.

Finally and independent of my private activities above, have been appointed a consultant to DASD Matt Waxman's on detainee affairs.

Look forward to hearing from you soon.

Ray

(b)(6)

(h)
(cell)

10 February 2005

U.S. Policy Options for Iran

Prepared by:
Iran Policy Committee (IPC)

Co-Chairs:

Ambassador James Akins, (ret.)

Lt. Col. Bill Cowan, USMC (ret.), CEO, wvc3, inc.

Paul Leventhal, Founder and President Emeritus, Nuclear Control Institute

Dr. Neil Livingstone, CEO, Global Options, Inc.

Bruce McCalm, President, Institute for Democratic Strategies and
Former President, International Republican Institute

Lt. General (ret.) Thomas McInerney
Former Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force

Captain Chuck Nash (ret.)
President, Emerging Technologies International

Lt. General Edward Rowny (ret.)
Former Ambassador Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

Professor Raymond Tanter
Former Staff Member, National Security Council

Major General (ret.) Paul Vallely,
Military Committee Chairman, Center for Security Policy

Executive Director: Clare Lopez
Strategic Policy and Intelligence Analyst

Iran Policy Committee
3700 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Suite 507, Washington DC 20016
202-333-7346 (o) 202-333-4126 (fax)

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U.S. Policy Options for Iran: Executive Summary

Iran poses six threats to American interests and ideals:

- Drive to acquire nuclear weapons
- Continuing support for and involvement with terrorist networks
- Publicly-stated opposition to the Arab-Israel peace process
- Disruptive role in Iraq
- Expansionist radical ideology
- Denial of basic human rights to its own population

With respect to these threats from Iran, Washington circles largely divide between two alternatives—those who favor engagement with and those who support military strikes against the regime. Few favor regime change as an end in itself.

While the Bush administration does not yet explicitly call for changing the regime, it advocates working with the Iranian people as opposed to the unelected theocracy in Tehran, which is an implicit policy of regime change.

By calling for change in Tehran based on the Iranian opposition instead of the U.S. military, the Iran Policy Committee (IPC) highlights a third alternative: Keep open diplomatic and military options, while providing a central role for the Iranian opposition to facilitate regime change.

IPC joins the debate in Washington over Iran policy initiated by think tank reports on Iran—Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), The Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), and The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (TWI). In contrast to the thrust of such reports, IPC suggests that Iranian opposition groups ought to play a central role in U.S. policymaking regarding Iran.

Comprised of former officials who have worked on the Middle East in the White House, State Department, Pentagon, intelligence agencies, Congress, and experts from think tanks and universities, IPC welcomes the occasion to support the Iranian people in pursuit of U.S. national interests. But continued designation since 1997 of the main Iranian opposition group, Mujahedeen e-Khalq (MEK), as a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department assures Tehran that regime change is off the table. Removing the MEK's terrorist designation would be a tangible signal to Tehran and to the Iranian people that a new option is implicitly on the table—regime change.

U.S. Policy Options for Iran

Introduction

"...liberty in our land depends on the success of liberty in other lands...So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture.

President George W. Bush, Inaugural Address, 20 January 2005

"As you stand for liberty, America stands with you."

President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, 2 February 2005

Using the theme of liberty in general from his Inaugural Address, President Bush refers directly to the Iranian people in his State of the Union Address. In so doing, he tacitly "targets" the regime in Tehran.

The question is what means should the President use to decrease threats posed by Iran:

- Continued negotiations, including positive and negative incentives
- Future military action
- Support for the Iranian opposition.

These options are neither mutually exclusive nor logically exhaustive; but they do reflect courses of action being considered in Washington.

Because the Iranian regime's policies pose direct threats to national security interests and ideals of the United States Government (USG) and those of its allies and friends, Iran is on the front burner of American foreign policy.

Consider these six Iranian threats to U.S. interests and ideals:

- Drive to acquire nuclear weapons
- Continuing support for and involvement with terrorist networks
- Publicly-stated opposition to the Arab-Israel peace process
- Disruptive role in Iraq
- Expansionist radical ideology
- Denial of basic human rights to its own population

The Iran Policy Committee (IPC) analyzes these dangers and makes recommendations to meet them. It is not the intention of the IPC to duplicate analysis already receiving consideration in policymaking circles; rather, this policy paper offers a distinct perspective and recommends a course of action that is different in key aspects from what has been proposed to date. IPC seeks to build upon the President's disposition to work with the Iranian people by broadening options for American policymakers regarding Iran.

For too long, Washington has been divided between those who favor engagement with and those who support military strikes against the Iranian regime. The Committee stresses the potential for a third alternative: Keep open diplomatic and military options, while providing a central role for the Iranian opposition to facilitate regime change.

President Bush's 2005 State of the Union Address ignores the leadership in Iran in order to converse directly with Iranian people. And it is not his first time doing so; indeed, the President's radio address of December 2002 began the process of having a conversation with the people instead of diplomatic discourse with the regime.

The IPC urges the administration to acknowledge the threat posed to American national security interests by the totalitarian theocracy in Tehran and to adopt a policy that proactively steps forward to defend those interests.

Furthermore, the IPC believes that Washington should support the Iranian people in their efforts to participate meaningfully in a representative government that is responsive to their concerns; implicit in such support is the recognition that the Iranian people have the right to choose and change their own government, as they see fit.

IPC joins the debate in Washington over Iran policy initiated by think tank reports on Iran—Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), The Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), and The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (TWI). In contrast to the thrust of such reports, IPC suggests that Iranian opposition groups ought to play a central role in U.S. policymaking regarding Iran.

Themes running through these think tank reports include the following reasons for dissatisfaction with American policy toward Iran. Critics hold that U.S. policy is not well articulated because of bureaucratic differences; there are too many or too few carrots in relation to sticks; and American policy is not linked enough with Europe's approach to Iran. The reports view

the threat of sanctions and force as well as the promise of diplomacy as complementary tools in the Western arsenal. At issue is the mix between negative and positive incentives, a formula for which there is little accord among transatlantic partners.

While some place the burden on Washington to resolve Iran's nuclear proliferation activities and its state sponsored international terrorism, few place that responsibility directly on the Iranian people. With the possible exception of the CPD, there is too little acknowledgment of a role for Iranians in general and groups opposed to the regime in particular.

As a result, there is a niche for the Iran Policy Committee to address Iranian threats from the perspective of encouraging the people to be principal agents change. Without the active participation of Iranians, moreover, regime change from the outside is unlikely to succeed.

En route to her first overseas mission to Europe on February 3, 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice held that the Iranian people should have a chance to "change their own future," a statement IPC considers as a euphemism for regime change.

Summing up the U.S. government's principal concerns with respect to Iran, Rice further stated that, "The goal of the administration is to have a regime in Iran that is responsive to concerns that we have about Iran's policies, which are about 180 degrees antithetical to our own interests at this point."

While the debate in Washington concerns whether to make explicit its tacit policy of regime change for Iran, the debate in the region is the race between two clocks—a diplomatic and a nuclear timepiece.

On one hand, at issue is whether negotiations can slow down Tehran's march toward nuclear weapons status before Iran acquires such status. The Committee holds that the diplomacy is moving too slowly in relation to nuclear weapons progress.

On the other hand, unless working with the Iranian people rapidly leads to regime change in Tehran, the pace of nuclear weapons development might leave Washington with what the Committee believes is the least desirable option of waging military strikes against Iran.

Iran's Nuclear Weapons Program

Regarding impact in the region, the nature of the regime in Tehran is of greater import than its nuclear weapons capability: An Iran with representative institutions with a nuclear weapons capability would not be as destabilizing as nuclear weapons in the hands of the unelected, expansionist theocracy. The best outcome is a freely-elected, representative government without nuclear weapons; only with such a government would such an outcome be possible.

The nightmare scenario is that a nuclear weapons capability in the hands of an aggressive and repressive regime in Tehran raises the possibility that it could and would collaborate with transnational networks to carry out nuclear terrorism. In any event, of the six critical threats posed by Iran, its drive to acquire nuclear weapons is the first and most urgent.

According to June 2004 testimony by Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, John Bolton, defense experts in the United States strongly believe that Iran has a clandestine program to produce nuclear weapons. Speaking in January 2005, moreover, Bolton told reporters that Iran's repeated support for terrorism makes it particularly dangerous if Tehran were to acquire nuclear weapons.

There have been new revelations about the rapid pace of Iran's nuclear weapons progress since 2002. It is known that Iran is developing its indigenous uranium mines; has built a uranium conversion facility at Isfahan in central Iran; is building a massive uranium enrichment facility at Natanz, which is designed to house tens of thousands of centrifuges plus numerous centrifuge production workshops, a heavy water production plant at Arak, and a laser enrichment facility.

Revelations by diplomatic sources on February 3, 2005 suggest that Iran is testing components of its centrifuge rotors, despite a November 2004 pledge to freeze all such activities related to enrichment. That pledge led to an agreement among Iran's European interlocutors and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to put a hold on U.S. attempts to report Iran to the UN Security Council for violations of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The new revelations deal a serious blow to any hopes that Iran intends to forego uranium enrichment en route to a nuclear weapons capability.

In separate developments on February 3, a spokesman for the main Iranian opposition group charged that Iran has obtained materials and expertise to make neutron initiators ("triggers") for an atomic bomb. A senior official of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), speaking in Paris, cited secret sources inside Iran's nuclear development programs. This person accused Tehran of conducting a secret program to develop a nuclear triggering mechanism using smuggled materials. He claimed that Iran has produced or purchased from abroad quantities of polonium-210 and beryllium, two elements required for building a "neutron initiator," which is an integral part of a nuclear bomb.

The facility where this work allegedly is taking place is a military installation on the outskirts of Tehran, known as Lavizan II. Remarkably, the IAEA has not inspected Lavizan II yet, nor does it appear to be pressing for inspections there, despite the site first being identified by the NCRI in November 2004.

The NCRI has been instrumental in exposing Iran's secret nuclear facilities in the past. By relying on its network inside Iran of a member organization, the Mujahedeen e-Khalq (MEK), the NCRI revealed a number of significant nuclear sites including Natanz, Arak, Ab-Ali, and Lavizan.

Despite the fact that Iran is a signatory to the NPT, Tehran has repeatedly violated its provisions and continues to play fast and loose with IAEA efforts to monitor compliance. The regime appears to be counting on the apparently inexhaustible patience of the IAEA and the Europeans, who have agreed to compromise after compromise with Iran, to avoid having the issue brought before the United Nations (UN) Security Council, as pursued by the United States. The longer this negotiation takes, the more time Iran has to engage in covert activities, enabling it to acquire fissile materials to build and test nuclear weapons.

In other words, time is on Iran's side. The world cannot wait for proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" of an Iranian bomb. The risks of delay are too high. The international community should be prepared to act on the recent discoveries of evidence of weapons-related nuclear activities. Discoveries over the past two years, along with the revelations by Iranian opposition groups that Iran is developing a nuclear trigger, constitute "clear and present evidence" of illicit activities that, unless halted, may lead to bomb-making.

The general view among the experts is that, if left undeterred, Iran is only one to three years away from producing a nuclear bomb. Indeed, there are

reports from a secret meeting that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has ordered technicians to accelerate Iran's nuclear program in order to achieve nuclear weapons status by the end of 2005.

There is a notion in certain policy circles that, if Iran feels threatened, the hard-line clerics will be further induced to go nuclear. They propose offering additional security assurances to Iran as an incentive to convince it to give up its nuclear weapons program. Given the nature and behavior of the regime, the more plausible argument is that unless they feel threatened, the Iranian clerical rulers will continue their nuclear weapons program on the assumption they can get away with it. Only the prospect of severe consequences threatening the very existence of the regime could induce them to forego nuclear weapons out of fear of the consequences.

Nuclear Delivery Systems: the Iranian Missile Program

Iran possesses one of the largest missile inventories in the Middle East. It has acquired complete missile systems and developed an infrastructure to build missiles indigenously. During military exercises held in September 2004, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards successfully test-fired a "strategic missile," likely the Shahab-3 rocket, which reportedly has a range of up to 2,000 kilometers and is capable of carrying a 760-1,000 kilogram warhead. The Revolutionary Guards is officially armed with the Shahab-3 missiles.

Taken in combination with Iran's drive to achieve a nuclear weapons capability, its continuing support for radical Islamist terrorist groups and avowed opposition to the existence of Israel, Iran's demonstrated capability to field an intercontinental ballistic missile raises much concern among defense officials of many countries.

In December 2004, Iran's main opposition coalition, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), uncovered a new missile program secretly pursued by Iran, as well as a program to develop a nuclear warhead. The new secret missile, produced at the Hemmat Missile Industries Complex in northeast Tehran, is named Ghadar, NCRI reported. North Korean experts are believed to be assisting the Iranian program at this complex.

The Ghadar missile may have a range of 2,500 to 3,000 kilometers (1,550 to 1,860 miles). NCRI also reported that Iran has improved the guidance and control system of its Shahab-4 missiles, based on a system acquired from China.

In late January 2005, a Ukrainian legislator alleged that Kiev sold nuclear-capable cruise missiles to Iran and China during the period from 1999-2001. The Kh-55 cruise missile has a range of 3,000 kilometers and is capable of carrying a 200-kiloton nuclear warhead.

In addition to Iran's nuclear weapons program and its advanced delivery system, a second threat posed by the regime is its support for and involvement with international terrorist networks.

Regime Support for International Terrorism

The Islamic Republic of Iran is the world's number one state-sponsor of terror. It created Hizballah, supports al Qaeda, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Tehran operates at the heart of a network of terrorist organizations engaged in murder, kidnapping, bombing, and other atrocities calculated to sap the will of the United States and the West to resist.

Iran's logistical, financial and operational assistance takes the form of providing terrorists safehaven, travel documents such as passports, weapons, training and technical expertise.

Information reveals a pattern of operational contacts between the Iranian government and Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda organization. These contacts include: joint planning of terrorist operations, military training of bin Laden operatives inside Iran and by Iranian IRGC and MOIS officers in Syria and Lebanon, financial assistance to clandestine terrorist and surveillance cells, false passports, and communications.

The 9/11 Commission report documented in great detail the logistical, operational, and material support provided by Iran and Hizballah to al Qaeda. This report, released in July 2004, echoes the earlier federal grand jury findings about links between Iran and al Qaeda. The Commission's report stated that Iran's support of al Qaeda dates back to 1991, when operatives from both sides met in Sudan; by 1993, "al Qaeda received advice and training from Hezbollah" in intelligence, security, and explosives, especially in how to use truck bombs. The training took place in the Beka'a Valley, Hizballah's stronghold in Lebanon.

According to the 9/11 commission report, there is strong evidence that Iran facilitated the transit of al Qaeda members into and out of Afghanistan

before 9/11, and that some of these were future 9/11 hijackers. Iran's support for al Qaeda has continued.

Iran's Opposition to the Arab-Israel Peace Process

Tehran was instrumental in the creation of Lebanese Hizballah, which formed in 1982 under the sponsorship of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), who arrived in Lebanon as the vanguard of Khomeini's Islamic revolution.

Iran continues to provide Hizballah with money, equipment, training locations, and refuge from extradition. Its overall financial support to Hizballah and Hamas totals tens of millions of dollars in direct subsidies each year.

Iranian Designs in Iraq

Demography and geography facilitate the impact of Iran's expansionist ideology. With a population three times Iraq's and a contiguous territory four times Iraq's, Iran exerts a naturally powerful influence on its western neighbor. Iraq's longest border is with Iran (over 900 miles), and the vast majority of the Iraqi population lives within a 100-mile distance from the Iranian border, placing it well within the sphere of Tehran's expansionist ideology.

Shiite pilgrims began flowing once again after 2003 between the holy places in Iran and those in Iraq, especially the holy shrines in Najaf and Karbala. Iranian intelligence agents also flooded the country. They quietly and effectively set up a network of agents across Iraq, recruiting and training local village people, former Iraqi military officers, politicians, and young men to collect intelligence on Coalition forces and facilities.

A long period of secular Ba'athist domination in Iraq punctuated by a savage eight-year war between Iran and Iraq countered Iranian political influence in the region. During this time, westward expansion of Iran's theocratic ideology declined. With the April 2003 collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime and ensuing breakup of existing security and border patrol forces, Iran seized the chance to spread its influence and launched a multifaceted military, intelligence, and political campaign in Iraq.

Along with intelligence agents, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS) also sent suicide bombers,

money, and weapons to support insurgents fighting against Coalition forces in Iraq. Testimony and documentary evidence show that officials at the highest level of the Iranian regime have been involved with planning and providing support for terrorists and suicide bombers affiliated not only with the upstart Shiite cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr, but with the forces of wanted Jordanian terrorist and al Qaeda associate, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and Ba'athist loyalists as well.

In late January 2004, an Iraqi terrorist leader captured in Falluja and accused of carrying out beheadings and deadly attacks, claimed that his group was linked to Tehran. In footage aired January 8, 2005 on the U.S.-run television channel, Al-Hurra, Ahmed Yassin, a leader of the Jaish Muhammed (Muhammed's Army) and a former colonel in Saddam Hussein's army, said two members of his group went to Iran in April or May, where they met a number of Iranian intelligence officials and Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei. Iranian officials provided money, weapons, and even "car bombs." During December 2004, the Najaf police chief said that the commander of three terrorists arrested in connection with a car bomb that exploded in the holy city on December 26, had extensive connections to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence.

Tehran also recruited over four thousand volunteers for suicide operations in Iraq in public ceremonies in Iran attended by prominent Revolutionary Guards commanders.

Iranian intelligence services have pumped millions of dollars and hundreds of operatives into Iraq. In a press conference in October 2004, Iraq's national intelligence chief, Mohammed Al Shahwani, accused Iran's Baghdad embassy of recruiting elements for sabotage operations and assassinations of his intelligence agents. He said that documents showed Iran had a \$45-million budget for sowing chaos in Iraq. At least 27 people working in the Iranian embassy in Baghdad were coordinating intelligence-gathering operations and assassinations, the spy chief added.

Iranian meddling is aimed at frustrating the emergence of a stable and representative government in Iraq and also at keeping the United States so occupied in dealing with the insurgency that it would have neither the will nor the resources to pressure Iran on the nuclear issue. In the months and weeks leading up to national elections in January 2005, both Iraqi President Ghazi al-Yawar and Jordan's King Abdullah charged that Iran was heavily involved in attempting to influence the outcome to produce a Shiite-dominated government similar to Iran's. In an interview with the Kuwaiti

daily, *Al-Qabas* on January 6, 2005, Iraqi Defense Minister Hazem Shaalan accused the Iranian regime of "interfering [in Iraq] with money, guns, and intelligence."

With the apparent success of the Iraqi elections, Iraq has now entered a new phase. Only a day after the January 2005 elections, Iranian media and web sites claimed victory, comparing the Shiites' gain in the elections with the Iranian revolution that brought an Islamic system to power or with the rise of Hizballah in the Lebanese political scene in the Middle East.

The first and most pressing post-election challenge is to ensure the selection of a representative National Assembly that would draft a modern, broad-minded constitution for Iraq. The aim would be to reflect Iraq's Islamic soul but avoid a narrow formula for governance based solely on Sharia law. It is to be expected that Iran will seek to influence the members of the National Assembly and their drafting of this constitution.

The makeup of the future interim government is equally important and might succeed to avoid Iranian dominance by seeking as diverse participation as possible from all sectors of Iraqi society. In the transitional period before the constitution comes up for a vote and a permanent government and military and security structure is in place, it will be critical to monitor Iranian efforts to influence the process.

Expansionist Radical Ideology

Iran's "Velayat e-Faqih" system poses both an immediate and continuing threat to neighbors because of its aggressive policy of expansion. This policy is evident in Iranian actions in Lebanon and Iraq, where calculated cultivation of terrorism is an inseparable characteristic of the theocratic system.

Export of terrorism and extremism is an intrinsic attribute of Iran's theocratic system. Tehran's rulers believe their power lies in awakening the Islamic world to their Islamist ideology. Iran's leadership clearly believes the Islamic Republic's survival depends on the support of such a global force.

Denial of Basic Human Rights to its own citizens:

The human rights situation in Iran has deteriorated severely over the past year. Ironically, the European Union's "human rights dialogue" has had the

opposite effect from that intended because the regime has continued its suppression of the Iranian citizenry.

In December 2004, the United Nations in a resolution criticized Iran for public executions, arbitrary sentencing, flogging, stoning, and systematic discrimination against women. The measure also condemned "the execution of minors below eighteen years of age, and the use of torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment." It also rebuked Iran for discrimination against minorities, including Christians, Jews, Sunnis, and the Baha'is.

Gender discrimination and violence against women in Iran continue to give cause for grave concern. The parliament has called for placing more restrictions on women's attire and on their social freedoms. Deputies have also called for segregating men and women at universities and for other limits on women's activities. The number of publications closed down and of people arrested, prosecuted and sentenced for the peaceful expression of their opinion has increased.

While the human rights situation deteriorated in Iran, the public discontent has been on the rise.

Political Dissent in Iran

Over the past year, hundreds of anti-government demonstrations were held in Iran, further destabilizing the regime. Originating with complaints over municipal issues, a series of anti-regime demonstrations that erupted in 2004 in many provincial cities, such as Feraydoun Kenar, Boukan, and the earthquake-stricken city of Bam, reportedly targeted government buildings, vehicles, and security forces.

In December 2004, students at Tehran University gave President Khatami an angry and humiliating reception when he admitted to the role he played in preserving the regime. They shouted, "Shame, shame" while calling him a liar and demanding his resignation.

The anti-regime movement, partly derailed by the false expectations aroused as a result of the election of Khatami as president in 1997, has now gained a new momentum. The disillusionment of the population with Khatami took place in July 1999, when he failed to support a student demonstration that turned into a six-day popular uprising, spreading to 19 cities and shaking the foundations of the regime. In the midst of a bloody crackdown on the

students, Khatami opted to stand by the establishment; many believe he may have ordered some of the crackdown himself.

The opposition movement meanwhile continued its expansion, and since 1999, many student demonstrations and popular protests have rocked Tehran and other cities.

In Search of a New Approach toward Iran: Options

Some American policy advisors urge the administration to refrain from taking a hard line with Tehran because they interpret recent developments inside Iran as pointing to an impending collapse of the system, much like the Soviet implosion that led to the end of the communist regime in the USSR. Other policymakers advocate engagement with the ruling clerics in Tehran in order to solve controversial issues outstanding between the two countries.

In a difficult atmosphere of diplomatic gridlock, internal and international ideological divisions, and faced with an unappealing slate of military options, the United States needs a broad set of options. This paper outlines a full spectrum of approaches toward Iran, beginning with diplomacy and moving through increasingly more coercive measures, culminating with an outright commitment to regime change.

Diplomacy

Proponents of the diplomatic approach hold that the United States has not offered enough carrots to Iran to address its security concerns. In addition, it is necessary to convince Tehran that it is in its own interests to abandon outlaw behavior, they contend.

There are several carrots that might be offered to the Iranian regime in the hope that a good-faith demonstration by the West to an approach of engagement would elicit desired compliance with international norms of behavior. Most of these incentives have already been placed on the table.

This diplomatic approach requires that Washington cooperate with Europeans to present a united front to the regime. With the example of U.S. resolve in Afghanistan and Iraq before them, the Iranian leadership might be persuaded to reach the appropriate conclusions, if the principal European interlocutors were to emphasize the limits of their ability to influence, much less control, American foreign policy decisions. In a version of "good cop –

bad cop," the message would be conveyed that there are consequences for noncompliance that are beyond European ability to control.

An effort to acknowledge the legitimacy of Iranian national desires for a civilian nuclear power program might provide Iran an opportunity to demonstrate its peaceful intentions, according to diplomatic approach.

To enhance the acknowledged benefit of exchange programs that bring foreign students and business leaders to the United States for study and travel opportunities, Washington should look for ways to expand such exchange programs, consistent with the requirements of homeland security.

Coercive Diplomacy

A frank evaluation of the track record so far on attempts at diplomatic engagement with the ruling regime in Tehran must conclude that such an approach is not working and probably will not ever succeed, if not stiffened with more stringent measures. Such measures would begin exacting penalties from Iran if it does not comply.

At the top of the list of penalties are economic sanctions, which will not succeed unless applied in concerted and cooperative fashion by all of Iran's major Western trading partners. Such sanctions would include oil; ban on airline travel; prohibition of financial transaction, bilateral or multilateral economic assistance, and general trade.

Increased funding and strong congressional backing for radio and satellite television broadcasts into Iran would send the message that Washington wants to reach out to the Iranian people. Public statements of support from American officials in favor of imprisoned and exiled Iranian political leaders would be an encouraging sign of support for the people.

The U.S. State Department can send a strong message of disapproval to the regime in Tehran by refusing to issue visas to its United Nations representatives that would permit them to travel beyond the immediate radius surrounding New York City (as occasionally has been done).

In the same vein, the activities of Iran's diplomatic representation at the regime's interest section in the Embassy of Pakistan in Washington, as well as at the regime's UN mission in New York, should continue to be closely observed by the appropriate domestic intelligence and other agencies for

possible unlawful activities that may include espionage, threat, intimidation, or unlawful lobbying with Members of Congress.

Also relevant is a threat of action by an international tribunal for Iranian leadership crimes. It might charge the leaders with support for transnational terrorism and human rights abuses. This threat might be made tangible by bringing a legal case against Supreme Leader Khamenei.

Most important of all, the United States must stay the course in Iraq to ensure that a moderate system takes hold, which is representative, committed to fairness for all Iraqis, and intolerant only of terrorism and violence. Helping the voices of moderate Iraqi Muslims to be heard and protecting them from intimidation by agents of Iranian terror should go a long way to encourage emergence of like-minded moderates within Iran.

As efforts on the diplomatic front are under way, the United States should accelerate its outreach to the Iranian people, as part of the process to help them change their future.

Destabilization

Application of the diplomatic measures may not alter the regime's behavior on those issues of paramount concern to the international community, such as support for terror, pursuit of WMD programs, meddling inside Iraq, and violation of its citizens' human rights. If not, then Washington should be prepared to embrace a new option, short of direct military action, but which might have the best chance for success.

The middle option would open a campaign of destabilization, whose aim would be to weaken the grip of the ruling regime over the Iranian people sufficiently that Iranian opposition groups inside the country and abroad are empowered to change the regime. To the extent that any or all of the foregoing diplomatic measures, coercive or not, are deemed useful, their application should be sustained during a destabilization phase.

However implausible or unlikely to be taken seriously, an American call for Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei and his cohorts "to return to the mosque" might set the stage and be used as a point of departure for further negotiations. Such a call might give the international community a foundation upon which to build a case against the regime.

The next stage of an American-led campaign to compel conformity to international norms of behavior would be to encourage Iranian opposition groups. This is an option that has never actually been on the table and has not been explored sufficiently; this option relies on the Iranian opposition to take the lead role in coordinating a campaign for regime change and establishing representative institutions.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told reporters on her February 2005 European trip, "The Iranian people should be no different from the Palestinians or Iraqis or other peoples around the world." That is, the people of Iran are not immune to the wave of democracy in the Middle East.

In January 2005, six prominent members of the U.S. Congress, led by House International Relations subcommittee chair for Middle East and Central Asia, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), as well as Tom Lantos (D-CA), Eric Cantor (R-VA), Howard Berman (D-CA), Steve Chabot (R-OH), and Gary Ackerman (D-NY), introduced the Iran Freedom Support Act (H.R. 282), with more than 50 co-sponsors. It would provide U.S. assistance to independent broadcasts into Iran and to pro-democracy groups.

The best-known of the Iranian opposition groups is the Mujahideen-e Khalq (MEK). Founded in the 1960s by college students, the MEK participated in the 1979 revolution against the Shah, but quickly fell out with Ayatollah Khomeini, who executed thousands of its members and leaders. Following the start of mass executions in June 1981, the group went underground, and many of its leaders fled to France from 1981 to 1986, after which the MEK took refuge in Iraq.

While in Iraq, the group formed an army equipped with tanks, armored personnel carriers, and field guns, implementing cross-border attacks against the Iranian regime. The MEK network in Iran also carried out military operations against the Revolutionary Guards and other government targets. The MEK has represented a significant security threat to the Iranian regime ever since the end of the Iran-Iraq War and could continue to do so, were it released from its circumscribed status in Iraq.

United States policy toward the MEK has been ambivalent and controversial over the years and reached a nadir in 1997, when the Department of State placed the MEK on its Foreign Terrorist Organizations list. This inclusion was primarily a goodwill gesture to Mohammad Khatami, the newly-elected Iranian president, whose administration was looked to with much hope for its reformist promise. Despite the State Department's accusations that the

MEK murdered Americans in mid 1970s and supported the U.S. embassy takeover in Tehran in 1980—charges the organization denies—the MEK has not attacked or targeted U.S. interests since the 1979 Iranian revolution.

Nevertheless, the State Department added the major political wing of the Iranian opposition, NCRI, to the Department's terrorist designation; previously, NCRI had operated in the United States as a legitimate, registered organization.

Before surrendering hundreds of tanks and armored personnel carriers to the U.S. military, the MEK had notable mechanized and infantry capabilities. The fledgling Iraqi Army uses some of this equipment, since 2004.

The MEK seems to have an impressive network in Iran, where it has been gathering intelligence on Iran's nuclear weapons program as well as its activities in Iraq. The MEK published a book detailing the particulars and pictures of nearly 22 thousand people—mostly associated with the MEK—executed for political charges by the Iranian government.

There is sizable support among the exile Iranian community for the MEK, which often draws large crowds to its rallies and demonstrations in western capitals.

The MEK's Relationship with the U.S. Military in Iraq

Months before the start of the 2003 War in Iraq, the United States' major concern was Iraq's eastern neighbor, and its perceived involvement in the conflict that might have complicated the situation in the region. Washington, therefore, offered to alleviate Iran's concerns by bombing and destroying the MEK, hoping to reach an accommodation with Iran in a post-Saddam Iraq.

Days after the start of U.S. bombing of Saddam's forces in late March and early April of 2003, Coalition planes heavily bombed nearly a dozen bases belonging to the MEK, killing dozens of fighters and wounding many more.

U.S. Special Forces worked out a ceasefire agreement with the MEK in April 15, 2003, once the MEK consolidated its forces in a few camps north of Baghdad. The United States decided in May 2003 to disarm the group, and confiscated 2,139 tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery pieces, air defense artillery pieces, and miscellaneous vehicles formerly in the MEK's possession.

In August 2003, in what appeared to be a response to Iranian demands, the State Department acted to close down the offices of MEK associate groups in Washington.

Tehran has been particularly sensitive to the MEK activities inside Iran and abroad, signaling that it takes the dissident group most seriously. European governments and some U.S. administrations have used the MEK as bait to improve relations with Tehran. In a similar vein, the November 2004 European Union nuclear agreement with Iran includes an EU promise to treat the MEK as a terrorist group, which addressed Iran's security concerns.

Although it is difficult if not impossible to gauge the level of support MEK enjoys in Iran, this organization is indisputably the largest and most organized Iranian opposition group. There are nearly 3,800 of its members in Camp Ashraf, 60 miles north of Baghdad. Females constitute nearly a third of its rank and file.

As of February 2005, the State Department still listed the MEK as a foreign terrorist organization, despite calls for its removal from the list by many members of the U.S. Congress and others.

The MEK and other Opposition Groups Support of U.S. Interests

The lack of viable intelligence about Iran continues to plague analysts and planners. As stated earlier, the MEK and NCRI revealed much of the information that has been verified about Tehran's nuclear weapons programs. In this respect, Washington might consider using intelligence made available from opposition groups as lead information, i.e., to be verified using independent means.

A 16-month investigation by the State Department and other government agencies of the MEK members in Iraq culminated in the 2004 judgment that they were "protected persons under the Fourth Geneva Convention," and that there was no basis to charge any of them with terrorist actions.

At this juncture in 2005, therefore, a review of U.S. policy concerning the MEK and the overall Iranian opposition is in order. The designation of the MEK as a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department has served, since 1997, as an assurance to the Iranian regime that the United States has removed the regime change option from the table. Removing the terrorist designation from the MEK could serve as the most tangible signal to the Iranian regime, as well as to the Iranian people, that a new option is now on the table. Removal might also have the effect of supporting President Bush's

assertion that America stands with the people of Iran in their struggle to liberate themselves.

In the same way that the United States was receptive to South African anti-apartheid leaders and the Soviet Union's anti-communist activists, Washington should invite prominent opposition figures both in Iran and in exile to the United States. They might meet with U.S. officials, Members of Congress, academics, think tanks, and the media. The European Parliament offered such an example in December 2004, when it invited Maryam Rajavi, the president of the NCRI to its headquarters in Strasburg, where she offered an alternative view to that of the Iranian regime. Tehran's angry reaction to this invitation served to highlight the effectiveness of such measures.

As an additional step, the United States might encourage the new Iraqi government to extend formal recognition to the MEK, based in Ashraf, as a legitimate political organization. Such recognition would send yet another signal from neighboring Iraq that the noose is tightening around Iran's unelected rulers.

In light of the MEK's status as protected persons under the Fourth Geneva Convention and the continued protection that the U.S. military provides the group in Iraq, Washington has an opportunity to decide whether to return to the MEK its weapons, which would relieve responsibility from the American military for the protection of its camps and personnel. Such a move also would send an unambiguous signal to the Iranian regime that it faces an enabled and determined opposition on its borders.

Iranian groups, whether domestic or internationally-based, which seek to broadcast or publish pro-democracy messages inside the country might be provided with equipment, facilities, funding, and support. Relatively modest expenditures on such purposes can spell the difference between a capability for such groups to get their message out to international publics and in Iran.

The United States should make it official policy to protest publicly cases of human rights violations, crackdown on Iranian student demonstrators, and application of inhumane and degrading punishments, such as stoning to death, flogging, eye gouging, and amputation. Washington should be particularly vigilante in providing political and moral support to student demonstrators in Iran and hold Tehran accountable for the arrest and killing of students during anti-government demonstrations.

Should the United States reach a decision to support an explicit policy of regime change in Iran, a Presidential Finding would be a necessary first step, enabling many activities by U.S. entities that cannot take place without such a finding.

The United States should ensure that Iran understands that neither it nor the Iranian opposition will take any option off the table, if Iran remains unwilling to address adequately international concerns about its nuclear programs in particular. The goal is to ensure that democracy, tolerance, and the rule of law are established in an Iran that abjures use of WMD, terrorism, and threats against its neighbors. Bringing Tehran's flagrant non-compliance with the NPT before the UN Security Council would be an important first step.

In Search of a New Approach: The Military Option

"We do not want American armies marching on Tehran," then-Secretary of State Colin Powell said in November 2004. Despite the official position of the administration, there are some who suggest that given the failure of the engagement option over the past quarter century and the urgency to counter the Iranian threat, Washington should adopt a military option. Despite its risks and implications, they are willing to absorb the costs and consequences. Proponents of strikes believe that United States interests are better served by taking preventive military action in the present than facing the future nightmare of a nuclear Iran with extensive regional dominance armed with the ideology of hate.

Conventional force military options have a broad spectrum upon which to draw, which individually or collectively might evoke different results and/or responses from the Iranian regime.

Air options include low-end, minimal-risk overflights of unmanned aerial vehicles into Iranian airspace for purposes of reconnaissance, psychological impact, testing of Iranian response and capabilities. In addition, maximum options consist of airstrikes by manned aircraft and drones as well as cruise missile attacks against targeted facilities, installations, bases, and command or research centers.

Naval options range from low end overt open waters surveillance and harassment of Iranian shipping to maximum options such as introduction of major forces into theater and a full blockade of Iranian ports and waters.

On one hand, ground forces options include a low-end approach of pressuring Iran through the buildup of conventional ground forces and supporting logistics capability along borders and at strategic locations within the region. On the other hand, there are high-end options, such as a well-planned, fully-coordinated and -executed ground assault into Iran.

On one hand, Special Operations Forces options include low-end clandestine ground operations supported by air insertion/extraction to acquire target information, emplace sensors or precision guidance beacons, or preposition arms/equipment for local insurgents. On the other hand, high-end options consist of direct action missions against pre-selected targets, link-up with indigenous forces to engage and attack government facilities, bases, and personnel. In total context, combinations of the various minimal to maximum options provide a wide array of choices that can exert significant impact on Tehran and influence the regime economically, diplomatically, and politically.

Given the above capabilities, potential military options include:

Limited Actions: Clandestine insertions of Special Operations Forces to acquire precision target information, emplace remote sensors, and preposition arms/equipment. Such actions offer the ability to gather unobtrusively more reliable information than currently available through other military means; these actions also might establish sustainability for future operations. But, such actions do not cause the regime to react as long as such actions remain clandestine and the regime unaware. There is the possibility of extremely negative reaction from various entities internationally and in Iran if such activity were compromised or uncovered.

Moderate Actions: Limited naval blockade that overtly conducts surveillance and harasses Iranian flagged shipping; overt overflights of Iranian airspace by U.S. surveillance aircraft and unmanned platforms; limited buildup of U.S. forces, supplies, and equipment in friendly countries adjacent to Iran; stationing of U.S. Marine amphibious forces off the coast; overt equipping of Iranian dissident groups; limited precision strikes or special operations activities against known WMD targets or munitions factories.

As such measures become increasingly visible to the international public, a negative reaction might occur from many quarters, including, of course, Iran, which would seek diplomatic support in world forums to oppose U.S. activities. Assuming the effectiveness of any actual military strikes that

cause damage to Iran's WMD or other indigenous military capabilities, such offensive measures would degrade Iran's ability to employ/deploy its weapons against United States or other friendly interests.

Outrage from some corners of the globe is to be expected; the possibility of loss or capture of some U.S. service personnel might create a new dimension to the problem; outright military action also might toughen the resolve of the Iranian regime and even turn some of the Iranian people against the attacking forces. Serious consideration must be given to the likelihood that under the extreme stress of being attacked, Iran might unleash Hizballah and other terrorist organizations around the world to launch terrorist attacks against United States and/or other friendly interests. The ultimate potential for pulling the Washington into a full-scale military confrontation with Iran must be weighed before any military action, however limited, is considered.

Maximum actions: Full-scale naval blockade, the landing of U.S. Marine Corps amphibious forces at strategic locations, introduction of airborne, Ranger, Green Beret, or SEAL forces to seize key objectives, and cross-border invasion by land forces. All these actions would be fully supported by preparatory airstrikes intended to disable and destroy command and control centers, anti-aircraft capabilities, as well as key military and logistics centers.

Full-scale military invasion on the scale of Iraq or Afghanistan would be a very serious step, embarked upon with only one ultimate objective in mind: the overthrow of the regime in Tehran and the forcible occupation of the country. In addition to the destruction of regular army, IRGC, and MOIS military units together with their armaments, such an invasion would also number among its objectives the elimination of Iran's WMD programs, and thereby, the ending of WMD threats from Iran.

Full-scale military invasion of Iran, even if supported by an international coalition, would be likely to elicit outrage from many corners of the globe. An invasion would be likely to incur higher casualties and a much longer period of intense, widespread conflict than that experienced in Iraq. Given the size and population of Iran, a full-scale invasion would require a force several times the size of the force in Iraq; continued strain on the overall U.S. military structure and its available resources would affect long-term sustainability of any such operation and the overall ability of U.S. armed forces to respond to crises elsewhere.

Conclusion:

Recall the nuclear time clock that is ticking down as Iran drives to reach nuclear weapons capability. If the regime continues to prove intransigent with respect to fulfilling its obligations under the NPT, the international community may not have the luxury of pursuing only a regime change policy. The theocratic leadership in Tehran must know that they will not be permitted to achieve a nuclear bomb status. A military option, which could include limited strikes against Iran's nuclear program infrastructure, clearly would be a last option but must clearly be understood to remain on the table.

Given the realities in the region and the fact that the United States continues to be engaged in Afghanistan and Iraq, a full-scale military invasion is the least appealing of all the options on the table for dealing with Iran. Nevertheless, as the ultimate means of ensuring U.S. national security interests, such military action must remain unambiguously among the options at U.S. disposal.

The moderate action option that includes limited military strikes would at best buy time while leaving intact or even enhancing the overall threat of the regime in areas like terrorism, opposition to the Arab-Israel peace process, and involvement in Iraq. Nevertheless, limited, precision military strikes, executed according to high quality targeting information with minimal collateral damage and casualties might not only set back Iran's nuclear program to a significant degree but likely would also help destabilize the regime.

In addition, diplomacy pursued by the Europeans and several U.S. administrations has produced little tangible result over the past quarter century. And unless the potential for UN Security Council sanctions is on the table, diplomacy is likely to yield few results in the future.

While keeping open diplomatic and military options, Washington should consider a third alternative, one that provides a central role for the Iranian opposition to facilitate regime change.

Appendix

Iran Policy Committee (IPC) Co-Chair Biographies

James Akins, Ambassador (ret.): James Akins was U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia during the Nixon administration. An internationally respected expert on Middle East and energy issues, Akins has been an active and outspoken proponent for a just resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and a prescient analyst of the Middle East peace process and Arab politics in general. Author Jean-Jacques Servan Schreiber has called Akins "the westerner who knows the most about the Middle East and has the closest relationship of trust with its leaders."

Lt. Col. Bill Cowan, USMC (ret.), co-founder of wvc3, inc.: Bill Cowan is an internationally acknowledged expert in areas of terrorism, homeland security, intelligence, and military special operations. A retired Marine Corps officer, Cowan spent three-and-a-half years on combat assignments in Vietnam. From 1989 through 1994, Cowan was involved in numerous operations in the Middle East in response to terrorist incidents and the holding of Western hostages in Beirut and Kuwait. He was directly involved in every facet of the Beirut hostages drama, including international negotiations leading to their release in 1991.

In 1990, on behalf of a major New York law firm and working with former CIA Director Bill Colby, he organized and successfully conducted a series of operations resulting in the repatriation of a number of Western hostages from Iraqi-occupied Kuwait. Cowan is a FOX News Channel contributor and a co-founder of the WVC3 Group, a company providing homeland security services, support and technologies to government and commercial clients.

Paul Leventhal, Founder and President, Nuclear Control Institute: Paul Leventhal founded the Nuclear Control Institute (NCI) in 1981 and served as its President for 22 years prior to becoming Senior Advisor and Founding President in June 2002. He prepared four books for the Institute and lectured in a number of countries on nuclear issues, including as Distinguished Visiting Fellow at Cambridge University's Global Security Programme. Prior to establishing NCI, Leventhal held senior staff positions in the United States Senate on nuclear power and proliferation issues.

Leventhal was Special Counsel to the Senate Government Operations Committee and Staff Director of the Senate Nuclear Regulation Subcommittee; Leventhal was responsible for the investigations and legislation that resulted in enactment of two landmark nuclear laws—the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. He also served as co-director of the Senate Special Investigation of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Accident and Assistant Administrator for Policy and Planning at the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Leventhal holds a bachelor's degree from Franklin and Marshall College and a master's degree from the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism.

Dr. Neil Livingstone, CEO, Global Options, Inc., an international risk management and business solutions company, headquartered in Washington. Livingstone is author of nine books on terrorism and national security topics and more than 200 articles that have appeared in such publications as The Washington Post, The New York Times, and The Wall Street Journal. He serves on numerous corporate and other advisory boards, and has appeared on more than 1100 television programs. He holds an A.B. from the College of William and Mary, three master's degrees, and a Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

R. Bruce McColm, President Institute for Democratic Strategies and Former President, International Republican Institute: McColm is the President of Democratic Strategies, a non-profit organization committed to strengthening democratic processes abroad. For the past 25 years, he has been actively involved in the global movement toward democracy and has written extensively on political transitions in Latin America, Africa, and Central Europe. He has served on numerous boards of directors and acts as a trustee for various private foundations and advocacy groups. McColm served as president of the International Republican Institute, where he extended the organization's capacity to provide technical assistance on economic and political reform around the world, introducing the use of information technologies to democracy programs. Previously, McColm worked in a variety of capacities at Freedom House, a New York-based human rights organization and also was elected a member of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights by the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS). McColm was educated at William College, Harvard University, and the University of Chicago.

Lt. General Thomas McInerney USAF, (Ret.): General McInerney established his own consulting firm, GRIT (Government Reform Through

Technology) in January 2000. Working with high-tech companies that do business with federal, state, city, and local governments, GRRT helps them introduce advanced technology into the private sector. From 1996-1999, Gen. McNerney was Chief Executive Officer and President of Business Executives for National Security (BENS), a national, nonpartisan organization of business and professional leaders, with headquarters in Washington. Prior to joining BENS, Gen. McNerney was Vice President of Command and Control for Loral Defense Systems-Eagan. He joined Loral (then Unisys Electronic Systems Division) in 1994, following 35 years as a pilot, commander, and Joint Force Commander in the United States Air Force. Gen. McNerney retired from military service as Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force and as Director of the Defense Performance Review (DPR), reporting to the Secretary of Defense. In that capacity, he led the Pentagon's "reinventing government" effort, visiting more than 100 leading-edge commercial companies to assimilate their ideas about business re-engineering.

Gen. McNerney earned a Bachelor of Science degree at the U.S. Military Academy in 1959 and a master's degree in international relations from George Washington University in 1972. He completed Armed Forces Staff College in 1970 and the National War College in 1973. Gen. McNerney is a member of several Boards of Directors.

Captain Charles T. "Chuck" Nash, USN (ret.) is the founder and President of Emerging Technologies International, Inc. (ETII). The company's focus is to understand military requirements and then actively search out and identify high leverage, emerging technologies that can be inserted quickly and inexpensively into tools for the U.S. military. Clients include government laboratories and commercial technology companies. Previously, Capt. Nash served as Vice President, Emerging Technologies Group, Santa Barbara Applied Research, Inc. For 25 years before that, Capt. Nash served as an officer in the U.S. Navy, accumulating over 4,300 hours of flight time and 965 carrier landings on nine different aircraft carriers as a Naval Aviator. He served in a variety of command positions with Naval Operations at the Pentagon and U.S. Naval Forces Europe and has filled billets with U.S. and foreign special operations forces in Turkey, Northern Iraq and elsewhere. Capt. Nash previously served on the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and on the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) Expert Panel for the Supersonic Cruise Missile Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration. He was a sponsor and co-chairman of the OPNAV High Speed Strike Information Day, Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory (JHAPL). Currently, he serves on a number of Boards of

Directors and is an advisor to the Chairman of the Board of Isothermal Systems Research, Inc. and to the President and CEO of Vision Technologies International, Inc. Capt. Nash earned his B.S. in Aeronautics from Parks College of Aeronautical Technology, St. Louis University and attended the National War College at Fort L. J. McNair in Washington. Currently a Fox News Channel Military Analyst, Capt. Nash frequently appears on the network to discuss military, terrorism and aviation issues.

Lt. General Edward Rowny, USA (ret.): General Rowny began his military career following graduation from the Johns Hopkins University and the U.S. Military Academy, two Masters degrees from Yale University and a Ph.D. from American University. He fought in WW II, Korea, and Vietnam, commanding units from platoon to Corps size. Later, he served in the 1970s and 1980s as an advisor to the SALT II talks and as the chief negotiator of the START negotiations, with the rank of ambassador. From 1985 to 1990, he was Special Advisor for Arms Control to Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush. In 1989, President Reagan awarded him the Presidential Citizens Medal. The citation reads that Gen. Rowny is "one of the principal architects of America's policy of peace through strength. As an arms negotiator and as a presidential advisor, he has served mightily, courageously, and nobly in the cause of peace and freedom." In 1991, Ambassador Rowny retired from government and currently consults on international affairs.

Professor Raymond Tanter, Former Senior Staff Member, National Security Council: Raymond Tanter is Visiting Professor at Georgetown University, where he teaches courses on International Relations and Terrorism. Tanter is adjunct scholar at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and was scholar-in-residence at the Middle East Institute in Washington. He researched U.S. policy options regarding Iran at both think tanks. After receiving a Ph.D. from Indiana University in 1964, Prof. Tanter taught at Northwestern, Stanford, and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Tanter was a fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford and the Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington and a Fulbright scholar, University of Amsterdam. In 1975, Tanter spent a month as scholar-in-residence at the American Embassy, Tokyo, lecturing on petroleum interruption scenarios, with special reference to the Middle East. In 1967, Tanter was deputy director of behavioral sciences at the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the U.S. Department of Defense and a member of the Civilian Executive Panel, Chief of Naval Operations. He served at the White House on the National Security Council staff, 1981-1982. In 1983-1984, he was personal representative of the Secretary of Defense to arms control talks

in Madrid, Helsinki, Stockholm, and Vienna. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Among Tanter's publications is *Rogue Regimes: Terrorism and Proliferation*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997. Tanter is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Committee on the Present Danger.

Major General Paul E. Valley, USA (Ret.): General Valley retired in 1991 from the U.S. Army as Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army Pacific in Honolulu, Hawaii. Gen. Valley graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and was commissioned in the Army in 1961, serving a distinguished career of 32 years in the Army. He served in many overseas theaters, including Europe and the Pacific Rim countries, as well as two combat tours in Vietnam. He has served on U.S. security assistance missions on civilian-military relations in locales around the world. Gen. Valley is a graduate of the Infantry School, Ranger and Airborne Schools, Jumpmaster School, the Command and General Staff School, The Industrial College of the Armed Forces and the Army War College. His combat service in Vietnam included positions as infantry company commander, intelligence officer, operations officer, military advisor and aide-de-camp. He has over 15 years experience in Special Operations, Psychological and Civil-Military Operations. Gen. Valley was one of the first nominees for Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations under President Reagan and commanded the 351st Civil Affairs Command during the 1980s. He has served as a consultant to the Commanding General of the Special Operations Command as well as the Department of Defense Anti-Drug and Counter-Terrorist Task Forces. Gen. Valley is a military analyst for Fox News Channel and is a guest on many nationally-syndicated radio talk shows. He also is a guest lecturer on the War on Terror and has just co-authored a book entitled *The Endgame, Winning the War on Terror*.

Clare M. Lopez, Executive Director, IPC is a strategic policy and intelligence analyst with a focus on Middle East, homeland security, national defense, and counterterrorism issues. Based for the last five years in the private sector environment of the Washington metro area, Lopez began her career as an operations officer with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), serving domestically and abroad for 20 years in a variety of assignments. Lopez served as a Senior Intelligence Analyst, Subject Matter Expert, and Program Manager for the Alexandria, VA firm, HawkEye Systems, LLC. Lopez previously produced Technical Threat Assessments for U.S. Embassies at the Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, where she worked as a Senior Intelligence Analyst for Chugach Systems Integration. During Lopez's CIA career, she served under diplomatic cover

in various postings around the world, acquiring extensive regional expertise with a career focus on the former Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans. She has served in or visited over two dozen nations worldwide and speaks several languages, including Spanish, Bulgarian, French, German, and Russian. Lopez began a study of Arabic in 2003 at the Department of Agriculture Graduate School before transferring to the Middle East Institute (MEI) in downtown Washington.

Lopez received a B.A. in Communications and French from Notre Dame College of Ohio and an M.A. in International Relations from the Maxwell School of Syracuse University. She completed Marine Corps Officer Candidate School (OCS) in Quantico, Virginia before declining a commission in order to join the CIA. Lopez is a Visiting Researcher and an occasional guest lecturer on counterterrorism, national defense, and international relations at Georgetown University. Lopez is a member of the International Association of Counterterrorism and Security Professionals (IACSP), Women in International Security (WIIS) and the Middle East Institute (MEI).

(b)(6)

From: Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2005 5:15 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: Phone Message

Jed Babbin, (b)(6)

Call went well -- the only news maybe that he hinted that they are seeing more foreign fighters than before.

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2005 9:29 AM
To: Barber, Alison, CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) LTC OASD-PA; (b)(6) (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA
Subject: RE:

hi folks. here is the most recent list of the military analysts calling in this morning for our conference call. thanks. (b)(6)

Confirmed Retired Military Analysts:

Colonel Carl Kenneth Allard	(USA, Retired)
Mr. Jed Babbitt	(USAF, JAG)
Lieutenant Colonel Rick Francona	(USAF, Retired)
Colonel John Garrett	(USMC, Retired)
Colonel Jack Jacobs	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis	(USA, Retired)
Colonel Jeff McCausland,	(USA, Retired)
General Montgomery Meigs	(USA, Retired)
Captain Chuck Nash	(USN, Retired)
General William L. Nash	(USA, Retired)
Major General Paul E. Vallely	(USA, Retired)

Respectfully,

(b)(6)

OSD Public Affairs

Community Relations and Public Liaison

(b)(2) *The Pentagon*

Washington, D.C. 30401-1400

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2006 11:22 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Subject: American Spectator (Babbin)

The American Spectator (Jed Babbin)

http://www.spectator.org/dsp_article.asp?art_id=7956

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Researcher
Department of Defense
OSD Writers Group, Room (b)(2)
Telephone: (b)(2)
Fax: (b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2005 8:55 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Military analyst on O'Reilly factor

sir,
dallas wanted me to make changes to the original doc b/c of something secdef expressly wanted... then give to allison so she can see what we're offering before we offer it. but allison has asked me for something else a little more pressing. i will get the new outreach plan to ab by cob today. good enough? :)

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2005 7:34 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Military analyst on O'Reilly factor

where is the info i requested, ma'am?

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, March 29, 2005 6:48 PM
To: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Military analyst on O'Reilly factor

Jed Babbin will be on fox news tonight around 8:30 talking about detainee deaths. fyi. thanks (b)(6)

Respectfully,

(b)(6)

*OASD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison*

(b)(2) The Pentagon

Washington, D.C. 30401-1400

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, March 29, 2005 7:48 PM
To: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA;
(b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Military analyst on O'Reilly factor

Jed Babbin will be on fox news tonight around 8:30 talking about detainee deaths. fyi. thanks. (b)(6)

Respectfully,

(b)(6)

*OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison*

(b)(2) *The Pentagon*

Washington, D.C. 30401-1400

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, March 21, 2005 6:55 AM
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Subject: Re:

Thanks larry.

We were thinking military analysts and defense analysts . Wasn't sure about the other groups--open to your ideas. We will work on that this week.

The documentary we finished on friday-- dictatorship to democracy will probably have an even broader audience. Will get that to you today or tomorrow.

We are broadcasting both on all of our internal channels.

See you soon

Ab

Allison Barber
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

Sent from my BlackBerry Handheld.

-----Original Message-----

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA <larry.dirita@(b)(6)>
To: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA <Allison.Barber@(b)(6)>
Sent: Mon Mar 21 04:22:54 2005
Subject:

Welcome back.

Just a quick note to say that the DVD is outstanding. Thanks so much for doing it. What is your thinking about distribution? It really is something we should push - opinion elite, analysts, hill, etc.

You are doing such a terrific job, across the board. Thanks for everything

(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, March 18, 2005 3:01 AM
To: Klein, Dale, Hon, OSD-ATL
Subject: Re: EMP Report

Bill- tnx]. Frank mentioned it and I believe he said there is a brief he could send --- along. That might be a little easier in the interim than getting it scheduled. -We have some travel coming up and if there is a brief someone could get to me before monday a.m., he'll have a lot of airplane time to go thru it.

Understand the rnep b'fast went well. Thanks for all you're doing. Take care, dale.
Best

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Klein, Dale, Hon, OSD-ATL <Dale.Klein@(b)(6)>
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD [EX:/O=ORGANIZATION/OU=SECDEF/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=DIRITA]
Sent: Wed Mar 16 18:13:59 2005
Subject: EMP Report

Larry -- I talked with Frank Gaffney and he indicated he recently talked with you and the SecDef about the EMP Commission report. Bill Graham briefed the DepSecDef several weeks ago and the DepSecDef said the SecDef really needed to hear this brief from Bill. We have been having difficulty in getting this scheduled with the SecDef. Can you help get this scheduled ?? Dale

(b)(6)

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA [allison.barber@ (b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, March 16, 2005 7:27 PM
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Cc: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: secdef 10 min

yikes o friday..that is a busy schedule.. maybe we can check in the morning to see if we can squeeze a few minutes on the schedule or try and build it in on the back side of the town hall friday. thanks ab

-----Original Message-----

From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA [mailto:Bryan.Whitman@ (b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, March 16, 2005 5:26 PM
To: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Cc: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: secdef 10 min

I think it would be great; however this is how the hour is currently filled. That with 5 minutes to walk to and from the studio.

3:20 - 3:30 NBC News, Jim Miklaszewski
3:35 - 3:45 WSMV - Nashville (NBC affiliate)
3:47 - 3:57 WCTI - New Burn, NC (ABC affiliate)
4:00 - 4:10 KENS - San Antonio, TX (CBS affiliate)

-----Original Message-----

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA [mailto:allison.barber@ (b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, March 16, 2005 3:38 PM
To: Whitman, Bryan, CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: secdef 10 min

hi there

do you think we could squeeze 10 min for secdef to answer a few questions from military analysts? i know we are trying to get a lot out of the block of time.. what do you think? thanks

ab

-----Original Message-----

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA [mailto:larry.dirita@ (b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, March 16, 2005 3:35 PM
To: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: secdef 10 min

Probably. Work with bryam so that our hour is used up smartly

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA <allison.barber@ (b)(6)>
To: Di Rita Larry (E-mail) <larry.dirita@ (b)(6)>
Sent: Wed Mar 16 15:34:30 2005
Subject: secdef 10 min

hi there

any chance we can get secdef to do a 10 min call with military analysts tomorrow after his interviews? just a few questions on the 2 year anniversary? it is another crazy idea but i think it would be powerful since they will all be on tv this weekend.

(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, March 16, 2005 8:02 AM
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; 'Dan Senor'
Subject: RE:

Good additions.

Senor, if this doesn't make you a star we're going to stop trying!!

-----Original Message-----

From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, March 16, 2005 6:58 AM
To: 'Dan Senor'
Cc: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Subject: RE:

With Italy's announcement to withdraw troops starting in December, I would also offer the following:

--We appreciate Italy's demonstrated support for the coalition and the Iraqi people.

--Italy has been and continues to be a steadfast ally in the Global War Against Terror and we value all their contributions in support democracy and liberty

The Coalition

--Coalition support is more than having troops in Iraq

--More than 30 countries are key members of the coalition team providing troops, political backing to the coalition, training opportunities, supplies and financial support to help rebuild the country

--The coalition is supporting all Iraqi efforts to establish the rule of law, promote justice and improve quality of life

--27 countries with forces in Iraq (in addition to US)

-----Original Message-----

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, March 16, 2005 6:34 AM
To: 'Dan Senor'; (b)(6) Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: RE:

1. some allies have said repeatedly that they will assess as the Iraqi security forces get more capable. The U.S. is doing the same thing.
2. Once the U.S. recedes back to its pre-election level of about 138,000 (17 brigades) Iraqi security forces themselves constitute the largest single component of the coalition, and that is goo.
2. Even so, there are upwards of two dozen countries with troop commitments in Iraq.
2. Every country in NATO has recently pledged to make some kind of commitment -- money, trainers, off-shore training, etc -- to the NATO training mission in Iraq.
3. General Casey, General Abizaid, on up regularly consult with other countries that are looking for ways they may be helpful.
4. the coalition will continue to shift, but that is expected as individual countries make their own decisions.

-----Original Message-----

From: Dan Senor [mailto:dansenor@(b)(6)]

Sent: Tuesday, March 15, 2005 6:56 PM

To: (b)(6); Di Rita Larry CIV OSD; bryan.whitman@(b)(6)

Subject:

Hey there,

Going on Fox & Friends tomorrow morn at 8:20...will definitely get questions about troop withdrawal from coalition allies.

Any talkers on it beyond what Scott said below? If not, I can get by. Otherwise, please shoot me anything you've got.

Thanks!

-Dan

Q Scott, what is your understanding of Italy's position on withdrawing troops from Iraq?

MR. McCLELLAN: Well, actually, last week Prime Minister Berlusconi spoke to, I believe, the Italian Senate and addressed this issue. He said that, as Iraqis are able to assume more responsibility, we will work in agreement with our allies and start to withdraw some of our forces. And that was something he said, I believe it was just about a week ago -- last Wednesday, I think.

Q But has this come to a head, then, today?

MR. McCLELLAN: I saw the comments he made today and I think they were very similar to the comments he made last week.

Q What does this do to our overall troop strength there? And is it hurting our effort, in general, in --

MR. McCLELLAN: I don't think so, because if you look at what he said last week and what he said again today, this will be based on the ability and capability of Iraqi forces and the Iraqi government to be able to assume more responsibility, and that he will work in agreement with allies in the region before taking those steps. And we certainly appreciate the contributions of the Italians. They have served and sacrificed alongside Iraqis and alongside other coalition forces.

Our focus remains on making sure that the Iraqi forces are fully trained and equipped and ready to assume more responsibility for their future, and that's where our focus will remain, so that eventually our troops will be able to return home with honor.

Q How much of this reflects the tension between the United States and Italy over the shooting incident?

MR. McCLELLAN: I'm not sure that I'd make a connection there. I don't view it the same way.

Q Is there any connection?

MR. McCLELLAN: Not that I'm aware of.

Q So no connection at all?

MR. McCLELLAN: Not that I -- I haven't heard any comment to that effect from Italian officials.

(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Saturday, March 12, 2005 6:08 PM
To: 'dansenor@'(b)(6)
Subject: Re:

Tnx. We'll survive!

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Dan Senor <dansenor@'(b)(6)>
To: larry.dirita@'(b)(6) <larry.dirita@'(b)(6)> ldirita@'(b)(6) <ldirita@'(b)(6)>
Sent: Sat Mar 12 18:03:15 2005
Subject:

Lar,

My apologies. I told the Standard copy editor to change "Navy Seals" to "Americans" in both places...she did in one, but in the other replaced with "Special Forces". Not helpful. I've seen Navy Seals elsewhere in print before. But, still, sorry about that.

I think you'll like the rest of the piece. Put in the bird if you think it would be helpful.

Here's the link to the piece...

<http://www.weeklystandard.com/>

Thanks!

-Dan

(b)(6)

From: Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, March 11, 2005 9:03 AM
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Jeb Babbín editorial -- need to keep this dog fed

Done
COL George H. Rhynedance

-----Original Message-----

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA <larry.dirita@(b)(6)>
To: Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA <George.Rhynedance@(b)(6)>
Sent: Fri Mar 11 09:01:32 2005
Subject: Fw: Jeb Babbín editorial -- need to keep this dog fed

For monday's early bird, pls. Tnx

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA <Bryan.Whitman@(b)(6)>
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA <larry.dirita@(b)(6)>
CC: Geren, Pete, CIV, OSD <Pete.Geren@(b)(6)>
Sent: Fri Mar 11 08:17:53 2005
Subject: Jeb Babbín editorial -- need to keep this dog fed

<http://www.nypost.com> <http://www.nypost.com>

TORTURE TRUTHS

By JED BABBIN

JUST how far were U.S. interrogators told they could go in questioning detainees in Iraq, Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay? A new report by Vice Adm. Albert T. Church III, the former navy inspector general, answers some questions pointedly, but raises many more. The Defense Department has now done 11 investigations growing out of the Abu Ghraib prisoner-abuse scandal, which broke a year ago. Church testified to the Senate Armed Services committee on the latest report Thursday. His task was to trace any connection between the interrogation methods sanctioned by Defense to any abuses in Iraq, Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

At the outset of the war, the president determined, entirely correctly, that suspected terrorists and their ilk - such as the Taliban and later the so-called "Saddam Fedayeen" - weren't prisoners of war entitled to the protections afforded under the Geneva Conventions. Since we attacked Afghanistan in October 2001, the left has been working night and day to force a reversal of that decision. Its principal tool has become the abuses at the Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad.

Critics focused the confirmation hearings for Alberto Gonzales as attorney general on Justice Department and White House memos debating the definitions of torture. Ever since the Abu Ghraib scandal broke, others have blamed Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and the senior military leadership for creating an atmosphere in which prisoner abuse was, if not specifically permitted, at least inevitable.

The Church report proves those assertions wrong. It says, "We found, without exception, that the DoD and senior military commanders responsible for the formulation of interrogation policy evidenced the intent to treat detainees humanely, which is fundamentally inconsistent with the notion that such officials or commanders ever accepted that detainee abuse would be permissible . . . [and] it is clear that none of the pictured abuses at Abu Ghraib bear any resemblance to approved policies at any level, in any theater."

But what about Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay? Weren't the interrogators just turned loose? In fact, no. Church wrote, "We found no link between approved interrogation techniques and detainee abuse."

Church found that most of the abuse cases didn't even come out of interrogations. "Of the 70 cases of . . . substantiated abuse, only 20 of these cases, or less than one-third, could be considered 'interrogation-related.'" The rest occurred in situations such as at

the "point of capture" - where soldiers who've captured people they believed had caused the deaths or wounding of their pals got emotionally carried away.

According to Church, the incidence of abuse is not unique to any of the services, to active vs. reserve soldiers or other factors. (Thus, he apparently disagrees with the earlier Taguba report on Abu Ghraib, which found the reservist military police inadequately trained for detainee operations in the environment they encountered.) Every true interrogator's goal is to get actionable intelligence - reliable information that's translatable into offensive or defensive action. To get it, we must both abjure torture and reject the tide of political correctness that threatens to drown our interrogators. Interrogation-related abuse is quite rare, the report notes: "At [Guantanamo Bay], where there have been over 24,000 interrogation sessions . . . there are only three cases of . . . substantiated abuse, all consisting of minor assaults in which [military intelligence] interrogators exceeded the bounds of approved interrogation policy."

But those bounds, as Church's report explains, remain blurry because "no universally accepted definitions of 'torture' or 'abuse' exist." All there is - in the Geneva Conventions, U.S. and international law - is the concept that detainees must be treated "humanely."

As the Church report shows, the terrorists are trained in our interrogation methods and how to resist them. When we use more aggressive techniques - as we did in the case of two "high-value" detainees at Guantanamo who resisted standard interrogation for months - the new techniques "successfully neutralized the two detainees' resistance training and yielded valuable intelligence."

Church said in a conference call Wednesday that our interrogators are now "clamped up" - declining to push interrogations as hard as they legally and morally can and should for fear of the next investigation that will come along.

We are punishing innovative interrogators, such as the two women at Guantanamo Bay, "who, on their own initiative, touched and spoke to detainees in a sexually-suggestive manner in order to incur stress based on the detainees' religious beliefs." Why should we punish those women? Why should we respect terrorists' religious beliefs when we - and a growing number of their co-religionists - say they are perverting their religion by their terrorism?

The most important finding Church makes is a negative one: that there is no universal definition of torture or abuse. American and allied interrogators shouldn't have to work in fear of prosecution under vague laws and treaties. So long as they do, they will remain "clamped up" - less effective than they must be if we are to get the actionable intelligence we need to save lives.

We have a clear definition of "torture" in U.S. law. Congress should - as clearly as possible, without trying to specify every possible circumstance - act quickly to specify what "abuse" means.

Jed Babbin is a former deputy undersecretary of defense, a contributing editor with familysecuritymatters.com and author of "Inside the Asylum: Why the U.N. and Old Europe Are Worse Than You Think."

Home

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(b)(6)

From: Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, March 11, 2005 7:41 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Babbin (New York Post)

Sure
COL George H. Rhynedance

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@^{(b)(6)}>
To: Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA <George.Rhynedance@^{(b)(6)}>
CC: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA <Bryan.Whitman@^{(b)(6)}>
Sent: Fri Mar 11 07:28:58 2005
Subject: Fw: Babbin (New York Post)

George, can you please make sure the bird staff runs this in MONDAY'S ebird? Thanks.

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: ^{(b)(6)} CIV OASD-PA
To: ^{(b)(6)} CIV OASD-PA <^{(b)(6)}>
Sent: Fri Mar 11 07:06:53 2005
Subject: Babbin (New York Post)

TORTURE TRUTHS

By JED BABBIN

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According to Church, the incidence of abuse is not unique to any of the services, to active vs. reserve soldiers or other factors. (Thus, he apparently disagrees with the earlier Taguba report on Abu Ghraib, which found the reservist military police inadequately trained for detainee operations in the environment they encountered.) Every interrogator's goal is to get actionable intelligence - reliable information that's translatable into offensive or defensive action. To get it, we must both abjure torture and reject the tide of political correctness that threatens to drown our interrogators. Interrogation-related abuse is quite rare, the report notes: "At [Guantanamo Bay], where there have been over 24,000 interrogation sessions . . . there are only three cases of substantiated abuse, all consisting of minor assaults in which [military intelligence] interrogators exceeded the bounds of approved interrogation policy." But those bounds, as Church's report explains, remain blurry because "no universally accepted definitions of 'torture' or 'abuse' exist." All there is - in the Geneva Conventions, U.S. and international law - is the concept that detainees must be treated "humanely."

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(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Researcher
Department of Defense
OSD Writers Group, Room (b)(2)
Telephone: (b)(2)
Fax: (b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, March 11, 2005 7:21 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Babbin (New York Post)

No, Jed is a friend of mine and he sends them to me directly.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Researcher.

Department of Defense

OSD Writers Group, Room (b)(2)

Telephone: (b)(2)

Fax: (b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, March 11, 2005 7:20 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Babbin (New York Post)

(b)(6)

did this make it into the bird today?

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA (b)(6)
To: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA (b)(6)
Sent: Fri Mar 11 07:06:53 2005
Subject: Babbin (New York Post)

TORTURE TRUTHS

By JED BABBIN

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(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Researcher

Department of Defense

OSD Writers Group, Room (b)(2)

Telephone: (b)(2)

Fax: (b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, March 11, 2005 6:23 AM
To: 'Allardck@'(b)(6); Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Cc: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: GEN Casey

Ken--

I couldn't do the "hooaahhh" part. Too contrary to my naval gene pool!

Cheers...

-----Original Message-----

From: Allardck@'(b)(6)mailto:Allardck@'(b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 08, 2005 12:14 PM
To: larry.dirita@'(b)(6)
Cc: Dallas.Lawrence@'(b)(6)
Subject: GEN Casey

Larry - Im up at MSNBC this week on in-studio strip alert. But we are in full Michael Jackson mode this PM so I may not get on-air to talk about George Casey's presser. He is an old friend(Bosnia and the Army Chief of Staff's office). Could you tell him I said "Hello, hooaahhh and well done."

All the best

COL Ken Allard
MSNBC

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, March 10, 2005 5:48 PM
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Subject: RE:

They have it for action....

-----Original Message-----

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, March 10, 2005 4:54 PM
To: Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA
Subject: Fw:

Let's be on the lookout for a senior piece in the weekly standard for Monday's bird...tnx

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Dan Senor <dansenor(b)(6)>
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA <larry.dirita(b)(6)>
Sent: Thu Mar 10 16:50:03 2005
Subject: Re:

it will appear in next week's issue and will be on their website on Sat night or Sun morning...if you could put it in the Monday bird, that would be great.

--- "Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA" <larry.dirita(b)(6)> wrote:

> When will it appear? We can throw it in the bird...
> -----

> Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld
>
>

> -----Original Message-----

> From: Dan Senor <dansenor(b)(6)>
> To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
> <larry.dirita(b)(6)>
> Sent: Thu Mar 10 16:33:41 2005
> Subject: Re:

> okay.
>

> i think you all will long the piece in its entirety
> --

> it's a pretty lengthy look at four barometers (iraqi
> security forces, iraqi press, iraqi women, and iraqi
> pride), and i show how in each area the trendlines
> are
> strong...things are getting much better.

> --- "Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA"
> <larry.dirita(b)(6)> wrote:

> > Still checking on that. Want to make sure I got
> the

> > names of the types of
> > units right...
> > -----

> > Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

1

> >
> >
> > -----Original Message----- (b)(6)
> > From: Dan Senor <dansenor@...>
> > To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
> > <larry.dirita@...> (b)(6)
> > Sent: Thu Mar 10 16:29:50 2005
> > Subject: Re:
> >
> > very good...thanks.
> >
> > is the part on the elite iraqi teams playing a
> > lead
> > role on some ops okay?
> > --- "Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA"
> > <larry.dirita@...> (b)(6) wrote:
> >
> > > Great insights...dan--may want to qualify your
> > > comments a bit
> > > -----
> > > Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld
> > >
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
> > > <Bryan.Whitman@...> (b)(6)
> > > To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
> > > <larry.dirita@...> (b)(6)
> > > Sent: Thu Mar 10 16:22:31 2005
> > > Subject: RE:
> > >
> > > It's good -- I concur with your concerns.
> > > Additionally I wonder with the
> > > recent checkpoint shooting, if the point about
> > > Iraqis managing all the
> > > checkpoints might be a bit overstated and leave
> > > the
> > > reader to challenge
> > > other aspects.
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
> > > Sent: Thursday, March 10, 2005 3:45 PM
> > > To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
> > > Subject: Fw:
> > >
> > > Pls take a look at this email string and let me
> > > know
> > > what you think. Tnx
> > > -----
> > > Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld
> > >
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Dan Senor <dansenor@...> (b)(6)
> > > To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
> > > <larry.dirita@...> (b)(6)
> > > Sent: Thu Mar 10 15:40:01 2005
> > > Subject: Re:
> > >
> > > okay, glad i checked. are the allawi graphs fine
> > > so
> > > long as i don't specify
> > > beyond "americans"?
> > > --- "Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA"
> > > <larry.dirita@...> (b)(6) wrote:
> > > > Good for you for doing this, dan...I think the

> > two
> > > grafs on allawi
> > > security go too far. Certainly the second one
> > > does by identifying
> > > specific unit.
> > >
> > > You might be able to tell the same story by
> just
> > > saying that
> > > "americans"
> > > were providing personal security (leave it
> open
> > to
> > > whether it was civ
> > > or
> > > mil) and that now it increasingly is iraqis,
> or
> > > whatever the case is.
> > >
> > > One point worth considering is the general
> point
> > > that, across the
> > > board, iraqi security forces must get much
> more
> > > capable, but at the
> > > high end (swat teams, emergency response,
> > > counterinsurgency teams,
> > > etc.) They are getting
> > > really quite good. They are getting more
> > involved
> > > in sensitive, comex
> > > ops, etc.
> > >
> > > Anyway, glad you are doing it.
> > >
> > > Enjoyed our brief visit last week...cheers
> > > -----
> > > Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld
> > >
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Dan Senor <dansenor@(b)(6)>
> > > To: Di Rita Larry CIV OSD
> > > <larry_dirita(b)(6)>
> > > ldirita(b)(6)
> > > <ldirita(b)(6)>
> > > Sent: Thu Mar 10 14:03:31 2005
> > > Subject:
> > >
> > > Larry,
> > >
> > > Good to see you last week.
> > >
> > > I'm publishing an article in the Standard next
> > > week that points to all
> > > the positive developments I observed on my
> > recent
> > trip to Iraq.
> > >
> > > One section relates to Iraqi security forces,
> > and
> > > I just want to make
> > > sure it's okay by you...that it doesn't
> violate
> > or
> > > expose anything
> > > that you'd be uncomfortable with.

> > > >
> > > > The relevant text is below (I'm particularly
> > > concerned with the
> > > reference to the Navy Seals and the senior DoD
> > > official):
> > > >
> > > > Checkpoints and security...
> > > >
> > > > Last summer, every military checkpoint was
> > > manned
> > > by American
> > > soldiers. Iraqis were the first to cite this
> > > "humiliation". But
> > > every checkpoint I've been through now is
> > > staffed
> > > by Iraqi soldiers.
> > > >
> > > > Now American troops are increasingly
> > > behind-the-scenes, only there to help if
> > > things
> > > get dicey. For most
> > > Iraqis, the checkpoint experience has become
> > > one
> > > of interface with
> > > their fellow citizens in uniform -- an
> > > enormous
> > > psychological and
> > > symbolic change.
> > > >
> > > > A senior Defense Department official here
> > > discussed taking this
> > > process to the next step by employing
> > > Iraqi-only
> > > military patrols in
> > > the major cities.
> > > >
> > > > Last year, Iraq's Prime Minister, Deputy Prime
> > > >
--- message truncated ---

(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, March 10, 2005 4:31 PM
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: Re:

Maybe mnfi? I am personally comfortable with it based on the briefings/demos we got in iraq. Not sure if I got the names of the individual forces yet...

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA <Bryan.Whitman@(b)(6)>
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA <larry.dirita@(b)(6)>
Sent: Thu Mar 10 16:26:19 2005
Subject: RE:

I'll try to wash it around -- but it really is in the eye of the beholder. Again I think it maybe unnecessarily overstated. Anyone in particular you might me to run it by?

-----Original Message-----

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, March 10, 2005 4:07 PM
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: Fw:

Can you have someone do a basic sanity check on the following graf dan has in a forthcoming article. Part of the same article I sent you some text from earlier...tnx

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Dan Senor <dansenor@(b)(6)>
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA <larry.dirita@(b)(6)>
Sent: Thu Mar 10 15:59:46 2005
Subject: Re:

Lar, I integrated your most recent suggestion into another graph from another part of the article. Let me know if the facts are correct...thanks!

---As for Iraqi security force performance, I asked US troops in Baghdad for feedback. Some glowing, some restrained, but none disparaging. At a minimum, there was a real respect on the part our troops for Iraqis risking their lives for their own country. And while everyone agrees that Iraqi forces still have a way to go, their elite teams -- like SWAT, emergency response, and counterinsurgency -- are performing exceptionally well. They have been fully participating and are often taking the lead in complex and dangerous operations.

--- "Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA"

<larry.dirita@(b)(6)> wrote:

> Good for you for doing this, dan...I think the two grafs on allawi
> security go too far. Certainly the second one does by identifying
> specific unit.
>
> You might be able to tell the same story by just saying that
> "americans"
> were providing personal security (leave it open to whether it was civ
> or
> mil) and that now it increasingly is iraqis, or whatever the case is.
>
> One point worth considering is the general point that, across the

> board, Iraqi security forces must get much more capable, but at the
> high end (swat teams, emergency response, counterinsurgency teams,
> etc.) They are getting
> really quite good. They are getting more involved in sensitive, comex
> ops, etc.

> Anyway, glad you are doing it.

> Enjoyed our brief visit last week...cheers

> -----
> Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

> -----Original Message-----

> From: Dan Senor <dansenor@(b)(6)>

> To: Di Rita Larry CIV OSD

> <larry.dirita@(b)(6)>

> Sent: Thu Mar 10 14:03:31 2005

> Subject:

> Larry,

> Good to see you last week.

> I'm publishing an article in the Standard next week that points to all
> the positive developments I observed on my recent trip to Iraq.

> One section relates to Iraqi security forces, and I just want to make
> sure it's okay by you...that it doesn't violate or expose anything
> that you'd be uncomfortable with.

> The relevant text is below (I'm particularly concerned with the
> reference to the Navy Seals and the senior DoD official):

> Checkpoints and security...

> Last summer, every military checkpoint was manned by American
> soldiers. Iraqis were the first to cite this "humiliation". But
> every checkpoint I've been through now is staffed by Iraqi soldiers.

> Now American troops are increasingly
> behind-the-scenes, only there to help if things get dicey. For most
> Iraqis, the checkpoint experience has become one of interface with
> their fellow citizens in uniform -- an enormous psychological and
> symbolic change.

> A senior Defense Department official here discussed taking this
> process to the next step by employing Iraqi-only military patrols in
> the major cities.

> Last year, Iraq's Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, and President
> were guarded by US special forces.

> When
> these politicians appeared on local television, a ring of
> plain-clothed Americans was often in the camera shot.

> At that time, Prime Minister Allawi visited the scenes of suicide
> bombings to project a strong 'large and in-charge' image. This effort
> was greatly hampered by visuals of the tight circle of Navy Seals who
> were keeping him alive. Now Iraqis have been trained to do the job -
> another important change.

> As for the Iraqi security services, when I passed a recruiting
> facility in Baghdad, the line went on as far as the eye could see. It
> looked like a suicide bombing waiting to happen, as events this week
> in al-Hilla reminded us. But Iraqis have not been
> deterred. As the Centcom Commander, General

> Abizaid,
> put it, "each time an Iraqi soldier is killed, another steps up to
> take his place. And since the handover of sovereignty, more Iraqis
> have died in the line of duty in Iraq than Americans."
>
> When I repeated this story to a western reporter, he cynically
> responded: "Well that just shows you how desperate they are for
> jobs." Perhaps. But then how does one explain 8.8 million Iraqis who
> risked their lives, not for a job, but to vote?
>
>

(b)(6)

From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, March 10, 2005 4:26 PM
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Subject: RE:

I'll try to wash it around -- but it really is in the eye of the beholder. Again I think it maybe unnecessarily overstated. Anyone in particular you might me to run it by?

-----Original Message-----

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, March 10, 2005 4:07 PM
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: Fw:

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Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

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From: Dan Senor <dansenor(b)(6)>
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA <larry.dirita(b)(6)>
Sent: Thu Mar 10 15:59:46 2005
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> Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Dan Senor <dansenor@ (b)(6)>
> To: Di Rita Larry CIV OSD <ldirita@ (b)(6)> <ldirita@ (b)(6)>
> <larry.dirita@ (b)(6)>
> Sent: Thu Mar 10 14:03:31 2005
> Subject:
>
> Larry,
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> jobs." Perhaps. But then how does one explain 8.8 million Iraqis who
> risked their lives, not for a job, but to vote?
>
>

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, March 09, 2005 8:03 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Worth Reading

If you were to click on the Archives link you can just read the titles to her articles and get a sense of her.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Researcher
Department of Defense
OSD Writers Group, Room (b)(2)
Telephone: (b)(2)
Fax: (b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, March 09, 2005 8:01 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Worth Reading

Oh sure, she seems to be fair and most importantly, interested in the issues.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Researcher
Department of Defense
OSD Writers Group, Room (b)(2)
Telephone: (b)(2)
Fax: (b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, March 09, 2005 7:59 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Worth Reading

(b)(6) in your view, is this columnist someone we might want to offer a one-on-one with to senior dod leadership? thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA

Sent: Wednesday, March 09, 2005 7:58 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Worth Reading

Eric, when you get the time, here are her last 4 articles published in the WSJ Opinion Page.

<http://www.opinionjournal.com/columnists/cRosett/?id=110006328>

<http://www.opinionjournal.com/columnists/cRosett/?id=110006267>

<http://www.opinionjournal.com/columnists/cRosett/?id=110006207>

<http://www.opinionjournal.com/columnists/cRosett/?id=110006145>

Also, here is the link to her archives.

<http://www.opinionjournal.com/columnists/cRosett/archive/>

Have a great day.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Researcher
Department of Defense
OSD Writers Group, Room (b)(2)
Telephone: (b)(2)
Fax: (b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, March 09, 2005 7:50 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Worth Reading

thanks, (b)(6) bryan, hollen, let's remember this writer the next time we have a trip for the sd or the dsd in europe. she might be someone we want to meet after we review a few more of her columns. thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, March 09, 2005 7:42 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Subject: Worth Reading

Saigon's Sharansky

Will Vietnam be the next Iraq?

BY CLAUDIA ROSETT

Wednesday, March 9, 2005 12:01 a.m.

There's been a lot of talk since Sept. 11 about how President Bush's war-lovin' ways have galvanized terrorists, recruiting jihadis to the ranks. What's increasingly evident, however, is that the character suffering the real blowback is Osama bin Laden, who, as it turns out, jolted the U.S. into a global recruiting drive for democrats. Faced with an unprecedented attack on American shores, Mr. Bush smashed the mold for Middle-East policy, and with the invasion of Iraq lit a beacon for freedom-lovers in a part of the world that until quite recently was widely seen as having none.

As it turns out, there are many. Already, Mr. Bush has been answered by the breathtaking election turnout in Iraq, the uprising in Lebanon, the tremors in Syria and Iran, the stirrings in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. But the effects hardly stop with the Middle East. In many places, people trapped under tyrannies are now watching. Ballots cast in Baghdad echo way east of Suez.

So it happens that a message reached me last weekend from within one of the world's most repressive states: Vietnam. Word came that the Sharansky of Saigon, democratic dissident Nguyen Dan Que, had been released from his latest stretch in Vietnam's prisons. Though Dr. Que, as he prefers to be called, is now dogged by state security agents around the clock and allowed no phone or computer of his own, he could arrange to be on the receiving end of a phone call.

So at an appointed hour, I picked up the phone in New York and spoke with Dr. Que, a 63-year-old doctor who has by now spent almost half his life fighting for liberty in Vietnam. Given that Vietnam's secret police almost certainly eavesdrop on any contact he has with the wider world, I was prepared for a discreet and carefully phrased conversation, meant to minimize his risk. Dr. Que was not. He got straight to the point: "What I want is liberty for my people." The question now, he said, "is how to make regime change in Vietnam." For democratization of his country, he added, "support from the rest of the world is important." Specifically, he wants Hanoi's decaying communist party to "put forward a timetable for free and fair elections."

It is important for the world to understand that in saying such things, Dr., Que knows all too well the risk he is taking. Back in 1975, as Saigon fell, he had a chance to leave--and turned it down. Even today, he says, "For me, exile is not freedom." Instead, for more than 30 years he has seized every chance to speak out and demand liberty for his country. For that, under Vietnam's communist regime, he has paid dearly--spending more than 20 years in labor camps and prisons. Released on two previous occasions, due to international pressure, Dr. Que seized the chance each time to again demand freedom for Vietnam's people. Twice, the regime jailed him again, most recently in March 2003--an outrage that was swamped at the time by the flood of news from Iraq, as the U.S.-led coalition went in to overthrow Saddam Hussein.

And though it is cause for immediate rejoicing that Dr. Que has been released, it is not yet a sign that Vietnam's brutal regime is easing up. "It's likely that I was just transferred from a smaller prison to a bigger one," he says. His release looks more like a matter of hostage politics, as Hanoi's regime haggles with Washington over

Vietnam's recent designation by the U.S. as a "country of particular concern" for being what Human Rights Watch calls "one of the worst violators of religious rights in the world." Vietnam also makes Freedom House's short list of the world's most repressive regimes. The prisons of Vietnam are infamous for torture, beatings and filthy conditions. Dr. Que notes that after his latest bout in which he was imprisoned incommunicado for two years, he is "tired out."

Dr. Que does not have access to the daily diet of news that feeds the free world. But given the feats of modern technology to spread information, he knows enough about what is now happening in the Middle East so that he wished to share his views on how America's intervention in Iraq is like the war in Vietnam, and how it isn't. The similarity, he says, "is the same fighting spirit for freedom." The difference, he adds, is that in the fight for freedom, the side America is on "will triumph this time."

Why?

"The world is changing," says Dr. Que. "There are more opportunities than ever."

He is right, and if the world is changing, it is because the U.S. is hardly alone in prizing freedom. In every country are people who care about liberty--and in most places there are a few willing to pay dearly and take extraordinary risks to lead the way. Dr. Que is one, and as we watch the Middle East, it bears remembering, as he says, that these are "universal values," that in many places there are people who given any chance at all will answer freedom's call.

Ms. Rosett is a journalist-in-residence with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. Her column appears here and in The Wall Street Journal Europe on alternate Wednesdays.

(b)(6)

From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, March 08, 2005 6:17 PM
To: Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
Cc: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; Geren, Pete, CIV, OSD; Maples, Michael D, MG, JCS VDJS
Subject: FW: Military Analysts call

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, March 08, 2005 5:47 PM
To: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Subject: Military Analysts call

Here is the most current RSVP list for tomorrow's conference call. It will be held in Allison's office at 1500. Thanks.

Confirmed Retired Military Analysts:

Colonel Carl Kenneth Allard	(USA, Retired)
Mr. Jed Babbin	(USAF, JAG)
Lieutenant General Frank B. Campbell	(USAF, Retired)
Colonel Tim J. Eads	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Rick Francona	(USAF, Retired)
Colonel John Garrett	(USMC, Retired)
Brigadier General David L. Grange	(USA, Retired)
Command Sergeant Major Steven Greer	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney	(USAF, Retired)
Captain Chuck Nash	(USN, Retired)
General William L. Nash (tentative)	(USA, Retired)
General Glen K. Otis	(USA, Retired)
General Tom Wilkerson	(USMC, Retired)

Declining:

Colonel Jack Jacobs	(USA, Retired)
General William F. "Buck" Kernan	(USA, Retired)
General Thomas S. Moorman, Jr.	(USAF, Retired)
Lieutenant General Erv Rökke	(USAF, Retired)

Respectfully,

(b)(6)

OSD Public Affairs

Community Relations and Public Liaison

(b)(6)

The Pentagon

Washington, D.C. 30401-1400

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, March 08, 2005 6:17 PM
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Cc: Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA

Gentlemen,

I was asked to send this to you. Allison Barber, Eric Ruff and Bryan Whitman have the list. Thanks.

Here is the most current RSVP list for tomorrow's conference call. It will be held in Allison's office at 1500. Thanks.

Confirmed Retired Military Analysts:

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Lieutenant General Erv Rokke	(USAF, Retired)

Respectfully,

(b)(6)

OSD Public Affairs

Community Relations and Public Liaison

(b)(2) The Pentagon

Washington, D.C. 30401-1400

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: Allardck@ (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 08, 2005 12:14 PM
To: larry.dirita@ (b)(6)
Cc: Dallas.Lawrence@ (b)(6)
Subject: GEN Casey

Larry - Im up at MSNBC this week on in-studio strip alert. But we are in full Michael Jackson mode this PM so I may not get on-air to talk about George Casey's presser. He is an old friend (Bosnia and the Army Chief of Staff's office). Could you tell him I said "Hello, hooaahh and well done."

All the best

COL Ken Allard
MSNBC

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: Starr, Barbara [Barbara.Starr@^{(b)(6)}]
Sent: Tuesday, March 08, 2005 10:31 AM
To: 'Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA'
Subject: RE: wash times story

well that is my view but is the following accurate, can you say?

Besides, there is no indication that the Italian security forces made prior arrangements to facilitate the transition to the airport."

-----Original Message-----

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA [mailto:larry.dirita@^{(b)(6)}]
Sent: Tuesday, March 08, 2005 10:30 AM
To: 'Barbara.Starr@^{(b)(6)}]
Subject: Re: wash times story

Pretty thin stuff, no?

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Starr, Barbara <Barbara.Starr@^{(b)(6)} <larry.dirita@^{(b)(6)}
To: 'Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA'
Sent: Tue Mar 08 10:28:10 2005
Subject: RE: wash times story

i am just wondering if its a 'message point' somebody wrote rather than a real memo frankly

-----Original Message-----

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA [mailto:larry.dirita@^{(b)(6)}
Sent: Tuesday, March 08, 2005 10:27 AM
To: 'Barbara.Starr@^{(b)(6)} ; Whitman, Bryan SES OASD-PA
Cc: 'Mike.Mount@^{(b)(6)} 'Jamie.McIntyre@^{(b)(6)}
Subject: Re: wash times story

I have not seen the memo. Short of asking the reporter for a copy, I'm not sure how we'll turn up something referred to as a "pentagon information memo". The facts in this affair will be established by the investigating officer and I don't think we will try to handicap it along the way. We will be hearing all sorts of conjecture and views, but with an investigation established it will be difficult to comment.

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Starr, Barbara <Barbara.Starr@^{(b)(6)} <larry.dirita@^{(b)(6)} Bryan Whitman (E-mail) <bryan.whitman@^{(b)(6)}
Cc: Mount, Mike <Mike.Mount@^{(b)(6)} McIntyre, Jamie <Jamie.McIntyre@^{(b)(6)}
Sent: Tue Mar 08 10:21:02 2005
Subject: FW: wash times story

we need some facts on this story
please see boldface below

is their such a pentagon memo that says what this article says thank you Washington Times March 8, 2005 Pg. 1 Italy Didn't Plan Safe Escape For Hostage By Rowan Scarborough, The Washington Times Italian security forces failed to make arrangements for safe passage out of Iraq for a freed Italian reporter, whose car was fired on by U.S. troops, killing

intelligence agent Nicola Calipari who brokered the reporter's release, according to an internal Pentagon memo.

The memo says checkpoint soldiers are trained to deal with erratic speeding vehicles whose drivers ignored warnings -- a profile that matches the Army's version of events in Friday night's shooting.

The memo says more than 500 American troops have been killed on the streets and at checkpoints in Iraq. Mistaken shootings of civilians resulted in "few deadly incidents" since the U.S. started checkpoints in March 2003, according to the memo.

Meanwhile, the White House dismissed as "absurd" the stated suspicion of the reporter, Giuliana Sgrena, who said the United States tried to kill her because it opposes negotiations with terrorists to free hostages. Miss Sgrena, a reporter for the Italian communist newspaper Il Manifesto, provided no evidence.

"It's absurd to make any such suggestion that our men and women in uniform would deliberately target innocent civilians," said White House spokesman Scott McClellan adding: "We regret this incident. We are going to fully investigate what exactly occurred."

Maj. Gen. William G. Webster Jr., who heads the Army's 3rd Infantry Division, yesterday completed the "commander's preliminary inquiry." He has decided to conduct a more extensive inquiry, called a 15-6 for the regulation that authorizes it. Gen. Webster will name one officer to head the probe.

A U.S. official said that of all the cars that passed through the checkpoint that night, the reporter's vehicle was the only one fired upon.

"Something that car did caused the soldiers to fire," said the official, who asked not to be named.

The shooting occurred at night at a checkpoint on a notoriously dangerous road that links Baghdad to the international airport.

The incident has put a spotlight on "friendly fire" episodes that occur with some regularity in Iraq when motorists fail to heed warnings to stop at roadside checkpoints and are fired on by American troops who fear that the vehicle might be a weapon. Cars and trucks are a common weapon in suicide bombings and drive-by shootings.

The soldiers did not know that Miss Sgrena and Italian agents were headed in their direction on the way to the airport for a flight back to Italy.

An internal Pentagon information memo states, "This is war. About 500 American service members have been killed by hostile fire while operating on Iraqi streets and highways. The journalist was driving in pitch-dark and at a high speed and failed, according to the first reports, to respond to numerous warnings. Besides, there is no indication that the Italian security forces made prior arrangements to facilitate the transition to the airport."

The left-leaning Italian newspaper La Repubblica reported yesterday that Mr. Calipari decided not to use available escort protection from the elite commandos who protect Italy's Baghdad embassy.

Instead, he rented an inconspicuous pickup truck to recover Miss Sgrena, wrote La Repubblica's top investigative reporter, Giuseppe D'Avanzo.

"In Iraq, the United States makes the rules and the Italian ally also must respect them. If it wants to break them, it must do so with a double game and some crafty tricks," Mr. D'Avanzo wrote.

Italian magistrates have opened an inquiry into the killing and are arranging for the truck to be flown to Italy for examination by ballistic experts, judicial sources said. The magistrates also have obtained from the U.S. military the cellular phone that Mr. Calipari was carrying when he was shot.

Analysis of calls logged on the cellular phone might allow investigators to determine the speed at which the vehicle was traveling when U.S. troops opened fire on it, the sources

say.

Mel Sembler, U.S. ambassador to Italy, reiterated Washington's position in a 45-minute meeting with Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi last night, diplomatic sources said.

Robert Maginnis, a retired Army officer and military analyst, said Rome should have done a better job coordinating Miss Sgrenna's exit once the Italians negotiated her release.

"It seems to me that the Italian secret service considers this a James Bond movie in Baghdad," Mr. Maginnis said. "They're driving around at night picking up a journalist who has been kidnapped and pretending they can get through a phalanx of checkpoints along the deadliest road in all of Iraq without being detected, much less shot up."

The Army's 3rd Infantry Division, which last week resumed command of Baghdad operations after participating in the 2003 invasion, said the soldiers had warned the approaching car repeatedly before opening fire.

According to the division, the patrol attempted to warn the driver to stop by hand and arm signals, flashing white lights, and firing warning shots in front of the car.

John Phillips contributed to this report in Rome.

Mike Mount | CNN Pentagon Producer | 820 First St., NE | Washington, DC
20002 | (b)(6) (office) | +(b)(6) (GSM mobile) | mike.mount@ (b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, March 08, 2005 10:33 AM
To: 'Starr, Barbara'; Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Cc: Mount, Mike; McIntyre, Jamie
Subject: RE: wash times story

I am not familiar with the memo referenced below and I appreciate your desire to conduct a parallel investigation on CNN, but I'm afraid you are inquiring about things that will have to be thoroughly looked into by the 15-6 Investigating officer. The investigation will address coordination with the soldiers maintaining the traffic control point and higher levels of command on the transport of Ms. Sgrenna from Baghdad to Baghdad International Airport as well as a thorough review the actions and training of the soldiers manning the traffic control point, traffic control point procedures, the local security situation, enemy tactics, techniques and procedures, and the rules of engagement employed in this incident.

From: Starr, Barbara [mailto:Barbara.Starr@^{(b)(6)}]
Sent: Tuesday, March 08, 2005 10:21 AM
To: Larry Drita (E-mail); Bryan Whitman (E-mail)
Cc: Mount, Mike; McIntyre, Jamie
Subject: FW: wash times story

we need some facts on this story
please see boldface below
is their such a pentagon memo that says what this article says
thank you

Washington Times
March 8, 2005
Pg. 1

Italy Didn't Plan Safe Escape For Hostage

By Rowan Scarborough, The Washington Times

Italian security forces failed to make arrangements for safe passage out of Iraq for a freed Italian reporter, whose car was fired on by U.S. troops, killing intelligence agent Nicola Calipari who brokered the reporter's release, according to an internal Pentagon memo.

The memo says checkpoint soldiers are trained to deal with erratic speeding vehicles whose drivers ignored warnings -- a profile that matches the Army's version of events in Friday night's shooting.

The memo says more than 500 American troops have been killed on the streets and at checkpoints in Iraq. Mistaken shootings of civilians resulted in "few deadly incidents" since the U.S. started checkpoints in March 2003, according to the memo.

Meanwhile, the White House dismissed as "absurd" the stated suspicion of the reporter, Giuliana Sgrenna, who said the United States tried to kill her because it opposes negotiations with terrorists to free hostages. Miss Sgrenna, a reporter for the Italian communist newspaper *Il Manifesto*, provided no evidence.

"It's absurd to make any such suggestion that our men and women in uniform would deliberately target innocent civilians," said White House spokesman Scott McClellan adding: "We regret this incident. We are going to fully

investigate what exactly occurred."

Maj. Gen. William G. Webster Jr., who heads the Army's 3rd Infantry Division, yesterday completed the "commander's preliminary inquiry." He has decided to conduct a more extensive inquiry, called a 15-6 for the regulation that authorizes it. Gen. Webster will name one officer to head the probe.

A U.S. official said that of all the cars that passed through the checkpoint that night, the reporter's vehicle was the only one fired upon.

"Something that car did caused the soldiers to fire," said the official, who asked not to be named.

The shooting occurred at night at a checkpoint on a notoriously dangerous road that links Baghdad to the international airport.

The incident has put a spotlight on "friendly fire" episodes that occur with some regularity in Iraq when motorists fail to heed warnings to stop at roadside checkpoints and are fired on by American troops who fear that the vehicle might be a weapon. Cars and trucks are a common weapon in suicide bombings and drive-by shootings.

The soldiers did not know that Miss Sgrenna and Italian agents were headed in their direction on the way to the airport for a flight back to Italy.

An internal Pentagon information memo states, "This is war. About 500 American service members have been killed by hostile fire while operating on Iraqi streets and highways. The journalist was driving in pitch-dark and at a high speed and failed, according to the first reports, to respond to numerous warnings. Besides, there is no indication that the Italian security forces made prior arrangements to facilitate the transition to the airport."

The left-leaning Italian newspaper La Repubblica reported yesterday that Mr. Calipari decided not to use available escort protection from the elite commandos who protect Italy's Baghdad embassy.

Instead, he rented an inconspicuous pickup truck to recover Miss Sgrenna, wrote La Repubblica's top investigative reporter, Giuseppe D'Avanzo.

"In Iraq, the United States makes the rules and the Italian ally also must respect them. If it wants to break them, it must do so with a double game and some crafty tricks," Mr. D'Avanzo wrote.

Italian magistrates have opened an inquiry into the killing and are arranging for the truck to be flown to Italy for examination by ballistic experts, judicial sources said. The magistrates also have obtained from the U.S. military the cellular phone that Mr. Calipari was carrying when he was shot.

Analysis of calls logged on the cellular phone might allow investigators to determine the speed at which the vehicle was traveling when U.S. troops opened fire on it, the sources say.

Mel Sembler, U.S. ambassador to Italy, reiterated Washington's position in a 45-minute meeting with Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi last night, diplomatic sources said.

Robert Maginnis, a retired Army officer and military analyst, said Rome should have done a better job coordinating Miss Sgrenna's exit once the Italians negotiated her release.

"It seems to me that the Italian secret service considers this a James Bond movie in Baghdad," Mr. Maginnis said. "They're driving around at night picking up a journalist who has been kidnapped and pretending they can get through a phalanx of checkpoints along the deadliest road in all of Iraq without being detected, much less shot up."

The Army's 3rd Infantry Division, which last week resumed command of Baghdad operations after participating

in the 2003 invasion, said the soldiers had warned the approaching car repeatedly before opening fire.

According to the division, the patrol attempted to warn the driver to stop by hand and arm signals, flashing white lights, and firing warning shots in front of the car."

John Phillips contributed to this report in Rome.

Mike Mount | CNN Pentagon Producer | 820 First St., NE | Washington, DC 20002 | (b)(6) (office) + (b)(6)
(GSM mobile) | mike.mount@ (b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, March 08, 2005 7:29 AM
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA

With Church, the things we should be pressing on the most are:

- Targeted backgrounder night before.
- Military analysts/Press avail day of
- WP/NYT ed boards.

4/5/2008

(b)(6)

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, March 07, 2005 9:41 AM
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Cc: Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA
Subject: march 19 ideas

Importance: High

FROM: Larry Di Rita

TO: SecDef

DATE: March 3, 2005

SUBJECT: March 19 Anniversary Ideas for SD/DSD

Following are some suggestions for consideration. Thanks.

SD Speech. We did not do such a speech last year so we should give this some real consideration. There are several local venues we could tap for marking the occasion.

Pentagon Town Hall. I believe we did a town hall last year and one would be appropriate again this year. Media would monitor via studio or Pentagon Channel.

Talk Radio. We should pitch the SecDef and DepSecDef to national and large regional programs. Two to three interviews could be conducted on one or more days the week of March 19.

Satellite Media Tour. Perhaps we should consider pitching the SecDef to television stations in media markets with large military viewing audiences. The SD could conduct such interviews from the studio and ideally we would be able to do at least 5 stations in a 35-minute time frame.

Hannity & Colmes. This would be a natural venue for allowing the SecDef to assess where we stand and reflect on progress that has been made.

New York Times. Suggest we approach Thom Shanker or Eric Schmitt about doing an exclusive Q and A with the SecDef or DepSecDef, about Iraq and the GWOT.

Editorial Board Conference Call. We could invite editorial writers from five major regional newspapers (metro dailies) to talk with the SecDef or DepSecDef about Iraq and the GWOT.

Morning Show Round Robin. Explore interest in getting the DepSecDef out to the morning shows on the day of the anniversary.

The Pentagon Channel/Internal Communications. Documentary for the Pentagon Channel (Dictatorship to Democracy), Radio message from SecDef to troops, Web Special on two-year contribution of the military, Op-Ed for Stars & Stripes.

Public Liaison. Military analysts call, special brochure for tour groups (Dictatorship to Democracy)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
 Sent: Monday, March 07, 2005 8:49 AM
 To: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
 Subject: Today's Spectator (Jed Babbin)

THE AMERICAN
SPECTATOR

[Print Article](#)[Close Window](#)**March SGO**By Jed Babbin

Published 3/7/2005 12:07:44 AM

Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy, creating a new job market for hit men under the age of 18, opined that American law -- and that dusty old Constitution that sits in increasing irrelevance behind a plate of glass down Capitol Hill from Kennedy's perch -- was out of step with the rest of the world. That would be enough SGO for any month, but it's certainly the clearest written excogitation of this month's theme. (For those just joining us, "SGO" is the immortal acronym that sprang from the overly-active mind of my pal and former SEAL Al Clark for the phrase, "s\$%t goin' on.")

We are, thankfully, so out of step with Europe that even when we appear to be in step -- as in telling Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad to get out of Lebanon -- no one, including Assad, takes it seriously. France has joined us in telling the Syrians to end their occupation of Lebanon forthwith. If we can count on the French for anything, it's only that they are likely whispering to Assad what they told his Baathist pal Saddam three March's ago: that they won't really do anything, and can tie us up in the U.N. so that we won't either. Assad is dancing the Saddam waltz, playing for time with meaningless promises to withdraw Syrian forces from Lebanon gradually, meaning not at all. The latest -- announced yesterday -- is a withdrawal beginning today, to move Syrian troops back to the Syrian-Lebanese border, but still in Lebanon. That which is moved today can be moved back tomorrow, with equal ease.

We have both underestimated and overestimated Assad. He's not the dummy we have thought, but his personal power is limited. His generals and advisers -- most leftovers from his father's reign -- are his power base, and they'd trade him for a short beer if they saw the need. Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed terrorist organization, controls much of southern Lebanon and has been used by Assad to threaten Israel. Hezbollah is not under Assad's control. It will do what the mullahs in Tehran tell it to do, and they're

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not about to tell them to withdraw.

Syria will have to be solved militarily and the longer we wait to do it the easier it will be for the terrorists to escape, to move weapons, money, and people to another sanctuary. Dubya is setting himself up for another long bout of quagmire diplomacy in the U.N. It won't work any better than it did on Iraq. Better to act and ask forgiveness than to wait for permission. Especially when Bad Vlad Putin is on the prowl.

THE MOST DANGEROUS HEADLINE of the week is the one leading the story of Russia's imminent launch of two Iranian spy satellites. Planned for launch some time between April and June, the "Mesbah" and "Sinah-1" satellites -- Iran's first -- will be a major strategic increase of Iran's military and terrorist capabilities. There is no reason to think that the satellites -- which must have been built by the Russians for Iran -- will do any less. Moreover, these satellites almost certainly have secure communication capabilities, which will make Iran's terrorist operations -- through Hezbollah, al Qaeda, and other groups it is allied with -- much more effective and less vulnerable to attack. Our anti-satellite weapons capability (which is still aborning) should be put high on the agenda for development and implementation. And the Iranian satellites should be taken out at the first opportunity.

Russia's alliance with Iran makes impossible any effective U.N. or European diplomatic action to defuse the Iranian nuclear weapons program. President Bush is making a major mistake in creating an easy political environment for Putin to push Russia's centuries-old ambitions in the Caucasus by helping Iran achieve its nuclear ambitions. By joining in the European effort to negotiate Iran's nuclear program away, the President is emboldening Russia and Iran both, and further muddying our incoherent policy toward the mullahs. By doing so, he will neither lead the Europeans to divorce themselves from feckless diplomacy nor isolate Iran. Europe will always appease, even when appeasement means the rise of another nuclear power that will threaten it directly, as Iran will. We need to sort out what we will do about Iran, and get on with it. Peace -- here and in the Middle East -- cannot be achieved until we do. There will be no progress this week, because the world's attention will again be on allegations of American prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay.

LAST WEEK, THE BBC called to ask what I knew of the allegations made by a Libyan detainee (who, until captured in Pakistan, was a resident of the UK) that Libyans had interrogated him at the Baghram air base in Afghanistan, having been flown there secretly by a CIA aircraft. One Omar Deghayes claims he was threatened with removal to Libya, where he would be treated ungently by Qaddafi's secret police. When I checked with an

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intelligence source, it denied knowledge of any Libyan involvement (which means close to nothing). When I asked a Defense Department source, he laughed uproariously but said not a word. Which means, methinks, that a couple of Middle Eastern-looking guys on our payroll (dressed up in Libyan uniforms) visited Mr. Deghayes to interrogate him and succeeded in scaring the hell out of him. (Were I in charge, it could also mean that the whole incident was concocted simply to see how long it would take for the rumor of Libyan involvement to be picked up in the Brit media.) But regardless of the mind games we are playing with Mr. Deghayes and the Beeb, this will be a very rough week on the prisoner abuse issue.

On Thursday VAdm. Albert T. Church III -- former Navy inspector general, and now director of Navy staff -- will report in Senate testimony the results of the DoD inquiry into detainee interrogation methods. Senators will dredge up every abuse at Abu Ghraib, every allegation of abuse coming out of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and every other horrible thing they can, seeking yet again to score a soundbite on the CBS Evening News. (Gunga Dan Rather gives up the anchor chair on Wednesday. Pity. It'd be worth putting up with him for one more night to see how he slanted this story.) Despite the Senate theatrics, there may be some light shed on what's going on.

Church will probably say, as the Schlesinger panel said before him, that there is no policy permitting torture, that our interrogators are well supervised, and that our interrogators aren't permitted to mistreat or degrade detainees. What won't be asked will be more important than what will be. Are we imposing false limits on interrogation methods that are hampering our ability to get information we may need desperately? Are we limiting techniques such as degradation, body clock manipulation and such, more than we legally and morally must? Seems to me that our people should be able to do more than say, "Your momma wears combat boots."

TAS contributing editor Jed Babbin is the author of *Inside the Asylum: Why the UN and Old Europe Are Worse Than You Think* (Regnery, 2004).

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(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Researcher
Department of Defense

4/5/2008

OSD Writers Group Room (b)(2)
Telephone: (b)(2)
Fax: (b)(2)

4/5/2008

NY TIMES

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, February 25, 2005 4:42 PM
To: 'Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA'
Cc: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Rhyndance, George, COL, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Research you wanted
Attachments: SpecialOpsClips.2.25.doc

Pursuant to your request, we found:

- Two U.S. papers (KC Star and Lexington Herald Leader) that put (most) of "Pentagon Seeking Leeway Overseas" in their print editions;
- Two Canadian papers that printed "original" articles citing the Post's work;
- Twelve Newspaper websites and one TV news website that republished the Tyson/Priest article online;
- Six news websites that published "original" articles citing the Post's work (all were foreign);
- Military analyst David Grange characterized the initiative as aiming to "improve flexibility" in discussing the article on CNN's Lou Dobbs Tonight program (transcript and videoclip included); and
- A number of blog comments (representative samples included). Those comments varied only in the degree of their criticism of having the DoD take on the alleged new role.

Please see attachment for full details.

-----Original Message-----

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA [mailto:larry.dirita@(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, February 25, 2005 1:56 PM
To: (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA
Cc: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Rhyndance, George, COL, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Subject:

Please get me a tally of the places where the following story or related story ran around the country. The wash post articles frequently get carried elsewhere around the country/world. Tnx.

<http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20050224353807.html>

4/5/2008

Pursuant to your request, we found:

- Two U.S. papers (KC Star and Lexington Herald Leader) put (most) of "Pentagon Seeking Leeway Overseas" in their print editions;
- Two Canadian papers that printed "original" articles citing the Post's
- Twelve Newspaper websites and one TV news website that republished the Tyson/Priest article online;
- Six news websites that published "original" articles citing the Post's work (all were foreign);
- Military analyst David Grange characterized the initiative as aiming to "improve flexibility" in discussing the article on CNN's Lou Dobbs Tonight program (transcript and videoclip included); and
- A number of blog comments (representative samples included). Those comments varied only in the degree of their criticism of having the DoD take on the alleged new role.

PRINT CLIPS

Reprints:

Kansas City Star, p. A2 - Counterterror plan draws opposition - PARTIAL REPRINT
Lexington Herald Leader, p. A7 - Pentagon seeks new anti-terror operation; U.S. FORCES COULD ACT WITHOUT EMBASSY OK - PARTIAL REPRINT

Original:

Ottawa Citizen, Pg. A11 - Pentagon seeks to curb ambassadorial vetoes: Generals, not diplomats, would decide whether to deploy special forces
Press Trust of India - Pentagon promoting foreign operation plans without ambassadorial veto
The Washington Post - Pentagon Seeks Leeway Overseas For Special Ops Forces
Windsor Star (Ontario) - Rice opposes plan

ONLINE CLIPS:

Reprints:

Contra Costa Times - Pentagon seeks special leeway overseas
Fort Wayne Journal Gazette - Plan eases global-operations path
Fort Worth Star Telegram - Plan would weaken ambassadors' authority
Houston Chronicle - Pentagon seeks leeway on overseas operations
Kansas City Star - Counterterror plan draws opposition
Kentucky.com - Pentagon seeks new anti-terror operation
Lexington Herald Leader - Pentagon seeks new anti-terror operation
MSNBC - More freedom sought for special forces
Omaha World Herald - Pentagon seeks to weaken envoys' power to decide on troops' entry
Star Tribune Online - Pentagon seeks out more power overseas
The Standard, Hong Kong - Pentagon pushes for covert foreign raids
The Union Leader, NH - COVERT OPS: Pentagon seeks leeway on overseas operations

Troy Daily News, OH - Pentagon seeks leeway on overseas operations

Original:

ISN, Switzerland - Pentagon seeks more leeway in special ops
 New Kerala, India - Pentagon promoting foreign operation plans without
knowledge of India, India - The Pentagon wants to freelance
 uruknet.info, Italy - Covert Ops in Your Neighborhood
 Xinhua, China - Pentagon seeks greater powers to combat terrorism
 Presna Latina (Latin American news wire service) - Pentagon Seeks to
Operate without Ambassadors' Knowledge

BROADCAST CLIPS

CNN - Lou Dobbs Tonight

February 24, 6:00 PM EST

Well, coming up, how special operations forces are taking on a larger role in U.S. Military operations around it is globe. "Grange on Point" is next.

PILGRIM: In "Grange on Point" tonight, the increasing role of American special operations troops in the global war on terror, the "The Washington Post" today reported, the Pentagon wants to give special operations troops new flexibility to hunt down terrorists in foreign countries. The Pentagon is also building up its human intelligence capabilities. Well, joining me from Chicago to talk about that is General David Grange. Thanks for being with us, sir.

BRIG. GEN. DAVID GRANGE (RET.), CNN MILITARY ANALYST: Thank you.

PILGRIM: What do you make of this report, it is a "The Washington Post" article. The Pentagon is disputing certain points of it, but what do you think, in theory, of this plan?

GRANGE: Well, I think what is true, is that the U.S. special operating forces are trying to improve the flexibility of their organizations. Any adaptability of its personnel to actually conduct operations around the world as it is today or into the future, not like it was.

PILGRIM: What sort of missions could you envision them doing?

GRANGE: Well, special operating forces, and they change from Green Beret Special forces to Navy SEALs, to rangers, to counterterrorism forces. There's this -- every service has some type of special operating force to add to quite an extensive capability of our country. The type of stuff they would do is, for instance, mainly reconnaissance. Reconnaissance of specific areas or areas

in general that future operations may take place.

And what they call this reconnaissance or other tactics is to shape an environment for future operations. Special operating forces are an enabling for general purpose forces. They are a -- they can conduct operations unilaterally, but they also enable general purpose forces to accomplish their missions more successfully.

PILGRIM: Now the CIA, also, has paramilitary forces. How might you see this compete or work with?

GRANGE: Well, hopefully not compete. Sometimes some of that goes on in the interagencies our a government. The idea here is that they -- it would enhance the Department of Defense only, not take the place of agency operations.

The agency has more of a covert, other words, hide the sponsor type of requirement. Where military special operating forces have a more clandestine. In other words, they just hide the act, like, they're sneaking into a place. They're parachuting in. They're swimming, whatever the case may be. And so they're not going to compete. But it's very important that all of the governmental agencies have a robust capability. And the type of enemies this country faces today, it's essentially to our success.

PILGRIM: We're talking about counterinsurgency operations basically. One fine point on this, and you just touched on this point, there's a discussion over whether there should be, what they call, explicit concurrence of the U.S. ambassadors in those countries, that they know that they're going in. Do you think that is quite an important point, isn't it?

GRANGE: Well, it is an important point. And the ambassador of a particular country is the honcho, they're in charge. Now, what is probably happening is that the Department of Defense and the Department of State is doing pre-approval of certain types of operations to streamline the process. Because in today's environment, today's world, as fast as things happen, the military in particular has to be able to do things quickly. And you can't wait weeks for an approval process to take place. So they're front-ending, I would imagine, a lot of these types of requests. And they're giving a stamp of approval through the Department of State and those ambassadors in those specific countries to OK those type of missions for special operating forces.

PILGRIM: General grange, do you think they're front-ending anything at this point? Anything being planned that you could...

GRANGE: Oh, I think so, yes. And I would hope so, because it's prudent to stay ahead of the enemy. And when you're dealing with places like, let's

take Syria, I mean, they're training terrorists right now in Syria to go into Iraq. And I would hope that we're doing something to counter that. And one of the best tools that we have at our disposal is special operating forces.

PILGRIM: Thank you so much, General David Grange.

A Sampling of Blog comments about "Pentagon Seeking Leeway Overseas"

"Steve Gillard's News" blog:

But as Rummy builds his empire, and Bush and Rice remain mute, just envision this:

July, 2005: as a second day of riots engulfed Central Baghdad, the trial of the US commandos caught inside Iran enters it second week. After being spotted by local farmers, the six man team was tracked and caught in the suburbs of Tehran in April.

The more operations you run, the risk of embarrassment increases exponentially. Yellowfruit comes to mind, Dick Marchinko also comes up. ~~Both involved scandals with the US's most elite units, Delta and SEAL Team Six.~~ ~~Another European blog~~ money went missing. Well, you allow these units off the leash; then you expect State and the CIA to clean up and keep the peace. Disregarding the squabble between the Pentagon and the State Department, consider what this means: Special Operations forces are covertly entering countries and conducting "military operations," that is to say killing people the Pentagon doesn't like. Iran, Syria, Cuba, North Korea, and other countries listed as "regime regimes" come to mind, if Special Operations forces started killing off the Iranian mullahs and their supporters and Iranian covert agents entered the United States and revenged these killings by assassinating U.S. officials, would there really be any room to criticize the Iranians? Fair is fair, after all.

Problem here is, since these operations will be "covert," that is to say we will not know about them since the Pentagon will have no accountability to Congress or the American people, any revenge operations will be considered prima facie terrorism and serve as an excuse to attack Iran or whatever country reacts in kind. Only knowing half the story-they attacked us unprovoked-the American people will sign off on larger and more deadly....

"Liberty Report" blog:

As if their ineptitude hadn't already reached epic proportions, the Pentagon is pushing hard not to be held accountable by anyone, especially the State Department or the CIA.-----

"Just a Bump in the Beltway" blog:

We'll go where we wanna go, kill who we wanna kill, and f*\$#@ you, host nation, we're the only hyperpower in the world. Eat our dust. We are the champions of the world. Bow down and acknowledge us or be crushed.

"Just-World News" blog

The check and balance system with the ambassador does not work when he is an evil person like Negroponte, but it is still better than giving military special ops carte blanche. Good grief, they are mad. I used to be in the US foreign service and I hope to hell that Foggy Bottom pulls out all the stops in getting this insane idea rejected

(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, February 25, 2005 11:14 AM
To: (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA
Subject: Re: From my team - overview of comments this week by retired military personnel serving as TV analysts - FYI

Trnx

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA (b)(6)
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA <larry.dirita(b)(6)>; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA <allison.barber(b)(6)>; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA <Bryan.Whitman(b)(6)>; Ruff, Eric, CIV, OASD-PA <eric.ruff(b)(6)>; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA <dallas.lawrence(b)(6)>; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA <George.Rhynedance(b)(6)>; (b)(6) Capt, USMC, OASD-PA (b)(6) Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA <Roxie.Merritt(b)(6)>
CC: (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/CNS (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/CNS (b)(6) (b)(6) LCDR, OASD-PA (b)(6)

Sent: Fri Feb 25 11:07:43 2005

Subject: From my team - overview of comments this week by retired military personnel serving as TV analysts - FYI

Ken Allard:

- * American citizen conspiring to assassinate President Bush (MSNBC)
- * Discussed the topic of potentially having the U.S. take more aggressive measures toward the insurgents (MSNBC)

Bill Cowan:

- * Increased insurgent attacks during the Shiite holiday - February 19th (Fox News)

William Nash:

- * Change in insurgent attacks. They are now going for infrastructure such as oil refineries and electric plants around Baghdad (Fox News)

Paul Vallely:

- * Syria will have to be dealt with (Fox News)

(b)(6)

From: Dan Senor [dansenor@(b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, February 22, 2005 11:47 AM
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Subject: RE: FW:

yeah, as he was getting his make-up done, he reached for into his pocket for a couple Bush-Cheney campaign buttons to wear during the interview. Priceless!

--- "Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA"

<larry.dirita@ (b)(6) wrote:

> As you no doubt learned, don king is some kind of true believer. I
> remember hearing him during the convention last summer and he is right
> on the talking points!

>
> -----Original Message-----

> From: Dan Senor [mailto:dansenor@ (b)(6)]
> Sent: Tuesday, February 22, 2005 11:12 AM
> To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
> Subject: RE: FW:

> very funny.

> the only thing more bizarre was having coffee with don king in the
> green room...what's this network coming to?

> --- "Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA"

> <larry.dirita@ (b)(6) wrote:

> > It felt to me like you and Tiki had something
> going
> > there. Good chemistry.
> > (-:

> > -----Original Message-----

> > From: Dan Senor [mailto:dansenor@ (b)(6)]
> > Sent: Tuesday, February 22, 2005 7:34 AM
> > To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
> > Subject: Re: FW:

> > Great. Thank you. Very helpful.

> > --- "Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA"

> > <larry.dirita@ (b)(6) wrote:

> > > -----Original Message-----

> > > From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
> > > Sent: Tuesday, February 22, 2005 7:28 AM
> > > To: Senor, Daniel S.
> > > Subject:

> > > Watching you on Fox. Terrific as always. FYI,
> > > here

> > > is what Schmierer put
> > > together in response to this Time Mag story on negotiating with
> > > terrorists:

> > > Embassy Guidance:

> > >
> > > The United States speaks to a range of Iraqis, including some
> > > people who may have contact through intermediaries with the
> > > insurgents (but not Zarqawi's group). But it is the Iraqi
> > > government that will decide to negotiate with them or not. The
> > > United States supports the
> Iraqi
> > > government in its efforts
> > > to persuade the insurgents to give up violence
> and
> > > to join the peaceful
> > > political process now underway in this country.
> An
> > > example of this is the
> > > Iraqi government's successful efforts to end the Moqtada al-Sadr
> > > armed uprising of last summer and fall. We encourage
> all
> > > armed insurgents in Iraq
> > > to end their violence and join the democratic process.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
>

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, February 22, 2005 8:58 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Subject: The American Spectator (Jed Babbin)

Attachments: The American Spectator.htm



The American Spectator.htm (36...



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
Loose Canons Dubya Goes Euro-Stroking

By Jed Babbin
Published 2/22/2005 12:08:16 AM


Author Bio
Letter to the Editor
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The BBC calls it President Bush's "charm offensive." Off to EUnuch-land for a week of conciliation, the President is doing his best to heal the rifts that divide us from our traditional NATO allies. The problem nations, better known to our readers as the Axis of Weasels, are greeting Mr. Bush with profusions of smiles and hugs while they go about sharpening shivs to stick in his back. Is it really worth the effort for the President to even try? Yes, but not because it will change anything.

Got conservative books?



Two facts drive the President to Europe. First, the allies we still have there, such as Britain's Tony Blair, are weaker now than they were before the Iraq campaign began in 2003. Blair has often come to America to consult with Mr. Bush, but the President hasn't returned the favor. Had he done so two years ago, the Brits might feel more appreciated, and the anti-Bush feeling there at least prevented from rising to its current heights. Second, the President has some faint hope of convincing the Euros that they are making the world less safe in their dealings with China and Iran, and in trash-talking NATO.

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In a speech in Brussels yesterday, the President said we are ready for "a new era of transatlantic unity," and "no temporary debate, no passing disagreement of governments, no power on earth will ever divide us." He called on the Euros to aid the rise of democratic Iraq, to deal realistically with Iran's nuclear weapons program, and to help confront Russian strongman Vladimir Putin's drive to smother the new Russian democracy. The European political environment cannot produce any of those results. Europe is in a state of self-hypnosis, dealing with its own reality to the exclusion of everything else.

FACTS DON'T MATTER to libs in Europe any more than they do to libs here. Only feelings are important. On Sunday, Spanish voters (only forty or so percent bothered to vote, but the overwhelming majority of those who did) began the dissolution of Spanish sovereignty by approving the new European Union constitution. But, according to the *Telegraph* newspaper, "despite a widespread government promotional campaign,

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nine out of 10 people had little or no understanding of the charter they approved." But they felt good about it. How do the Europeans feel about the rest of the world? Just as they usually do: anxious to appease, and to make a buck.

After the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, we and the Europeans imposed an arms embargo against Communist China. The only thing that has changed in China since then is that the Chinese appetite for modern weapon systems has grown enormously. Since about 1994, China has spent at least \$13 billion buying the most modern ships, submarines and aircraft from Russia. Last week, Big Dog Don Rumsfeld, CIA Director Porter Goss, and Defense Intelligence Agency chief Adm. Lowell Jacoby warned Congress that the Chinese arms buildup is a great and growing danger. The Quadrennial Defense Review -- the periodic recrafting of our defense budgets, strategies, and capabilities that is being done again this year -- is aimed, in part, to deal with the growing Chinese threat. But where we see dangers, the Euros see markets.

The Euros don't want to miss out on the profits to be made by selling to the Chinese, so they are about to lift their arms embargo. President Bush will try to convince them not to, and he will fail. They will sell ships, aircraft, and other weapons to China, and by doing so will place greater burdens on our armed forces and our defense budget. China is building -- and buying -- a "blue water" navy, to be able to threaten Taiwan and every other nation within the reach of a global navy. Threatened India is already well-armed, and will continue to seek its own defenses against China. An Asian arms race is on, and the shopkeepers of Europe will care only for the profits they can make in it. Gerhard Schroeder of Germany said as much on February 14 when he called for a revamping of NATO.

Schroeder, seeking to strengthen his weak hand in a national election slated for next year, called for a panel of experts to recommend changes to the NATO treaty making it more a political forum than a military alliance. Schroeder's vision of a transatlantic version of the U.N. would eliminate the residual value that NATO holds. America and Europe don't need another diplomatic mechanism. President Bush also wants to revamp NATO, to restore its real value as the primary means of mutual defense of the West. Schroeder and the rest will have none of it. Nor will they accept the President's warnings about Iran.

THAT IRAN IS THE central terrorist nation and the greatest immediate threat cannot be restated often enough, even to the deaf ears of Europe. Time after time, in agreement after agreement, the Europeans try to buy Iran's compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty with more trade and assurances to the mullahs. And each time they try, they are rebuffed. The mullahs won't trade their heavy-water nuclear plant, which can produce enriched uranium useful for weapons, for a light-water plant that can't. They won't permit international inspections of their suspected nuclear weapons-production sites. Iran is bent upon becoming a nuclear power. The Israelis, who feel the threat most, say that Iran will have the ability to build nuclear weapons by the end of this

year. Even if they are exaggerating the threat, Iran is not far from the day when it will be able to produce nukes, and deliver them by missile as far as Europe. This will change the entire geopolitical equation in a way we -- and the Europeans -- should not tolerate. But the Euros will, even if we won't. Facts don't matter to Old Europe, which won't even agree to label Hezbollah a terrorist organization.

If it could, Europe would replace President George W. Bush with President Elwood P. Dowd. Mr. Dowd (Jimmy Stewart's greatest role) said that he felt he had to choose between being smart and being nice. He chose to be nice, but found his reliable good nature answered in kind only by an imaginary friend. Mr. Bush chooses to be smart, and refuses to temper decisive action with the indecisive diplomacy Old Europe would like. He will return from Europe with his agenda unchanged, and with no new support for it from the EUnuchs. He has as much chance of success with them as he would in trying to replace Jacques Chirac with Harvey. Not that that wouldn't be a vast improvement.

TAS contributing editor Jed Babbin is the author of *Inside the Asylum: Why the UN and Old Europe Are Worse Than You Think* (Regnery, 2004).

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(b)(6)

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2005 7:38 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Images for SECDEF

(b)(6) let's discuss. Thanks, eric

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA (b)(6)
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@(b)(6)>
Sent: Thu Feb 10 17:28:45 2005
Subject: Images for SECDEF

Mr. Ruff please find attached picture video montage that USN Retired Captain Chuck Nash, who participated in our briefing wanted the SECDEF to look at. He sent two but only the SECOND one works-- **You have to copy and paste the link and it will take you to the site.

The first one is not a working site-- but it may work on your computer. The second one does work.

See below:

(b)(6)

Please see the email below that I forwarded to a friend and neighbor. I would appreciate it if you would forward it to the Secretary. The videos are powerful as they spell out clearly the sacrifice and the reward that makes that sacrifice so very noble.

See you at 09:45.

All the best,
Chuck

----- Original Message -----

Subject: Mary: MUST see
Date: Wed, 02 Feb 2005 21:11:30 -0500
From: Chuck Nash <nashc@(b)(6)>
To: Mary Matalin <mmatalin@(b)(6)>

Mary,

Two videos that the President and our national leadership MUST see. They are brief but powerful.... look at them and you will surely agree. Both - in their own right - tell the story of sacrifice and of courage.

<http://206.152.229.13/bobbywarns/Bobby.wmv>

last image - woman with face covered - only eyes exposed with a tear coming down - showing her purple finger.... representing MILLIONS now and MILLIONS to come.

http://adamkeiper.blogs.com/comparevideo/files/Iraq_Election.wmv

All the best,
Chuck

(b)(6)

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2005 12:14 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: FYI

roger that

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2005 12:00 PM
To: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: FYI

the sd is on tv now live. be sure to get babbin a transcript of the remarks as he has just gotten a q about n korea.
thanks, eric

-----Original Message-----

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2005 11:56 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: FYI

Hannity and Colmes is having Jed Babbin on today to talk about North Korea, not sure if this is a trend you folks are seeing but just wanted to give you a heads up. We are getting Jed a one pager on the status of forces in the Korean Peninsula (the message being, we still have a massive deterrent there for NK). We will also put him into touch with State for talking points on the 6 party talks.

(b)(6)

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, February 03, 2005 3:20 PM
To: Stavridis, James, VADM, OSD
Cc: Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: [Fwd: Mary: MUST see]

Much simpler. Will do. Thanks. Eric

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Stavridis, James, VADM, OSD <Jim.Stavridis@(b)(6)>
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@(b)(6)>
Sent: Thu Feb 03 14:35:01 2005
Subject: RE: [Fwd: Mary: MUST see]

Just send up a video with both of them on there ...

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, February 03, 2005 1:42 PM
To: Stavridis, James, VADM, OSD
Cc: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Subject: FW: [Fwd: Mary: MUST see]
Importance: High

Jim, at the analysts briefing today Capt. Nash mentioned these two videos to the SecDef, who said he wanted to see them. Thanks, Eric

-----Original Message-----

From: Chuck Nash [mailto:nashct@(b)(6)]
Sent: Thursday, February 03, 2005 12:46 PM
To: eric.ruff@(b)(6)
Subject: [Fwd: Mary: MUST see]

Eric,

For the Secretary. The first is about a Marine causality and emotionally shows the personal burden of sacrifice WITH HONOR... the second is the uplifting video that shows the RESULTS of that sacrifice. They are a compelling view. That 1000 of this nation's best have sacrificed their lives and tens of millions NOW are free and millions more will certainly follow, just makes their sacrifice and that of their loved ones more noble.

All the best,
Chuck

<http://206.152.229.13/bobbywarns/Bobby.wmv>

last image - woman with face covered - only eyes exposed with a tear coming down - showing her purple finger.... representing MILLIONS now and MILLIONS to come.

http://adamkeiper.blogs.com/comparevideo/files/Iraq_Election.wmv

All the best,
Chuck

(b)(6)

From: Stavridis, James, VADM, OSD
Sent: Thursday, February 03, 2005 2:36 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Subject: RE: [Fwd: Mary: MUST see]

Eric, as discussed, please just send up a video with both on one tape, thx, Jim

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, February 03, 2005 1:51 PM
To: Stavridis, James, VADM, OSD
Cc: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Subject: RE: [Fwd: Mary: MUST see]

fyi, I am not able to open the bobbywarns. i have been able to open the second. I'm checking with our tech folks to see what the problem might be. thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, February 03, 2005 1:42 PM
To: Stavridis, James, VADM, OSD
Cc: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Subject: FW: [Fwd: Mary: MUST see]
Importance: High

Jim, at the analysts briefing today Capt. Nash mentioned these two videos to the SecDef, who said he wanted to see them. thanks, Eric

-----Original Message-----

From: Chuck Nash [mailto:nashct@(b)(6)]
Sent: Thursday, February 03, 2005 12:46 PM
To: eric.ruff@(b)(6)
Subject: [Fwd: Mary: MUST see]

Eric,

For the Secretary. The first is about a Marine causality and emotionally shows the personal burden of sacrifice WITH HONOR.... the second is the uplifting video that shows the RESULTS of that sacrifice. They are a compelling view. That 1000 of this nation's best have sacrificed their lives and tens of millions NOW are free and millions more will certainly follow, just makes their sacrifice and that of their loved ones more noble.

All the best,
Chuck

<http://206.152.229.13/bobbywarns/Bobby.wmv>

last image - woman with face covered - only eyes exposed with a tear coming down - showing her purple finger.... representing MILLIONS now and MILLIONS to come.

4/5/2008

http://adamkeiper.blogs.com/comparevideo/files/Iraq_Election.wmv

All the best,
Chuck

4/5/2008

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA (b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, February 01, 2005 5:31 PM

To: larry.dirita (b)(6) Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA

Cc: (b)(6) AFPS; (b)(6) OASD-PA; (b)(6) LCDR, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Chafin, Claude, CIV, OSD-LA; (b)(6) OASD-PA; (b)(6) OSD PWPO; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/AFRTS; (b)(6) Major (b)(6) Haddock, Colonel Ellen; (b)(6) Col. AFIS-HQ/DVI; (b)(6) OASD-PA; (b)(6) Lt. (b)(6) (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/CNS; (b)(6) Keck, Gary, Col. OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/MO; (b)(6) Commander (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Minnick, Cynthia, OASD-PA; (b)(6) OASD-PA; (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/NEWS; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Major (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/Pentagon Channel; (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/MO; (b)(6) LtCdr, OASD-PA; (b)(6) AFPS; (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/MO; (b)(6) Capt. AFIS-HQ/PIA; (b)(6) Rhem, Kathy, CIV, OASD-PA; Rhyndance, George, COL, OASD-PA; (b)(6) OSD PWPO; (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA; (b)(6) (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/AFRTS-D; (b)(6) CTR, AFIS-HQ/PIA; (b)(6) Captain (b)(6) SFC, AFPS; (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA; (b)(6) (b)(6) OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Thorpe, Captain Frank; (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/CNS; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) AFPS; (b)(6)

Subject: How former military members serving as media analysts viewed the Iraqi election

Attachments: Military Analyst Coverage - Iraq 020105.doc

TV Broadcast Summary:

Analysts Tommy Franks, Jed Babbin, Don Shepperd, Montgomery Meigs and Jack Jacobs were all featured on national news stations (Fox News, CNN and MSNBC). Generally speaking, all agreed that the election was not as violent as expected and that the Iraqi security forces and American troops did a very good job. Several analysts alluded to the fact that there will be more danger ahead. The analyst mood was positive as Iraqi events unfolded.

Print/Online/Radio Summary:

Military analysts' discussion of Sunday's election in print, online and radio outlets was minimal, limited to accounts quoting William Nash and Bob Scales. General Nash was featured on NPR before and during the election process (January 30th) while Bob Scales was quoted in *The Baltimore Sun* (reprinted by The South Florida Sun Sentinel) on keeping troops safe in Iraq. In addition, a *Washington Times* reader wrote a letter to the paper commenting on Scales' Op-Ed piece from earlier in the week on the need to raise troop levels.

The attached memo provides information on what each analyst said and how often they appeared on television.

4/5/2008

MILITARY ANALYST COVERAGE
IRAQI ELECTIONS

Print/Online/Radio Summary:

Military analysts' discussion of Sunday's election in print, online and radio outlets was minimal, limited to accounts quoting William Nash and Bob Scales. General Nash was featured on NPR before and during the election process (January 30th) while Bob Scales was quoted in *The Baltimore Sun* (reprinted by The South Florida Sun Sentinel) on keeping troops safe in Iraq. In addition, a *Washington Times* reader wrote a letter to the paper commenting on Scales' Op-Ed piece from earlier in the week on the need to raise troop levels.

William Nash (NPR)

- Iraqi troops "doing their duty" and enforcing security well
- Statements made about U.S. troops pulling out within 18 months "may be ambitious, but it's a good start."
- Nash emphasized the importance of the U.S. supporting, not leading efforts for the new Iraq, and avoiding being asked to leave Iraq.

Bob Scales (Baltimore Sun – print/online)

- The Sun piece described the Pentagon's plans to take U.S. soldiers from their own units and add them to Iraqi units.
- Scales: "It (embedding with Iraqi units) would put our troops' safety at risk, as they'd be more vulnerable to insurgent attacks."
- The key here is to quickly solidify the Iraqi troops as a standalone force from U.S. troops.

TV Broadcast Summary:

Analysts Tommy Franks, Jed Babbin, Don Shepperd, Montgomery Meigs and Jack Jacobs were all featured on national news stations (Fox News, CNN and MSNBC). Generally speaking, all agreed that the election was not as violent as expected and that the Iraqi security forces and American troops did a very good job. Several analysts alluded to the fact that there will be more danger ahead. The analyst mood was positive as Iraqi events unfolded.

Representative remarks per analyst are as follows:

Tommy Franks (Fox News – Hannity & Colmes / Fox & Friends)

- Troops feel great about what they've done in relation to the elections
- Any election in the Arab world is a "big deal"
- This is the first practical example of democracy in the Arab world
- Does not agree with comments made by Senator Kerry and Senator Kennedy
- He is proud of the work troops have done
- Last thing you want to do is announce your "timetable" for withdrawal

Jed Babbin (MSNBC Live Coverage – Iraqi Elections)

- Withdrawal from Iraq is “Simply the worst thing we could do”
- Withdrawal would strengthen the terrorists and weaken the Iraq people
- We have to look at the bigger picture, we have to deal with all the Jihadist nations that are influencing Iraq

Don Shepperd (CNN Live From....)

- What we did in the run up to the election made a big difference (i.e. controlling traffic flow around polling areas)
- There were extensive offensive operations to stop terrorist before voting took place especially in relation to foreign insurgents
- This weekend was very stressful for coalition forces
- It was very important for the Iraqis to pull this off


Montgomery Meigs (MSNBC Live Coverage – Iraqi Elections)

- Events in Iraq have gone surprisingly well
- It is a very tough process in inventing a new government
- We will see more Iraqi forces come on board with fewer American troops
- We will have to watch how Sunnis are brought into the process
- Doesn't think the coalition will change after the vote
- Need to continue to watch insurgents from Syria and Iran

Jack Jacobs (MSNBC Live Coverage – Iraqi Elections)

- Highlighted “hot spots” in Iraq in real-time during the polling process
- Jacobs, during the polling, predicted high voter turnout
- Security expectations were “managed well”
- Provided an overview of how insurgents might inflict violence during the vote
- Said the training of Iraqi forces by the U.S. military was key
- Questioned whether “two Iraqs” would arise until the next election in October (religious and cultural divides a potential after Sunday's election)

WHERE THE ANALYSTS APPEARED



(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, February 01, 2005 12:56 PM
To: 'Pittman, CAPT Harold E. (USN)'; Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Cc: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
Subject: RE:

Attachments: Feb 0105 Draft Newsweek Letter.doc



Feb 0105 Draft
Newsweek Letter...

hal--

there is a terrible article in this week's newsweek that says abizaïd asked for more troops in iraq and was denied and that it was done in a way to let the secretary be truthful when he says the commanders have gotten all they ask for.

it is scurrilous, and a proposed draft response for your consideration is attached. the response really should be from general abizaïd or you, in my view, because general abizaïd is being portrayed as someone who has had to deceive the secretary of defense and hedge his requests for forces.

please take a look at this draft. whether you choose to use the draft or not, i urge you to strongly consider responding. leaving the article stand does a terrible disservice to both secretary rumsfeld and general abizaïd.

-----Original Message-----

From: Pittman, CAPT Harold E. (USN) [mailto:pittmahe@(b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, February 01, 2005 12:16 PM
To: 'Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA'; Pittman, CAPT Harold E. (USN)
Cc: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
Subject: RE:

Larry --

We currently have two print reporters traveling with the Boss on our next trip in country -- Dave Moniz, USA Today, and Julian Barnes, USN&WR -- along with an AFIS writer. After that, the next opportunity likely won't be until late MAR.

Am pleased to add Dan to the list. Would also be interested in knowing how hard you want me to push for him to go in MAR... We were planning on Campbell Brown from NBC to potentially travel with us, and there may be only one window for travel that month... Bret Baier traveled with us in NOV, so FOX has been with us recently.

Thanks, vr/Hal

-----Original Message-----

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA [mailto:larry.dirita@(b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, February 01, 2005 12:10 PM
To: 'pittmahe@(b)(6)'
Cc: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
Subject:

hal--

dan senor is going to iraq soon with press accreditation to cover post-election activities.


without discussing any particular travel plans, he wondered whether he might tag along with your boss on an upcoming transit to the theater.

he will make other plans otherwise, but apparently he understands there may be an opportunity here and he asked about it.

it is your and your boss's call. i am agnostic as to the decision, but a quick decision will allow dan to make his other arrangements.

he will follow all the rules regarding the logistics here, i'm sure.

(b)(5)



(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, February 01, 2005 8:34 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Subject: American Spectator (Babbin)

Thought you might be interested in this article.

Iraq's Election Day

By Jed Babbin <MailTo:editor@spectator.org>
Published 1/31/2005 12:09:34 AM

Yesterday, for the first time in their history, Iraqis went to the polls to exercise one of the most basic rights of a free people. They voted despite the U.N.'s failure to help, despite liberals' predictions of disaster, and – most importantly – despite the terrorist declaration that democracy cannot exist in an Islamic society. The leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, declared that those who vote in democratic elections are "apostates," the Islamic term for those who violate Islam's laws and advocate competing religions. Zarqawi's meaning was clear: that Islam requires its believers to accept religious dictators as their only legitimate leaders. When the Iraqis went to the polls in droves – many losing their lives to do it – they rejected Zarqawi's message and opened a gaping wound in the jihadist ideology.

The Iraqi election is a milestone in the war against terrorism, but whether it is a major victory won't be known for years to come. Yesterday's election was only to select a provisional national assembly (and leadership) that will, over the next year, draft a permanent constitution for Iraq that will be presented to the voters. Whether the assembly succeeds, or whether the insurgents prevent it, are still open questions. But the turnout among Iraqi voters – something over 70% – shows that the insurgents do not have the popular support that's necessary for them to win.

No matter how many times Ted Kennedy, Barbara Boxer, and John Kerry insist otherwise, Iraq looks more like 1945 Germany than 1972 Vietnam. One of the reasons we've had so little success in establishing effective Iraqi security forces has been the fact that before soldiers and policemen will risk their lives, there must be a something for them to swear loyalty to. Until yesterday, there was nothing in Iraq for them to swear allegiance to other than the tribal, ethnic, and religious groups that have comprised Iraq from its birth, or the American-appointed Allawi government. Now, even though the national assembly is temporary, it is Iraqi: chosen by Iraqi voters themselves and not appointed by an outside power or imposed by a home-grown despot. It is such things that soldiers and policemen can claim to be their own and willingly risk their lives to defend. Difficulties remain, but one of the biggest obstacles to creating a self-sustaining and self-protecting Iraq has just been overcome.

IT WOULD BE AN ENORMOUS mistake for us to withdraw from Iraq, or even establish a date to do so. On Sunday evening I had the bizarre pleasure of debating this point on MSNBC with Rep. Lynn Woolsey (D-Calif. Need you even ask?) who said that we need to take our soldiers out of Iraq now and let Iraq's neighbors come in to help. This member of the Democrats' Von Braun Caucus apparently thinks that Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia are chafing at the bit to help Iraqi democracy rise above the Halliburton-driven U.S. occupation. She thinks the terrorists won't be mad at us anymore if we replace our troops with peacekeepers and humanitarian aid workers. Fortunately, no one outside of northern California knows or cares who Ms. Woolsey is, far less what she thinks.

The insurgents -- now unable to escape the label "enemy of the Iraqi people" -- are still supported by Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. Those despotisms realize that their days are numbered if Iraqi democracy succeeds. They will become increasingly desperate to make the Iraqi democracy fail, and we will have to be in Iraq to protect it from them for the foreseeable future. President Bush is correct in saying that the election creates momentum behind the Iraqi democracy experiment. But momentum can be lost if we quit too soon. That is one of the central points we will hear on Wednesday when Mr. Bush delivers his State of the Union address. And it is one that the Democrats and their holy of holies -- the U.N. -- can't bring themselves to answer.

President Bush will call for more nations to come to the aid of the fledgling Iraqi democracy. He will praise the sacrifices of our real allies, challenge the U.N. and all its members to support freedom with economic aid, with engineers, construction crews, and all those things needed to put Iraq on its feet. They will smile politely, applaud feebly, and again ignore his call to action.

Yesterday, on *Meet the Press*, John Kerry said over and over again that the road to success in Iraq depends on our obtaining the support of the "international community," by which he means the U.N. and Old Europe. President Bush realizes -- as the American people did in choosing to reelect him -- that we cannot depend on the EU nuchs and the despots and dictators who make up three-quarters of the U.N.'s membership to do anything to fight terrorists and the nations that back them. To take any risk to support democracy in Iraq would be too much for Kofi Annan, because he doesn't want President Bush to succeed in what Annan called an "illegal war." The U.N. and Old Europe are too busy to help. The first thing on their agenda is still constraining the United States in this war. Convincing them -- or the democrats -- to do otherwise is simply impossible.

THE PRESIDENT WILL SOON ASK Congress for a supplemental appropriation of \$80 billion for Iraq. (Five billion of it is for the State Department's efforts there which are, to be charitable, hard to discern.) The Democrats will fight against the appropriation, seeking to leverage some plan for withdrawal of our forces before the job is done. They have obviously missed the lesson the election taught former senator Tom Daschle: obstructionism is not a policy. But they will obstruct as best they can, on the funding for the war and on everything else the President seeks to do.

George Bush can't win the global war against terrorism by the time he leaves office in 2009. But he can -- as the Iraqi election proves -- make enormous progress toward victory. In his State of the Union speech, the president should issue a call to all Islamic nations to follow the example of Iraq. The sooner those nations are rid of jihadism and religious dictatorships -- by us or by their own peoples -- the sooner the war against terrorists and their ideology will be won. There is every reason to be skeptical that the Islamic nations can reform themselves. But as more of their people see what freedom looks like, the momentum the President sees in Iraq will grow, and -- so long as we stand ready to help -- grow fastest in places where it is least welcome.

TAS contributing editor Jed Babbin is the author of *Inside the Asylum: Why the UN and Old Europe Are Worse Than You Think* (Regnery, 2004).

(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, January 31, 2005 6:45 AM
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: Response to IG Report

Attachments: CPA IG REPORT.doc



CPA IG
REPORT.doc (31 KB)

Dan pulled these together. I note cnn is starting to run some stories on it, so we ought to get these points into the mix.

-----Original Message-----

From: Dan Senor [mailto:dansenor@(b)(6)]
Sent: Sunday, January 30, 2005 9:07 PM
To: (b)(6); dbartlet@(b)(6); scott_mcclelland@(b)(6); smccormac@(b)(6); wilkinsonjima@(b)(6); karl_rove@(b)(6); larry.dirita@(b)(6); (b)(6)
Subject: Response to IG Report

Attached is a detailed set of points responding to the CPA IG Report.

THE IG REPORT IGNORES SECURITY, POLITICAL, AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTEXT IN WHICH THE CPA OPERATING.

Security context: The report assumes that western-style budgeting and accounting procedures could be immediately and fully implemented in the midst of a war.

- 1. For example, the draft suggests that CPA should have delayed paying Iraqi public servants until we had fully modern pay records.**

This would have taken many months, if not years. More than a million Iraqi families depended on the Iraqi government for their salaries. When the CPA arrived in Iraq after Liberation, unemployment was over 50%. Not paying the civil servants would have been destabilizing and would have increased the security threat to Iraqis and to Americans. In brief, such a course would have cost lives.

- 2. At another point the draft report criticizes the Coalition's handling of Facilities Protection Service (FPS). Here again the draft misses the context.**

As a matter of American government policy, our military commanders were instructed to build up the FPS force quickly. The purpose of the FPS was to relieve the American military of tasks such as providing static security to government buildings. This would free our military to deal with the terrorists.

In November, the CPA decided to give Iraqis responsibility for these security forces by shifting the forces' payroll from the military commanders to the Iraqi Ministries. Many Ministries, already struggling to cope with the new budgetary demands, had difficulties making the transfer.

The CPA was aware of this problem and accepted that the payroll system was still imperfect. There was a war

going on in Iraq, and it would have been dangerous for security—ours and Iraq's— to stop paying armed young men.

The Political context: This is the report's most significant fault. For the CPA's entire period, American strategy was to transfer to the Iraqis as much responsibility as possible as quickly as possible, including responsibility for the Iraqi budget.

- 1. This was not just American Government policy. It was mandated by successive United Nations Security Council resolutions.**
- 2. The CPA worked quickly to establish an Iraqi Governing Council. This was done within 8 weeks.**
- 3. The CPA then pushed to get a new Iraqi Cabinet named quickly. Iraqi Ministers took over Iraq's Ministries on September 3.**
- 4. Contrary to the draft report's assertion, the guidance to CPA's Senior Advisors was clear. Bremer told the CPA Advisors that henceforth the Iraqi Ministers, not the American Advisors, would run Iraq's Ministries. The Advisors were to counsel the Ministers as requested by the Ministers but to leave the operations of the Ministries, including the budgets, to the Iraqis. Bremer restated this policy directly to the Iraqi Ministers in his first meeting with them in September.**
- 5. The draft suggests that instead of giving the Iraqi Ministers responsibility for their budgets, the CPA should have placed hundreds of CPA auditors into the Ministries. This would have been directly contrary to US government policy and to the mandate of the UN. And what kind of message would that have sent to the new Iraqi ministers and their staff, if they were being monitored by American 'minders'?**

Administrative context: The IG auditors presume that the Coalition could achieve a standard of budgetary transparency and execution which even peaceful Western nations would have trouble meeting within a year, especially in the midst of a war.

Given the situation the CPA found in Iraq at Liberation, this is an unrealistic standard.

1. When the CPA was established, there was no functioning Iraqi government.
2. Essential services in Iraq were primitive or non-existent. There was no national telephone system. Most Iraqi ministries had no computers. Use of the Internet, which the previous government heavily restricted, was limited to less than 3% of the population.
3. Iraqi government budget and personnel records, already inadequate before the war, had been destroyed by looting and by wilful criminal sabotage.
4. As the GAO has reported, Saddam's dictatorship treated the national budget and economic statistics as state secrets. CPA determined that less than 8% of the annual state expenditures were even run through the Ministry of Finance. The vast majority of government expenditures were directly controlled "off budget" by the Presidency. We could find no reliable records of these expenditures.
5. The CPA discovered that the Iraqi Ministries had no regular payroll systems. Nor was there a unified civil service pay system. The system had been corrupted beyond repair by decades of cronyism and ad hoc fixes.
6. At Liberation, the Iraqi economy was dead in the water. So CPA's top priority was to get the economy going. The quickest way was to pay the country's 1.2 million civil servants who had not been paid for two months. Within a week of arrival, the CPA established a four grade pay scale and started paying civil servants. We also established an Iraqi-Coalition task force to design a modern, professional civil service pay system. This was put in place in August, 2003.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) LtCol, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, January 27, 2006 10:40 AM
To: (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA
Cc: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Military Analysts

Thank you , Sir.

Mr. Ruff is looking for any updates you might have.

v/r

(b)(6)

LtCol (b)(6) USMC
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
Phone: (b)(2)
Fax: (b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, January 26, 2005 5:19 PM
To: (b)(6) OASD-PA; (b)(6) LtCol, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Military Analysts

We are working this - we haven't seen anything yet but will have a clearer picture in the morning. We are also looking at how much coverage has come out of the Faith/Defense Writers Group session.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, January 26, 2005 3:49 PM
To: (b)(6) LtCol, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA
Subject: RE: Military Analysts

Actually, (b)(6) is the person you need to talk to (cc'd). He is tracking that.

Respectfully,

(b)(6)
OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison
(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 30401-1400
(b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) LtCol, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, January 26, 2005 2:36 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: Military Analysts

Hi (b)(6)

This is a stab in the dark...

Mr. Ruff is asking if any of the analysts went out with what they learned yesterday.

I do not know if we track that type of information...any thoughts?

(b)(6)

LtCol (b)(6) USMC
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
Phone: (b)(2)
Fax: (b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 25, 2005 11:59 AM
To: (b)(6) LtCol, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Service Topline Input: S: 1330 TODAY - 21 JAN 05
(UNCLASSIFIED)
Importance: High

see below.

Confirmed Retired Military Analysts:

Colonel Carl Kenneth Allard	(USA, Retired)
Mr. Jed Babbin	(USAF, JAG)
Lieutenant General Frank B. Campbell	(USAF, Retired)
Dr. James Jay Carafano	(LTC, USA, Retired)
Colonel (Tim) J. Eads	(USA, Retired)
Colonel John Garrett	(USMC, Retired)
Command Sergeant Major Steven Greer	(USA, Retired)
Colonel Jack Jacobs	(USA, Retired)
Colonel Jeff McCausland,	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney	(USAF, Retired)
General Montgomery Meigs	(USA, Retired)
Captain Chuck Nash	(USN, Retired)
General William L. Nash	(USA, Retired)
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.	(USA, Retired)
Major General Donald W. Shepperd	(USAF, Retired)
Major General Perry Smith	(USAF, Retired)
Major General Paul E. Vallely	(USA, Retired)
General Tom Wilkerson	(USMC, Retired)

Tentative - Awaiting Confirmation

Admiral Dennis C. Blair	(USN, Retired)
Commander Peter Brookes	(USN, Reserve)
Lieutenant Colonel Bill Cowan	(USMC, Retired)
Major Dana R. Dillon	(USA, Retired)
General Wayne A. Downing	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant General Buster Glosson	(USAF, Retired)
Brigadier General David L. Grange	(USA, Retired)
Admiral David E. Jeremiah	(USN, Retired)
General William F. "Buck" Kernan	(USA, Retired)
Admiral Thomas Joseph Lopez	(USN, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis	(USA, Retired)
General Glen K. Otis	(USA, Retired) - not avail.
at 1600	
General Joseph Ralston	(USAF, Retired)
Mr. Wayne Simmons	(USN, Retired)
Captain Martin L. Strong	(USN, Retired)
General Charles E. Wilhelm	

(b)(6)

From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 25, 2005 12:44 PM
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LtCol, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) CAPT, OSD-COMPT; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; Keck, Gary, Col, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Service Topline Input: S: 1330 TODAY - 21 JAN 05 (UNCLASSIFIED)

To be more clear -- my current thinking is to not do the Press event but to do the analyst.

-----Original Message-----

From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 25, 2005 12:42 PM
To: (b)(6) LtCol, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) CAPT, OSD-COMPT; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; Keck, Gary, Col, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Service Topline Input: S: 1330 TODAY - 21 JAN 05 (UNCLASSIFIED)

But she can discuss thematics and what this supplemental will address. I think it is very worthwhile to do the analyst. I am leaning against no doing a press event.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) LtCol, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 25, 2005 12:20 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CAPT, OSD-COMPT; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; Keck, Gary, Col, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Service Topline Input: S: 1330 TODAY - 21 JAN 05 (UNCLASSIFIED)

Sir

Ms Jonas is concerned that she will have nothing to give them. They will want details and she can't give them numbers.

She doesn't want them to come in with expectations that can't be met.

V/r

(b)(6)

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff.(b)(6)>
To: (b)(6) LtCol, OASD-PA; (b)(6)
Sent: Tue Jan 25 11:58:50 2005
Subject: RE: Service Topline Input: S: 1330 TODAY - 21 JAN 05 (UNCLASSIFIED)

see below.

Confirmed Retired Military Analysts:
Colonel Carl Kenneth Allard (USA, Retired)
Mr. Jed Babbitt (USAF, JAG)
Lieutenant General Frank B. Campbell (USAF, Retired)
Dr. James Jay Carafano (LTC, USA, Retired)
Colonel (Tim) J. Eads (USA, Retired)

Colonel John Garrett	(USMC, Retired)
Command Sergeant Major Steven Greer	(USA, Retired)
Colonel Jack Jacobs	(USA, Retired)
Colonel Jeff McCausland,	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney	(USAF, Retired)
General Montgomery Meigs	(USA, Retired)
Captain Chuck Nash	(USN, Retired)
General William L. Nash	(USA, Retired)
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.	(USA, Retired)
Major General Donald W. Sheppard	(USAF, Retired)
Major General Perry Smith	(USAF, Retired)
Major General Paul E. Valley	(USA, Retired)
General Tom Wilkerson	(USMC, Retired)

Tentative - Awaiting Confirmation

Admiral Dennis C. Blair	(USN, Retired)
Commander Peter Brookes	(USN, Reserve)
Lieutenant Colonel Bill Cowan	(USMC, Retired)
Major Dana R. Dillon	(USA, Retired)
General Wayne A. Downing	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant General Buster Glosson	(USAF, Retired)
Brigadier General David L. Grange	(USA, Retired)
Admiral David E. Jeremiah	(USN, Retired)
General William F. "Buck" Kernan	(USA, Retired)
Admiral Thomas Joseph Lopez	(USN, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis	(USA, Retired)
General Glen K. Otis	(USA, Retired) - not avail. at 1600
General Joseph Ralston	(USAF, Retired)
Mr. Wayne Simmons	(USN, Retired)
Captain Martin L. Strong	(USN, Retired)
General Charles E. Wilhelm	

-----Original Message-----
 From: (b)(6) LtCol, OASD-PA
 Sent: Tuesday, January 25, 2005 11:56 AM
 To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
 Subject: Re: Service Topline Input: S: 1330 TODAY - 21 JAN 05
 (UNCLASSIFIED)

Hello Sir

Can you send it back to me so I have it on my blackberry and can forward it from here.

Thank you

(b)(6)

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@
To: (b)(6) LtCol, OASD-PA (b)(6)
Sent: Tue Jan 25 11:45:57 2005
Subject: RE: Service Topline Input: S: 1330 TODAY - 21 JAN 05 (UNCLASSIFIED)

(b)(6) do you think you should send him the navy's submission so he can see an e.g.?
thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) LtCol, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 25, 2005 11:44 AM
To: (b)(6) T LTC OCPA
Subject: Re: Service Topline Input: S: 1330 TODAY - 21 JAN 05
(UNCLASSIFIED)

(b)(6)

They just want three positive things Army is saying about Transformation along with three
topline messages regarding the Army's budget.

I've sent you all the input I have.

(b)(6)

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6) LTC OCPA (b)(6)
To: (b)(6) LECOL OASD-PA (b)(6)
Sent: Tue Jan 25 11:39:36 2005
Subject: RE: Service Topline Input: S: 1330 TODAY - 21 JAN 05 (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

(b)(6)

I will revisit, but initial indications are negative. Pls provide some examples which may
help me break something loose from the Army Budget Office. Thanks.

v/r,

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) LtCol OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 25, 2005 11:17 AM
To: (b)(6) T LTC OCPA
Subject: RE: Service Topline Input: S: 1330 TODAY - 21 JAN 05 (UNCLASSIFIED)

Hi (b)(6)

Did you ever get a final Topline input?

(b)(6)

LtCol (b)(6) USMC
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
Phone: (b)(2)
Fax: (b)(2)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6) LTC OCPA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, January 21, 2005 3:25 PM
To: (b)(6) LTC ASA-FM
Cc: (b)(6) ASA-FM; (b)(6) LTC OCPA; (b)(6) LtCol OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Service Topline Input: S: 1330 TODAY - 21 JAN 05 (UNCLASSIFIED)
Importance: High

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

(b)(6)

Do you have any additions? The list was provided by OSD(PA) and was not service specific. Do we have any service-specific items we want to give OSD a heads up on? We don't want to wait until the last minute to surprise them. Let me know. Thanks.

v/r,
LTC (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6) LTC ASA-FM
Sent: Friday, January 21, 2005 2:54 PM
To: (b)(6) LTC OCPA; (b)(6) LTC OCPA; (b)(6) ASA-FM
Cc: (b)(6) Mr OCPA; (b)(6) Mr OCPA; (b)(6) Mr OCPA; Boyce, Paul Mr OCPA
Subject: RE: Service Topline Input: S: 1330 TODAY - 21 JAN 05 (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

LTC (b)(6)
OK we are fine with the Themes you put down.

(b)(6)
LTC (b)(6)
PPBC Executive for Budget Army Budget Office
SAFM-BUC-F Rm (b)(2)
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management & Comptroller) Pentagon
Washington, DC 20310-0109
(b)(2)
DSN (b)(2)

From: (b)(6) LTC OCPA
Sent: Friday, January 21, 2005 2:14 PM
To: (b)(6) LTC OCPA; (b)(6) LTC ASA-FM; (b)(6) ASA-FM
Cc: (b)(6) OCPA; (b)(6) OCPA; (b)(6) OCPA; (b)(6)
Paul Mr OCPA
Subject: RE: Service Topline Input: S: 1330 TODAY - 21 JAN 05 (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

All,

Took a look at the messages and themes attached - looks good. Prior to budget hearings, testimonies, believe its a good idea to go with broad themes... unless the budget professionals have some additional specific messages they'd like to convey.

v/r,
LTC (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6) LTC OCPA
Sent: Friday, January 21, 2005 1:40 PM

To: (b)(6) LTC ASA-FM; (b)(6) ASA-FM
Cc: (b)(6) LTC OCPA; (b)(6) OCPA; (b)(6) OCPA;
(b)(6) OCPA; (b)(6) OCPA

Subject: FW: Service Topline Input: S: 1330 TODAY - 21 JAN 05 (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE

LTC (b)(6)
Pls see attachments from OSD(PA) for budget rollout prep. OSD is looking for topline messages that we want to add to their list (attached). This is our opportunity to provide "Army input," for their rollout package. The other request is for messages that link to transformation, insofar as changes to existing systems to address the asymmetrical threats of today and tomorrow. Any and all input will be appreciated.

SCD,
Pls take a look at the Q/As from the perspective outlined below and provide input accordingly. Thanks.

ALCON - suspense to OSD(PA) is 1500 today.

v/r
LTC (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6) LtCol OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, January 21, 2005 10:55 AM
To: (b)(6) LTC OCPA
Subject: RE: Service Topline Input: S: 1330 TODAY - 21 JAN 05 (UNCLASSIFIED)

Hi (b)(6)

They are looking for the topline messages that your service wants said about the budget. We actually have quite a few for the Army already, but if your service is pushing something in particular that we at DoD aren't pushing, we can do that.

The other request is for transformation messages. For example, the Navy is not getting new platforms, but the Ballistic Submarines are being converted to SSGNs and will be used for new methods to meet the asymmetrical threats of the 21st Century.

Here are our DOD messages as they stand. We are looking for service unique messages that we may have missed.

<< File: FY 2006 Budget Rollout(rev3).doc >> << File: FY 2006 Budget - 2005 01 21.doc >>

(b)(6)

LtCol (b)(6) USMC
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
Phone (b)(2)
Fax: (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(6) LTC OCPA [HYPERLINK mailto: (b)(6)]
mailto: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, January 21, 2005 10:04 AM
To: (b)(6) LtCol OASD-PA
Subject: FW: Service Topline Input: S: 1330 TODAY - 21 JAN 05 (UNCLASSIFIED)
Importance: High

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE

(b)(6)

My STRATCOM/Plans guy is having difficulty ascertaining what you're looking for in regards to topline messages. Pls provide example. I will work with my Budget contact for further assistance. Thanks.

v/r,
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) Mr OCPA
Sent: Friday, January 21, 2005 9:29 AM
To: (b)(6) LTC OCPA; (b)(6) LTC ASA-FM
Cc: (b)(6) OCPA; (b)(6) OCPA; (b)(6) LtCol OASD-PA; (b)(6)
(b)(6) OCPA; (b)(6) LTC OCPA
Subject: RE: Service Topline Input: S: 1330 TODAY - 21 JAN 05 (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE

?? Don't know what this is. FCS is the Army's big push but is this weapons systems specific or do personnel issues come into play?

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) LTC OCPA
Sent: Friday, January 21, 2005 8:44 AM
To: (b)(6) LTC ASA-FM
Cc: (b)(6) OCPA; (b)(6) OCPA; (b)(6) OCPA; (b)(6)
(b)(6) LtCol OASD-PA
Subject: FW: Service Topline Input: S: 1330 TODAY - 21 JAN 05 (UNCLASSIFIED)
Importance: High

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE

LTC (b)(6)
Pls provide input for the DoD request for topline messages and measures to counter the asymmetric threat per below. Thanks.

(b)(6)

Pls review the Q/As for the same input request. Thanks.

Pls provide to me to collate and forwarding to DoD by 1330 today. Thanks.

v/r,
LTC (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) LtCol OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, January 19, 2005 6:01 PM
To: (b)(6) LTC OCPA; (b)(6) GS-05 434 ARW/PA; (b)(6) Civ
SAF/PAM; (b)(6) LtCol SAF/PAN; (b)(6) [HQMC]; (b)(6)
(b)(6) WASHINGTON DC CHINFO; (b)(6) LT
Subject: Service Topline Input

Good Afternoon Ladies and Gentlemen,

As we move forward with the budget rollout, Mr. Ruff has asked me to pulse the services regarding the following:

1. Any Service-specific topline messages
2. Three examples how your Service can talk about this budget moving to meet the asymmetric threat of the 21st Century

For example, the Navy's SSBN's converting to SSGN's (same platform being used for a different purpose)

This information is requested for 1500 on Friday, 21 January.

Thank you.

v/r

(b)(6)

LtCol (b)(6) USMC
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
Phone (b)(2)
Fax: [redacted]

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: ~~FOUO~~

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, January 24, 2005 11:11 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Subject: FW: Today's Spectator (Babbin)

Thought you would be interested in this.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Researcher
Department of Defense
OSD Writers Group, Room (b)(2)
Telephone: (b)(2)

Subject: Today's Spectator
A little dose of reality on the prisoner abuse/interrogation issue, with thanks to Wayne Simmons.

The American Spectator

Jed L. Babbin

4/5/2008

(b)(6)

From: JedBabbin@ (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, January 24, 2005 9:18 AM
To: tmcinerney@ (b)(6); paulvalley@ (b)(6); nashct@ (b)(6); Glenstrae77@ (b)(6); BURM41516@ (b)(6); (b)(6)
Subject: Today's Spectator

A little dose of reality on the prisoner abuse/interrogation issue, with thanks to Wayne Simmons.

The American Spectator

Jed L. Babbin

(b)(6) (Home Office)
(b)(6) (Fax)
(b)(6) (Mobile)

4/5/2008

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, January 21, 2005 11:14 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Subject: FW: today's Spectator (Jed Babbin)

Thought you would enjoy this !!!!

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Researcher
Department of Defense
OSD Writers Group, Room (b)(2)
Telephone: (b)(2)

The American Spectator

Jed L. Babbin

4/5/2008

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, January 19, 2005 12:28 PM
To: larry.dirita@ (b)(6) Ruff, Eric, CIV, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; Keck, Gary, Col, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LCDR, OASD-PA
Subject: Coverage of Military Analysts' Trip - follow up memo
Attachments: MilitaryAnalysts.1.19.doc; MilitaryAnalystsExcerpts.1.19.doc

Media coverage of the seven military analysts' visits to Iraq was contained to: Paul Vallely, Bill Cowan, Steven Greer and Ken Allard. Vallely, Cowan and Greer appeared only on Fox News shows from January 13th - 17th, discussing their recent trips to Iraq in primarily positive terms. Allard was quoted in a Washington Times piece on the need for a larger U.S. military force in Iraq, which was reprinted by a handful of foreign news outlets.

Among issues highlighted by the analysts in television coverage:

- The Marines are a key force in maintaining security and stability in Iraq, and "finding the bad guys"
- The extensive security measures being implemented for the upcoming elections
- The "outstanding" training of Iraqi armies - we are "aggressively moving forward"
- The expected high voter turnout for the elections - could reach up to 80% of residents
- Fallujah is now the safest city in Iraq
- And, to a lesser extent, Iraq as a potential training ground for terrorists

Two documents are attached. On the left are the highlights; on the right are the excerpts + links.

4/5/2008

MILITARY ANALYSTS – IRAQ TRIP

AS OF 1/19/05

OSD(PA) Karabell/Walt/Heilsnis

HIGHLIGHTS

Paul Vallely

Paul Vallely appeared on Fox's DaySide with Linda Vester (talk show) on January 13th, discussing his recent trip to Iraq. He was extremely upbeat and spoke about the upcoming elections in Iraq in positive terms, saying they will absolutely happen as scheduled. He said he's very comfortable with the election situation, and that voter turnout will most likely be better than expected. A possible issue could be voter registration in certain provinces, due to security threats from insurgents.

Also appearing on Fox News Live on January 14th, he noted: the positive morale of the military in Iraq, the Marines as a key force in Iraq, and extremely tight, organized security measures for the upcoming elections. A summary of this appearance was available on a Fox News-focused blog, but the Fox transcript is not yet available.

Fox featured Paul Vallely again on "Fox and Friends" Saturday on January 15th where he repeated the same upbeat description of the voting situation in Iraq. He also mentioned that 13 million Iraqis have registered to vote and that the elections need to go forward as scheduled.

Fox News Channel:

- The Marines are "doing a great job" in Iraq
- Fallujah is probably now the safest city in Iraq right now, as citizens are coming back into neighborhoods, getting ID cards, supplies, etc.
- Iraqis are very active in helping their people, and finally taking the initiative, which they haven't been able to do up until this point
- Syria & Iran are causing a great deal of problems in the region by providing support to the insurgents
- Images of a Humvee retro-fitting plant in Iraq

Bill Cowan

Bill Cowan is also featured on the Fox News Channel on January 14th, 16th and 17th on shows such as "Heartland with John Kasich" and "Fox and Friends." Like Paul Vallely, his take on the Iraq situation was also upbeat. His one overriding statement was that if

the U.S. pulls out of Iraq now, then it would look like Afghanistan before we invaded (i.e. insurgent training camps). He also said he felt that the U.S. would be down to 50,000 troops by the end of the year.

Key points of discussion highlighted by Colonel Cowan:

- The U.S. is being aggressive in training an Iraqi police force
- It has trained “quick response” teams to respond to insurgents threatening Iraqi police forces
- There is increased communication between the Iraqi and U.S. soldiers
- He is upbeat about the number of Sunnis, Kurds and Shiites that will participate in the election process

Ken Allard

A story originally written by *The Washington Times* on news that U.S. military officials are seeking more troops in Iraq included commentary by Ken Allard. The piece was reprinted by several publications, including New Kerala (India), Big News Network (Australia), Assyrian International News Agency (Switzerland) and the World Peace Herald. Specifically, Allard said the current troop numbers are not sufficient to sustain fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, or to deter aggression in Europe and South Korea.

Steven Greer

Steven Greer, also on the Fox News Channel, addressed the primary issue of whether Iraq is just turning into another training ground for insurgents. This became a common theme across many of the military analysts interviewed and was previously a big story in *The Washington Post* (i.e. National Intelligence Council Report).

Sergeant Major Greer had the following to say:

- He focused on the fact that the U.S and Iraq need to work closely together to beat down and contain current terrorist activities in Iraq
- Said Iraq is not a “breeding ground” for terrorists but may possibly be providing “on the job training” to terrorists from other countries who have joined the fight in Iraq

Note: The following military analysts did not appear in media coverage:

- Robert Maginnis
- John Garrett
- Jeff McCausland

**MILITARY ANALYSTS – IRAQ TRIP
EXCERPTS
AS OF 1/19/05**

* Indicates excerpt was distributed as part of Friday's analyst update.

ONLINE COVERAGE

KENNETH ALLARD

U.S. officers in Iraq seek more troops: report

Pakistan Dawn - January 17

* Originally produced by *The Washington Times*; reprints by New Kerala (India), Big News Network (Australia), Assyrian International News Agency (Switzerland) and The World Peace Herald (global online source)

Ken Allard, a retired colonel and author of four books on national security, told the (Washington Times) newspaper that America needed to expand its military if it wanted to continue to shoulder its responsibilities abroad.

According to him, the current strength of 500,000-troop active force was not enough to fight wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and to deter aggression in Europe and South Korea. "I would start adding forces until it is demonstratively too much," Mr. Allard said. "What happens if somewhere something else goes wrong ... We are eating seed corn. In an 18-division requirement, we have a 10-division force," he said.

STEVEN GREER

Fox News Channel

1/14/2005 5:05:24 PM

Steve Greer is a retired U.S. Army command Sergeant Major and a senior fellow at the National Defense Council Foundation. The big question today, is Iraq a breeding ground for the next generation of terrorists? Greer: Hi, John, no, I don't think so, not yet, anyway. It certainly has the potential to become so. What you see here is Iraq is a training base. An area where your opportunistic terrorist -- can do on the job training. There are other breeding grounds in the Muslim world. Syria, Lebanon. Those are breeding grounds where the government and the military structure really lets these terrorist operations work unfettered. It was blown into a big story. Apparently sort of waving this at President Bush. You said it was going to be a free, fair democracy in Iraq that was safe from terrorists and now we have terrorists there. John: Why is it -- why wouldn't one conclude that Iraq is a terrorist training ground when they have so much opportunity to train killing Americans? Greer: Well, I certainly think that Iraq is a training ground but it is not a breeding ground for terrorists. The breeding ground comes from when the young terrorists or young individual and they teach them the ideology of hate. I think part of the issue -- the issue is that inside of Iraq the difference is that you have terrorists flooding in from other nation states. The reason why you have that is the nation states like Syria are reluctant to do anything. They're not happy that Iraq may turn into a democracy. The

monarchies are not happy that you may have an elected government next to them in their border region.

PAUL VALLELY

Fox News Channel 1/13/2005 1:33:28 PM *

DaySide with Linda Vester

Vallely: We had great meetings with the first cavalry division and the Marines up in Fallujah. They're doing so many things, but it's security, it's finding the bad guys. We're finding there's more foreigners now than we thought that have come across the borders, so they're working it and doing a great job but what they're doing for the people we can talk about. Just wonderful what we're doing for the people of Fallujah right now... In 60 days, it's the safest city they say in Iraq right now. The marines control it. Now the citizens are starting to come back into the neighborhoods, they're being given identification cards, which they really like, by the way. It gives them some status... I can't say enough about the marines up there doing a great job, the men and women. It's just fantastic.

Fox News Channel 1/13/2005 1:35:38 PM *

DaySide with Linda Vester

Linda: We have a question from a viewer by email. He says what more can be done to get more Iraqis to come forward to help the U.S. soldiers deliver a pinpoint and decisive blow to the insurgency? Vallely: Great question. Two things happening here. We're training more battalions each month. I saw many Iraqi soldiers out there, National Guard. They're doing the security work for the convoys over there. I saw them in downtown Fallujah, we're trying to put the best Iraqi face out there, and that's what we need to do, so the Iraqis are very active, they're very active in the polling stations, in getting those set up throughout the country for the election. So they're taking the initiative finally... Linda: but bottom line, you were comfortable with the vote going off January 30? Vallely: Very comfortable. I think it may be better than we think but there will be problems up in that area only because of registration.

Fox News (Fox and Friends Saturday)

01/15/05 08:23:06

Vallely: There are 13 million people registered to vote... up to 80 percent could vote... The people in Iraq have done a wonderful job of mapping out security for the polling stations... The elections need to go forward, the people there need to get involved in the process of democracy. The Iraqis have taken a lot of initiative, doing positive things in the midst of a lot of terrorism... but security will be the key. In Fallujah - the most marvelous, inspiring trip, to see what the Marines have done up there - it's now the most secure city...

BILL COWAN

Fox News Channel 1/14/2005 10:17:23 AM *

Well, joining us now with some insight, Lieutenant Colonel Bill Cowan who actually just returned from Iraq last week and live in Iraq "Newsweek" magazine's Baghdad bureau chief. Gentlemen, welcome both of you. Colonel Cowan, give us your take on this news that Iraq may be the new terrorist training ground. Cowan: Any fundamentalist out there who wants to be part of their future needs to be in Iraq to start honing up his skills to find out how to fight western, U.S. or coalition forces.

Fox News -- Heartland With John Kasich

01/16/05 04:35:49

John: Colonel, I know there is a sense that if we can continue to train them, you have been there you are more optimistic about the train, I look at Bosnia, it took us ten years to train the Bosnian Army. I mean you are not advocating we stay ten years. What's the responsible exit strategy here? Cowan: John, we have seen good results with the training we have done. In speaking to our American forces over there, those Iraqi battalions that not alongside us in Najaf, Samarra and Fallujah did an outstanding job. No complaints. One key part is we had American advisors alongside the guys and that's what we have now. A program to get American advisors with all of these Iraqi units that are coming out we can take Iraqi units have that combat experience now, well trained, we are finding good lead merits there. Our primary goal now in Iraq besides reconstruction, employment and all other things has to be to build an effective fighting force with the Iraqi Army.

John: Colonel, would you send your family there now? Cowan: My son has been in Iraq. I had a son who went there. He was in Afghanistan also. Like any parent whose children are worried over there I was worried the whole time. But it is interesting. I met with young troops, young troops in the reserves over there who had nothing bad to day. Good, highly motivated kids doing a mission and they felt strongly about it.

Fox News -- Fox and Friends

01/17/05 07:26:27

Joining us now to discuss that from his first-hand account is Fox news military analyst, Lieutenant Colonel Bill Cowan back from Iraq. Nice to be with you. Brian: the big difference between the last time you were there and this time. Cowan: Well, seeing what's happening to the Iraqi security forces, how we're really moving forward aggressively, Lieutenant General Petraeus to get qualified Iraqis out there, one putting advisors alongside the Iraqi forces, it bolsters their offense, capabilities and confidence, putting together quick reaction forces, so when they run into trouble, they have folks to help them out. Better communications, better equipment, getting things ready for the Iraqis to take over more responsibilities.

BLOG COVERAGE

PAUL VALLELY

"Happy Iraq" Turns Out To Be Not That Happy *

NewsHounds.us - blog - January 14

On FNL today (1/14), one interview stood out among the usual crop of likely suspects: Rick Folbaum (who substitutes for David Asman on Fridays) interviewed Paul Vallely, Fox News military analyst, who had recently returned from a trip to Iraq. The topic was

"Happy Iraq" -- & to listen to Valley, you'd think the US military had learned nothing in Vietnam.

...The interview was long on hyperbole, short on actual facts. Valley claimed there's "more successes than failures" & offered as an example of "success" that the "Marines have made Fallujah the safest city in Iraq" because "we took out the bad guys..." He added "We're defeating the enemy every time we can find them..." Folbaum acted enthusiastic about how "We are so proud" of what the US military is doing in Iraq & asked Valley what he thought we should be most proud of. Valley said he is "most proud of their morale" & of their "very, very positive attitude" in the face of "isolated incidents like the attacks today." Folbaum asked if there were any surprises while Valley was there. Valley replied that he was surprised by "how well organized they are for this election." Valley added that there will be "extraordinary security" for the upcoming election & he expects everything to go pretty smoothly "except up in Anbar province." He also admitted that the "amount of foreigners [is] greater than we thought..." Valley has been mentioned often on this website because of his frequent appearances on FNC, where he is always very gung-ho & rah-rah. Today was no exception.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 18, 2005 6:27 PM
To: Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA
Cc: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Keck, Gary, Col, OASD-PA; Merritt, Roxie T, CAPT, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Subject: comment for Mr. Di Rita re Hersh statement

Following please find some comments from one of the military analysts on the 17 January statement by Di Rita on Hersh article (sent as today's talking points per Mr. Di Rita).

Mr. Cowan as you know is an analyst for Fox (wears the black turtlenecks and has the white hair and beard). Retired LTC for Marines.

Col. Rhynedance - for you to forward as you see fit to Mr. Di Rita.

CC for others.

-----Original Message-----

From: bill_cowan [mailto:bill_cowan@ (b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, January 18, 2005 6:11 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: DoD Update - Iran

(b)(6)

please pass to Larry DaRita and others as further support to hersch's crap.

i was the OpsO at ISA during the period hersch talks about. Yellow Fruit wasn't about ISA, as he alleges. it was about the Army's ODSO. his BASIC premise of 'run-amuck' commandos is wrong from the outset. Yellow Fruit happened quickly and folks from ODSO went to jail. the Pentagon policed its own.

ISA wasn't involved in supporting the Contras and had no Central American ops that went awry. MOREOVER, i was a senior staffer on the Iran/Contra hearings shortly thereafter, in which ISA was NEVER mentioned.

go after the BASIC premise. specops guys, and ISA in particular, have done a GREAT job of supporting the Pentagon and the nation.

thanks.

resp'y,

bill cowan

-----Original Message-----

From: Military-Analysts List [mailto:MILITARY-ANALYSTS-L@DTIC.MIL] On Behalf Of (b)(6) OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 18, 2005 5:59 PM
To: MILITARY-ANALYSTS-L@DTIC.MIL
Subject: DoD Update - Iran

Attached please find the latest update from the Department of Defense.

<<TP 01-18-05 Iran.doc>>

Statement from Pentagon Spokesman Lawrence DiRita on Latest Seymour Hersh Article

The Iranian regime's apparent nuclear ambitions and its demonstrated support for terrorist organizations is a global challenge that deserves much more serious treatment than Seymour Hersh provides in the New Yorker article titled "The Coming Wars."

Mr. Hersh's article is so riddled with errors of fundamental fact that the credibility of his entire piece is destroyed.

Mr. Hersh's source(s) feed him with rumor, innuendo, and assertions about meetings that never happened, programs that do not exist, and statements by officials that were never made.

A sampling from this article alone includes:

* The post-election meeting he describes between the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not happen.

* The only civilians in the chain-of-command are the President and the Secretary of Defense, despite Mr. Hersh's confident assertion that the chain of command now includes two Department policy officials. His assertion is outrageous, and constitutionally specious.

* Arrangements Mr. Hersh alleges between Under Secretary Douglas Feith and Israel, government or non-government, do not exist. Here, Mr. Hersh is building on links created by the soft bigotry of some conspiracy theorists. This reflects poorly on Mr. Hersh and the New Yorker.

* Mr. Hersh cannot even keep track of his own wanderings. At one point in his article, he makes the outlandish assertion that the military operations he describes are so secret that the operations are being kept secret even from U.S. military Combatant Commanders. Mr. Hersh later states, though, that the locus of this super-secret activity is at the U.S. Central Command headquarters, evidently without the knowledge of the commander if Mr. Hersh is to be believed.

By his own admission, Mr. Hersh evidently is working on an "alternative history" novel. He is well along in that work, given the high quality of "alternative present" that he has developed in several recent articles.

Mr. Hersh's preference for single, anonymous, unofficial sources for his most fantastic claims makes it difficult to parse his discussion of Defense Department operations.

Finally, the views and policies Mr. Hersh ascribes to Secretary Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, Under Secretary Feith, and other Department of Defense officials do not reflect their public or private comments or administration policy.

(link to the Jan. 17, 2005 release
<<http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2005/nr20050117-1987.html>>)

(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, January 17, 2005 7:27 AM
To: Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; (b)(6)
 Capt. USMC, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; Keck, Gary, Col, OASD-PA; (b)(6)
 (b)(6) LCDR, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA
Subject: Re: New Ideas for Military analyst coverage - Iraq trip

This is a thoughtful note...I think it makes a lot of sense to do as you suggest and I guess I thought we already were doing a lot of this in terms of quick contact, etc...we ought to be doing this, though, and we should not make the list too small...

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA <Roxie.Merritt@(b)(6)>
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA <larry.dirita@(b)(6)>; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@(b)(6)>; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA <Allison.Barber@(b)(6)>; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA <Bryan.Whitman@(b)(6)>; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA <George.Rhynedance@(b)(6)>; (b)(6); Capt. USMC, OASD-PA (b)(6)
 Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA <Dallas.Lawrence@(b)(6)>; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA <Roxie.Merritt@(b)(6)>; Keck, Gary, Col, OASD-PA <gary.keck@(b)(6)> (b)(6)
 LCDR, OASD-PA (b)(6)
CC: (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA (b)(6)
Sent: Fri Jan 14 19:25:08 2005
Subject: RE:New Ideas for Military analyst coverage - Iraq trip

BACKGROUND:

One of the most interesting things coming from this trip to Iraq with the media analysts was learning how their jobs have been undergoing a metamorphosis. There are several reasons behind the morph... with an all voluntary military, no one in the media has current military background. Additionally, we have been doing a good job of keeping these guys informed so that they have the ready answers when the network comes calling.

CURRENT ISSUES:

The key issue here is that more and more, media analysts are having a greater impact on the television media network coverage of military issues. They have now become the go-to guys not only on breaking stories, but they influence the views on issues. They also have a huge amount of influence on what stories the network decides to cover proactively with regards to military.

In media ops, I have been using them more frequently to get our side of the story out with media sensitive departments such as USDI, which is typically hard to penetrate with traditionally media, but that we have found to be receptive to talking to the analysts such as Ken Robinson.

RECOMMENDATION:

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Roxie T. Merritt
Captain, U.S. Navy
Director, DoD Press Operations
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Pentagon, Room (b)(2)
Washington, DC 20301-1400
(b)(2)
cell (b)(2)
roxie.merritt@ (b)(6)
"Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of All Who Threaten It"

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/CNS [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, January 14, 2005 5:25 PM
To: larry.dirita (b)(6) Ruff, Eric, CIV, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; Keck, Gary, Col, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LCDR, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA; (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/CNS
Subject: Military analyst coverage - Iraq trip

Below is a summary of the most recent military analyst media items that appeared as a result of the trip to Iraq. We will distribute another report early next week on forthcoming items.

Attached please find the related media excerpts and links.

HIGHLIGHTS:

Paul Vallely appeared on Fox on January 13th, on DaySide with Linda Vester (talk show), discussing his recent trip to Iraq. He was extremely upbeat and spoke about the upcoming elections in Iraq in positive terms, saying they will absolutely happen as scheduled. He said he's very comfortable with the election situation, and that voter turnout will most likely be better than expected. A possible issue could be voter registration in certain provinces, due to security threats from insurgents.

He also noted that:

- * The Marines are "doing a great job" in Iraq
- * Fallujah is probably now the safest city in Iraq right now, as citizens are coming back into neighborhoods, getting ID cards, supplies, etc.
- * Iraqis are now very active in helping their people, and finally taking the initiative, which they haven't been able to do up until this point

Paul Vallely appeared on Fox News Live on January 14th, in which he noted: the positive morale of the military in Iraq, the Marines as a key force in Iraq, and extremely tight, organized security measures for the upcoming elections. A summary of this appearance was available on a Fox News-focused blog, but the Fox transcript is not yet available.

In military analyst broadcast appearances focusing on subjects other than Iraq:

- * Paul Vallely appeared on Fox's Hannity & Colmes on January 13th, discussing the situation in Indonesia, and tension about U.S. foreign aid
- * John Garrett appeared on Fox on January 12th to discuss U.S. military death benefits

and life insurance policies

* Analysis from Bill Cowan was included in a Fox News report from January 14th about Friday's CIA report on new terrorist threats ("Mapping the Global Future")

"Happy Iraq" Turns Out To Be Not That Happy

NewsHounds.us – blog – January 14

On FNL today (1/14), one interview stood out among the usual crop of likely suspects: Rick Folbaum (who substitutes for David Asman on Fridays) interviewed Paul Valley, Fox News military analyst, who had recently returned from a trip to Iraq. The topic was "Happy Iraq" -- & to listen to Valley, you'd think the US military had learned nothing in Vietnam.

... The interview was long on hyperbole, short on actual facts. Valley claimed there's "more successes than failures" & offered as an example of "success" that the "Marines have made Fallujah the safest city in Iraq" because "we took out the bad guys..." He added "We're defeating the enemy every time we can find them..." Folbaum acted enthusiastic about how "We are so proud" of what the US military is doing in Iraq & asked Valley what he thought we should be most proud of. Valley said he is "most proud of their morale" & of their "very, very positive attitude" in the face of "isolated incidents like the attacks today." Folbaum asked if there were any surprises while Valley was there. Valley replied that he was surprised by "how well organized they are for this election." Valley added that there will be "extraordinary security" for the upcoming election & he expects everything to go pretty smoothly "except up in Anbar province." He also admitted that the "amount of foreigners [is] greater than we thought..." Valley has been mentioned often on this website because of his frequent appearances on FNC, where he is always very gung-ho & rah-rah. Today was no exception.

Fox News Channel 1/14/2005 10:17:23 AM

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Fox News Channel 1/13/2005 1:35:38 PM

We have a question from a viewer by email. He says what more can be done to get more Iraqis to come forward to help the U.S. soldiers deliver a pinpoint and decisive blow to the insurgency? Great question. Two things happening here. We're training more battalions each month. I saw many Iraqi soldiers out there, National Guard. They're doing the security work for the convoys over there. I saw them in downtown Fallujah, we're trying to put the best Iraqi face out there, and that's what we need to do, so the Iraqis are very active, they're very active in the polling stations, in getting those set up throughout the country for the election. So they're taking the initiative finally. And they haven't been able to do that. They didn't know what taking the initiative was under Saddam Hussein. Now they're finding out as we work with them, they're taking the initiative for projects and helping their own people and this is just wonderful news. Linda: from the troops you were able to talk to, when you're out and about the -- Syria, Iran, a bigger problem and what we hear Baathists in Syria still funding the insurgency, some of the fighters right after they kill them -- I mean, they were being killed, they were found with cash on them. That's right. As they found the insurgents in Fallujah, many of them had \$200 to \$300 in

American money, cash, which means they had just got paid, so this is all being -- Linda: didn't get paid by Joe's construction company. That's exactly right. Didn't get work -- paid from work in Fallujah, from outside sources paying them, so the situation with Syria is very bad, and we need to really take some action over there in some ways because they're fueling the fires there. Linda: but bottom line, you were comfortable with the vote going off January 30? Very comfortable. I think it may be better than we think but there will be problems up in that area only because of registration. Linda: wow, thank you for coming here on zero sleep and welcome back home.

Fox News Channel 1/13/2005 1:33:28 PM

That's half, so the numbers are looking good and this was done by an independent poll. Linda: this is even though the Al Anbar province is the real challenge up there because they haven't been able to go out and register them because of the threats of the insurgents that are out there to terrorize them. Linda: what do you do about it? Well, to continue what we're doing. We had great meetings with the first cavalry division and the Marines up in Fallujah. They're doing so many things, but it's security, it's finding the bad guys. We're finding there's more foreigners now than we thought that have come across the borders, so they're working it and doing a great job but what they're doing for the people we can talk about. Just wonderful what we're doing for the people of Fallujah right now. Linda: yeah, I was surprised that you saw in Fallujah that it's so safe. I mean, that was always considered the worst. We know what happened to American contractors when they rolled in there and it's now really that safe? In 60 days, it's the safest city they say in Iraq right now. The marines control it. Now the citizens are starting to come back into the neighborhoods, they're being given identification cards, which they really like, by the way. It gives them some status. Linda: really? Yeah. They come through, get identified, they come to the next tent, they get a big box of food, water, and some other staples, and then they move out and they're open from 8:00 to 5 every day so more and more are coming back in, and it's just -- I can't say enough about the marines up there doing a great job, the men and women. It's just fantastic. [Applause] Linda: I'm going to tell you, it's by pure accident we happen to have two marines in our audience and I just want you to know, he wasn't pitching that for you. That's what he really saw. Those are pictures of General Vallely during the trip. We have a question from a viewer by email. He says what more can be done to get more Iraqis to come forward to help the u.s. soldiers deliver a pinpoint and decisive blow to the insurgency?...

(b)(6)

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 04, 2005 3:47 PM
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: Fw: Military Analyst Heads up

Interesting feedback from an analyst.

Allison Barber
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

Sent from my BlackBerry Handheld.

-----Original Message-----

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA <Dallas.Lawrence@(b)(6)>
To: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA <Allison.Barber@(b)(6)>
Sent: Tue Jan 04 15:31:32 2005
Subject: FW: Military Analyst Heads up

id rather forward this to you and then you to di rita as you see appropriate.

-----Original Message-----

From: Allardck, (b)(6) [mailto:Allardck@(b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, January 04, 2005 3:28 PM
To: Dallas.Lawrence@(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: Re: Military Analyst Heads up

Dallas - Can you please pass this along to Larry Di Rita?

It's no longer my function to advise DOD leaders, but may I make three informal suggestions about your communications strategy in the current tsunami crisis?

1. It is not obvious to general audiences or the media how a CVN or an LHA can contribute to the remediation of a natural disaster. For example: virtually every capability that Kofi Anan called for over the weekend is typically represented by such battle groups. Those points need to be communicated using jargon-free, non-programmatic language (otherwise known as dumb-dumb speak). And the flag officers chosen to communicate that message fail in their mission if they cannot explain those functions convincingly to third graders.

2. Same point needs to be made about mil-to-mil contacts in which PACOM excels. All those otherwise incomprehensible combined exercises, FTXs and educational exchanges can now be seen as critical investments that today are making a difference - just when they are needed most. The fact that most of those things occur well below the media "noise level" should not blind us to their importance.

3. Defenselink is not a helpful source of information when you're working a time-critical story: too much information, buried way too deep with far too much DOD-speak. Same assessment can be offered about PAC apparatus in DOD as well as the services. In a useful contrast today, I received some very helpful information this morning from an action officer who was far more concerned with helping me tell an accurate story rather than worrying about a fully coordinated "official position."

I respected that and never ratted out his name on TV. Suspect I'm speaking for most of the military analysts in suggesting that we couldn't care less about official positions and authoritative statements from on high: but we do try and get it right under some fairly severe time constraints. Anything helping us do that is incredibly valuable and likely helps DOD as well: but anything that's too late or too self-serving is worse than useless. Bottom line: say a few things well!

And thanks again!

Colonel Ken Allard
MSNBC

|

(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 04, 2005 12:33 PM
To: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: HELP!!!!

I was thinking someone in between him and abizaid. For instance, is gen Lessel in his world?

-----Original Message-----

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 04, 2005 12:21 PM
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Subject: RE: HELP!!!!

he is the deputy PAO and has been one of many people working on this trip. they don't have a dedicated flight for us out of kuwait to iraq -- so they are going to do their best to help us. these things usually work out but actually, if you could zip a note to gen abazaid, that would really clear things up.

the request:

we are sending military analysts over and this is a high priority for the department. we need full support to include airlift from kuwait to iraq.

is that possible?

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 04, 2005 12:10 PM
To: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: HELP!!!!

Who is he? Who does he work for?

-----Original Message-----

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 04, 2005 12:08 PM
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Cc: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Subject: HELP!!!!

could use some ASD muscle please. will you please zip an email to (b)(6) letting him know the iraq trip is a high priority for dod?

thanks... if you ever need muscle support from me -- you are in trouble!

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) LTC CFLCC/3A-ATL-PAO
[mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, January 04, 2005 10:59 AM
To: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA;
(b)(6) LTC ARMY/III Corps MNC-I PAO; (b)(6) LTC
MNC-I PAO Media Officer; (b)(6) MAJ MNC-I PAO; (b)(6)
(b)(6) LTC MNF-I C1 Trip Planner; (b)(6) LTC; (b)(6)
MAJ; (b)(6) (b)(6) LTC
CFLCC/3A-ATL-PAO; (b)(6) Lt Col CFLCC/3A-FWD-PAO; (b)(6)

MAJ CFLCC/3A-FWD-PAO; (b)(6) COL MNC-I C9; (b)(6) COL
MNF-I STRATCOM DEP DIR PAO; (b)(6); (b)(6)
MNF-I CG PAO; (b)(6) LTC MNC-I PAO Media Officer; Pittman, CAPT
Harold E.; (b)(6) COL
CFLCC/3A-ATL-PAO
Subject: RE: Iraq Trip

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE

Sir,

We are continuing to work the issue of dedicated aircraft or priority seating on available aircraft. Although the commanders support this media facilitation they have not necessarily signed up to prioritize air assets for this purpose over other resources in support of operations in theater - It would be very helpful to have a SECDEF endorsement to encourage priority or dedicated aircraft.

My counterpart in Kuwait, LTC (b)(6) is attempting to coordinate for dedicated Sherpa support.

(b)(6)

It would help if LTG Metz/MNC-I requested through official message traffic for CFLCC to provide dedicated Sherpa support for this mission.

VR
LTC (b)(6)
Deputy PAO
Third Army/ARCENT/CFLCC
Atlanta

(b)(2)

DSN (b)(2)
Cell (b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA [mailto:Dallas.Lawrence@ (b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, January 04, 2005 10:29 AM
To: (b)(6) LTC ARMY/III Corps MNC-I PAO; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC CFLCC/3A-ATL-PAO; (b)(6) LTC MNC-I PAO Media Officer; (b)(6) MAJ MNC-I PAO; (b)(6) LTC MNF-I C1 Trip Planner; (b)(6) LTC; (b)(6) MAJ; (b)(6)
(b)(6) Lt Col CFLCC/3A-FWD-PAO; (b)(6) MAJ CFLCC/3A-FWD-PAO; (b)(6)
(b)(6) COL MNC-I C9; (b)(6) COL MNF-I STRATCOM DEP DIR PAO; (b)(6)
(b)(6) MNF-I CG PAO; (b)(6) LTC MNC-I PAO Media Officer
Cc: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Iraq Trip

(b)(6)

Hearing that there might be an issue getting a dedicated flight into Iraq from Kuwait. I know this is not in your lane, but wanted to get your guidance. My understanding was this would be taken care of from Kuwait's end once our TCR was approved (which it has).

Also, FYI, ASDPA has added Captain Roxie Merritt, director of press ops, to our trip, she will be on hand to manage the 2 bureau chiefs along for the trip and Fred Barnes if he does indeed confirm his attendance today.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) LTC ARMY/III Corps MNC-I PAO [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, January 04, 2005 4:58 AM
To: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC CFLCC/3A-ATL-PAO; (b)(6) LTC MNC-I PAO Media Officer; (b)(6) MAJ MNC-I PAO; (b)(6) LTC MNF-I C1 Trip Planner; (b)(6)

(b)(6) MAJ; (b)(6)
LTC CFLCC/3A-ATL-PAO; (b)(6)
MAJ CFLCC/3A-FWD-PAO; (b)(6) COL MNF-I
STRATCOM DEP DIR PAO; (b)(6) LTC
MNC-I PAO Media Officer
Cc: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Iraq Trip

Dallas,

Happy New Year!

We'll see what we can do - I'm not going to promise. One of the challenges is that MNF-I have declared a moratorium on visits into theater, because of the resources (like aircraft) being dedicated to the election security mission and the increased troop flow into theater, etc. We have received a waiver for your group to visit. The challenges will be air transportation for such a large group (it would take two helicopters - that's why when I signed up to do this from MNC-I, it was under the assumption that we would try to organize events in the Greater Camp Victory/BIAP Complex Area of Operations). Travel to places like Falluja will be difficult to do.

At this point we have planned on scheduling LTG Metz to talk to the group and MG Chiarelli and/or BG Hammond from the 1st Cav. Also, last night I talked to COL Holbert from I MEF and she is going to talk to her leadership about sending somebody to talk to the group.

As far as site visits are concerned - this will be hard in such a limited time. Is it possible for the group to stay another day? I've been talking to LTC (b)(6) from 1st Cav - there could possibly be a visit to see construction and the security situation in Thawra (Sadr City) - but to make it worthwhile we need to dedicate a day to this.

Also, one of the questions folks have asked me for clarification, is: What kind of products do we expect to get out of this? I would hate to organize all the security and logistics for that size group to go to Thawra or Falluja, etc. for only a limited return on investment. Let me know your thoughts.

I will talk to COL (b)(6) at I MEF to see if it is worthwhile and assets are available to visit Falluja or maybe Najaf or Ramadi. I will also consult with our C-9 (CMO) - COL (b)(6) about the best venues for reconstruction that fit out constraints.

As far as the IIG piece is concerned, I'll punt that back up to STRATCOM to COL (b)(6) & COL (b)(6) for visibility on PM Allawi.

As soon as we can get more granularity on your itinerary - if we can get it on SIPR - it will be helpful. It is hard to book specific times for GOs in particular without specific times.

As far as the issues in Kuwait are concerned, I've copied LTC (b)(6) and MAJ (b)(6) in Kuwait as well as LTC (b)(6) in Atlanta. I defer to them.

Thanks, Dan

P.S. Reminder all of these guys need to bring their own Body Armor & Helmets.

(b)(6)
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
Chief of Public Affairs
Multi-National Corps - Iraq
Camp Victory Main, Baghdad -
DSN (b)(2)
MCI Cell (b)(6) (U.S.)

Iraqna Cell (b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA [mailto:Dallas.Lawrence@ (b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, January 03, 2005 9:59 PM
To: (b)(6) LTC CFLCC/3A-ATL-PAO; (b)(6) LTC MNC-I PAO
Media Officer; (b)(6) LTC ARMY/III Corps MNC-I PAO; (b)(6)
(b)(6) MAJ MNC-I PAO; (b)(6) LTC MNF-I C1 Trip Planner
Cc: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Iraq Trip
Importance: High

Gentleman,

I wanted to bring everyone into the loop now that we finally have country clearance approval for our OSDPA Military Analyst trip into Iraq. For obvious security reasons (and my lack of sipr) I will avoid using specific dates, however I think you are all keyed into the dates we are traveling into the theater.

Right now, in addition to the 9 or so military analysts on the trip, we will be bringing two bureau chiefs.

Desired outcomes:

- 1) Provide our television military analysts with 1st person knowledge of the successes in Iraq, both militarily and in rebuilding the infrastructure and democratic institutions.
- 2) Provide 1st person knowledge on the progress being made towards elections on 30 January and the Iraqi's desire for a free and democratic country

Our three day trip will be comprised as follows:

Day 1: Our group will arrive into Kuwait and be picked up and taken to the Kuwait base. opportunity to eat with troops, and attend any late afternoon briefings the folks in Kuwait want to put together (this is at the request of the folks in Kuwait).

Day 2, early am departure for Iraq

Day 3, evening departure for Kuwait

"Dream" Schedule, these are the things we would like to fit into the 38 hours or so we will be in the country:

- 1) Briefings by MNFI on military status in Iraq. Note, this is not a 1-1 interview, but a group unclassified on the record briefing. 1-2 hours
- 2) trip to fallujah (again, dream scenario) to allow the group to meet with the Marine commanders to help our folks understand the huge successes achieved in Fallujah and their positive ripple effects throughout Iraq. This message has not resonated in the States. SecDef has reinforced it time and time again during briefings as has CJCS.
- 3) Briefing on status of elections from election team officials on the ground
- 4) Meeting with senior Iraqi leaders - ideally 15-20 minutes with PM Allawi or President Ghazi
- 5) Visit to a US reconstruction project to show signs of progress.
- 6) Lots of eating with troops, lunch, dinner etc

I am open to any and all changes that you folks would recommend that would better allow us to meet the objectives of this trip while meeting your trip goals as well.

Dan, it will be great to see you again, please let me know if there is anything I can bring you or your guys from the states and Ill pack the extra bag. LTC (b)(6) who is cc'd above, will be advancing the Kuwait leg of our trip and will be traveling in country with us.

Please advise on the following: Does an up to date DOD CAC card still provide access into Kuwait without a Visa, and 2) for our non CAC card folks, I have been told that folks arriving into Kuwait can process their Visa at the airport as long as they have an up-to-date passport. Is this correct, and is the office open 24/7 (we have a few late arrivals coming in in the evening of the 1st day)

Best,

dl

Dallas B. Lawrence
Director, Office of Community Relations & Public Liaison United States
Department of Defense
(b)(2)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE

(b)(6)

From: Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, December 30, 2004 7:28 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: Good News

FYI. Been working on this one with Ken Robinson at CNN since this past summer. We are finally getting some traction on it.

Captain, U.S. Navy
Director, DoD Press Operations

(b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: Pittman, CAPT Harold E. (USN) [mailto:pittmahe@^{(b)(6)}]
Sent: Thursday, December 30, 2004 11:34 AM
To: 'Robinson, Ken'; Lessel, Erwin F. (O-7); 'Lessel, Erwin F. III Brig Gen MNE-I DCS STRATCOM'
Cc: (b)(6) MNF-I CG PAO; (b)(6) COL MNF-I STRATCOM; (b)(6) LCDR
(b)(6); 'roxie.merritt@^{(b)(6)}'; (b)(6) LTC ARMY/III Corps MNC-I PAO; (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: Good News

Ken -

I like it. I am cc'ing the senior leadership of MNF-I Strategic Communications - Brigadier GEN Irv Lessel, & COLs (b)(6) on my response to you... General, (b)(6) - Ken Robinson is the national security producer for CNN who also happens to be a retired Army SOF guy... Ken is also the brains behind the CNN Presents GWOT program we are working with Aaron Brown as the host.

This is an opportunity to get some good news coverage from Iraq on CNN - You essentially provide some factoids to Ken that can be used on the program and line up an interview from in country (using DVIDs) that could (I am assuming) be taped or could air live...

Thoughts?

Thanks, vr/Hal

-----Original Message-----

From: Robinson, Ken [mailto:Ken.Robinson@^{(b)(6)}]
Sent: Thursday, December 30, 2004 7:24 PM
To: 'pittmahe@^{(b)(6)}'
Cc: (b)(6); 'roxie.merritt@^{(b)(6)}'
Subject: Good News

If I had some guidance, factoids, and a bit of access, I could envision a story about the REMARKABLE works that have been accomplished, under the most HOSTILE conditions imagined...as we lead in to the elections...

Things such as roads, schools, hospitals, shelters, jobs, training, ALL done, on almost a daily basis, while under fire....

4/5/2008

A counter to the IF IT BLEEDS IT LEADS story +

We could call it "the rest of the story, drowned out by the sound of a gun or bomb...the bomb sound dies out, the schools, educated children, the infrastructure makes life better for the next generation.

I'd grab a big guest from Capt Roxie Merritt....so tape from the region, and some q and a, and place it in primetime, Sunday slot, 6PM.

I would start this on Jan 9th, 18:00p, then roll it into Jan 10th, 13:00 to 15:30.

Then put all the factoids into a web article on CNN.Com.

This would be to balance the bloody shirt of the day reporting, ALL Networks are guilty of...

Any takers?

VR,

Ken

(b)(6)

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld (www.BlackBerry.net)

4/5/2008

(b)(6)

From: Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, December 29, 2004 7:31 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: Summary of Mr. O'Connell's interview on the Tony Snow Show

FYI.

Captain, U.S. Navy
Director, DoD Press Operations

(b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6), LTC, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, December 29, 2004 5:14 PM
To: Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) Maj. OASD-PA
Subject: Summary of Mr. O'Connell's interview on the Tony Snow Show

Ma'am,

As discussed, the interview went very well. It lasted 30 minutes. They took no calls. Instead they stuck to the enclosed format that Col (ret.) Bill Cowan had sent (see email below). Cowan was the stand-in for Snow. Mr. O'Connell making the following key points:

The Goldwater-Nichols and Cohen-Nunn acts significantly changed SF for the better and changed it from being a strp child to an integral part of the military. Both acts ensure close civilian supervision, increased coordination and increased capability. The bottom line is that Congress acted wisely with Goldwater-Nichols and Cohen-Nunn.

Reviewed Enduring Special Operations Truths:
Humans are more important than hardware.
Quality is better than quantity.
SOF cannot be mass produced.
SOF cannot be created after emergencies arise.

Noted SF troops are due to increase from 49k to 52k next fiscal yea.

Replied to the question about women in SF by noting that while some units are closed to them (e.g. Green Berets, Seals, etc.) that women are at the HQ elements and with PSYOP and civil affairs. Also said ... "they're part of the team. We're proud of them."

Noted current accomplishments of SF

- Seals seizure of Oil Platforms in OIF prevented an ecological disaster and saved \$10B in damages.
- 10th SF in Northern Iraq got in prior to OIF and helped pin down 13 Iraqi divisions.
- 7th SF in Colombia have been instrumental in transforming the Colombian military and containing the FARQ.

Noted the future of SF depends on POTUS and SecDef but regardless of their future plans SF will have a role in helping deal with ungovernable areas of the world.

R/

(b)(6)

Lt. Col. (USA)
OASD Press Operations
phone: (b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: bill_cowan [mailto:bill_cowan@(b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, December 27, 2004 9:38 AM
To: (b)(6) Maj OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: O'Connell interview on 12/29

(b)(6)

for wednesday's show, i basically want to do the following:

introduce the Secretary properly by noting his distinguished background and the fact that he's uniquely qualified for the job.

talking briefly about how SpecOps has changed since the legislation of '87. that is, how it looked before and how it looks now.

mention what roles/missions each of the services play in the SpecOps community, including some of the training they go through.

talk about the role of women in the SpecOps community.

talk about what SpecOps is doing in Iraq and Afghanistan.

talk about the role of SpecOps in the future.

under no circumstances will i ask or push for information which is classified or even close to it, nor will i talk politics inside or outside the beltway. this should be an enjoyable session. we've got LOTS of listeners around the country, some catching it on delayed broadcast, so we'll avoid talking about 'morning'.

questions/concerns? call me at (b)(6)

could i get a copy of his resume?

thanks much.

resp'y,

bill

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) Maj. OASD-PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, December 07, 2004 10:43 AM
To: 'bill_cowan@(b)(6)'
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY
Subject: O'Connell interview on 12/29

Sir,
Mr. O'Connell forwarded your request for interview on the 29th. My pleasure to arrange.
Feel free to give me a call and we can set it up.

v/r
MAJ (b)(6)
Public Affairs Officer, OASD(PA)
Office: (b)(2)
Mobile:
Fax: (b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, December 28, 2004 7:09 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Let the Big Dog Run (Babbin)

Busy enough for you? Well done all around...with schmitt, you should turn it into a virtue and acknowledge directly that the senior leaders of the department, including service second's, depsec, and secdef, have reached out to key members and they have been appreciative for the consultation and understand all we are trying to do...you might suggest that if staff and others are unaware, it is understandable that they may be anxious but that since everything is pre-decisional we are trying to focus the info at the member level only...no specifics as to who has been called, but the fact that there has been outreach and consultation so the members would be able to put disconnected and out of context stories (such as loren thompson's) into perspective...assume schmitt has loren's piece and suggest that there may be outcries by people out of the loop or wedded to the past, but that the members seemed to understand and know that transformation requires tough choices...a thought...great work today...

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@^{(b)(6)}>
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA <larry.dirita@^{(b)(6)}>
Sent: Tue Dec 28 19:01:03 2004
Subject: RE: Let the Big Dog Run (Babbin)

yes. i spoke with him and he has waived off the story for now. gave him erv's assessments of hmx involvement and held back erv's specific statement. he said if it wasn't hmx then it had to be pe4. i said that would be one that was under consideration and reminded that the investigation is ongoing. i told him he is the only reporter to work this angle and that i would be int touch with him if i got any indications that something had changed. he was very sanguine about the whole thing. i've informed fred jones at nsc.

meantime, i've learned from barry venerable that all explosives have a "tag it", which is a chemical that is mixed in that will not be destroyed in an explosion. this "tag it" is meant to be a fingerprint that allows investigators to trace the munition back to its manufacturer. i've asked barry to go ask the army if the tag its for the hmx in al qaqaa were ever known. told him to press hard.

also spoke to eric schmitt. he has the story on the f22. i would not confirm the number of aircraft to be produced and he said he had the info (around 150 total) from dod, admin and hill sources. he asked if we had been talking to the hill and i confirmed that. i worked from the talking points and started up front on the bullets pertaining to the budget we are developing -- accelerate army transition to more powerful and deployable force, transformation, etc. then worked in the qdr talking point and others in the f22 talkers.

i'm fairly certain his original source on this was capitol hill. he also had spoken to omb public affairs.

regarding tsunami, the president will be making a statement tomorrow. i've asked marine bg. john allen, head of asian-pacific affairs in rodman's shop, to put together a gaggle for our reporters afterward. we need to knit together all that is being done.

thanks, eric

-----Original Message-----

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, December 28, 2004 6:45 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Let the Big Dog Run (Babbin)

Read it...it is pretty rough, even if well intended...p.s. Saw your note about the talk radio progress...terrific!!...any more about sanger?

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@^{(b)(6)}>
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA <larry.dirita@^{(b)(6)}>
Sent: Tue Dec 28 18:29:33 2004
Subject: FW: Let the Big Dog Run (Babbin)

hopefully you can read this version. lemme know if you think i should reconsider whether to send. i think we should go by my initial thought, btw. thanks, eric

-----Original Message-----

From: ^{(b)(6)} CIV OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, December 28, 2004 2:23 PM
To: ^{(b)(6)} CIV OASD-PA
Subject: Let the Big Dog Run (Babbin)

Great Article by Jed Babbin

^{(b)(6)}

Let the Big Dog Run
By Jed Babbin <MailTo:editor@spectator.org>
Published 12/28/2004 12:08:57 AM

Dan Rather grimaces whenever pronouncing the man's name. MO Dowd, the New York Times's anti-testosterone columnist, is so crazed by him that she writes lousy poetry attacking him. John McCain says he has no confidence in him, and the most prominent members of the Ankle-Biter Caucus -- Trent Lott, Chuck Hagel and Susan Collins -- all line up to take their shots at Big Dog Donald Rumsfeld, the man they love to hate. Even Wade Sanders -- one of the Swift Boat vets who campaigned for Kerry -- is in on the act. Sanders sounds a lot like Lott, Hagel, and Collins. Or is it the other way around?

The harpies of the left -- and the opportunists of the right -- realize that because the path to victory or defeat in any war is strewn with setbacks and mistakes, Rumsfeld is much more exposed to their flak than newly reelected President Bush. Rumsfeld stands for everything they despise about President Bush: decisiveness, directness and -- most unforgivably -- impatience with those who most richly deserve it. Like the CIA, the State Department, and the U.N., just for starters. Mr. Rumsfeld actually had the audacity to call Old Europe by its proper name and, according to Ken Timmerman's book, The French Betrayal of America, was fond of quoting your humble servant's words, "Going to war without France is like going deer hunting without an accordion. You just leave a lot of noisy, useless baggage behind." Oh, the horror.

THE LATEST KERFUFFLE resulted from a session Mr. Rumsfeld had with soldiers in Iraq on December 8, where he answered a soldier's question about the scarcity of armor for light vehicles in Iraq. If you listen to MoDo, CBS and John McCain, you would believe Rumsfeld told the soldier, "that's a stupid question, and we don't worry about it because we don't give a damn about your life or safety." But that's not even close to what he said.

The "question" -- really a short speech written by a reporter -- said, "Our soldiers have been fighting in Iraq for coming up on three years. A lot of us are getting ready to move north relatively soon. Our vehicles are not armored. We're digging pieces of rusted scrap metal and compromised ballistic glass that's already been shot up, dropped, busted, picking the best out of this scrap to put on our vehicles to take into combat. We do not have proper armament vehicles to carry with us north."

Mr. Rumsfeld responded honestly and at length. He said he talked to the commanding general on the way out to meet the soldiers about the pace at which the vehicles are being armored. He said, the vehicles "have been brought from all over the world, wherever

they're not needed, to a place here where they are needed. I'm told that they are being -- the Army is -- I think it's something like 400 a month are being done. And it's essentially a matter of physics. It isn't a matter of money. It isn't a matter on the part of the Army of desire. It's a matter of production and capability of doing it.

"As you know, you go to war with the Army you have. They're not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time. Since the Iraq conflict began, the Army has been pressing ahead to produce the armor necessary at a rate that they believe -- it's a greatly expanded rate from what existed previously, but a rate that they believe is the rate that is all that can be accomplished at this moment." In short, an honest answer from a concerned leader. (You can read the transcript of the whole session here <<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20041208-secdef1761.html>>.) And, though you'll never learn this from the ankle-biters, Rumsfeld received a standing ovation from the troops when the session ended.

EVER SINCE THE FALL of Baghdad, Mr. Rumsfeld has suffered one media feeding frenzy after another. When the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal broke, he and Joint Chiefs chairman Gen. Dick Myers were subjected to a six-hour marathon of congressional hearings in which they were subjected to little speeches by little men aimed more at scoring a sound bite on the evening news than at getting answers. He has been accused of spending too much on the war, and too little. His faults are found in every failure on the battlefield and in the nation-building process we are pursuing in Iraq. Few know, and fewer still care, about the facts of the latter.

In the planning for the Iraq campaign, Mr. Rumsfeld proposed a plan in which a provisional government would have been formed before the invasion, and would have taken over immediately, reducing the need for American presence, and making our presence that of one ally helping another. A competing plan, advanced by Colin Powell and George Tenet, chose an extended occupation with Iraq ruled by a MacArthur-like consul, and gradual turnover of Iraq to an interim government chosen by the major representatives of the Iraqi population. The President chose the latter, the wrong plan, and then stuck Rumsfeld with the job of implementing a plan Rumsfeld knew was not likely to succeed. In the past twenty months, the interim government wasn't formed as predicted, because some of the major Iraqi leaders -- most notably leading Shia cleric Ali al-Sistani -- refused to play L. Paul Bremer's diplomatic games. Worse still, the President hasn't yet decided to deal with the insurgency at its sources. Without the support of Syria and Iran, the insurgency wouldn't be able to continue under the constant pressure of Coalition military action.

Now, with the Iraqi election scheduled in about five weeks, Rumsfeld is still struggling to push the Iraqis into democracy, and with mixed results. Predictably, the U.N. -- whose function it is to assist new democracies in running elections -- has refused to help bail America out of a situation that the U.N. opposed. In Iraq, a nation of about 24 million, tens of thousands of election assistance representatives should be on the ground. Instead, the UN has -- so far -- provided fewer than fifty. And, somehow, to those who oppose the President and the war we are fighting, that's all Rumsfeld's fault. Nonsense.

FORTUNATELY FOR MR. RUMSFELD, and for us, the President has spoken forcefully in support of Rumsfeld and the job he is doing. And for every CBS there is a Mitch McConnell. For every New York Times or CNN, there is a Pete Domenici, a Bill Frist, a Kay Bailey Hutchison and a Jim Inhofe. And a Jeff Sessions. All of those senators have spoken out in Mr. Rumsfeld's defense, and quieted the media feeding frenzy. For a while.

Alabama Republican Jeff Sessions is one of Rumsfeld's most respected and outspoken supporters. He took time from his Christmas Eve shopping trip to talk to me about the current attacks on the Big Dog. Sessions said Rumsfeld is a "remarkable man. He's been the point man in the war on terror from the beginning." Rumsfeld "understands the military and its need to transform."

I asked Sen. Sessions what motivates Rumsfeld's critics. He said there were three reasons. First, he said, "the Democrats are determined to find fault" in the war and how it is being run. Sessions sees that in any war, the enemy evolves and so must we. He said, "Rumsfeld, the President and all of their team have to be on top of this and able to change tactics at a moment's notice." He's confident they are, and are getting the job done.

The second reason, Sessions said, is that "people who have been supportive of the war, including some editors, are now more difficult." Many of those who advocated the Iraq campaign most vehemently are now afraid that they'll be blamed for its failures and the sacrifices our troops are called upon to make it succeed. Though Sessions didn't say it, it's clear that some of those vehement advocates of invading Iraq -- including one notable neocon magazine -- are political cowards. Sessions said, "The second-guessers enjoy coming out and shooting the [politically] wounded." It's not hard to figure out who he meant.

The third reason is that there is always "some temptation to play for the media." If you're a Republican senator, the best way to buy a place on Meet the Press is to criticize the President. Because the President is in so strong a position, it's not possible to damage him -- yet -- by carping about the daily problems in Iraq. That leaves the people who are running the show as the only practical target, and that means Mr. Rumsfeld.

MR. RUMSFELD SUFFERS from one of the faults his boss often displays: loyalty to those who are not loyal to him, and those who don't do their jobs well. It's unheard of to be three years into a war and never to have fired a general. The military leadership Mr. Rumsfeld works with is not of his creation. Those generals rose to prominence under the Clintons, and many are more politically minded than warrior-like. Neither Rumsfeld nor the President has fired a single one, despite some bad decisions and -- in the case of former Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki -- not only bad judgment but political campaigning against the President's plans and objectives. Shinseki should have been fired, but wasn't. Too many of the Clinton-chosen bureaucrat-generals remain on duty today, though warriors should long ago have taken their place. Military transformation means transforming the generals, not just the hardware.

But Jeff Sessions has it right. As another Southern gentleman of my acquaintance often says, "If you can't run with the big dogs, you'd better go sit on the porch." That admonition should be taken to heart by all the ankle biters in Congress and the press who are calling for the beheading of Big Dog Don Rumsfeld. Their criticisms -- especially those coming from congressional Republicans -- are the worst sort of cowardice and political opportunism.

TAS Contributing Editor Jed Babbin is the author of *Inside the Asylum: Why the UN and Old Europe Are Worse Than You Think* (Regnery Publishing).

(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, December 28, 2004 9:44 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: Fw: Spectator.org

I can't open this piece I got from bill luti but you may want to look at it and send it to the boss if you think appropriate...bill says it is too harsh for the bird

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: wl <prowlere@(b)(6)>
To: larry.dirita2@osd.mil <larry.dirita2@(b)(6)>
Sent: Tue Dec 28 09:37:56 2004
Subject: Spectator.org

The following article from Spectator.org was sent to you by wl.

Let the Big Dog Run

By Jed Babbin

The neocon-Dem chorus bashing Don Rumsfeld is way off base. Sen. Jeff Sessions concurs.

Message from Sender: Larry, not for Early Bird (hits generals), but SecDef might like to read it. Bill

You can read this story in its entirety on the web at:
http://www.Spectator.org/dsp_article.asp?art_id=7556

The article is protected by copyright and should not be printed or distributed for anything except personal use.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, December 24, 2004 12:23 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: Re: thank you

Happy to help. I forwarded this to bill turenne - he is in on monday.
I am back on tuesday.

Merry christmas!!!!

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA <Eric.Ruff@
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thu Dec 23 17:58:21 2004
Subject: thank you

(b)(6) thanks for your help today, it was really great to get your support. below is the memo i sent to sd. merry christmas. eric

DECEMBER 23, 2004 MEMO FOR THE SECDEF from RUFF

CC: DIRITA

SUBJECT: Talk Radio Interviews

Congressman Jim Marshall, D-GA, will be interviewed today by Roger Hedgecock, KOGO, San Diego.

Senator Sessions will talk with Dom Giordano, WPHT, Philadelphia, today.

As we make contact with radio hosts or their producers, we are suggesting interviews with Marshall, Sessions, Domenici, Mica and Saxton. We also mention Hunter, Kyl, Cornyn, McConnell and Inhofe. We are providing press statements and other material to the programs.

Looking ahead to next week and beyond, Michael Smerconish, WPTH, Philadelphia, is filling in for Bill O'Reilly's radio program. He is interested in talking with some of the members and we are to coordinate with him on Monday.

Scott Hennon, WDAY, Fargo, is filling in for Sean Hannity on Dec. 29. He is interested and we will coordinate that on Monday.

Military analyst, LTC Bill Cowan, is filling in for Tony Snow on Dec. 29. He is interested in talking with Congressman Marshall. He is thinking about other guests we have suggested.

Jed Babbin will be filling in for Greg Garrison, WIBC, Indianapolis, the first week in January. He is interested in interviewing members of Congress and we have put him in touch with Senator Sessions' press secretary.

Talk show host Lars Larson, KXL, Portland, is on vacation until the first week of January but has committed to talking with one or more members. We have left messages for several other hosts with whom we have had good interviews. Like Lars Larson, they are on vacation until the first week in January. We will pursue.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, December 23, 2004 9:55 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Contact info

Mr. Jed Babbin (AF, Former JAG)

(b)(6)
Telephone: (b)(6)
Cellular: (b)(6)
Fax: (b)(6)
Email: jedbabbin@ (b)(6) <mailto:jedbabbin@ (b)(6)>

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, December 23, 2004 9:51 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Contact info

(b)(6) can you also send me the work number for jed babbin? thanks, eric

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, December 23, 2004 9:20 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: Contact info

Per your request:

Lieutenant Colonel Bill Cowan (USMC, Retired)
CEO, WVC3 Group, Inc.
1800 Alexander Bell Drive, Suite 101
Reston, Virginia 20191

Telephone: (b)(6)
Cellular: (b)(6)
Fax: (b)(6)
Email: bill_cowan@ (b)(6)

v/r
(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: O'Connell, Thomas, HON, OSD-POLICY
Sent: Thursday, December 23, 2004 6:35 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: q for you

Thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, December 22, 2004 4:40 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY; O'Connell, Thomas, HON, OSD-POLICY; 'dfrum@ (b)(6)
Cc: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) Maj. OASD-PA
Subject: RE: q for you

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY
Sent: Wednesday, December 22, 2004 4:25 PM
To: O'Connell, Thomas, HON, OSD-POLICY; 'dfrum@ (b)(6)
Cc: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Maj. OASD-PA
Subject: RE: q for you

Wayne will gladly speak to David Frum. His cell phone # is:

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Senior Advisor, OASD (SO/LIC)
Rm (b)(2)
2500 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301
(b)(2)
(Cell)

-----Original Message-----

From: O'Connell, Thomas, HON, OSD-POLICY
Sent: Monday, December 20, 2004 2:08 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY; (b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY
Subject: RE: q for you

We can...I better ask first. OC

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Sent: Monday, December 20, 2004 12:30 PM
To: O'Connell, Thomas, HON, OSD-POLICY; Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Cc: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: q for you

Can you help with contact information?

-----Original Message-----

From: David Frum (mailto:dfrum@ (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, December 20, 2004 11:43 AM
To: (b)(6)

Subject: q for you

(b)(6) I'm organizing some articles to speak up for hte secretary. question: do you know Wayne Downing? wouldl he do it? if so, where do I find him? d

(b)(6)

From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, December 22, 2004 10:42 AM
To: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Subject: RE: radio- Garrison show

Thanks, we are going to talk to him about what he will be discussing so we can try to fit the right guest to the topics he is interested in too.

-----Original Message-----

From: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, December 22, 2004 10:37 AM
To: Bryan Whitman (E-mail); Eric Ruff (E-mail); Frank Thorp (E-mail); (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Subject: radio- Garrison show

here is the info for the radio opportunity...

-----Original Message-----

From: JedBabbin (b)(6) [mailto:JedBabbin (b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, December 22, 2004 10:12 AM
To: allison.barber (b)(6)
Subject: Garrison show

Allison: This is the show I'll be subbing on both 4 and 5 Jan. Please note that the hours are 10 am to 1 pm Eastern, not 9-12 as I said on the phone. Many thanks for the help. Best, Jed.

;; wibc.com ;;

Jed Babbin

(b)(6) (Home Office)
(b)(6) (Home Fax)
(b)(6) (Mobile)

4/5/2008

(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, December 21, 2004 2:32 PM
To: 'Dan Senor'
Subject: RE:

Thanks for your help.

-----Original Message-----

From: Dan Senor [mailto:dansenor@(b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, December 21, 2004 2:29 PM
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Subject: Re:

oped is great. just read it. thanks.

--- "Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA"
<larry.dirita@osd.mil> wrote:

> Pls take a look at the secdef oped in usa today...otherwise, it's
> moseul and bryan can be sure you have latest
> -----
> Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld
>

(b)(6)

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, December 21, 2004 1:09 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: another request from military analyst

Jed Babbin, on Scarborough tonight and Fox & Friends tomorrow morning

Topic: Defending SecDef/Intel Bill/Iraq Elections

Needed info: "How will intel bill improve quality of intelligence gathering? Why is today's NYT definitely wrong with the attack against SecDef for his positions. Are there any UN election workers in Iraq today."

(b)(6)

From: Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, December 20, 2004 1:18 PM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: SecDef Outreach

Allison asked me to check with you on the following:

Allison had asked me early this morning to gauge interest from our analysts in a potential meeting with the secdef this afternoon. We had 9 folks reply they would be available and interested in coming in should the meeting come together. It was expressed in very, very tentative terms, and it was made clear that we were just checking as a formality in the event folks in the front office decided to move forward and hold a meeting. Anyhow, long story short, with the decision not to do a conference call, should I let these guys know that there will not be an in person meeting today? The rsvp list is enclosed below.

Dana Dillon
Jed Babbin
Robert L. Maginnis
Larry Welch
Wayne Simmons
LTG Thomas G. McInerney
Bill Cowan
Steven Greeg
Robert Scales

(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, December 20, 2004 12:36 PM
To: 'Dan Senior'
Subject: RE:

here's what he said about the letter flap. in general, though, you might mention that he has made many many trips to walter reed, bethesda, and other military hospitals, met with hundreds of wounded troops and their families, spends time with grieving widows when he makes troop visits in the u.s.. he does not seek publicity for these things and would certainly be chagrined if any surviving family member did not understand how much he values and honors their sacrifice and service.

"It is a solemn privilege of the many of us in the Department to meet with U.S. forces and families who have experienced injury or death in the defense of our country.

"During visits with wounded forces and their families at Walter Reed Army Hospital or at the Bethesda Naval Medical Center, I have drawn inspiration from the dignity and resolve of these wonderful young Americans and their loved ones.

"Over the past years, my wife, Joyce, and I have met with several hundred wounded troops and their families during visits to intensive care units, therapy facilities, and their rooms in military hospitals in the United States and abroad.

"During visits to military installations, I have met with still others during their visits to the Pentagon.

"Joyce and I also have met together and individually with spouses and children of those killed in action.

"At the earliest moment in the global war on terror, I determined that it is important that military families who have lost loved ones in hostile actions receive a letter from me directly.

"I wrote and approved the now more than 1000 letters sent to family members and next of kin of each of the servicemen and women killed in military action. While I have not individually signed each one, in the interest of ensuring expeditious contact with grieving family members, I have directed that in the future I sign each letter.

"I am deeply grateful for the many letters I have received from the families of those who have been killed in the service of our country, and I recognize and honor their personal loss."

-----Original Message-----

From: Dan Senior [mailto:dansenor@(b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, December 20, 2004 11:37 AM
To: larry.dirita@osd.mil
Subject:

Lar,

I'm on Linda Vester (FOX) at 1PM, defending secdef.
Let me know if there are any new points to hit (other than the ones we discussed on Fri).

Thanks!

-Dan

(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA

Sent: Tuesday, December 14, 2004 8:01 AM

To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA

Cc: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA

Please share your ideas about generals casey and abizaïd with Lessel and pittman and let them know this is what we are thinking about.

Don't distribute that full plan you developed that includes secdef and depsec ideas. Just share the thoughts about casey and abizaïd and see how people feel about it.

I think it would be particularly important to ensure one or both of them speak with the military analysts, and does some kind of public event, too.

Tnx..

4/5/2008

(b)(6)

From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, December 13, 2004 8:21 PM
To: Larry DiRita (E-mail 2)
Cc: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
Subject: FW: MIL ANALYSTS CONF CALL – FEEDBACK

This event went very well -- you were right Gen Pace really gave it the right context and the group on the phone asked insightful questions in a very friendly atmosphere. This should pay off down the road.

-----Original Message-----

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Monday, December 13, 2004 7:32 PM
To: Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
Cc: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LCDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Maj, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) COL OCPA; (b)(6) CAPT, JCS SJS; (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Subject: MIL ANALYSTS CONF CALL – FEEDBACK

Capt Thorp,

Late this afternoon, in response to a request from Mr. Di Rita, Gen Pace spoke with 15 retired military analysts on the subject of Armored vehicles/force protection. The session was **ON THE RECORD**, so you will likely hear some of the analysts using his name. Also supporting the event was BG Jeff Sorenson, from Army GB. Call was from 1715-1745. A brief recap follows -- not sure when OSD will have a transcript ready to post, but thought some of this might be useful considering the media plan for Gen Myers over the next several days.

Gen Pace opened by discussing the force protection challenge has two parts -- equipment, but also the tactics used. He described a continuum of protection, from most being buttoned up in a tank, to least, being walking the streets of Baghdad without a flak vest or helmet. The greater the protection, the less the ability to personally interact with the people and influence the situation.

He recapped the history of the "need" -- that shortly after May 03, the requirement was for about 1/3 of the vehicles to be armored; 2/3 of the vehicles to be soft-skinned.

But a thinking, adapting enemy quickly learned that he couldn't take us on military-to-military so he changed tactics to IEDs.

He described the three levels of armored vehicles, indicated much had been done to procure equipment, and much more to do. Goal is 28,000 armored vehicles by the end of March. Healthy application of money and industry has already been applied to this challenge, with more to follow. He also described the two task forces SecArmy has initiated: one on equipment, and one -- last October -- an IED Task Force to study TTPs, share lessons learned immediately with the field, analyze results, etc.

He made the point -- several times throughout the call -- that this is more than simply a concern about equipment...the need to balance between equipment and tactics. As a form of summary, Gen Pace indicated that we should not be collectively too defensive on this subject, nor should we put too big a smiley face on it. Americans need to know that their sons and daughters are important to us, and the analysts need to keep that in their minds, while we keep hard at this, working on improving force protection against a thinking/adapting enemy.

Focus of the questions:

Any constraints (fiscal, industry, etc.) on getting needed armor?

Can you characterize the tactics (on an unclas basis) that would help us understand other force protection issues, such as convoy protection? (Gen Pace said he didn't want to give TTPs, because then the enemy would change to counter them, but rather he described the changing tactics of the enemy...first 1 IED, then later changed to explode 1 IED, and when responders come, set off the 2nd one, etc.)

Can we reach the goals/numbers of armored vehicles we want in the time frame we want?

How much of this [responding to need for additional armor] is reaction to last week's dust-up at Town Hall, and how much

already in the works?

How would you characterize the level of protection offered by an 'up-armored' Humvee?

How did this issue bubble up? Is it an issue that leadership has ignored previously?

What types of responses are we working on? Substances other than steel being considered? Kevlar? [Analyst asked how they might contact the right person if they were approached by industry or others with a possible solution.]

Overall lessons being learned and applied to future budgets/appropriations? How much is this impacting the future purchases of the military?

Some are suggesting Marines are taking more casualties because they have less armored vehicle support than the Army -- is that accurate?

At the end of the call, Army PA indicated that BG Sorenson and MG Speaks will be doing a press briefing at 0800 Eastern, on Wednesday to discuss Wheeled vehicles -- way ahead.

Analysts who indicated they would be on the call (those in BOLD asked questions):

Colonel Carl Kenneth Allard	(USA, Retired)
Mr. Jed Babb	(USAF, JAG)
Lieutenant General Frank B. Campbell	(USAF, Retired)
Dr. James Jay Carafano	(LTC, USA, Retired)
Colonel (Tim) J. Eads	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Rick Francona	(USAF, Retired)
Brigadier General David L. Grange	(USA, Retired)
Colonel Jack Jacobs	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney	(USAF, Retired)
Major General Michael J. Nardotti, Jr.	(USA, Retired)
Captain Chuck Nash	(USN, Retired)
General William L. Nash	(USA, Retired)
General Glen K. Otis	(USA, Retired)
Major General Donald W. Shepperd	(USAF, Retired)
Major General Paul E. Vallely	(USA, Retired)

I have included COL Joe Curtin's wrap up of the call below.

Provided for your info.

V/R

Katie

GEN Pace and BG Sorenson participated in an OSD PA hosted teleconference today with 15 military analysts. Brief remarks made by each general officer followed by some excellent questions by the military analysts. All on the record. Bullet summary below:

* GEN PACE KEY COMMENTS:

- * Challenge today is to balance equipment versus tactics for troops deployed throughout Iraq.
- * Requirement changed over time as a thinking enemy found innovative methods to attack our troops using IEDs
- * Provided definition for the three levels of protection provided on vehicles going into Iraq.
- * Provided a short summary of the two SECARMY directed task forces underway to look at both the manufacturing base and the IED threat.
- * Provided context on what the Army has done over time to armor vehicles
- * Made clear that armor is only part of protecting Marines and Soldiers: training, lessons learned, TTPs, and technology are also key elements

*BG SORENSON

- * Summarized number of vehicles armored to date: unparalleled accomplishment versus any other coalition nation

- * Army is accelerating FMTV armored vehicles into theater
- * Emphasized funding is there and we are working closely with industry to meet demand
- * Pointed out the incredible testing effort on-going: tested over 1,000 "coupons" of materials
- * Added emphasis that armor is only part of the solution to protecting troops -- same points as above.

OSD PA officials very pleased with the engagement. Believe this made a big difference to help counter media misperceptions.

(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, December 13, 2004 8:37 AM
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Brooks, Vincent K BG OCPA
Cc: Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA

we ought to think about a roundtable with military analysts that vcjcs, secarmy, and Itgen blum can do today to put this whole armor/ng issue into better perspective.

(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, December 08, 2004 4:55 PM
To: 'Dan Senor'
Subject: RE:

Yes. Will talk. I'll call you.

-----Original Message-----

From: Dan Senor [mailto:dansenor@
Sent: Wednesday, December 08, 2004 4:31 PM
To: Di Rita Larry CIV OSD; ldirita@
Subject:

Larry,

Need your help: A number of people trashing Kerik on background (shocker!!!).

NYT is doing a big piece on his service in Iraq.
Would you mind talking to them on background to say positive things? I could give you the points that I've been hitting with them...would be good if they were echoed. You'll have credibility with them, b/c your time in Baghdad overlapped with Bernie's.

Let me know.

Thanks!

-Dan

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, November 22, 2004 1:29 PM
To: 'Dan Senor'
Subject: RE:

Thanks.

-----Original Message-----
From: Dan Senor [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, November 22, 2004 1:29 PM
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Subject: RE:

Perfect. Great. Watch at 5PM...I promise to stick to script...Thanks!
--- "Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA"
<larry.dirita@ (b)(6)> wrote:

- > 1. elections in Iraq...good thing, it will be tough between now and
- > then, lots of pressure to change date from u.n. and elsewhere,
- > transition to sovereignty was hard, too, etc.
- >
- > 2. force levels: a matter for the commanders..
- > They have gotten what they
- > have sought. Abizaid and metz have the job of balancing the requests
- > from individual division commanders against the country-wide
- > requirements. If abizaid and metz determine more is needed, they are
- > going to get what they need.
- >
- > 3. rumsfeld "killed" intel bill: nonsense.
- > Testified in public before the
- > president even submitted legislation. Said we need reform. Details
- > were left to the committees in congress, white house.
- > General Myers was asked
- > for his views and he gave them, as he is statutorily required to do.
- >
- > 4. Through it all, remember the u.s. forces on thanksgiving.

> Tnx...

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Dan Senor [mailto:dansenor@ (b)(6)]
> Sent: Monday, November 22, 2004 12:14 PM
> To: Di Rita Larry CIV OSD; ldirita@ (b)(6)
> Subject:

> Larry,

> I'm going on FOX News ("BIG STORY WITH JOHN GIBSON") today at 5PM.

> Anything new that you want me to push?

> -Dan

>

(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, November 19, 2004 11:49 AM
To: 'Dan Senor'
Subject: RE:

Thanks. You might dampen a little bit the comments by the IMBF commander that we "broke the back" of the insurgency.

These points would help:

- We are on track to make Fallujah unavailable as a safe haven to terrorists and f.r.e.
- The campaign of intimidation against Sunnis was part of the strategy in Fallujah, and sunni citizens are now coming forward in large numbers to provide better intelligence.
- Fallujah was obviously being used for zarqawi operations. We have uncovered large weapons caches, i.e.d. factories, etc.
- Now comes the important work of reconstruction and integration of Fallujah into Iraq as a whole. The Iraqi government and coalition have a plan to commit hundreds of millions of dollars to reconstructing the city and helping the residents return.

Thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: Dan Senor [mailto:dansenor@...] (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, November 19, 2004 11:45 AM
To: Di Rita Larry CIV OSD
Subject:

Larry,

Doing some TV later on Fallujah. Here are the points I will hit:

- Raid on Baghdad mosque & Mosul hospital demonstrate value of having Iraqi security forces on front line of certain operations. Better to have Iraqis engaging Iraqis at politically or religiously sites, rather than Americans engaging Iraqis.
- Discovery of terror facilities in Fallujah (slaughterhouse, terror training classroom, SUV, etc) underscore the importance of going into Fallujah, even if many of the terrorists were able to scatter. We've removed their base of op's. They need these facilities to be effective. Once they're on the run and w/o access to a safe haven from which to build and use such facilities, harder for them to operate.

Anything else? Any other nuggets that would bolster the case for why our strategy is working?

Thanks!

-Dan

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, November 08, 2004 6:01 AM
To: 'Dan Senor'
Subject: RE: Re: Re: [Fwd: Re: Bagdad media reporting]

I'm in my office now.

(b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: Dan Senor [mailto:dansenor@
Sent: Monday, November 08, 2004 5:45 AM
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [Fwd: Re: Bagdad media reporting]

okay...thanks...will call in about a half-hour. where will you be? on cell??

--- "Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA"

<larry.dirita@
(b)(6) wrote:

> On cell now (b)(6)

> Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

> -----Original Message-----

> **From:** Dan Senor <dansenor@
(b)(6)
> **To:** Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
> <larry.dirita@
(b)(6)
> **Sent:** Sun Nov 07 21:46:14 2004
> **Subject:** Re: Re: Re: [Fwd: Re: Bagdad media reporting]

> thanks...what # can i reach you at in the AM?

> --- "Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA"

> <larry.dirita@
(b)(6) wrote:

> > I'll be up...will send you some talkers in the meantime

> > Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

> > -----Original Message-----

> > **From:** Dan Senor <dansenor@
(b)(6)
> > **To:** Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
> > <larry.dirita@
(b)(6) ldirita@
(b)(6)
> > <ldirita@
(b)(6)
> > **Sent:** Sun Nov 07 17:46:22 2004
> > **Subject:** Re: Re: Re: [Fwd: Re: Bagdad media reporting]

> > Larry, I'm going on TV tomorrow morning regarding Fallujah. Want

> > to make sure I'm on message. Will you be up tomorrow morning at

> > around 5:00 AM to give

> > me

> > the dump? Would be grateful. Thanks!

> > --- "Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA"

> > <larry.dirita@
(b)(6) wrote:

> > > Call me (b)(6)

> > > Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

> > > -----Original Message-----

> > > **From:** Dan Senor <dansenor@
(b)(6)
> > > **To:** Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA

> > > <larry.dirita@ (b)(6)
> > > Sent: Tue Oct 26 19:19:36 2004
> > > Subject: RE: Re: Re: [Fwd: Re: Bagdad media reporting]
> > >
> > > Good. About to go on Paula Zahn to duke it out
> > > on
> > > the
> > > explosives issue.
> > > --- "Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA"
> > > <larry.dirita@ (b)(6) wrote:
> > >
> > > > Spoke with him. Agrees.
> > > >
> > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > From: Dan Senor [mailto:dansenor@ (b)(6)
> > > > Sent: Tuesday, October 26, 2004 4:45 PM
> > > > To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
> > > > Subject: RE: Re: Re: [Fwd: Re: Bagdad media reporting]
> > > > (b)(6)
> > > > --- "Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA"
> > > > <larry.dirita@ (b)(6) wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > Do you have a phone number?
> > > > >
> > > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > > From: Dan Senor [mailto:dansenor@ (b)(6)
> > > > > Sent: Tuesday, October 26, 2004 1:39 PM
> > > > > To: larry.dirita@ (b)(6) ldirita@ (b)(6)
> > > > > Subject: Fwd: Re: Re: [Fwd: Re: Bagdad media reporting]
> > > > >
> > > > > You should touch base with Bremer...see his
> > > > > email
> > > > > below.
> > > > > --- "J. Bremer" <jbremer@ (b)(6) wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > > To: "Dan Senor" <dansenor@ (b)(6)
> > > > > > Subject: Re: Re: [Fwd: Re: Bagdad media
> > > > > > reporting]
> > > > > > From: "J. Bremer" <jbremer@ (b)(6)
> > > > > > Date: Tue, 26 Oct 2004 01:48:00 +0000 GMT
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I understand their concern and am frankly
> > > > > > agnostic
> > > > > > about the dates.
> > > > > > LPB
> > > > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > > > From: Dan Senor <dansenor@ (b)(6)
> > > > > > Date: Mon, 25 Oct 2004 16:22:16 To: "J. Bremer"
> > > > > > <jbremer@ (b)(6)
> > > > > > Subject: Re: Re: [Fwd: Re: Bagdad media
> > > > > > reporting]
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Okay.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > By the way, I spoke to DiRita, who is
> > > > > > planning
> > > > > > on
> > > > > > calling you about this event. Apparently
> > > > > > it
> > > > > > was
> > > > > > organized by the IG. It's closed to the
> > > > > > press,
> > > > > > but
> > > > > > they're
> > > > > > nervous
> > > > > > that your participation could draw

> > unnecessary
> > > > > press
> > > > > attention.
> > > > > FYI.
> > > > > --- "J. Bremer" <jbremer@>
> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > >
> > >
> >
> >
>

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: Wall Leola Civ AF/CVAP

Sent: Wednesday, September 29, 2004 12:52 PM

To: (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) Col, OSD

Cc: (b)(6) Col, JCS SJS; (b)(6) CIV, JCS OC, JCS; (b)(6) Lt. Col AF/CVAP; (b)(6) [HQMC]; (b)(6) Ms VDAS; Bucci, Steven, COL, OSD

Subject: RE: List for Office of the Secretary of Defense

The following retired Air Force generals are living in the National Capital Region (NCR):

CJCS

General David C. Jones, USAF
21 June 1978 - 18 June 1982

VCJCS

General Joseph W. Raiston (*works & lives in both the NCR and Alaska*)
1 March 1996 - 29 February 2000

Chiefs of Staff

General David C. Jones
1 July 1974 - 20 June 1978

General Lew Allen, Jr.
1 July 1978 - 30 June 1982

General Larry D. Welch
1 July 1986 - 30 June 1990

General Michael E. Ryan (*just moved to South Carolina, but still works in the NCR area*)
6 Oct 1997 - 6 Sep 2001

CINCs

General Russell E. Dougherty - CINC, SAC
1 Aug 74 - 31 Jul 77

General Howell M. Estes, Jr. - Cmdr, MAC
19 Jul 64 - 31 Jul 69

General Hansford T. Johnson, Cmdr, MAC/TRANSCOM
20 Sep 89 - 1 Jun 92

v/r

Leola Wall
Deputy Chief, Air Force Protocol
Ofc: (b)(2)
Fax: [Redacted]

4/5/2008

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Sent: Wednesday, September 29, 2004 10:59 AM
To: (b)(6) Lt Col, OSD
Cc: (b)(6) Lt., Col, JCS SJS; (b)(6) CIV, JCS OCJCS; (b)(6) Lt. Col AF/CVAP; Wall Leola Civ AF/CVAP; (b)(6) [HQMC]; (b)(6) Ms VDAS; Bucci, Steven, COL, OSD
Subject: List for Office of the Secretary of Defense

The Joint Staff Protocol should be able to help with the COCOM's, CJCS and VCJCS

Each Service Protocol Office should be able to assist with Service Chiefs living locally - I have cc'd them on this e-mail

I am not sure if the Joint Staff tracks former Combatant COMmanders - It could be potentiall the Services or each respective liaison office within the Pentagon. We will se about them as we get a response from the Service Protocol shops.

V.R

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) Lt Col, OSD
Sent: Wednesday, September 29, 2004 10:48 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OSD; Bucci, Steven, COL, OSD
Subject: retired dudes

(b)(6)

Need a list of retired COCOMs, CJCS, VCJCS, and Service Chiefs living in the DC area. Can you help?

Thanks

(b)(6)

(b)(6) Lt Col, USAF
Military Assistant to SecDef

(b)(2)

4/5/2008

Analysts were not pressured

"And let me take one of the explanations most commonly given: Analysts were pressured to reach conclusions that would fit the political agenda of one or another administration. I deeply think that is a wrong explanation. And never -- not in a single case -- was the explanation, 'I was pressured to do this.' The explanation was, very often, 'The limited data we had led one to reasonably conclude this. I now see that there's another explanation for it' And each case was different, but the conversations were sufficiently in depth and our relationship was sufficiently frank that I'm convinced that, at least to the analysts I dealt with, I did not come across a single one that felt it had been, in the military term, 'inappropriate command influence' that led them to take that position."

"Absolutely no doubt" Saddam harbored ambitions to develop and use WMD

Senator McCain: "Saddam Hussein developed and used weapons of mass destruction; true?"
David Kay: "Absolutely."

Senator McCain: "He used them against the Iranians and the Kurds; just yes or no."
David Kay: "Oh, yes."

Senator McCain: "OK. And U.N. inspectors found enormous quantities of banned chemical and biological weapons in Iraq in the '90s."
David Kay: "Yes, sir."

Senator McCain: "We know that Saddam Hussein had once a very active nuclear program."
David Kay: "Yes."

Senator McCain: "And he realized and had ambitions to develop and use weapons of mass destruction."
David Kay: "Clearly."

Senator McCain: "So the point is, if he were in power today, there is no doubt that he would harbor ambitions for the development and use of weapons of mass destruction. Is there any doubt in your mind?"
David Kay: "There's absolutely no doubt. And I think I've said that, Senator."

"We have learned things that no U.N. inspector would have ever learned given the terror regime of Saddam"

Senator Clinton: "I think that rightly does raise questions that we should be examining about whether or not the U.N. inspection process pursuant to 1441 might not also have worked without the loss of life that we have confronted both among our own young men and women, as well as Iraqis."

David Kay: "Well, Senator Clinton, let me just add to that. We have had a number of Iraqis who have come forward and said, 'We did not tell the U.N. about what we were hiding, nor would we have told the U.N. because we would run the risk of our own' -- I think we have learned things that no U.N. inspector would have ever learned given the terror regime of Saddam and the tremendous personal consequences that scientists had to run by speaking the truth." That's not to say, and it's not incompatible with the fact that inspections accomplish a great deal in holding a program down. And that's where the surprise is. In holding the program down, in keeping it from break out, I think the record is better than we would have anticipated. I don't think the record is necessarily better than we thought with regard to getting the final truth, because of the power of the terrorist state that Saddam Hussein had."

White House Office of Communications

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) COL, OSD-POLICY
Sent: Monday, August 23, 2004 5:05 PM
To: Faith Douglas, HON, OSD-POLICY
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OSD-POLICY (b)(6) CAPT, OSD-POLICY; (b)(6)
LTC, OASD-PA
Subject: Supporting the PA plan for Global Posture - request 1

OSD Public Affairs requests that you participate in an outreach briefing for a group of key military analysts assembled by the OSD-PA Office of Community Relations and Public Liaison.

You are asked to address Global Posture with initial brief remarks and Q&A, for a total of 30 minutes, from 10:15 a.m. to 10:45 a.m., on Wednesday, September 8, 2004 in room (b)(2). Your schedule should allow you to participate in this event, (depending on the DC schedule).

General Richard Myers has been invited to provide an update on the global war on terrorism; and General Peter Schoomaker has been invited to speak on troop strength and troop morale in Iraq and Afghanistan. They will speak during separate time blocks, not while you are speaking.

The list of invited military analysts is below.

Do you want to participate?

Col (b)(6)
Military Assistant
OUSD(Policy)
(b)(2)

- Colonel Carl Kenneth Allard (USA, Retired)
- Mr. Jed Babbin (AF, Former JAG)
- Major Robert S. Bevelacqua (USA, Retired)
- Admiral Dennis C. Blair (USN, Retired)
- Lieutenant General Frank B. Campbell (USAF, Retired)
- Dr. James Jay Carafano (LTC, USA, Retired)
- Lieutenant Colonel Bill Cowan (USMC, Retired)
- Major Dana R. Dillon (USA, Retired)
- General Wayne A. Downing (USA, Retired)
- Colonel (Tim) J. Eads (USA, Retired)
- General Ronald Fogelman (USAF, Retired)
- Lieutenant Colonel Rick Francona (USAF, Retired)
- Colonel John Garrett (USMC, Retired)
- Lieutenant General Buster Glosson (USAF, Retired)
- Brigadier General David L. Grange (USA, Retired)
- Command Sergeant Major Steven Greer (USA, Retired)
- Colonel Jack Jacobs (USA, Retired)
- Admiral David E. Jeremiah (USN, Retired)
- General George Joulwan (USA, Retired)
- General William F. "Buck" Kernan (USA, Retired)
- Colonel Glenn Lackey (USA, Retired)
- Colonel Walter P. Lang, Jr. (USA, Retired)

Admiral Thomas Joseph Lopez (USN, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis (USA, Retired)
Colonel Jeff McCausland, (USA, Retired)
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney (USAF, Retired)
General Montgomery Meigs (USA, Retired)
Major F. Andy Messing Jr. (USAR, Retired)
General Thomas S. Moorman, Jr. (USAF, Retired)
Major General Michael J. Nardotti, Jr. (USA, Retired)
Captain Chuck Nash (USN, Retired)
General William L. Nash (USA, Retired)
General Glen K. Otis (USA, Retired)
General Joseph Ralston (USAF, Retired)
Lieutenant General Erv Rokke (USAF, Retired)
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr. (USA, Retired)
General Hugh Shelton (USA, Retired)
Major General Donald W. Shepperd (USAF, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Carlton Sherwood (USMC, Retired)
Major General Perry Smith (USAF, Retired)
Captain Martin L. Strong (USN, Retired)
Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor (USMC, Retired)
Major General Paul E. Vallely (USA, Retired)
Colonel John Warden (USAF, Retired)
General Larry D. Welch (USAF, Retired)
General Charles E. Wilhelm (USMC, Retired)
General Tom Wilkerson (USMC, Retired)

Local Forces & US Troops in Iraq: Turning over Responsibilities

Presentation to Security and Stability Operations
(SASO) Conference on 17-18 Dec 2003

By Bing West westf@



5 Dec 03

Preparing for SASO at infantry level

- Honored to be invited to this conference
- We were in Iraq together until Sept, now you are going back - 70% have been there before
- We know the fighting & terrain but new locale
- Old missions still apply - provide stability & root out the fedayeen
- New mission - work with the Iraqis so they can take over, especially the new CDC
- I worked with CAP Lima-One over its 485 days, and was throughout Vn in '66, '67, '68, '69 in pacification and as Ass't Sec'y of Defense for Int'l Sec'y oversaw several counter insurgent efforts in the '80s
- So what can we learn by looking at past efforts?

The Challenge

- Iraq sharply divides the political parties and the American public
- Not in our national interest to have US in drawn-out, politically divisive combat like in Vn
- Iraqis must take responsibility for own internal security in a pluralistic, democratic nation
- How do you, as US infantry, help them, instead of doing the job for them?

Iraq Security Basics

- ~24 million
 - 60% Shiite, 15% Kurd, 20-25% Sunni problem
 - No enemy tactics as organized as a rifle squad
 - Four sources of hostility
 - 1 former regime loyalists fedayeen main problem
 - 2 terrorists from outside
 - 3 anger against actions of US forces
 - 4 Sunni sullenness fomented by satellite TV
-

Current Iraqification Plan

- By April, 36 Civil Defense Corps bns of 1,000 men trained at small unit level (\$3,000 per man per year)
- 71,000 police (\$13,000 per man per year)
- By July, 16 regular Iraqi battalions (\$50,000 per man per year) (40,000 men)

THE ABOVE USES ALL OF THE AVAILABLE U.S. MONEY

- Problem 1. Longer-term sustainability if US funds decline**
- 2. Variability in cost per man**
 - 3. Troop/police density thin on the ground**
-

Merits of a written Msn & CONOPS

- - Example: your msns of *in descending order of importance* might be to:
 - 1) provide a security umbrella, 2) secure LOCs 3) attrite enemy, and 4) train up Iraqis to replace the US troops
- OR**, 1) provide a security umbrella 2) train Iraqis OJT, 3) secure LOCs and 4) attrite enemy
- Note the above priorities are quite different
- So writing down a clear Msn, Intent & CONOPS enables everyone to understand where headed & why

What is the worst case? Disdain of the Iraqis or the Mission

Excerpt from recent The New York Times, (Nov 03):
In ----, US Army plans to pull out and leave the security to
the local sheik and his police.

“It’ll never work,” Specialist ___ said. “When the shooting
starts, the Iraqis start running. The only guys I trust are in
my own platoon.”

*The reason US troops are in Iraq is to buy time for the
Iraqis to organize their own security. You must help
them. The troops will reflect your attitude.*

This is a war about confidence

- Poor firepower & tactics on both sides
- Fedayeen rely on IEDs, intimidation and encouragement of local Sunni resentments
- Satellite TV magnifies problems/fears of Sunnis, encourages resisters, and feeds them back success
- In Sunni area, doubtful US can win hearts and minds and thus stop the violence
- (Mafia neighborhood hearts and minds never won)
- Sunni area needs tough, fair Iraqi security forces who know *they* are going to win, + future economic promise and local federal rule + severe public punishment of fedayeen who kill

Can Iraq be stabilized quickly?

Precedent: Vietnam from 1968 vs 69

- After TET '68, war portrayed in US as lost
- Then Gen Abrams took over, changed strategy & ordered 120 US teams to train 90,000 militia in a year
- US squads combined with RF/PF in 100 villages in the toughest area up north
- US pulled out in '70; internal security then excellent
- (Five years later, after the US cut off air support and most supplies, S. Vietnam did fall - due to 18 NVA divisions supplied by Russia and China, *not due to internal insurgency.*)

How did Vn situation turn in year?

- 1 there was in place a Vn gov't and security structure
- 2 50% change in local leaders
- 3 district fusion centers, US and Vn
- 4 a decent quantitative evaluation system
- 5 US quickly trained militia to a basic degree of competence (squad level)

Combined units in Iraq: Why?

- Need a mission and metrics for US withdrawal (or for a pull back to cantonments)
- Combined units are the intermediary step necessary for a logical US withdrawal. The fewer the combined units, the longer US forces remain on the front lines.
- But without a mission statement and measurable commander's intent, we could be in combined units for a decade
- Why? Because without a means of measuring how much we Americans are training the Iraqis to do the job, we will continue to do the job for them
- Without a clear CONOPS, most 'can-do' US units will do the job themselves, year after year.

EXAMPLE A. OF A MSN STMT & INTENT

“Our primary mission is to work with the armed forces of the GOI – police, civil defense, facilities protection, border and military – to enhance training and instill a winning spirit. The front line patrols within six months should be done by the Iraqi police and civil defense, with the US in much more of a support role. *My intent is that US forces work themselves out of a job by focusing on the training of the Iraqis, especially by joint operations, on-the-job training and constant encouragement. Most of our ops and patrols, mounted or foot, will be with Iraqis.*”

EXAMPLE B. of Msn & Intent

“Our primary mission is to break the enemy’s will to resist. The front line patrols will be done by us, with the Iraqi police and civil defense in a support role. *My intent is that US forces will place unremitting pressure on any who seek to resist and will control all major LOCs. Most of our ops and patrols, mounted or foot, will be unilateral, with careful protection of our forces. If attacked, we will respond with overwhelming force, while respectful of the safety of the Iraqi people.*”

What are the “Ops” in CONOPS?

- primary Ops are:
 - 1 local defensive foot and mounted ptls (US only)
 - 2 raid & search teams (include Iraqis as joint)
 - 3 foot patrols to sweep LOCs (joint)
 - 4 foot patrols in town for presence (joint)
 - 5 mounted LOCs to protect convoys (US only)
 - 6 reaction force (probably US only due to immediacy)
 - 7 friendly activities with locals (joint)
 - 8 crowd/mob control (joint, with US providing the discipline)
 - 9 Iraqi only - subtly observe them & constantly encourage

A clear CONOPS needs metrics

- Metrics are basic to internal security: E.G., a US police officer works 200 8-hour days
- A metric for a battalion might be inputs like, “conduct 25% off duty, 25% fixed defense & stand-by, 20% mounted patrols, 20% dismounted and 10% joint with Iraqis”
- Or it might be goal oriented: “It is my intent there be throughout this AO within six months we will establish a degree of security such that three or four Iraqi troops will not hesitate to walk or drive anywhere.”
- Metrics enable the staff to point out inconsistencies between intent and resources or measure of effort
- The Hamlet Evaluation System worked in Vn; it showed trends

Without measures, every US unit will do its best to train Iraqis, & go in different ways

- One battalion may assign 30 MPs to training, another a fulltime platoon, while a third conducts a combined raid each week
- None has a plan or an end point for handing off mission responsibility to the Iraqis
- Each of the three hypothetical bns above is doing its best, while none is allocating 10% of its effort.
- In Vn, MAF in I Corps assigned 100 of ~ 700 rifle squads to the combined mission. MAF had one US division fighting NVA along DMZ, so was putting 28% of forces available for internal security into genuine combined ops.

Why should we measure how much time we spend training or working alongside Iraqis?

- Because in Vn we worked ourselves out of the internal security job in a year.
- Gen Abrams put the Americans behind the Vn militia & fielded 90,000 in one year
- Because 40,000 Iraqi army cost \$50K each; 70,000 police cost \$13K; & 40,000 militia cost \$3K. The militia need us.
- We must measure what we're doing; firefights in Iraq are too episodic to be a measure.
- Time - the allocation of our squads or platoons - is a measure

Set goals to achieve by your turnover time

- Goal should be something like every CDC squad conducts at least two patrols w/US per week
- Examples of the goal achieved by turnover time:
- Four-man Iraqi foot patrols go anywhere w/o US
- Three-vehicle Iraqi patrols drive anywhere w/o US

When to withdraw?

- Those on the ground will know when it is time
- Violence will continue after coalition troops pull back
- E.G., rate in Rio today is 70 homicides per 100,000 = 17,000 killed in a year in Iraq!
- Must build substantial Iraqi force density before coalition forces can all leave

Personnel Selection & Command

- in Vn, PFs were local hire; district chief had final say
- Police in villages were in different chain of cmd
- To protect their families, PFs and police often stationed not in their own villages
- (huge issue for Iraq, given depth of tribal roots)
- Tunisia & El Salvador (pink teams) stationed at province level, like PRUs in Vn, not at local level

You must advocate to equip & pay the CDC

- CDC has no high-level civilian guardian
- CDC needs GPS, radios, technicals, NVG
- GPS to immediately report location & to grid area
- grid map system in towns at 1:5,000
- Iraq is vehicular; CDC needs 30 pick-ups per bn from Japan fund; mod in-country w/MG as a 'technical'
- You should bring some CDC on practically all your patrols; that requires technicals for day transport and NVGs at night

TTPs for combined patrols in Iraq, based on prior wars

- Never flinch in firefight or confrontation: you're THE MAN
- Convey that confident attitude to the CDC
- Always be aggressive. No matter the carnage, do something to show you are still the hunter.
- Keep putting the Iraqis out in front & get them local PR
- They will believe it's your gear, not you. This is a tough one. You have to show it's not the gear, yet get them what they need: marksmanship, NVGs, GPS, radios & technicals.
- Encourage them as your equals.

Language & Culture

- Language : skill in CAP school not achieved
- Pidgin “4-months” language result: English overwhelms in country, due to indigenous incentive for a better life
- No CAP spoke good Vietnamese; no CAP unable to talk
- IADs & code words best in English; have NATO code book
- Employ dual-language Combat Decision Range to teach IADs
- 30 Iraqi-Americans bring language/culture for 30 platoons!
- Cultural training: ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL
- Basic teaching point: “They is us.”
- Stress: you will never have this opportunity again

Immediate Action Drills

- Use a dual-language CD to practice the critical scenarios requiring predictable Iraqi response
- Examples include:
 - 1 Sniper in a crowd
 - 2 RPG/small arms ambush vs mounted patrol
 - 3 IED explodes on LOC
 - 4 Crowd in angry demonstration
 - 5 Crowd turning mean
 - 6 Employing base of fire and maneuver

LOCAL FUSION CENTERS

- District/town 'fusion' centers are *essential* to gather & coordinate info & planned ops from US troops, OGA, Iraqi army, police, CDC,
- Although turf trumps war unification, try to appoint best Iraqi as fusion cntr chief regardless of his ministry
- Don't get too worried about OPSEC penetration; assume a spy & compartment; OGA can brief on how to do this
- hard for opponents to hide in plain sight without ceasing to resist; fusion increases their visibility
- Publicize success; key to this war is public confidence that the outcome is inevitable

Summary: Working with local forces: why is it so important?

- Because they can replace you
- CDC is the intermediate step between the army and police
- Most of the threat does not require army tactics above a squad, but it does require that the Iraqi police have a larger presence with them, not trained in police work, but there in numbers, and *not afraid*
- View them like the National Guard
- Iraq is in a crisis which requires all the Guard to be on the streets
- This is a war about confidence in the future

ELEMENTS OF A
SUNNI STRATEGY

AN INTEGRATED ACTION PLAN

28 November 2003

GOALS

- ASSURE SUNNI ARAB PARTICIPATION AND SUPPORT FOR 15 NOVEMBER PROCESS, SUPPORT FOR SECURITY EFFORTS
- STRENGTHEN IRAQI NATIONAL IDENTITY IN SUNNI AREAS
- IMPLEMENT ALL ASPECTS OF SUNNI STRATEGY IN PARALLEL

TIMELINE FOR ACTION

- IMMEDIATE
- WITHIN 30 DAYS
- WITHIN 60 DAYS
- WITHIN 90 DAYS AND AFTER

POLITICAL ACTION

- IMMEDIATE
 - Develop talking points for use with diverse Sunni audiences (GOVERNANCE)
- WITHIN 30 DAYS
 - (TBC) Ambassador Bremer visits to one or more cities in the Sunni heartland (EXEC, GOVERNANCE, GCS)
 - Working with IGC, finalize de-Ba'athification exemption process (EXEC, GOVERNANCE)
 - Identify inclusive, pro-democracy political organizations for democratization funds (GOVERNANCE, GCS)

POLITICAL ACTION cont.

Improve transparency of detention system (CJTF-7?/GENERAL COUNSEL)

Assure prominent Sunni participation in Basic Law drafting (GOVERNANCE)

Lobby IGC members to reach out to Sunni governorates (GOVERNANCE, EXEC as necessary)

POLITICAL ACTION cont.

■ WITHIN 60 DAYS

Use any refreshments of Provincial and Local Councils to enhance legitimacy/representation of Sunnis (EXEC, Governance, GTs)

Re-selection or reaffirmation of all governors anticipated to be done by January 15. (EXEC, Governance, GTs)

Identify, establish outreach with Sunni clerics who could be receptive to urging participation

POLITICAL ACTION cont.

■ WITHIN 90 DAYS

Encourage all groups to organize and participate in coming elections (EXEC, STRATCOMM, GOVERNANCE, USAID, CIVIL EDUCATION)

TRIBAL OUTREACH

Addressing Sunni Disaffection in the Heartland

- **IMMEDIATE**
- Organization of tribal data well underway
- Consider creating Tribal Affairs Office
- Expand contacts of Sunni Outreach Group to engage tribal leaders

TRIBAL OUTREACH cont.

- WITHIN 30 DAYS
 - Determine whether CPA should establish a National Tribal Council
 - Resolve lingering "blood money" cases

ECONOMIC ACTION

IMMEDIATE

Approve microfinance program; establish measures of success.

Identify additional resources within existing ministry and development programs for targeting at Sunni areas

Iraqi Community Action Program partners establish offices in Anbar and Salah Ad Din

ECONOMIC ACTION cont.

WITHIN 30 DAYS

Increase GC's and local councils' discretionary budgets

Ambassador Jones addresses Anbar businessmen's group

Ministries establish action plan on delivery of services; identify service gaps and actions to remedy

ECONOMIC ACTION cont.

Current R3P funded again in December through June. Funding levels under current review based on plans submitted by each region.

Ministries report on feasibility of job creation via contracting private companies to guard electrical lines, pipelines etc.

CAP partners committed to 500,000 in projects with 20 community associations formed.

WITHIN 60 DAYS

CAP partners committed to over 1,000,000 in projects with 20 community associations formed.

ECONOMIC ACTION cont.

WITHIN 90 DAYS

Establish university partnership with Anbar University under Higher Education and Development Program

CAP partners committed to over 1.5 million in projects with over 60 community associations formed

ECONOMIC ACTION cont.

Incorporate Sunni heartland areas in USAID
national agricultural programs

SECURITY POLICIES

Inclusion is key—but there will not be space for all disaffected soldiers/security officers

IMMEDIATE and ONGOING

- Identify potential senior leadership for new defense/security institutions (OSA)
- Continue transitioning of local areas to Iraqi police and ICDC units (MOI, CJTF-7)
- Continue accelerated recruitment and training of Iraqi security forces (CJTF-7, CMAT)

SECURITY POLICIES cont.

- WITHIN 60 DAYS
 - Open recruiting station for NIA in Ramadi (CMAT)
 - Consider transferring North Baghdad station to Tikrit (CMAT)
 - Seek prominent Sunni appointment to National Security Advisory Council (EXEC, OSA)

SECURITY POLICIES cont.

■ WITHIN 90 DAYS AND AFTER

By April 1st: 36 battalions of ICDC organized at the local level from local recruits (CJTF-7)

By July 1st: new MOD and JFHQ (OSA, MOD)

By July 1st: national command structure for 71,000 strong police force

By July 1st: reconstitution of Iraq's military academy. (OSA)

By July 31st, planned establishment of 16 battalions, 6 brigades, and two divisional HQs of the NIA. (OSA, CJTF-7), CMAT)

PUBLIC OUTREACH AND EDUCATION

■ IMMEDIATE

- Finalize one-page summary document explaining November 15 agreement
- Identify spokesmen and facilitate media opportunities for them
- Through other spokesmen, stress the joint nature of US-Iraq security cooperation
- Urge sending IGC delegation to neighboring states to secure regional backing for 15 November process.

Public Outreach Cont.

- More publicity in Sunni outlets for infrastructure improvements, job creation etc. (STRATCOMM)
- More high-level outreach to Sunni Media (al-Sa'ah, etc.)
- Structure media events in which Iraqis debate issues positively.

REGIONAL PUBLIC OPINION

- Seek general Arab buy-in to political process, stressing message of Sunni inclusion, protection of rights of all.
- Engage Pan-Arab media in London through existing US and UK offices
- Coalition Dips/Milreps throughout region engage media in Arab host countries

PUBLIC OUTREACH cont.

WITHIN 30 DAYS

- Assign more PAOs to each GC
- Organize town hall meetings, other popular fora to educate about, raise interest in political process
- Sunni figures anchor fora in Sunni heartland
- CPA organizes IGC-sponsored national political conference in January 2004 to include Sunnis not represented on IGC

PUBLIC OUTREACH cont.

- Invite Iraqi reps to observe Iowa
Caucuses
- Expand civil education projects geared to
fostering participation in process.

WITHIN 60 DAYS

- Organize IV program of Sunni reps to
engage officials and publics in Coalition
countries.

DIPLOMACY

IMMEDIATE/ONGOING

- Request State task various embassies to demarche hosts to exert host government influence over Iraq's tribes
- Request State demarche Arab League, member states, OIC, and others to support full Iraqi participation in political process
- Continue efforts with regional states to prevent infiltration

(b)(6)

From: dcmeetings@^{(b)(6)}
Sent: Wednesday, October 01, 2003 6:07 PM
To: dcmeetings@^{(b)(6)}
Subject: 10/2 CFR meeting reminder "Back from Iraq"

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

??

WASHINGTON OFFICE 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW Washington, D.C. 20036
Email dcmeetings@cfrr.org Meetings Response Line Tel 202 518 3479 Fax 202
986 2984

REMINDER

You are cordially invited to a General Meeting with

William L. Nash
Major General (USA, Ret.); John W. Vessey Senior Fellow & Director,
Center for Preventive Action, Council on Foreign Relations

Jessica T. Mathews
President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Frank B. Campbell
Lieutenant General (USAF, Ret.); Vice President, Advanced Concepts,
Lockheed Martin Integrated Systems and
Solutions

Back from Iraq
Views of experts recently returned from Iraq

Thursday, October 2, 2003
6:00 ? 6:30 p.m. Reception
6:30 ? 7:30 p.m. Meeting

at

Special Location
The Washington Club
15 Dupont Circle, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Robin Wright
Global Affairs Correspondent, Los Angeles Times
will preside

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON OFFICE 1779 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE NW WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036
Email dcmeetings@cfr.org Meetings Response Line Tel 202 518 3479 Fax
202 986 2984

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Washington, D.C. 20036

ROBIN WRIGHT

Global Affairs Correspondent, *Los Angeles Times*
will preside

**Please RSVP by EMAIL dcmeetings@cfr.org, FAX (202) 986-2984
Or call our MEETINGS RESPONSE LINE at (202) 518-3479. ACCEPTANCES ONLY PLEASE.**

Name: _____

Affiliation: _____

Tel.: _____ Fax: _____

This invitation is non-transferable.

- Forming Women for Al-Awda
- Focus on building women leadership
- Condemn oppression resulting from all factors

Advocacy

- Join Campaign against Caterpillars
- Train on Lobbying
- Push for Palestinian Rights in the next elections, especially with Democrats.

4/5/2008

(b)(6)

From: Thirdwave2@ (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, September 30, 2002 7:16 AM
To: stephen.cambone@OSD.mil; iavmie.durnan@ (b)(6)
Cc: Larry.DiRita@ (b)(6)
Subject: (no subject)

Buck Kernan in a recent Inside the Army article gave us the argument for ADS, Tracer and an advanced MTLV, Stryker cannot provide either the lethality or the agility for 18th corps that Kernan describes
newt

"One of the things you want to have, I believe, is a very rapidly deployable, lethal capability. You want it as agile as you possibly can

You want to be able to leverage all the platforms that are available to you -- not only the strategic, but also the intratheater lift that's available. That's the advantage of the 130. So, I think there's some more work that needs to be done on that."

4/5/2008

**ITINERARY FOR
DEFENSE ANALYSTS
15-18 SEP 06**

OFFICIAL PARTY (7):	SUPPORT PARTY (7):
HON Bing West (National Review & Atlantic Monthly) Former Asst Secretary of Defense	Brig Gen Wright, MNF-I STRATEFF Comms Div Director
GEN (r) Wayne Downing (MSNBC)	Lt Col (b)(6) MNF-I STRATEFF Comms Div Plans
COL (r) John Garrett (FOX News)	MAJ (b)(6) Aide-de-camp
Dr. (COL) Jeff McCausland (CBS)	
Mr Wayne Simmons (FOX News)	
Mr Lawrence (OASD-PA) GS-15	
Ms (b)(6) (OASD-PA) GS-11	
	JVB (4) (b)(6)
JVB Escort: CPT (P) (b)(6)	Trip Planner: LCDR
DSN: (b)(2)	DSN: (b)(2)
Iraqna	Iraqna

Purpose:

The Office of the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs invited civilian military analysts and national veterans organization leaders to the Iraq AOR to show them, first-hand, current Multinational Force-Iraq operations and to file reports on the same. These retired senior officials provide MNF-I a unique capability to accurately communicate with global audiences regarding current operations, as well as showcase the progress MNF-I is making in Iraq. As former U.S. Government or Department of Defense employees, DVs have first-hand experience with military doctrine and operations. They are educated, informed and ready to engage the national and international media on current issues to help deliver themes and messages, and counter enemy propaganda. The group should see the degree to which Coalition Forces and Iraqi leaders are working together. Engaging with these DVs will help the global audience understand the current situation on the ground and the progress being made in Iraq, which will increase public trust and support for the MNF-I effort. OASD-PA hosted a similar outreach trip to Iraq in the days leading up to the October 2005 elections with full support from MNF-I.

ITINERARY: All Times Are Baghdad Local (C = Z + 4)

Friday, 15 Sep

DVs arrive Kuwait City (commercially) / RON

DECLASSIFIED
 BY Joint Staff
 DATE 4/4/08

MNF-I Trip Planner: LCDR (b)(6) DSN (b)(2) VOIP (b)(2)
 IRAQNA (b)(2)
 JVB Escort Officer: CPT (b)(6) DSN (b)(2) IRAQNA (b)(2)

Saturday, 16 Sep

- 0830 DVs depart KCIA
- 0730 STRATEFF members depart LZ Washington
0750 JVB ground transportation to JVB Hotel to check in
0830 STRATEFF departs for BIAP Glass House with JVB
0900 STRATEFF members arrive at BIAP Glass House
- 1000 DVs arrive at BIAP Glass House via fixed wing
- 1015-1045 Ground transportation Camp Victory, JVB Hotel
(JVB Escort Officer)
- 1045-1115 JVB Hotel in-processing (billeting) / personal time
(MAJ (b)(6) [redacted] DSN (b)(2) [redacted])
- 1115-1200 IGFC JOC tour / mission overview (Bldg 0)--COL (b)(6) [redacted]
- 1200-1240 MNC-I Ops/Intel (Location MNC-I JOC)--COL (b)(6) [redacted]
- 1245-1330 Lunch at Camp Victory Sport Oasis DFAC or Coalition DFAC
- 1330-1415 Executive time
(JVB Escort Officer)
- 1415-1430 Ground transportation to 4JD
(POC: MAJ (b)(6) [redacted] / CPT (b)(6) [redacted])
Ironhorse Visitors Bureau
DSN (b)(2) [redacted] VOIP (b)(2) [redacted] Iraqna (b)(2) [redacted]
- 1430-1730 Battlefield tour of Doura and Ameriyah in combat vehicles
2 separate convoys, ONLY 4 Official personnel & 1 JVB per convoy
(POC: MAJ (b)(6) [redacted] / CPT (b)(6) [redacted] IVB
DSN (b)(2) [redacted] VOIP (b)(2) [redacted] Iraqna (b)(2) [redacted])
- 1800 Return to Victory
- 1830-1915 Executive time at JVB Hotel
(POC: MAJ (b)(6) [redacted] DSN (b)(2) [redacted])
- 1920 Ground transportation to GEN Casey's quarters
- 1930 Dinner with GEN Casey

MNF-I Trip Planner: LCDR (b)(6) [redacted] DSN (b)(2) [redacted] VOIP (b)(2) [redacted]
IRAQNA 0790-192-8133
JVB Escort Officer: CPT (b)(6) [redacted] DSN (b)(2) [redacted] IRAQNA: (b)(2) [redacted]

Sunday, 17 Sep

- 0630-0700 Breakfast available in JVB Hotel dining area
- 0700-0725 Ground transportation to BIAP Glass House for departure
- 0730 C-130 fixed wing departure for Mosul
- 0900-1200 Battlefield tour of Mosul in combat vehicles
(Mosul ops / intel / reconstruction overview)
(POC: MAJ (b)(6) [redacted] 251D JVB, VOIP (b)(2) [redacted] DSN (b)(2) [redacted])
- 1215-1300 Working lunch w/CF (CGOs / NCOs)
- 1300 C-130 fixed wing departure for BIAP Glass House
- 1430 Helo flight from BIAP Glass House to LZ Washington
- 1445-1455 Travel to US Embassy
- 1500-1530 Office call with USEMB/DCM Speckhard
(POC: CAPT (b)(6) [redacted] CoS to AMB Khalilzad
Tel: (b)(2) [redacted] ext: (b)(2) [redacted] GSM Cell: (b)(6) [redacted]
DSN: (b)(2) [redacted] Iraqna: (b)(2) [redacted] SVOIP: (b)(2) [redacted])
- 1530-1555 Travel to Prime Minister's building
- 1600-1630 Office call with Prime Minister
(POC: MAJ (b)(6) [redacted] MNF-I STRATOPS (b)(2) [redacted])
- 1635-1645 Ground transportation to 10th Combat Support Hospital
- 1645-1745 Informal talks with staff, especially EMT Medics and Nurses
- 1800 Helo flight from LZ Washington to LZ Liberty Main, at Camp Victory
- 1815 Arrive Victory, transfer to JVB
- 1825-1900 Dinner at JVB Hotel Dining Facility
- 1925 Transportation to LTG Chiarelli's quarters
- 1930 Stand-up social at LTG Chiarelli's quarters
- 2030-2100 Ground transportation to Camp Dublin, near BIAP
- 2100-???? Emergency Response Unit demonstration
MNF-I Trip Planner: LCDR (b)(6) [redacted] DSN (b)(2) [redacted] VOIP (b)(2) [redacted]
IRAONA (b)(2) [redacted]
JVB Escort Officer: CPT (b)(6) [redacted] DSN (b)(2) [redacted] IRAQNA (b)(2) [redacted]

~~SECRET/REL MCFI~~
Version 7 As of 1928 local 14 Sep 06

Monday, 18 Sep

0630-0800 Breakfast available in the JVB Hotel Dining Facility

0700-0720 JVB out-processing

0730-0830 Breakfast with BG Pittard, MITT / NPTT reps (JVB Conference Room)
(POC: COL (b)(6) IAG/PA, (b)(2)
(POC for JVB Conf. Room, MAJ (b)(6) DSN (b)(2)

0830-0845 Ground transportation to LZ Liberty Main
(JVB Escort Officer)

0845-0900 Helo flight from LZ Liberty Main to LZ Washington

0900-0915 Ground transportation to Embassy Annex

0915-1015 CPATT Briefing with MG Peterson (Room N215)
(POC: MAJ (b)(6) DSN (b)(2) IRAQNA (b)(2)

1030-1100 Office call with LTG Dempsey at Embassy Annex

1100-1115 Ground transportation to LZ Washington

1115-1145 Helo flight from LZ Washington to LZ Habbaniyah

1145-1345 Battlefield tour of Habbaniyah in combat vehicles
(ops / intel / reconstruction overview)
(Protocol Capt (b)(6) DSN (b)(2) VOIP (b)(2)

1345-1500 Working lunch w/ CF (CGOs / NCOs)
(Protocol Capt (b)(6) DSN (b)(2) VOIP (b)(2)

1500 Helo flight from LZ Habbaniyah to BIAP Glass House

1530 Arrive BIAP Glass House

1600 Fixed Wing Departure for Kuwait

1630 STRATEFF departs for LZ Washington

MNF-I Trip Planner: LCDR (b)(6) DSN (b)(2) VOIP (b)(2)
IRAQNA (b)(2)

JVB Escort Officer: CPT (b)(6) DSN (b)(2) IRAQNA (b)(2)