December 19, 2001

Mr. Theodore Sullivan
Vice President - Operations
Entergy Nuclear Northeast
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant
Post Office Box 110
Lycoming, NY 13093

SUBJECT: FITZPATRICK - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-333/01-10

Dear Mr. Sullivan:

On November 18, 2001, the NRC completed an inspection at the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on December 13, 2001, with you and members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. No findings of significance were identified.

Since September 11, 2001, FitzPatrick has assumed a heightened level of security based on a series of threat advisories issued by the NRC. Although the NRC is not aware of any specific threat against nuclear facilities, the heightened level of security was recommended for all nuclear power plants and is being maintained due to the uncertainty about the possibility of additional terrorist attacks. The steps recommended by the NRC include increased patrols, augmented security forces and capabilities, additional security posts, heightened coordination with local law enforcement and military authorities, and limited access of personnel and vehicles to the site.

The NRC continues to interact with the Intelligence Community and to communicate information to Entergy Nuclear Northeast. In addition, the NRC has monitored maintenance and other activities which could relate to the site's security posture.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

William A. Cook, Chief
Projects Branch 3
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 50-333
License No.: DPR-59

Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-333/01-10
Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/encl: J. Yelverton, CEO, Entergy Operations
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J. Knubel, VP Operations Support
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Docket No.:	50-333
License No.:	DPR-59
Report No.:	50-333/01-10
Licensee:	Entergy Nuclear Northeast
Facility:	James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant
Location:	268 Lake Road Scriba, New York 13093
Dates:	October 1 - November 18, 2001
Inspectors:	R. A. Rasmussen, Senior Resident Inspector D. A. Dempsey, Resident Inspector D. M. Silk, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector S. Chaudhary, Senior Reactor Engineer K. Kolaczyk, Reactor Engineer
Approved by:	William A. Cook, Chief Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000333-01-10, on 10/1 - 11/18/2001; Entergy Nuclear Northeast, James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, resident inspection.

The report covers a seven-week inspection by resident inspectors, specialist inspections of maintenance rule implementation and independent spent fuel storage installation dry run activities, and the results of an in-office emergency preparedness inspection. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609 "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply are indicated by "No Color" or by the severity level of the applicable violation.

A. Inspector Identified Findings

None

B. Licensee Identified Findings

The inspectors reviewed a violation of very low significance which was identified by Entergy. The corrective actions taken or planned by Entergy appeared to be reasonable. This non-cited violation is described in Sections 4OA3 and 4OA7 of this report.

If you deny this Non-Cited Violation, you should provide a response with the basis for your denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the FitzPatrick facility.

REPORT DETAILS

SUMMARY OF PLANT STATUS

The reactor operated at full power for the majority of the inspection period. On October 28, 2001, an unplanned power reduction of greater than 20% occurred due to a trip of the B reactor recirculation motor generator.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity [REACTOR - R]

1R04 Equipment Alignments

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted the following partial equipment alignment walkdowns:

- Safety relief valves and the high pressure coolant injection system during a planned reactor core isolation injection system maintenance outage.
- B train core spray system during a planned outage of the A train core spray system.
- B and D emergency diesel generators during planned surveillance of the A and C emergency diesel generators.

During these walkdowns the inspectors verified that select valves and circuit breakers were in the appropriate position by comparing actual component position and the position described in the applicable operating procedures. The inspectors also performed visual inspections of the material condition of the major system components.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors toured several plant areas and observed conditions related to fire protection. The inspectors looked for transient combustible materials, observed the condition of suppression systems, penetration seals, and ventilation system fire dampers, and verified that fire doors were functional. Areas observed were:

- Reactor Building East Crescent Room, Area RB-1E.
- Reactor Building West Crescent Room, Area RB-1W.
- Cable Spreading Room, Area CS-1.
- Reactor Building West Elevation 272, Area RB-1B.
- Reactor Building East Elevation 272, Area RB-1A.
- South Cable Run Room, Area CT-3.

On November 14, 2001, the inspectors also observed a fire brigade drill that was conducted in the cable spreading room.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

.1 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the implementation of the maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65) as it pertained to the following:

- Proper classification of equipment functional failures for the reactor water recirculation flow control system following the B motor generator set speed control problems and a trip of the A motor generator set. The inspector reviewed the deviation/event reports that were initiated for these components and verified that functional failures were properly evaluated.
- Proper classification of equipment functional failures and system unavailability following failures of level switches in the core spray, residual heat removal, and residual heat removal service water systems. The inspector reviewed the deviation/event reports that were initiated for these components and verified that functional failures and system unavailability were properly evaluated.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Maintenance Rule Periodic Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the periodic evaluations required by 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(3) to verify that structures, systems, and components (SSCs) within the scope of the maintenance rule were included in the evaluations, and that balancing of system reliability and unavailability was given adequate consideration. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's most recent periodic evaluation reports. A draft of the current periodic assessment report, covering the period October 31, 1999 though October 31, 2001, and the last periodic assessment report for FitzPatrick, which covered the period from October 31, 1997 through October 31, 1999, were reviewed.

The inspector selected the safety significant systems that were in (a)(1) status to verify that: (1) goals and performance criteria were appropriate; (2) industry operating experience was considered; (3) corrective action plans were effective; and, (4) performance was being effectively monitored. As of October 30, 2001, eleven SSCs

were in (a)(1) status. Out of the eleven (a)(1) systems, six were selected for detailed review. All the selected (a)(1) systems were safety related and risk significant. These six systems were in various stages of evaluation, monitoring, and corrective action. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's assessment of the balance between reliability and unavailability for these systems.

The inspector selected the following (a)(1) systems for detailed review:

- Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (System #013).
- High Range Radiation Monitors (System #017).
- High Pressure Coolant Injection (System #023).
- Compressed Air System (System #039).
- Emergency Service Water (System #046).
- Normal Service Water System (System #046).

Additionally, status and documentation for the following risk significant (a)(2) systems were also reviewed for the balance between reliability and unavailability.

- Main Steam System (MS).
- Reactor Water Cleanup System (RWCU).
- Stand-by Liquid Control System (SBLC).
- Containment Atmosphere Dilution System (CAD).
- Core Spray System (CS).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed Entergy's assessment of plant risk due to the following planned and emergent maintenance activities:

- Emergent repairs to the condensate pump motor cooling lines during the week of October 4.
- Modifications and repairs to east electric bay unit cooler No. 67-UC-16B during the week of October 17.
- Functional testing of reactor pressure ATWS instruments during the week of October 24.
- Planned maintenance on A core spray system components during the week of November 11.

The inspectors reviewed the maintenance risk assessments and the evaluations of the core damage impact of the activities. Entergy concluded that these activities were not risk significant, based on the slight increase in conditional core damage probability for the period that the systems were out of service. The inspectors also reviewed the

technical specifications and the final safety analysis report for compensatory measures associated with these activities.

The inspection also included a review of contingency plans and verification that the effects on plant risk and protected equipment were discussed during briefings and shift turnovers. During the maintenance, the inspectors toured the work areas to assure that the scope of the work was consistent with the maintenance plans and that no additional systems were adversely impacted.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the below listed operability determinations performed to address issues identified with safety significant systems. The inspectors reviewed associated sections of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and technical specifications for the discrepant condition.

- Power oscillations caused by recirculation pump B speed changes on October 3, (DER No. 01-03848).
- Apparent drift of B main steam line radiation monitor 17RM-251B on November 15, (DER No. 01-04468).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed and reviewed the post maintenance testing associated with the following activities:

- Replacement of B residual heat removal service water pump motor cooling solenoid valve 10SOV-101B.
- Modifications and repairs to west crescent area unit cooler 66UC-22E.
- Preventive and corrective maintenance on A train core spray system components, including: (1) flow instrument sensing lines; (2) the keep-full system flow restricting orifice; (3) the 600 VAC motor controller for valve 14MOV-11A; and, (4) the Limitorque actuator for valve 14MOV-11A.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed portions of testing and/or reviewed procedures and test results involving the following surveillance tests:

- ST-4N, "HPCI Quick-Start, Inservice, and Transient Monitoring Test (IST)."
- ISP-175A3, "Reactor Pressure ATWS Instrument Functional Test/Calibration. "
- ST-2XB, "RHR Service Water Loop B Operability Test (IST)."
- ST-9BA, "EDG A and C Full Load Test and ESW Pump Operability Test."

The inspector reviewed technical specifications and the FSAR, and verified that the testing met appropriate test objectives.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed temporary modification (TMOD) 01-006, "Install Temporary Monitoring Points and Temporary Instruments to Monitor Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) Output." The inspectors verified that the safety functions of the APRM system were not affected. The TMOD was reviewed for impact on control room operations and 10 CFR 50.59 applicability. Additionally, the inspectors performed a walkdown of the TMOD to ensure consistency with the TMOD documentation.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment

E2.2 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) Project (IP 60854)

a. Inspection Scope

During the week of October 29, 2001, the inspectors observed portions of dry run activities related to the transfer of spent fuel from the fuel pool to the on-site dry cask storage facility. As part of this review, the inspectors observed movement and placement of the multipurpose container (MPC) and HI-TRAC transfer cask from the refuel floor into the spent fuel pool. While the MPC and HI-TRAC transfer cask were in the pool, the inspectors observed licensee personnel practice installing and removing the MPC lid. Later, the inspectors observed licensee personnel move the MPC and HI-TRAC transfer cask from the spent fuel pool to the refuel floor.

The inspectors also observed activities involving the transfer of fuel from the HI-TRAC transfer cask to the HI-Storm 100 overpack, and moving the overpack and MPC from the reactor building to the dry cask storage facility. Helium cooldown skid operations were also observed to verify that procedures were followed, safe work practices were utilized, and questions that arose during the process were documented and resolved.

To ensure discrepant conditions were adequately dispositioned and that design changes to the ISFSI were conducted in accordance with 10CFR 72.48, "Changes, Tests, and Experiments," the inspectors reviewed a sample of Deficiency Event Reports (DER)s, 10CFR 72.48 safety screens, and 10CFR 72.48 safety evaluations. Audits and assessments of ISFSI activities were also examined to verify the licensee adequately resolved the issues identified in the reviews. When reviewing the audits and assessments, the inspectors verified the licensee had used industry operating experience to improve ISFSI operations.

Procedures for moving fuel from the spent fuel pool to the dry cask storage pad were reviewed by the inspectors to ensure the procedures met the requirements and commitments established in the ISFSI Certificate of Compliance (C of C), and ISFSI FSAR. Finally, the inspectors reviewed portions of the training program provided to fuel handling personnel to ensure personnel were trained in accordance with commitments outlined in the C of C and ISFSI FSAR.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Emergency Preparedness

1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector conducted an in-office review of licensee submitted changes for the emergency plan-related documents listed below to determine if the changes decreased the effectiveness of the plan. A thorough review was conducted of documents related to the risk significant planning standards (RSPS), such as classifications, notifications and protective action recommendations. A cursory review was conducted for non-RSPS documents. The documents submitted and reviewed were:

- Emergency Plan, Section 4, Emergency Conditions, Rev. 17.
- Emergency Plan, Section 7, Emergency Facilities and Equipment, Rev. 23.
- Emergency Plan, Section 9, Recovery, Rev. 15.
- Emergency Plan, Appendix C, Letters of Agreement, Rev. 24.
- IAP-1, Emergency Plan Implementation Checklist, Rev. 25.
- IAP-2, Classification of Emergency Conditions, Rev. 21.
- EAP-1.1, Offsite Notifications, Rev. 45.
- EAP-4.1, Release Rate Determination, Rev. 13.
- EAP-8, Personnel Accountability, Rev. 53.

- EAP-17, Emergency Organization Staffing, Rev. 95, 96.
- EAP-31, Recovery Manager, Rev. 1.
- EAP-32, Recovery Support Group, Rev. 6, 7.
- EAP-37, Security of the EOF and EL During Drills, Exercises and Actual Events, Rev. 6.
- EAP-43, Emergency Facilities Long Term Staffing, Rev. 53.
- SAP-3, Emergency Communications Testing, Rev. 70.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA3 Event Follow-Up

.1 (Closed) LER 050333/2001-005: Safety Relief Valve Setpoint Drift

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector performed an on-site review of the event documented in LER 50-333/2001-005.

b. Findings

LER 50-333/2001-005 reported that two out of eleven safety relief valves (SRVs) had been found to be inoperable due to setpoint drift caused by oxidic binding of the pilot valve disks and seats. The condition resulted in a noncompliance with Table 3.2-7 of Technical Specification (TS) 3.2.G, which requires the high reactor pressure ATWS recirculation pump trip setpoint to be lowered when two or more SRVs are out of service. This issue was evaluated using the SDP and determined to be of very low safety significance (Green).

SRV setpoint drift due to oxidic binding of the pilot valves is a generic industry issue that continues to be addressed by the NRC and the GE Boiling Water Reactors Owners Group. FitzPatrick has installed a diverse and redundant SRV pressure switch actuation system what is not affected by oxidic binding. The licensee also is evaluating other corrective actions involving surveillance testing.

If additional SRVs were similarly affected, the issue could become a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the reduced reliability and functionality of the safety system designed to mitigate a reactor overpressure event could adversely affect fuel cladding and reactor coolant system pressure boundary integrity. However, this specific event was mitigated by two considerations: (1) while the two SRVs did not lift within the limit prescribed in the TS, they did actuate at a higher pressure; and (2) the pressure switch actuation system was available. Since the plant continued to operate within the bounds of the Extended Load Line Analysis for overpressure events, there was no loss of the SRV safety function. The inspector evaluated the issue using phase 1 of the SDP and

determined that it was a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in a loss of function per Generic Letter 91-18, Revision 1. Therefore, the risk associated with this condition was determined to be of very low significance (Green).

Failure to reduce the ATWS recirculation pump trip setpoint, with two or more SRVs out of service, was a violation of TS 3.2.G, Table 3.2-7, Note 3. This violation is being treated as a licensee-identified Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section VI.A of the Enforcement Policy, issued on May 1, 2000 (65FR25368). The issues associated with this violation are in the Entergy corrective action system as DER 01-02396. (**NCV 05000333/2001-10-01**)

4OA6 Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

The results of inspections of the ISFSI dry run activities and the implementation of the maintenance rule were presented to Mr. Ted Sullivan and other members of the licensee staff on November 2, 2001.

On December 13, 2001, the resident inspectors presented their inspection results to Mr. Sullivan and members of the Entergy staff. The inspectors asked whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

4OA7 Licensee Identified Violations

The below listed finding of very low significance was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV).

.1 LER 50-333/2001-005, “Safety Relief Valve Setpoint Drift,” reported that Technical Specification 3.2.G, Table 3.2-7, Note 3, which requires that the high reactor pressure ATWS recirculation pump trip setpoint be lowered when two or more safety relief valves are out of service, was not satisfied during operating cycle 14. This issue was evaluated using the SDP and determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). The event was addressed in the licensee’s corrective action program in DER 01-02396. This issue is being treated as a licensee-identified Non-Cited Violation. **(NCV 05000333/01-10-01)**

ATTACHMENT 1
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

a. Key Points of Contact

J. Blathie	ISFSI Maintenance Supervisor
J. Flaherty	Quality Assurance Manager
A. Halliday	Licensing Manager
A. Khanifar	Manager of Engineering
W. Maguire	General Maintenance Manager
S. Miller	ISFSI Project Supervisor
R. Miller	ISFSI Operations Supervisor
B. O'Grady	Plant Manager
K. Phy	ISFSI Project Manager
R. Plasse	Licensing Engineer
D. Ruddy	Engineering Manager
T. Sullivan	Site Executive Officer
G. Thomas	Director Design Engineering
A. Zaremba	Director Safety Assurance

b. List of Items Opened, Closed and Discussed

Opened and Closed

NCV 05000333/01-10-01: Safety relief valve setpoint drift (Sections 4OA3, 4OA7)

Closed

LER 05000333/01-005: Safety Relief Valve Setpoint Drift

c. List of Acronyms

APRM	Average Power Range Monitor
ATWS	Anticipated Transient Without Scram
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
DER	Deviation/Event Report
EOF	Emergency Operations Facility
FSAR	Final Safety Analysis Review
ISFSI	Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
LER	Licensee Event Report
MPC	Multi-Purpose Container
NCV	Non-Cited Violation
RSPS	Risk Significance Planning Standards
SDP	Significance Determination Process
SRV	Safety Relief Valve
SSC	Systems, Structures, and Components
TMOD	Temporary Modification
TS	Technical Specification

d. List of Documents Reviewed

The James A. FitzPatrick Maintenance Rule Periodic Assessment for the period October 31, 1997 through October 31, 1999. (Report No. JAF-RPR-MISC-02850)

The Maintenance Rule Periodic Assessment Report for period October 31, 1999 through October 31, 2001. (DRAFT)

Current System Health Reports for:

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (System #013)
High Range Radiation Monitors (System#017)
High Pressure Coolant Injection (System#023)
Compressed Air System (System#039)
Emergency Service Water (System#046)
Normal Service Water System (System#046)
Main Steam System (MS)
Reactor Water Cleanup System (RWCU)
Stand-by Liquid Control System (SBLC)
Containment Atmosphere Dilution System (CAD)
Core Spray System (CS)

Maintenance Rule Improvement Action Plan for selected systems:

JENG-APL-01-014, Rev.0 for RCIC Sys.
JENG-APL-01-001, Rev. 0 for HPCI Sys
JENG-APL-01-006, Rev. 1 for RPIS Sys
JENG-APL-01-008, Rev. 2 for CSP 'B'
JENG-APL-01-018, Rev. 0 for Maintenance Rule Deficiencies Identified through Audits.
JENG-APL-01-012, Rev. 0 for NWS Sys
JENG-APL-01-004,Rev. 0 for Feedwater Sys

Maintenance Rule Action Plans for (a)(1) Systems and Components:

97-08; 97-010; 07-011; 97-018; 97-026;
98-028;
99-008; 99-011; 99-013; 99-014;
00-001; 00-011;00-012;
01-001;

JAF Deviation/Event Reports;

DER-01-03026, Maintenance Rule Timeliness Issue
DER-01-03806, Maintenance Rule is not being Fully Implemented

JAF Self-Assessment Reports,

SESA 00-06, JAF Maintenance Rule Program, July 27, 2000
SR# 2252, JAF QA Surveillance Report- Maintenance

Procedures:

OP-66A Rev 2., Refuel Bridge Operations

RAP-7.2.07 Rev 0., Fuel Selection for Dry Cask Storage
TMP-019.04 Rev 2., Cask Handling Demonstration
TMP-019.05 Rev 1., Underwater Operations and Fuel Load
TMP-019.06 Rev 1., Helium Cooldown Operations

10 CFR 72.48 Evaluations and Screens

JAF-ISFSI-01-001, HI-STORM JAF Overpack Rev 0
JAF-ISFSI-01-002, Engineering Change Order 1024-3 Rev 2
JAF-ISFSI-01-003, Engineering Change Order 1025-20 Rev 1
JAF-ISFSI-01-004, Engineering Change Order 1025-40 Rev 2
JAF-ISFSI-01-005, Engineering Change Order 1025-70 Rev 0
Engineering Change Order 1025-10 Rev 1
Engineering Change Order 1025-2 Rev 1
Engineering Change Order 1025-3 Rev 0
Engineering Change Order 50114-41 Rev 0
Engineering Change Order 1025-4 Rev 1
Engineering Change Order 1025-6 Rev 0
Engineering Change Order 1025-7 Rev 0
Engineering Change Order 1025-8 Rev 3
Engineering Change Order 1025-9 Rev 0
Engineering Change Order 1025-10 Rev 0
Engineering Change Order 1025-11 Rev 0
Engineering Change Order 1025-12 Rev 2
Engineering Change Order 1025-15 Rev 0
Engineering Change Order 1025-18 Rev 2
Engineering Change Order 1025-19 Rev 0
Engineering Change Order 1025-20 Rev 0
Engineering Change Order 1025-25 Rev 0

Deviation/Event Reports

01-02312, NRC #38060 - Spent Fuel Storage System Defect
01-03774, Violations Identified During Inspection of Holtec International
01-03897, Hot Spot (1000R/HR) Identified on Hi Trac Cover
01-04050, ISFSI Dry Run-TS Violation; Cask Lifted Above Limit

Self-Assessment Audits

Dryrun Scenarios 1, 2, &3
Spent Fuel Handling Upgrade
Preparation for Dryrun Scenarios 4, 5, &6
Work Control Regarding Changes to ISFSI Low Profile Transfer Device and Railway Rails
MPC/Hi-Trac Underwater Operations