

April 30, 2002

EA-02-049

Mr. M. Warner
Site Vice President
Kewaunee and Point Beach Nuclear Plants
Nuclear Management Company, LLC
6610 Nuclear Road
Two Rivers, WI 54241

SUBJECT: POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2
NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-266/02-04(DRS); 50-301/02-04(DRS)
PRELIMINARY WHITE FINDING

Dear Mr. Warner:

On April 1, 2002, the NRC completed an inspection of your Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report documents the inspection results, which were discussed with Mr. M. Reddemann and members of your staff at an interim exit meeting on February 15, 2002. Following the on site inspection, additional information was provided by your staff that was reviewed in the Region III office. A final exit meeting was conducted on April 1, 2002, with Mr. A. Cayia and other members of your staff to discuss the NRC's preliminary significance determination of the inspection results.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Specifically, this inspection focused on emergency preparedness, including your staff's determinations of performance indicators for the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone.

The enclosed report discusses an issue involving your staff's critique of its performance during the biennial emergency preparedness exercise that was conducted on February 12, 2002. The NRC's preliminary conclusion is that two exercise performance concerns, which are associated with emergency preparedness planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), were inadequately critiqued by your staff. The first concern was the critique of the initial protective action recommendation that your exercise participants communicated to offsite officials. Your exercise critique concluded that this recommendation was a successful performance indicator opportunity. However, our inspection identified issues concerning this recommendation that were not fully evaluated within your critique. The second concern involved your staff's critique of the exercise participants' decision making on the simulated removal from the site of non-essential personnel, who were not members of the current shift of emergency responders, after all onsite personnel were accounted for.

This issue was assessed using the applicable significance determination process as a potentially safety significant finding that was preliminarily determined to be White, i.e. an issue with some increased importance to safety which may require additional NRC inspection. A basic reason for conducting emergency preparedness drills and exercises is to identify performance and procedure concerns through the critique process so that corrective actions can be taken before such concerns might occur during an actual emergency and possibly have an adverse impact on health and safety. Therefore, it is important that your staff's critiques of emergency preparedness drills and exercises be thorough and self-critical whether or not NRC staff are also present to observe and assess these activities. Since both items are associated with an exercise critique, rather than an actual emergency event, no apparent violation is associated with the preliminary White finding.

Before the NRC makes a final decision on this matter, we are providing you an opportunity to request a Regulatory Conference where you would be able to provide your perspectives on the significance of the finding, the bases for your position, and whether you agree with the apparent violations (if applicable). If you choose to request a Regulatory Conference, we encourage you to submit your evaluation and any differences with the NRC evaluation at least one week prior to the conference in an effort to make the conference more efficient and effective. If a conference is held, it will be open for public observation. The NRC will also issue a press release to announce the conference.

Please contact Mr. Kenneth Riemer at (630) 829-9757 within seven days of the date of this letter to inform the NRC of your intentions. If we have not heard from you by telephone or in writing regarding a conference within 10 days, we will continue with our significance determination and enforcement decision, and you will be advised by separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on this matter.

In accordance with 10 CFR Part 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA by Roy Caniano Acting For/

John A. Grobe, Director
Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301
License Nos. DPR-24; DPR-27

Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-266/02-04(DRS);
50-301/02-04(DRS)

See Attached Distribution

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Sincerely,
/RA by Roy Caniano Acting For/

John A. Grobe, Director
Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301
License Nos. DPR-24; DPR-27

Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-266/02-04(DRS);
50-301/02-04(DRS)

See Attached Distribution

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DATE	4/30/02	4/30/02	4/30/02	4/30/02	4/30/02

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M. Warner

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cc w/encl: R. Grigg, President and Chief
Operating Officer, WEPCo
R. Anderson, Executive Vice President
and Chief Nuclear Officer
T. Webb, Licensing Manager
D. Weaver, Nuclear Asset Manager
T. Taylor, Plant Manager
A. Cayia, Site Director
J. O'Neill, Jr., Shaw, Pittman,
Potts & Trowbridge
K. Duveneck, Town Chairman
Town of Two Creeks
D. Graham, Director
Bureau of Field Operations
A. Bie, Chairperson, Wisconsin
Public Service Commission
S. Jenkins, Electric Division
Wisconsin Public Service Commission
State Liaison Officer
W. Curtis, FEMA, Region V

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket Nos: 50-266; 50-301
License Nos: DPR-24; DPR-27

Report No: 50-266/02-04(DRS); 50-301/02-04(DRS)

Licensee: Nuclear Management Company, LLC

Facility: Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2

Location: 6610 Nuclear Road
Two Rivers, WI 54241

Dates: February 11 through February 15, 2002; and
April 1, 2002

Inspectors: T. Ploski, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector
R. Jickling, Emergency Preparedness Inspector
S. Orth, Senior Radiation Specialist
P. Krohn, Senior Resident Inspector

Approved by: Kenneth Riemer, Chief
Plant Support Branch

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000266-02-04(DRS), 05000301-02-04(DRS), on 02/11-04/1/2002, Nuclear Management Company, LLC, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. Exercise Evaluation.

The report covers a baseline inspection by two regional emergency preparedness inspectors, one regional radiation protection inspector, and a senior resident inspector. The inspection focused on the Reactor Safety, Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone, during the biennial emergency preparedness exercise, and included a review of records related to the three emergency preparedness performance indicators for the period ending December 31, 2001. One preliminary White finding was identified during the inspection.

The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609 "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at <http://www/nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html>. Findings for which the SDP does not apply are indicated by "No Color" or by the severity level of the applicable violations.

A. Inspector Identified Findings

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

TBD. Two exercise performance issues, which are associated with emergency preparedness planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), were inadequately critiqued by licensee staff. The first issue was associated with the licensee's critique of the initial offsite Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) that its exercise participants communicated to offsite officials. The NRC identified issues that contradicted the licensee's critique conclusion that the initial PAR was a successful performance indicator opportunity with respect to its content. The second issue was the licensee's critique of its participants decision making process on the simulated removal from the site of non-essential personnel, who were not members of the current shift of emergency responders, once all onsite personnel were accounted for.

Using the Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process, the NRC has made a preliminary determination that the finding was of low to moderate risk significance (White). In accordance with NRC's Enforcement Policy, as published in NUREG 1600, it was determined that there is no apparent violation of NRC requirements since the critique issues were related to an exercise, rather than to an actual emergency. (Section 1EP1.b)

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status

The plant operated at approximately 100 percent power throughout the inspection period.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP1 Exercise Evaluation (71114.01)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the February 2002 exercise's objectives and scenario to ensure that the exercise would acceptably test major elements of the licensee's emergency plan and to verify that the exercise's simulated problems provided an acceptable framework to support demonstration of the licensee's capability to implement its plan. The inspectors also reviewed records of a pre-exercise practice drill, which was conducted in January 2002, to determine whether the associated accident scenario was sufficiently different from the scenario used in the February 12, 2002 exercise.

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's exercise performance, focusing on the risk-significant activities of emergency classification, notification, and protective action decision making, as well as implementation of accident mitigation strategies in the following emergency response facilities:

- Control Room Simulator (CRS)
- Technical Support Center (TSC)
- Operations Support Center (OSC)
- Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

The inspectors also assessed the licensee's recognition of abnormal plant conditions, transfer of responsibilities between facilities, internal communications, interfaces with offsite officials, readiness of emergency facilities and related equipment, and overall implementation of the licensee's emergency plan.

The inspectors attended the initial post-exercise critiques in the CRS, OSC, TSC, and EOF to evaluate the licensee's initial self-assessment of its exercise performance. The inspectors later met with the licensee's lead exercise evaluators to assess the licensee's refined critique of its exercise participants' performances. The licensee's refined critique's results were then compared with the inspectors' independent observations and assessments.

b. Findings

One preliminary White finding was identified for the licensee's inadequate critique of two exercise performance issues associated with emergency planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). Per Supplement VIII of NRC's Enforcement Policy, as published in Nuclear Regulatory Guide (NUREG) 1600, no associated violation of NRC requirements was identified since the finding was associated with an exercise rather than an actual emergency event.

This planning standard encompasses protective actions for the general public and onsite personnel. As demonstrated by the licensee's exercise performance, the inspectors identified two issues associated with the planning standard that were not adequately critiqued by the licensee. The first issue was that the licensee failed to adequately critique exercise participants' initial Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) that was communicated to offsite officials. The second issue was that the licensee failed to adequately critique exercise participants' decision making on the simulated removal of non-essential onsite personnel, who were not members of the current shift of emergency responders, from the site after all onsite personnel had been accounted for.

The NRC Manual Chapter (MC) 0609 divides the sixteen emergency planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) into two categories, namely risk significant planning standards and other planning standards. With respect to the two aforementioned issues, MC 0609 states that 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) is risk significant for offsite PARs but not also for onsite protective actions.

Protective Action Recommendation

The first issue associated with the preliminary White finding was that the licensee did not adequately critique the initial PAR. Based on a review of the licensee's exercise scenario manual, Section 6 of the licensee's emergency plan, Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) 1.3, relevant guidance in Nuclear Regulatory Guide NUREG 0654 and Supplement 3 of this NUREG, the Environmental Protection Agency's protective action guides, and the criteria in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) publication 99-02, Revision 2, the inspectors determined that the licensee's initial PAR was incorrect and unanticipated per the scenario and should not be considered as a successful Performance Indicator (PI) opportunity. In contrast, the licensee's critique conclusion was that this initial PAR was a successful Performance Indicator PI opportunity.

In accordance with the exercise scenario, the licensee's decision maker correctly declared a General Emergency at about 10:48 a.m. Licensee staff then formulated an initial PAR that was communicated to offsite officials within 15 minutes of the General Emergency declaration. The initial PAR included a correct recommendation to evacuate the public within a two mile radius of the site. However, the inspectors' specific concern was that this initial PAR also included an unexpected recommendation to evacuate persons within five sectors (L, M, N, P, and Q) between two and five miles from the site, rather than evacuation of persons within three or possibly four of these sectors between two and five miles from the site, which was predicted by the scenario and which would be consistent with the emergency plan and implementing procedures. The inspectors

based their conclusion that the initial PAR was not a successful PI opportunity on a number of factors, including:

- Licensee participants were presented with plant conditions, which were correctly recognized by those tasked with developing and approving the initial PAR, that included a gap release from containment. The scenario also postulated a wind direction from 90 degrees +/- five degrees, a forecast wind direction shift that might occur, and a “B” atmospheric stability class before and after this possible wind direction shift.
- Per Attachment A to EPIP 1.3 and the output from the licensee’s offsite dose projection software, which was used by participants during the exercise and included atmospheric stability class as an input, a wind direction from 90 degrees +/- five degrees translated into the three downwind sectors (each having a width of 22.5 degrees) of M, N, and P.
- Per Step 3.3 of EPIP 1.3 and Subsection 5.1.2 of Section 6 of the licensee’s emergency plan, an offsite PAR would include evacuation of a two mile radius from the site and “typically” (per EPIP 1.3) or “in many cases” (per the emergency plan) three or four sectors between two and five miles downwind. However, neither EPIP 1.3 nor the emergency plan specified what circumstances might warrant a PAR having more than three or four downwind sectors with the following possible exception. Step 3.4 of EPIP 1.3 stated that a PAR to evacuate all sectors within a five mile radius of the site should be considered if either the wind speed was less than three miles per hour or if a lake breeze effect was identified. In contrast, the scenario postulated a wind speed remaining above five miles per hour and no lake breeze effect.
- As noted by the inspectors and as documented in a few records generated by licensee participants during the exercise, State officials modified the licensee’s initial PAR to include evacuation of only three downwind sectors (M, N, and P) between two and five miles from the site.
- The scenario manual indicated that a wind direction shift from about 90 degrees to about 115 to 120 degrees would be issued to participants around noontime in order to support an exercise objective of having licensee, State, and county staffs demonstrate their capabilities to deal with changing meteorological conditions warranting two PARs. During the exercise, the licensee’s exercise controllers modified the scenario’s postulated wind direction shift such that the revised wind direction was from about 130 degrees. The inspectors interpreted this controller action to mean that the initial PAR’s inclusion of five sectors beyond two miles from the site was not forecast by the scenario and was, therefore, unexpected by the scenario and the licensee’s exercise controllers.
- The licensee’s exercise participants quickly recognized the wind direction shift to be from 130 degrees. They developed a revised PAR that included the three downwind sectors between two and five miles from the site that were consistent with Attachment A to EPIP 1.3 and the output from the licensee’s offsite dose projection software. The inspectors agreed with the licensee’s critique that the

development of this revised PAR was a successful PI opportunity.

- The licensee generated a number of Action Requests-Corrective Action Program (AR-CAP) documents as a result of its exercise critique. The inspectors noted that only AR-CAP002169 addressed PARs developed during the exercise. However, this AR addressed a concern of how to document a PAR change due to a wind shift. Specifically, this AR-CAP's concern was whether accumulated sectors should be documented on the form or only the newly affected downwind sectors. Therefore, the inspectors concluded that the licensee had not adequately critiqued its initial PAR.

Removal of Non-Essential Personnel

The second issue associated with the preliminary White finding was that the licensee did not adequately critique its exercise participants' decision making on the simulated removal of non-essential onsite personnel, who were not members of the current shift of emergency responders, from the site after all onsite personnel were accounted for.

An actual assembly and accountability of onsite personnel was performed during the exercise and was successfully completed at about 10:05 a.m., which was after the Site Area Emergency declaration and prior to the General Emergency declaration. The subsequent removal of non-essential personnel from the site was simulated in order to avoid further disrupting the normal work activities of personnel who were not chosen to be otherwise involved in the exercise.

During the exercise, inspectors noted that the decision to begin the simulated removal of non-essential personnel from the site was not made until about 12:50 p.m. The decision occurred over 2.5 hours after all onsite personnel were accounted for and about two hours after the licensee issued its initial PAR to offsite officials that included evacuation of the public. The decision was to "release" non-essential personnel and to allow them to leave the site using their own vehicles, although the use of buses to be provided by a local company was discussed.

The inspectors reviewed the following documents: Sections 5 and 6 and Appendix D of the licensee's emergency plan and EPIP 6.1, which was titled "Assembly, Accountability, Release, and Evacuation of Personnel." The inspectors also reviewed AR-CAP002156 and AR-CAP002170 that were generated as a result of the licensee's exercise critique, as well as log entries made by several participants who were involved in the decision making process. Based on the inspectors' exercise observations, review of the aforementioned documents, and assessment of the licensee's February 14 and 15 critique presentations, inspectors concluded that the licensee had not adequately critiqued exercise performance regarding participants' decision making to simulate removing non-essential personnel from the site. In contrast, the licensee's position was that its staff had adequately critiqued this decision making and that participants' use of EPIP 6.1 was acceptable.

The inspectors' conclusion was based on a number of factors, including:

- Subsection 5.1.1.d.2 of Section 6 of the emergency plan stated that an assembly and release or evacuation “will be ordered upon the classification of a Site or General Emergency.” This subsection and EPIP 6.1 stated that assembled, non-essential personnel would either be “released” from the site when no radiological conditions were present, or be “evacuated” from the site when radiological conditions were present and additional actions, such as radiological monitoring and relocation, were required.
- Subsection 3.2.3 of Section 5 of the emergency plan stated that non-essential personnel will be released if “conditions allow;” however, these conditions were not specified. Step 4.4 of EPIP 6.1 stated that an “evacuation” of non-essential personnel to an offsite assembly area “shall be considered” under certain projected or measured radiological conditions, or other hazards.
- Following the licensee’s critique presentation on February 14, the inspectors asked the licensee’s exercise controllers about the acceptability of the participants’ considering the use of buses from a local company to transport non-essential personnel from the site. The licensee indicated that it believed that an agreement existed with a local company to provide such a support. In contrast, the inspectors did not identify evidence of pre-planning, either in the emergency plan or in EPIP 6.1, to use a local company to provide buses to remove non-essential personnel from the site during an emergency.
- At its February 14 critique presentation, the licensee gave the inspectors copies of two AR associated with its exercise critique of the implementation of EPIP 6.1. Eight concerns associated with the assembly and accountability processes in one onsite building were summarized in AR-CAP002156. “Assembly and Accountability Process” was the title of AR-CAP002170, which also listed eight concerns. Although one of these eight concerns was “when to ‘evacuate’ assembled personnel,” the AR did not also list a concern about when to “release” assembled personnel consistent with the emergency plan’s and EPIP 6.1’s different meanings of the words “release” and “evacuate.”
- After the licensee’s February 14 critique presentation, the inspectors asked other questions about the participants’ decision making on removing non-essential personnel from the site, such as whether the decision to begin removing non-essential personnel was considered to be timely and what road was eventually chosen to reach the Site Boundary Control Center (SBCC). The inspectors concluded that the licensee did not have sufficient information available to respond to these questions.

Significance Determination

Appendix B to NRC Manual Chapter (MC) 0610* includes criteria for determining whether an issue warrants further analysis and documentation in an inspection report as a finding. Using these criteria, the inspectors determined that the issues of the licensee’s failure to adequately critique: (1) its participants’ initial PAR and (2) its participants’ decision making on the simulated removal of non-essential personnel from

the site were issues that had a credible impact on safety. Each issue could also be viewed as a precursor to a significant event and would, if left uncorrected, under the same conditions become a more significant safety concern. Both critique issues were evaluated as such because a basic reason for conducting Emergency Preparedness drills and exercises is to identify performance and procedure concerns so that corrective actions on such concerns can be taken before these concerns may occur during an actual emergency and have an adverse impact on health and safety.

Appendix B to MC 0609 divides the 16 emergency planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) into two categories, specifically "risk significant" and "other" planning standards. With respect to the two aforementioned issues, Subsection 5.10 of Appendix B states that 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) is "risk significant" for offsite PAR's, but not for onsite protective actions.

Rather than have a separate finding for each critique issue, it is appropriate to identify one preliminary finding to encompass both issues and to focus on their common factor, specifically that both issues were inadequately critiqued by licensee staff. It is then appropriate to assign a preliminary significance to the evaluation of the licensee's critique that is associated with the more risk significant of the two critique issues (White) (Unresolved Item No. 50-266/02-04-01 and 50-301/02-04-01).

4. **OTHER ACTIVITIES**

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's records related to each of the three emergency preparedness PIs to verify that the licensee's program was implemented consistent with the industry guidelines in Nuclear Energy Institute publication No. 99-02 and related licensee procedures. Specifically, licensee records related to the performance of the Alert and Notification System (ANS), key Emergency Response Organization (ERO) members' drill participation, and Drill and Exercise Performance (DEP) were reviewed to verify the accuracy and completeness of the data submitted to NRC for the period October 2001 through December 2001.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Meetings

a. Exit Meeting

The inspectors presented the preliminary inspection results to Mr. M. Reddemann and other members of licensee management and staff at an interim exit meeting on February 15, 2002. The licensee acknowledged the information presented. No proprietary information was identified. On April 1, 2002, a final exit meeting was held with Mr. F. Cayia and other members of licensee management and staff.

b. Other Meeting

On February 15, 2002, an inspector summarized NRC's preliminary inspection results at a public and media briefing hosted by the Federal Emergency Management Agency in Manitowoc, Wisconsin.

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Interim Exit Meeting

Licensee

J. Anderson, Production Planning Manager
L. Armstrong, Engineering Manager
R. Arnold, Chemistry Supervisor
W. Bartelme, EP Coordinator
A. Cayia, Site Director
G. Corell, Chemistry Manager
D. Hettick, Performance Assessment Manager
V. Kaminskas, Maintenance Manager
M. Kelley, EP Coordinator
C. Krause, Regulatory Compliance
K. Pavley, Nuclear Oversight Manager
M. Reddemann, Site Vice President
R. Repshas, Site Services Manager
J. Strarsky, Operations Manager
S. Thomas, Radiation Protection Manager
R. Walsh, Nuclear Oversight
D. Weaver, Assistant Manager
T. Webb, Licensing Manager
W. Yarosz, EP Manager

Final Exit Meeting

Licensee

J. Anderson, Production Planning Manager
L. Armstrong, Engineering Manager
W. Bartelme, EP Coordinator
A. Cayia, Site Director
F. Flenje, Senior Regulatory Compliance Specialist
R. Hopkins, Nuclear Oversight Supervisor
V. Kaminskas, Maintenance Manager
M. Kelley, EP Coordinator
R. Pulec, Assistant Director
R. Repshas, Site Services Manager
D. Schoon, Operations Manager
T. Taylor, Plant Manager
S. Thomas, Radiation Protection Manager
E. Weinkam, Regulatory Services Director
W. Yarosz, EP Manager

NRC

R. Caniano, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety, Region III
T. Ploski, Senior EP Inspector, Region III
K. Riemer, Chief, Plant Support Branch, Region III

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Opened

50-266/02-04-01	URI	Inadequate critique of two exercise performance issues
50-301/02-04-01		(Section 1EP1.b)

Closed

None

Discussed

None

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ANS	Alert and Notification System
AR	Action Request
CAP	Corrective Action Program
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CRS	Control Room Simulator
DEP	Drill and Exercise Performance
DRS	Division of Reactor Safety
EOF	Emergency Operations Facility
EP	Emergency Preparedness
EPIP	Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure
ERO	Emergency Response Organization
IR	Inspection Report
MC	NRC Manual Chapter
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NUREG	Nuclear Regulatory Guide
OSC	Operations Support Center
PAR	Protective Action Recommendation
PI	Performance Indicator
SBCC	Site Boundary Control Center
TBD	To Be Determined
TSC	Technical Support Center

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

1EP1 Exercise Evaluation

	February 2002 Exercise Scenario Manual	
	Summary of January 2002 Drill Scenario	
	Licensee's Time Line on Decisions on Simulated	
	Removal of Non-essential Personnel	
	Point Beach Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan	August 2000
EPIP 1.1	Course of Actions	Revision 37
EPIP 1.2	Emergency Classification	Revision 34
EPIP 1.3	Dose Assessment and Protective Action	
	Recommendations	Revision 27
EPIP 2.1	Notifications	Revision 22
EPIP 4.1	TSC Activation and Evacuation	Revision 30
EPIP 4.2	OSC Activation and Evacuation	Revision 14
EPIP 4.3	EOF Activation and Evacuation	Revision 24
EPIP 4.7	Offsite Radiation Protection Facility Activation and	
	Evacuation	Revision 1
EPIP 5.1	Personnel Emergency Dose Authorization	Revision 13
EPIP 5.2	Radioiodine Blocking and Thyroid Dose	Revision 13
	Accounting	
EPIP 6.1	Assembly and Accountability, Release and	Revision 19
	Evacuation of Personnel	
EPIP 10.1	Emergency Reentry	Revision 21
AR-CAP002117	Joint Public Information Center Does Not Appear	
	to be Set Up for Concurrent Kewaunee and Point	
	Beach Plant Emergency Events	
AR-CAP002127	Supply Discrepancies in TSC, OSC, and EOF	
AR-CAP002156	Assembly/Accountability Problems in North	
	Service Building	
AR-CAP002166	Reassess Emergency Action Level 1.1.5.1	
AR-CAP002167	Lab Coats Not Available for Sample Handlers	
AR-CAP002168	Milwaukee Call Center Provided Out of Date	
	Information to Simulated Public Callers	
AR-CAP002169	How to Document PAR Change Due to Wind	
	Direction Shift on State/County Notification Form	
AR-CAP002170	Reassess Assembly and Accountability Process	
AR-CAP002171	Discrepancy in Dose Assessment Program's	
	Computer Monitor Display versus a Printout	
AR-CAP002172	Develop Briefing Sheets for Directors	
AR-CAP002173	Miscellaneous Equipment Issues During Exercise	
AR-CAP002174	Qualifications of Craft Personnel for Some Tasks	

AR-CAP002175	Shift Manager Unable to Activate Primary ERO Notification System
AR-CAP002176	Dose/PAR Coordinator Checklist Concern
AR-CAP002177	CRS Crew Twice Started Equipment Without Proper Investigation
AR-CAP002178	Problems Hearing Gai-Tronics Announcements
AR-CAP002179	Several Staff Reading Personal Reading Materials in OSC Briefing Room During Exercise
AR-CAP002180	Participant Access Problem at Joint Public Information Center
AR-CAP002181	Several Non-Participants Unwilling to Augment Participants When Requested
AR-CAP002182	Several Simulator Fidelity and Controller Performance Issues
AR-CAP002183	Several Information Flow Problems in TSC
AR-CAP002184	Two Participants Not Fully Qualified
AR-CAP002185	Environmental Sample Analysis Records Keeping
AR-CAP002186	Accumulated Dose Tracking Concern in OSC
AR-CAP002189	EP Staff Involvement in Operator Training for DEP Performance Indicator
AR-CAP002190	Two Vehicles Had Insufficient Gas
AR-CAP002215	Instances of OSC Teams Not Demonstrating Good Contamination Control Practices

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

	Fourth Quarter 2001 Evaluation Forms for Three PIs	
MO4-11	Field Observations of Sirens' Full Sound Test	November 7, 2001
MO4-12	Full Sound Siren Test Records - October through December 2001	
MO5-12	Growl Sound Siren Test Records - October through December 2001	
	Drill Nuclear Accident Reporting Form	October 4, 2001
	Drill Nuclear Accident Reporting Forms	December 6, 2001
	Drill Scenario Time Line	December 2001
AR-CAP-002214	Reassess Which EOF Position is State/County Communicator for PI Reporting Purposes	