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William J. Perry
Secretary of Defense

Q&A's

for

Congressional Testimony

on the

Downing Report on the
Saudi Bombing

September 17, 1996

Saudi Bombing

1/18/96

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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TAB 1	Legal (Culpability)
TAB 2	Intelligence
TAB 3	Force Protection & Antiterrorism
TAB 4	Saudi Cooperation
TAB 5	Iraq
TAB 9	Bosnia
TAB 10	Haiti



KHOBAR TOWERS Q's & A's

Legal

The findings in the report.

Q. Have you accepted the findings in General Downing's report?

A. As you know, immediately after the bombing of Khobar Towers, I took steps to enhance force protection in the Central Command area of responsibility. One of those steps was the creation of the Downing assessment team, which I asked to provide a quick, candid report on the status of force protection on the Arabian peninsula and recommendations for preventing further terrorist acts. Because the Department has been moving out on force protection in CENTCOM, I have focused on implementing General Downing's recommendations as part of our overall efforts to enhance force protection in the region.

Who should be fired?

Q. What did Gen. Schwalier know about the threat against Khobar Towers?

A. Gen. Schwalier knew Khobar Towers, like any troop concentration in an urban setting, was vulnerable to terrorist attack. He knew of the general threats to U.S. forces in the area. He knew of incidents which may have indicated that Khobar Towers was under surveillance by persons with hostile intent. He did not know -- as no one knew -- when or how an attack might be made.

Q. Should Gen. Schwalier be fired because he did not prevent the attack?

A. We must not forget that terrorists killed the 19 American servicemen and women who were murdered at Khobar towers. After the OPM/SANG bombing, Gen. Schwalier and Wing personnel were aware of a terrorist threat and did a great deal to "harden" Khobar Towers against attack. Gen. Schwalier's security staff focused on force protection, and worked with their Saudi counterparts to that end. Because of their efforts, entry procedures were strengthened, Jersey Barriers were added to the perimeter, security lookouts were posted on the roofs of buildings, and the Saudis increased their patrols outside the perimeter. These measures worked in

preventing an attack inside the compound, and probably saved lives, but were insufficient against an extremely sophisticated attack. It is important to emphasize that terrorists have the luxury of searching for and attacking any weak spot, while defenders must consider and attempt to protect against every vulnerability -- no one, and no amount of money or care, can guarantee that our servicemen and women will always be safe from terrorist attack.

Backup A. Before I read the report, I referred it to the Secretary of the Air Force for any appropriate action on discipline and any other issues raised in the report concerning how the Air Force supports forces deployed to unified commands such as CENTCOM. That process is ongoing and it would be entirely inappropriate for me to comment on disciplinary issues until that process is complete.

Q. Whenever this sort of event occurs, it seems that the official report lets the top brass off and lower-ranking people in the field take all the blame. Isn't that what General Downing has done here? Why hasn't General Peay been sacked?

A. Again, terrorists killed our servicemen and women at Khobar Towers. It is always possible to spend more and take further steps to ensure force protection -- and we are doing this today in light of the greatly increased threat in Saudi Arabia. Obviously, in light of the Khobar Towers event and the Downing report, I have reviewed General Peay's performance in all of his responsibilities. I continue to give him my full support and have so advised the President. General Peay is a superb combat commander, who has handled his Command in one of the most challenging areas of the world with great skill.


Q. Do you consider the Commander, 4404th Wing (Provisional) to have been negligent in performing his force protection duties?

A. Neither I nor any other official may properly comment on this. Before reviewing the Downing report, I referred that report to the Secretary of the Air Force for an independent review of the facts and an independent decision on disciplinary and any other issues raised by the report.

Q. Do you believe the chain of command failed General Schwalier?

A. General Downing's recommendations and the actions we have taken independently to improve force protection demonstrate that we all can do more to respond systematically to what is a new and sophisticated terrorist threat. Our goal now is to make sure that we do what is necessary to make sure that terrorist attacks on our forces do not readily succeed. And in doing that, we are going to make a lot of changes. So I think we can make a lot of improvements -- in focus, in funding, in technology, and in local command authority. [I do not, however, think the chain of command "failed" General Schwalier.]

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INTELLIGENCE FAILURE ISSUE

Q: Mr. Secretary, was there an intelligence failure or, as Senator Specter has said, a "failure to use intelligence?"

A. The fact that the HNSC staff wrote a report that basically faults the intelligence community for the deadly terrorist attack at Khobar Towers while the Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman concluded that there was no intelligence failure, highlights the complexity of this issue. General Downing conducted an exhaustive and extensive review of the performance of intelligence leading up to the Al Khobar attack. I believe he would agree with my report to the President that we had very good intelligence in some areas, sufficient intelligence in other areas, and, at least in the case of intelligence of impending attack, we were deficient. Let me briefly try to put this complicated topic in better context.

Four months prior to the OPM/SANG bombing in November of last year, DIA and CENTCOM raised the threat level in Saudi Arabia from "low" to "medium." That was a significant move given that the last incident directed against Americans in Saudi Arabia was in 1991 when a bus carrying US military personnel was fired on. The threat level was raised because of intelligence that indicated an increased terrorist threat.

After OPM/SANG, the threat level was raised again, this time to "high" based on a number of suspicious incidents that could have reflected preparations of a terrorist attack. The threat level was not raised to "critical" however, because the key ingredient to a critical threat level was missing -- that is, the specific intelligence that would link any of these suspicious incidents to a direct threat to Khobar Towers or any other U.S. occupied facility. As late as 17 June 1996, for example, in an often-quoted Military Intelligence Digest article, DIA analysts noted that organized terrorist groups had not been reported targeting US and other Coalition personnel while noting that increased security procedures were warranted. Indeed, that is

exactly what the command was doing -- improving security procedures.

As I reported to the President, the commanders on the ground paid attention to the intelligence they had, and the resulting increased threat levels, to implement many security enhancements. It is unquestionably true that those security improvements saved lives and injuries.

But, clearly, we need to work on intelligence capabilities to provide warnings of impending attack. Even so, we will likely never be in a position of guaranteeing perfect knowledge of terrorist intent. That is one of the reasons I have undertaken the force protection initiatives that I am here to talk about today.

HUMINT ISSUE

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Long Commission report cited intelligence failings, specifically HUMINT, as a contributor to our lack of preparation for the Beirut bombing. General Downing notes that we lacked tactical warning and says that warning can come only from HUMINT penetration. Why haven't we fixed the HUMINT problem?

A. First, let me start by saying that we have had several successes in thwarting specific terrorist activity in recent years. One of the best examples was the contribution intelligence made to warning of the January 1995 Ramzi Yousef plot to assassinate the Pope and destroy 10 US airliners. Nonetheless, it is true that we did not have the kind of specific information that would have both characterized the seriousness of the threat or permitted us to raise the threat level to critical.

HUMINT, much more than technical collection such as that we get from satellites, is an art not a science. And HUMINT on

terrorist activity is probably our hardest target. The information is perishable and, by virtue of the fact that we must act on any information we get, sources are extremely vulnerable and quickly compromised.

There is another, much more difficult, issue related to HUMINT access that I will work with the DCI to resolve. That issue has to do with the cultural bias within the US structure against the risk associated with HUMINT operations. Shortly after the Long Commission report, military HUMINT organizations began proposing HUMINT initiatives that would help us against the terrorist threat as well as the threat from radical fundamentalism. Eight initiatives in eight distinct moderate-to-high-threat areas were rejected during the past ten years ultimately because one or more of the approving officials outside the Defense approval chain was concerned that the "risk" was too great. Given that it can take years to develop a good HUMINT plan, years to train case officers, and years to get results, every proposal that is dismissed, costs us years to recover.



Q's and A's

Secretary of Defense Hearing on Force Protection

Force Protection and Antiterrorism

Q. The attack on Khobar Towers is just like the one on the Marine Barracks in Beirut in 1983. How can it be that you have learned nothing in 13 years?

A. The DOD and our government have learned a lot in 13 years. Regrettably, so have the terrorists. In Beirut a key failure was the fact that the truck bombers were able to breach the perimeter security of the compound. At Khobar Towers they were not able to do so because of the numerous security measures taken by our forces, as we saw the threat escalate in Saudi Arabia after the OPM/SANG bombing. Therefore the terrorists decided to employ a bomb of unprecedented size, regardless of whether we use General Downing's estimate, or the DSWA estimate. Although 19 deaths are 19 too many, there was no structural collapse of the buildings at Khobar Towers, because the bomb was kept away from the building. This alone saved many, possibly hundreds of American lives. Nonetheless, the DoD has embarked on a top to bottom scrub of our force protection and antiterrorism processes, procedures, and programs to counter the changed and changing threat to our forces and our interests around the globe.

Q. According to General Downing, DoD did not have clear security standards at Khobar Towers. Why?

A. General Downing notes in his report that there are no DoD wide prescriptive security standards. In our revision to DoD Directive 2000.12 we have designated the DoD Handbook, 0.2000.12-H to serve as the DoD standard. Within DoD we will continue to rely on a commander's judgment to ensure that security precautions are robust. The commander will be guided by the standards, but will also be required to consider his mission, the evolving threat, the local conditions, and other factors in determining appropriate force protection measures

Q. Why doesn't DoD just use the same standards as the Department of State?

A. State Department standards, although somewhat more prescriptive, are also only baseline guidelines which must be adapted to the prevailing threat. In most places in the world, State Department personnel must live among the local population in large cities in order to do their jobs. Such standards, while appropriate to the State Department, may not be appropriate for DoD personnel who perform a vastly different mission than their State Department colleagues. Additionally, in some instances DoD may be able to relocate forces, as we have done in Saudi Arabia. This option is generally not feasible for the Department of State.

Q. Doesn't the delegation of authority for force protection matters from DoS to DoD suggest that the Sec State had been derelict in his duties in protecting DoD elements under his control?


A. No. After the OPM/SANG bombing both the DoD Anti Terrorism Task Force and the State Department's Accountability Review Board noted that a " bifurcation of authority" existed between DoD and State for those DoD elements under the authority of the Chief of Mission. The State Department's ARB noted that this bifurcation caused confusion. Both the Secretary of State and I agreed that we needed to end this confusion. The delegation of authority was the quickest way to accomplish this and to ensure clear lines of responsibility.

Q. Why did you seek delegation of this authority only in countries of the Arabian Peninsula ?

A. The countries of the Arabian Peninsula were the principal places where there were disproportionately large numbers of DoD personnel under the security responsibility of the Chief of Mission, numbers which far exceeded the State Department's funding levels to carry out the kinds of security programs required when threat levels increased suddenly, as they did in Saudi Arabia. As additional security reviews are completed we may delegate such authority elsewhere, depending on the numbers of DoD personnel involved and changes to threat levels.

Q. The Downing Report recommends increased use of technology to help defend against terrorist attacks. Why hasn't the DoD used its research and development capabilities against this threat?

A. It has. Responding to the increase in terrorism in the early 1980's, the department initiated a low-profile but extremely effective research and development program for combating terrorism. The ASD(SO/LIC) manages this small but robust program whose focus is on combating terrorism. The Counterterror Technical Support (CTTS) program identifies and extracts the most promising technologies from DoD, civil agencies, industry, academia, and international partners. It rapidly develops prototypes in one to three years, in response to DoD, interagency and international combating terrorism requirements. Additionally, we have active bilateral R&D agreements with the United Kingdom, Canada, and Israel. The CTTS program has been successful over the last decade in leveraging technology, funds, and manpower to address both anti- and counter-terrorism needs. Since its inception, the total investment in the program has been \$90 million and the program has transitioned over 70% of its projects, including more than 60 pieces of equipment. Even prior to the attack on Khobar Towers we had planned to almost double the funding for this program in FY 98 and beyond, to approximately \$30 million per year.



SAUDI COOPERATION ISSUES

- Q. Please explain the decision-making process regarding the implementation of security measures at the American compound and other U.S. installations in Saudi Arabia? Do the Saudis have authority to reject security recommendations made by the U.S.?**

The normal decision-making processes of the U.S. military govern implementing security measures within those areas for which we have security responsibilities. The U.S. military does not have any "installations" of its own in Saudi Arabia and is a guest on Saudi military bases or other facilities, such as Khobar Towers, for our use. The Saudi Arabian Government has sovereign authority over all its territory. We undertake the force protection measures we believe appropriate, and we work closely with Saudi officials to ensure that they are implemented.

- Q. The Saudis did not allow U.S. investigators to interview the suspects in the November attack. Why? At what level did we press them to allow us to interrogate these suspects? The Secretary of State? Chairman Shalikashvili?**

A. The Secretary of Defense was not aware that such requests had been made nor the Saudis' reasons for not granting them. Most governments would be reluctant to share complete information relating to matters of internal security and indigenous opposition to the regime. The question of interviewing the suspects remained an FBI matter.

- Q. Did you not think that interrogating the suspects of the November incident was important enough to press the Saudis to cooperate at the highest levels of our government?**

A. The Secretary of Defense was unaware, until informed by FBI Director Freeh after their execution, that a request to interrogate the four suspects had been denied. Access to the suspects was potentially very important, which is why Secretary Perry made very clear to the Saudi leadership that we must be able to interrogate the Khobar Towers suspects when they are apprehended. The Saudis have agreed, and we will hold them to that commitment.

- Q. How would you describe the level of Saudi cooperation with FBI investigators on the bombing investigation?**

A. That is a question you need to ask Director Freeh. This is an open investigation with the FBI leading the US effort. During my trips to Saudi Arabia, I asked for and stressed our concern with Saudi cooperation in this area. I received a pledge of cooperation. I am hopeful it is working.

- Q. Who will pay for relocation? Who will pay for force protection enhancements? The Saudis? The U.S.?**

The cost of the relocation will be shared. Generally, the U.S. will bear the near term relocation cost, while the Saudis will pay for permanent upgrades to the bases that they will make available for our use. The Saudis will also pay the entire relocation costs for security assistance personnel as required by law.

Q. How much will a relocation cost? Must new buildings be constructed? Will new airstrips and hangars be required?

A. U.S. costs with the relocation are expected to be approximately \$120 million. This does not include funding for any of the permanent facilities or upgrades for which the Saudis have agreed to pay. U.S. forces will use existing runways and hangars. Since the Saudis are providing any permanent facilities or upgrades, no military construction is required.

Q. Will a congressional authorization/appropriation be required to conduct any of these moves?

A. The Department required no additional authorization to provide protection for its forces. The cost of the force protection moves, however, cannot be accommodated within existing appropriations. The Deputy Secretary has invoked the "Feed and Forage" authorities, allowing the Services to incur additional obligation required to maintain essential readiness as well as meet the force protection requirements. Additional appropriations will be required to liquidate any obligations incurred under this authority.

Q. Why aren't the Saudis allowing us to undertake operations from their airbases?

A. The U.S., French, and British coalition forces have been engaged in Operation Southern Watch from Saudi, Kuwaiti, and UAE bases since 1992. Their support continues today, and, based on my recent meetings with regional leaders, I am confident that we remain able to carry out whatever actions we deem necessary.

Q. Why didn't you use Saudi-based aircraft to strike Iraq earlier this month? Is it true that they refused permission?

A. We maintain a variety of forces capable of carrying out such a mission, including land-based aircraft in the region, carrier aircraft, and cruise missile platforms, both afloat and air-launch from strategic air assets based outside the region. For a variety of reasons, including safety of our aircrews, our military planners in this instance chose the cruise missile options. All options remain available to us for future missions as necessary.

Q. How would you characterize Saudi cooperation today? Are they being helpful with your new force protection initiative?

A. I went to Saudi Arabia this weekend in part to review the progress being made in relocating our forces from Dhahran and Riyadh to the remote Prince Sultan Air Base. I could not have been more impressed. Where there was nothing

underway six weeks ago, Operation Southern Watch is in full swing. Amazing logistical and construction feats have been accomplished by our people, all with extraordinary cooperation from the Saudi Government. Their assistance has been ungrudging and often provided before we could make the request.

Iraq Questions and Answers

Question: Why didn't we prevent Iraq from attacking the Kurds and taking Irbil?

Answer: As a practical matter, that would have been very difficult, given the situation on the ground, including the participation of one of the major Kurdish parties in the takeover. As you know, we were working right up to the day of the attack to establish a permanent ceasefire among the Kurds, so as to deprive Saddam of the opportunity to exploit their divisions.

That said, we took very seriously signs that Iraq was preparing for a possible move against Irbil. When the level of that buildup reached a stage we considered significant, we made clear to Iraq--and to the world--that there would be consequences if it moved. And we have made good on those warnings.

In addition, we determined that we should focus our actions where our interests lie--in the strategic heartland (i.e., Baghdad) and in the south. Extending the southern no-fly zone supports this strategic objective in two ways. First, it improves our ability to monitor Saddam's actions and constrains his ability the Gulf states--where our vital interests lie. It also shows Saddam that he will pay a heavy price by resorting to reckless behavior.

Question: What is the legal basis for our actions, including redefining the no-fly zone?

Answer: Our actions are authorized under the terms of United Nations Security Council resolutions relating to Iraq. UNSCR 678 authorizes member states to "use all necessary means to uphold and implement" all relevant resolutions, including UNSCR 688. This resolution "condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population" and demands that Iraq end this repression "as a contribution to removing the threat to international peace and security in the region." Saddam's misuse of his armed forces poses a threat to the stability of the region and thus our national strategic interests. These vital interests include maintenance of security and stability and protection of our friends and allies in the region.

Question: For more than five years, the United States supported Iraq's Kurds out of humanitarian concerns and because of their opposition to Saddam. Now that one of the main Kurdish groups--the KDP--is working with Saddam, what is the future of our policy toward northern Iraq? Specifically, what is the future for Operation Provide Comfort?

Answer: Because the situation in northern Iraq remains fluid, it would be premature to comment on the future of Operation Provide Comfort or future U.S.

contacts with the Kurds. Clearly, we have an interest in maintaining stability in that region in order to avoid a repeat of the refugee crisis of 1991 that led to the establishment of Operation Provide Comfort in April 1991. At the same time, let me make clear that we have no interest in becoming entangled in factional fighting among Iraq's Kurdish groups. Our strategic interests lie in central and southern Iraq, and that will remain the focus of our efforts.

Question: Why are U.S. aircrews continue to fly missions over northern Iraq. Hasn't Operation Provide Comfort lost its mission?

Answer: While conditions on the ground in northern Iraq have changed dramatically in the last three weeks, I believe continued enforcement of the northern no-fly zone supports our overall objective of limiting Saddam's freedom of action. Eliminating the northern no-fly zone would reward him for his aggression. I am determined that there should be no easy victories for Saddam. At the same time, we continue to review Operation Provide Comfort's relevance to our interests in the region, and we will stop these flights when we believe they no longer serve our strategic interests.

Question: Why did the U.S. act without seeking support from the UN Security Council?

Answer: We acted in our own national security interests which is the President's responsibility. We believed we had to act quickly. We did, however, have extensive consultation with our allies.

Question: Saddam Hussayn has said that his forces will no longer fire on U.S. aircraft overflying Iraq. Does this mean that the crisis is over? If so, what have we achieved?

Answer: We have seen many times in the past that Saddam has said one thing and done another. We have no desire to prolong the crisis, but we remain determined to take all necessary actions to ensure the safety of our pilots enforcing the no-fly zones over Iraq. We believe the steps we have taken have sent a strong signal to Saddam that he cannot act with impunity and will pay a heavy price for his reckless behavior. In addition, we have significantly improved our ability to monitor his actions and limit his ability to threaten our interests.



**If Asked: Questions and Answers on Bosnia for SecDef's Hill Appearance
18 September 1996**

IFOR Withdrawal Date

Q: Will all U.S. forces be out of Bosnia by December 1996?

A: No. While some IFOR forces - including U.S. forces - will be withdrawn from Bosnia before the end of the IFOR mandate, the remaining forces will be withdrawn in the weeks immediately after December 20 according to a schedule set by the NATO commanders consistent with safety and logistical requirements and the need to maintain a fully effective force through the end of the IFOR mandate. As a practical matter, this means that some IFOR personnel, to include U.S. troops, will remain in Bosnia into the first weeks of 1997.

Q: When does the United States plan to start withdrawing forces from Bosnia?

A: Some units have already been withdrawn and other have replaced them, in accordance with COMIFOR's request to adjust the force mix prior to the September 14 elections. However, generally, SACEUR and COMIFOR intend to keep IFOR at full strength through the Bosnian elections on September 14. Thereafter, IFOR will begin the drawdown process. The pace and extent of the drawdown between September 14 and December 20 will be determined by General Joulwan and other NATO military authorities, in consultation with the North Atlantic Council, on the basis of the nature of the security environment prevailing in Bosnia at the time and mission requirements and the NAC's previous approval of SACEUR's request to maintain a militarily effective force fully capable of carrying out its entire mission through the end of IFOR's mandate on December 20.

Q: Whose decision was it to keep the full force in place? NATO? Our commanders on the ground?

A: All IFOR force level decisions are made by NATO military authorities, in consultation with the North Atlantic Council. The decision to keep IFOR at full strength through the Bosnian elections and to maintain a militarily effective force in place between the elections and December 20 was made by General Joulwan, in consultation with other senior NATO military commanders and approved by the NATO Ministerial North Atlantic Council meeting in Berlin this past June. Obviously, President Clinton and Secretary Perry were consulted and approved the decision.

Q: Had the United States originally planned to start withdrawing forces prior to the September elections?

A: As I discussed with the Congress last December, it had originally been thought that, given that the principal military tasks and key milestones of Annex 1-A would be completed within the first six months, we could begin a more gradual drawdown of IFOR after that period. However, after receiving the recommendation of SACEUR and COMIFOR, it was determined that a modification to that drawdown plan was necessary, in order to accommodate security and other requirements on the pre- and post-Bosnian election period.

Q: Is the Administration considering a follow-on force in Bosnia after December 1996?

A: IFOR's mandate and mission end on December 20. That has not changed. In concert with our allies, the United States will begin to look closely at the security situation in Bosnia and its relationship to civilian reconstruction and Dayton implementation following Bosnian national elections that were held on September 14. In the coming weeks, we and our NATO allies will be in a better position to assess the parties' progress and to judge what sort of security arrangement, if any, will be needed post-IFOR. No decision has been made on a mission beyond the IFOR mission set out in the Dayton Agreement, and as this process continues we will, of course, continue to consult with the Congress.

Q: Will U.S. forces participate in such a force? Have our NATO allies asked the U.S. to participate in a follow-on force?

A: No decisions have been made by either the United States or NATO with respect to a post-IFOR force. Our NATO allies have not made any requests of the United States to participate in a possible post-IFOR force in Bosnia after December, 1996.

Q: Is the U.S. obligated to participate in a follow-on force if it is under NATO auspices?

A: The Administration has made no commitment and is under no obligation to participate in any post-IFOR operation, NATO or otherwise. As I have noted, no decisions have been made on the subject of a post-IFOR force. NATO will begin to consider the security situation in Bosnia in the coming weeks, now that national elections have been held.

Q: Repeatedly, the Congress has been told by Administration witnesses that IFOR could accomplish its mission in about a year and then withdraw. Now we are being told there may be a need for IFOR to stay longer. Why? What has changed?

A: First, let me repeat that it remains our judgment, as it was last December, that the military mission that IFOR was sent to Bosnia to accomplish will be completed within one year and that the mission will then terminate. As I told the troops of Task Force Eagle when he visited them on the 4th of July, they are coming home at the end of the year after IFOR's mission is completed. No decision has been made on any security mission or international military presence in Bosnia beyond IFOR. That is an entirely separate issue that will need to be addressed in the period between the Bosnian elections and the end of IFOR's mandate in December. During that period we will have to assess a variety of factors including: what the security mission would be, what the risk of renewed fighting would be without a continued international presence, and whether or not such a mission would be in the security interest of the United States or NATO. Such a decision would obviously need to be taken in concert with our allies and in consultation with the Congress.

Q: In congressional testimony on August 1, a Defense official stated that no decision had been made on a mission post-IFOR. The official went on to say that following the September elections, the U.S. and NATO will be in a better position to assess the parties' progress in implementing the Dayton Accords and to judge what security arrangement, if any, will be needed post-IFOR.

What specific indicators will be assessed after the September election to determine whether a new security mission will be necessary post-IFOR? Free and fair elections? Freedom of movement? Removal of war criminals from Bosnia? Effective cooperation between the Muslim and Croat elements of the Bosnian Federation? Military balance of power?

A: Specific indicators could include, but not be limited to, the following items: the state of the parties' compliance with the military requirements of Dayton; an assessment of the outcome of the Bosnian national elections; an assessment of the regional balance of military power, to include an examination of the success of Dayton's Article IV arms control provisions and the US-led Train and Equip program; the health of national political institutions, to include the Bosnian-Croat Federation; and the general security situation that exists in late 1996, noting such factors as freedom of movement for displaced persons and refugees, the disposition of local police forces, and the extent and pace of civilian economic reconstruction. In addition, we would have to examine the exact nature of such a mission, and whether or not it is in the security interests of the United States and NATO.

Q: After the September election, what is the timeline for deciding whether there should be a peacekeeping mission in Bosnia post-IFOR? When is the latest a decision can be made?

A: My NATO colleagues and I agreed to begin to take up the subject of Bosnia and IFOR in late September at our informal defense ministerial in Bergen, Norway. At that time, NATO will assess IFOR's accomplishments, and the current and prospective security environment in Bosnia. The intra-alliance dialogue will continue during the fall and, while no decision date has been set, I suspect that such a decision would need to be made in the weeks before IFOR's mandate ends, perhaps at the NATO Ministerial in December.

Q: Has the Joint Staff been directed to conduct any contingency planning for U.S. participation in a follow-up force in the event that the United States decides to participate in such a force?

A: I am unaware of any formal request for the Joint Staff to conduct contingency planning for a post-IFOR force. I have no doubt that some individual or office may be examining the mission and requirements of a potential follow-on force. This is prudent military planning that is done regularly and on an informal basis, but does not constitute a decision to go ahead formally with any specific future mission.

Q: Is NATO or SHAPE conducting any contingency planning for such a follow-on force?

A: The NATO Planning process for military operations is a complex process that involves numerous steps and approval of each step. No such formal planning has been directed by the NAC that I am aware of. However, I have no doubt that such informal contingency planning is taking place.

September 14 Elections

Q: What is your assessment of the September 14 Bosnian elections?

A: The elections in Bosnia this past Saturday appear to have gone fairly smoothly, with few if any incidents of violence. Their successful conclusion is an important step forward in the rebuilding and reintegration process for Bosnia. Travel across the IEBL by refugees and displaced persons was less than predicted, most likely because of the postponement of Bosnian municipal elections. One of the principal reasons why the elections went so well was IFOR's robust and proactive support to the OSCE and its role in providing for a safe and secure environment throughout the country on election day.

Q: With the September 14 elections complete, what political steps are next for Bosnia?

A: In the coming weeks, Bosnians will begin the political process of setting up the governmental institutions that were created as a result of the elections. Additionally, municipal elections are expected to be held later this year, most likely in mid-to-late November, to complete the elections process as outlined in the Dayton Agreement. Within its capabilities and the limits of its primary military mission, as well as its previously announced drawdown schedule, IFOR will most likely be assisting the OSCE, the IPTF, and the entities with security and other arrangements in support of the municipal elections.

Q: What if Krajisnik, a Bosnian Serb, is elected as the first chairman of the rotating presidency of Bosnia?

A: It is premature to draw any conclusions about the final outcome until all votes are counted, investigations of fraud completed, and the results certified by the OSCE. However, whoever is elected President will be expected to fully carry out the next stages called for in the Constitution of moving quickly to establish the joint governmental institutions.

Covering Force

Q: We have read in the press about a "covering force" being deployed during IFOR's drawdown. When is this force to be deployed? What is its mission? Where is it coming from and how large is it? When will it be withdrawn? What is its command relationship to IFOR? Isn't it really just the first deploying unit of a follow-on force?

A: Just as USCINCEUR directed the deployment of the Southern European Task Force (SETAF) while IFOR was first being deployed last winter in order to provide initial force protection while IFOR's units were in transit and being deployed to Bosnia, SACEUR plans to deploy a covering force during IFOR's redeployment to provide extra force protection. The covering force will be a balanced combined arms unit of about brigade strength that will provide protection for IFOR troops as they go about the tasks of closing down their base camps and operations and packing their equipment. Planning for the covering force is still underway, so it has not yet been determined exactly when it will deploy, but it will be sometime later this fall. In addition, because of its mission of having to provide protection until the last IFOR elements withdraw, parts of the covering force will have to remain in Bosnia after 20 December and it will undoubtedly be one of the last IFOR units to leave Bosnia. However, this should in no way be interpreted as a follow-on force.

Cost Estimate

Q: What is the current cost estimate for Operation Joint Endeavor? Why has the cost increased?

A: The total current cost estimate for U. S. troop participation in IFOR is \$3, 275.8 million. This figure was provided to the Congress in July.

The initial estimate of \$2 billion for US troop participation in IFOR was built in November, 1995. It was generated by OSD and Joint Staff personnel using a force deployment model that was based on experience in Desert Storm and Somalia. While the number of troops (32,000) and general operating tempo were known, the types of forces, deployment schedules, field conditions, and security situation has not been determined. More detailed cost estimates from Military Departments and inclusion of FY 96 costs incurred before deployment of U. S. forces for IFOR increased costs by \$256.4 million. New intelligence and communications requirements resulting from the evaluation of the Scott O'Grady extraction difficulties added \$139.3 million to the estimate.

As forces were deployed to Bosnia, new information about the field conditions rapidly resulted in revisions to the funding requirements. Major flooding delayed the establishment of routes for forces to travel overland. In order to maintain the deployment schedule, significantly more air transportation was required. In addition, field surveys determined that some planned sites for camps were untenable due to physical security or environmental concerns. Additional reserves were also required to back fill for troops that were deployed to Bosnia. Finally, the quality of life for U. S. troops that have either been on patrol or confined to camps was a major concern to the field commander. The increase in funding requirements for these changes was \$476.1 million.

Further refinements of the cost estimate based on actual experiences were made in July. The cost of pulling out heavy armor forces and replacing them with military police, additional communications requirements, and better data on sustainment of costs resulted in an increase of \$309.9 million.

Organization and Personnel Strength of IFOR

Q: What is the current organization and strength of IFOR?

A: The force structure has stabilized with minor changes due to reshaping. IFOR continues to field 31 maneuver battalions with a force strength of approximately 53,000 in the former Yugoslavia. As of last Friday, 6 September, approximately 48,000 of these soldiers were serving in Bosnia. To support the requirements of the elections, additional helicopters are expected from Germany, The Netherlands, the Czech Republic, the United

Kingdom and France. The NATO chain of control for IFOR runs from SACEUR, General Joulwan, through COMIFOR, ADM Lopez, through COMARRC, LTG Walker to the Commander of MND North, MG Nash.

There are approximately 15,000 Americans in IFOR in Bosnia. Most of them serve within TF Eagle, the element built around the 1st Armored Division. Within TF EAGLE, additional Military Police and Heavy Engineer units have been recently introduced into Bosnia-Herzegovina to enhance mobility. Nonetheless, substantial heavy combat forces remain within TF Eagle. The U.S. national chain of command runs from GEN Joulwan, in his capacity as USCINCEUR, through GEN Crouch, CINCUSAREUR, to MG Nash.

LANDCENT

Q: What is the rationale and timeline for the proposed deployment of NATO's LANDCENT Headquarters into theater?

A: On 24 July, the NAC approved SACEUR's concept to have Headquarters, LANDCENT, commanded by U.S. General Crouch, deploy to Sarajevo after the Bosnian elections to replace AFSOUTH and ARRC as Headquarters, IFOR, for the redeployment phase of the operation. This will streamline the operation by eliminating one level of command and allow both AFSOUTH and ARRC to refit and retrain after a nearly one year deployment. The NAC is expected to take up the release of the ACTORD to authorize the actual deployment on Wednesday, 18 September.