UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-8064

December 15, 2000

Otto L. Maynard, President and
Chief Executive Officer
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation
P.O. Box 411
Burlington, Kansas 66839

SUBJECT WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION--NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-482/00-09

Dear Mr. Maynard:

On November 18, 2000, the NRC completed inspections at the Wolf Creek Generating Station. The enclosed report presents the results of these inspections. The results of these inspections were discussed during meetings on October 6 and 27 and November 17 and 21, 2000, with you and members of your staff.

These inspections were an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspections consisted of selected examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.

No findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely,

/RA/

William D. Johnson, Chief
Project Branch B
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No.: 50-482
License No.: NPF-42

Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report No.
50-482/00-09

cc w/enclosure:
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Only inspection reports to the following:
Scott Morris **(SAM1)**
NRR Event Tracking System **(IPAS)**
WC Site Secretary **(SLA2)**
Dale Thatcher **(DFT)**

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RIV:SRI:DRP/B	RI:DRP/B	PE:DRP/B	SPE:DRP/B	EP:DRS/PSB
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ENCLOSURE

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV

Docket No.:	50-482
License No.:	NPF-42
Report No.:	50-482/00-09
Licensee:	Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation
Facility:	Wolf Creek Generating Station
Location:	1550 Oxen Lane, NE Burlington, Kansas
Dates:	October 1 through November 18, 2000
Inspectors:	F. L. Brush, Senior Resident Inspector J. S. Dyke, Resident Inspector R. V. Azua, Project Engineer R. A. Kopriva, Senior Project Engineer C. A. Clark, Reactor Inspector P. J. Elkmann, Emergency Preparedness Inspector J. B. Nicholas, PH.D., Senior Health Physicist
Approved By:	W. D. Johnson, Chief, Project Branch B
ATTACHMENTS:	1. Supplemental Information 2. NRC's Revised Reactor Oversight Process

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Wolf Creek Generating Station
NRC Inspection Report No. 50-482/00-09

IR 50-482/00-09; on 10/1-11/18/2000; Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation; Wolf Creek Generating Station. Integrated Resident/Regional Report. Access Controls to Radiologically Significant Areas

The report covers a 7-week period of resident inspection and announced inspections by Region IV inspectors.

The significance of issues is indicated by their color (green, white, yellow, red) and was determined by the Significance Determination Process in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.

A. Inspector Identified Findings

None

B. Licensee Identified Findings

- Violations of very low significance which were identified by the licensee have been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee appear reasonable. These violations are listed in Section 40A7 of this report.

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status

The plant was in Refuel XI at the beginning of the report period. On November 7, 2000, the licensee closed the main generator output breaker to end the refueling outage. On November 10, 2000, the plant reached 100 percent power and operated at approximately that power level for the remainder of the report period.

1. REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather (71111.01)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a walkdown of the refueling water storage tank to verify that adverse weather would not affect mitigating systems. The inspectors discussed aspects of severe weather preparations with licensee personnel.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a partial walkdown of residual heat removal system Train A while the opposite train was out of service for planned maintenance activities. The inspectors verified equipment alignment and looked for discrepancies that could impact system operability. The inspectors used the following procedures to perform the walkdowns:

- SYS EJ-121, “Startup of a RHR Train in Cooldown Mode”

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a walkdown of the following areas to determine that the licensee implemented a fire protection program that properly controlled combustibles, that maintained the fire detection, suppression equipment, and passive fire protection features, and that adequately compensated for inoperable or degraded fire protection equipment, systems, or features:

- South piping penetration room
- Auxiliary feedwater pump and valve rooms
- Reactor building

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified that the licensee's flooding mitigation plans and equipment were consistent with the licensee's design requirements and the risk analysis assumptions. The areas inspected were emergency diesel generator Rooms 5201 and 5203, which could propagate a flood into engineered safety feature switchgear Rooms 3301 and 3302. These areas were inspected because of their susceptibility to internal flooding as identified in the Updated Safety Analysis Report, the Wolf Creek Individual Plant Evaluation, and flooding Calculation AN-96-126, "Wolf Creek Generating Station PSA Internal Flooding Notebook," Revision 0.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R08 Inservice Inspection Activities (71111.08)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the Wolf Creek Generating Station 2000 Refuel XI Inservice Inspection Program activities to verify that the program for monitoring degradation of the reactor coolant system boundary was effective. As part of this review the inspector:

- Reviewed a sample of the contractor nondestructive examination procedures and certification documentation for equipment and examination personnel

- Reviewed the status of "Inservice Inspection Program Plan Wolf Creek Generating Station Interval 2," Revision 2

- Reviewed "Surveillance Report S-3203, 15th Year Tendon Surveillance," dated May 16, 2000, and "WCNOC QE Audit K-529, Plant Maintenance," dated August 9, 2000

- Reviewed a sample of completed Refuel XI inservice inspection examination records

- Reviewed a sample of performance improvement requests issued for problems identified in the inservice inspection area during the 1999 Refuel X and the current Refuel XI
- Reviewed reports for three liquid penetrant examinations
- Reviewed two completed ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, repair and replacement plan packages
- Reviewed radiograph film for two welding activities
- Observed portions of ultrasonic testing examinations performed on 13 welds
- Observed magnetic particle examinations performed on three welds

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation (71111.12)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's maintenance rule implementation for functional failure evaluations to assess the effectiveness of maintenance efforts that apply to the following scoped structures, systems, and components:

- Feedwater isolation valve
- Emergency diesel generator - diesel output breaker
- Emergency diesel generator - fuel injector leak off
- Emergency diesel generator - governor mechanical actuator
- Residual heat removal system
- Containment closure equipment

The inspector's review included the following information:

- Maintenance rule bases information
- Maintenance rule expert panel meeting minutes
- Functional failure determination checklists

b. Findings

The inspectors identified the failure to include the containment building equipment hatch motors in the scope of the maintenance rule program as a minor violation with possible generic implications.

On October 3, 2000, while reviewing the licensee's contingency plans for closing the containment building equipment hatch, the inspectors identified that the

nonsafety-related equipment hatch motors were necessary for the licensee to attain successful containment closure in the event of a transient. 10 CFR 50.65(b)(2)(i) and (ii) state in part that nonsafety-related components that are relied upon to mitigate transients or whose failure could prevent safety-related structures from fulfilling their safety-related function should be included in the scope of the maintenance rule monitoring program. The inspectors questioned the licensee about whether the equipment hatch motors, which were needed to close the equipment hatch, were monitored under the maintenance rule program. The licensee indicated that the equipment hatch motors had not been included in the scope of the maintenance rule program. In addition, the licensee identified that a function for containment closure had not been developed under which the equipment hatch motors would be scoped.

In addition, the licensee did not have any contingency plans or procedures for achieving containment closure in the event that one or both of the equipment hatch motors failed. Without such guidance, the licensee would not have had the equipment available to guarantee containment closure within the 4-hour time limit requirement set forth in Technical Specifications 3.9.5A.4 and 3.9.6B3, “Refueling Operations.” Neither would the licensee have been able to achieve containment closure within 30 minutes, which the licensee committed to in its amended response to Generic Letter 88-17, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal," for a loss-of-coolant transient while operating at reduced inventory with the equipment hatch open. Failure to close the equipment hatch in a timely manner would result in the inability of the containment building to mitigate the consequences of a transient.

The failure to include the containment building equipment hatch motors within the scope of the licensee's maintenance rule program is not considered to have a credible impact on safety and as a result is considered a minor violation of 10 CFR 50.65(b)(2)(i) and (ii). Although this issue should be corrected, it constitutes a violation of minor significance that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with Section IV of the NRC’s Enforcement Policy. A minor violation would normally not be documented. However, the issue addresses a weakness that may be present at other facilities. As a result, this issue is being documented as a potential generic safety concern. This minor violation is in the licensee’s corrective action program as Performance Improvement Requests 2000-2901 and -3340.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation (71111.13)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee’s risk assessment for equipment outages as a result of planned and emergent maintenance to evaluate the licensee’s effectiveness in assessing risk for planned and emergent maintenance. The inspectors also discussed the planned and emergent work activities with planning and maintenance personnel. The inspectors review included the following:

- Daily shutdown risk assessment for various periods during the refueling outage
- Actual, planned, and emergent work schedules for the refueling outage

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following operability evaluations to ensure that operability was properly justified and the component or system remained operable:

- Emergency Diesel Generator A

The inspectors also discussed the evaluations with licensee personnel and reviewed applicable portions of the Updated Safety Analysis Report, control room logs, and appropriate regulatory guides.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Postmaintenance Testing (71111.19)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed or observed the postmaintenance testing on the following equipment to verify that procedures and test activities are adequate to verify system operability:

- Emergency Diesel Generator A
- Emergency Diesel Generator B
- Seal water return containment isolation valve

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities (71111.20)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed or observed refueling outage activities to ensure that the licensee considered risk during development of the outage schedule, developed mitigation strategies for the loss of key safety functions, and adhered to operating license and Technical Specification requirements.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed or observed all or part of the following surveillance activities to verify that risk significant structures, systems, and components are capable of performing their intended safety functions and assessing their operational readiness:

- Channel calibration containment instrument tunnel sump
- Vibration and loose parts monitor channel calibration

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP2 Alert and Notification System Testing (7111402)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed design documentation associated with the emergency alerting (siren) system and reviewed testing commitments contained in the siren testing procedure. The inspector also observed a scheduled siren growl test and interviewed the siren technician.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP3 Emergency Response Organization Augmentation Testing (7111403)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the following documents related to emergency response augmentation:

- Staffing and activation commitments for emergency response facilities
- Augmentation and call-out system design documentation
- Primary and backup augmentation procedures

- Call-out (pager and communications) drill results from January through September 2000
- Current qualifications of a sample of 20 emergency response organization members

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP5 Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies (7111405)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the following documents related to corrective actions:

- Summaries of 149 performance improvement requests (corrective actions) assigned to the emergency preparedness department.
- Summaries of 120 performance improvement requests for emergency preparedness functions assigned to other station departments.
- Details of 25 selected performance improvement requests.
- Details of three performance improvement requests generated during the inspection. The inspector discussed the adequacy of immediate corrective actions performed as a result of Performance Improvement Request 2000-3501.
- 10 CFR 50.54(t) Audit Reports QE-K-515 and QE-E-546 for calendar years 1999 and 2000.
- Details of three self-assessments conducted during calendar years 1999 and 2000.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2. RADIATION SAFETY
Cornerstone: Occupational, Public

2OS1 Access Controls to Radiologically Significant Areas (7112101)

a. Inspection Scope

Radiation workers and radiation protection personnel were interviewed concerning their radiation protection work requirements. A number of tours of the radiologically

controlled area and containment were conducted. The following items were reviewed to ensure that the physical and administrative controls for airborne areas, radiation areas, high radiation areas, locked high radiation areas, and worker adherence to these controls were accomplished in accordance with regulatory requirements:

- Quality Evaluation Audits K-520 and K-533
- Plant Evaluation Program Reports OB-00-1247, -1261, -1270, -1272, -1290, and -1304
- Access controls and surveys of the following three significant high dose work areas in the radiologically controlled area: Steam generator nozzle dam removal, component cooling water pipe replacement at the letdown heat exchanger, and reactor lower cavity decontamination activities.
- The following three job-in-progress reviews were performed: Steam generator nozzle dam removal, component cooling water pipe replacement at the letdown heat exchanger, and reactor lower cavity decontamination activities.
- Radiation work permits (001007, 003022, 003200, 003202, 003220, and 005000) and specified electronic dosimeter setpoints
- Placement of personnel dosimetry
- Radiation postings and barricades used at entrances to high dose rate areas, high radiation areas, and very high radiation areas.
- Job coverage by radiation protection personnel
- Radiation protection program procedures
- Radiation protection as low as reasonably achievable prejob briefings for the component cooling water piping replacement at the letdown heat exchanger, reactor head stud tensioning, and reactor lower cavity decontamination activities.
- A summary of radiological operational performance improvement requests written between June 1, 1999, and October 27, 2000. Seven of these performance improvement requests dealing specifically with high radiation areas and radiation worker performance were reviewed in detail (Performance Improvement Requests 2000-0523, -0524, -1290, -1877, -2998, -3046, and -3050).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

.1 Resident Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified the licensee's safety system unavailability performance indicator for the residual heat removal system and the reactor coolant system leakage performance indicator to determine the accuracy and completeness of the licensee's data. The inspectors reviewed the following:

- Licensee worksheets
- A sampling of control room logs

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Radiation Protection Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed corrective action program records for high radiation areas, locked high radiation areas, and unplanned exposure occurrences for the past 12 months to confirm that these occurrences were properly recorded as performance indicators. Radiologically controlled area exit transactions with exposures greater than 100 millirems for the past 12 months were reviewed. Selected examples were investigated to determine whether they were within the dose projections of the governing radiation work permits.

Radiological effluent release program corrective action records, licensee event reports, and annual effluent release reports documented during the past 4 quarters were reviewed to determine if any events exceeded the performance indicator thresholds.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Emergency Preparedness Inspection

Drill and Exercise Performance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed scenario data, evaluator worksheets, and postdrill reports for emergency preparedness drills conducted between January and September 2000 and simulator scenarios and evaluation forms for simulator training sessions that were counted toward drill and exercise performance.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Emergency Response Organization Drill Participation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the following documents:

- List of key emergency response organization positions
- Emergency response organization rosters for the first, second, and third quarters of calendar year 2000
- Drill participation data from the licensee's computer data base
- Drill participation attendance forms for a sample of six emergency response organization members

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Alert and Notification System Reliability

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed 100 percent of the siren test worksheets for siren tests conducted between January and September 2000.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA5 Other

.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-482/2000-002-01: loss of containment total unidentified leak rate computer point operability. The inspectors reviewed the LER supplement and no significant findings were identified. The licensee initiated Performance Improvement Request 2000-1570 for this issue. The licensee issued this LER supplement to provide additional information on LER 50-482/2000-002-00, which was closed in NRC Inspection Report 50-482/00-07. The supplement provided additional information on the basis for reportability, event description, significance, and corrective actions.

.2 (Closed) LER 50-482/2000-003-00: unit trip due to a fire in the auxiliary transformer caused by a squirrel. The inspectors reviewed the LER and no significant findings were identified. The licensee initiated Performance Improvement Request 2000-2462 for this issue.

.3 The inspectors reviewed the INPO Accreditation Evaluation Report, dated August 16, 2000, for the following training programs:

- Instrumentation and control technician and supervisor
- Electrical maintenance personnel and supervisor
- Mechanical maintenance personnel and supervisor
- Chemistry technician
- Radiological protection technician
- Engineering support personnel

4OA6 Meetings

.1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the results of the inservice inspection activities inspection to Mr. K. Scherich and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 6, 2000.

The inspectors presented the results of the access to radiological significant areas and performance indicator verification for occupational and public exposure inspection to Mr. O. Maynard and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 27, 2000.

The inspectors presented the results of the emergency preparedness inspection to Mr. O. Maynard and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on November 17, 2000.

The inspectors presented results of the resident inspection to Mr. B. T. McKinney and other members of licensee management after the conclusion of the inspection on November 21, 2000.

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

4OA7 Licensee Identified Violations

The following findings of low significance were identified by the licensee and are violations of NRC requirements which meet the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as noncited violations.

(1) 10 CFR 20.1501 requires that each licensee shall make, or cause to be made, surveys that are reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate the potential radiological hazards. On October 25, 2000, after spent fuel pool cleanup Filter FEC01B was transferred into a waste liner at approximately 4 a.m., the licensee failed to conduct a dose rate survey of the area surrounding the waste liner. The licensee performed a followup radiation survey at approximately 8:30 a.m., after identifying that a survey had not been conducted. The survey identified two high radiation areas which were subsequently properly posted as described in the licensee's corrective action program Performance Improvement Request 2000-3225. This is a noncited violation (50-482/0009-01).

(2) Technical Specification 5.4.1 requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Radiation Work Permit 005000, Revision 0, special instruction (7) stated that proper contamination and airborne controls were to be established in accordance with radiation work permit briefing material prior to commencing work. On October 6, 2000, a deconner received an uptake while performing deconning activities inside the containment bioshield. The deconner failed to follow the radiation work permit special instructions to establish respiratory protection or high efficiency particulate airborne ventilation prior to initiating deconning activities. The details are described in corrective action program Performance Improvement Request 2000-2909. This is a noncited violation (50-482/0009-02).

ATTACHMENT 1

Supplemental Information

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

K. A. Harris, Manager, Licensing and Corrective Action
J. W. Johnson, Manager, Resource Protection
O. L. Maynard, President and Chief Executive Officer
B. T. McKinney, Vice President Plant Operations and Plant Manager
R. Muench, Vice President Engineering and Information Services
S. R. Koenig, Manager, Performance Improvement and Assessment
C. C. Warren, Vice President Operations Support

ITEMS OPENED and CLOSED

Opened

50-482/0009-01	NCV	Failure to perform a dose survey (Section 4OA7)
50-482/0009-02	NCV	Failure to follow radiation work permit special instructions (Section 4OA7)

Closed

50-482/0009-01	NCV	Failure to perform a dose survey (Section 4OA7)
50-482/0009-02	NCV	Failure to follow radiation work permit special instructions (Section 4OA7)
50-482/2000-002-01	LER	Loss of containment total unidentified leak rate computer point operability (Section 4OA5)
50-482/2000-003-00	LER	Unit trip due to a fire in the auxiliary transformer caused by a squirrel (Section 4OA5)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Emergency Preparedness

Licensee Procedures:

- AI I5D-001, Computer Software Modifications, Revision 2
- AP 06-002, Radiological Emergency Response Plan, Revision 1
- AP 15D-007, Computer Software Quality Program Requirements

- AP 26A-007, NRC Performance Indicators, Revision 0
- AP 28A-001, Performance Indicator Request, Revision 16
- EPP 06-007, Emergency Notifications, Revision 2
- EPP 06-015, Emergency Response Organization Callout, Revision 1
- EPP 06-018, Maintenance of Emergency Facilities and Communication Checks, Revision 0
- EPP 06-019, Alert and Notification System Sirens, Revision 0
- EPF 06-019-01, ANS Siren Annual Maintenance (form), Revision 0

Other Documents:

- WCNOC Emergency Response Organization Duty Rosters (January through September 2000)
- Siren Testing Records, October 1999 through September 2000
- Impact 2000-513, Emergency Action Levels

  Correspondence, J.D. Overstreet, Regional Direction, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region VII, to Col. M. G. Weed, Assistant Director, Kansas Division of Emergency Management, dated June 1987
- Wolf Creek Generating Station Site Specific Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness Alert and Notification System Quality Assurance Verification, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Contract EMW-83-C-1217
- Wyle Research Report WR 82-36, Final Design of Alert and Notification System for Wolf Creek Generating Station, June 1983
- Wyle Research Report WR 83.25, Technical Support for Final Design of Alert and Notification System for Wolf Creek Generating Station, August 1983
- Engineering Disposition, CDR 95-0070, Rotator Motor for Thunderbolt Siren
- Engineering Disposition, CDR 96-0177, Damaged American Signal Siren
- Engineering Disposition, EER 95-RZ-01, Cooling Lake Siren Additions
- Form, ERO Position Acknowledgment
- Self-Assessment 98-033, ERO Communications

- Self-Assessment SELL 99-025, Emergency Planning Training Assessment
- Self-Assessment SELL 00-003, Review of Emergency Planning Commitments against the Regulatory Commitment Management System
- Desk Guide, Emergency Planning Performance Indicators, Revision 0

Fire Protection

- Combustible Loading Information Program Listing for Fire Area A-25, south pipe penetration room
- Applicable fire protection preplans

Inservice Inspection

Procedures

- AP 16A-003, ASME Section XI Repair and Replacement Program, Revision 5
- E.I. 29A-001, Preparation Of Form OAR-1, Revision 0
- E.I. 29A-002, Vendor Oversight During IS Exams, Revision 0
- Q.M. 101, Nondestructive Examination Personnel Certification, Revision 5
- S.D.-800-018, Procedure For Ultrasonic Examination Of Foredeck Pipe Welds In Accordance With P.I.-UT-1, Revision 0
- S.D.-800-019, Procedure For Ultrasonic Examination Of Austenitic Pipe Welds In Accordance With P.I.-UT-2, Revision 0
- S.D.-800-020, Procedure For Ultrasonic Through Wall Sizing Of Pipe Welds In Accordance With P.I.-UT-3, Revision 0
- S.D.-AMD-024, Ultrasonic Instrument Linearity Verification, Revision 8
- STS PE-300, Inservice Inspection Examinations, Revision 6
- WCRE-10, Inservice Inspection Program Plan Wolf Creek Generating Station Interval 2, Revision 2
- WLFCRK-800-001, Procedure For Magnetic Particle Examination At Wolf Creek Nuclear Power Plant, Revision 0
- WLFCRK-800-002, Procedure For Liquid Penetrant Examination Utilizing The Solvent Removal Technique At Wolf Creek Nuclear Power Plant, Revision 0

- WLFCRK-800-003, Procedure For Acquiring Material Thickness And Weld Contours At Wolf Creek Nuclear Power Plant, Revision 0

Drawing

- RI-IS-M-12AE02, Feedwater System, Revision 00

Miscellaneous Documents

- Certification documentation for Refuel RFXI nondestructive examination equipment and five WESDYNE contractor examination personnel
- ASME Section XI Repair/Replacement Plan 2000-073, EG-Component Cooling Water, Revision 01
- ASME Section XI Repair/Replacement Plan 2000-004, EF-Essential Service Water, Revision 01
- WCNOC QE Audit K-529, “Plant Maintenance,” dated August 9, 2000
- Surveillance Report S-3203, “15th Year Tendon Surveillance,” dated May 16, 2000
- Plant Evaluation Report OB 99-0132, “RF X Eddy Current of Steam Generators,” dated May 3, 1999
- Component support visual examination reports for components IDs AE04-R019/251 (Work Order 99-208970-000), GN01-H006 (Work Order 99-209321-000), GN01-H007 (Work Order 99-209321-000)
- Performance Improvement Requests 2000-2887 and -2830, and 99-1439
- Liquid penetrant examination Reports 2559 and 2582
- Magnetic particle examination sheets and associated examination records for Reports RF11-MT-001, -002, and -003
- Ultrasonic (UT) calibration data sheets and associated examination records for UT Numbers, RF11-UT-002, -003, -004, -005, -006, -007, -008
- Radiographs film for Welds MW-7016 and -7017
- Work Orders 00-219379-000, 00-219377-000, 00-219377-000, 00-19376-00, 00-219374-000, 00-219373-000, 00-219372-000, 99-11484-00, 99-209321-001, 99-213931-000, and 00-216707-000
- STN GP-001, Plant winterization

- STS RE-004, Shutdown margin, Revision 23
- STS IC-550, Channel calibration containment instrument tunnel sump level, Revision 0
- STS IC-840, Vibration had loose parts monitor channel calibration, Revision 13
- STS PE-124, LLRT valve lineup for Penetration 24, Revision 2

Maintenance Rule Documents

- Functional failure evaluations for AE, feedwater isolation valve
- Functional failure evaluations for EJ, residual heat removal system
- Functional failure evaluations for KJ, Emergency Diesel Generator A fuel injector leak off
- Functional failure evaluations for KJ, Emergency Diesel Generator A output breaker
- Functional failure evaluations for KJ, Emergency Diesel Generator A governor mechanical actuator
- Maintenance rule bases information, EJ, residual heat removal system
- Maintenance rule expert panel meeting Minutes EJ-01 through EJ-09, residual heat removal system
- Maintenance rule performance evaluation for EJ, residual heat removal system
- Performance improvement requests 2000-2901 and 3340
- Unavailability data for EJ, residual heat removal system

Operability Evaluations

- Evaluation of Nonconforming Conditions of Installed Plant Equipment initiated by Work Order 00-221329-000 for Emergency Diesel Generator A operability
- Performance Improvement Request 2000-3213
- Reportability Evaluation Request 2000-023

Performance Indicator Verification

- Unavailability data for EJ, residual heat removal system
- Surveillance Procedure STS BB-004, “RCS Water Inventory Balance”
- Control room log entries on STS BB-004 results from January 01 to August 01, 2000
- Input performance indicator data report on safety system unavailability (SSU) - residual heat removal system
- Input performance indicator data report on reactor coolant system identified leak rate (RCSL)

Postmaintenance Testing

- WO 99-209997-000 Emergency Diesel Generator A
- WO 99-210622-001 Emergency Diesel Generator A
- WO 99-211846-000 Emergency Diesel Generator A

Refueling Outage

- Clearance Order 00-0280KJ, Emergency Diesel Generator A
- GEN 00-008, Reduced inventory operations
- Maintenance Procedure C1151Q-01, “Containment Equipment Hatch Maintenance and Operation”
- Procedure AP 19C-002, “Special Nuclear Material Safeguards and Accountability,” Revision 5
- Procedure Form APF 19C-002-03, “Fuel Shuffle Sequence,” Revision 2
- Refuel XI outage schedule risk assessment activities
- SYS BB-112, Vacuum fill of the reactor coolant system
- Work Package 00316-93-01, Equipment hatch door full closure test utilizing temporarily installed emergency generator

ATTACHMENT 2

NRC's REVISED REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS

The federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) recently revamped its inspection, assessment, and enforcement programs for commercial nuclear power plants. The new process takes into account improvements in the performance of the nuclear industry over the past 25 years and improved approaches of inspecting and assessing safety performance at NRC licensed plants.

The new process monitors licensee performance in three broad areas (called strategic performance areas): reactor safety (avoiding accidents and reducing the consequences of accidents if they occur), radiation safety (protecting plant employees and the public during routine operations), and safeguards (protecting the plant against sabotage or other security threats). The process focuses on licensee performance within each of seven cornerstones of safety in the three areas:

Reactor Safety	Radiation Safety	Safeguards
● Initiating Events	● Occupational	● Physical Protection
● Mitigating Systems	● Public	
● Barrier Integrity		
● Emergency Preparedness		

To monitor these seven cornerstones of safety, the NRC uses two processes that generate information about the safety significance of plant operations: inspections and performance indicators. Inspection findings will be evaluated according to their potential significance for safety, using the significance determination process, and assigned colors of GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW, or RED. GREEN findings are indicative of issues that, while they may not be desirable, represent very low safety significance. WHITE findings indicate issues that are of low to moderate safety significance. YELLOW findings are issues that are of substantial safety significance. RED findings represent issues that are of high safety significance with a significant reduction in safety margin.

Performance indicator data will be compared to established criteria for measuring licensee performance in terms of potential safety. Based on prescribed thresholds, the indicators will be classified by color representing varying levels of performance and incremental degradation in safety: GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW, or RED. GREEN indicators represent performance at a level requiring no additional NRC oversight beyond the baseline inspections. WHITE corresponds to performance that may result in increased NRC oversight. YELLOW represents performance that minimally reduces safety margin and requires even more NRC oversight. RED indicates performance that represents a significant reduction in safety margin but still provides adequate protection to public health and safety.

The assessment process integrates performance indicators and inspection so the agency can reach objective conclusions regarding overall plant performance. The agency will use an Action Matrix to determine in a systematic, predictable manner which regulatory actions should be taken based on a licensee's performance. The NRC's actions in response to the significance (as represented by the color) of issues will be the same for performance indicators as for inspection findings. As a licensee's safety performance degrades, the NRC will take more and increasingly significant action, which can include shutting down a plant, as described in the Action Matrix.

More information can be found at: http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html.