Event Desc|En No|Site Name|Licensee Name|Region No|City Name|State Cd|County Name|License No|Agreement State Ind|Docket No|Unit Ind1|Unit Ind2|Unit Ind3|Reactor Type|Nrc Notified By|Ops Officer|Notification Dt|Notification Time|Event Dt|Event Time|Time Zone|Last Updated Dt|Emergency Class|Cfr Cd1|Cfr Descr1|Cfr Cd2|Cfr Descr2|Cfr Cd3|Cfr Descr3|Cfr Cd4|Cfr Descr4|Staff Name1|Org Abbrev1|Staff Name2|Org Abbrev2|Staff Name3|Org Abbrev3|Staff Name4|Org Abbrev4|Staff Name5|Org Abbrev5|Staff Name6|Org Abbrev6|Staff Name7|Org Abbrev7|Staff Name8|Org Abbrev8|Staff Name9|Org Abbrev9|Staff Name10|Org Abbrev10|Scram Code 1|RX CRIT 1|Initial PWR 1|Initial RX Mode1|Current PWR 1|Current RX Mode 1|Scram Code 2|RX CRIT 2|Initial PWR 2|Initial RX Mode 2|Current PWR 2|Current RX Mode 2|Scram Code 3|RX CRIT 3|Initial PWR 3|Initial RX Mode 3|Current PWR 3|Current RX Mode 3|Event Text|
Power Reactor|46965|FORT CALHOUN|OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT|4|FORT CALHOUN|NE|WASHINGTON||Y|05000285|1|||(1) CE|SCOTT MOECK|PETE SNYDER|6/16/2011 00:00:00|14:46|6/16/2011 00:00:00|12:30|CDT|9/26/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)|UNANALYZED CONDITION|50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)|ACCIDENT MITIGATION|||||GREG WERNER|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Cold Shutdown|0|Cold Shutdown|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||ADDITIONAL PENETRATION IDENTIFIED FOR MITIGATION DURING WALKDOWN  "Operations identified a potential flooding issue in the Intake Structure 1007 ft. 6 in. level.  The area of concern is a the hole in the floor at the 1007 ft. 6 in. level where the relief valve from FP-1A discharge pipe goes through the raw pump bay and discharges into the intake cell.  There is one penetration of concern.  Flooding through this penetration could have impacted the ability of the station's Raw Water (RW) pumps to perform their design accident mitigation functions.   "Efforts are in progress to seal the penetration.   "This eight-hour notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  * * * RETRACTION ON 9/26/12 AT 1949 EDT FROM ROBERT KROS TO DONG PARK * * *  "The penetration in question is not an external penetration and is not within the scope of the CLB [Current Licensing Basis] and therefore the condition is not reportable. The penetration is internal to the intake structure and does not affect internal flooding.   "The failure to retract this notification in a timely fashion was identified while reviewing flood related station notifications from 2011 and has been entered into the corrective action system."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified R4DO (Werner).|
Agreement State|47768|TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH|NON-DESTRUCTIVE INSPECTION CORPORATION|4|LAKE JACKSON|TX|||Y|L02712|||||ROBERT FREE|HOWIE CROUCH|3/25/2012 00:00:00|09:20|3/24/2012 00:00:00|16:00|CDT|9/12/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||THOMAS FARNHOLTZ|R4DO|ANGELA MCINTOSH|FSME|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - OVEREXPOSURE TO RADIOGRAPHER WHEN CAMERA SOURCE BECAME DISCONNECTED  The following information was received by facsimile:  "On March 24, 2012, the licensee notified the Agency that it one of its radiography teams had experienced a disconnect of a 65 curie iridium-192 on a QSA Delta 880 radiography camera at a temporary work site in Pasadena, Texas. The crank out drive cable had broken and the source had completely disconnected.  After an authorized  individual performed  the source retrieval, the licensee's RSO learned that the radiographer trainer disconnected the source tube from the camera and had carried the source tube around his neck while he climbed down the ladder of the scaffold.  The source was in the tube at this time, but it is uncertain at this time the source's location within the tube.  When the radiographer trainer reached the platform he removed the source tube from his neck.  The licensee's initial dose estimates for the radiographer trainer are a whole body dose of at least 56 rem and an extremity limit that may exceed 100 rem.  The radiographer's film badge is being sent for immediate reading.  The licensee is conducting an investigation.    "NOTE:  During the licensee's initial phone call to the Agency, the Agency understood the whole body dose estimate to be 6 rem and considered the event to be a 24-hour report (the Agency did report to the NRC HOO within 24 hours).  However, when the Agency received the written initial report this morning, March 26, 2012, it was discovered that the estimate is 56 rem, which requires immediate notification.  This report is being submitted to update and upgrade the event.  More information will be provided as it is obtained.   The State also corrected the source strength to 65 curie Ir-192 source.  REAC/TS was notified on 03/26/12 and the licensee has made contact with them.  Texas Incident: I-8942  * * * UPDATE FROM KAREN BLANCHARD TO CHARLES TEAL ON 3/29/12 AT 1712 EDT * * *  "The radiographer's badge was processed on March 28, 2012.  The badge reading was 812 mrem whole body (deep dose equivalent).  Dose reconstruction continues as the investigation continues.  More information will be provided as it is obtained."   Notified R4DO (Farnholtz) and FSME (McKenney).  * * * UPDATE AT 1414 EDT ON 09/12/12 FROM KAREN BLANCHARD TO S. SANDIN * * *  The following update from the State of Texas was received via email:  "Investigation of the event provided the following information.  The radiographer stated he had performed a survey of the camera and source guide tube prior to disconnecting it.  He stated he observed normal readings, including approximately 20 mr/hr at the camera.  He lowered the camera and drive cable assembly down to the radiographer trainee who was working with him.  After climbing down the ladder and removing the source guide tube from around his neck, the radiographer walked over to assist the trainee who was having trouble disconnecting the drive cable assembly.  The radiographer stated he saw that the camera was not locked and was still in the red position.  The radiographer stated he again surveyed the camera and then the source guide tube and got high readings at the end of the source guide tube.  Sometime between the time the radiographer began attempting to disconnect the drive cable assembly and the time he surveyed the guide tube, both of their alarming rate meters (ARM) began alarming.  They both moved back and notified the licensee's Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) of the apparent disconnect.  The radiographer then used a pair of 3-foot long tongs to lift the guide tube from the collimator end.  As he lifted the tube, the source fell out onto the floor.  He again moved back, re-established a 2 mr/hr boundary, and waited on the RSO.  The RSO arrived on-site as did an individual authorized to perform source retrieval.  The source was then properly retrieved and secured.  The RSO checked ARMs and the survey meter and all were working properly at that time.  "The camera, drive cable assembly, and source guide tube were sent to the manufacturer for evaluation.  The manufacturer reported that . . . 'the cable was severed directly behind the 550 connector.  The male connector passed the no go gauge but is heavily worn . . . The cable is corroded/rusted and stiff at the broken area and was dry of any lubricant grease . . . the control pistol assembly components showed significant signs of rusting and the control housings were taped to allow continued use . . . there are no indications of improper manufacture or defect in the Teleflex drive cable . . . Based on this evaluation, the drive cable failed due to a combination of wear, corrosion and lack of lubrication indicative of improper maintenance.'  The radiographer stated he did not check the condition of the crank out drive cable prior to using it (as required) even though he initialed the daily work sheet indicating he had completed his daily equipment check.  "The survey meter and ARMs were sent to the manufacturer for evaluation.  All were within the calibration date and all were operating properly.  The ARMs began alarming at 400 mr/hr when they were checked.      "The radiographer was wearing his dosimetry badge on his right chest pocket.  It was sent for immediate processing following the incident.  The badge reading was 812 mrem.  The licensee performed dose assessment calculations for the event and assigned an estimated dose of 29.32 rem for this event.  "Key issues identified:  1. Failure to perform proper survey. 2. Failure of licensee to properly inspect and maintain equipment (specifically the drive cable in this instance). 3. Failure of radiographer to perform daily equipment inspections and remove from service components in need of maintenance. 4. Failure to ensure camera is in locked position after cranking source into camera and before proceeding."  Notified R4DO (Lantz) and FSME via email.|
Part 21|47833|MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD.|MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD|1|ARLINGTON|VA|||Y||||||EI KADOKAMI|JOHN KNOKE|4/13/2012 00:00:00|15:58|2/21/2012 00:00:00||EDT|9/7/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|21.21(a)(2)|INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION|||||||BLAKE WELLING|R1DO|KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE|R2DO|DAVID HILLS|R3DO|VINCENT GADDY|R4DO|PART 21 GROUP|EMAI|||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||PART 21 INTERIM REPORT - STEAM GENERATOR TUBE WEAR  This interim Part 21 is in regard to San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2, Steam Generator replacement.  "During the first refueling outage following steam generator replacement, eddy current testing identified ten total tubes with depths of 90 to 28 percent of the tube wall thickness. Some of the affected tubes were located adjacent to retainer bars. The retainer bars are part of the floating anti-vibration bar (AVB) structure that stabilizes the u-bend region of the tubes.  "Other tubes in the two steam generators had detectable wear associated with support points elsewhere in the AVB structure. Each steam generator has 9727 tubes with an 8 percent (778 tubes) design margin for tube plugging.    "Discovery Date: February 13, 2012  "Evaluation completion schedule date: May 31, 2012"  "Those Mitsubishi Heavy Industries customers potentially affected by this issue have been notified and will receive a copy of this interim report."  Reference Document: UET-20120089 Interim Report No: U21-018-IR (0)   Notified R1DO (Joustra), R2DO (Nease), R3DO (Peterson), R4DO (O'Keefe), and Part 21 Group via email.   * * * UPDATE FROM MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD VIA FAX ON 6/4/12 AT 1145 EDT * * *  The vendor changed the number of tubes identified with wear depths of 90 to 28 percent from ten tubes to six tubes and only some of the tubes were adjacent to retainer bars.  Notified R1DO (Cahill), R2DO (Vias), R3DO (Passehl), R4DO (Gepford) and Part 21 Groups via email.  * * * UPDATE FROM MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD VIA FAX ON 9/7/12 AT 1539 EDT * * *  "MHI evaluated that the deviation contains a reportable defect for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2 and 3."  Notified R4DO (Gaddy) and Part 21 Reactor Group via email.|
Power Reactor|47848|FORT CALHOUN|OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT|4|FORT CALHOUN|NE|WASHINGTON||Y|05000285|1|||(1) CE|AMY BURKHART|JOHN SHOEMAKER|4/18/2012 00:00:00|18:53|10/6/2011 00:00:00|13:44|CDT|9/26/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)|UNANALYZED CONDITION|||||||NEIL OKEEFE|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Cold Shutdown|0|Cold Shutdown|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||WASTE DISPOSAL SYSTEM CLASS ONE SEISMIC SUPPORT INOPERABLE  "The Waste Disposal System [WDS] Class 1 piping requires operable seismic supports downstream of the isolation valve class break.  Currently, eight (8) INC [International Nuclear Safety, Corp.] snubbers have been degraded to [Non Nuclear System] NNS Class 4 ridged struts.  The snubbers original design function was to allow thermal motion but restrain seismic motion.   "The snubbers have been identified as potential to create an unanalyzed condition that over stresses the safety class 1 drain pipe upstream of the isolation valve if the snubbers on the drain pipe downstream of the isolation valve were in a locked condition (acting as a strut).  Per NRC bulletin 81-01, these snubbers are assumed to be frozen and do not allow movement of the pipe; thus, they have been degraded to rigid struts as they are not in the snubber program and are not tested. They still provide a seismic safety function for [class] II/I issues and act as a strut to provide horizontal restraint to the WDS piping.    "The snubbers were removed from the piping system and tested to determine their performance and if they would have moved to allow thermal growth.  Six snubbers failed the test and were either in a locked condition or their movement was dimensionally small relative to the required movement. The [Reactor Coolant System] RCS is within acceptable stress values with the snubbers removed.  "The 8-hour regulatory reporting time has been exceeded."  An initial Reportability Evaluation was completed on March 26, 2012 and had determined the supports were operable.  A second Reportability Evaluation later determined the supports have been inoperable since October 6, 2011.  The WDS is used to drain the RCS.  The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.  * * * RETRACTION ON 9/26/12 AT 1949 EDT FROM ROBERT KROS TO DONG PARK * * *  "Additional review and testing demonstrated that [there was] no degradation of the RCS from thermal fatigue. The analysis demonstrates adequate past performance of the snubbers with regard to thermal fatigue. The impact of the snubber has been analyzed and determined to have not resulted in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety. Therefore, this event is being retracted. The failure to retract this notification in a timely fashion has been entered into the corrective action system."  The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified R4DO (Werner).|
Part 21|47990|MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD.|MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD.|1|ARLINGTON|VA|||Y||||||MIKE SCHULTZ|HOWIE CROUCH|4/19/2012 00:00:00|12:33|2/13/2012 00:00:00||EDT|9/7/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|21.21(a)(2)|INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION|||||||CHRISTOPHER CAHILL|R1DO|STEVEN VIAS|R2DO|DAVE PASSEHL|R3DO|HEATHER GEPFORD|R4DO|PART 21 GRP (EMAIL)||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||PART 21 - STEAM GENERATOR TUBE WEAR ADJACENT TO RETAINER BARS  The following information was obtained from Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, LTD on April 19, 2012 was inadvertently added to Event Notification #47833 as an update to that event. The vendor's intent was to issue two interim reports; one for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) Unit 2 and one for SONGS Unit 3. The information was obtained via fax:  "On January 31, 2012, San Onofre Unit 3 shut down due to indications of a steam generator tube leak. Steam generator tube inspections confirmed one small leak on one tube in one of the two steam generators. Continuing inspections of 100% of the steam generator tubes in both Unit 3 steam generators discovered unexpected wear, including tube to tube as well as tube to tube support structural wear. Inspection, testing, and analysis of SG tube integrity in both Unit 3 SGs is ongoing. In-situ pressure testing identified eight Unit 3 SG tubes that did not meet the target performance criteria in Technical Specification for tube integrity. One of the failed tubes was the leaking tube that required the Unit 3 shutdown.  "Discovery date: February 21, 2012  "Evaluation completion schedule date: August 31, 2012"  Interim Report: U21-019-IR Reference Document: UET-20120105  Original notifications (per EN#  47833) were made to R1DO (Joustra), R2DO (Nease), R3DO (Peterson), R4DO (O'Keefe), and Part 21 Group via email.   Notified R1DO (Cahill), R2DO (Vias), R3DO (Passehl), R4DO (Gepford) and Part 21 Groups via email.  * * * UPDATE FROM MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD VIA FAX ON 6/4/12 AT 1145 EDT * * *  The vendor reported that eight Unit 3 SG tubes did not meet the target performance criteria in Technical Specifications for tube integrity.  Notified R1DO (Cahill), R2DO (Vias), R3DO (Passehl), R4DO (Gepford) and Part 21 Groups via email.  * * * UPDATE FROM MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDSUSTRIES, LTD VIA FAX ON 9/7/12 AT 1539 EDT * * *  "MHI evaluated that the deviation contains a reportable defect for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2 and 3."  Notified R4DO (Gaddy) and Part 21 Reactor Group.|
Power Reactor|48114|QUAD CITIES|EXELON NUCLEAR CO.|3|CORDOVA|IL|ROCK ISLAND||Y|05000254|1|2||[1] GE-3,[2] GE-3|FRED SWIHART|BILL HUFFMAN|7/17/2012 00:00:00|17:36|7/17/2012 00:00:00|11:20|CDT|9/10/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)|ACCIDENT MITIGATION|||||||LAURA KOZAK|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION AC SYSTEM INOPERABLE  "On July 17, 2012, at 1120 hours the Control Room Emergency Ventilation Air Conditioning (CREV AC) system was declared inoperable due to a cooling water leak from the condenser on the Refrigeration Compressor Unit (RCU). The leakage originates from an apparent gasket leak at a bolted connection on the condenser. As a result, Technical Specification 3.7.5, Condition A, was entered. A repair plan and schedule is being developed.  "The CREV AC system maintains a habitable control room environment and ensures the operability of components in the control room emergency zone during accident conditions.  "This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) because the CREV system is a single train system, and loss of the CREV AC could impact the plant's ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  * * * UPDATE AT 1317 EDT ON 09/10/12 FROM DEREK DROCKELMAN TO S. SANDIN * * *   The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:  "The purpose of this notification is to retract the ENS Report made on July 17, 2012, at 1120 hours (ENS Report # 48114).  "Further evaluation performed by Quad Cities Station confirms the CREV AC system would have performed its safety function.  "Based on this subsequent evaluation, ENS Report # 48114 is being retracted.  "Note: On July 18, 2012, the CREV AC system was successfully repaired and CREV AC system was returned to Operable status."  The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified R3DO (Giessner).|
Power Reactor|48125|OYSTER CREEK|AMERGEN ENERGY COMPANY|1|FORKED RIVER|NJ|OCEAN||N|05000219|1|||[1] GE-2|ROBERT SALES|DONG HWA PARK|7/23/2012 00:00:00|04:24|7/23/2012 00:00:00|03:29|EDT|9/12/2012 00:00:00|UNUSUAL EVENT|50.72(a) (1) (i)|EMERGENCY DECLARED|50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)|RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL|50.72(b)(2)(xi)|OFFSITE NOTIFICATION|50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)|VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION|ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS|R1DO|HO NIEH|NRR|WILLIAM GOTT|IRD|BILL DEAN|R1RA|BRUCE BOGER|NRR|HASSEL|DHS|GUERRA|FEMA|GAMBINO|NICC|||||A/R|Y|100|Power Operation|0|Hot Shutdown|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER  At 0329 EDT, Oyster Creek experienced a loss of offsite power.  As a result of the loss of offsite power, the unit automatically scrammed from 100% with all control rods fully inserting and all safety systems functioning as required.  Both Emergency Diesel Generators automatically started and are carrying loads on the safety buses.   At 0341 EDT, Oyster Creek declared an Unusual Event based on a loss of offsite power for greater than 15 minutes. The unit is stable in Hot Shutdown with decay heat removal via the Isolation Condenser.  The cause of the loss of offsite power is currently under investigation by JCP&L.  The licensee notified the State and local agencies, as well as the NRC Resident Inspector.  The licensee will be making a press release.  * * * UPDATE ON 7/23/12 AT 0625 EDT FROM ROBERT SALES TO DONG PARK * * *  "Oyster Creek has terminated from the loss of offsite power Unusual Event [at 0538 EDT].  All safety systems functioned as expected for this event."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis), NRR EO (Nieh), IRD (Gott), DHS SWO, FEMA, and DHS NICC.  * * * UPDATE ON 7/23/12 AT 1205 EDT FROM ANDREW ZUCHOWSKI TO VINCE KLCO * * *  "As a result of the loss of offsite power, both Emergency Diesel Generators automatically started and carried loads on the safety buses, as required. Offsite power was returned to service at 0457 EDT and both Emergency Diesel Generators were secured at 0520 EDT.  "Per 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), Oyster Creek is reporting any event or condition that results in valid actuation of an Emergency AC electrical power system.  "Additionally, the Reactor Building (Secondary Containment) differential pressure indicated positive 0.25 inches W.G. at approximately 0357 EDT. Reactor Building differential pressure indication returned to normal at 0434 EDT. Oyster Creek is currently investigating the cause of the positive Reactor Building pressure indication.  "Per 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Oyster Creek is reporting an event that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to control the release of radioactive material."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified R1DO (Gray).  * * * UPDATE AT 0914 EDT ON 9/12/12 FROM ERIC SWAIN TO HUFFMAN * * *  As a result of further investigation it was found that the Reactor Building Differential Pressure issue was an indication issue only and not indicative of a loss of the secondary containment barrier. The positive indication was caused by a degradation of instrument air pressure to the instrument used to generate the differential pressure indication. The degradation of instrument air pressure was an expected condition caused by the loss of offsite power.  Alternate indication, not affected by instrument air pressure, was available throughout the event.   The alternate indication read negative 0.4 Inches water gauge throughout the event.  Based on this information Oyster Creek is retracting the portion of this report that was reported per 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), an event that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to control the release of radioactive material.  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  R1DO (Newport) notified.|
Power Reactor|48134|WOLF CREEK|WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORP.|4|BURLINGTON|KS|COFFEY||Y|05000482|1|||[1] W-4-LP|MARK JENKINS|VINCE KLCO|7/25/2012 00:00:00|22:14|7/25/2012 00:00:00|16:02|CDT|9/19/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)|UNANALYZED CONDITION|||||||JAMES DRAKE|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||IDENTIFICATION OF A DEGRADED OR UNANALYZED CONDITION  "At 1602 [CDT], Engineering personnel notified the control room that during review of a pipe stress calculation it was identified that non-conservative or incorrect methodologies were used in the calculation. This calculation was for a modification to install four; 3 [inch] drain lines between the Essential Service Water (ESW) (safety) and the Service Water (SW) (non-safety) in 1991. A preliminary ME101 stress analysis performed, which corrects the above-identified discrepancies, indicates that the pipe stresses at the drain line weldolet connection exceed the ASME code of record allowable stresses by approximately 50%, when the revised Stress Intensification Factor (SIF) is applied. This modification affected both trains (A & B) ESW trains.  "The normal system alignment uses the SW water to supply the ESW, then during accident conditions the SW and ESW systems isolate from each other so that two redundant separate train isolation valves isolate the ESW system. These 3 [inch] drain lines are located in the section of piping that is isolated from the ESW and SW systems.  "At the time of notification 'A' ESW was isolated from SW and 'B' ESW was in normal system alignment. 'B' ESW was declared inoperable and action was taken to separate the SW and ESW and isolate the 3 [inch] drain valves.  With this action complete the non-conforming components have been removed from service and OPERABILITY of the ESW has been restored.  "This condition is been reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).  "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."  * * * RETRACTION FROM MARCY BLOW TO DONG PARK ON 09/19/12 AT 1520 EDT * * *  "Further engineering evaluation determined that the four drain lines [3-inch] between the Essential Service Water (ESW) (safety) and the Service Water (SW) (non-safety) were found to be within the allowable limits for operability and are acceptable.  As a result, the condition has been determined to not be reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)."  The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (Miller).|
Part 21|48146|QUALTECH NP CURTISS WRIGHT|QUALTECH NP CURTISS WRIGHT|3|CINCINNATI|OH|||Y||||||TIM FRANCHUK|BILL HUFFMAN|8/1/2012 00:00:00|10:56|8/1/2012 00:00:00||EDT|9/10/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|21.21(d)(3)(i)|DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE|||||||TAMARA BLOOMER|R3DO|PART 21 GROUP|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||POTENTIAL PART 21 ISSUE RELATED TO TYCO TIMING RELAY  The following information was provided via facsimile:  "QualTech NP is providing this notification as a potential 10 CFR Part 21 issue. We have discovered a manufacturing defect in a timing relay which prevents the relay from operating at a specific setting. This relay was purchased as a commercial grade item and dedicated through our dedication process for safety related applications at our Cincinnati facility.  "The subject equipment is TYCO Model CNT-35-96, a timing relay with adjustable trip ranges from seconds up to 9,990 hours. QualTech NP has recently identified a failure mode for this relay in that the device will not trip in the 10H setting. In communications with the manufacturer, they have confirmed that there is a flaw in the design that prevents this specific setting from tripping.  "QualTech NP has only sold this unit to two plants, both Exelon. We recognize, however that other utilities could have these installed. Based on the information in hand we are evaluating the need for a 10 CFR Part 21 notification. Since the item was qualified under the EPRI SQURTS [Seismic Qualification Reporting and Testing Standardization] Program, the recommended corrective action is to notify EPRI of the condition in order for SQURTS members to perform an impact evaluation.  "Additional details will be provided in the formal written report. Please contact Tim Franchuk at 513-528-7900, ext. 176 (office), [redacted] or via email tfranchuk@curtisswright.com for any additional information."  * * * UPDATE ON 8/2/12 AT 1659 EDT FROM MARGIE BREWER TO DONG PARK * * *  The licensee has revised the third paragraph to read as follows:   "QualTech NP has only sold this unit to two plants, Exelon LaSalle and Quad Cities. We recognize, however that other utilities could have these installed. Based on the information in hand we are evaluating the need for a 10 CFR Part 21 notification. Since the item was qualified under the EPRI SQURTS [Seismic Qualification Reporting and Testing Standardization] Program, QualTech NP recognizes that other SQURTS members may have used the qualification basis as part of licensee dedication activities, and therefore, will notify EPRI of the condition."  Notified R3DO (Kunowski) and Part 21 group via email.  * * * UPDATE AT 1803 EDT ON 09/10/12 FROM TIM FRANCHUK TO S. SANDIN * * *  The following update was received via fax:  "QualTech NP is issuing this letter to provide additional details from our initial notification dated July 31, 2012 with regard to a potential defect in a timing relay (Log No. 2012-31-00 and 2012-031-01). The affected equipment is TYCO Model CNT 35-96 and the defect is the failure of the component to trip in the 10H setting. The following actions have been taken since the time of the initial notification.  "QuaITech NP has notified EPRI, who in turn has notified SQURTS members of the defect in the 10H setting. In addition, supplemental testing has been performed to provide reasonable assurance that the defect is limited to the 10H setting.  "Please contact Tim Franchuk at 513-528-7900 ext. 176 (office) or via email tfranchuk@curtisswright.com for any additional information."  Notified R3DO Giessner) and Part 21 group via email.|
Power Reactor|48174|WOLF CREEK|WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORP.|4|BURLINGTON|KS|COFFEY||Y|05000482|1|||[1] W-4-LP|JAMES M. KURAS|JOHN SHOEMAKER|8/10/2012 00:00:00|02:27|8/9/2012 00:00:00|18:45|CDT|9/19/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(v)(A)|POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD|50.72(b)(3)(v)(B)|POT RHR INOP|50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)|POT UNCNTRL RAD REL|50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)|ACCIDENT MITIGATION|MICHAEL VASQUEZ|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||CONTROL BUILDING A/C UNIT MAY NOT PERFORM DESIGN FUNCTION ON LOSS OF REDUNDANT A/C UNIT  "Affected equipment includes two 4160 volt safety buses, four 480 volt safety buses, four 120 volt AC safety trains, and four 125 volt DC safety trains.  "Following an accident Class 1E AC Unit SGK05B may not be able to perform is design safety function if a single failure causes a loss of redundant Class 1E AC unit SGK05A. This is due to continued latent heat input from A train Control Room Pressurization Fan which continues to operate. SGK05A and B provide room cooling for all safety related electrical busses.   "Action Taken: Established the following compensatory measure - During accident conditions with both trains of CRVIS [Control Room Ventilation Isolation System] actuated if at any time SGKO5A trips then following completion of immediate actions Control Room pressurization fan CGK04A will be secured to reduce latent heat removal requirements for SGK05B."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  * * * UPDATE FROM MOORE TO KLCO ON 8/11/2012 AT 1058 EDT * * *   "[On August 11, 2012 at 1845 CDT, the licensee identified] this condition applies to SGK05A.  Action taken: Established compensatory measures that during an accident condition with both trains of CRVIS actuated, if at any time SGK05A or SGK05B trips for any reason then, following completion of immediate actions, Control Room pressurization fan on the same train with the tripped A/C unit will be secured if the other pressurization fan is running."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified the R4DO (Drake).  * * * RETRACTION FROM MARCY BLOW TO DONG PARK ON 09/19/12 AT 1520 EDT * * *  "Further engineering evaluation determined that the Class 1E AC unit SGK05A and SGK05B have the ability to remove the heat addition of the Control Room Pressurization Fans.  As a result, the condition has been determined to not be reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)."   The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (Miller).|
Power Reactor|48212|DUANE ARNOLD|NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY|3|PALO|IA|LINN||Y|05000331|1|||[1] GE-4|ANDREW HESS|JOHN KNOKE|8/20/2012 00:00:00|19:11|8/20/2012 00:00:00|15:20|CDT|9/27/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)|POT UNCNTRL RAD REL|||||||ERIC DUNCAN|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||RWCU SYSTEM ISOLATION DIFFERENTIAL FLOW - HIGH FUNCTION INOPERABLE  "On 8-20-2012 during scheduled surveillance testing, the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation Differential Flow - High function was discovered to be inoperable at 1520 CDT. The high differential flow signal is provided to detect a break in the RWCU system when area or differential temperature would not provide detection (i.e. cold leg break). This instrumentation provides isolation signals to both inboard and outboard isolation valves and its loss is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C).  "The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."  * * * RETRACTION AT 1513 EDT ON 9/27/2012 FROM BOB MURRELL TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *  "Subsequent to the initial report, NextEra Energy Duane Arnold (NextEra) has determined that the RWCU Differential Flow High instrument loop was, at all times, capable of performing its TS function.  Specifically an engineering analysis of the impact of the instrument as-found and as-left values on the overall instrument loop setting was performed.  The analysis determined that the instrument in question was set at a value which would have isolated the RWCU Primary Containment Isolation Valves prior to reaching the Technical Specification (TS) allowable value and therefore the instrument loop remained capable at all times of performing its TS function.  "This event is not considered a Safety System Functional Failure or a Condition Prohibited by TS and is not reportable to the NRC as a Licensee Event Report (LER) per 10CFR50.73.   "The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."  Notified the R3DO (Lipa).|
Power Reactor|48215|MILLSTONE|DOMINION GENERATION|1|WATERFORD|CT|NEW LONDON||N|||2||[1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP|KENNETH HAJNAL|STEVE SANDIN|8/21/2012 00:00:00|07:50|8/21/2012 00:00:00|00:38|EDT|9/4/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)|ACCIDENT MITIGATION|||||||WILLIAM COOK|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0|Cold Shutdown|0|Cold Shutdown|N|N|0||0||BOTH EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS INOPERABLE  At 0038 EDT on 08/21/12, EDG "A" was declared inoperable after the Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESFAS) fuse failed .  EDG "B" had been inoperable for planned maintenance since 2223 EDT on 08/15/12.  With both EDGs inoperable, Unit 2 entered Tech Spec LCO 3.8.1.2 which requires suspension of all operations involving core alteration and positive reactivity additions.  At 0713 EDT on 08/21/12, the licensee declared EDG "B" Operable exiting the Tech Spec LCO.  The cause of the ESFAS fuse failure on EDG "A" is under investigation.  The licensee will notify state and local agencies and has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.  * * * RETRACTION FROM WAYNE WOOLERY TO DONG PARK AT 1027 EDT ON 9/4/12 * * *  "The purpose of this call is to retract the report made on 8/21/2012, Event Number 48215.  Upon further review, the fuse failure did not render the 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) inoperable in MODE 5.  If called upon, the safety functions would have been met.  The Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESFAS) was repaired prior to restart of the unit.  Notified R1DO (Conte).|
Agreement State|48226|ARIZONA RADIATION REGULATORY AGENCY|ASARCO, LLC|4|SAHUARITA|AZ||AZ 10-017|Y||||||AUBREY GODWIN|BILL HUFFMAN|8/24/2012 00:00:00|13:15|8/23/2012 00:00:00|09:00|MST|8/24/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||MICHAEL HAY|R4DO|FSME EVENT RESOURCE|EMAI|MATTHEW HAHN|ILTA|MEXICO|EMAI|||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING AMERICIUM-241 AND RADIUM-226 SOURCES  The following information was received from the Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency via e-mail:  "At approximately 9:00 AM August 23, 2012, the Agency was informed that the licensee lost a 3 millicurie Americium-241 source and a 0.9 microcurie Radium-226 source.    "The licensee was performing a clean-up at their facility between the dates of February 15, 2012 and June 11, 2012.  The licensee assumes during those dates is when the sources went missing.  However, the radiation safety officer for the license left on October 21, 2011 and the licensee cannot verify the location of the sources after that date.  "The licensee is currently interviewing employees involved in the cleanup to attempt to determine the location of the missing sources.  "The Arizona Regulatory Agency continues to investigate the event.  "The states of CA, NV, CO, UT, and NM and Mexico and U.S. NRC and FBI are being notified of this event."  AZ Report Number 12-014  THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL  Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to  http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf  This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint.  Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source|
Agreement State|48227|ARIZONA RADIATION REGULATORY AGENCY|TLS SYSTEMS, INC|4|TUCSON|AZ||AZ 10-086|Y||||||AUBREY GODWIN|BILL HUFFMAN|8/24/2012 00:00:00|13:17|8/23/2012 00:00:00|08:00|MST|8/24/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||MICHAEL HAY|R4DO|FSME EVENT RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED AND UNACCOUNTED FOR TRITIUM LIGHT SOURCES  The following information was received from the Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency via e-mail:  "At approximately 8:00 AM on August 23, 2012, the Agency was informed that the Licensee had one damaged light source, two light sources unaccounted for, and identification of an intake of radioactive material by two TLS Systems employees.    "The Licensee was taking back 148 drogue light assemblies for disposal/recycling.  After receiving the sources, the Licensee noticed minute fragments of a light source on a stainless steel bench top on which the sources were being examined.  The fragments were placed in empty liquid scintillation vials and an initial decontamination of the workbench was performed.  In addition, an inventory of the sources was performed and 297 intact sources were counted.  A total of 298 sources implied 149 drogue light assemblies, not 148 as indicated by the company who returned the sources.  Also, 150 radiation labels, stainless steel housings, and Lucite inserts were counted, which would indicate 300 light sources.  "Each drogue light assembly contained two mb-Microtec Model T-4376-1 tritium light sources.  The sources had an initial activity of 450 millicuries each.  The drogue lights are approximately 4 years old.    "Bioassays were given to individuals present in the lab and are currently awaiting results.  "The investigation into this event is ongoing.  The U.S. NRC and AZ governor's office have been notified."  AZ Report Number: 12-013   THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL  Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to  http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf  This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint.  Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source|
Agreement State|48229|PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION|UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA|1|PHILADELPHIA|PA||PA-0131|Y||||||JOSEPH MELNIC|BILL HUFFMAN|8/24/2012 00:00:00|15:25|8/23/2012 00:00:00||EDT|8/24/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||WILLIAM COOK|R1DO|FSME EVENT RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PATIENT UNDEREXPOSURE USING YTTRIUM-90 SIR-SPHERES TREATMENT  The following event was received from the Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection via facsimile:  "Event type: A medical event (ME) involving the administration of yttrium-90 SIR-Spheres which is reportable under 10 CFR 35.3045(a)(1)(i).  "Notifications: On August 24,2012, the Department's Southeast Regional Office received notification via a phone call and follow-up electronic correspondence about this ME.  "Event Description: The patient was being treated for disease of the liver and received 71% of the intended dose as identified by post treatment measurements. The treating physician, who also is the referring physician, notified the patient.  "Cause of the Event: Currently under investigation and unknown at this time.  "Actions: No harm to the patient is expected. The Department plans to do a reactive inspection"  PA Report Number: 120026  A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials.  It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.|
Agreement State|48235|OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION|TRINITY MEDICAL CENTER|3|STEUBENVILLE|OH||02120-42-0003|Y||||||MARK LIGHT|BILL HUFFMAN|8/27/2012 00:00:00|14:04|8/24/2012 00:00:00|16:50|EDT|8/27/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||JAMNES CAMERON|R3DO|FSME EVENT RESOURCE|E-MA|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - IODINE-125 SEALED SOURCE SEED FAILURE  The following information was supplied by the State of Ohio Department of Health via e-mail:  "RE: Leaking I-125 prostate sealed source   "Date: August 24, 2012  "Source Type: I-125 Prostate Seed, Model STM1251, distributed by Bard  "Activity: 0.334 mCi/seed on 8/24/12  "During a prostate seed implant a seed became jammed in the Mick gun. The gun was placed on sterilization table and examined. It was found that the seed was lodged in the Mick cartridge. The cartridge that held the seed was removed from the gun over a basin full of water and the end result was the seed broke into two pieces. One piece was recovered in the water and the second was still lodged in the end of the Mick cartridge. The area was surveyed for any additional contamination and none was found.  All personnel involved in the case were surveyed and no additional contamination was found.  "The broken I-125 seed was wiped and analyzed with the equipment below:  "Well Chamber- Captus 3000 s/n CNV-376 (located in Nuclear Medicine)  "Background- 339 cpm  "Wipe- 17.63 Mcpm = 21.24 Mdpm = 9.6 ÁCi  "The wipe test revealed that the removable contamination exceeds the 0.005 ÁCi.   "Bard, the company that supplied the seeds was contacted. The leaking I-125 seed and contaminated water was sealed and placed in the radiation waste storage area."|
Agreement State|48242|ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH|ANDERSON ENGINEERING|4|Little Rock|AR||ARK-0519-0312|Y||||||STEVE MACK|BILL HUFFMAN|8/28/2012 00:00:00|17:27|8/28/2012 00:00:00||CDT|8/28/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||DAVID PROULX|R4DO|FSME EVENT RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT -  DAMAGED TROXLER GAUGE  The following report was obtained from the Arkansas Radioactive Materials Program via e-mail:  "On August 27, 2012, the Radiation Control Program of Arkansas received notification from the Arkansas Department of Emergency Management that a tractor trailer had run over a nuclear gauge at the 192 mile marker on Interstate 40 near Hazen, Arkansas.  "The driver of a Motorists Assist Truck familiar with moisture density gauges identified the gauge parts on the side of the highway.  The gauge had been struck by a vehicle and broken up.  The driver reported the presence of the gauge parts to his construction company Project Manager who in turn notified Highway Police.  At 1914 the west bound lane of Interstate 40 was closed and remained closed until 2155.  The Highway Police asked for assistance from the Radiation Safety Officer of the Arkansas Highway and Transportation Department (AHTD) who drove to the scene.  "The 44 millicurie, Americium-241:Beryllium source was still contained within the original threaded cavity with the  Caution-Radioactive Material  label covering it.  The base of the gauge was broken to the point that only the threaded cavity and surrounding lead remained.  "The 9 millicurie, Cesium-137 source remained attached to the source rod and inside the original shielding.  The shielding was sheared off just above the tungsten sliding block (shutter).    "The AHTD Radiation Safety Officer, upon arrival, secured the Americium-241:Beryllium  source in a polyethylene box brought to the scene.  The Cesium-137 source was removed from the gauge shielding by the AHTD RSO and this source was placed in a lead shield brought to the scene.  "Two Health Physicists from the Arkansas Radiation Control Program were also dispatched and upon arrival took wipes of both sources.  These smears were field counted utilizing a Ludlum-2241 and Ludlum 44-9 pancake  probe.  No loose contamination was found.  "All potential serial numbers were recorded and the sources were transferred to the Radiation Control Program by the AHTD RSO.  The Health Physicists transported the sources to a secure storage area at the State Health Department.  "On Tuesday morning, Troxler identified the owner of the gauge by the serial number.  The gauge is a Model 3430, Serial Number 21024.  The gauge is owned by Anderson Engineering of Little Rock, Arkansas.  Arkansas Radioactive Material License Number ARK-0519-03121.  "It appears that an Anderson Engineering technician had been working at a construction job site in De Valls Bluff, Arkansas.  On Monday evening, he left this job site and returned to the Anderson Engineering Little Rock Office.  The gauge was left unsecured in the back of the pickup.  On Interstate 40 West at mile marker 192, the gauge fell out of the pickup bed, where it was struck by at least one vehicle.  Upon arrival at the Anderson Engineering offices, the technician removed the Troxler Gauge Storage Box from the pickup bed and noted that it was empty.  The technician believed that he had left the gauge at the job site.  On the morning of August 28, 2012, he returned to the jobsite to search for the gauge.  "On Tuesday, August 28, 2012, the Radiation Safety Officer was contacted and retrieved the two sources from the Arkansas Department of Health and secured these in the Anderson Engineering permanent storage area.  "The Arkansas Radiation Control Program has assigned Incident Number AR-2012-006 and is continuing to investigate."|
Agreement State|48243|MISSISSIPPI DIV OF RAD HEALTH|WORLD TESTING, INC.|4|MOSCOW|MS||MS-1035-01|Y||||||JAYSON MOAK|HOWIE CROUCH|8/28/2012 00:00:00|17:37|8/24/2012 00:00:00||CDT|9/10/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||DAVID PROULX|R4DO|FSME RESOURCE EMAIL||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||MISSISSIPPI AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA STUCK SOURCE  The following information was obtained from the state of Mississippi via email:  "DRH [Mississippi Department of Radiation Health] was notified on 8/27/2012 by Licensee's RSO regarding a stuck source incident that occurred on 8/24/2012 while performing industrial radiography at a temporary job site in Mississippi.    "The RSO claims the camera (880D) fell onto the guide tube during one of the shots and crimped the guide tube preventing the source from retracting back into the camera.  The RSO suspects the technician may have pulled on the cranks while trying to crank back in the source after the shot.  This could have then caused the camera to fall onto the guide tube and crimp it.  "The restricted area boundary was readjusted to one (1) mR/hr, maintained, and the RSO was called by the radiographers at the job site.  An ARSO and technician from the company who are trained in source retrieval arrived at the job site and retrieved the source.  The camera was wiped and leak tests were submitted for analysis.  "The Licensee's ARSO received 82 mR and the technician received 8 mR/hr from actions taken during the source retrieval."  MS Report Number: MS 120003  * * * UPDATE AT 1558 EDT ON 09/10/12 FROM JAYSON MOAK TO S. SANDIN * * *  The following update was received from the State of Mississippi via email:  "Test for leakage and/or contamination received from the Licensee was less than .005 microCuries."  Notified R4DO (Lantz) and FSME via email.|
Agreement State|48244|MISSISSIPPI DIV OF RAD HEALTH|WORLD TESTING, INC.|4|MACON|MS||MS-1035-01|Y||||||JAYSON MOAK|HOWIE CROUCH|8/28/2012 00:00:00|18:11|8/26/2012 00:00:00||CDT|8/28/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||DAVID PROULX|R4DO|FSME RESOURCE EMAIL||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||MISSISSIPPI AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY TRUCK INVOLVED IN AN ACCIDENT  The following information was obtained from the state of Mississippi via email:  "DRH [Mississippi Division of Radiation Health] was notified 8/26/2012 by MEMA, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, regarding an overturned radiography truck that occurred on Hwy 45 south of Macon, Mississippi.  Two Licensee personnel were involved in the wreck with minimal injuries.  The camera remained secured in the overpack but separated from the destroyed dark room. Surveys were performed of the overpack and camera by the driver after the wreck.  The driver and MS Highway State Patrol Officer waited with the overpack and camera until DRH and the Licensee's ARSO arrived on site to take possession of the camera."  MS Report Number: MS 120004|
Power Reactor|48246|DIABLO CANYON|PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO.|4|AVILA BEACH|CA|SAN LUIS OBISPO||Y|05000275|1|2||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|DAN STERMER|JOHN KNOKE|8/29/2012 00:00:00|00:16|8/28/2012 00:00:00|17:00|PDT|9/8/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)|UNANALYZED CONDITION|50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)|ACCIDENT MITIGATION|||||DAVID PROULX|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||MITIGATING ACTIONS IMPLEMENTED FOR INOPERABLE CONTROL ROOM ENVELOPE  "On August 28, 2012, 17:00 PDT,  Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) identified additional release pathways that could affect the control room (CR) operator dose following a Large-Break Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LBLOCA).  Consequently, PG&E declared the control room envelope (CRE) inoperable and is establishing mitigative actions in accordance with TS 3.7.10, Action B.1, 'Initiate action to implement mitigating actions' immediately, and Action B.2, 'Verify mitigating actions ensure CRE occupant exposures to radiological hazards will not exceed limits, and CRE occupants are protected from smoke and chemical hazards' within 24 hours.  "PG&E is establishing mitigative actions in accordance with TS 3.7.10 and RG 1.196. These mitigative actions are for operations control room personnel to administer potassium iodide and don self-contained breathing apparatus equipment in a timely fashion should a LBLOCA occur. They will be communicated and controlled by a standing order to the control room staff.  "PG&E previously established controls on other release pathways that offset the potential increases to the maximum predicted offsite dose due to the new release pathways.  No increase in maximum predicted offsite dose is expected from the new release pathways.    "Diablo Canyon (DCPP) is making this 8-hour, non-emergency notification under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).  "Plant personnel notified the NRC Resident Inspector."   * * * UPDATE AT 1600 EDT ON 9/8/12 FROM GLEN GOELZER TO PETE SNYDER * * *   "PG&E is retracting EN 48246, based on the results from a new dose analysis coupled with compensatory measures implemented to ensure that the analysis input parameters and assumption will not be inadvertently exceeded.  The analysis concluded that the CRE was operable and that CR doses remained below regulatory limits.   "Plant personnel notified the NRC resident inspector."  Notified R4DO (Gaddy).|
Agreement State|48248|ARIZONA RADIATION REGULATORY AGENCY|LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY|4|LOS ALAMOS|NM|||Y||||||AUBREY GODWIN|HOWIE CROUCH|8/29/2012 00:00:00|13:04|8/29/2012 00:00:00||MDT|8/29/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||DAVID PROULX|R4DO|FSME RESOURCE EMAIL||MICHELE BURGESS|FSME|||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||ARIZONA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - ARIZONA WORKER CONTAMINATED WHILE WORKING AT LOS ALAMOS IN NEW MEXICO The following information was obtained from the state of Arizona via email:  "On Saturday, August 25, 2012, the Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency was informed by Tempe Fire Department that they responded to a 911 call for assistance from a private citizen who indicated that he may have received a possible radiation exposure/contamination while working at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico. The Tempe Fire Department conducted a radiation survey and found that the shoes were the source of the radioactive contamination.    "At 2315 hours MDT, on August 25, 2012, DOE Region 4 sent a radiological response team to Tempe, AZ to investigate and perform a radiological survey of the item/s reported with the radiation contamination.  A radiation survey, using a Ludlum survey meter with a beta detector, provided a positive result for contamination on a few articles, bottom of both shoes (350 cpm above background) and a pair of underwear (measured 850 cpm above background).    "On Tuesday August 28, 2012, the following occurred:  -The source of the contamination as reported by DOE RAP Teams Region 4 is Technetium-99. (Half-Life is 211,000 years and is a Beta emitter) -It is reported that 13 to 16 individuals may be contaminated with the Tc99. -It is reported that several automobiles and other personal articles have been located in New Mexico and were moved to an isolated area. -ARRA laboratory is now in possession/control of the clothing and will conduct a laboratory analysis to determine and confirm the source of the radioactive material. -ARRA reported levels of Beta Radiation several times above background on both the shoes and underwear. -DOE Los Alamos National Laboratory Waste Management team has recovered the contaminated items from ARRA with a chain of custody for the record.   "The Los Alamos National Laboratory has released the following information regarding this event:  " 'Los Alamos National Laboratory is investigating the inadvertent spread of some Technetium-99 by employees and contractors at the Lujan Neutron Scattering Center at LANSCE [Los Alamos Neutron Science Center].  It's been determined that about a dozen people were exposed, and some tracked small amounts of Technetium 99 off-site. The contamination poses no danger to the public.    " 'The Laboratory and Department of Energy RAP teams (Radiological Assistance Program) have been working to survey, assess, and where needed, decontaminate all affected people and property.  The teams will continue to address all possible escape paths to be certain that all off-site contamination has been appropriately characterized and remediated.  So far, based on multiple direct measurements, no exposures to Lab workers or the public pose a health risk.'"  "The Agency [ Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency] continues to investigate.  "The Governor's Office, state of New Mexico and the U.S. NRC are being notified of this event."|
Agreement State|48249|VIRGINIA RAD MATERIALS PROGRAM|HURT & PROFFITT|1|RUSTBURG|VA|CAMPBELL|680-346-1|Y||||||CHARLES COLEMAN|HOWIE CROUCH|8/29/2012 00:00:00|14:30|8/29/2012 00:00:00|10:30|EDT|8/29/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||JOHN ROGGE|R1DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST THEN RECOVERED TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE  The following information was obtained from the Commonwealth of Virginia via facsimile:  "On August 29, 2012 at 10:30 a.m., the licensee reported that a Troxler Model 3440 portable density gauge was missing. The gauge, in its transport case, apparently fell from the licensee's truck during transport. The licensee notified the local law enforcement and initiated a search for the gauge. At 11:45 a.m., the licensee reported that the gauge had been found by a local resident who called the licensee. The RSO verified that neither the gauge nor the transport case was damaged. The Virginia Radioactive Material Program is investigating the cause of the incident."  Virginia Event Number: VA-12-05|
Agreement State|48254|TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH|HENLEY-JOHNSTON & ASSOCIATES, INC.|4|DALLAS|TX||L00286|Y||||||KAREN BLANCHARD|STEVE SANDIN|8/30/2012 00:00:00|13:25|8/30/2012 00:00:00|09:45|CDT|8/30/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||DAVID PROULX|R4DO|FSME RESOURCE|EMAI|ILTAB via email||MEXICO via fax||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE  The following information was received from the State of Texas via email:  "On August 30, 2012, the licensee notified the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] that at approximately 0945 hrs CDT a Troxler model 3430 moisture/density gauge, containing a 40 millicurie Americium-241/Beryllium source and an 8 millicurie Cesium-137 source, had been stolen out of the back of one of its pickup trucks [a white Chevrolet C-1500] outside a hotel in Lubbock, Texas.  The licensee's employee had gone inside to check out of the hotel and when he came back outside he found both chains securing the gauge had been cut and the gauge was gone.  The local police department was notified by the employee. The licensee will notify the manufacturer and other gauge service companies.  The Agency will notify the Texas Association of Pawn Brokers.  An investigation into this event is ongoing and information will be updated as it is received per SA-300 [Reporting Material Events].  "Gauge Information: Troxler Model 3430, Serial # 25088 "Sources: Americium-241/Beryllium -- 40 millicuries -- Serial #75-7262, Cesium-137 -- 8 millicuries -- 47-21295"  Texas Incident #:  I-8981  THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL  Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to  http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf|
Agreement State|48256|TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH|MDI OF ABILENE|4|ABILENE|TX||L06133|Y||||||CHRIS MOORE|STEVE SANDIN|8/30/2012 00:00:00|14:53|8/30/2012 00:00:00||CDT|8/30/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||DAVID PROULX|R4DO|FSME RESOURCE|EMAI|ILTAB via email||MEXICO via fax||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - IMPROPER SALE AND TRANSFER OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCE  The following information was received from the State of Texas via email:  "On August 30, 2012, a company contracted by a licensee to conduct a closeout of an imaging facility notified the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] that the licensee had sold an ADAC Gamma/PET Camera early in 2012 without proper shipping and transfer paperwork and with a 20 millicurie Cesium-137 seal source located inside the PET scanner.  The PET scanner with internal source was brokered and sold to a company overseas. Details of the date of sale, broker company, and who purchased the device are unknown.  An investigation into this event is ongoing and information will be updated as it is received per SA 300 [Reporting Material Events].   "The State of Texas event number for this event is I - 8982.   "Equipment: ADAC Gamma/PET Camera "Source: Cesium-137 -- 20 millicuries -- CZ882"  THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL  Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to  http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf  This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint.  Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source.|
Non-Agreement State|48259|ACUREN INSPECTION|ACUREN INSPECTION|1|CHARLESTON|WV||42-27593-01|N||||||CHRIS DIXON|JOHN KNOKE|8/31/2012 00:00:00|09:54|4/28/2012 00:00:00|09:45|EDT|8/31/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|30.50(b)(2)|SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE|||||||JOHN ROGGE|R1DO|FSME RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||IR-192 SOURCE DISCONNECTED FROM RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA  At 0945 hours on 4-28-2012, the radiographer at the jobsite in Willeysville, WV reported to his Division Manager that the source in a Sentinel 880 Delta camera, S/N D4132, was disconnected and could not be retracted into the shielded position following the first exposure.  The Division Manager contacted the Acuren Cincinnati RSO for assistance.  Arrangements were made for both the Division Manager and Cincinnati RSO who had extensive experience in source retrieval to respond to the jobsite.  The source was successfully retrieved by 1805 hours the same day.    The camera, crank, guide tube, and quick connect were transported to the Ona lab to be shipped to QSA for investigation on Monday morning, 4-30-2012.  There were no personnel overexposures associated with this incident.  Corrective actions included: All radiographic personnel were immediately notified of the source disconnect incident to raise awareness of equipment checks and no-go-gage test. Acuren Division Manager and RSO conducted the misconnect test [Acuren terminology] on all radiographic equipment cranks and cameras as of 5-4-12.|
Agreement State|48260|VIRGINIA RAD MATERIALS PROGRAM|UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIIA|1|CHARLOTTESVILLE|VA||540-248-1|Y||||||CHARLES COLEMAN|STEVE SANDIN|8/31/2012 00:00:00|15:19|8/31/2012 00:00:00||EDT|8/31/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||JOHN ROGGE|R1DO|FSME EVENT RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PATIENT RECEIVED LESS THAN THE PRESCRIBED FRACTIONAL DOSE  The following information was received from the Commonwealth of Virginia via email:  "On August 31, 2012, the licensee reported that a wire drift error occurred during a high dose rate afterloader procedure on August 31. The patient undergoing a tandem and ovoid treatment was scheduled to receive a fraction dose of 6 Gray. Because of the wire drift error the fraction was terminated prior to completion and the patient received only 0.73 Gray. The licensee has informed the patient and the referring physician. The cause of the error and the patient's revised treatment plan are being reviewed by the licensee. The Virginia Radioactive Material Program will review the circumstances of the event."  A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials.  It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.|
Agreement State|48261|NV DIV OF RAD HEALTH|UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA|4|LAS VEGAS|NV||03-13-0305-01|Y||||||SNEHA RAVIKUMAR|STEVE SANDIN|8/31/2012 00:00:00|15:48|10/1/2011 00:00:00||PDT|8/31/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||DAVID PROULX|R4DO|FSME EVENT RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUDENT RECEIVED POTENTIAL INHALATION OVEREXPOSURE  The following information was received from the State of Nevada via email:  "A graduate student inhaled a mixture of U-233 and U-238 while working in the lab grinding a compound of Uranium Octoxide. [The graduate student] used a glove box instead of the hood with the HEPA filter, contrary to UNLV [University of Nevada Las Vegas] approved procedure.   "This happened twice and could have been between October 1, 2011 and April 1, 2012.   "The first bioassay, based on an inhalation date of October 1, 2011, showed 17.72 rem total. When the inhalation date was assumed to be April 1, 2012, the result was 5.52 rem.   "[U-233]*1.6 = [U-238] contribution.   "The student will be getting a third bioassay on September 5, 2012 at the Lawrence Livermore National Lab (LLNL). This will involve a low-energy chest count to detect Th-234 and an organ count, looking at the kidneys for Uranium.   "The student has been restricted from all lab work since April.   "The bioassay was done at Test America."|
Power Reactor|48264|OCONEE|DUKE ENERGY NUCLEAR LLC|2|SENECA|SC|OCONEE||Y||||3|[1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP|JEFF HRYNDA|DONG HWA PARK|9/2/2012 00:00:00|06:22|9/1/2012 00:00:00|22:30|EDT|9/2/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||STEVEN VIAS|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|RADIATION MONITOR DECLARED INOPERABLE  "This is a non-emergency report. No actual event has occurred.  "At 2230 hours EDT, on September 01, 2012, Oconee Nuclear Station Operations determined that the radiation monitor for Low Gas Unit Vent monitoring failed its check source and was declared inoperable. This monitor is used for determination of Emergency Action Levels (EALs) in ALL Modes. Specifically, the criterion states that an Unusual Event should be declared if this radiation monitoring reading reaches 9.35E5 for greater than 60 minutes. This condition was discovered during weekly radiation monitor setpoint determinations.   "There is no adverse impact on nuclear safety. A redundant method for sampling and determination of activity levels has been implemented per SLC 16.11.3. The same EAL criterion has a redundant determination of Unusual Event classification based on these activity levels.  "This report is submitted based upon a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).  "The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."|
Power Reactor|48265|OCONEE|DUKE ENERGY NUCLEAR LLC|2|SENECA|SC|OCONEE||Y|05000269|1|2|3|[1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP|JEFF HRYNDA|DONG HWA PARK|9/2/2012 00:00:00|08:35|9/2/2012 00:00:00|12:00|EDT|9/2/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||STEVEN VIAS|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|PLANNED OUTAGE OF EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY  "As part of preparation for the upcoming Democratic National Convention (DNC), contingencies are in place associated with the common Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) for Catawba, McGuire, and Oconee Nuclear Stations. The common EOF is located in Charlotte, NC. Because of the potential for event security to delay staffing of the facility within the prescribed time frame, Duke Energy is implementing its business continuity plan for the EOF during the period from 12:00 PM (noon) on September 2nd until 24:00 (midnight) on September 6th.  "If a declared emergency were to occur at Oconee Nuclear Station, the EOF would be set up in the Catawba Alternate Technical Support Center (TSC) location. This facility is used as a backup location for the Catawba TSC as specified in station procedures.  "This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72, criterion (b)(3)(xiii), and in accordance with NUREG-1022, Revision 2, as a condition that may impair the functionality of an Emergency Response Facility."  The licensee notified the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, Pickens County, and Oconee County.  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48266|MCGUIRE|DUKE POWER|2|CORNELIUS|NC|MECKLENBURG||Y|05000369|1|2||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|JOSH STROUPE|DONG HWA PARK|9/2/2012 00:00:00|08:52|9/2/2012 00:00:00|12:00|EDT|9/2/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||STEVEN VIAS|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||PLANNED OUTAGE OF EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY  "As part of preparation for the upcoming Democratic National Convention (DNC), contingencies are in place associated with the common Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) for Catawba, McGuire, and Oconee Nuclear Stations. The common EOF is located in Charlotte, NC. Because of the potential for event security to delay staffing of the facility within the prescribed time frame, Duke Energy is implementing its business continuity plan for the EOF during the period from 12:00 PM (noon) on September 2nd until 24:00 (midnight) on September 6th.  "If a declared emergency were to occur at McGuire Nuclear Station, the EOF would be set up in the Catawba Alternate Technical Support Center (TSC) location. This facility is used as a backup location for the Catawba TSC as specified in station procedures.  "This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72, criterion (b)(3)(xiii), and in accordance with NUREG-1022, Revision 2, as a condition that may impair the functionality of an Emergency Response Facility."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48267|CATAWBA|DUKE ENERGY NUCLEAR LLC|2|YORK|SC|YORK||Y|05000413|1|2||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|AARON MICHALSKI|DONG HWA PARK|9/2/2012 00:00:00|09:21|9/2/2012 00:00:00|12:00|EDT|9/2/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||STEVEN VIAS|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||PLANNED OUTAGE OF EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY  "As part of preparation for the upcoming Democratic National Convention (DNC), contingencies are in place associated with the common Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) for Catawba, McGuire, and Oconee Nuclear Stations. The common EOF is located in Charlotte, NC. Because of the potential for event security to delay staffing of the facility within the prescribed time frame, Duke Energy is implementing its business continuity plan for the EOF during the period from 12:00 PM (noon) on September 2nd until 24:00 (midnight) on September 6th.  "If a declared emergency were to occur at Catawba Nuclear Station, the EOF would be set up in the McGuire Alternate Technical Support Center (TSC) location. This facility is used as a backup location for the McGuire TSC as specified in station procedures.  "This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72, criterion (b)(3)(xiii), and in accordance with NUREG-1022, Revision 2, as a condition that may impair the functionality of an Emergency Response Facility."  The licensee will notify the State of North Carolina, State of South Carolina, York County, Gaston County, and Mecklenburg County. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48268|CALLAWAY|AMEREN UE|4|FULTON|MO|CALLAWAY||N|05000483|1|||[1] W-4-LP|DAVID BONVILLIAN|DONALD NORWOOD|9/2/2012 00:00:00|14:45|9/2/2012 00:00:00|10:31|CDT|9/2/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(xi)|OFFSITE NOTIFICATION|||||||RAY AZUA|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO NON-RADIOLOGICAL LEAKAGE FROM THE NEUTRALIZATION TANK  "In response to identification of a non-radiological leak from the Neutralization Tank at Callaway Plant today (9/2/2012), notification was made to the EPA National Spill Response Center at 1031 CDT and to the Missouri Department of Natural Resources at 1043 CDT.  The leak was initially identified at 0926 CDT.  From testing of a sample taken from the tank, the pH of the tank fluid was reported to be 1.9.  Initially, the leak was to the ground and into a ditch that is part of a flow path that ultimately leads off site via a storm sewer.  However, there is no indication of any of the leakage flowing beyond the site boundary via that pathway since action was promptly taken to divert the leakage to the sump area of the equalization tank (on site).  The leakage will thus be collected there until it terminates.  At 0926 CDT, the leakage rate was estimated to be approximately 20 gpm; at 1025 CDT the leakage was estimated to be approximately 50 gpm.  The leak is at the bottom of the Neutralization Tank, and thus will terminate when the tank is emptied.  At 1218 CDT, the fluid level in the Neutralization Tank was at 17%.  The initial quantity of fluid in the tank (at the onset of the leak) was approximately 110000 gallons.  "This spill was reported to offsite organizations, as noted.  This event is reportable to the NRC pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi).  "The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of the event and this ENS notification."  17% tank fluid level corresponds to approximately 25000 gallons.|
Power Reactor|48269|CLINTON|AMERGEN ENERGY COMPANY|3|CLINTON|IL|DEWITT||Y|05000461|1|||[1] GE-6|DANIEL HUNT|DONG HWA PARK|9/3/2012 00:00:00|05:17|9/2/2012 00:00:00|22:04|CDT|9/3/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(v)(B)|POT RHR INOP|50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)|POT UNCNTRL RAD REL|||||JAMNES CAMERON|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|97|Power Operation|97|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||TRANSFER OF EMERGENCY RESERVE AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER ISOLATING FUEL POOL COOLING AND CLEANUP SYSTEM, AND FUEL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM  "At 22:04 CDT on 9/02/2012, the Emergency Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (ERAT) transferred unexpectedly to the Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (RAT). During this transfer, the Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup (FC) system pump 'A' tripped and the Fuel Building Ventilation (VF) system isolated.  Upper containment pool level dropped below the minimum required level per Technical Specifications (TS) 3.6.2.4 and Secondary Containment differential pressure increased above 0.25 inches vacuum per TS 3.6.4.1.  Upper Containment Pool level was restored above the minimum level at 01:27 CDT on 9/3/2012 within the 4 hour completion time.  The Upper Containment Pool is a part of the suppression pool makeup system used to ensure the Primary Containment function.  Secondary Containment differential pressure was restored at 22:19 on 9/2/2012 when the Standby Gas Treatment System was started.  Maintaining secondary containment differential pressure helps to control the release of radioactive material.    "This event is being reported as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C). The station is currently in a 72-hour action to restore the ERAT to an operable status per TS LCO 3.8.1 Required Action A.2. Plant conditions are stable and actions are underway to repair the ERAT.    "The NRC Resident [Inspector] has been notified."|
Power Reactor|48270|FITZPATRICK|ENTERGY NUCLEAR|1|LYCOMING|NY|OSWEGO||Y|05000333|1|||[1] GE-4|JOHN WALKOWIAK|DONG HWA PARK|9/3/2012 00:00:00|07:40|9/3/2012 00:00:00|02:25|EDT|9/4/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)|ACCIDENT MITIGATION|||||||JOHN ROGGE|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|93|Power Operation|93|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||HPCI INOPERABLE DUE TO ERRONEOUS INDICATION ON FLOW INDICATING CONTROLLER  "At 0225 EDT on September 3, 2012, with the James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF) operating at 93% reactor power, High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) was declared inoperable due to abnormal indication on the HPCI Flow Indicating Controller (FIC). The FIC was found to be indicating a HPCI System flow rate of 700 gpm while the system was in the standby lineup. Under these conditions, the capability of the system to achieve the required flow rate cannot be assured.   "This failure meets NRC 8 hour reporting criterion 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) and other Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) remain operable.  "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."  * * * UPDATE AT 1418 EDT ON 9/4/12 FROM DeFILLIPPO TO HUFFMAN * * *  "The improper HPCI flow indication was determined to be due to minor air intrusion following restoration of the system after maintenance.  The flow transmitter for the HPCI system was repeatedly vented with no air observed.  The HPCI system has been restored to a normal standby line-up and is OPERABLE as of 9/4/2012 at 1415 EDT."  The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.  R1DO (Conte) notified.|
Agreement State|48271|FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL|REYNOLDS, SMITH, AND HILLS C.S.|1|ORLANDO|FL||2732-2|Y||||||STEVE L. FURNACE|DONG HWA PARK|9/4/2012 00:00:00|09:49|9/1/2012 00:00:00||EDT|9/4/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||RICHARD CONTE|R1DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|ILTAB|EMAI|||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE  The following information was received from the State of Florida via email:  The State of Florida was notified by the licensee that one of their Troxler moisture density gauges has been stolen. The theft is believed to have occurred on the night of September 1st, 2012. The gauge was properly stored in a secure storage shed when the theft occurred. The licensee has notified the manufacturer and local law enforcement and will be offering a reward for its recovery. The State of Florida will investigate.  Gauge Information: Troxler Model 3440, Serial # 14471 Sources: Americium-241/Beryllium, 40 millicuries  Cesium-137, 8 millicuries   Florida Incident #:  FL12-065  THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL  Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to  http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf  This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint.  Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source|
Non-Agreement State|48272|PPG INDUSTRIES INC.|PPG INDUSTRIES INC.|1|NEW MARTINSVILLE|WV||GL|N||||||ERIKA BALDAUFF|STEVE SANDIN|9/4/2012 00:00:00|14:10|9/1/2012 00:00:00|18:45|EDT|9/5/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|30.50(b)(4)|FIRE/EXPLOSION|||||||RICHARD CONTE|R1DO|FSME EVENT RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||TWO TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS DESTROYED IN WAREHOUSE FIRE  "At approximately 6:45 pm on 9-1-12, there was a fire in two warehouses at the PPG Industries, Inc. Natrium Plant located in New Martinsville, WV.  The warehouses are storage areas for product, where personnel are usually not stationed.  The facility does have a specific license from the NRC.  However, the mentioned signs are not covered under the license.  They are generally licensed.    "Two tritium exit signs, one in each warehouse, were destroyed in the fire.  The signs were:   - manufactured by Self-Powered Lighting, LTD.  - Model No. CPI-700  - Activity on the manufacture date of 2-1983 was 12.5 Curies  - Decay corrected activity on 9-1-2012 was calculated to be 2.4 Curies   The area around the former location of the signs is barricaded off.  This afternoon an outside contractor performed testing to determine if there is tritium contamination.  The area will remain barricaded off until results are received.     "A follow-up report will be submitted within 30 days."  * * * UPDATE AT 1210 EDT ON 9/5/12 FROM BALDAUFF TO HUFFMAN * * *  Sampling has been completed and analyzed to determine if any contamination was present from the destroyed tritium exit signs.  The results verify that there is no contamination present.  R1DO (Conte) notified.  FSME Events Resource e-mailed.|
Agreement State|48273|OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION|ACUREN INSPECTION, INC|3|DAYTON|OH||03320990006|Y||||||STEPHEN JAMES|BILL HUFFMAN|9/4/2012 00:00:00|15:01|7/24/2012 00:00:00||EDT|9/4/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||KENNETH RIEMER|R3DO|FSME EVENT RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT -  RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE DISCONNECT  The following information was provided by the Ohio Bureau of Radiation Protection via e-mail:  "Licensee experienced a source disconnect with an industrial radiography camera. The radiographers were working at a temporary job site and attempted to retrieve source after completing the first exposure of the workday. Source would not retrieve and a source disconnect was  suspected, with the source remaining at the exposure end of the guide tube. The source position was verified by on-site radiation surveys. The guide tube (containing the source at the far end) was disconnected from the camera and moved to an isolated location at the client site. The radiographers established appropriate barriers and entry controls for the temporary area and maintained constant surveillance until licensee's source retrieval personnel arrived. Retrieval personnel were able to reconnect the source using a special tool and the source was able to be retracted back into the camera. The camera and all associated equipment were sent to the manufacturer for evaluation. Cause of the problem was determined to be a worn connecting collar around the plug assembly and failure to follow a source connect procedure recommended by the manufacturer. Ohio Bureau of Radiation Protection will visit site and conduct an investigation.  "The licensee's report was received at Ohio Bureau of Radiation Protection today, 9/4/12, at approximately 1240 EDT.   "Based on manufacturer's evaluation of the equipment used, Ohio Bureau of Radiation Protection will conduct an investigation of licensee's maintenance program and to determine reasons for failure by licensee to make initial notification and follow-up written report in a timely manner."  No significant personnel exposure was received during retrieval procedures.    Ohio Report OH 120003|
Power Reactor|48274|HOPE CREEK|PSEG NUCLEAR LLC|1|HANCOCKS BRIDGE|NJ|SALEM||N|05000354|1|||[1] GE-4|JAMES PRIEST|BILL HUFFMAN|9/4/2012 00:00:00|17:10|9/4/2012 00:00:00||EDT|9/4/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)|ACCIDENT MITIGATION|||||||RICHARD CONTE|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION DECLARED INOPERABLE  "At 1320 EDT, on September 4, 2012, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable during performance of HC.OP-IS.BJ-0001, HPCI Main and Booster Pump Set - 0P204 and 0P217 - In Service Test (IST). The HPCI system was being started for the quarterly IST when 1-FD-HV-F001, HPCI Turbine Steam Supply Valve, failed to open per step 5.21.7 of the test. The control room operators returned the system to a standby line up. The Outage Control Center was staffed to investigate the cause of the valve misoperation.  "Loss of the HPCI system is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as loss of a single train safety system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The 'A' Residual Heat Removal System was aligned for Suppression Pool Cooling to support the HPCI IST surveillance and was inoperable for Low Pressure Coolant Injection function until realigned to a standby lineup at 1340 EDT.  No additional Emergency Core Cooling Systems or safety-related equipment was inoperable during this time period."  The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.  Lower Alloways Creek Township will be notified.|
Agreement State|48275|TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH|WEATHERFORD ARTIFICIAL LIFT SYSTEM|4|HOUSTON|TX||G02201|Y||||||ART TUCKER|BILL HUFFMAN|9/4/2012 00:00:00|17:55|9/1/2012 00:00:00||CDT|9/4/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||VINCENT GADDY|R4DO|FSME EVENT RESOUCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT -  DAMAGED PROCESS GAUGE SHUTTER  The Texas Department of State Health Services Radiation Branch provided the following report via e-mail:  "On September 4, 2012, the Agency [Texas Department of Health] was notified by the licensee that the shutter on an Ohmart / Vega nuclear gauge model SHLD-1 containing a 20 millicurie cesium - 137 source had been damaged and no longer functioned as designed.  The licensee stated that the gauge is mounted on the side of a truck trailer.  The licensee stated that the gauge operator had tried to close the gauge shutter and could not get the shutter to move.  The operator obtained a hammer and struck the shutter mechanism.  The four bolts holding the shutter mechanism in place snapped and the shutter fell off the gauge.  The operator placed the shutter back on the gauge to provide shielding, but the shutter is not attached to the gauge housing.  The gauge is at the licensee's facility isolated inside of a locked fence.  A barrier has been placed around the gauge to prevent inadvertent entry to the area around the gauge.  The licensee has contacted the manufacturer to repair the gauge.  The licensee stated that the gauge does not present an exposure hazard to any individual.   Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA 300: 'Reporting Material Events'."  Texas Incident # I-8984|
Power Reactor|48276|MCGUIRE|DUKE POWER|2|CORNELIUS|NC|MECKLENBURG||Y|05000369|1|2||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|MICHAEL RICHARDSON|HOWIE CROUCH|9/5/2012 00:00:00|10:54|9/5/2012 00:00:00|10:40|EDT|9/5/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||MARK LESSER|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER OUT OF SERVICE DUE TO PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE ON HVAC SYSTEM  "This [report] is being issued in advance of a planned activity.  Today, 9/5/2012, the (TSC) Technical Support Center Emergency Ventilation System will be removed from service to support preventative maintenance activities.  The Emergency Ventilation System will not be available and cannot be restored within the time period (75 minutes) required to staff and activate the Emergency Response Organization (ERO). This work is scheduled to complete today.  "If an emergency is declared and the TSC ERO activation is required, the TSC will be staffed and activated unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological conditions, or other conditions.  If relocation of the TSC staff becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the staff to an alternate TSC location.  "The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."|
Power Reactor|48277|SOUTH TEXAS|STP NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY|4|WADSWORTH|TX|MATAGORDA||Y|||2||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|ROBERT BRINKLEY|PETE SNYDER|9/5/2012 00:00:00|16:35|8/22/2012 00:00:00|12:36|CDT|9/20/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)|UNANALYZED CONDITION|50.72(b)(3)(v)(A)|POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD|50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)|ACCIDENT MITIGATION|||VINCENT GADDY|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||MISSING FLOOD SEAL  "During flooding walkdowns being performed on August 22, 2012, with the unit at 100 percent power, South Texas Project Unit 2 discovered the potential for water intrusion into the 10' Elevation Electrical Auxiliary Building (EAB) via a 2-inch underground conduit that was found to be missing its flood seal. It has been determined that the missing flood seal compromised the external flood design controls for the EAB. If flooding of the 10 [foot] EAB were to occur as a result of the missing flood seal, the operability of the Train A Engineered Safety Features (ESF) switchgear and the ESF Sequencers for all three Standby Diesel Generators could have been affected. Additionally, the Qualified Display Parameter System process cabinets (which control Auxiliary Feedwater flow and Steam Generator PORVs) and the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel are also located on the 10' Elevation.  "Repairs have been made and the 2-inch conduit is sealed.  "The event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for Unit 2 being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety, and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.  "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."  * * * RETRACTION FROM JAMES MORRIS TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1658 EDT ON 09/20/12 * * *  "The purpose of this call is to retract the notification made on 09/05/2012, Event Number 48277. Further analysis indicates that water intrusion resulting from the missing 2-inch conduit seal would not have been sufficient to affect the operability of the equipment located on the 10-foot elevation of the Unit 2 Electrical Auxiliary Building. It has been determined that the maximum water depth would not have exceeded 2 inches in depth and all safety related equipment on the 10-foot elevation is greater than 2 inches above the floor, therefore there would be no impact to any safety-related equipment. Accordingly, this event notification is being retracted."  The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified the R4DO (Geoffrey Miller).|
Power Reactor|48278|BYRON|EXELON NUCLEAR CO.|3|BYRON|IL|OGLE||Y|05000454|1|2||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|MIKE LINDEMANN|BILL HUFFMAN|9/5/2012 00:00:00|16:32|9/5/2012 00:00:00|12:25|CDT|9/5/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(xi)|OFFSITE NOTIFICATION|||||||KENNETH RIEMER|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|91|Power Operation|91|Power Operation|N|Y|95|Power Operation|95|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||OFFSITE NOTIFICATION OF SODIUM HYPOCHLORITE SPILL  "At 1225 on 9/5/12, the Main Control Room received a report of a Sodium Hypochlorite spill estimated at 100 gallons at the Byron Circulating Water Pump House.  The spill was caused by a leak from the hose of the Chemical Delivery truck.  "A spill of greater than 80 gallons of Sodium Hypochlorite is considered a reportable quantity.  "The spill was reported to the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA) in accordance with 29 IAC 430.30 and 35 IAC 750.304, and the National Response Center in accordance with 40 CFR 302.6.  "Notification to IEMA was performed at 1235 on 9/5/12, and notification to the National Response Center was performed at 1245 on 9/5/12.  "The notifications to other government agencies is reportable to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi)."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48279|MILLSTONE|DOMINION GENERATION|1|WATERFORD|CT|NEW LONDON||N|||2||[1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP|DAVE BURLEY|BILL HUFFMAN|9/5/2012 00:00:00|17:10|9/5/2012 00:00:00|13:25|EDT|9/5/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(xi)|OFFSITE NOTIFICATION|||||||RICHARD CONTE|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||OFFSITE NOTIFICATION OF SMALL OIL SPILL  A small amount of oil spilled from a forklift hydraulic oil connection.  The amount was estimated at about 1 quart.  The release has been terminated.  However, the oil was washed into the navigable waterway at the site by heavy rains and as indicated by an oil sheen that was observed.  Oil booms have been distributed around the sheen to contain the oil and prevent its spread to the environment.  The licensee reported this spill to the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection and the Waterford Dispatch.  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Agreement State|48280|MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM|BERKSHIRE MEDICAL CENTER|1|PITTSFIELD|MA||SN-1439|Y||||||MICHAEL P WHALEN|JOHN SHOEMAKER|9/6/2012 00:00:00|11:17|5/24/2012 00:00:00||EDT|9/6/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||RICHARD CONTE|R1DO|FSME RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RECOVERED PACEMAKER  "A patient with a Pu-238 pacemaker died on 5/16/12 and was scheduled to be buried on 5/26/2012.  Berkshire Medical Center (BMC) observed the obituary in the newspaper on 5/24/2012 and contacted funeral home to retrieve the pacemaker.  The funeral home still possessed the pacemaker as it was extracted before the patient was cremated.  On 5/24/2012, the BMC Radiation Safety Officer retrieved the pacemaker.  Radiation measurements of the pacemaker were less than 1 mR/hr near the surface and not detectable above background at 1 meter.  Leak tests were also not detectable above background.  "BMC registered the source with the DOE Off-Site Recovery Project (OSRP) to have it disposed."  Category 3 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for some hours.  It could possibly - although it is unlikely - be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks. These sources are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high activity sources (for example: level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges and spinning pipe gauges) and well logging.  For additional information go to  http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf.|
Agreement State|48281|SC DIV OF HEALTH & ENV CONTROL|STERIS ISOMEDIX SERVICES|1|SPARTANBURG|SC||267|Y||||||MARK L. WINDHAM|PETE SNYDER|9/6/2012 00:00:00|16:25|9/6/2012 00:00:00|06:02|EDT|9/6/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||RICHARD CONTE|R1DO|FSME EVENT RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SOURCE RACK STUCK IN UNSHIELDED POSITION  The State of South Carolina submitted the following information via email:  "The SC Department of Health and Environmental Control [SCDHEC] was notified on Thursday, September 6, 2012, at 1500 EDT, that rack #2 failed to return to a shielded position at 0605 EDT due to a cleaning rag that was inadvertently wrapped around the source rack hoist cable. The RSO/Maintenance Manager for the facility stated that authorized personnel were able to clear the obstruction and return the rack to a shielded position at 0700 EDT. There were no personnel exposures and no equipment damage.  "This event is open and pending the licensee's investigation and report to the SCDHEC. Updates will be made through the national NMED system."|
Power Reactor|48282|QUAD CITIES|EXELON NUCLEAR CO.|3|CORDOVA|IL|ROCK ISLAND||Y|05000254|1|2||[1] GE-3,[2] GE-3|BRIAN MAGNUSON|MARK ABRAMOVITZ|9/6/2012 00:00:00|18:39|9/6/2012 00:00:00|13:14|CDT|9/6/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)|POT UNCNTRL RAD REL|||||||KENNETH RIEMER|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||LOSS OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT VENTILATION FOR EIGHT SECONDS  "On September 6, 2012, at 1314 hours, the reactor building ventilation system was being restored to service following planned maintenance and surveillance activities. During the reactor building pressure transition when restoring reactor building ventilation (from the Standby Gas Treatment System), an employee entered a secondary containment interlock and identified a door leading to the environment had opened. The employee immediately secured the door and notified Operations personnel. A review of the door alarm history determined the door was open for approximately eight seconds.   "Given the temporary breech in secondary containment, this event is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48283|BEAVER VALLEY|FIRSTENERGY NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY|1|SHIPPINGPORT|PA|BEAVER||N|05000334|1|||[1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP|ROBERT KRISTOPHEL|PETE SNYDER|9/6/2012 00:00:00|19:20|9/6/2012 00:00:00|14:16|EDT|9/6/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)|ACCIDENT MITIGATION|||||||RICHARD CONTE|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||BOTH OFFSITE POWER SOURCES INOPERABLE  "At 1416 EDT, after consultation with the Unit 1 control room, the #1 138 KV bus in the Beaver Valley switchyard was deenergized by the grid system operator in response to a degraded switchyard breaker. The bus loss caused the Unit 1 A train offsite power supply to be inoperable. The Unit 1 B train offsite power supply was previously inoperable due to planned maintenance on its transformer cooling fan control circuit. The Unit 1 B train offsite power supply remained energized and available during this event. Both Emergency Diesel Generators remained operable and both emergency buses remained energized from the onsite source and operable during this event.  "At 1425 EDT the #1 138 KV bus was re-energized. The planned maintenance was completed on the B train offsite power supply transformer. Following testing, at 1452 EDT both offsite power supplies were declared operable.  "This notification is provided in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) since both offsite power supplies were inoperable from 1416 EDT to 1452 EDT on 9/6/12."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48284|OCONEE|DUKE ENERGY NUCLEAR LLC|2|SENECA|SC|OCONEE||Y||||3|[1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP|ERIC J DOYLE|MARK ABRAMOVITZ|9/6/2012 00:00:00|23:28|9/5/2012 00:00:00|20:06|EDT|9/6/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||MARK LESSER|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|INOPERABLE ACCIDENT RADIATION MONITORS  "This is a non-emergency report.  No actual event has occurred.  "At 2006 EDT, on 9/5/2012, Oconee Nuclear Station Operations declared the radiation monitors out of service for Low Gas Unit Vent monitoring (3RIA-45) and High Gas Unit monitoring (3RIA-46) when the Unit 3 Vent Skid lost its internal memory during a monthly PM to replace the filter cartridge.  These monitors are used for determination of Emergency Action Levels (EALs) in ALL modes.  "Oconee Nuclear Station did not initially recognize that criteria for reporting in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) (Major Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities) was met and acknowledge this notification is outside of the eight (8) hour notification window.  "There is no adverse impact on nuclear safety.  Redundant methods for sampling and determination of activity levels were  implemented per SLC 16.11.3.    "This report is submitted based upon a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).  "Redundant methodology was employed [when the inoperable status was recognized].  "Repair and restoration of the effected radiation monitors was completed at 2145 on 9/6/2012.  "The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."|
Part 21|48285|AMETEK SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS|AMETEK SOLDSTATE CONTROLS|3|COLUMBUS|OH|||Y||||||ROBERT GEORGE|PETE SNYDER|9/7/2012 00:00:00|12:45|3/14/2012 00:00:00||EDT|9/7/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|21.21(d)(3)(i)|DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE|||||||KENNETH RIEMER|R3DO|PART 21 REACTOR GRP|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||PART 21 - IMPROPER SELECTION OF INVERTER CAPACITORS  "PRODUCT: 10 KVA inverter Model 86VC0100-15, 3 phase 480 VAC output. Limited to systems supplied to Exelon Byron and Braidwood units.  Capacitors C10 through C15 part number 03-040060-00.  "COMPONENT DESCRIPTION: Suppression capacitors, Ametek part number 03-040060-00, used in positions C10 through C15 on Model 86-VC0100-15 only.   "PROBLEM YOU COULD SEE: Capacitor could arc internally and open internally and externally.  "CAUSE: the manufacturer's investigation revealed that due to improper selection of capacitor used may fail due to a corona effect internally.   "EFFECT ON SYSTEM PERFORMANCE: The capacitor may short internally and open circuit by forcing lead separation from the device.  "ACTION REQUIRED: Replace the capacitor(s) with Ametek part 03-040041-20. The replacement is rated at 370 VAC and used in a 277 VAC circuit.  "AMETEK SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS CORRECTIVE ACTION: The defect is limited to the units supplied to Exelon Byron and Braidwood plants under Ametek joc C103552."  Both the Byron and Braidwood plants are already informed of this condition.|
Agreement State|48286|PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION|UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH|1|PITTSBURGH|PA|ALLEGHENY|PA-0190|Y||||||JOSEPH MELNIC|PETE SNYDER|9/7/2012 00:00:00|14:29|9/6/2012 00:00:00||EDT|9/7/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||RICHARD CONTE|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - YTTRIUM-90 MICROSPHERES ADMINISTERED TO THE WRONG TREATMENT SITE   "On September 6, 2012, the [Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, Bureau of Radiation Protection (PADEPBRP)] Central Office received notification via a phone call about this medical event.  "The patient received an administration of approximately 1.4 millicuries (mCi) of Y-90 microspheres to the wrong treatment site. The intended treatment was to administer approximately 24 mCi to the left lobe of the liver through three different arteries. During the administration of one of the split doses, the Interventional Radiologist (IR) incorrectly positioned the catheter in the right hepatic artery. A portion of the one split dose was administered to the right lobe of the liver before the IR realized that the catheter was not in the correct artery.  "Cause of the event: Human Error.  "Actions: Both the referring physician and the patient have been notified of the medical event. The [PADEPBRP] plans to do a reactive inspection."  A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials.  It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.|
Fuel Cycle Facility|48287|AREVA NP INC RICHLAND|AREVA NP INC RICHLAND|2|RICHLAND|WA|PENTON|SNM-1227|Y|07001257||||URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION|CALVIN MANNING|PETE SNYDER|9/7/2012 00:00:00|19:18|9/7/2012 00:00:00|15:53|PDT|9/7/2012 00:00:00|ALERT|70.32(i)|EMERGENCY DECLARED|||||||MARK LESSER|R2DO|VICTOR MCCREE|R2|SCOTT MOORE|NMSS|GORDON BJORKMAN|NMSS|JANE MARSHALL|IRD|||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||FIRE IN PLASMA CUTTER RECIRCULATING VENTILATION SYSTEM   "At 1553 PDT Areva Richland declared an Alert due to a fire [greater than 15 minutes] in the waste handling / packaging area within the UO2 Building. The fire was associated with a plasma cutter HEPA filter in the recirculation system. The plasma arc filter is a stand alone filter that recirculates the air into the room.  The room ventilation system has two HEPA filters in series before it exhausts out of the stack.  "Personnel in the building evacuated when a smoke alarm activated. All personnel from the evacuated building were accounted for. The fire was confined to the plasma cutter filters and is now believed to be extinguished."  Notified DHS, DOE, DHS NICC, HHS, EPA, USDA and Canada.  * * * UPDATE FROM CALVIN MANNING TO JOHN KNOKE AT 0036 EDT ON 09/08/12 * * *  At 1609 PDT the fire was extinguished and a re-flash watch set. The ventilation system in the UO2 Building was restored.  The area of the fire is quarantined off, pending further investigation.  No injuries were reported and there were no offsite radiological releases.  At 2135 PDT, Areva Richland exited the Alert.  Notified R2DO (Lessor), IRD (Marshall), NMSS (Bjorkman), DHS, DOE, DHS NICC, HHS, EPA, USDA and Canada.|
Power Reactor|48288|ROBINSON|CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.|2|HARTSVILLE|SC|DARLINGTON||Y|05000261|2|||[2] W-3-LP|GEORGE CURTIS|JOHN KNOKE|9/8/2012 00:00:00|08:16|9/8/2012 00:00:00|08:00|EDT|9/8/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||MARK LESSER|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||EMERGENCY OFFSITE FACILITY/TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION MAINTENANCE    "This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility.   "Planned maintenance activities are being performed today to the Emergency Offsite Facility (EOF)/Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC. The work entails replacement of a pressure switch. The filtration portion of the system will not be affected by this work. This work activity is planned to be performed and completed expeditiously within about 3.5 hours including establishing and removing the clearances and performing post maintenance testing; however, restoration time required during the maintenance could exceed the time required to activate the TSC.     "If an emergency condition occurs that requires activation of the EOF and TSC, plans are to utilize the EOF and TSC during the time this work activity is being performed as long as habitability conditions allow. The Emergency Response Organization team members will be relocated to alternate locations if required by habitability conditions in accordance with emergency implementing procedures. Alternate emergency response facilities will remain available in the event that relocation is necessary."   The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Licensee has also notified state and local agencies.   * * * UPDATE FROM GEORGE CURTIS TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1025 EDT ON 9/8/2012 * * *  The maintenance work was completed.  The TSC and EOF were declared operable as of 1025 EDT.  The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified R2DO (Lesser).|
Power Reactor|48289|TURKEY POINT|FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.|2|MIAMI|FL|DADE||Y|05000250|3|4||[3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP|KEITH MAESTAS|MARK ABRAMOVITZ|9/8/2012 00:00:00|13:12|9/8/2012 00:00:00|12:30|EDT|9/8/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||MARK LESSER|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|12|Power Operation|12|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||HISTORICAL TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION EVALUATION DEFICIENCY  "FPL (Florida Power & Light) previously reported (EN 47819) that a portion of the Turkey Point Technical Support Center (TSC) Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning System (HVAC) was deenergized for maintenance during two extended periods.  FPL concluded that due to the condition, the TSC may not have been fully functional under every postulated design basis accident scenario.  As a result of further investigation, FPL has been unable to validate the historical TSC design basis assumptions for habitability for an indeterminate period in the past.  Among the issues identified include (a) seized HVAC isolation damper, (b) unsecured HVAC balancing damper, and (c) voids in the concrete shield wall.  Additionally, while the original design basis did not provide for any unfiltered air inleakage, the HVAC system was constructed and maintained to ensure only that a positive pressure could be achieved.  "FPL has addressed the TSC issues.  A new dose analysis and recent tracer gas test have established TSC compliance with the current licensing basis.  Therefore, the TSC is fully functional at this time.  "This report is made for historical conditions in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48290|BYRON|EXELON NUCLEAR CO.|3|BYRON|IL|OGLE||Y|05000454|1|||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|ROBERT LAWLOR|JOHN SHOEMAKER|9/10/2012 00:00:00|11:34|9/10/2012 00:00:00|09:00|CDT|9/10/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||JOHN GIESSNER|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Cold Shutdown|0|Cold Shutdown|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||PLANT PROCESS COMPUTER REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE  "At 0900 CDT on September 10, 2012, the Unit 1 Plant Process Computer (PPC) was removed from service for a planned replacement in the current Unit 1 Refueling Outage. The Unit 1 PPC feeds the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) used in the Main Control Room (MCR) and the Technical Support Center (TSC). The Unit 1 PPC also feeds the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS).  "The Unit 1 and Unit 2 PPCs also feed the Plant Parameters Display System (PPDS) used in the MCR, TSC and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). Meteorological data will remain available. The dose assessment program will remain functional as the Unit 2 PPC will be capable of providing the necessary data through PPDS to run the program. The dose assessment program is not affected by the Unit 1 PPC being out of service.  As compensatory measures, a proceduralized backup method to fax or communicate via a phone circuit applicable data to the NRC, TSC, and EOF exists. There is no impact on the Emergency Notification System (ENS) or Health Physics Network (HPN) communication systems.   "The new Unit 1 PPC is scheduled to be functional on September 17, 2012.  However, based on the Mode Unit 1 will be in, this will limit the number of points that would provide usable data.  The Unit 1 PPC will be tested as Mode changes occur. The Unit 1 PPC is planned to be declared functional by Mode 2.  A follow-up ENS call will be made once the Unit 1 PPC is declared functional.  "The loss of SPDS and ERDS is a 'major loss of assessment capability' and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3) (xiii).  "The NRC Senior Resident Inspector and the State of Illinois (through the Illinois Emergency Management Agency Resident Inspector) have been notified of this ENS call."|
Agreement State|48291|KENTUCKY DEPT OF RADIATION CONTROL|DOMTAR PAPER COMPANY|1|HAWESVILLE|KY||201-174-57|Y||||||MARISSA VEGA VELEZ|STEVE SANDIN|9/10/2012 00:00:00|14:15|9/7/2012 00:00:00|11:00|CDT|9/10/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||CHRISTOPHER NEWPORT|R1DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER ON FIXED NUCLEAR GAUGE  The following information was received from the Commonwealth of Kentucky via fax:  "KY RHB [Kentucky Radiological Health Branch] was notified on Monday, 9/10/12 by a representative from Domtar Paper Company, a routine shutter check was performed 9/7/12 on a fixed nuclear gauge and the shutter did not function as designed. Operation of the shutter required use of a tool. The gauge involved is Ohmart model SR-A, S/N 9296GG, containing 10 mCi Cs-137. It appears corrosive atmosphere caused damage to the source holder. The licensee requested proposal from Vega Americas, Inc. to repair or replace the source holder."  KY Event Report ID No.:  48291|
Agreement State|48292|ILLINOIS EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY|BED BATH AND BEYOND|3|VERNON HILLS|IL|||Y||||||DAREN PERRERO|VINCE KLCO|9/10/2012 00:00:00|15:47|7/15/2012 00:00:00|16:00|CDT|9/10/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||JOHN GIESSNER|R3DO|FSME RESOURCES|EMAI|ILTAB|EMAI|||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TRITIUM SIGN  The following information was received on 9/7/2012 via email:  "The Corporate RSO for Bed, Bath and Beyond (B3) called to advise that an exit sign containing H-3 appears to be missing from their Illinois store.  The sign had been taken down by an electrician in July in anticipation of recovery and disposal by Shaw Environmental.  A representative from Shaw had arrived this past week to collect and package the sign only to find that the sign was missing from the storage location where it had been placed at the time of removal.  The electrical company hired by the licensee to perform the un-installation had noted that there were no signs of damage or loss of contents at the time of removal on July 13, 2012.  The manager of the licensee's store can only definitely recall having seen the sign on July 14 or 15th in secure storage.  Subsequent visual surveys of the store were conducted in an attempt to locate the sign with no success.    "The sign involved is made by Safety Light Corporation (m/n SLX-60).  It was purchased in November of 2004.  Based on the serial number involved (289354) it was determined that the sign was sold with a nominal H-3 content of 11.5 Ci.  As of this date, that activity is approximately 7.4 Ci.  Currently, it is believed that the device has been inadvertently disposed with the facilities normal trash stream."  Illinois Number: IL-12014  THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL  Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to  http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf  This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint.  Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source|
Power Reactor|48293|SUSQUEHANNA|PPL SUSQUEHANNA LLC|1|ALLENTOWN|PA|LUZERNE||N|05000387|1|2||[1] GE-4,[2] GE-4|DAVID WALSH|STEVE SANDIN|9/10/2012 00:00:00|17:15|9/10/2012 00:00:00|10:25|EDT|9/10/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)|ACCIDENT MITIGATION|||||||CHRISTOPHER NEWPORT|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||BOTH UNITS ENTERED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.0.3 DUE TO INOPERABLE CONTROL STRUCTURE CHILLERS  "Unit 1 and Unit 2 entered LCO 3.0.3 due to both Control Structure (CS) chillers 'A & B' concurrently inoperable.  "At 1025 [EDT], the control room was notified that the 'B' CS Chiller was not running. There were no control room alarms due to this condition. Review of indications on control room panel 0C681 noted that the loop circ pump and all three CS fans remained in service. Indication of CS loop flow and loop temperature remained normal, approximately 600 gpm and 44 degrees.  "The 'B' CS Chiller restarted at 1027 [EDT] and normal system parameters were observed.  "Work on the 'A' CS Chiller was released at 0928 [EDT] on 9/10/2012 for scheduled maintenance, LCO's 3.7.3 and 3.7.4 were entered, however no work had actually commenced or was performed. The 'A' CS Chiller remained available and in standby during the entire evolution.  "Since the cause of the 'B' CS Chiller to shutdown has not been determined, the 'B' CS Chiller was declared inoperable. Inoperability of both CS chillers 'A & B' required immediate entry into LCO 3.0.3 per TS 3.7.4 Condition D.  Both chillers were inoperable from 1025 [EDT] until 1042 [EDT] (17 minutes), when the 'A' CS Chiller was restored to operable status.  "This condition is being reported as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."  The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48294|CATAWBA|DUKE ENERGY NUCLEAR LLC|2|YORK|SC|YORK||Y|05000413|1|2||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|THOMAS GARRISON|STEVE SANDIN|9/10/2012 00:00:00|21:30|9/10/2012 00:00:00|21:00|EDT|9/10/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||MARK LESSER|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER UNAVAILABLE DUE TO PLANNED MAINTENANCE  "On 9-11-12 the Technical Support System (TSC) ventilation will be removed from service for a planned maintenance activity.  The ventilation system will be out of service for approximately 9 hours.  During this time the TSC will be unavailable should an event involving a radiological release occur.  The Catawba Emergency Plan has provisions to relocate TSC personnel if required to the alternate TSC location."  The licensee will inform State and local agencies as a courtesy and the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48295|COOPER|NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT|4|BROWNSVILLE|NE|NEMAHA||Y|05000298|1|||[1] GE-4|STEVE WHEELER|STEVE SANDIN|9/10/2012 00:00:00|22:07|9/10/2012 00:00:00|14:43|CDT|9/10/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)|ACCIDENT MITIGATION|||||||RYAN LANTZ|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||LOSS OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT  "At 1443 CDT, indication was received in the Control Room that both the inner and outer personnel access doors to the Reactor Building were open simultaneously.  This caused entry into Technical Specification 3.6.4.1 for Secondary Containment inoperable and is a loss of safety function per station procedure 2.0.11.1.  An event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function requires an 8 hour report per 10CFR50.72.b.3.v.D for Accident Mitigation.  The doors were open for several minutes until station personnel could reset the interlock to allow for door closure.  The doors were reclosed and Secondary Containment was restored to operable at 1451 CDT.    "The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this condition."|
Power Reactor|48296|DUANE ARNOLD|NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY|3|PALO|IA|LINN||Y|05000331|1|||[1] GE-4|HANS OLSON|DONALD NORWOOD|9/11/2012 00:00:00|04:08|9/11/2012 00:00:00|03:08|CDT|9/12/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||JOHN GIESSNER|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|94|Power Operation|94|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER NON-FUNCTIONAL DUE TO PLANNED MAINTENANCE  "A planned maintenance evolution at the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) will remove the TSC [Technical Support Center] ventilation system from service.  The TSC would be rendered non-functional with the loss of ventilation.  The repair to the TSC ventilation is expected to last 3 days.  "If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures.  Maintenance will be expedited to restore ventilation to the TSC.   "This notification is being made in accordance with 10CR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of an Emergency Response Facility (ERF).  An update will be provided once the TSC ventilation system has been restored to normal operation."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector  * * * UPDATE FROM MIKE STROPE TO CHARLES TEAL ON 9/12/12 AT 1157 EDT * * *   The TSC maintenance has been completed.  The TSC has been restored to service.  The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.  Notified R3DO (Kunowski).|
Power Reactor|48297|PEACH BOTTOM|EXELON NUCLEAR CO.|1|PHILADELPHIA|PA|YORK & LANCASTER||N|05000277|2|||[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4|MIKE WEAVER|JOHN SHOEMAKER|9/11/2012 00:00:00|11:11|9/11/2012 00:00:00|07:33|EDT|9/11/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(xi)|OFFSITE NOTIFICATION|||||||CHRISTOPHER NEWPORT|R1DO|MARK KING|NRR|JANE MARSHALL|IRD|||||||||||||||N|N|0|Cold Shutdown|0|Cold Shutdown|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||VOLUNTARY OFFSITE NOTIFICATION WITH POTENTIAL MEDIA INTEREST  "This ENS [report] is being voluntarily issued to notify the NRC that voluntary communications were made to offsite agencies this morning between 0700 and 0830 [EDT] due to an event of potential public interest.    "At approximately 1 a.m. on September 11, 2012, Peach Bottom outage workers on the Unit 2 refuel floor were disassembling the reactor head vent when steam discharged from the flange, causing a small but detectable amount of airborne contamination that was contained in the building. All workers were wearing the proper protective equipment and no significant personal [personnel] exposure has been reported. As a precaution, employees were asked to temporarily leave the area for onsite evaluation while radiation protection technicians investigated. Approximately 50 workers were impacted by the radiological airborne event at Peach Bottom and had to stay over shift for radiological monitoring. In accordance with station Radiological procedures, affected personnel are being monitored and as required bioassay is being conducted. Radiation monitors in the reactor building initially detected the airborne contamination, but all have returned to normal levels. This event resulted in no significant impact to the health and safety of our workers or the public. The station made voluntary notifications to the NRC Senior Resident, the State Bureau of Radiation Protection and state and local stakeholders.  "This issue has been entered into the site Corrective Action Program for evaluation and implementation of further corrective actions."|
Agreement State|48298|RI DEPT OF RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH|ROGER WILLIAMS MEDICAL CENTER|1|PROVIDENCE|RI||7D-026-01|Y||||||CHARMA WARING|STEVE SANDIN|9/11/2012 00:00:00|13:07|8/28/2012 00:00:00||EDT|9/11/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||CHRISTOPHER NEWPORT|R1DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PATIENT RECEIVED TWO UNDERDOSES OF Y-90 TO DIFFERENT TREATMENT SITES  The following information was received from the State of Rhode Island via fax:  "Event Type: Medical event involving the administration of Yttrium-90 microspheres.  "Notification(s): On August 30, 2012, the RI Department of Health Office of Facilities Regulation, Radiation Control Program received a phone call from the facility's Radiation Safety Officer, with a follow-up e-mail the same day.  "Event Description: On 08/28/2012, two incorrect doses were prepared for a Y-90 microsphere treatment. Both doses were for the same patient (i.e., two different treatment sites). One dose was drawn at 28.7% less than prescribed and the other dose was drawn at 22.9% less than prescribed. The final administered doses were less than 40.3% and 27.2%  prescribed, respectively.  "Cause of the event: Under investigation and unknown at this time.  "Actions: Adverse effects to the patient are not expected; a follow-up reactive inspection is planned.  "[Rhode Island] Event Report ID: 2012-001"  A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials.  It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.|
Agreement State|48299|MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM|WOOD'S HOLE OCEANOGRAPHIC INSTITUTION|1|WOOD'S HOLE|MA||00-0643|Y||||||JOHN SUMARES|STEVE SANDIN|9/11/2012 00:00:00|14:28|9/11/2012 00:00:00|12:05|EDT|9/11/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||CHRISTOPHER NEWPORT|R1DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAK TEST RESULTS FOR NI-63 SOURCE > .005 MICROCURIES  The following information was received from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts via fax:  "[The licensee] called the Agency [Massachusetts Radiation Control] to report that [the licensee] received leak test results that were above 0.005 microCurie for their 'Shimadzu' [Manufacturer] Ni-63 gas chromatograph instruments, each containing approximately 10 milliCurie foil sources. [The licensee] reported that the leak test results were 0.0053 and 0.0069 microCurie. [The licensee] stated that wipe surveys for Ni-63 were taken of the lab areas where these instruments were used. [The licensee] did not yet have the LSC [liquid scintillation counter] results of the wipe surveys. [The licensee] also disassembled the electron capture detectors (ECD) from the GC [Gas Chromatograph] instruments and placed them inside a scaled poly bag to store the ECD's until [the licensee] can return the ECD's to 'Shimadzu'."|
Agreement State|48300|TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH|HALLIBURTON|4|HOUSTON|TX||02113|Y||||||ART TUCKER|BILL HUFFMAN|9/12/2012 00:00:00|08:37|9/11/2012 00:00:00|21:00|CDT|9/13/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||RYAN LANTZ|R4DO|BRIAN MCDERMOTT|FSME|JANE MARSHALL|IRD|MEXICO|E-MA|JIM WHITNEY|ILTA|DEBORAH HASSEL|DHS|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|E-MA|||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST AM-241/BE WELL LOGGING SOURCE  The following information was obtained from the Texas Department of State Health Services Radiation Branch via e-mail:  "On September 11, 2012, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee that an Americium-241/ Beryllium [well logging] source could not be located.  The source had been used earlier that day at a well site near Pecos, Texas. The well logging crew left the Pecos site and went about 130 miles to a well site south of Odessa, Texas. When the crew went to remove the Am-241 source they discovered the source transport container lock and plug were not in place and that the source was missing.  The crew returned to the well site near Pecos and searched for the source, but did not find it. The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) stated that the lock was found in the storage compartment in the back of the truck. The transport container plug was not in the container.  The RSO stated they were putting together a group to look for the source along the roadway between the two locations.    "The RSO stated that the crew stated that they did not stop anywhere along the route between the two locations.  The RSO stated they were verifying that using the vehicles black box.  The RSO agreed to contact the appropriate local law enforcement.  The RSO stated he would send a copy of the latest dose rate readings for the source to the Agency.     "The Agency has notified their local inspectors of the event.  Additional information will be provided as it is received in  accordance with SA-300 [Reporting Material Events]."  The source was described as approximately 7 inches long by 1 inch in diameter stainless steel cylinder.  The State has not requested any assistance in locating the source at this time.  Texas Report I-8988  * * * UPDATE AT 1744 EDT ON 09/12/12 FROM ART TUCKER TO S. SANDIN * * *  The following update was received from the State of Texas via fax:  "[At] 1430 hours [CDT] the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was contacted by the licensee and provided the following information.   "The licensee has completed a press release which provides a description of the source, actions to take if found, and stated that they would offer a reward.  The press release will be issued by their Public Information Group. The licensee has completed logging of the well near Pecos and the source was not located.    "The licensee stated that the well site had been searched and surveyed twice.  The licensee stated that the road between Pecos and Odessa had been surveyed using well logging tools extended from pickup trucks and driven between 5 and 10 miles per hour and the source was not found.  The licensee stated they have had people on the ground searching, but did not know how much area away from the well site in Pecos had been searched.    "The licensee has sent a Radiation Safety Officer and a second supervisor to the Pecos well site.  The RSO is bringing scintillation survey instruments to the well site for additional surveys.  An Agency inspector will meet the RSO at the well site.    "The licensee has reviewed the well logging data and confirmed that the source was installed on the tool during logging operations.  The licensee has performed preliminary interviews with the operator involved.  The licensee indicated that additional interviews are required.  They have not been able to determine how the source could have been lost during transport.  The licensee stated that they completed a review of the truck's black box and confirmed that the truck did not stop while traveling between the two well sites.    "The license stated that the local sheriff has responded to the Pecos location and was interviewing the tool operators.  The licensee stated they believe that the group supervisor involved had been evaluated under the IC's [Increased Controls] as trust worthy and reliable.   "The licensee stated that other entities at the well site as well as the lease holder have been notified of the event.  The licensee stated that they will continue to search for the source until it can be located.  The Agency has offered their assistance to the licensee.  Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA - 300 [Reporting Material Events]."  Notified R4DO (Lantz) and FSME (McDermott), IRD (Marshall), ILTAB (Whitney) and Mexico via email/fax.  * * * UPDATE ON 9/13/12 AT 1015 EDT FROM ART TUCKER TO HUFFMAN * * *   The following update was received from the State of Texas via e-mail:  "A third search of the well site was completed on September 12, 2012 at 2030 hours.  The source was not found.  The licensee will resume the search early today. The licensee stated that surveys will be conducted on the road between Odessa and Pecos today. The licensee stated that a mud pit at the Pecos site will be logged today. The logging truck is at their shop in Odessa now and they are literally stripping it down, removing every piece of equipment looking for the source. The licensee stated that the three individuals who were conducting the well logging operations when the source was lost were interviewed by individuals from the Federal Bureau of Investigation working with the Department of Transportation. The licensee stated that the FBI would only say that they believed there was no criminal activity involved with the missing source.   Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA - 300."  Notified R4DO (Lantz) and FSME (McDermott), IRD (Marshall), ILTAB (Whitney) and Mexico via email.  THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL  Category 3 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for some hours.  It could possibly - although it is unlikely - be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks. These sources are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high activity sources (for example: level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges and spinning pipe gauges) and well logging.  For additional information go to  http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf|
Power Reactor|48301|COOPER|NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT|4|BROWNSVILLE|NE|NEMAHA||Y|05000298|1|||[1] GE-4|CURTIS MARTIN|BILL HUFFMAN|9/12/2012 00:00:00|09:33|9/12/2012 00:00:00|08:06|CDT|9/13/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||RYAN LANTZ|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER OUT OF SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE  "A planned maintenance activity at Cooper Nuclear Station will remove the TSC [Technical Support Center] ventilation system from service. The TSC ventilation system will be rendered non-functional during this maintenance period. The repair to the TSC ventilation is expected to last less than 2 days.  "If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. CNS Station procedures provide appropriate monitoring and compensatory measures to ensure habitability of the TSC and, if necessary, instructions for relocation of TSC personnel should the need arise. In the event of TSC activation, maintenance will be expedited to restore ventilation to service.  "This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of an Emergency Response Facility (ERF). An update will be provided once the TSC ventilation system has been restored to normal operation.   "The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."   * * * UPDATE FROM CURTIS MARTIN TO PETE SNYDER AT 1026 EDT ON 9/13/12 * * *   At 0910 CDT on 9/13/12 the TSC ventilation system has been returned to service. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Lantz).|
Agreement State|48302|ILLINOIS EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY|FLINT HILLS RESOURCES CHEMICAL INTERMEDIATES|3|JOLIET|IL||IL-01337-01|Y||||||DAREN PERRERO|STEVE SANDIN|9/12/2012 00:00:00|16:26|9/11/2012 00:00:00||CDT|9/12/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||MICHAEL KUNOWSKI|R3DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIXED NUCLEAR GAUGE FOUND WITH STUCK SHUTTER  The following information was received from the State of Illinois via email:  "On Tuesday afternoon, the Agency [Illinois Emergency Management Agency] received a call from the RSO for Flint Hills Resources Chemical Intermediates, LLC (IL-01337-01).  He called to report a shutter failure of a fixed gauge which he cannot close.  The device manufacturer, Ronan Engineering, has been contacted and arrangements are pending for repair of the device.  The RSO has isolated the area, posted warning signs and instituted a lock out/tag out procedure for the manway entrance to the vessel in order to prevent exposures which might occur from someone attempting to perform work within the tank that the gauge is located. Area surveys performed show no variations above normal (i.e., less than 1 milliR/h at 1 foot) for when the shutter is open and the unit is in operation. The  shutter had last been tested in March with no abnormalities noted.  The gauge has not been subjected to any corrosives or solvents or other conditions which exceed the gauge's prototype test conditions.   "The RSO was reminded of the requirement to provide a written report within 30 days of the event and to contact the Agency when the manufacturer was able to perform the site visit to evaluate/repair the device.  The Agency considers this matter open pending those additional actions."  The Ronan gauge is model X90-SA1, S/N M7389, contains 24.5 mCi Cs-137.|
Agreement State|48303|PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION|UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA|1|PHILADELPHIA|PA||PA-0131|Y||||||JOSEPH M. MELNIC|DONG HWA PARK|9/13/2012 00:00:00|12:05|9/11/2012 00:00:00||EDT|9/13/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||CHRISTOPHER NEWPORT|R1DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PATIENT UNDEREXPOSURE USING YTTRIUM-90 SIR-SPHERES TREATMENT  The following event was received from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via facsimile:  "Event type: A medical event (ME) involving the administration of yttrium-90 SIR-Spheres which is reportable under 10 CFR 35.3045(a)(1)(i).  "Notifications: On September 12, 2012, an inspector was performing a reactive inspection for a recent event (PA120026) that occurred on August 23, 2012. During the inspection the licensee reported another similar Sir-Sphere event.  "Event Description: A patient was being treated for disease of the liver with 33.04 millicuries (mCi) of Y-90 and received 25.6 mCi resulting in 77.5% of the intended dose. The treating physician, who also is the referring physician, notified the patient.  "Cause of the Event: Currently under investigation and unknown at this time.  "Actions: No harm to the patient is expected. The Department's reactive inspection occurring on September 11, 2012 incorporated this new event and therefore no new inspection is planned."  PA Report Number: 120030  A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials.  It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.|
Power Reactor|48304|CATAWBA|DUKE ENERGY NUCLEAR LLC|2|YORK|SC|YORK||Y|05000413|1|2||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|SCOTT MILTON|DONG HWA PARK|9/13/2012 00:00:00|13:08|9/13/2012 00:00:00|07:40|EDT|9/13/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||SCOTT SHAEFFER|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) UNAVAILABLE DUE TO VENTILATION SYSTEM FAILURE  "On 09/13/12 at 0740 [EDT] the TSC ventilation was determined to be non-functional. Investigation is underway to determine the cause of the ventilation failure and make the necessary repairs.  While the TSC is unavailable, the Catawba Emergency Plan has provisions to relocate TSC personnel if required to the alternate TSC location."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will inform State and local agencies as a courtesy.|
Power Reactor|48305|POINT BEACH|NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY|3|TWO RIVERS|WI|MANITOWOC||N|05000266|1|2||[1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP|MARY SIPIORSKI|DONG HWA PARK|9/13/2012 00:00:00|19:36|9/13/2012 00:00:00|14:28|CDT|9/14/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||MICHAEL KUNOWSKI|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER NON-FUNCTIONAL DUE TO TSC VENTILATION EQUIPMENT ISSUE  "The Technical Support Center (TSC) at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP) is non-functional as a result of conservatively securing an exhaust fan that exhibited an abnormal noise in the TSC Ventilation system. The fan is currently in service and being monitored as part of the troubleshooting, with maintenance repair plans being conducted in parallel.  "Functional alternate locations described in the emergency plan procedures for events resulting in radiological conditions affecting habitability will be used and are currently available. The Control Room or EOF will be selected as the alternate facility. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using the procedure and functional facilities selected.  "This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of an Emergency Response Facility (ERF).  An update will be provided once the TSC ventilation system has been restored to normal operation."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  * * * UPDATE FROM MARY SIPIORSKI TO CHARLES TEAL ON 9/14/12 AT 1942 EDT * * *   "At 1737 on 9/14/12, maintenance activities are complete on the TSC ventilation system.  The TSC ventilation has been restored to normal operation and the TSC [has been] returned to fully functional."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Kunowski).|
Power Reactor|48306|SAINT LUCIE|FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.|2|FT. PIERCE|FL|ST LUCIE||Y|05000335|1|2||[1] CE,[2] CE|REESE KILIAN|BILL HUFFMAN|9/14/2012 00:00:00|11:20|9/14/2012 00:00:00||EDT|9/14/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|26.719|FITNESS FOR DUTY|||||||SCOTT SHAEFFER|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||FITNESS FOR DUTY - CONTRACT SUPERVISOR TESTED POSITIVE FOR ALCOHOL  A non-licensed contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test.  The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.  Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Agreement State|48307|ARIZONA RADIATION REGULATORY AGENCY|ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION|4|PHOENIX|AZ||07-031|Y||||||AUBREY V. GODWIN|DONG HWA PARK|9/14/2012 00:00:00|13:22|9/13/2012 00:00:00|09:00|MST|9/14/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||RYAN LANTZ|R4DO|FSME EVENT RESOURCES|EMAI|ILTAB|EMAI|MEXICO|EMAI|||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN HUMBOLDT NUCLEAR GAUGE  The following report was received from the State of Arizona via email:  "At approximately 9:00 AM September 13, 2012, the [Arizona Radiation Regulatory] Agency was informed that the Licensee had a Humboldt Model 5001, SN 3920, portable gauge stolen from the back of a truck.  The theft occurred between 9:00 PM September 12, 2012, and 6:00 AM September 13, 2012.  The gauge was locked in a 16 gauge steel box bolted to the bed of the truck which was parked unattended at an employee's resident.  The gauge contains 370 MBq (10 mCi) of Cesium-137 and 1.62 GBq (44 mCi) of Am:Be-241.  "El Mirage PD is investigating and has issued report number 12-09000902.  "The Agency continues to investigate this event.  "The Governor's Office, the States of CA, NV, CO, UT and NM and Mexico and U.S. NRC and U.S. FBI are being notified of this event."  Arizona Event Number: 12-020  THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL  Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf  This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint.  Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source.|
Agreement State|48308|MISSISSIPPI DIV OF RAD HEALTH|ANDERSON REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER|4|MERIDIAN|MS||MS-267-01|Y||||||JAYSON MOAK|DONG HWA PARK|9/14/2012 00:00:00|16:57|9/10/2012 00:00:00||CDT|9/28/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||RYAN LANTZ|R4DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - A PATIENT RECEIVING AN INCORRECT DOSAGE OF I-131  The following report was received from the State of Mississippi via email:  "On 9-10-2012, the licensee administered 163 mCi of I-131 from an admission order dated 9-6-2012, instead of the prescribed 100 mCi of  I-131 from the written directive dated 9-5-2012.  The licensee's investigation revealed a misinterpretation of an admission order as a written directive by the nuclear medicine technologist due to inclusion of the authorized user's name and 150 mCi of a radionuclide activity on the admission order.  The written directive was never received by the Nuclear Medicine Department.  The licensee determined the root cause of the error stemmed from a new communication process by which written directives are conveyed from the authorized user to Central Scheduling and then to the Nuclear Medicine Department.     "The administered dose is described as not out of line with doses typically prescribed for patients with similar disease and the authorized user indicates an expectation of no adverse effect for the patient.  The referring physician and patient were both notified on 9-10-2012 by the authorized user.   "The licensee is correcting its procedure for written directives and how they are communicated to the Hospital's Nuclear Medicine Department and will submit them for review to DRH."  Mississippi Event Report No.:  MS-267-01  A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials.  It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.   * * * UPDATE FROM MOAK TO SNYDER ON 9/28/12 AT 1656 EDT * * *   "[The] licensee's inspection revealed the medical event was an isolated incident.  The new procedures for communicating written directives were only in place for two (2) months with one (1) I-131 administration during this time. The licensee has since changed back to their old procedures where written directives are communicated directly from the authorized user to the nuclear medicine department."  Notified R4DO (O'Keefe) and FSME Event Resource (e-mail).|
Power Reactor|48309|FERMI|DETROIT EDISON CO.|3|NEWPORT|MI|MONROE||N|05000341|2|||[2] GE-4|BRETT JEBBIA|DONG HWA PARK|9/14/2012 00:00:00|19:27|9/14/2012 00:00:00|16:03|EDT|9/14/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A)|ECCS INJECTION|50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)|RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL|||||MICHAEL KUNOWSKI|R3DO|DAVID SKEEN|NRR|WILLIAM GOTT|IRD|||||||||||||||A/R|Y|68|Power Operation|0|Hot Shutdown|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO THE LOSS OF THE 120 KV SWITCHYARD  "At 1603 EDT, Fermi 2 automatically scrammed due to onsite loss of 120 kV switchyard. All control rods fully inserted. The lowest Reactor Water Level (RWL) reached was 98 inches. Division I diesels, EDG-11 and EDG-12, automatically started and loaded. HPCI and RCIC automatically started and restored RWL. RWL is currently being maintained in the normal level band with Condensate/Feed and Control Rod Drive (CRD) systems. No Safety Relief Valves (SRV) actuated. All isolations and actuations for RWL 3 and 2 occurred as expected. Investigation into loss of 120 kV switchyard continues.  "At the time of the scram, all Emergency Core Cooling (ECCS) and Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) were operable with the exception of EDG-11 which was available vice operable due to ventilation work, and no other safety related equipment was out of service. This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), any event that results in ECCS discharge into the reactor coolant system as a result of a valid signal and 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), any event that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical."  EDG-11 and EDG-12 are performing all of their functions and providing power to the Division I AC buses.  Temperatures are being monitored in the room containing EDG-11 and the room is not approaching any temperature limits.  The MSIVs are open with decay heat being removed via steam to the main condenser using the bypass valves.  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48310|SEABROOK|FPL ENERGY SEABROOK|1|MANCHESTER|NH|ROCKINGHAM||Y|05000443|1|||[1] W-4-LP|SHAWN MILLER|DONG HWA PARK|9/14/2012 00:00:00|22:05|9/14/2012 00:00:00|20:25|EDT|9/14/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)|RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL|||||||CHRISTOPHER NEWPORT|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||A/R|Y|85|Power Operation|0|Hot Standby|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOW STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL  "[At] 2025 [EDT] reactor tripped on 'C' Steam Generator Low Low Level due to feed water regulating valve failing closed due to a 7300 process cabinet card failure. Control Room entered E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, then transitioned to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response.  "Emergency Feedwater actuated due to the Low Low Steam Generator Level. All other plant equipment functioned as expected. Plant is being stabilized in mode 3.  "Emergency News Manager will update the states and local media.  "NRC Resident Inspector was notified at 2045 [EDT]."  The trip was uncomplicated and all rods fully inserted.  Decay heat is being removed to the condenser via the turbine bypass valves.  Electrical buses are powered by offsite power.|
Power Reactor|48311|BYRON|EXELON NUCLEAR CO.|3|BYRON|IL|OGLE||Y|05000454|1|||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|HARRIS WELT|HOWIE CROUCH|9/15/2012 00:00:00|03:10|9/14/2012 00:00:00|19:00|CDT|9/15/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A)|DEGRADED CONDITION|||||||MICHAEL KUNOWSKI|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Refueling|0|Refueling|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||DEGRADED CONDITION DUE TO INDICATIONS ON REACTOR VESSEL HEAD DURING DYE PENETRANT TEST   "On September 14, 2012, during the Byron Station Unit 1 refueling outage, it was determined that the results of planned Liquid Penetrant (PT) examinations performed on two previous overlay repairs of the reactor vessel head do not meet applicable acceptance criteria. Both penetrations require repairs prior to returning the vessel head to service. These indications are not in the reactor coolant pressure boundary; however they are very near the previously repaired J-groove weld. The examinations were being performed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME Code Case N-729-1, to ensure the structural integrity of the reactor vessel head pressure boundary. No ultrasonic indications have been identified at this time. Repairs are currently being planned, which will include buff of the rejectable area and retest, and will be completed prior to returning the vessel head to service. If retest of the rejectable areas is unacceptable, then additional repairs will be required prior to returning the vessel head to service.  "This condition is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) since the as found indications did not meet applicable acceptance criteria referenced in ASME Code Case N-729-1 to remain in-service without repair. Any further examination failures and repairs will be updated under this ENS Notification.   "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."  The original indications that led to the two overlay repairs were discovered during ultrasonic testing and were reported to the NRC and assigned EN #46686.|
Power Reactor|48312|FITZPATRICK|ENTERGY NUCLEAR|1|LYCOMING|NY|OSWEGO||Y|05000333|1|||[1] GE-4|ROBERT BRUNS|DONG HWA PARK|9/16/2012 00:00:00|12:57|9/16/2012 00:00:00|10:55|EDT|9/16/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(i)|PLANT S/D REQD BY TS|||||||CHRISTOPHER NEWPORT|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Startup|0|Hot Shutdown|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN  "At 1055 EDT on September 16, 2012 with the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF) at 0% power while performing a planned reactor shutdown for a refueling outage, multiple control rods were conservatively declared inoperable due to the potential for control rod channel interference in the event of a seismic event. In response to [the] GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) recommendations regarding the 10CFR Part 21 issue for control rod blade interference, JAF has implemented compensatory measures that require control rods with a Cell Friction Metric (CFM) greater than or equal to 100 be declared inoperable upon RPV pressure decreasing below 800 psig if a full stroke insertion test has not performed within the past 14 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD). During a planned shutdown, reactor pressure decreased below 800 psig before all control rods could be fully inserted using normal control rod insertion methods. With nine or more control rods inoperable in Mode 1 or 2, JAF Technical Specifications (LCO 3.1.3 Condition E) require the unit be placed in Mode 3 within 12 hours. This condition was entered at 1055 EDT and the unit was placed in Mode 3 at 1226 EDT. This event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i), 'The initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications.'  "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."|
Power Reactor|48313|FORT CALHOUN|OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT|4|FORT CALHOUN|NE|WASHINGTON||Y|05000285|1|||(1) CE|ROBERT KROS|DONG HWA PARK|9/17/2012 00:00:00|15:23|9/17/2012 00:00:00|08:58|CDT|9/17/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||GEOFFREY MILLER|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Cold Shutdown|0|Cold Shutdown|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||LOSS OF EMERGENCY SIRENS  "At 0858 hrs. [CDT], Corporate Communications notified the control room that there was a communication issue with the emergency siren router.  Based on the report, all sirens for the Alert Notification System within the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) were declared nonfunctional and notifications were completed.  Local law enforcement has been notified in the required surrounding counties and compensatory measures are in place to ensure notification of the public in case of an actual emergency.  "Troubleshooting of the siren's communication system revealed that a peripheral router power supply had failed.  The power supply was replaced at 0935 and router restarted.  At 0955 sirens were restored to the counties of Harrison and Pottawattamie in Iowa. Communications were restored to all but one siren, in Washington County Nebraska by 1031, with that one siren (Siren 35) restored at 1103. All repairs completed and retested satisfactorily with proper communications confirmed with each siren.  The power supply failure resulted in 2.1 hours with the sirens being unavailable.  Notifications have been completed with compensatory actions by local law enforcement secured.    "This is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for 'Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, off site response capability, or communications capability.'"  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Fuel Cycle Facility|48314|HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.|HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.|2|METROPOLIS|IL|MASSAC|SUB-526|Y|04003392||||URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION|MICHAEL ABEL|DONG HWA PARK|9/17/2012 00:00:00|16:29|9/17/2012 00:00:00|09:30|CDT|9/17/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|40.60(b)(3)|MED TREAT INVOLVING CONTAM|||||||SCOTT SHAEFFER|R2DO|DAVID PSTRAK|NMSS|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||UNPLANNED MEDICAL TREATMENT OF A CONTAMINATED EMPLOYEE  "An employee reported to the dispensary this morning with a thermal burn from a steam line to the neck area [at approximately] 0930 CDT. The plant nurse administered preliminary treatment and decided to transport the employee to a local medical facility. A whole body survey of the employee in his plant clothing was performed; the maximum amount of contamination was present on his left boot, 36,866 dpm/100cm2. Prior to leaving the Restricted Area, the employee removed all plant clothing, changed into his personal clothing, and was re-surveyed. The employee was free of contamination upon release."  The contamination was from uranium ore concentrates.  The licensee informed R2 (Richard Gibson) via voicemail.|
Agreement State|48315|ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH|APPLIED INSPECTION SYSTEMS INC.|4|BENTON|AR||ARK-576-03310|Y||||||JARED THOMPSON|PETE SNYDER|9/17/2012 00:00:00|17:19|9/17/2012 00:00:00|14:20|CDT|9/18/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||GEOFFREY MILLER|R4DO|CHRISTOPHER CAHILL|R1DO|BRIAN MCDERMOTT|FSME|BARRY WRAY|ILTA|WILLIAM GOTT|IRD|||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA MISSING IN TRANSIT  This report submitted by email from the Agreement State of Arkansas:  "On September 17, 2012 at 1420, the Radiation Safety Officer for Applied Inspection Systems, Inc. (ARK-576-03310) in Benton, Arkansas notified the Department that a radiography camera shipped via [a transportation company] had not been delivered to their location.  The camera was shipped from a jobsite in Montoursville, Pennsylvania on September 11, 2012.  The camera was scheduled for delivery on September 14, 2012 at the licensee's facility in Benton, Arkansas.  "The licensee has begun investigating the location of the camera through use of the tracking number and in conversation with customer service.  The licensee has verified that the camera is not at the Pennsylvania location as of September 17, 2012.  "Camera Information: SPEC Model 150; Serial Number: 1301; Source: Iridium-192; Source Serial Number: TF0807  "The camera was shipped in an overpack cardboard container supplied by SPEC.  "The licensee and [the Arkansas Department of Health] are continuing to monitor and search for the camera.  Investigation remains on-going."  Arkansas Incident Number: AR-2012-007  Additionally notified: DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, EPA, DOE, HHS, and USDA.   * * * UPDATE ON 9/18/12 AT 1240 EDT FROM JARED THOMPSON TO PETE SNYDER VIA EMAIL * * *   "The radiography camera and source have been located and has arrived at the licensee's facility on September 18, 2012 at 1040 [CDT]. The package was found in the [transportation] facility in Newark, New Jersey in the afternoon of September 17, 2012. It appears that the shipping documentation had been changed and the package was misplaced.  "The camera was surveyed and there appears to be no damage to the source or camera.  "The licensee will be preparing a report for the [Arkansas Department of Health].  "The [Arkansas Department of Health] considers this event closed."  Notified R4DO (Miller), R1DO (Cahill), FSME-Day EO (McIntosh), ILTAB (Wray), DHS SWO, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, DHS, and EPA.  THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 2" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL  Category 2 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for a short time (minutes to hours).  It could possibly be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of hours to days.  These sources are typically used in practices such as industrial gamma radiography, high dose rate brachytherapy and medium dose rate brachytherapy. For additional information go to  http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf|
Power Reactor|48316|GRAND GULF|ENTERGY NUCLEAR|4|PORT GIBSON|MS|CLAIBORNE||Y|05000416|1|||[1] GE-6|ROGER BUTLER|DONG HWA PARK|9/17/2012 00:00:00|18:03|9/17/2012 00:00:00|14:25|CDT|9/17/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(xi)|OFFSITE NOTIFICATION|||||||GEOFFREY MILLER|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||PRESS RELEASE REGARDING LABOR NEGOTIATIONS  "Entergy became aware of incorrect information that had been given to the media regarding employees being locked out of the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station.  Entergy will be making the following statement:  "Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Negotiations Update  "Entergy will continue to negotiate with UGSOA [United Government Security Officers of America] Local 36, representing Grand Gulf security officers, in good faith to bring contract negotiations to a successful closure, and those security officers remain on the job today.  The current contract expires at midnight September 30.   "In keeping with the best interest of safety and maintaining formal organizational controls at the plant site, the company will pursue contingency plans for alternate staffing, consistent with Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations, as the contract expiration date nears."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48317|LASALLE|EXELON NUCLEAR CO.|3|MARSEILLES|IL|LA SALLE||Y|05000373|1|2||[1] GE-5,[2] GE-5|TODD GRANLUND|VINCE KLCO|9/18/2012 00:00:00|05:59|9/18/2012 00:00:00|01:15|CDT|9/18/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)|POT UNCNTRL RAD REL|||||||MARK RING|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||MALFUNCTION OF THE SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DOOR INTERLOCK  "This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to Control the Release of Radioactive Material. An employee entered a secondary containment interlock and identified that both doors of the interlock opened simultaneously when the door on the reactor building side was opened. The employee immediately secured both doors in the interlock and notified the Main Control Room Supervisor. Both doors in the interlock were open for approximately 10 seconds. With both doors open, TS SR 3.6.4.1.2 was not met. This rendered secondary containment inoperable per TS 3.6.4.1. Reactor Building differential pressure, as observed in the Main Control Room, has remained less than -0.25" H20 at all times. Initial investigation determined that a mechanical interlock for the doors was malfunctioning. Administrative controls have been put in place to ensure the doors remain closed pending repairs to the mechanical interlock."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48318|COMANCHE PEAK|TXU GENERATION COMPANY LP|4|GLEN ROSE|TX|SOMERVELL||Y|05000445|1|2||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|ROBERT DANIELS|PETE SNYDER|9/18/2012 00:00:00|11:58|9/18/2012 00:00:00|10:55|CDT|9/20/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||GEOFFREY MILLER|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||OUTAGE OF PLANT RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM REMOTE READOUT DUE TO PLANNED MODIFICATION  "On September 18, 2012, power was removed from SCADA A of the Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) to perform a planned system modification. During this period, data for most Unit 1 radiation monitors will not be electronically available in the emergency response facilities and will not be supplied to the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), if activated. System alarms and data displays will still be available to the plant operators in the Control Room. The expected duration of RMS remote data partial inoperability is approximately 72 hours. The loss of Unit 1 remote readout capability requires compensatory measures to be used for the acquisition of radiological data in the emergency response facilities. These compensatory measures have been communicated to the emergency response organization, Therefore, it is expected that appropriate assessment of plant conditions, notifications, and communications could still be made, if required, during the time that the portions of the RMS are inoperable. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), which is any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability. An update message will be provided when the RMS is restored."   The NRC Resident has been notified.  * * * UPDATE FROM TONY SIROIS TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1749 EDT ON 09/20/12 * * *  "The Radiation Monitoring System alarms and data displays have been restored to the Comanche Peak Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) following completion of planned system modifications.  The emergency assessment capability of the Comanche Peak ERF have been re-established.  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified the R4DO (Geoffrey Miller)|
Power Reactor|48319|PERRY|FIRSTENERGY NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY|3|PERRY|OH|LAKE||Y|05000440|1|||[1] GE-6|LLOYD ZERR|DONG HWA PARK|9/18/2012 00:00:00|12:58|7/23/2012 00:00:00|20:57|EDT|9/18/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.73(a)(1)|INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION|||||||MARK RING|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|96|Power Operation|96|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||INVALID SYSTEM ACTUATIONS  "On July 23, 2012, at 2057 hours, the Perry Nuclear Power Plant experienced a loss of the normal power supply to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) A electrical bus. The loss of RPS bus A caused an actuation of several Division 1 containment outboard isolation valves. The actuation signal caused full closure of one or more valves in each of the following Division 1 subsystems: Main Steam line drains, Containment Radiation Monitor, Drywell Radiation Monitor, Reactor Water Cleanup, Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup, Liquid Radwaste Sumps, Containment Vessel Chilled Water, Containment Vacuum Relief, Condensate Transfer and Storage, Mixed Bed Demineralizer and Distribution, Containment Personnel Airlocks, Service Air, and Instrument Air. Division 2 components and valves were not affected.  "This event is considered an invalid system actuation reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The isolation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters, and was not a manual initiation. Therefore, this notification is provided via a 60 day optional phone call in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) instead of submitting a written Licensee Event Report.  "The event meets reporting criteria specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(2) as a general containment isolation valve signal affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system. All affected systems functioned as expected in response to an outboard isolation signal. The valves were reopened in accordance with plant procedures. The failure mechanism that caused the loss of RPS bus A was a degraded voltage regulator. The voltage regulator was replaced and retested with satisfactory results.  "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."|
Agreement State|48320|TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH|BAYER MATERIAL SCIENCE LLC|4|BAYTOWN|TX||01577|Y||||||KAREN BLANCHARD|DONG HWA PARK|9/19/2012 00:00:00|14:47|9/19/2012 00:00:00||CDT|9/19/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||GEOFFREY MILLER|R4DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIXED GAUGE SHUTTERS STUCK OPEN  State of Texas provided the following information via email:  "On September 19, 2012, the licensee notified the Agency [Texas Department of Health] that during a routine inspection it had discovered that the shutters on two Berthold LB-300L gauges were stuck in the open position.  Both gauges contained cobalt-60 sources: one source was 1.9 milliCuries and the other was 1.68 milliCuries.  Since these gauges normally operate in the open position, there was no increased risk of exposure to any individual.  The licensee is making arrangements for a licensed vendor representative to make repairs as soon as possible.  Information will be provided in accordance with SA-300 as it is obtained.  "Source holder/source information: 1.9 mCi cobalt-60 source holder/source SN: 1412/1-7-98; 1.68 mCi cobalt-60 source holder/source SN: 1771/2-11-00."  Texas Incident #: I-8990|
Part 21|48321|THE SHAW GROUP INC.|CIVES STEEL COMPANY|1|CHARLOTTE|NC|||Y||||||EDWARD HUBNER|PETE SNYDER|9/19/2012 00:00:00|15:15|9/19/2012 00:00:00||EDT|9/19/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|21.21(a)(2)|INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION|||||||GERALD MCCOY|R2DO|PART 21 GROUP|E-MA|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||INTERIM 10 CFR PART 21 REPORT REGARDING EMBEDMENTS FOR AP1000 PROJECT VOGTLE UNITS 3 AND 4  "[This notification] provides an interim report in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21 pertaining to the identification of noncompliances and deviations associated with embedments being supplied as basic components for the Vogtle Units 3 and 4, nuclear project.  "The evaluation of reportability in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21 could not be completed within the 60 day evaluation period due to the number of components found with noncompliances and deviations. It is currently expected that the evaluation of these conditions will be completed by November 6, 2012.  "If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Geoffrey Grant, Vice President of Licensing, Regulatory Affairs and Compliance."  "Component Supplier: Cives Steel Company of 102 Airport Road; Thomasville, GA 31757  "During receipt inspection, QC inspectors found that some of the embedments received from Cives Steel Company had noncompliances and deviations, some of which warranted evaluation under 10 CFR Part 21. Examples of the types of deviations identified include unacceptable welds and weld repairs, missing Nelson studs, damaged Nelson studs, improper painting, incorrect dimensions, and illegible markings for identification. Approximately 211 embedments have been identified as having a noncompliance or deviation.  "It is currently expected that the reportability evaluation for 10 CFR Part 21 will be completed by November 6, 2012, due to the quantity of embedments identified and the time required to evaluate the effects from these noncompliances and deviations."|
Agreement State|48322|UTAH DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL|ENERGY SOLUTIONS LLC|4|CLIVE|UT||UT2300249|Y||||||GWYNN GALLOWAY|PETE SNYDER|9/19/2012 00:00:00|17:34|9/18/2012 00:00:00|14:00|MDT|9/19/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||GEOFFREY MILLER|R4DO|FSME EVENT RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SURFACE CONTAMINATION IDENTIFIED ON A SHIPMENT  The following information was received from the State of Utah via email:  "During the normal receipt process of a shipment #0870-09-0101 of LLRW [low level radioactive waste] on September 18, 2012, Energy Solutions personnel found one barrel in a shipment of five barrels that had removable beta contamination (tritium) which exceeded U.S. DOT limits.  There was no visible damage to the barrel and no indication that the barrel had leaked during transport.  Licensee personnel surveyed the other barrels in the shipment and the vehicle.  No removable beta contamination was found and the vehicle was released on September 18, 2012.  "[Utah Division of Radiation Control] staff are investigating this incident."  Utah Incident No.:  UT120002|
Power Reactor|48323|NINE MILE POINT|CONSTELLATION NUCLEAR|1|SYRACUSE|NY|OSWEGO||Y|05000220|1|||[1] GE-2,[2] GE-5|PHILIP M. NICHOLS|JOHN KNOKE|9/20/2012 00:00:00|11:55|9/20/2012 00:00:00|09:23|EDT|9/20/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)|RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL|50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)|VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION|||||CHRISTOPHER CAHILL|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||A/R|Y|100|Power Operation|0|Hot Shutdown|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AUTOMATIC SCRAM AND HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM INITIATION  "On September 20, 2012 at 0923 EDT, Nine Mile Point Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor scram due to a turbine trip at power. The cause of the turbine trip is currently under investigation. All control rods fully inserted and all plant systems responded per design following the scram.  "Following the automatic scram, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System automatically initiated as expected. At Nine Mile Point Unit 1, a HPCI System actuation signal on low Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) level is normally received following a reactor scram, due to level shrink. HPCI is a flow control mode of the normal feedwater systems, and is not an Emergency Core Cooling System. At 0924 EDT, RPV level was restored above the HPCI System low level actuation set point and the HPCI System initiation signal was reset. Pressure control was established on the Turbine Bypass Valves, the preferred system. No Electromatic Relief Valves actuated due to this scram.  "Nine Mile Point Unit 1 is currently in Hot Shutdown, with reactor water level and pressure maintained within normal bands. Decay heat is being removed via steam to the main condenser using the bypass valves. The offsite grid is stable with no grid restrictions or warnings in effect. One 115kv off site power source (Line 4) is unavailable for planned maintenance at the James A Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant. Both Reserve Station Transformers are in service and being supplied by the other 115kv offsite power source (Line 1). Both Emergency Diesel Generators are operable and in standby. The unit is currently implementing post scram recovery procedures."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  Licensee has notified the state.|
Agreement State|48324|PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION|UNIVERSAL WELL SERVICES|1|MEADVILLE|PA||PA-1446|Y||||||JOSEPH MELNIC|JOHN KNOKE|9/20/2012 00:00:00|13:21|9/18/2012 00:00:00||EDT|9/20/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||CHRISTOPHER CAHILL|R1DO|FSME EVENT RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SHUTTER FAILURE  The following information was provided by the State of Pennsylvania via facsimile:  "On September 19, 2012, the licensee sent notification via email to the Department's Central Office regarding an event that took place on September 18, 2012. The event is reportable within 24 hours per 10CFR 30.50(b)(2).  "The licensee discovered during a routine maintenance inspection that the pin which allows the shutter handle to move was stuck in the closed position, rendering the shutter inoperable. No radiation exposure to personnel is believed to have occurred. The cause of the event was normal wear of gauge. The handle is in the closed position and the gauge has been taken out of service. A reactive inspection is planned by the Department's Western Regional Office.  "The device is identified as: Manufacturer: Berthold Technologies USA, LLC Model: LB8010 Serial #: 10055 Isotope: Cs-137 Activity: 20 mCi Source Serial Number: 0800/08"  Event Report ID No: PA120031|
Power Reactor|48325|THREE MILE ISLAND|AMERGEN ENERGY COMPANY|1|MIDDLETOWN|PA|DAUPHIN||N|05000289|1|||[1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP|DAVID LEWIS|JOHN KNOKE|9/20/2012 00:00:00|16:15|9/20/2012 00:00:00|14:16|EDT|9/20/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)|RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL|50.72(b)(2)(xi)|OFFSITE NOTIFICATION|||||CHRISTOPHER CAHILL|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||A/R|Y|100|Power Operation|0|Hot Shutdown|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM ACTUATION  "On September 20th at 1416 EDT, Three Mile Island automatically tripped due to a flux to flow imbalance as a result of a trip of the 'C' reactor coolant pump. The cause of the trip of the 'C' reactor coolant pump is still under investigation.  "The electrical grid is stable and unit 1 is being supplied by offsite power. All control rods have fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed by main feedwater flow to both steam generators that are exhausting via the normal main condenser cooling loop under manual control. Preliminary evaluation indicates that all plant systems functioned normally following the reactor trip, except for automatic operation of turbine bypass valve control due to failure of the automatic control function to control precisely at setpoint. Three Mile Island remains stable in hot shutdown mode while conducting the post trip review. No radioactive releases were experienced as a result of this event.  "This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation, and under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(xi) due to an information release to local officials. Both are four hour reports.  "The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."    The licensee has notified the state and local governments, and will be making a media release.|
Agreement State|48326|TENNESSEE DIV OF RAD HEALTH|UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE MEDICAL CENTER|1|KNOXVILLE|TN||R-47011|Y||||||JERRY BINGAMAN|JOHN KNOKE|9/20/2012 00:00:00|16:38|9/11/2012 00:00:00||EDT|9/20/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||CHRISTOPHER CAHILL|R1DO|FSME EVENT RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PATIENT RECEIVED UNDERDOSE OF Y-90 MICROSPHERES  The following information was provided by the State of Tennessee via facsimile:  "On September 11, 2012, the Division of Radiological Health received a report from the University of Tennessee Medical Center regarding a misadministration that occurred September 11, 2012. A patient was prescribed a dose of 20.0 mCi of Y-90 SirSphere microspheres, and only 15.32 mCi was administered. The administered dosage was 23% less than prescribed and will result in an absorbed dose of 40.1 Gy less than the calculated 171.3 Gy. The reason why this event occurred is not known.   "The residual activity was detectable in the SirSpheres waste container which contained the V-vial; tubing, catheters, and protective radioactive waste cloths. The administered dosage is still considered to be within therapeutic range, but less than that prescribed by the physician. The patient and the referring physician were both notified on September 11, 2012. Inspectors from the Knoxville Field Office will follow-up on this incident."  A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials.  It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.|
Power Reactor|48327|BROWNS FERRY|TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY|2|DECATUR|AL|LIMESTONE||Y|05000259|1|2|3|[1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4|WILLIAM BALL|DONALD NORWOOD|9/20/2012 00:00:00|20:47|9/20/2012 00:00:00|12:40|CDT|9/20/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||GERALD MCCOY|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|LOSS OF EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY DUE TO INOPERABLE SEISMIC MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION  "At 1240 CDT on 9/20/2012, Operations personnel determined that Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant had experienced a loss of assessment capability.  The loss of assessment capability identified was due to not having functional seismic monitoring instrumentation during performance of a modification.  The loss of seismic monitoring capability was determined to have existed from 8/17/2012 until 9/15/2012.  "The ability to declare an Unusual Event per Emergency Action Level 7.1-U or an Alert per Emergency Action Level 7.1-A could potentially be hampered by the unavailability of the seismic monitoring instrumentation, because the declarations would be based on personnel feeling an earthquake.  In addition, the unavailability of the seismic monitoring instrumentation could potentially hamper the operators in determining the magnitude of an earthquake in order to determine if it reached Operating Basis Earthquake levels or Safe Shutdown Earthquake levels.  Therefore, this event is being considered reportable as it results in a loss of emergency assessment capability.  Compensatory measures were established on 9/15/2012 which restored assessment capability.  "This condition is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).  The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."|
Power Reactor|48328|BRAIDWOOD|EXELON NUCLEAR CO.|3|BRACEVILLE|IL|WILL||Y|05000456|1|2||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|JOHN LOGAN|BILL HUFFMAN|9/21/2012 00:00:00|01:20|9/20/2012 00:00:00|20:35|CDT|9/21/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||MARK RING|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION INOPERABLE  "At 2035 CDT on 9/20/2012 power was removed from the Technical Support Center ventilation for planned maintenance on the supply breaker and the supply breaker cubicle.  At 2109 CDTduring restoration, it was discovered that the breaker for the Technical Support Center ventilation could not be closed.  "The cause for not being able to close the supply breaker is unknown. Troubleshooting is currently in progress and the Technical Support Center ventilation is expected to be returned to service on 09/21/2012.  "This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev.2 since this work activity affects an emergency response facility."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48332|QUAD CITIES|EXELON NUCLEAR CO.|3|CORDOVA|IL|ROCK ISLAND||Y|||2||[1] GE-3,[2] GE-3|ANDREW MITCHELL|JOHN KNOKE|9/21/2012 00:00:00|18:48|9/21/2012 00:00:00|14:49|CDT|9/21/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)|POT UNCNTRL RAD REL|||||||MARK RING|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||DRYWELL RADIATION MONITOR INOPERABLE  "At 1449 CDT on September 21, 2012, the 2B Drywell Radiation Monitor was found downscale during control room panel monitoring. This monitor provides the input into one division of the primary containment isolation logic for a Group II isolation. As a result, the channel was placed in a tripped condition at 1515 hours in accordance with Technical Specification 3.3.6.1, Condition B.  "Initial troubleshooting indicates that one of the two divisions of the isolation logic was inoperable. Given both divisions are required to complete the Group II isolation logic, this condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.  "The station is currently taking action to restore the 2B Drywell Radiation Monitor to an operable condition.  "The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.|
Power Reactor|48333|GINNA|ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.|1|ONTARIO|NY|WAYNE||Y|05000244|1|||[1] W-2-LP|REX REISSNER|DONALD NORWOOD|9/21/2012 00:00:00|20:28|9/21/2012 00:00:00|14:00|EDT|9/28/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)|UNANALYZED CONDITION|||||||CHRISTOPHER CAHILL|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||UNANALYZED CONDITION IDENTIFIED IN APPENDIX R FIRE SCENARIO  "On September 21, 2012, a condition was identified where hydrogen may become entrained in the charging pump suction after the credited pump is restarted as part of the alternate shutdown procedure for the Auxiliary Building basement and mezzanine levels.  "An air operated valve separates the Volume Control Tank (VCT) from the charging pump suction and this valve fails open on loss of air or power caused by the postulated fire.  The alternate flow path from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) fails closed on a loss of air or power.  A manual valve is provided to bypass this closed valve.  However, due to hydrogen pressure in the VCT and the potential for significant pressure losses in the piping from the RWST to the charging pump suction, insufficient elevation head exists in the RWST to ensure that hydrogen will not become entrained.  If this condition is left unmitigated, the credited charging pump is assumed to fail.  "Due to the location of the postulated fire and its impact on equipment and cables, no other inventory makeup sources are credited.  "Compensatory Measures have been implemented as follows: 1.  All fire detection and suppression systems in the Appendix R fire zones have been verified functional. 2.  All Hot Work in the area has been suspended. 3.  Continuous Fire Watch has been posted in the Appendix R fire zone. 4.  Combustion engine powered vehicles are restricted from entering the Auxiliary Building. 5.  Within 24 hours remove all non-attended transient combustible materials from Appendix R fire zones.  "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."   * * * RETRACTION FROM REISNER TO SNYDER ON 9/28/12 AT 1415 EDT * * *   "This is a retraction of ENS report 48333 that was submitted at 2028 EDT on Friday, September 21 , 2012.  "A 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) ENS notification was made due to a condition that was identified where hydrogen may become entrained in the charging pump suction after the credited pump is restarted as part of the alternate shutdown procedure in the event of a fire in the Auxiliary Building basement and mezzanine levels.  "A subsequent engineering evaluation calculated the amount of gas that will be entrained into the charging pump suction flow and the duration of the entrainment. This evaluation demonstrates that for the most limiting Appendix R scenario that the charging pump will entrain a minimal amount of gas for a short duration, and is unaffected by this condition. Inventory control for the reactor coolant system is maintained throughout the scenario.  "Based on the above information the 'Unanalyzed Condition' ENS notification made on September 21, 2012 is being retracted."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified R1DO (Bellamy).|
Power Reactor|48334|LIMERICK|EXELON NUCLEAR CO.|1|PHILADELPHIA|PA|MONTGOMERY||N|05000352|1|2||[1] GE-4,[2] GE-4|DAN WILLIAMSON|DONALD NORWOOD|9/21/2012 00:00:00|21:29|9/21/2012 00:00:00|16:00|EDT|9/21/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A)|DEGRADED CONDITION|50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)|POT UNCNTRL RAD REL|||||CHRISTOPHER CAHILL|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||ISOLATION VALVES COULD FAIL TO FULLY CLOSE  "A review of load sequencing during a design basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA) with offsite power available has identified an issue with 24 motor operated valves (MOVs - 12 per unit).  These valves all use limit switch 8 (LS-8) as an isolation permissive and may indicate closed if they are in a dead band zone when stroking closed from a containment isolation signal at the time of the load shed.  The valves will then not resume movement to full isolation when power is restored potentially impacting containment leakage.  This condition could occur during specific LOCA conditions, dependent on several variables.  "The systems affected by this issue are: - RWCU - DWCW - PCIG - CAC - Suppression Pool Cleanup  "Actions are in progress to resolve the LS-8 issue with a modification to remove this vulnerability.  Appropriate testing will be done to prove that all valves perform their required safety function after the modifications are complete for each valve.  "All affected valves are either closed and de-energized, or have been modified at this time."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48338|FERMI|DETROIT EDISON CO.|3|NEWPORT|MI|MONROE||N|05000341|2|||[2] GE-4|BRETT JEBBIA|BILL HUFFMAN|9/24/2012 00:00:00|11:23|9/24/2012 00:00:00|04:07|EDT|9/24/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||MARK RING|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|68|Power Operation|68|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM PROCESS COMPUTER DATA SERVER FAILURE  "At 04:07 EDT on September 24, 2012, Fermi 2 experienced a failure of a data server within the Process Computer system. The failure of the data server does affect data input to the server providing information to the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS).  ERDS is currently not receiving updated information from Fermi data systems. This loss in capability is being reported as a loss of assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).  "Indications of related plant variables are available in the Main Control Room. The Visual Annunciator System (VAS) and other portions of the Process Computer system remain functional. Meteorological and process effluent radiological monitor indications are available and dose assessment capability is available. Fermi 2 personnel will use normal phone communications to update NRC Operations Center in the case of an event declaration. Information normally provided by ERDS can be transmitted via the notification system as described in the Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Plan."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48339|DIABLO CANYON|PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO.|4|AVILA BEACH|CA|SAN LUIS OBISPO||Y|05000275|1|2||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|GLENN GOELZER|BILL HUFFMAN|9/25/2012 00:00:00|09:46|9/25/2012 00:00:00|05:55|PDT|9/27/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||GREG WERNER|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE  "On September 25, 2012, power was removed from various Technical Support Center (TSC) systems to perform planned system preventative maintenance (PM) and corrective maintenance (CM) activities. During these maintenance activities, the normal TSC and Operational Support Center (OSC) are unavailable for use during an emergency. The Plant Data Network (PDN) will not be available to the TSC. This will render the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), Emergency Response Facility Display System (ERFDS), Emergency Assessment and Response System (EARS) and the Post LOCA Sampling System in the TSC unavailable. System alarms and data displays will still be available to the plant operators in the Control Room. The expected duration of the power outage is approximately 39 hours.  "As compensatory measures, the backup emergency response facilities will be manned during an emergency. This compensatory measure has been communicated to the emergency response organization. It is expected that appropriate assessment of plant conditions, notifications, and communications could still be made, if required, during the time that the normal TSC and OSC are unavailable. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), which is any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability. An update message will be provided when the emergency response facilities are restored."  The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.  * * * UPDATE FROM GOELZER TO KLCO ON 9/27/12 AT 0025 EDT * * *   "This is an update to EN #48339 report on September 25, 2012, where Pacific Gas & Electric company (PG&E) reported that a planned maintenance power outage caused the normal Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operational Support Center (OSC) to be unavailable for use during an emergency.    "PG&E has completed all preventative maintenance (PM) and corrective maintenance (CM) activities that required the power outage to the TSC and OSC and has completed the restoration of these emergency response facilities.  Plant personnel have been notified that the normal emergency response facilities have been restored.    "PG&E personnel have informed the NRC Resident Inspector."  Notified the R4DO (Werner).|
Power Reactor|48341|MONTICELLO|NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY|3|MONTICELLO|MN|WRIGHT||N|05000263|1|||[1] GE-3|BEN COOK|DONG HWA PARK|9/25/2012 00:00:00|15:11|9/25/2012 00:00:00|10:44|CDT|9/25/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)|RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL|50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)|VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION|||||MARK RING|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||A/R|Y|100|Power Operation|0|Hot Shutdown|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DURING MAINTENANCE ON 4160V BUS 12 AMMETER  "During maintenance on 4160V Bus 12 ammeter, a Bus 12 lockout occurred. The station power was from 1R Reserve transformer for work on the 2R Auxiliary transformer. Net effect was Bus 12 locked out, removing power from 12 Reactor Feed Pump and 12 Reactor Recirculation pump. Reactor level lowered to +23 inches then began to rise. With both Main Feed Reg Valves in AUTO, the level transient reached +48 inches, the Reactor Water Level Hi Hi setpoint. The Main Turbine and 11 Reactor Feed Pump tripped as designed, and a Reactor SCRAM occurred. Reactor water level began to drop, and C.4.A Abnormal Procedure for SCRAM was used to restart 11 Reactor Feed Pump and recover water level. Minimum water level reached was -26 inches. Reactor Low Level SCRAM signal and Group 2 Primary Containment isolation occurred at +9 inches as designed, No Safety Relief valves lifted during this transient. High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) did not receive an initiation signal due to not reaching their setpoints. There were no Emergency Core Cooling Systems initiation setpoints reached. Prior to the event, both divisions of Standby Liquid Control were inoperable as part of planned maintenance."  All control rods fully inserted.  Decay heat is being removed through the turbine bypass to the main condenser.  The plant is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup and stable in Mode 3.  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the State and local governments.|
Power Reactor|48342|SURRY|DOMINION GENERATION|2|SURRY|VA|SURRY||N|05000280|1|2||[1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP|THOMAS D. OLIVER|DONG HWA PARK|9/25/2012 00:00:00|18:07|9/25/2012 00:00:00|15:30|EDT|9/25/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(xi)|OFFSITE NOTIFICATION|||||||REBECCA NEASE|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO TRITIUM IN OVERFLOW  "At 1215 hours on September 24, 2012, Surry Power Station personnel confirmed the presence of tritium at a level of 1,450 picoCuries/Liter (pCi/L) in a Unit 2 Turbine Building heating steam drain receiver (HSDR) tank. This tank collects condensate from steam which is used to heat buildings. A sample of the condensate was analyzed following failure of the pump (used to control level) which resulted in the tank overflowing to a drain line on September 17 and 23. The sample was taken because the drain line was degraded and the overflow resulted in a release to the environment.  "The normal inputs into this drain line had been isolated from use in August when the degraded pipe was discovered. Currently, the tank contents are being diverted to a sump until repairs to the drain line and pump are complete. These are expected to complete in the next couple of weeks.  "Both releases were estimated to be greater than 100 gallons. The location of the leak was within the Protected Area of Surry Power Station. There has been no tritium detected in any monitoring wells in the vicinity of the degraded drain line, nor in any monitoring wells outside the Protected Area. Because the leak remained onsite, no offsite impact to ground water is expected. Furthermore, the leak posed no threat to employees or the public.  "Because there was a detectable amount of licensed material in the water, Surry implemented communication to offsite agencies as part of [licensee] commitment to the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Ground Water Protection Initiative.  "This notification is being transmitted due to Notification of Other Government Agencies under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). The Virginia Department of Environmental Quality, Virginia Department of Health, Virginia Department of Emergency Management, NRC Senior Resident Inspector and Surry County Administrator were notified."|
Power Reactor|48343|MONTICELLO|NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY|3|MONTICELLO|MN|WRIGHT||N|05000263|1|||[1] GE-3|JERRY STOCKHAM|DONG HWA PARK|9/25/2012 00:00:00|18:23|9/25/2012 00:00:00|15:00|CDT|9/25/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(xi)|OFFSITE NOTIFICATION|||||||MARK RING|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Hot Shutdown|0|Hot Shutdown|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO HYDRAULIC LEAK  "On September 25, 2012 at 1055 CDT, a road grader developed a hydraulic leak on a steering hose. This resulted in a light mist of approximately 20 gallons of oil being sprayed for a quarter mile.  Three hundred feet of that was on gravel and the rest on blacktop.  There is no actual or potential impact to the environment.   "There is no impact to plant operation.  At 1500 CDT, [the licensee was] notified by Xcel Energy Environmental Services that the State has been notified."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48344|SAN ONOFRE|SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON  COMPANY|4|SAN CLEMENTE|CA|SAN DIEGO||Y|||2|3|[1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE|CHUCK HAIDAR|JOHN KNOKE|9/25/2012 00:00:00|22:50|9/25/2012 00:00:00|17:07|PDT|9/25/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(xi)|OFFSITE NOTIFICATION|||||||GREG WERNER|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0|Cold Shutdown|0|Cold Shutdown|N|N|0|Refueling|0|Refueling|OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO A FREON LEAK FROM BUILDING AIR CONDITIONER  "The control room was notified by the Environmental Protection Group that 43 lbs of Freon was released [from an air conditioning unit] at the Administration Warehouse Supply/Shop, not in the Protected Area, and that it was reported to the California Emergency Management Agency at 17:19 PDT and San Diego County at 17:12 PDT, per lAW procedure SO123-XV-17.3, 'Spill Contingency Plan'.  "There is no longer a Freon release in progress."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48345|MONTICELLO|NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY|3|MONTICELLO|MN|WRIGHT||N|05000263|1|||[1] GE-3|RANDY SAND|VINCE KLCO|9/26/2012 00:00:00|09:47|9/26/2012 00:00:00|08:00|CDT|9/26/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||MARK RING|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Hot Shutdown|0|Hot Shutdown|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) PLANNED MAINTENANCE ACTIVITY  "On 9/26/12, the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant's TSC power supply will be isolated to perform a planned maintenance activity.  The maintenance activity requires implementation of compensatory measures to maintain TSC functions during the planned activity.  Compensatory measures include having the Emergency Director report to Control Room and relocating the remaining TSC staff at the EOF should an event be declared requiring Emergency Response Organization (ERO) activation.  Maintenance activity is scheduled to be complete with the TSC fully functional by end of dayshift on 9/26/12.  Site ERO has been notified of maintenance activity and instructed on planned compensatory measures to be implemented during activity if required.  This event is considered reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."  The licensee will notify the Minnesota State Duty Officer, and the Sherriff Departments for both Wright and Sherburne Counties.  * * * UPDATE ON 9/26/12 AT 1734 EDT FROM TOM PROELL TO DONG PARK * * *  "At approximately 1520 Central time, a disturbance occurred in the 12.5kV system during restoration activities for the TSC power supply. This would have caused a Major Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and thus is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee is investigating the disturbance. The EOF and all other emergency assessment capabilities were verified functional. The licensee notified NRC Resident Inspector."  The disturbance to the 12.5kV system did not affect plant operations.  Notified R3DO (Lipa).|
Power Reactor|48347|PALO VERDE|ARIZONA NUCLEAR POWER PROJECT|4|WINTERSBURG|AZ|MARICOPA||Y|05000528|1|2|3|[1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE|DELBERT ELKINTON|MARK ABRAMOVITZ|9/26/2012 00:00:00|19:49|9/26/2012 00:00:00|13:36|MST|9/26/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(xi)|OFFSITE NOTIFICATION|||||||GREG WERNER|R4DO|DARYL JOHNSON|ILTA|WILLIAM RULAND|NRR|JANE MARSHALL|IRD|||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|90|Power Operation|90|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|ATTEMPTED ENTRY ONTO THE SITE BY AN ILLEGAL ALIEN WITH FALSE IDENTIFICATION  "This event is being reported as a newsworthy concern to the public under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi).  All times listed are approximate Mountain Standard Time.  "On September 26,2012, at 13:36 pm, Arizona Public Service (APS) was notified of the intention of Maricopa County Sheriff's Office (MCSO) to issue a press release regarding an attempted entry to the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station's (PVNGS) Security Owner Controlled Area (SOCA) by an individual with suspicious identification earlier this morning.  "An individual employed with a construction project sub-contractor arrived at the SOCA checkpoint and presented suspicious identification to PVNGS security officers to gain access to the site. The individual was not admitted through the checkpoint into the SOCA.  MCSO was notified and placed the individual into custody. MCSO determined the identification was false and the individual was an undocumented immigrant.  "The individual did not enter nor was he previously granted access to the site's Protected Areas surrounding the three units and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation.  No evidence of malicious intent has been identified. MCSO is investigating the incident.  "The station notified NRC Resident Inspectors and Region IV staff of the condition.  "APS does not intend at this time to issue a press release, but is responding to media inquiries."|
Power Reactor|48348|CATAWBA|DUKE ENERGY NUCLEAR LLC|2|YORK|SC|YORK||Y|05000413|1|2||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|BRIAN HAYNES|DONG HWA PARK|9/26/2012 00:00:00|22:27|9/26/2012 00:00:00|15:15|EDT|9/26/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)|UNANALYZED CONDITION|50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)|ACCIDENT MITIGATION|||||REBECCA NEASE|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.0.3 ENTERED DUE TO SURVEILLANCE TESTING NOT BEING COMPLETED AS REQUIRED  "Pressurizer Pressure LO Instrument surveillance testing was discovered to not have been completed as required.  Existence of an internal jumper on solid state protection system input to logic cards prevented complete circuit testing. Unit 1 and unit 2 entered Technical Specification [TS] 3.0.3 at 1515 hours."  Alternate method of surveillance testing on one of the trains was completed and TS 3.0.3 was exited on Unit 1 at 2203 EDT and Unit 2 at 2132 EDT.  The licensee plans to complete surveillance testing on the second train before 1515 hours on 9/27/12.  The licensee is currently in TS 3.3.2.  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  The states of North Carolina and South Carolina will be notified.  Local county governments of York, Gaston, and Mecklenberg counties will also be notified.|
Part 21|48350|GE HITACHI NUCLEAR ENERGY|GE HITACHI NUCLEAR ENERGY|1|WILMINGTON|NC|||Y||||||DALE PORTER|VINCE KLCO|9/27/2012 00:00:00|11:01|9/27/2012 00:00:00|11:01|EDT|9/27/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|21.21(a)(2)|INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION|||||||RONALD BELLAMY|R1DO|REBECCA NEASE|R2DO|CHRISTINE LIPA|R3DO|GREG WERNER|R4DO|PART 21 GROUP|EMAI|||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||ERROR IN MAIN STEAM LINE HIGH FLOW CALCULATIONAL METHODOLOGY  The following information was received by facsimile:  "GEH [General Electric Hitachi] has recently discovered that calculations of choked flow rate in the Main Steam Line (MSL) of GEH BWRs may not be conservative, with the potential impacts to be evaluated for existing MSL high-flow setpoints and Analytical Limits (ALs).  "GEH has not completed the evaluation of this condition to determine reportability under 10CFR Part 21 and is therefore issuing this 60-day Interim Notification. GEH will close or issue an update on this matter on or before December 12, 2012. Given the early status of the evaluation, GEH has no recommended actions at this time. This 60-day Interim Notification is issued in accordance with 10CFR Part 21.21(a)(2), and will be sent to all GE BWR/2-6 plants and ABWR plants."  Affected plants include the following: Nine Mile 1-2, Fermi 2, Columbia, Grand Gulf, River Bend, FitzPatrick, Pilgrim, Vermont Yankee, Clinton, Dresden 2-3, LaSalle 1-2, Limerick 1-2, Oyster Creek, Peach Bottom 2-3, Quad Cities 1-2, Perry 1, Duane Arnold, Cooper, Susquehanna 1-2, Brunswick 1-2, Hope Creek, Hatch 1-2, Browns Ferry 1-3, and Monticello.|
Power Reactor|48351|BRAIDWOOD|EXELON NUCLEAR CO.|3|BRACEVILLE|IL|WILL||Y|05000456|1|2||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|BRIAN FINLAY|PETE SNYDER|9/27/2012 00:00:00|13:55|9/27/2012 00:00:00|09:30|CDT|9/27/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|26.719|FITNESS FOR DUTY|||||||CHRISTINE LIPA|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||FITNESS FOR DUTY  - CONTRABAND MATERIAL IDENTIFIED IN THE PROTECTED AREA  A licensee contractor discovered contraband material concealed above ceiling tiles in a locker room during a renovation of the area. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for details.  The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48352|COMANCHE PEAK|TXU GENERATION COMPANY LP|4|GLEN ROSE|TX|SOMERVELL||Y|05000445|1|2||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|RAUL MARTINEZ|MARK ABRAMOVITZ|9/27/2012 00:00:00|14:08|9/27/2012 00:00:00|12:54|CDT|9/27/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||GREG WERNER|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||PARTIAL LOSS OF EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT DURING PLANNED MODIFICATIONS  "On September 27, 2012, Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant began a cyber security related modification to the Unit 1 and 2 Plant Computer Systems (PCS) and associated network infrastructure.  The entire PCS for each unit will be out of service for approximately 6 hours.  During that time, the PCS satellite display systems (SDSs) in the TSC and EOF will be inoperable.  After approximately 8 hours, the PCS will be restored to service along with the SDSs in the TSC.  The SDSs in the EOF will remain out of service until the modification and related site acceptance testing is complete, currently scheduled for October 5, 2012.  During this period. the remote display of Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) information in the EOF and OSC will be unavailable.  "The loss of EOF SDS terminals will be compensated by use of an alternate plant parameter display system, and loss of EOF/OSC RMS remote display will be compensated by means of the status board recorder telephone loop.  Therefore, it is expected that appropriate assessment of plant conditions. notifications, dose projections, and communications could still be made, if required, during the time that the SDSs and RMS remote displays are inoperable.  "The extended loss of the EOF SDSs and EOF/OSC remote RMS data is being reported in accordance with 10.CFR.50.72(b)(3)(xiii). which is any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or off site communications capability.  The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.  A follow-up ENS communication will be made when the EOF SDSs and EOF/OSC remote RMS remote displays are fully restored to service."|
Power Reactor|48353|FITZPATRICK|ENTERGY NUCLEAR|1|LYCOMING|NY|OSWEGO||Y|05000333|1|||[1] GE-4|JORGE O'FARRILL|MARK ABRAMOVITZ|9/27/2012 00:00:00|22:17|9/27/2012 00:00:00|12:12|EDT|9/27/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|21.21(d)(3)(i)|DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE|||||||RONALD BELLAMY|R1DO|PART 21 GROUP||||||||||||||||||N|Y|92|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||PART-21 REPORT - FAULTY MASTER TRIP UNITS, SLAVE UNITS, AND RESISTANCE TEMPERATURE DETECTORS  "On September 27, 2012, the Site Vice President was notified that a 10CFR21 evaluation of thirteen (13) reworked Master Trip Units, Resistance Temperature Detector Units, and Slave Units supplied by Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc. (Rosemount) determined that a non-compliant condition involving a basic component existed.  "Rosemount informed James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF) that 13 reworked Master Trip Units, Resistance Temperature Detector (RTD) Units and Slave Units were received at JAF which did not comply with their rebuild repair specification. Specifically, epoxy was not applied under certain resistors as required. In accordance with JA FitzPatrick plant procedures, this condition was determined as a 10CFRPart 21 condition involving a defect in a basic component.  "As noted by an engineering review, some of the applications for the trip units require them to energize to perform the associated safety functions. Therefore, a failure occurrence by an installed non-conforming unit could potentially have an adverse affect on the associated systems' safety/accident mitigation functions.  "JAF verified that none of the 13 deficient units were installed in any plant systems. Therefore, this condition had no actual safety consequences as the deficiency was identified by Rosemount prior to installation. The 13 units that were received at JAF without the epoxy have been returned to Rosemount for the addition of the epoxy and have subsequently been reworked and returned to JAF.  "This notification is made pursuant to 10CFR21.21(d)(3)(i)."|
Power Reactor|48354|ROBINSON|CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.|2|HARTSVILLE|SC|DARLINGTON||Y|05000261|2|||[2] W-3-LP|MARTIN ARNOLD|VINCE KLCO|9/28/2012 00:00:00|09:00|9/28/2012 00:00:00|08:30|EDT|9/28/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||REBECCA NEASE|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||PLANNED EMERGENCY OFFSITE FACILITY/TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION MAINTENANCE   "This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability.   "On September 28, 2012, the EOF/TSC air handler chiller unit was removed from service to perform planned maintenance.  This maintenance activity will not affect the air filtration portion of the system and these facilities remain available for use during an emergency.  This maintenance activity will be performed in a manner to minimize the time that the air handler chiller is out of service.  This maintenance activity impacts the ability to maintain ambient air temperature in the facilities.  The [estimated] duration of this activity is planned to be 4 hours.    "If an emergency condition occurs that requires activation of the emergency response facilities, the EOF and TSC will be utilized.  The Emergency Response Organization team members have the ability to relocate to alternate locations in accordance with emergency implementing procedures based on conditions.  Alternate emergency response facilities will remain available in the event that relocation is necessary.  This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), which is any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability. An update message will be provided when the emergency response facilities are restored."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the State of South Carolina and the local counties of Lee, Chesterfield and Darlington.  * * * UPDATE FROM ARNOLD TO KLCO ON 9/28/12 AT 1125 EDT * * *   "The EOF/TSC Chiller is back in service as of 1102 [EDT] on 9/28/12.  The ability to maintain ambient air temperature in the EOF/TSC facilities has been restored."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified the R2DO (Nease).|
Power Reactor|48357|WATERFORD|ENTERGY NUCLEAR|4|KILLONA|LA|ST CHARLES||Y|05000382|3|||[3] CE|WILLIAM HARDIN|PETE SNYDER|9/28/2012 00:00:00|17:49|9/28/2012 00:00:00|14:10|CDT|9/28/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|21.21(d)(3)(i)|DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE|||||||NEIL OKEEFE|R4DO|PART 21 GROUP|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||PART 21 - DEFECTIVE MASONEILAN TRANSDUCER MODEL 8005N  "This message is notification to the NRC, pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i) requirements, that the Vice President   Operations at Waterford 3 was notified on September 28, 2012 at 14:10 CDT of a condition which will be conservatively reported as a defect under the rule.  A written report to the NRC will follow within 30 days.  "The basic component that is subject to reporting is the Masoneilan I/P (current to pneumatic) Transducer Model 8005N.  These transducers are utilized in safety related applications at Waterford 3.  This condition has been corrected in the plant."  Waterford has identified that the subject transducer fails to calibrate at the high end of its span.  No defective components are currently installed.  "Waterford 3 is operating normally at 100% power.  This identified condition caused no loss of safety function and had no impact on public health and safety."   The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Part 21|48359|FAIRBANKS MORSE|FAIRBANKS MORSE|3|BELOIT|WI|||Y||||||DOMINIC DEDOLPH|PETE SNYDER|9/28/2012 00:00:00|21:03|9/28/2012 00:00:00||CDT|9/28/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|21.21(d)(3)(i)|DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE|||||||RONALD BELLAMY|R1DO|REBECCA NEASE|R2DO|CHRISTINE LIPA|R3DO|GREG WERNER|R4DO|PART 21 GROUP|EMAI|||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||PART 21 - FAIRBANKS MORSE OPPOSED PISTON EDG FUEL OIL PUMP LEAK  The following information was received via fax and email:  "Utilities operating Fairbanks Morse (FM) Opposed Piston (OP) Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) are as follows:  "Constellation Energy - Calvert Cliffs; "Dominion - North Anna, Millstone; "DTE - Fermi II; "Entergy - Vermont Yankee; Arkansas Nuclear One; "Exelon - Limerick, Peach Bottom, Three Mile Island; "Next Era Energy - Duane Arnold; "Progress Energy - H.B. Robinson, Crystal River 3; "Southern Company - Georgia Power (Plant Hatch), Alabama Power (Plant Farley); "Xcel Energy - Prairie Island.  "The defect is a significant oil leak from the fuel oil pump shaft. Leakage will occur if the mechanical seal area within the pump is displaced by an impact to the pump shaft during shipment and handling.   "Even with a significant leak the pump has sufficient capacity to provide the proper operating pressure and volume of fuel oil to start the engine / EDG within the design specifications and continue operating the EDG at 100% load. However, the significant amount of fuel oil leaking while the system is under pressure, during standby and operating conditions, could potentially result in having an inadequate volume of stored fuel for the EDG to fulfill the seven day operating mission.  "FM has instituted the following corrective actions which will be effective on all shipments after September 28, 2012:  "1. Hydrostatic testing will be performed at FM during the dedication. "2. Outgoing shipments will be packaged in accordance with a new packaging procedure which requires the pump be secured to a piece of wood or directly to a skid, thus prevents an impact to the shaft during shipment.  "Customers should perform a visual inspection after installation to ensure the fuel pump has no leaks. Defective pumps will have an immediate and significant leak.  "All installed pumps that are free of leaks are acceptable for continued operation."  Fairbanks Morse Report Number 12-01 -  Issued Sept 28, 2012|
Power Reactor|48360|HOPE CREEK|PSEG NUCLEAR LLC|1|HANCOCKS BRIDGE|NJ|SALEM||N|05000354|1|||[1] GE-4|THOMAS AGSTER|MARK ABRAMOVITZ|9/29/2012 00:00:00|14:50|9/29/2012 00:00:00|08:09|EDT|9/29/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||RONALD BELLAMY|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||LOSS OF POWER SUPPLY FOR NUCLEAR EMERGENCY TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEM  "At 0809 [EDT] on 9/29/12 a loss of power to the Nuclear Emergency Telecommunication System (NETS) at the PSEG Nuclear Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) located in Salem, New Jersey resulted in a loss of dial tone to the NETS phones located at the Salem and Hope Creek Generating Stations.  This failure had no effect on the safety system or ability to safely control or monitor the Salem and Hope Creek generating stations: back-up emergency telecommunications (Direct-Inward-Dial, and Centrex) remained available.  At 1038 [EDT] on 9/29/12, power was restored along with full NETS functionality.  No injuries have occurred."  The NETS communicates between the site and the County and State.  A card in the UPS power supply failed resulting in this loss of power.  Power was restored by bypassing the UPS.  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48361|DRESDEN|EXELON NUCLEAR COMPANY, LLC|3|MORRIS|IL|GRUNDY||Y|||2|3|[1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3|KATHARINE NETEMEYER|HOWIE CROUCH|9/30/2012 00:00:00|23:22|9/30/2012 00:00:00|19:30|CDT|9/30/2012 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(xi)|OFFSITE NOTIFICATION|||||||CHRISTINE LIPA|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|97|Power Operation|97|Power Operation|OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO FIRE IN THE MAINTENANCE BUILDING  "At 1804 hrs. CDT on Sunday, September 30, 2012, security personnel reported a fire in the mechanical maintenance shop. Fire Brigade responded and due to the severity of the fire, Coal City Fire Department was called for assistance. The fire was successfully extinguished at 1834 hrs. There were no personnel injured in the fire. The fire did not affect any structures, systems, or components that are required to provide for nuclear safety. At no time was the health and safety of the public adversely affected by this condition.  "The maintenance shop is not attached to safety related structure of the operating units; therefore Dresden Station Unit 2 and Unit 3 were not affected by the fire.  "At approximately 1930 hrs., information was released to the media due to fire in the mechanical maintenance shop requiring Coal City Fire Department assistance. This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) due to a release of information to the media. No official press release was made."  The cause of the fire is under investigation. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|