

December 1, 2003

Mr. Peter E. Katz
Vice President Nine Mile Point
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC
P. O. Box 63
Lycoming, NY 13093

SUBJECT: NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION - NRC INSPECTION REPORT
05000220/2003011, 05000410/2003011

Dear Mr. Katz:

On October 24, 2003, the NRC completed a team inspection at the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on October 24, 2003, with you and other members of your staff.

This inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to the identification and resolution of problems, compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and representative records, observation of activities, and interviews with personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified. The team concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated and corrected within the problem identification and resolution (PIR) program. Since the last PIR inspection, weaknesses associated with your corrective action program have been identified as a contributing root cause for an unplanned scram performance indicator that crossed the white threshold and for a white finding associated with degraded reactor building closed loop cooling system piping. These equipment reliability issues contributed to the 2003 NRC Reactor Oversight Program mid-cycle performance assessment that a substantive cross-cutting issue existed in the PIR area. Although the long term effectiveness of recent changes to your corrective action program cannot yet be evaluated, the team determined that the changes appeared appropriate.

Mr. Peter E. Katz

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Sincerely,

/RA/

Raymond K. Lorson, Chief
Performance Evaluation Branch
Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos: 50-220, 50-410
License Nos: DPR-63, NPF-69

Enclosure: Inspection Report Nos. 05000220/2003011, 05000410/2003011
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/encl:

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Mr. Peter E. Katz

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Docket Nos: 50-220, 50-410

License Nos: DPR-63, NPF-69

Report Nos: 05000220/2003011, 05000410/2003011

Licensee: Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC (NMPNS)

Facility: Nine Mile Point Units 1 and 2

Location: P. O. Box 63
Lycoming, NY 13093

Dates: October 6-10, and October 20-24, 2003

Inspectors: Thomas R. Hipschman, Senior Reactor Inspector (Team Leader)
Gregory T. Bowman, Reactor Inspector
Suresh K. Chaudhary, Senior Reactor Inspector
Brian J. Fuller, Resident Inspector
Shriram G. Iyer, Reactor Inspector
Paul D. Kaufman, Senior Reactor Inspector
Keith A. Young, Reactor Inspector

Approved by: Raymond K. Lorson, Chief
Performance Evaluation Branch
Division of Reactor Safety

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000220/2003-011, 05000410/2003-011; 10/6/2003 - 10/24/2003; Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; biennial baseline inspection of the identification and resolution of problems.

This inspection was conducted by six regional inspectors and one resident inspector. No findings of significance were identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process (SDP)." Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000.

Identification and Resolution of Problems

The team determined that, in general, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (NMPNS) properly identified, evaluated and corrected problems. Corrective actions, when specified, were generally implemented in a timely manner. Audits and self-assessments were found to be acceptable. Since the last problem identification and resolution (PIR) inspection, weaknesses associated with your corrective action program have been identified as a contributing root cause for an unplanned scram performance indicator that crossed the white threshold and for a white finding associated with degraded reactor building closed loop cooling system piping. These equipment reliability issues contributed to the 2003 NRC Reactor Oversight Program (ROP) mid-cycle performance assessment that a substantive cross-cutting issue existed in the PIR area. Although the long term effectiveness of recent changes to your corrective action program cannot yet be evaluated, the team determined that the recent improvements to the corrective action program appeared appropriate. On the basis of interviews conducted during the inspection, workers at the site felt free to input safety findings into the corrective action program.

A. NRC Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

None.

Report Details

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

a. Effectiveness of Problem Identification

(1) Inspection Scope

The inspection team reviewed the procedures describing the corrective action program at the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (NMPNS). The team reviewed items selected from various licensee processes and activities to determine if personnel were properly identifying, characterizing and entering problems into the corrective action program for evaluation and resolution. The NMPNS uses the deviation event report (DER) process for identifying problems, evaluating and prescribing the associated corrective actions at NMPNS.

The team reviewed logs, control room deficiencies and operator work-arounds, system health reports, temporary modifications, operating experience reviews, and procedures. In addition, the team interviewed plant staff and management to determine their understanding of and involvement with the corrective action program. The specific documents reviewed and referenced during the inspection are listed in the attachment to this report.

The team reviewed a sample of the quality assurance department's audits and assessments, as well as departmental and program self-assessments. This review was to verify that issues identified during the assessment were entered into the corrective action program, and that the corrective actions were properly completed to resolve the self-identified deficiencies. The team evaluated the effectiveness of the audits and self-assessments by comparing the associated results against self-revealing and NRC-identified findings.

The team conducted several plant walkdowns of safety-related and risk significant areas to verify that observable adverse system equipment and plant material conditions were properly identified and entered into the corrective action program. Team members attended daily management meetings where DERs were reviewed and actions for resolution were assigned. The team attended these meetings to understand the threshold for identifying problems and to assess management involvement with the corrective action program. The team also assessed the interface between the corrective action program and the work control process.

(2) Observations and Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Overall, NMPNS's effectiveness at problem identification was acceptable. Audits and self-assessments were self-critical and generally consistent with the team's findings.

However, the team identified that opportunities exist to strengthen the linkage between the security department's internal corrective action program and the site's corrective action program. Evaluation of issues such as personnel performance, equipment failures, and trending could be improved by addressing, communicating and involving the site's senior management in such issues. A DER was initiated in response to this observation. This problem identification deficiency was considered minor in accordance with the guidance in IMC 0612, Appendix B.

b. Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues

(1) Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the DERs listed in the attachment to this report to assess whether NMPNS adequately prioritized and evaluated problems. The team evaluated the causal assessment of each issue (i.e., root cause analysis or apparent cause evaluation); and for significant conditions adverse to quality, the extent of condition and determination of corrective actions to preclude recurrence. The team selected the DERs to cover the seven cornerstones of safety identified in the NRC Reactor Oversight Program. The team also considered risk insights from the NMPNS probabilistic risk assessment to focus the inspection sample. Additionally, the team attended the daily meetings to observe the DER review process and to verify that the assigned significance and root cause levels were appropriate.

The team also selected a sample of DERs associated with previous NRC non-cited violations (NCV) to determine whether NMPNS properly evaluated and resolved problems associated with compliance to applicable regulatory requirements. The team reviewed NMPNS's evaluation of industry operating experience information for applicability to NMPNS. The team also reviewed NMPNS's assessment of equipment operability, reportability requirements, and the potential extent of the problem.

(2) Observations and Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

The team determined that, in general, NMPNS adequately prioritized and evaluated the issues and concerns entered into the corrective action program. Personnel were generally effective at classifying and performing operability evaluations and reportability determinations for discrepant conditions. The team noted that while the site has implemented improvements to the corrective action program, some recurring and long-standing issues remain to be resolved. These issues included valve packing leaks, control rod drive pump failures, high pressure coolant injection system problems, feed pump clutch problems, and quality issues associated with maintenance procedures. The team independently evaluated the above items, and concluded that none of the items mentioned above resulted in an adverse safety or operability consequence.

c. Effectiveness of Corrective Actions(1) Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the corrective actions associated with selected DERs to determine whether the actions addressed the identified causes of the problems. The team also reviewed NMPNS's timeliness in implementing corrective actions and their effectiveness in precluding recurrence of significant conditions adverse to quality. Furthermore, the team assessed the backlog of corrective actions to determine, if any, individually or collectively, represented an increased risk due to the delay in implementation. The team also reviewed non-cited violations issued since the last inspection of the NMPNS corrective action program to determine if issues placed in the program had been properly evaluated and corrected.

(2) Observations and Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

d. Assessment of Safety Conscious Work Environment(1) Inspection Scope

During this inspection, the team interviewed plant staff to determine if conditions existed that would result in personnel being hesitant to raise safety concerns to their management and/or the NRC.

(2) Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, including Exit

The results of this inspection were discussed at an exit meeting conducted on October 24, 2003, with Mr. P. Katz, and other members of the Nine Mile Point staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during this inspection.

ATTACHMENT

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

J. Bunnel, Mechanical Support Supervisor
W. Byrne, Director of Security
J. Cole, Radiation Protection Supervisor
G. Deyo, In-service Testing Supervisor
L. Fletcher, Maintenance Support Supervisor
R. Franssen, Director of Security Programs
S. Heimovitz, Component Specialist
J. Jones, Director of Emergency Preparedness
A. Julka, QA Director
T. Maund, Manager, Work Control
J. Nicholson, Component Specialist (Maintenance Support)
D. Pierce, Security Specialist
T. Shippee, Feed Water Systems Engineer
A. Sievers, Maintenance
J. Spina, Maintenance Manager
J. Ting, Recirculation Systems Engineer
D. Topley, Manager, Corrective Action Program
J. Torbett, Manager, Employee Concerns
A. Verno, Supervisor of Security Operations
A. Zallnick, QA Engineer (Security Program Lead)

ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED

None

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Deviation Event Reports

DER-NM-2003-214	DER-NM-2003-4215	DER-NM-2003-2059
DER-NM-2003-622	DER-NM-2003-4046	DER-NM-2003-1996
DER-NM-2003-2107	DER-NM-2003-3279	DER-NM-2003-1995
DER-NM-2003-2463	DER-NM-2003-2940	DER-NM-2003-1872
DER-NM-2003-4404	DER-NM-2003-2785	DER-NM-2003-1694
DER-NM-2003-4391	DER-NM-2003-2722	DER-NM-2003-1406
DER-NM-2003-4367	DER-NM-2003-2463	DER-NM-2003-1308
DER-NM-2003-4020	DER-NM-2003-2435	DER-NM-2003-1139
DER-NM-2003-4282	DER-NM-2003-2289	DER-NM-2003-1118

DER-NM-2003-1426	DER-NM-2002-3524	DER-NM-2001-1414
DER-NM-2003-1070	DER-NM-2002-3031	DER-NM-1998-1603
DER-NM-2003-1108	DER-NM-2002-2886	DER-NM-1997-2364
DER-NM-2003-931	DER-NM-2002-2822	DER-NM-1995-1931
DER-NM-2003-890	DER-NM-2002-2821	DER-NM-2002-4570
DER-NM-2003-835	DER-NM-2002-2684	DER-NM-2003-1760
DER-NM-2003-646	DER-NM-2002-2656	DER-NM-2003-3396
DER-NM-2003-622	DER-NM-2002-2546	DER-NM-2003-245
DER-NM-2003-610	DER-NM-2002-2428	DER-NM-2003-345
DER-NM-2003-586	DER-NM-2002-1849	DER-NM-2003-1546
DER-NM-2003-442	DER-NM-2002-1721	DER-NM-2003-1799
DER-NM-2003-433	DER-NM-2002-971	DER-NM-2003-1852
DER-NM-2003-352	DER-NM-2002-652	DER-NM-2003-1853
DER-NM-2003-348	DER-NM-2002-393	DER-NM-2003-1868
DER-NM-2003-231	DER-NM-2002-366	DER-NM-2003-4639
DER-NM-2003-214	DER-NM-2002-223	DER-NM-2003-4654
DER-NM-2003-126	DER-NM-2002-209	DER-NM-2003-4873
DER-NM-2003-87	DER-NM-2001-6033	DER-NM-2002-4482
DER-NM-2003-56	DER-NM-2001-5931	DER-NM-2003-224
DER-NM-2003-48	DER-NM-2001-5898	DER-NM-2002-4178
DER-NM-2003-40	DER-NM-2001-5842	DER-NM-2002-5305
DER-NM-2002-5282	DER-NM-2001-5629	DER-NM-2003-1873
DER-NM-2002-4824	DER-NM-2001-5619	DER-NM-2003-1868
DER-NM-2002-4802	DER-NM-2001-5140	DER-NM-2001-5193
DER-NM-2002-4792	DER-NM-2001-5083	DER NM-2000-3802
DER-NM-2002-4790	DER-NM-2001-5058	DER NM-2001-2431
DER-NM-2002-4786	DER-NM-2001-4923	DER NM-2001-5894
DER-NM-2002-4616	DER-NM-2001-4848	DER NM-2002-1043
DER-NM-2002-4250	DER-NM-2001-4838	DER NM-2003-0348
DER-NM-2002-4248	DER-NM-2001-4830	DER NM-2003-2107
DER-NM-2002-4178	DER-NM-2001-4601	DER NM-2003-3263
DER-NM-2002-4034	DER-NM-2001-4553	DER NM-2003-3557
DER-NM-2002-4034	DER-NM-2001-4406	
DER-NM-2002-4016		

Procedures

N2-ISP-CMS-R104
 NTP-TQS-202, Revision 21
 NIP-EPP-01, Revision 14
 NIP-ECA-01, Revision 29
 GAP-PSH-01, Work Control, Revision 31
 NAI-ECA-04, Corrective Action Review Board, Revision 8
 NAI-ECA-05, DER Screening Committee, Revision 7
 NAI-ECA-07, Employee Concerns Program (ECP), Revision 0
 NAI-ECA-10, Vol. 1 of 3, Dispositioning Deviation/Event Reports, Revision 2
 NIP-ECA-01, Deviation/Event Report, Revision 29
 N1-MPM-029-106, Feedwater Pump Number 13 Clutch and Gear Inspection, Revision 2
 N1-OP-16, Feedwater System Booster Pump To Reactor, Revision 29

Non-Cited Violations (NCV) and Findings (FIN)

2001008-02	2003002-02	2002009-02	2001011-01	2001011-02	2001008-01
2003004-04	2003007-01	2003002-03	2003002-04	2002009-01	2001011-03
2001010-01	2001010-02	2001009-01	2003002-01	2002002-01	2001008-02
2002003-01	2002003-02	2001010-03			

Audits and Self-Assessments

Quality & Performance Assessment Audit Report 03-1Q, Quarterly Assessment
 Quality Assurance Audit Report 02009, Corrective Action Program, December 30, 2002
 NMP Event Trending Report, 2nd Quarter - 2003
 Reactivity Management Self-assessment, FSA-2002-42
 Operations Workaround Categorization, Tracking and Resolution Best Practices, BMK-2002-19
 Technical and Operations Training Programs, FSA-2002-57
 SRO, LO, Licensed Continuing and NLO Training, FSA-2002-0204
 Security Focused Self-Assessment, FSA-2002-31
 Security Focused Self-Assessment, FSA-2003-17
 Emergency Preparedness Training Focused Self-Assessment, FSA-2002-70
 Radiation Protection Focused Self-Assessment, FSA-2002-65
 03-0034-C, Adequacy of Performance of the Revised DER Screening Process, May 28, 2003
 03-0037-C, Assessment of the Effectiveness of Closed DERs, June 18, 2003
 03-0042-C, Assessment of DER Closure Effort Launched on May 1, 2003 to Reduce Backlog, August 7, 2003
 03-0047-C, Assessment of Value Packing Improvement Plan, August 20, 2003
 03-0001-C, Nuclear Quality Assurance Surveillance Report, 1/21/03
 03-0037-C, Nuclear Quality Assurance Surveillance Report, 6/18/03
 03-0041-C, Nuclear Quality Assurance Surveillance Report, 7/31/03
 03-0051-C, Nuclear Quality Assurance Surveillance Report, 8/27/03

Miscellaneous

SWR 06363 SWR 06360 WO-02-13640-00 WO-03-07719-00 WO-03-06731-00
 WO-03-08495-00 WO-03-00313-00 WO-03-00241-00 WO-03-11767-00
 WO-03-08939-00 WO-03-08512-00 WO-03-08082-00 WO-03-08084-00
 WO-03-10764-00 WO-03-10763-00 WO-03-05182-00 WO-03-08922-00
 WO-03-08947-00 WO-03-04373-00 WO-03-09145-00 WO-03-09207-00
 WO-03-08495-00 Dwg. NMP-C-22-08 DCR C94849 PR 08877
 B-18023-C, Shaft Driven Reactor Feedwater Pump Number 13 Gear and Clutch Oil P&ID,
 Revision 12
 LER 2001-002-01, Rated Thermal Power Exceeded When Recirculation Flow Control Valve
 Malfunction
 NMP Unit 1 Daily Operating Report, May 31, 2003 - October 8, 2003
 NMP Unit 2 Daily Operating Report, July 7, 2003 - October 8, 2003
 Vendor Manual N10005, Philadelphia Gear Corp. Operating and Maintenance Instructions
 Reactor FW Pump Clutch, Model S500M, Revision 5
 Pump & Valve In-Service Testing Program Health Report - 3rd Quarter 2003

LIST OF ACRONYMS

DER	Deviation Event Report
IMC	Inspection Manual Chapter
NCV	Non-Cited Violation
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NMPNS	Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station
PIR	Problem Identification and Resolution
ROP	Reactor Oversight Process
SDP	Significant Determination Process
SWR	Security Work Request