Performance Goals - Homeland Security

STRATEGIC GOAL: HOMELAND SECURITY

Ensure the security of the transportation system for the movement of people and goods, and support the National Security Strategy.

We **Aim To Achieve These Strategic Outcomes:**

- Reduce the vulnerability of the transportation system and its users to crime and terrorism.

- Increase the capability of the transportation system to meet national defense needs.

- Reduce the flow of illegal drugs entering the United States.

- Reduce the flow of migrants illegally entering the United States.

- Reduce illegal incursions into our sovereign territory.

- Increase support for United States interests in promoting regional stability.

- Reduce transportation-related dependence on foreign fuel supplies.

Performance Goals
Reduce Vulnerability to Crime and Terrorism and Promote Regional Stability
Aviation Security
Coastal and Seaport Security
[With DOD readiness for operation goal in USCG Performance Plan.]
Increase National Defense Capability
Strategic Mobility
Reduce Flow of Drugs and Migrants, and Reduce Illegal Border Incursions
Drug and Migrant Interdiction
[With cocaine seizure rate goal in USCG Performance Plan.]

Transportation security is equal in importance to transportation safety. As we have witnessed, the Nation's transportation system has certain vulnerabilities, which need to be guarded against attack, and our borders are subject to illegal intrusions by smugglers of contraband or weapons of mass destruction, and by illegal migrants. DOT's objective is to contribute to homeland security by minimizing the vulnerability of our transportation system to disruption, damage, or exploitation through crime or terrorism.

The FY 2003 budget proposes $8.7 billion to accelerate the Department's progress in achieving these outcomes.

A summary performance report and a detailed analysis of our 2003 strategies follow.

PERFORMANCE REPORT: HOMELAND SECURITY

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2001 Target	Met	Not Met
Percent of those who need to act who receive threat information within 24 hours	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/P	N/P	N/P	N/P		✓
Percent of days maintain combat readiness rating of 2 or better for the designated number of critical defense assets	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	4^	51	67*	100		✓
Percent RRF no-notice activations that meet assigned readiness timelines	100	100	94	100	100	100	100	100	✓	
Percent of days that RRF ships are mission-capable while under DOD control	N/A	99.2	95.2	98.8	98.4	97.0	99.3	99.0	✓	
Percent of total mariners available to crew	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	122(r)	117	120	100	✓	
Percent DOD-designated primary or alternate port facilities available when requested by DOD	71	64	57	93	93	93	92	93		✓
Percent seizure rate for cocaine shipped through the transit zone	6.1	5.3	16.3	10.1	12.2	10.6	11.1**	15		✓
Success rate for undocumented migrants attempting to enter the U.S. over maritime routes	25.1	8.5	5.6	8.9	13.3	11.0	17.5	13		✓
Transportation-related petroleum consumption (in quadrillion BTUs) per trillion dollars of Real GDP in 1996 constant dollars	3.075	3.037	2.945	2.900	2.851	2.882(r)	2.783#	2.76***		✓
Ship capacity (in thousands of twenty-foot container equivalent units, or TEUs) available to meet DOD's requirements+	N/A	N/A	124	161	162	171	168	165	✓	
Detection rate for explosives and weapons that may be brought aboard aircraft	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP		✓

N/A = Not Available
NP = Not published (Sensitive information protected under 14 CFR Part 191)
* Reflects data for the first ¾ of the year only; the last quarter is not available due to the 9/11 attack on the Pentagon
** Preliminary estimate
# Projection
*** Equivalent to previous target
^ FY 1999 used different reporting criteria than FY 2000 and 2001 (wartime personnel allowance vs. peacetime personnel allowance). Therefore, comparisons may be misleading.
+ Shipping capacity is based on the total capacity of the Maritime Security Program and the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement programs.

AVIATION SECURITY: The United States and its citizens remain targets for terrorist groups seeking to challenge or influence international affairs. Thus, protecting air travelers against terrorist and other criminal acts is a national security priority. After the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, the President signed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (P.L. 107-71). That act established the Transportation Security Administration. The Department's goals clearly reflect this new responsibility. Public confidence in the safety and security of air travel enables its continued growth - tourism and world economies depend upon effective aviation security measures being efficiently applied. Governments, airlines and airports must work together cooperatively to achieve our common goal: safe and secure air transportation worldwide.

Performance Goals:

Ensure that no terrorist or other individual is successful in causing harm or
significant disruption to the aviation system.

Reduce passenger waiting time at screening checkpoints to no more than ten
minutes, 95 percent of the time.

Performance Plan:

Performance measures*:

By November 19, 2002:

- By Nov. 19, 2002, meet legislative requirement to have passenger security screening at 424 airports accomplished by Federal employees; and establish Federal control of passenger screening at five additional airports; and

- By Dec. 31, 2002, meet legislative requirement to have all checked baggage at 429 airports screened by explosive detection technology.

[Passenger and baggage screening effectiveness measure – data is being developed by TSA.]

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Target:	N/A	N/A	N/A	*	*
Actual:	-	-	-		

|	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Average waiting time in minutes for passengers in line for screening.					
Target:	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	*
Actual:	N/A	N/A	N/A		

* TSA is developing long-term performance measures for aviation security and screening efficiency.

External Factors: Airport security measures as well as the speed of processing passengers and baggage through screening checkpoints must keep pace with the long-term growth trend in passengers and cargo, both international and domestic. Airport and airline operations at airports often feed sudden surges of passengers and baggage through security screening, creating "shock loads" for the screening process.

Strategies and Initiatives to Achieve 2003 Target: DOT resources attributable to this performance goal are depicted below:

Funding Directed to Aviation Security

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act set up a variety of aviation security measures and deadlines, which DOT is working hard to meet. The Under Secretary of Transportation for Security will forward a report to the Congress in accordance with Section 130 of the Act, outlining the short-term aviation security goals of the Department. When the DOT FY 2003 Performance Plan is revised this fall subsequent to Congressional action on the President's FY 2003 budget, DOT intends to establish a performance target for passenger and cargo screening effectiveness and efficiency. TSA is gathering data for that purpose now. In addition, TSA is:

- adding to its intelligence workforce to keep abreast of the evolving terrorism threat from potential chemical, biological, or surface-to-air attacks against the civil aviation system and possible disruptions of the National Airspace System information systems and infrastructure.

- purchasing and deploying advanced security equipment for use at airports across the Nation. This will include newly developed, smaller, less expensive explosives detection systems (EDS) for checked baggage that will be more suitable for less busy airports and air carrier stations.

- improving technology for detecting explosive devices and weapons to decrease the vulnerability of airports and aircraft to security threats.

Other Federal Programs with Common Outcomes: Aviation security is part of the Homeland Security Strategy. TSA works closely with the Office of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, and the State Department. TSA conducts joint airport vulnerability assessments with the FBI, and works with the U.S. Customs Service and the U.S. Postal Service to improve security for cargo and mail air shipment. TSA also works with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms to improve the use of canines for explosives detection.

Performance Report:

Discontinued performance measure:

Detection rate for explosives and weapons that may be brought aboard aircraft.

	1999	**2000**	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**
Target:	##	##	##	*	*
Actual:	##	##	##		

Detection rates are sensitive information protected under 14 CFR Part 191. Baseline data and targeted increases will be made available to appropriate parties upon request.

* Performance measure is discontinued after 2001, since TSA is developing a more comprehensive set of performance measures that will better define how effectively DOT performs its aviation security mission.

2001 Results: DOT did not meet the performance target. As the events of 9/11 made clear, DOT neither possessed nor distributed information sufficient to thwart the nineteen terrorists in their plan to attack New York City and Washington, DC. Reflecting the fact that DOT and FAA take seriously its aviation safety and security missions, the FAA Administrator withheld all executive bonuses in FAA for 2001.

FY 2002 Performance Plan Evaluation: DOT expects to meet the performance target for standing up TSA.

Management Challenge – Aviation and Transportation Security (IG/GAO)

The IG and GAO have previously noted that challenges exist in effectively meeting national requirements for improving security in aviation and surface transportation. After the terrorist attacks last September, Congress passed and the President signed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, which created an Under Secretary of Transportation for Security, and a new DOT operating administration - the Transportation Security Administration.

The Department is focused on rapidly standing up TSA and improving aviation security, while attending to security issues beyond aviation. The IG has pointed out that much needs to be done in defining and implementing TSA's statutory role in all aspects of transportation security, in addition to the immediate tasks at hand presented by meeting all statutory deadlines in Federalizing aviation security.

This goal page and the following discussion in the Critical Transportation Infrastructure Protection page in their entirety address the challenges laid out by the GAO and the IG.

COASTAL AND SEAPORT SECURITY: The Department, through the Transportation Security Administration and the U.S. Coast Guard – provides an essential element of homeland security. DOT's homeland security functions are anchored in coordinated interagency law enforcement, coastal sea control, and port security and defense.

Performance Goal:

Ensure sea-borne foreign and domestic trade routes and seaports
remain available for the movement of passengers and cargo.

Performance Plan:

Performance measure:

Percent of high interest vessels screened.				
	1999	**2000**	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**
Target: N/A	N/A	N/A	100%	100%
Actual: N/A	N/A	N/A		

Strategies and Initiatives to Achieve 2003 Target: DOT resources attributable to this performance goal are depicted below:

Funding Directed to Coastal and Seaport Security

FY 2002: 1,733.3
FY 2003: 1,974.3

This is a new performance goal and measure in 2002. DOT is working to improve security in the nation's ports, waterways and maritime borders. To achieve this goal, TSA, Coast Guard, and MARAD will jointly focus on the following strategies:

Domain Awareness. The Coast Guard will increase intelligence efforts in ports; improve advanced information on passengers, crew and cargo; and establish or improve information and intelligence fusion centers in Washington and on both coasts. Doing so requires significant improvements in DOT's communications and connectivity to enhance receipt, analysis, and dissemination of information to operational forces and state and local governments.

Control High Interest Vessel movements. With added personnel resources and additional small craft, the Coast Guard will increase boarding and escort operations to protect vessels carrying large numbers of passengers, and vessels with dangerous cargo such as liquefied natural gas or other volatile products from becoming targets. Coast Guard Sea Marshals will also board and control the movements of vessels where necessary to prevent the vessel itself from becoming a weapon, and to protect port populations and infrastructure, nuclear power plants situated along a seacoast or major river, bridges, and the like.

Domestic and international coordination. TSA, MARAD, and the Coast Guard will coordinate with the international community and Federal and State agencies to improve coordination of container identification, tracking, and inspection.

The security of U.S. seaports is vulnerable due to the weakness of port and cargo security in some of the countries with which the U.S. conducts maritime trade. As a proactive strategy, MARAD will facilitate improvements in port and cargo security in Latin America and the Caribbean through continued interaction with the Organization of American States (OAS). The results of this effort are expected to reduce the security risk of U.S. seaports shipping cargo between their Western Hemisphere trading partners.

Port and cargo security guidelines are an important tool to assist seaports in evaluating and improving their security. To support U.S. seaports, MARAD and the Coast Guard will develop model port security guidelines for commercial strategic ports.

Since security is an important aspect of the overall readiness of the commercial strategic ports, the Coast Guard and MARAD will test deployment plans through port security readiness exercises. The result will be assessment information derived from a standard process for evaluating commercial strategic port readiness.

Training is an indispensable necessity for the commercial strategic ports to meet enhanced port and cargo security standards. To assist posts in meeting more stringent standards, MARAD will conduct security modules within strategic port defense workshops for Federal and commercial port officials. Uniform instruction will facilitate systemic improvements in port and cargo security standards and reduce security risks for those seaports putting the guidelines into practice.

Other Federal Programs with Common Outcomes: DOT coordinates closely with the Office of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, the State Department, Customs Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and with local and state governments to ensure security in our ports and waterways.

Performance Report:

USCG supplementary performance measure*:

Percentage of days that the designated number of critical defense assets (high endurance cutters, patrol boats, and port security units needed to support Defense Department operational plans) maintain a combat readiness rating of 2 or better.				
	1999	**2000**	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**
Target:	N/A	100%	100%	*	*
Actual:	4%	51%	67%#		

 # Data are for the first three quarters of the year. Fourth quarter data was destroyed in the attack on the Pentagon.

* After 2001, this goal will be an operating administration performance goal and will continue to be tracked by USCG. Results will be discussed in the context of this performance goal.

2001 Results: DOT did not meet the performance target for providing combat ready units. High endurance cutter and patrol boat readiness remained nearly constant, meeting DOD plan requirements 91% and 100% of the time respectively. Similarly, port security units' readiness improved by approximately 3%, which was validated by actual performance and response following incidents on September 11th when they rapidly deployed to New York, Boston, Los Angeles/Long Beach and Seattle to improve security capabilities in these harbors.

Following the attacks on September 11, the Coast Guard quickly shifted to the biggest port security operation since World War II. The FY 2002 Intelligence Authorization Act elevated the Coast Guard to full membership in the national intelligence community, allowing better access to information and increasing awareness of marine traffic on the Nation's maritime borders.

Emergency rules and new operations were established and implemented to set positive control over vessel movements, and to quickly gain a greater and earlier awareness of which ships are approaching the U.S. The Coast Guard began vessel escorts, a ship rider program similar to sky marshals for ships needing positive control of navigation and engineering spaces, and established security zones and restricted navigation areas, and tighter controls over the movement and operation of vessels carrying cargoes of significant risk such as liquefied natural gas carriers. Coast Guard and Navy (under Coast Guard operational authority) patrol efforts were diverted immediately from other missions to establish an armed law enforcement and military presence to ensure security at the approaches to all major ports.

FY 2002 Performance Plan Evaluation: This is a new goal for 2003, and in 2002, DOT is beginning a multi-year task of thoroughly assessing seaport vulnerability. An interagency vulnerability assessment process led by the Coast Guard will complete 55 comprehensive port vulnerability assessments by 2004.

Management Challenge – Cargo Security (IG)
Coast Guard Capital Acquisition Budget (IG/GAO)
The IG has stated that:
▪ stabilizing Coast Guard's missions and budget requirements in light of post-9/11 priorities;
▪ making progress on Deepwater, while at the same time moving with dispatch on National Distress and Response System and Search and Rescue procurements;
▪ meeting Coast Guard's enhanced port security mission, while continuing to effectively meet Coast Guard's other responsibilities; and,
▪ strengthening cargo security;

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are major management challenges facing DOT. Ensuring robust port and maritime security is a national priority and an intermodal challenge, with impacts in America's heartland communities just as directly as the U.S. seaport cities where cargo and passenger vessels arrive and depart daily. The United States has more than 361 ports containing more than 3,700 passenger and cargo terminals. Current growth predictions indicate that container cargo will double in the next 20 years. The biggest cargo security challenge facing DOT is how to ensure that legitimate cargo is not unnecessarily delayed as we introduce enhanced security measures against security threats.

As described above, the Department is undertaking the largest port and waterway security ramp-up since World War II, in concert with other Federal, State, and local authorities, and the port industry. The Department was well equipped with existing statutory authority to develop the immediate maritime security response our Nation has required. These steps have formed the core of our near-term response to the new maritime and port security environment:

Coast Guard: 1) refocused resources to protect high consequence targets in the marine environment, including critical bridges, port facilities and other infrastructure; 2) issued emergency regulations requiring 96-hour advance notices of arrival for ships arriving in U.S. ports, and expects to make that regulation permanent by the summer of 2002; 3) working with the Office of Naval Intelligence, tracks inbound high-interest vessels and providing intelligence on the people, cargoes and vessels to operational commanders and interested agencies; 4) deployed personnel as Sea Marshals and small boat escorts to ensure positive control of vessels containing critical cargoes and in sensitive areas.

MARAD: 1) is working with the maritime industry to examine and address security issues and policy; 2) heightened security at its Ready Reserve Force fleet sites and outport

TSA: along with MARAD and an inter-departmental Credential Direct Action Group is examining ways that advanced technologies, including smart cards, biometrics and public key infrastructure, can be used throughout the maritime and related industries in order to accurately identify employees working in security-sensitive areas.

SLSDC: is working closely with its Canadian counterpart and the Coast Guard to heighten security on the St. Lawrence River and ensure the protection of ocean access to our Great Lakes ports.

In addition, on February 28, 2002, Secretary Mineta announced the implementation of the Port Security Grants Program from which TSA will distribute approximately $93 million in grant money to seaports to finance port security assessments and the cost of enhancing facility and operational security at critical national seaports.

The Deepwater Project is the largest capital improvement project ever undertaken by the USCG. The IG has acknowledged that the USCG is using an innovative planning process which, when completed, should provide a good basis for establishing needs and managing the Coast Guard's acquisition strategy. However, the IG and GAO have stated that there are several critical challenges remaining, including ensuring the planning progress includes a realistic level of funding and using a process to assess the readiness of proposed technology.

The Deepwater Capability Replacement Project will provide a performance-based acquisition focused on required Coast Guard mission capabilities, rather than specifications for specific assets. The Coast Guard will contract with a single System Integrator to acquire an integrated system of surface, air, command and control, intelligence and logistics systems. Focusing the Government's contract on required capabilities allows and encourages the System Integrator to use innovative available technologies and processes that will maximize operational effectiveness while minimizing total ownership cost. The Coast Guard's acquisition effort is ongoing with three industry teams, and a contract award is anticipated in FY 2002.

The IG identified the Coast Guard Search and Rescue program's effectiveness as needing additional focus due to staffing, training and capital asset readiness problems; particularly with regard to budget and acquisition schedule estimates for replacing the National Distress and Response System (NDRS). NDRS' primary focus is on search and rescue detection and response. However, this integrated system is also the Coast Guard's coastal and port command and control

solution, both for managing Coast Guard assets and for coordinating operations with local, State, and other Federal agencies. The FY03 budget fully funds NDRS. Initial operational capability for NDRS will occur in FY 2003, and full deployment of NDRS will be finished by 2006. Training and staffing are addressed in the Maritime Safety goal page.

FY 2002

- Award Deepwater contract (June 2002)

- Award NDRS full-scale development contract (September 2002)

FY 2003

- In FY 2003, the Coast Guard and System Integrator will finalize the Deepwater Performance Measurement Plan. Once the plan is complete and the targets are determined, the performance measures will be monitored and analyzed.

- To control costs, the Coast Guard will work closely with the System Integration Contractor to control the design and construction of Deepwater assets. Quarterly and annual reviews will be conducted to evaluate the performance of the System Integrator and product performance. The Coast Guard will maintain positive control over the integrator who will act only on the Coast Guard's task orders.

STRATEGIC MOBILITY:

To maximize DOD's logistics capability and minimize its cost, defense sealift increasingly relies on the U.S. commercial sector. The ability of the United States to respond to future military contingencies will require adequate U.S.-flag sealift resources, skilled U.S. maritime labor, and the associated maritime infrastructure. DOT helps provide for a seamless, time-phased transition from peacetime to wartime operations while balancing the defense and commercial elements of our transportation system. The Ready Reserve Force (RRF) is a key source of strategic sealift capacity to support the rapid deployment of U.S. military forces during the early stages of a military crisis. Merchant mariners employed on commercial vessels in the U.S. domestic and international trades provide the core job skills needed to crew the RRF. DOT is responsible for establishing DOD's prioritized use of ports and related intermodal facilities during DOD mobilizations, when the smooth flow of military cargo through commercial ports is critical.

Performance Goals:

Ensure sufficient contingency sealift and commercial outload ports are available to support DOD mobilization requirements.

Performance Plan:

Performance measures:

Percentage of DOD-required shipping capacity complete with crews available within mobilization timelines.

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Target:	N/A	N/A	N/A	93%	94%
Actual:	97%	92%	97%		

Percentage of DOD-designated commercial ports available for military use within DOD established readiness timelines.

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Target:	90%	90%	93%	92%	92%
Actual:	93%	93%	92%		

Note on data: The Department's mobilization goals of the past were independently measured, but our goals were undeniably linked. For instance, succeeding with ship capacity but failing to provide the mariners only provides a fraction of what DOD expects from the Department in time of war. Therefore, the new shipping capacity measure replaces three from the previous performance plan. In 2001, the number of DOD-designated ports decreased by one, so the target has been adjusted to show the effect. DOT's goal of ensuring that only one of the critical ports of embarkation for military logistic requirements will be unavailable has not changed.

External Factors: Business decisions resulting in further globalization and consolidation of shipping companies could reduce the availability of U.S.-flag sealift capacity.

Strategic Shipping Availability (based on DOD requirements)

Port Availability for Defense

Strategies and Initiatives to Achieve 2003 Target: DOT resources attributable to this performance goal are depicted below:

Funding Directed to Strategic Mobility

DOT's ability to provide adequate reserve sealift depends on three elements in combination: adequate privately owned U.S.-flag merchant shipping available for defense logistic needs, adequate government-owned reserve sealift, and an adequate base of qualified, available mariners to crew the ships DOD needs for its strategic sealift reserve. DOD funds the RRF, and MARAD manages it.

MARAD will jointly work with DOD and carriers to ensure the continued full commitment of commercial capacity to MSP and VISA ($98.7 million). In addition, MARAD, DOD and the industry will seek to ensure rapid crewing of RRF vessels and increased efficiency of the fleet sites to speed activations. MARAD will continue the RRF maintenance and repair regimen for all RRF vessels in FY 2003 and provide for berthing arrangements for each RRF ship according to its prescribed readiness status.

MARAD will:

- continue to provide for training of new merchant marine officers through the operation of the United States Merchant Marine Academy ($49.7 million) and support of the six state-run regional maritime academies ($7.6 million). These training programs replenish the pool of available officers and maintain and increase the competence of current mariners through continuing education programs.

- continue a variety of port readiness activities including: testing deployment plans through port readiness exercises; conducting strategic port defense workshops for Federal and port stakeholders; developing or updating port readiness initiatives such as port security manuals, port readiness workshops, and port

planning orders; monitoring strategic port availability on a monthly basis; and conducting semi-annual port assessments with the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC).

Other Federal Programs with Common Outcomes: The U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) is responsible for ensuring adequate sealift transportation of military cargo to support military needs. They determine the readiness status and siting of RRF ships in order to support their force projection mission and provide annual program planning guidance so that MARAD can develop RRF budget requirements.

DOD relies upon commercial merchant mariners to crew the ships activated for sealift purposes. MARAD meets regularly with DOD personnel to coordinate planning for crewing requirements.

Under a 1984 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Port Readiness, nine Federal agencies and organizations – MARAD, MTMC, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Military Sealift Command, the commands of the Maritime Defense Zone, the U.S. Army Forces Command, USTRANSCOM, and the U.S. Atlantic Command – agreed to share responsibilities for support of the efficient movement of military forces and supplies through U.S. ports. The MOU establishes a National Port Readiness steering group and a working group, both chaired by MARAD that contain representatives of all nine agencies. The steering group provides policy direction and sets broad priorities for accomplishing the objectives set forth in the MOU and the working group implements them.

Performance Report:

MARAD supplementary performance measures*:

Ship capacity (in thousands of twenty-foot container equivalent units (TEUs)) available to meet DOD's requirements for intermodal sealift capacity.

	1999	**2000**	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**
Target:	165	165	165	165	*
Actual:	162	171	168		

Percent of RRF no-notice activations that meet assigned readiness timelines.

	1999	**2000**	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**
Target:	100%	100%	100%	100%	*
Actual:	100%	100%	100%		

Percent of days that RRF ships are mission-capable while under DOD control.

	1999	**2000**	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**
Target:	99.0%	99.0%	99.0%	99.0%	*
Actual:	98.4%	97.0%	99.3%		

Of the mariners needed to crew combined sealift and commercial fleets during national emergencies, the percent of the total that are available.

	1999	**2000**	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**
Target:	100%	100%	100%	100%	*
Actual:	122%(r)	117%	120%		

(r) Revised. Shipping capacity measure is stated in thousands of TEU's.

* Performance measures are discontinued after 2001. They have been collapsed into the 2003 sealift measure above to provide a more systematic measure of the outcome DOT seeks. MARAD will continue to track each of these performance measures and they will be discussed in the context of this goal.

2001 Results: DOT met the sealift capacity, RRF and mariner availability performance targets. During 19 test activations, RRF ships were brought out of reduced status, fully crewed, and made available to accept cargo.

MARAD exceeded the mission-capable goal and reversed a two-year negative trend. The 13 RRF ships operated by MSC in FY 2001 missed only 15 operating days (due to the need for repairs) out of a total of 2,010 operating days desired by MSC.

In the aggregate, the number of mariners available exceeded the number of mariners required to meet sealift requirements for DOD's most likely mobilization scenario. While aggregate mariner supply exceeds projected demand, this is not the case where highly specialized experience is needed for some crew positions. The FY 1999 performance data was revised slightly based upon the use of the

availability percentage validated by the 2001 Mariner Survey.

Twelve out of 13 strategic ports, or 92%, were determined to meet the availability criteria.

FY 2002 Performance Plan Evaluation: DOT expects to meet the performance targets in 2002.

DRUG AND MIGRANT INTERDICTION: Illegal drugs threaten our children, our communities, and the social fabric of this country. Illegal immigration also poses a serious threat to America's economic and social well-being, and challenges the integrity of our borders as a sovereign Nation. Approximately 52,000 deaths occur annually in America from drug abuse and drug-related crimes, accidents, and illnesses. The Coast Guard seized a record 62.9 metric tons of cocaine, and 15.7 metric tons of marijuana in 2001. An untold number of illegal migrants perish each year when overloaded and unseaworthy vessels founder at sea.

Performance Goals (Drug goals set by Office of National Drug Control Policy):

By 2005, reduce current drug use among 12-17 year olds by 10 percent.

By 2005, reduce current drug use among 18 year olds and older by 10 percent.

By 2008, reduce current drug use among 12-17 year olds by 25 percent.

By 2008, reduce current drug use among 18 year olds and older by 25 percent.

Reduce illegal immigration across U.S. sea borders.

Performance Plan:

Performance Measures:

Amount of drugs seized or destroyed at sea (metric tons).

	1999	**2000**	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**
Target:	N/A	N/A	N/A	75	76
Actual:	78.7	83.2	78.6		

Interdict and/or deter at least 87 percent of undocumented migrants who consider attempting to enter the U. S. via maritime routes.

|	**1999**	**2000**	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**
Target:	87%	87%	87%	87%	87%
Actual:	86.7%	89%	82.5%		

Note on data: DOT endorses the attempt to estimate the availability of all four primary drugs (cocaine, marijuana, methamphetamine, and heroin) by the end of FY 2002. DOT is making the drug performance measure more comprehensive by including all drugs seized or destroyed at sea by the Coast Guard, in addition to cocaine. Data for the previous measure, the seizure rate for cocaine shipped through the transit zone, is obtained too late to be of use in managing performance, but will be discussed in the performance report section. To provide a more understandable migrant interdiction performance measure, DOT will invert the former performance measure and calculate the percent of undocumented migrants interdicted and/or deterred vs. the percent of undocumented migrants that have successfully entered the U.S. over maritime routes.

External Factors: Socioeconomic conditions here and abroad, and political and economic conditions abroad influence demand and supply for illegal drugs, and cause variations in illegal migration patterns.

Maritime Drug Interdiction

Undocumented Migrants

Strategies and Initiatives to Achieve 2003 Target: DOT resources attributable to this performance goal are depicted below:

Funding Directed to Drug & Migrant Interdiction

Reducing the supply of drugs entering the U.S. is an important element of the President's National Drug Control Strategy, and enforcing immigration laws is a vital component of maintaining the sovereignty of U.S. borders. The USCG, FAA, and NHTSA contribute to the interagency effort to reduce demand and supply. The Coast Guard Commandant serves as the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator for the ONDCP Director, coordinating yearly operations plans to ensure harmony of interagency effort. The Coast Guard will:

- operate along maritime routes to deter and defeat attempts at smuggling drugs and undocumented migrants into the U.S.;

- establish agreements with source countries to reduce migrant flow;

- use intelligence to continually improve patrol plans and tactics to provide both deterrence and effective enforcement;

- finalize a interagency study (with ONDCP and the Customs Service) of the deterrent effect that interdiction creates on drug trafficking organizations;

- develop more capable sensors, advanced vessel search technologies, and non-lethal interdiction technologies;

- develop tactical data exchange systems; and

- provide advice and assistance under State Department auspices for migrant source countries in improving law enforcement efforts against organized migrant smugglers.

Owing to the diversion of Coast Guard operating forces to coast and port security duties following last September's terrorist attacks, the 2002 and 2003 performance targets have been adjusted to reflect the effect of the Coast Guard's additional emphasis. The Coast Guard will continue to restore operating forces to these missions as resources allow.

Other Federal Programs with Common Outcomes: The ONDCP coordinates overall U.S. drug policy, and sets national objectives and goals in the National Drug Control Strategy and accompanying performance measures and objectives. USCG and the Customs Service coordinate to provide law enforcement defense in depth against drug traffickers. The Defense Department provides detection and monitoring support, and provides ships to augment interdiction efforts at sea. The State Department provides diplomatic liaison with other countries and supports DOT efforts in bilateral agreements to counter drug smuggling. The Justice Department coordinates drug intelligence.

The U.S. Border Patrol enforces U.S. immigration laws on shore, while the Coast Guard enforces immigration law at sea. The Coast Guard regularly coordinates with the State Department, INS, and the Border Patrol on immigration issues and potential international agreements.

Performance Report:

USCG supplementary performance measure*:

Seizure rate for cocaine that is shipped through the transit zone (high seas between source countries and the United States).				
1999	**2000**	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**
Target: 12.5%	13%	15%	18.7%	*
Actual: 12.2%	10.6%	11.1%#		

 # Preliminary estimate based on 2000 cocaine flow quantity.

* After 2001, this goal will be an operating administration performance goals and will continue to be tracked by USCG. Results will be discussed in the context of this performance goal.

2001 Results: DOT did not meet either performance target.

Despite Coast Guard seizure of a record 62.9 metric tons of cocaine, last year's increase in the total flow of cocaine through the transit zone has continued, outpacing the Coast Guard's increasing drug interdiction successes.

Improvements in intelligence and intelligence-sharing/fusion have allowed the Coast Guard to focus its resources on cases involving larger quantities of drugs in the eastern Pacific. Interdictions in this region accounted for 89 percent of all drugs seized by the Coast Guard in 2001.

There were 3,666 successful migrant landings on U.S. shores. There was an estimated maritime migrant threat of 21,000. Migration from the Caribbean continued to provide the majority of maritime interdictions. Cuban migration was steady but slightly less than in previous years, but Haitian migrant smuggling dramatically increased. There were several significant Cuban smuggling cases involving migrant deaths or missing persons.

FY 2002 Performance Plan Evaluation: Even with the need to refocus operations on coastal and port security, DOT expects to meet the performance targets.

CRITICAL TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION: The U.S.

transportation system is one of the most developed in the world, covering a large geographical area and numerous modes of travel. The system increasingly relies on information and telecommunications systems. Given our open society, the transportation system is vulnerable to attempts to destroy or degrade its infrastructure and performance. The goal and intent of Executive Order 31228 is to reduce the vulnerability of the Nation's critical infrastructure through public-private partnership. To assure the integrity of the nation's transportation system and to ensure the confidence of the public in safe, secure and efficient transportation services, DOT has a three pronged approach to transportation security: 1) through intelligence gathering and information sharing, we identify threats and communicate that information quickly to non-Federal owners of critical transportation infrastructure who must act to protect their assets; 2) DOT takes proactive measures to protect critical transportation infrastructure through vulnerability assessments and remediation steps to address the vulnerabilities; and 3) DOT works in partnership with industry to identify and counteract infrastructure vulnerabilities and transportation disruptions.

Performance Report:

Discontinued performance measure:

Of those who need to act, percent who receive threat information within 24 hours.				
	1999	**2000**	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**
Target: N/A	##	##	*	*
Actual: ##	##	N/A		

Not published in part due to sensitive information being protected under 14 CFR Part 191; N/A Not available.

* Performance measure is discontinued after 2001, but protection of critical transportation infrastructure is a key part of DOT's homeland security mission. The Under Secretary for Transportation Security will undertake a review of transportation security policy across each mode of transportation and in particular, how DOT needs to measure performance in this critical area. After that review is complete, DOT will decide on new performance measures to include in its Performance Plan.

External Factors: State and local agencies and businesses own and operate the majority of the Nation's transportation infrastructure. Achievement of our goal relies on increased coordination and cooperative partnerships with private industry and law enforcement, and on the willingness of industry to adjust security procedures based on threat information provided by DOT.

2001 Results: DOT did not meet the performance target. As the events of 9/11 made clear, DOT neither possessed nor distributed information sufficient to thwart the nineteen terrorists in their plan to attack New York city and

Washington, DC. The Aviation and Transportation and Security Act President Bush signed on November 19, 2001 created the Transportation Security Administration, which will be responsible for formulating security policy, and for coordinating security plans for all modes of transportation.

In 2001, DOT:

- implemented a Department wide IT security program;

- completed a comprehensive annual agency IT security program review of DOT, in accordance with the Government Information Security Reform Act (GISRA).

- prepared a plan and template for updating the inventory of PDD-63 systems with specific plans for assessment, remediation, certification and authorization.

- established an IT security committee - a valuable forum for addressing IT security issues of interest to the entire Department.

- trained 95% of DOT's workforce on general security awareness. FAA launched an extremely aggressive security awareness campaign. Training will be complete in 2002.

In the aftermath of the terrorist incidents of September 11, FMCSA conducted more than 36,000 Security Sensitivity Visits (SSVs) to increase the level of awareness of hazardous materials carriers to terrorist threats, identify potential weaknesses in carrier security programs, and report potentially serious security issues to the appropriate authorities. The SSVs have resulted in 280 findings of suspicious activities with 126 referrals to the FBI.

Other Federal Programs with Common Outcomes: DOT's performance in protecting transportation infrastructure depends to a substantial degree on our effectiveness in maintaining close liaison with numerous law enforcement agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, U.S. Secret Service, State Department, and local police departments to acquire current threat information against transportation systems and facilities. This affords DOT access to information on current terrorist activities to transportation operational elements worldwide.

In implementing the requirements of Section 1012 of the USA PATRIOT Act, FMCSA is coordinating with the U.S. Department of Justice, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, in developing procedures for performing a security risk review process for all persons seeking issuance, renewal, upgrade, or transfer of a hazardous materials endorsement for a commercial driver's license (CDL).

Management Challenge – Computer Security (Department-wide and FAA) (IG/GAO/OMB)

The IG, GAO, and OMB have identified information system security as a critical government-wide management challenge, and in particular, have identified FAA air traffic control information systems as needing special attention to harden them against malicious or criminal attack.

The DOT Chief Information Officer (CIO) will lead intermodal efforts to ensure the continued security of our transportation information systems to make IT systems less vulnerable to attack and other service disruptions, including those caused by natural disasters.

The Computer Security Challenge presents itself on two fronts: 1) protection of all IT assets as required by the Computer Security Act of 1987, the Government Information Security Reform Act (GISRA), OMB Circular A-130, National Institute of Standards and Technology guidance, etc.; and, 2) specific protection of critical IT assets in accordance with Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63).

DOT has established an IT Security Program requiring that all DOT IT Systems be assessed to

identify vulnerabilities; that vulnerabilities be evaluated and mitigated where justified; and, that systems be tested and certified as adequately protected. To judge our progress, we have set the following milestones and goals:

Key 2003 Milestones:

- Achieve at least one grade improvement in Federal classifications for the IT security program;

- Fully integrate IT security into the e-Government, capital planning, and enterprise architecture processes;

- Establish standards for authentication and digital signatures (reviewing technologies such as Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and biometrics) for the Department that contribute to operational and economic efficiencies;

- By January 2003, establish and operate a Department-wide monitoring and reporting capability;

- By January 2003, complete an update of the Department IT security governance structure;

- By December 2002, complete the inventory of DOT mission-critical and PDD-63 systems systems, and develop a plan for the completion of certification/accreditation of those systems by December 2005;

- By December 2003, develop a PKI prototype, including digital signature capabilities, for use within the Department.

FAA has developed a concept of operations, approach, and major milestones to address information security issues and protect information assets. The FAA approach focuses on protecting the operational capability of its facilities, which requires an integrated approach to information systems, personnel, and physical security at each facility. Other efforts to protect both the air traffic system infrastructure and to ensure that new systems incorporate security include:

- Authorizing and certifying computer security systems;

- Training FAA personnel in security awareness and vulnerability assessments; and

- Improving intrusion detection capability.

ENERGY EFFICIENCY: Moving people and goods requires more than one-quarter of the total energy used in the United States and accounts for two-thirds of U.S. petroleum consumption. Transportation is nearly totally dependent on oil for energy, and over half of the petroleum used in the United States must be imported. This dependency makes the U.S. economy particularly vulnerable to supply disruptions.

Performance report:

Discontinued performance measure:

Transportation-related petroleum consumption (in quadrillion BTUs) per trillion dollars of Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP).				
	1999	**2000**	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**
Target: N/A	2.80	2.76	*	*
Actual: 2.85	2.88(r)	2.78#		

(r) Revised; # Projection from trends.

* Performance measure is discontinued after 2001.

External Factors: Economic growth translates to growth in transportation energy consumption, because people and businesses travel more. Demand for private vehicles tends to follow energy price trends, and vehicle makers provide choice to consumers, allowing shifts to more fuel-efficient or alternative-fuel vehicles.

2001 Results: Based on a projection from trend data, DOT did not meet the performance target.

FY 2002 Performance Plan Evaluation: DOT will not report on this performance goal in 2002, since this is not a core mission of DOT, but of other Federal agencies – principally Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency. However, this does not signal a lack of commitment from DOT to the National Energy Policy, or the President's policy on reducing air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions.

NHTSA will fulfill its statutory responsibility of reviewing and establishing Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards toward the goal of improving energy efficiency. Analysis of manufacturers' capability to improve the fuel economy performance of their light duty vehicles, a review of automotive technologies that could achieve higher fuel efficiency, the environmental implications of higher CAFE standards, and the economic practicability of emerging technologies, will provide the basis for developing the most cost effective policies to increase fuel economy and to reduce fuel consumption and costs per mile traveled.

Other Federal Programs with Common Outcomes: DOT supports the Comprehensive National Energy Strategy. The Federal R&D partnership for next generation vehicle development includes the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Energy, and Transportation, as well as the Environmental Protection Agency. DOT leads an interagency task force on Bicycling and Walking. Members of the task force include the Department of the Interior, Consumer Product Safety Commission, Environmental Protection Agency, General Services Administration, and Centers for Disease Control.