

Log R-88 Not 1822-A Rec P-76-52 through 55

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C.

ISSUED: November 19, 1976

Forwarded to:

Honorable Asaph H. Hall
Administrator
Federal Railroad Administration
400 Seventh Street, S. W.
Washington, D.C. 20591

SAFETY RECOMMENDATION(S)

R-76-52 through 55

About 6:57 a.m., on May 5, 1976, 25 automobile carriers derailed from Auto-Train Corporation's northbound train No. 4 near Jarratt, Virginia. No one was injured. The train was traveling about 72 mph on the Seaboard Coast Line Railroad (SCL). The derailment occurred when a wheel fractured; the wheel had been overheated previously by dragging brakes. ^{1/}

The Safety Board has reviewed the conditions of this accident and finds that present Federal inspection procedures will not insure the detection of critical conditions in wheels before inservice failure. The present Code of Federal Regulations requires that overheated wheels be removed only after certain conditions exist on the wheel. The wheel that overheated in this accident failed before it ever showed these conditions specified in the Federal regulations.

The wheel involved in this accident fractured in the vertical leg of a stamped marking on the wheel rim. The crew did not observe or detect that a wheel of their train was derailed before the train separated. These problems, in the Board's view, warrant corrective action; therefore the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Federal Railroad Administration:

^{1/} For more detailed information on this accident, read "Auto-Train Corporation Train Derailment on the Seaboard Coast Line Railroad, near Jarratt, Virginia, May 5, 1976." NTSB-RAR-76-11.

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Establish national standards for the inspection of railroad wheels that will insure detection of critical conditions in wheels before inservice failures occur. (Class II--Priority Followup) (R-76-52)

Review the methods employed in marking wheels and determine if the present method of marking wheel rims is detrimental to the service life of railroad wheels (Class II--Priority Followup) (R-76-53)

Develop a method that does not depend on crew observation that will automatically detect when a wheel(s) has failed or derailed. (Class II--Priority Followup) (R-76-54)

Revise the Code of Federal Regulations to insure that wheels exposed or suspected of being exposed to critical temperatures are removed from service. (Class I--Urgent Followup) (R-76-55)

TODD, Chairman, McADAMS, HOGUE and HALEY, Members, concurred in the above recommendations. BAILEY, Vice Chairman, did not participate.



By: Webster B. Todd, Jr.
Chairman

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