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By JAR NARA, Date 10/3/2011
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Dear President Nixon: *Dick*

I would like to give you a prompt review of my discussions with Gorbachev. (Also enclosed for your information are texts of some of the key joint statements, remarks, and fact sheets.)

The atmosphere of the Summit was very positive, as you will have noted from the press coverage. Our private discussions were vigorous at times, but not confrontational. I felt we were able to talk with candor and openness.

The issues we addressed lie at the very root of the Cold War: the division of Germany and of Europe, significant reductions in the Soviet military threat, and the transformation of the Soviet system itself.

Although no breakthroughs were made on the toughest issues, I felt we made important progress toward narrowing our differences. At one point in our talks, Gorbachev sat back and told me that he thought it was remarkable that we are passing through a time of great change in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in such a peaceful way. That is one of the ways in which I think our good relationship is paying off.

All in all, I found Gorbachev still confident. But he is obviously weighed down by all he faces at home. He spoke to me about these problems in a direct way, and I think he is still committed to the path of reform -- political and economic.

I laid out my position on Lithuania and the other Baltic states and explained why we do not see this as an internal Soviet matter. President Gorbachev knows my views, and knows that Soviet action in the Baltics can be a thorn in the side of our overall relationship.

As for the Soviet international position, Gorbachev seemed to me to be groping his way through the

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implications of all the changes of the past year. To his credit, he is open-minded and prepared to be reassured by steps the Western allies might take to show that changes can be managed in ways that do not threaten Soviet security. In that regard, I believe the Summit helped give him some of those assurances. Our agreement to hold regular summit meetings will also strengthen the sense of predictability in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Germany and Europe

Gorbachev began our discussions by arguing that a united Germany in NATO would alter the strategic balance. He proposed that Germany belong to both NATO and the Warsaw Pact -- have "two anchors," as he put it -- and referred to a long transition period, seemingly under Four-Power supervision, an idea he came back to several times.

I responded clearly that Germany is no threat to anyone, including the Soviet Union, and stressed that Germany has earned its place in the new Europe and would have good and constructive relations with the Soviet Union. I emphasized that I support Chancellor Kohl's position that a united Germany should remain a full member of NATO, including participation in its integrated military structures. I also added that a united, democratic Germany must be free to choose its alliance and security arrangements. German sovereignty must be complete at the time of unification, with no new discriminatory constraints on German sovereignty. Forty-five years after the war, there is no reason for a united, democratic Germany to be singled out for special status.

Gorbachev seemed to agree that, while we differ about Germany's full membership in NATO, the Germans have a right -- under the Helsinki Final Act -- to choose their Alliance membership. We'll see how this works out in practice.

Gorbachev gave me the impression that he was still feeling his way and that his position may not yet be fixed. For example, in arguing against a united Germany in NATO, he seemed to be concerned as much with NATO itself as with Germany's membership in it. He seemed to be looking for reassurance that NATO

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would change its doctrine and evolve to become a more political alliance, and trying to get a better sense of what the Soviet position in Europe would be after unification.

I reaffirmed to Gorbachev my readiness, and that of the Atlantic Alliance, to address legitimate Soviet security concerns and I shared with him my vision of a transformed Alliance.

Arms Control

We reached several important arms control agreements. These serve our interest, as well as demonstrate to the Soviets that military tensions in the new Europe can be substantially reduced.

The joint statement on CFE was important. The Soviets agreed to re-dedicate themselves to reaching rapid agreement, and agreed that a CFE treaty is an indispensable foundation for the future of European security.

On chemical weapons, we signed a far-reaching agreement that will result in the destruction of the vast majority of the CW stockpiles that the two sides declared under the terms of the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding. My hope is that this agreement will lead quickly to a global ban on chemical weapons.

We also agreed on the verification protocols for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosives Treaty. We now have the on-site verification measures we wanted.

On START, we were able to record the substantial areas of agreement we reached, but we failed to resolve all the remaining differences. Two of these outstanding issues are Backfire and heavy missiles (the SS-18s).

Even though the Backfire bomber has only limited capabilities in a strategic nuclear context, we made clear to the Soviets the long history and political importance of the Backfire issue to us. They agreed to accept a politically binding commitment not to give Backfire an intercontinental capability through in-flight refueling or by any other means. They

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refused, however, to put a meaningful cap on the total number of Backfires they will have. They argued that it is not and will not be a strategic nuclear bomber and therefore should not be subject to any numerical limits in the START context. Nevertheless, we will continue in Geneva to try to get them to accept some kind of limit.

We also pressed the Soviets hard to go beyond their current agreement to cut their SS-18 force in half from 308 to 154 heavy missiles. They flatly rejected all of our proposals and arguments, including the idea of a limit on the number of SS-18 flight tests that would be permitted each year. While we will continue to try for further limits on these heavy missiles in the current START treaty, we are committed in any event to making the SS-18 a priority issue in the follow-on talks. With our agreement on the broad objectives for these follow-on talks, the need to pursue the key elements of our strategic modernization programs is all the more compelling.

I also pressed Gorbachev hard on Open Skies, emphasizing that a treaty would underscore our countries' commitment to openness. Gorbachev replied that he supported the concept, and thought more progress was possible.

In our press conference, we also issued a good joint statement against proliferation of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and missile technology.

Bilateral Agreements

A number of other agreements were signed during the Summit, including a commercial agreement, and joint statements were issued on a variety of subjects. The announcement of these agreements, on June 1, helped turn the atmosphere of the Summit toward a more upbeat tone.

Our commercial agreement breaks much new ground, and will make it easier for U.S. businesses to operate in the U.S.S.R. The agreement specifically provides improved access to Soviet markets, sets up easier procedures for operation of commercial offices, and contains strong protections for intellectual property rights. This agreement and waiver of Jackson-Vanik

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are prerequisites for granting the Soviets MFN status. Gorbachev and I agreed, however, that we cannot grant MFN until the Soviets pass their revised emigration laws.

We also signed agreements on student exchanges, the peaceful use of atomic energy, ocean studies, civil air transport, a long-term grains accord, and an agreement on maritime transportation. The maritime boundary agreement we signed puts about 70 percent of the Bering Sea under U.S. jurisdiction and will allow fishing and hydrocarbon resource development to go forward in previously disputed areas. We also issued joint statements on a Beringian region park, and other matters.

As a further indication of the new relationship between our countries, we reached a good customs agreement to get Soviet help in the drug war, and agreement on setting up a U.S. cultural center in Moscow for the first time. On the humanitarian front, we were pleased to issue a joint statement declaring our intention to cooperate in using Soviet planes to fly American food to starving Ethiopians.

Regional Affairs

During much of the day we spent at Camp David, Gorbachev and I discussed regional issues. Our discussions were very relaxed. Again, although we achieved no breakthroughs, a stronger basis for cooperation was laid.

On Afghanistan, for example, we agreed on the fundamental importance of elections -- which were so helpful in easing the Nicaraguan problem between us. We still disagree, however, about the role of Najibullah, during the transition period before elections.

In the Middle East, I raised our concerns about the recent attempted Palestinian terrorist raid against Israel, and said Arafat must condemn that act. The Soviets agreed with our concerns about terrorism and we had a good exchange on this issue. I also pressed Gorbachev for implementation of the Soviet direct flights agreement. He complained about the attitude

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of Israel toward settlements in the occupied territories.

As to Central America, I urged Gorbachev to use Soviet influence with Castro to stop arms shipments to the Communist rebels in El Salvador. The Soviets agreed on the need to support the Esquipulas peace process.

Other areas were also discussed -- Cambodia, Korea, Kashmir, and South Africa. On Cambodia, Gorbachev saw some hope for a settlement and described himself as slightly optimistic. It was his impression that China is acting more positively on the Cambodia issue as part of a normalization process between China and Vietnam.

Regarding Korea, Gorbachev seemed to share our concern about North Korean failure to sign and implement an International Atomic Energy Agency nuclear safeguards agreement. He described his planned meeting with President Roh as simply getting acquainted.

All in all, although many important differences remain, I believe the Summit moved us forward toward a more durable East-West relationship.

Sincerely,

Enclosures



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