Blog Posts tagged with "counterproliferation"

I do not think the comparison to the shortcomings of the Russia operations is an accurate one. What we are missing is the very basic fundamental concept of counter insurgency warfare: An insurgency can only be defeated by creating responsive government at the local level. Fail to do that and the counter insurgent will lose. Committing further resources and troops will merely delay the inevitable. It is possible to reduce the symptoms to a manageable level with more resources but this will only effect the timing of the outcome not the outcome itself. In Iraq I witnessed this repeatedly. In areas where responsive local government existed (in my experience exclusively on serendipitous grounds) there was no insurgent activity. Now to the connection between our efforts and those of the Russians, two words "National Government". To understand the role of national governments in governmental systems we must understand the concept of accountability in such systems. It begins at the local level with people bringing their issues to their representatives and up the chain it goes. Breaking this "chain of accountability" and keeping it broken is a necessary requirement for the survival of the insurgency. Now if you establish a national level government with no such mechanism (i.e. no accountability) and subsequently attempt to create responsive government at the local level you have a major problem. The accountability becomes a threat to the survival of the national government as the possibility exists that they may be held accountable. This of course assumes that the national government engaged in activities which they cannot survive an accounting for. Most engage in such activities. This leads to a strategic alignment of the goals of the national government and the insurgency. The result is the ultimate collapse of the national government or in the short term a dictatorship. The success strategy calls for the establishment of responsive government at

The concept of winning over the people is an important result to focus on. To do so on a enduring basis requires that their needs, wants, and desires be addressed. Please note the word "addressed" not fufilled. The military can attempt to address these needs but often we end up missing the mark for a litany of reasons. Even if we are successful it amounts to feeding them a fish. The hope is that tasting fish will provide them the motivation (though not the knowledge or tools) to fish. Great way to play wack-a-mole with the insurgents but not really helpful in terms of achieving the end state. The insurgents feed on peoples discontent be that from no fish or from failed fishing efforts. In terms of the counter insurgent the latter is far more damaging particularly when the counter insurgent is connected with it. A more efficient approach is to establish the responsive local government. If the local government is responsive the people will be of the view that progress is happening and the insurgent becomes the screwdriver in the spokes of the wheel of progress. Under these conditions the insurgency will collapse and the more active they become the more hastened will be their demise. This lens allows us to remove the apparent complexity of the insurgency challenge. All things seem complex when we fail to grasp the underlying fundementals. I am sure for most people the code driving the computer mouse seems complex. To Bill Joy (The programmer who designed and wrote much of the code for Graphic User Interfaces) it is not complex. Perhaps sophisticated and ingenious but simple. The reason it is simple for Bill Joy and complex for us is the knowledge of and experience with the underlying fundementals. Think about that the next time you hear the term complex employed.

I disagree. I think the Russians failed because they did not establish responsive local government. The rest of the reasons (cultural et al) are simply shiny objects. It is not that culture does not play a role in how things work out, it does. It is however rarely a proximate cause for the failure or success of an insurgency, at least historically. I really think the culture card is way over played like the bogey man. It is what we do not understand, we do not grasp the underlying fumdementals of culture. In other words it is "complex", an 800 pound gorilla waiting to ambush us, the evil within et al. Perhaps it not the culture that is challenging us but our inability to view a situation froma different perspective, to redefine what constitutes rational choice. From this perspective the challenge is not the culture but our inability to understand what drives it and see the world through anothers lens. You should never judge somebody until you have walked a mile in their shoes. Then you can pass whatever judgement you wish because they are a mile away and you have their shoes.

Thanks for all the back-and-forth on these issues. This exchange of ideas is precisely why I love this forum. In response to the question on the Mediterranean Dialogue, I'm in and I refer you to the NATO website, which is full of information on this important topic. Check out http://www.nato.int/med-dial/home.htm. The latest NATO policy document, A more Ambitious and Expanded Framework for the Mediterranean Dialogue, can be found at here, too: http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2004/06-istanbul/docu-meddial.htm. I personally am committed to advancing the Mediterranean dialogue and do so in my discussions as I travel to the nations involved. I would also emphasize that the dialogue is mutually beneficial, and for instance they get a lot from being involved in exercises, courses and operations - as of course do we. We should likewise be expanding our work in the Gulf -- in this complicated world we have to reach out to potential partners everywhere!

The Soviet Union spent 10 years trying to prop up a puppet Afghanistan central government supported by a strong national military. They failed in part because we, the U.S., played the part of "spoilers". But the endeavor was doomed to fail anyway due also to cultural traditions in the region and a historical lack of nationalism and a strong central government. The U.S. strategy has not changed from Bush's original policy, which is the same as the Soviet's mentioned above. What is it about this newest initiative to support the same strategy that seems promising? Thank you. Norman Carter

Thanks much. Would explain us what would you do for enhancing the Mediterranean Dialogue? What about a PfP SOFA-like for the Mediterranean Dialogue countries? The media show how Israel, Jordan and Morocco are engaged in NATO activities and operations...but what do we give then in exchange when the participate in exercises and courses?...a tourist visa.