

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C.

FOR RELEASE: 6:30 A.M., E.D.T., MAY 27, 1976

(202) 426-8787

ISSUED: May 27, 1976

Forwarded to:

Honorable John L. McLucas
Administrator
Federal Aviation Administration
Washington, D.C. 20591

} SAFETY RECOMMENDATION(S)

} A-76-71 and 72

On July 11, 1975, the No. 1 propeller blade separated from the No. 2 engine as a Puerto Rico International Airlines, Inc., DeHavilland DH-114 was taking off from Puerto Rico International Airport, San Juan, Puerto Rico.^{1/} As a result, the aircraft was damaged heavily and a passenger was injured.

The National Transportation Safety Board's investigation of this accident disclosed that the Federal Aviation Administration issued the supplemental type certificate for the installation of the Teledyne Continental IO-520 engine with the Hartzell EHC-A3VF-2B propeller without dynamic testing of the aircraft/engine/propeller combination.


The Safety Board's investigation further disclosed that FAA's supervision of the repair station which had overhauled propellers for PRINAIR may have been lax and that manufacturers' recommendations for compliance with service bulletins and other repair specifications were not adhered to. Even though the FAA has initiated corrective action in this specific case, the Safety Board believes that this accident may indicate laxities in the FAA's supervision of certificated repair stations and in the procedures which govern the granting of STC's.

Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Federal Aviation Administration:

^{1/} For more detailed information on this accident, read "Aircraft Accident Report: Puerto Rico International Airlines, Inc., DeHavilland DH-114, N570PR, San Juan, Puerto Rico, July 11, 1975 (AAR-76-13)."

- (1) Review immediately its programs for surveillance of certificated repair stations and its procedures which govern the granting of supplemental type certificates. (Class II-Priority Followup)
- (2) Review its policies relative to users' compliance with manufacturers' service bulletins which may have safety of flight implications, and, where appropriate, issue Airworthiness Directives as soon as possible after service difficulties are discovered. (Class III-Longer-term Followup)

TODD, Chairman, McADAMS, BURGESS, and HALEY, Members, concurred in the above recommendations. HOGUE, Member, did not participate.


By: Webster B. Todd, Jr.
Chairman

THESE RECOMMENDATIONS WILL BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC ON THE ISSUE DATE SHOWN ABOVE. NO PUBLIC DISSEMINATION OF THE CONTENTS OF THIS DOCUMENT SHOULD BE MADE PRIOR TO THAT DATE.