

hall-report draft 8; 9/11/96; 5:22 PM

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REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS
THE PROTECTION OF U. S. FORCES
DEPLOYED ABROAD

Submitted by
The Secretary of Defense
Honorable William J. Perry

September 16, 1996

16 Sep 96

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS
ON THE PROTECTION OF U. S. FORCES DEPLOYED ABROAD

The attack on U.S. forces at Khobar Towers has dramatically underscored that for U.S. forces deployed overseas, terrorism is a fact of life. Every terrorist attack provides lessons on how to prevent further tragedies. However, the Khobar Towers attack should be seen as a watershed event pointing the way to a radically new mindset and dramatic changes in the way we protect our forces deployed overseas from this growing threat. This report reviews the Khobar Towers attack, the context of our Persian Gulf force deployments, the force protection measures taken before and after the attack and lessons learned for all of our military operations.

The Attack Against Khobar Towers on June 25th

Khobar Towers is a residential compound built by the Saudi Government near Dhahran that housed the residential quarters of almost 3000 U. S. military personnel of the USAF 4404th Wing (Provisional), along with military personnel from the United Kingdom, France, and Saudi Arabia.

Shortly before 10:00 p.m. local time on Tuesday, June 25, 1996, a fuel truck parked next to the northern perimeter fence at the Khobar Towers complex. Guards posted atop the closest building, Building 131, immediately spotted the truck and suspected a bomb as its drivers fled the scene in a nearby car. Air Force guards began to evacuate the building, but were unable to complete this task before a tremendous explosion occurred. The blast completely destroyed the northern face of the building, blew out windows from surrounding buildings, and was heard for miles. Nineteen American service men were killed and hundreds more were seriously injured, (principally?) by flying glass. In addition, many Saudis and other nationals were injured.

The response of our forces at Khobar Towers to this tragedy reflected their thorough training and bravery. The buddy system worked, and every injured airman received on-the-spot first aid before being escorted to the clinics. Medical teams, both military and civilian, American and Saudi Arabian, performed commendably, without rest for many hours and, in some cases, despite their own wounds.

Once the immediate steps were taken to care for the injured, search for survivors, and account for everyone, the command of 4404th Wing Provisional began to reconstitute itself to carry out its Southern Watch mission. In less than three days, the skies over southern Iraq once again were being patrolled by the Coalition in full force.

The June 25 bombing attack remains under investigation by the Saudi Arabian Government, assisted by large numbers of forensic experts from the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, which has responsibility within the U. S. government for investigating attacks against Americans overseas. No group has claimed responsibility for the bombing, and the Department of Defense does not know who the perpetrators are or who sponsored them.

Why Are We in The Persian Gulf?

The attack on Khobar Towers has raised questions about the need for our presence in the Arabian Gulf Region, and Saudi Arabia in particular.

Our security interests in Saudi Arabia date back to the meeting between Franklin Roosevelt and King Abdul Aziz in 1945. The United States has had a military presence in Saudi Arabia since the early 1950s. During most of this time, our presence has been well under a 1,000 uniformed personnel and civilian employees, in addition to their families, engaged in training and advising the Saudi Arabian military. The United States Military Training Mission to Saudi Arabia (USMTM) was established in 1953 to assist the regular military under the Ministry of Defense and Aviation. In 1965 a U.S. Army program manager's office (OPM/SANG) was established to help in the modernization of the Saudi Arabian National Guard.

Our presence in helping the Saudis modernize their military and absorb new equipment was welcomed and unobtrusive. It was a benign environment in which tens of thousands of American civilians lived and worked, particularly since the oil boom of the 1970s. Since 1977, our military assistance, including the salaries and expenses of our uniformed personnel and civilian employees, has been fully funded by the Saudi Arabian Government.

Saudi Arabia has never hosted foreign military bases of any nation. While Saudi Arabia and its Gulf neighbors generally welcomed an American military presence in the region after Great Britain ended its security responsibilities east of Suez in the early 1970s, they preferred that presence to be "over the horizon." For the U. S., this presence was manifested primarily by our naval Middle East Force in the Arabian Gulf. While the U.S. made use of the Saudi air base at Dhahran in the early years of the Cold War, U.S. combatant forces were rarely deployed to the Kingdom. The major exception before the Gulf War was during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s when American AWACs and tanker aircraft were deployed to Riyadh.

When Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, that invasion dramatically changed the security dynamics, and the U.S. presence, in the region. The United States, acting to protect its vital interests, led a coalition of Western and Islamic forces that deployed over half a million men and women to the Gulf to defend Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states and to free Kuwait from Iraq's brutal occupation. Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm were an impressive victory, although the threats to the region from aggressor states were not completely destroyed.

The primary American interest that we acted decisively to protect in the Gulf War was access to the vast energy resources of the region, i.e., nearly two-third of the world's proven oil reserves upon which our own economy and those of the entire industrial world depend so heavily. This fact alone would have justified our actions in 1990-1991, but America also has other vital interests in the regions. The security of Israel and Egypt and the Gulf states themselves was endangered by Iraq's aggression and desire to dominate the politics of the region. Coupled with the end of the Cold War, the Coalition's victory allowed the U.S. to move forward on the Middle East peace process in a manner not previously possible. America also has vital interests in protecting U.S. citizens and property abroad, and in ensuring freedom of navigation

through the air and sea lanes that connect Europe and the West with Africa, Asia, and the Indian Ocean, all of which pass through and alongside the Arabian Peninsula.

The Nature of Our Current Mission

When President Bush sought King Fahd's permission to deploy American forces to Saudi Arabia in 1990, for the build-up to Desert Shield/Desert Storm, he made a solemn commitment that we would depart when our wartime mission was concluded. The United States sought no permanent bases or operational presence on the Arabian Peninsula and that continues to be our policy.

However, the threat to U.S. vital interests in the region from Saddam Hussein's regime did not end with Desert Storm. While the Desert Storm coalition ejected the Iraqi army from Kuwait in 1991, the goal of the coalition was not to dismember Iraq or advance to Baghdad to change the regime. Saddam Hussein has remained in power in Baghdad and continued to ignore or obstruct the UN Security Council resolutions that defined the terms of the cease fire, particularly the requirement to disclose and destroy all weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical, and biological, and their long range means of delivery. Consequently at the invitation of Gulf countries, a coalition of forces, primarily from the U.S., Great Britain and France have remained in the region to enforce the UN Resolutions. These forces include the USAF 4404th Air Wing (Provisional) that used the Khobar Towers facility.

In the years since the Gulf War Saddam Hussein's regime has undertaken overt acts that continue to threaten peace in the region. In 1993, the Iraqi regime plotted to assassinate former President George Bush during a visit to Kuwait. In response, the U.S. launched cruise missile strikes against the Iraqi intelligence headquarters. (CHECK - target?) In 1994 the Iraqi regime again moved forces toward the Kuwaiti border with an intent to launch another invasion. U.S. forces responded with a rapid buildup, using host nation bases, including those in Saudi Arabia, and the Iraqis turned back. In August 1996, Saddam Hussein, again in violation of UN resolutions, carried out vicious reprisals against his Kurdish minorities in the north and the Shia in the south.

We have been able to respond to Iraq's continued provocations and threats to the peace and stability of its neighbors because the United States, together with its coalition partners, France and the United Kingdom, have maintained a strong military presence on the Arabian Peninsula, principally Saudi Arabia, since the end of Operation Desert Storm. Our forward presence not only allows us to respond quickly, but to monitor Iraq's compliance with UN Security Council resolutions, both with respect to internal oppression, and with respect to direct military threats to the Gulf states. This forward presence includes:

- Nearly 5,000 U.S. Air Force men and women in Operation Southern Watch who conduct combat air missions from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, enforcing the "no fly" zone over southern Iraq that restricts Saddam Hussein's ability to oppress his people and threaten the peace and stability of the region.

- U.S. service men and women who support the work of the United Nations Special Commission charged with discovering and destroying his WMD programs, efforts which Iraq continues to oppose. Specifically, the U.S. flies U-2 surveillance missions over Iraq to assist with UNSCOM's monitoring responsibilities.

- U.S. Army PATRIOT air defense batteries that have been deployed to protect our forces and major Saudi population centers at Dhahran and Riyadh since 1991 and regular rotations of battalion-sized armor units which exercise in Kuwait.

- The U.S. Navy Middle East Force that has been greatly expanded from the few surface combatant ships to include the presence of an Aircraft Carrier Battle Group and a Marine Amphibious Ready Group throughout most of the year.

- Robust military exercise programs with every Gulf state, unheard of before Desert Storm, that contribute to the operational readiness of both our own and their military forces and helps provide a deterrent presence to Iraq as well as Iran, which also has hegemonistic ambitions coupled with a military modernization program out of all proportion to its defensive needs.

Our military presence in the Gulf region also includes prepositioned equipment -- a full brigade's worth in Kuwait, another brigade's worth afloat and we are building up to a third in Qatar. This equipment allows us to insert a substantial deterrent force onto the Peninsula in a fraction of the time that it took us in 1990. We demonstrated this potential in October 1994 with great success, and we continue to exercise with the equipment for both training and deterrent purposes.

Maintaining the U.S. military presence in the Arabian Gulf has not been easy for our uniformed personnel who have had to serve repeated tours of duty in a harsh environment. It places a serious strain on ships, aircraft, and other equipment through high operating tempos. While the cost of our presence has been greatly eased through generous Host Nation Support contributions from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the residual cost and, the sacrifice, of our presence is justified by the protection of vital U.S. national interests at stake in the region.

Our experience clearly shows that an immediate and forceful response to Saddam Hussein's provocative actions has been effective in causing his regime to retreat and back off from threatening moves each time it has been foolish enough to try them. The cost and sacrifice of our continuous presence is high, but far lower than the cost of having to return to fight a full-scale conflict as we did in Desert Storm.

In addition, should deterrence fail, we are without question in a better position to defeat aggression than we were in the Summer of 1990, prior to Desert Shield. Then it took three weeks to place meaningful combat power ashore. Today, we can do so in three days, using the combination of forward presence and measures that we have taken to improve our ability to deploy rapidly.

Why have our forces in Saudi Arabia been subject to terrorist attacks?

The terrorist attacks on the OPM/SANG in Riyadh last November and on Khobar Towers in Dhahran last June were not only attacks on American citizens and forces, they were also an assault on our security strategy in the region. Our military presence in the region is opposed by Iran and Iraq, obviously, but also by home-grown dissidents in some countries of the region. The opposition includes extremist groups who are cold blooded and fanatical, but also clever. They know that they cannot defeat us militarily, but they may believe they can defeat us politically, and they have chosen terror as the weapon to try to achieve this. They estimate that, if they can cause enough casualties or threat of casualties to our forces, they can weaken support in the United States for our presence in the region, or weaken support in the host nations for a continued U.S. presence. In essence, they seek to drive a wedge between the U.S. security strategy in the Gulf and the American public, and between the U.S. and our regional allies.

Recent Force Protection Initiatives

Before the terrorist attacks, Saudi Arabia has long been seen as an oasis of calm and safety in the turbulent Middle East. Americans, both military and civilians alike, felt secure and generally welcome, albeit within a very different and restrictive culture compared to the United States or in Western Europe and elsewhere our forces have been stationed overseas. Our approach to security matters in the Kingdom reflected this attitude, which was the reality until recent years. We lived and worked in urban environments and considered them on a par with Europe or Japan. While U.S. military security practices around the world were tightened following the Beirut bombings in 1983, we felt little danger in the Kingdom. Our presence in Saudi Arabia after the Gulf War had been requested and agreed to by the Government. We were not there as an occupying force and, indeed, our presence contributed significantly to our host's defense.

The location of a large number of our personnel and our major combat air operations in the Dhahran region reflected this sense of well-being. The air facilities were excellent and the Saudi Government provided good quality of life residence and office facilities in the nearby Khobar Towers complex.

The depth of feeling among strongly conservative Saudi elements that opposed inviting Western forces to the Kingdom in 1990 and remained opposed to our continued presence was slow to emerge clearly. There was evidence of anti-regime activity, but the Saudi Government seemed to have it under control, despite a rise in anonymous threats against American interests, especially following the additional troop deployment in October 1994. Resentment over the costs of the Gulf War and the continued high costs of military modernization, and discontent over strains in the social fabric of the Kingdom and royal corruption, even from normally pro-Western Saudis, was recognized but not considered a threat to American military security. Since our personnel worked on Saudi military installations and lived in guarded compounds, any risks were seen as manageable by maintaining a low profile and following standard personal security practices.

Beginning with the November 1995 bombing of the OPM/SANG office in Riyadh and now with the loss of 19 more American lives at the Khobar Towers, the world of calm and safety

in Saudi Arabia is gone and it is clear that we need to radically re-think the issue of force protection in the region, and our conclusions help us to reconsider force protection for our forces in other regions around the world.

Response to the Khobar Towers Bombing: Relocate

Immediately following the Khobar Towers bombing attack, and after extensive discussions with the senior Saudi leadership, I initiated a major realignment of our force protection posture in Saudi Arabia, known as Operation Desert Focus. The effort, which is nearing completion, is two-pronged.

First, with the full cooperation and support of the Saudi Arabian Government, we began immediately to move our deployed air forces (the 4404 Air Wing) from the Saudi air bases located in urban concentrations at Riyadh and Dhahran to an isolated location at the uncompleted Prince Sultan Air Base near Al Kharj where many Coalition forces were located during the Gulf War. While our personnel will be living in tents initially, we will be able to construct very effective defenses against terrorist attacks. This relocation effort, which will require over 1400 truck loads to accomplish, is well underway. Some 545 tents have been erected to provide living quarters for, dining and recreation facilities, communications sites, and maintenance and operations facilities, most of them air-conditioned. The refueling tankers and reconnaissance aircraft from Riyadh were the first to arrive last month, and the fighters and other aircraft from Dhahran are moving in by mid-September. More than 2,000 additional military personnel were deployed to Saudi Arabia temporarily to assist in this effort to provide security for the moves, erect facilities, and provide services at the base until permanent arrangements are in place. The Saudi Arabian Government has assumed responsibility for constructing permanent facilities.

Some of the units in Saudi Arabia cannot be relocated without degrading their effectiveness. Our USMTM and OPM/SANG security assistance personnel who train and advise the Saudi military, must be in close proximity to their Saudi counterparts in the capital and at various bases. Our PATRIOT missile battery crews must be located near the urban areas and air bases that they defend. While these units must continue to work where they are now, we are taking steps to improve their security by consolidating them and moving them to more secure housing areas, providing more guards and barriers, and taking other steps to enhance their protection and lessen the impact of any future attacks.

Second, the Department has reexamined its personnel assignment policies for Saudi Arabia. While the majority of the operational forces with the 4404th Air Wing are on temporary duty and deploy on rotational assignments for up to 179 days at a time and then return to their home bases, many of the DoD personnel permanently assigned to Saudi Arabia with OPM/SANG and USMTM are on multi-year tours accompanied by their dependent spouses and children. At the time of the Khobar Towers bombing, we sponsored nearly 800 military dependents in Saudi Arabia alone. This no longer seems prudent.

At my request, the Department of State implemented an "authorized departure" of all U.S. Government dependents in July, 1996, which provides monetary entitlements to any families who wish to leave the Kingdom. In addition, the Department of Defense has withdrawn

command sponsorship for dependents of most permanently assigned military members, which had the practical effect of an orderly, mandatory return. Nearly 300 dependents arrived by charter aircraft in Charleston, South Carolina, on August 18. While some families are undoubtedly displeased by this change in policy, I believe it was the correct choice. Military members understand personal risk and accept it by the nature of their profession. That is not true of their dependents, especially children, and we cannot allow them to remain in harm's way.

In the future, nearly all permanent assignments in Saudi Arabia will be one-year unaccompanied tours. There are some assignments where the nature of the job requires longer tours for continuity and familiarization with the host government, and we have identified 59 billets that will be permitted to be accompanied by dependents. School-aged children will not be allowed under any circumstance under current conditions.

Force Protection vs. Mission

The relocation of our forces in Saudi Arabia and the change in tours are just two examples of the need to fundamentally rethink our approach to force protection around the world. As the terrorist threat changed, our force protection measures focused on incremental fixes to existing arrangements, rather than consideration of radical changes in force posture. Incremental fixes in force protection can always be trumped by attacks of greater magnitude.

To stay ahead of the threat we must put force protection on an equal footing with other mission goals as we plan operations, and that parity must be maintained throughout the operation. Changes in threat must trigger fundamental reconsiderations of force protection.

The task of protecting our forces would be easy if we were willing to abandon or compromise our missions, but that is not an option. We have global interests and global responsibilities. Those require our forces to be deployed overseas to protect our national security interests. And our troops cannot successfully complete their tasks if they are required to live in bunkers 24 hours-a-day.

How then can we accomplish our missions without compromising on their success or abandoning the missions altogether? The answer is that we will require tradeoffs in other areas, such as cost, convenience, and quality of life. This is a tough answer for our men and women in uniform who will live in less comfortable surroundings and spend more time avoiding and defending against terrorism, and it is a tough answer for them and their families, who must experience the loneliness of unaccompanied tours. We will have to compensate for these changes and greater hardships in order to continue to maintain the superb quality force we have today.

Putting force protection on an equal footing with other mission objectives will require a fundamental change in the mindset with which we plan and carry out operations. It also requires structural changes in the Department. Many of the initial actions we are taking are directed only in part at the Southwest Asia theater. They all have global implications.

(not sure how to connect to the rest of this.)

(- will depend on submissions)

Instructions sent to Commanders Worldwide (to come up with stuff)

JCS

still to come

Other SWA Regional Initiatives

CENTCOM/JCS

still to come

Commissioning of Downing Assessment

On July 28, three days after the Khobar Towers bombing, I issued a charter for an assessment of the facts and circumstances surrounding the tragedy and appointed General (Retired) Wayne A. Downing, United States Army, to head the task force. I asked General Downing to give me an unvarnished and independent look at what happened there and offer ideas on how we can try to prevent such a tragedy in the future. The final report was delivered to me on August 30.

General Downing has given me that unvarnished and independent review of the Khobar Towers bombing and a tough critique of past practices and attitudes. His report confirms my belief that we must make a fundamental change in our mindset. On the whole I accept General Downing's findings and I believe it we can take effective action to deal with each of the problems identified in his comprehensive report. His conclusions have by and large validated the initiatives we have launched and many of his recommendations already have been implemented by the changes we have made. Where his recommendations have identified additional changes that should be considered we have a process underway to either implement them or put them on a fast track to decision. General Downing's report is an important contribution to changing our entire approach to force protection and provides evidence of the need for changes in the way we do business.

Annex (B) contains a detailed response to each recommendation included in the Downing report. I have directed the following actions be taken in response to the recommendation regarding force protection in the report.

Actions Taken in Response to General Downing's Report

- **Give local commanders operational control with regard to force protection matters.**

(Alternative 1) ← (fell and I just worked this one up - needs work) would replace the A/H. 2 version

Under the traditional peacetime command and control, force protection is the responsibility of the Service commander supplying combat elements to the CINCs, which in turn have tactical control over these elements. As a result, the responsibility for tactical control and force protection is not in the same hands. This was the case at the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). *Force protection* was the responsibility of the individual Army, Air Force and Marine Corps CENTCOM component commands, based in the United States and Bahrain. But *tactical control* was under the commander of the local Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia, who reports to CENTCOM.

Following the attack on U.S. forces in Dhahran last November, CENTCOM delegated to the Joint Task Force the responsibility to coordinate force protection among all the combat elements under its tactical control. Following the subsequent attack on Khobar Towers in June, I directed CENTCOM and the Joint Task Force to assume full responsibility for force protection of all combat elements on the Arabian Peninsula. Now tactical control and force protection will be in the same hands. I have also directed all Unified Commanders-in-Chief to review and make recommendations on similar command structure changes for force protection in their areas of responsibility.

The DoD directive I have issued establishing DoD-wide standards for providing force protection now requires that each CINC review the command arrangements for every Joint Task Force when it is established and at least every 6 months thereafter with regard to force protection responsibilities. The directive also requires that the CINCs report to me any decisions to vest operational control for force protection matters outside the Joint Task Force Commander and to detail the reasons why this decision has been made.

ALTERNATIVE 2 (would substitute for 3 paras above) - *from Policy*

In the aftermath of the November 1995 bombing in Riyadh, the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command, General J. H. Binford Peay, III, USA, determined that changes in the command and control structure for his Area of Responsibility did not need to be made to ensure force protection for his deployed military personnel. However, he directed a realignment of responsibilities in Saudi Arabia to enhance force protection measures. General Peay assigned the Commander, Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia, with force protection *coordination* responsibilities for all combatant forces in the Kingdom. Operational control and the chain of command remained with the Service component commanders, i.e., Commander, Army Forces Central Command, at Fort McPherson, Georgia; Commander, Central Command Air Forces, at Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina; Commander, Marine Corps Forces Central Command, in Hawaii; and Commander, Fifth Fleet, in Bahrain.

Subsequent to the Khobar Towers bomb attack, after consultation with the General Shalikashvili and General Peay, I directed that operational control for force protection matters for combatant forces on the Arabian Peninsula will be vested with U.S. CINCCENT and his Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia commander. I also directed that the other Unified Commanders-in-Chief review and make recommendations on similar command structure changes for force protection in their areas of responsibility.

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- **Issue DoD-wide standards for providing for protection**

DoD has maintained a variety of directives and standards related to force protection. These documents have been of great use to organizations and have served us well. However, as General Downing has indicated, the diversity of these documents, and their "advisory" rather than "directive" nature, has often caused confusion. In my judgment, this is largely a result of the continuing transition the Department is making under Goldwater-Nichols to joint service responsibility for operations.

To correct this situation, I am issuing this day DoD Directive 2000.12 -- protecting U.S. forces from terrorists and other threats worldwide. This new directive requires that the approaches previously set forth as suggestions in DoD Directive 2000.12 be implemented as the DoD standard. In applying this standard, commanders and managers must take account of the mission, the threat, and specific circumstances. The new directive also implements the other new initiatives I have identified elsewhere in this report.

- **Establish a central DoD agency to handle force protection matters**

General Downing's report recommends designation of a single agency DoD-wide agency to deal with force protection issues.

After careful consideration, I have decided not to accept this recommendation as written, but I accept the goal it is intended to achieve. That is why **..XXXXXX..** (*this section needs to be flipped so that we frame it by what we are doing vs. what we are not doing*)

.....I do not believe a central DoD agency would be able to accomplish the intended results. Providing adequate protection for our forces is and must remain a key responsibility of every commander at every level within our military organization. What is needed is highly situational -- rarely the same in any two locations. Furthermore, as I have said throughout this report, force protection considerations must always be balanced against what must be done to accomplish the mission. In cases of imminent or on-going combat, the trade-offs between these objectives may be severe at times. At the other extreme, during sustained long-term deployments force protection must be a paramount consideration. None of these careful judgments can be made at a distance by a central agency.

It is also argued that a central agency with force protection funds budgeted separately could better insure that force protection does not receive low priority in budgetary allocations. But this seems problematic. To begin with, many force protection costs are in reality joint costs - - in other words, the funds spent accomplish not only force protection but other necessary purposes at the same time. It would never be possible to isolate force protection spending.

Furthermore, given the requirements to provide strong force protection embodied in the directive issued today, strongest advocates for adequate funding should be the operating elements themselves who must meet this requirement.

However, I do agree with the thrust of this recommendation concerning the need for a stronger centralized approach to force protection. There should be a single individual designated as responsible for insuring that our policies and our budgets will result in adequate force protection measures being taken and to audit the performance of our units. Because force

protection measures must be carried out by our uniformed military organizations, I have therefore designated the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the single DoD-wide coordinator and overseer for force protection activities. The Chairman is required to establish an appropriate force protection element within the Joint Staff and to coordinate broader national security policy matters with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The instructions carrying out this recommendation are included in DoD Directive _____ being issued today.

- **Move force protection responsibilities from the Department of State to the Department of Defense where possible.**

There is a bifurcation of responsibilities between the Departments of State and Defense for the security of military forces overseas. This bifurcation and the problems for force protection it creates were highlighted by the bombing of the OPM/SANG in Riyadh, in November 1995.

Immediately following that event, I directed that the Chairman create a DoD Anti-terrorism Task Force (ATTF) to assess DoD anti-terrorism worldwide and to provide a report with recommendations to improve anti-terrorism readiness. The Task Force addressed the bifurcated responsibilities for security of DoD personnel, in particular combatant forces were under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief, Central Command, but U.S. military personnel assigned to OPM/SANG and USMTM were under the control of the U.S. Ambassador. The final report and recommendations completed just days before the bombing of Khobar Towers, called for a clarification of the division of responsibilities, including consideration of changes to the President's Letter to Chiefs of Mission.

Because the Department of State was responsible for security at OPM/SANG, the Secretary of State, in accordance with the law, created an Accountability Review Board (ARB) to review the security procedures in effect at the time of the bombing. The Board's report also highlighted the bifurcation of responsibilities and, in fact, found that the confusion created by the division, and a lack of clear guidance as to security responsibilities, precluded the Board from fixing accountability for the security failure in that instance.

In light of these findings, and the subsequent attack on Khobar Towers, a facility under the security cognizance of the regional CINC, the Department of Defense has, working closely with the Department of State, undertaken to realign security responsibilities on the Saudi Arabian Peninsula.

The planned realignment tracks closely with the finding and recommendation in the ***** report on this subject. That report recommends that all DoD personnel be assigned to the CINC, except those whose principal functions support the Chief of Mission, such as Marine Guards and Defense Attaches.

In fact, on ____ September, 1996 I requested that the Secretary of State delegate force protection responsibility and authority to him for all DoD activities within the Arabian Peninsula, that are not already assigned to, or otherwise under the command of, the Commander-in-Chief,

U.S. Central Command (CINCCENT). I will in turn delegate this responsibility to CINCCENT. The only DoD elements which would remain under the security responsibility of the Chief of Mission would be the integral elements of the country team (i.e. Defense Attaché Office, USMC Security Detachment, and the Security Assistance Offices that are located within or in close proximity to their respective U. S. Embassies, namely in Qatar, the U.A.E., Bahrain and Oman), those sensitive intelligence and counterintelligence activities that are conducted under the direction and control of the Chief of Mission/Chief of Station, and any DoD personnel detailed to other U.S. Government agencies or departments.

As force protection and anti-terrorism requirements are addressed in more detail by the other regional commanders-in-chief, they may identify other high threat countries/regions in which the CINC already maintains the predominance of DoD presence. For these, similar requests will be made to the Secretary of State.

This arrangement balances the requirement for force protection of DoD forces with the overall mission of the U.S. Government overseas. The Ambassador must be in charge of all activities that have a direct impact on the conduct of our nation's foreign policy. However, in those high threat instances, where the number of DoD forces in country assigned to the embassy exceeds the country team's ability to provide for their security, the regional CINC will be charged with ensuring their safety from terrorist attack.

- **Improve the use of available intelligence and intelligence collection capabilities.**

Passive protective measures are always important, but the real key to better, more effective force protection against terrorism is to take active measures against the terrorists. Which brings me to another major action we are taking in Saudi Arabia -- improving our intelligence capabilities. We do not want to simply sit and wait for terrorists to act. We want to seek them out, find them, identify them, and do what we can to disrupt or preempt any planned operation. The key to this is better intelligence.

In Saudi Arabia, the U.S. intelligence community was providing 24-hour a day coverage of terrorist and terrorist related activity. All of the available intelligence was widely available in theater to all of those who needed it. This intelligence support to force protection was very good in some areas, sufficient in others, and lacking in at least one key area -- that of providing tactical warning of impending attack.

There was a strong relationship between intelligence threat reporting and the theater security posture. The physical and personnel security enhancements that were in place at the time of the bombing were based on vulnerability threat analysis that came from intelligence reporting. The linkage between intelligence reporting and the operational commander's action is critically important whether it involves intelligence threat information feeding physical security improvements or aim points for precision targeting. In the case of the threat to U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia, the available intelligence clearly formed the basis for security planning and procedures. We must not lose sight of the fact that U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia acted on the general threat intelligence available prior to the bombing and that information *saved lives and*

injuries. What was missing was the hard tactical warning of impending attack -- the information we needed to thwart the operation before it reached fruition.

There is no doubt that we can always have better and more precise intelligence and we are continuously striving for that level of detail. I am reviewing the Department's ability to meet this long-term requirement and I will seek the DCI help to review our policies and capabilities to acquire better tactical information through all our intelligence assets.

Secondly, better intelligence depends not only on being able to collect information, but being able to use it. We need to sort out the real and useful intelligence from the misinformation and disinformation that is also collected. One key to improved analysis is the Counter Terrorist Center, which is now receiving higher priority in the face of the higher threat. But even with improved analysis in Washington, we still have to make this intelligence available in a timely way to the forces threatened, and to combine national intelligence with the local intelligence being collected. Among the steps we are taking to improve intelligence in the Gulf region is to set up what we call a "fusion cell." We developed the model for intelligence fusion cells in Bosnia. We are replicating this model now not only in the Gulf region, but around the world wherever our forces are deployed. A fusion cell combines, in a timely way, national strategic intelligence, which we gather around the world with local or tactical intelligence. That allows us to quickly "fuse" together the global picture and the regional picture to help us see patterns; To keep information from falling through the cracks; And to focus U.S. and our allies' intelligence services on the same pieces of information at the same time. To do this, I am emphasizing joint intelligence fusion cells, such as the ones we have in place in Bosnia and are augmenting in Saudi Arabia to help with the information flow, but we also are leveraging technology to build the tools we need to manage information better over the long term.

I am also taking steps to address General Downing's specific recommendations that we look at how we both make intelligence available and use it at small unit levels. I will work with CENTCOM and the Military Departments to implement those.

General Downing rightly identified that we must commit to sustained in-depth, long-term analysis of trends, intentions, and capabilities of terrorists. This is a systemic issue, not just in terrorism analysis, that we must address across the board in our intelligence analysis and reporting. In recognition of this systemic problem, the Department developed an initiative earlier this year for the intelligence community that will make a career-long investment in selective intelligence analysis to provide the skills and expertise the community needs to sustain proficiency against hard target problems.

- **Establish a workable division of responsibilities on force protection matters between the United States and host nation officials.**

General Downing correctly identified close and cooperative relationships with the host government as the key component of successful force protection programs in peacetime environments overseas. Without strong working relationships at all levels between U.S. and host nation officials many force protection measures could not be implemented.

Formal, structured relationships have their place and should be established where appropriate and possible. It is most important that those U.S. officials with responsibility for force protection, including all commanders responsible for activities in the field, work consciously to build personal relationships of trust and confidence with their foreign counterparts.

The Department intends to examine its personnel policies and practices to ensure that they support this important objective. In particular, we are increasing tour length for additional key U.S. personnel, including the commanders of the Office of Special Investigations and Security Police.

- **Raise the funding level and priority for force protection and get the latest technology into the field and into the Department of Defense.**

To cover the costs of the force protection initiatives taken immediately after Khobar Towers, Deputy Secretary White invoked the Food and Forage authority on August 9, 1996 (section 3732, Revised Statute 41 USC 11) to ensure the timely support of U.S. military operations in Saudi Arabia. Our immediate needs included food fuel, quarters, transportation. On August 23, I requested additional funding for FY 1996 and FY 1997 force protection and anti-terrorism requirements. That request provides for improvements in physical security for defense installations overseas, increased intelligence activity and communications security related to force protection, and restoration of projects that were deferred in FY 1996 to fund relocation of forces in Saudi Arabia.

I also directed that a comprehensive review of future funding for force protection be undertaken and designated classified force protection as a major issue for the FY 1998-2003 program review. All DOD components were asked to scrub the latest budget estimates to ensure that no key projects related to force protection and anti-terrorism were omitted. Based on the responses received, the Program Review Group will assemble options to augment spending for force protection activities in the defense program. The Defense Resources Board is scheduled to review the proposals and make recommendation in October.

Based on these budget reviews, the standard procedures for preparation of the program budget will be amended to facilitate the review of force protection requirements in future budgets. First, the existing procedures will be used to emphasize the high priority I am placing on force protection and counter terrorism. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council will continue to evaluate force protection and provide recommendations to me. I will ask the CINCs to include force protection programs in the Integrated Priority Lists they submit to me. This process will insure that specific programs or program areas highlighted by the CINCs will be included in the Program Objective Memoranda (POM) prepared by the Services for the next defense program (FY 1999-2003). To enhance further this process, detailed program and budget displays will be required for all force protection and anti-terrorism programs to track funding patterns and to provide a solid basis for reviewing proposed force protection enhancements. Force protection will continue to be treated as a major issue in the Department's budget.

(still need language for advanced technology).....

- **Determine culpability of individuals responsible for force protection matters in the chain of command.**

These findings suggest failures on the part of the Commander, 4404th Wing (Provisional), and his "chain of command." On August 30, 1996, without prior review, the Secretary of Defense transmitted the report to the Secretary of the Air Force for evaluation and appropriate action. Specifically, the Air Force was asked to examine issues raised in the report concerning how the Air Force organizes, trains, and equips to support forces deployed to unified commands. Additionally, Secretary Perry deferred to Secretary Widnall on any issues regarding the adequacy of individual acts or omissions.

In turn, the Secretary of the Air Force tasked the Commander, 12th Air Force (12 AF), to evaluate and make recommendations in response to the Downing Report concerning how the Air Force organizes, trains, equips forces deployed to U.S. Central Command. The 12AF Commander was also designated the disciplinary review authority and General Court-Martial Convening Authority regarding any actions or omissions by Air Force personnel associated with the Khobar Towers bombing. These latter designations empower the 12AF Commander to make appropriate disposition regarding individuals, in his discretion and consistent with applicable directives, across a range of options which includes no action, administrative action, nonjudicial punishment, or court-martial. The 12 AF Commander is charged with reporting findings and recommendations to the Secretary of the Air Force within 90 days of his tasking date of September 4, 1996.

(As we look at questions of accountability we will balance that need with the greater good of learning lessons for the future. The U.S. military has a long, and admirable, record of self-examination and correction. That process must not be sacrificed in the effort to hold individuals accountable.)

BH
Comment
- not
from GC

Summary and Conclusions

We live in an era of hope. Our hopes are nurtured by the emergence of democracy around the globe; by the growth of global trade relationships; by expansion of global communications.

Terrorism hangs over this bright future like a dark cloud. Terrorism threatens our hope for a future of freedom, democracy and cooperation among all nations. It is the antithesis of everything America stands for. It is an enemy of the fundamental principles of human rights -- freedom of movement, freedom of expression and freedom of religion. Perpetrators and sponsors of terrorist acts reject the rule of law and basic human decency. They seek to impose their will on others through acts of violence. Terrorism is a tool of states, a vehicle of expression for organizations and even a way of life for individuals. It will seek out vulnerabilities and attack our future. Terrorists normally prey on the weak, but even militaries have vulnerabilities, and present targets with high publicity value.

America has global interests and responsibilities. Our national security strategy for protecting those interests and carrying out those interests requires deployment of our forces to the far reaches of the globe. When terrorists aim their attacks at U.S. military forces overseas, they are attacking our ability to protect and defend our vital interests in the world. Our military presence in many areas provides the crucial underpinning that has made progress towards democracy and economic progress possible. We have the ability to project power far from our borders and influence events on a scale unmatched by any other country or organization. Normally our military can dominate in any location it chooses. But as General Downing points out in his report, terrorism provides less capable nations, or even organizations, the means to project a form of power, even across borders, and contest U.S. influence.

But terrorists cannot win unless we let them. Sacrificing our strategic interests in response to terrorist acts is an unacceptable alternative. We cannot be a great power and live in a risk free world. Therefore we must gird ourselves for a relentless struggle in which there will be many silent victories and some noisy defeats. There will be future terrorist acts attempted against U.S. military forces. Some will have tragic consequences. No force protection approach can be perfect, but the responsibility of leaders is use our nation's resources, skills, and creativity to minimize them. We must learn from the Khobar Towers tragedy, taking advantage of the U.S. military's tradition of strengthening itself out of adversity. The actions outlined in this report, the lessons articulated by General Downing and the ideas we have garnered from our military commanders around the world, will strengthen our defenses.

Annexes

A.	Downing Report	OGC/DASD(I&S)
B.	Point-by-Point Analysis of Downing	OGC/All
C.	DNA Report (Khobar Towers Bomb Damage Survey)	DNSA
D.	JCS Publication on A/T	JCS
E.	JCS Publication on Tactics and Techniques	JCS
F.	Command Structure Changes	CENTCOM/JCS
G.	A/T Task Force Report	SOLIC
H.	A/T Funding Initiative	COMPTROLLER/PA&E
I.	Letter of Referral, SecAf/CASF Letters	OGC
J.	DOD Directive 2000.12	