UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
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ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-8064

July 19, 2002

Mr. J. V. Parrish
Chief Executive Officer
Energy Northwest
P.O. Box 968; MD 1023
Richland, Washington 99352-0968

SUBJECT: NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-397/02-02 - COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION

Dear Mr. Parrish:

On June 22, 2002, the NRC completed an inspection at your Columbia Generating Station for the period March 24 through June 22, 2002. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on April 29, May 15 and June 25, 2002, as described in Section 40A6, with Mr. S. Oxenford and other members of your staff.

The inspections examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspectors examined a selection of procedures and representative records, observed activities, and conducted interviews with personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, the inspectors identified no findings of significance during this inspection period.

The NRC has increased security requirements at Columbia Generating Station in response to terrorist acts on September 11, 2001. Although the NRC is not aware of any specific threat against nuclear facilities, the NRC issued an Order and several threat advisories to commercial power reactors to strengthen licensees' capabilities and readiness to respond to a potential attack. The NRC continues to monitor overall security controls and will issue temporary instructions in the near future to verify by inspection the licensee's compliance with the Order and current security regulations.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.gov/reading-rm/ADAMS.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely,

/RA/

William B. Jones, Chief
Project Branch E
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket: 50-397
License: NPF-21

Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report
50-397/02-02

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ENCLOSURE

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket:	50-397
License:	NPF-21
Report:	50-397/02-02
Licensee:	Energy Northwest
Facility:	Columbia Generating Station
Location:	Richland, Washington
Dates:	March 24, 2002 through June 22, 2002
Inspectors:	G. D. Replogle, Senior Resident Inspector, Project Branch E, DRP M. S. Peck, Resident Inspector, Project Branch E, DRP P. J. Elkmann, Emergency Preparedness Inspector, DRS D. W. Schaefer, Security Inspector, Plant Support Branch, DRS
Approved By:	W. B. Jones, Chief, Project Branch E, Division of Reactor Projects
ATTACHMENT:	Supplemental Information

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR05000397-02-02; on 3/24/2002-6/22/2002; Energy Northwest; Columbia Generating Station. Integrated Inspection Report. No findings identified.

The report covers a 13-week period of routine resident and regional inspection activities from March 24 through June 22, 2002. No findings of significance were identified. The significance of findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red) using Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html. Findings for which the SDP does not apply are indicated by "No Color" or by the severity level of the applicable violation.

A. Inspector Identified Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

B. Licensee Identified Violations

One violation of very low significance was identified by the licensee and reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee appeared reasonable. This violation is listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status:

Energy Northwest operated the Columbia Generating Station at full power from March 24 through April 15, 2002. For the remainder of the inspection period, operators controlled reactor power between 100 and 45 percent - in response to requests from the Bonneville Power Authority. At the end of the inspection period, operators were controlling reactor power at 45 percent.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness

1R04 Equipment Alignments (71111.04)

.1 Partial System Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed three partial system walkdowns of safety significant equipment. During the walkdowns the inspectors reviewed the alignment and readiness of systems redundant to those systems which had been removed from service. The inspectors reviewed the following system alignments during the quarter:

- Offsite Alternating Current Transmission Power Supply to Safety Related Bus SM-7: On April 27, 2002, the inspectors walked down to verify the correct electrical alignment of the startup transformer offsite power supply to the Division I safety-related 4,160 volt bus, SM-7, while the redundant power supply, the backup auxiliary transformer, was out of service for maintenance. The inspectors reviewed critical portions of power system alignments using Procedure OSP-ELEC-W101, “Offsite Station Power Alignment Check,” Revision 1, and Drawings E507, “Main Three Line Diagram,” Sheet 2, Revision 20, and Sheet 3, Revision 29, and Drawing E510, “Synchronizing Diagram,” Revision 9.

- Division II Emergency Diesel Generator: On April 28, 2002, the inspectors walked down to verify the correct mechanical and electrical alignment of the Division II emergency diesel generator while the Division I emergency diesel generator was unavailable for scheduled maintenance. The system alignment was reviewed using Procedure 2.7.2.B, “Emergency Diesel Generator Division 2,” Revision 27, and Drawing M512-3, “Diesel Generator Miscellaneous Systems,” Revision 30.

- High Pressure Core Spray : On May 14, 2002, the inspectors reviewed the mechanical and electrical alignment of the high pressure core spray system while the reactor core isolation cooling system was unavailable because of scheduled maintenance. The inspector utilized Procedure 2.4.4, “High Pressure Core Spray System,” Revision 30, and Drawing M520, “High Pressure Core

Spray and Low Pressure Core Spray Systems," Revision 87, as references to perform this inspection.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed walkdowns of six fire areas to verify operational status and material condition of detection and mitigation systems, passive fire barriers and fire suppression equipment. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of controls for combustible materials and ignition sources in selected fire protection zones. The inspectors compared observed plant conditions against descriptions and commitments described in the Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 9.5.1, "Fire Protection System," and Appendix F, "Fire Protection Evaluation." The inspected areas included**:**

- Division I battery room, April 4, 2002
- Division II battery room, April 4, 2002
- Division II switchgear room, April 4, 2002
- Cable spreading room, April 5, 2002
- Low pressure core spray system pump room, April 25, 2002
- Reactor core isolation cooling system pump room, April 25, 2002

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Final Safety Analysis Report Sections 2.4, 3.4 and 9.3 and Calculations 5.51.058, "Flooding Safe Shutdown Analysis," Revision 3, and 5.51.55, "Pump Room/Stairwell Flooding Scenarios," Revision 4, to identify facility areas that may be affected by internal flooding. The inspectors review included identification of the predicted flood levels for plant locations containing safety-related and risk-significant equipment.

The inspectors selected the radwaste building 484 foot elevation (cable spreading room), and the 525 elevation, (control room emergency ventilation equipment room) for inspection. The inspectors conducted walkdowns of these areas during May and June 2002.

During the walkdowns, the inspectors assessed whether the licensee properly sealed equipment below the flood line, including electrical conduits and wall penetrations, and inspected flexible piping expansion joints and fire protection system sprinklers. The inspectors also reviewed the plant configuration for potential sources of flooding that may not have been included in their flooding analysis.

b. Findings

On May 7, 2002, during a fire suppression system surveillance, an equipment operator spilled about 20 gallons of water on a small area of the cable spreading room floor, 484 foot elevation. The spill resulted while draining the fire water header in the same room. The water leaked through floor cracks and down into the remote shut panel and the Division II switchgear rooms. The inspectors concluded from review of the licensee's Fire Hazards Analysis and flooding calculations, that the floor should have been leak tight. The leakage path was established through a damaged area of the floor, where concrete anchors had been removed, and through a shrinkage crack in the concrete floor.

The leakage into the remote shutdown panel room caused a ground on the Division II, 125V DC system, however, the train remained operable. A small amount of water also entered the remote shutdown panel but did not result in any damage to the panel or associated components. Leakage into the Division II switchgear room fell on top of the emergency diesel generator breaker cubicle. No adverse effects were noted from this occurrence.

The licensee promptly sealed the cable spreading room floor leakage pathways. The inspectors noted that there had been numerous other concrete shrinkage cracks on the floors that could have readily allowed leakage into the remote shut panel and the Division II switchgear rooms. The inspectors noted that the equipment housed directly below the cable spreading room floor included all of Division I and II switchgear, batteries and inverters, and certain pieces of reactor protection system equipment. The control room is located directly below the control room emergency filtration system room.

The licensee performed an operability determination and concluded that leakage through the cable spreading room floor, in the event of an initiation of the fire protection system, would not have adversely affected equipment operability. The licensee reached similar conclusions regarding the potential for flooding in the control room emergency filtration room. The licensee noted that all electrical equipment is housed in metal enclosures and protected from water that may leak through the overhead. The licensee concluded that the calculated leakage rate through any individual crack would not be sufficient to challenge safety-related equipment. The inspectors are assessing the overall significance of the as-found floor conditions for the two rooms and had not completed the inspection of this issue at the close of the inspection period. The inspectors have identified this issue as an unresolved item pending completion of the inspection (URI 50-397/02002-01).

1R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07A)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed two heat exchanger performance tests. The inspectors considered whether the licensee tested the heat exchangers in accordance with well established industry guidelines, that test conditions were consistent with procedural requirements, and test acceptance criteria and results were consistent with the design-basis values. The heat exchangers included the:

- Division II standby service water room cooler
- Division II emergency diesel generator cooling water heat exchangers

The inspectors reviewed the following documents during this inspection:

- Procedure TSP-SW- A102, "Service Water Loop B Cooling Coil Heat Load Capacity Test," performed on April 9, 2002
- Procedure 8.4.62, "Thermal Performance Monitoring of DCW-HX-1B1 and DCW-HX-1B2," Revision 6, performed on August 29, 2001
- Electric Power Research Institute NP-7552, "Heat Exchanger Performance Monitoring Guidelines," December 1991

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11)

a. Inspection Scope

On April 8 and 29, 2002, the inspectors observed operator training as they participated in two requalification scenarios on the plant simulator. The inspectors evaluated crew performance in terms of formality of communication, prioritizing actions, interpreting and verifying alarms, correct use and implementation of procedures and timely control board operation and manipulation. The inspectors also evaluated simulator fidelity by comparing simulator configurations with the plant control room.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation (71111.12)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors independently evaluated the licensee's maintenance effectiveness by reviewing the availability and reliability of risk-significant structures, systems and components (SSCs). The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of the Maintenance Rule for systems or components with performance problems. The inspectors considered whether the licensee performed correct Maintenance Rule scoping and characterization of failed SSCs. The inspectors also reviewed the appropriateness of the licensee's performance criteria and goals. The inspection included the following six systems and components which exhibited performance problems:

- Problem Evaluation Requests 201-1445 and 201-2596, Division II standby service exceeded unavailability criteria because of mechanism operated cell switch assembly failures on June 29 and November 19, 2001

- Problem Evaluation Request 201-2573, functional failure of residual heat removal primary containment isolation Valve RHR-V-75B on November 15, 2001

- Problem Evaluation Request 201-2857, functional failure of the containment instrument air system when a portion of the system was inadvertently electrically shorted during maintenance on December 19, 2001

- Problem Evaluation Request 201-1171, Division II residual heat removal system exceeded the maintenance preventable functional failure criteria goal due to an inadvertent isolation on June 8, 2001

- Problem Evaluation Request 200-0312 , Uninterruptible Power Supply EUP-SYS-NSR exceeded unavailability criteria due to an administrative/scheduling resulting in the system removed from service for six days during February 2000

- Problem Evaluation Requests 201-1445 and 201-1596, 4160 volt electrical distribution system, Bus SM-8, exhibited two maintenance prevented functional failures due to mechanism operated cell switch assembly issues on June 29 and November 19, 2001

In addition, the inspectors reviewed the following Maintenance Rule related corrective action documents to ensure that the licensee accomplished appropriate corrective measures to address the issues:

- Problem Evaluation Request 201-2492, Shutdown cooling function not clearly identified in Maintenance Rule database, dated November 8, 2001

- Problem Evaluation Request 201-2744, Planned Maintenance Rule recovery actions not tracked to completion, dated December 5, 2001

- Problem Evaluation Request 201-2852, Maintenance Rule “(a)1" status - 4160 volt distribution has experience repetitive functional failures, dated December 19, 2001

The inspectors reviewed the following documents as part of this inspection:

- Procedure TI 4.22, “Maintenance Rule Program,” Revision 4
- Regulatory Guide 1.160, “Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants,” Revision 2
- NUMARC 93-01, “Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants,” Revision 2
- Columbia Generating Station Maintenance Rule Program Status Report for the Fourth Quarter of 2001, dated April 18, 2002

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the risk assessments and controls for five planned and emergent maintenance activities. The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of information, and the use of the SENTINEL computer program. The inspectors' samples included:

- Work Order 01030194, Removal of residual heat removal Pump 2C from service for mechanism operated cell switch measurements, performed on April 19, 2002
- Work Orders 01043254 and 0104371, Pantograph inspections of Breaker E-CB-B/7 and E-CB-7/1, performed on April 27, 2002
- Work Order 0104159704, Standby Service Water Pump 1A breaker and mechanism operated cell assemble test and inspection, performed on April 28, 2002
- Work Order 01021307, Removal of residual heat removal Pump 2B from service for baseline testing of motor operated Valve RHR-V-64B, performed on May 6, 2002
- Work Order 01036304, Inoperability of secondary containment for fire protection system flushes, performed on June 10, 2002

The inspectors utilized the following documents as criteria for this inspection:

- Procedure 1.5.14, "Risk Assessment and Management for Maintenance/Surveillance Activities," Revision 4
- Operations Instruction, OI-49, "Protected Systems," Revision A

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed five licensee operability evaluations for degraded equipment conditions. The inspectors considered the adequacy of the licensee's technical review and implementation of compensatory measures considering overall plant risk. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operability conclusion for the following plant systems and components:

- Problem Evaluation Request 202-1246, Some E-Clips utilized in safety-related breaker linkage assemblies were found on the floor, dated April 23, 2002
- Problem Evaluation Request 202-1483, Four chemical cleaning blind flanges on the high pressure core spray and low pressure core spray systems were not verified in place during the last outage, dated May 15, 2002
- Problem Evaluation Request 202-1162, Over pressurization of the fire protection system, dated April 15, 2002
- Problem Evaluation Request 202-1564, Terminal box was not sealed leaving safe shutdown circuits vulnerable to loss following flooding or fire, dated May 23, 2002
- Problem Evaluation Request 202-1631, Turbine control valve reactor protection system switch set point drift, dated June 3, 2002

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Postmaintenance Testing (71111.19)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed four postmaintenance tests. The inspectors considered whether licensee personnel properly implemented procedural controls, that testing adequately demonstrated equipment operability, and the licensee met applicable Technical Specification and licensing-basis requirements. The inspection included the following postmaintenance tests:

- Work Order 01042752, Rod block monitor power supply replacement and Procedure ISP-RBMB-Q901, "Rod Block Monitor Channel B Channel Functional and Channel Check," Revision 7, completed on April 16, 2002

- Work Order 01030194, Residual heat removal Pump 2C mechanism operated cell switch measurement and Procedure OSP-RHR/IST-Q704, "Residual Heat Removal Loop C Operability Test," Revision 10, observed on April 19, 2002

- Work Order 01040193, Control rod drive Pump 1A mechanism operated cell switch measurement, observed on April 19, 2002

- Work Order 01008055, Replacement of source and intermediate range neutron monitoring detector cables, performed on June 1, 2001

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed by witnessing and/or reviewing test data/procedures whether surveillance tests for selected risk-significant systems and components met Technical Specification, Final Safety Analysis Report, and procedural requirements. The inspectors evaluated whether surveillance tests adequately demonstrated that systems were capable of performing their intended safety and design-basis functions. The inspectors specifically evaluated surveillance test activities for preconditioning, adequate acceptance criteria, calibration of test equipment and proper equipment restoration. The inspectors reviewed the following seven surveillance activities:

- Procedure TSP-THERM-C101, "Power Distribution Limits," Revision 12, performed on April 5, 2002

- Procedure QSP-ELEC-W102, "Electrical Distribution System Breaker Alignment and Power Availability Verification," Revision 8, performed on April 3, 2002

- Procedure OSP-CRD-W201, “Control Rod Exercises of Fully Withdrawn Rods,” Revision 5, performed on April 4, 2002
- Procedure OSP-CAC/IST-Q701, “Containment Atmosphere Control Valve Operability (Division 1),” Revision 6, performed on April 21, 2002
- Procedure TSP-CAC-B801, “Containment Atmosphere Control Skid Leakage Surveillance,” Revision 1, witnessed on April 21, 2002
- Procedure OSP-HPCS/IST-Q701, “High Pressure Core Spray Operability Test,” Revision 14, witnessed on April 30, 2002
- Procedure OSP-LPCS/IST-Q702, "Low Pressure Core Spray System Operability Test," Revision 9, performed on April 25, 2002

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (71114.04)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector performed an in-office review of Revisions 31 and 32 of the Columbia Generating Station Emergency Plan, dated October 27, 2001, and February 27, 2002, respectively, against previous revisions of the emergency plan and against 10 CFR 50.54(q) to determine if the revisions decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plan.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed an operations drill in the simulator on May 1, 2002, in order to evaluate the critique process, drill conduct, and drill performance. The inspectors reviewed the drill scenario and the Columbia Generating Station Emergency Plan, Revision 33, as part of this inspection.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

3. SAFEGUARDS

Cornerstone: Physical Protection (PP)

3PP2 Access Control (71130.02)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed the following inspection activities:

- Interviewed security personnel concerning the proper operation of the explosive and metal detectors, X-ray devices, and key card readers
- Observed licensee testing of access control equipment and the ability of security personnel to control personnel and packages entering the protected area

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

3PP4 Security Plan Changes (71130.04)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed changes to the Physical Security Plan (Revisions 42, 43, 45, and 46 dated December 20, 2000, January 12, 2001, April 21, 2001, and February 8, 2002, respectively), and the Training and Qualification Plan (Revisions 12 and 13 dated February 15, 2001, and January 21, 2002, respectively), to determine if requirements of 10 CFR 50.54 (p) had been met.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the accuracy of five selected performance indicator data for all four calender quarters of 2001. The inspectors compared licensee submitted performance indicator data with operator logs, maintenance records and corrective action documents. The inspectors verified the licensee calculated performance indicators in accordance with NEI 99-02, “Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline,” Revision 1. The inspectors' sample included the following performance indicators:

- Scrams with loss of normal heat removal
- Unplanned power changes per 7000 critical hours
- Safety system functional failures
- High pressure core spray unavailability
- Residual heat removal system unavailability

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed two plant issues to verify that equipment, human performance, and programmatic issues were being identified by the licensee at an appropriate threshold and were being entered in the licensee's corrective action program. In addition, the inspectors verified that the licensee's corrective actions were commensurate with the significance of the issues. The issues evaluated during this inspection period included:

- Some E-Clips used as fasteners on safety-related switchgear were falling off, documented in Problem Evaluation Request 202-1246, dated April 23, 2002

- Over pressurization of the fire protection system, documented in Problem Evaluation Request 202-1162, dated April 15, 2002

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA5 Other

.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 50-397/2002-001-00: Forced shutdown to comply with Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.8.1, Action F. Operators completed the shutdown on February 14, 2002, because they could not restore the Division II emergency diesel generator to operable status prior to the end of the allowed outage time. A generic problem with a new breaker design caused the problem. The NRC conducted a special inspection to investigate the failure and the inspection efforts were documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-397/02-05. This licensee event report is closed based on that inspection.

.2 (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-397/01009-01: On March 20, 2002, the licensee determined that two inboard main steam line isolation valves were closing slightly faster than permitted by Technical Specifications. The licensee requested and the NRC granted enforcement discretion for the Technical Specification noncompliance until the next refueling outage, based on the condition not being safety significant. The inspectors opened this unresolved item pending further NRC review of the

circumstances that led to the problem. No findings of significance were identified during the followup inspection.

.3 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 50-397/2002-02-00: Perimeter Intrusion Detection System

See Section 4OA7 for closure of this licensee event report.

4OA6 Management Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

Regional and resident inspectors conducted three exit meetings with members of licensee management staff during the inspection period. The exit meetings were:

- On April 29, 2002, an emergency preparedness inspector conducted a telephonic exit meeting concerning Emergency Plan changes with Mr. J. Pierce, Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness, and other members of licensee management.

- On May 15, 2002, a security inspector presented the security inspection results to Mr. John Wyrick, Resource Protection Manager, and other members of the licensee's staff.

- On June 25, 2002, the senior resident inspector presented the remainder of the inspection findings to Mr. Scott Oxenford, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee's staff.

The licensee acknowledged the inspection results during each meeting. Following the meetings, the inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. The licensee identified no proprietary information.

4OA7 Licensee Identified Violations

The following violation of very low significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as a noncited violation (NCV). If you contest the violation or significance of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400, Arlington, Texas 76011; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Columbia Generating Station.

	NCV Tracking Number	Requirement Licensee Failed to Meet
1.	50-397/02002-02	10 CFR 73.55(e)(2) requires, in part, that all alarm devices including transmission lines to annunciators be self-checking. Additionally, Section 7.1.1 of the licensee's Physical Security Plan requires, in part, that "line supervision" be provided to all alarm lines of the perimeter intrusion detection system (PIDS). On May 6, 2002, the licensee identified that the PIDS had been designed and installed in such a manner that line supervision had not been provided at small segments of some alarm zones. Upon identification, the licensee implemented appropriate compensatory measures. This violation is being treated as a NCV and is in the licensee's corrective action program, reference Problem Evaluation Request 202-1396, and Licensee Event Report 50-397/2002-02. The safety significance of this violation was determined to be very low (Green) by the Physical Protection Significance Determination Process because there was less than two similar events during the last four quarters.

ATTACHMENT

Supplemental Information

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

J. Parrish, Chief Executive Officer
D. Atkinson, Manager, Engineering
D. Coleman, Manager, Performance Assessment and Regulatory Programs
D. Feldman, Manager, Operations
W. Oxenford, Plant General Manager
J. Peters, Manager, Radiation Services
G. Smith, Vice President, Generation
R. Webring, Vice President, Operation Support
J. Wyrick, Manager, Resource Protection

ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED

Items Opened, Closed, and Discussed During this Inspection

Opened

50-397/02002-01	URI	Unexpected leaking flood barrier (Section 1RO6)

Opened and Closed

50-397/02002-02	NCV	Line supervision for perimeter intrusion detection system (Section 4OA7)

Previous Items Closed

50-397/2002-001-00	LER	Technical Specification required shutdown to inoperable Division II emergency diesel generator (Section 4OA5)
50-397/2002-002-00	LER	Line Supervision for Perimeter Intrusion Detection System (Section 4OA7)