



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
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61 FORSYTH STREET SW SUITE 23T85
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931**

October 29, 2001

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
ATTN: Mr. D. N. Morey
Vice President
P. O. Box 1295
Birmingham, AL 35201

**SUBJECT: JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT 50-348/01-03 and 50-364/01-03**

Dear Mr. Morey:

On September 29, 2001, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Farley Nuclear Plant. This inspection examined activities conducted under your license relating to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings discussed on October 1, 2001, with Mr. Mike Stinson and other members of your staff. Based on the inspection results, there were no inspector identified findings.

Since September 11, 2001, your staff has assumed a heightened level of security based on a series of threat advisories issued by the NRC. Although the NRC is not aware of any specific threat against nuclear facilities, the heightened level of security was recommended for all nuclear power plants and is being maintained due to the uncertainty about the possibility of additional terrorist attacks. The steps recommended by the NRC include increased patrols, augmented security forces and capabilities, additional security posts, heightened coordination with local law enforcement and military authorities, and limited access of personnel and vehicles to the site.

The NRC continues to interact with the Intelligence Community and to communicate information to you and your staff. In addition, the NRC has monitored maintenance and other activities which could relate to the site's security posture.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be publicly available in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is

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accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Stephen J. Cahill, Chief
Reactor Projects, Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50-364
License Nos. NPF-2 and NPF-8

Enclosure: NRC Integrated Inspection
Report 50-348/01-03 and 50-364/01-03

cc w/encl:

M. J. Ajluni, Licensing
Services Manager, B-031
Southern Nuclear Operating
Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution

M. Stanford Blanton
Balch and Bingham Law Firm
P. O. Box 306
1710 Sixth Avenue North
Birmingham, AL 35201

L. M. Stinson
General Manager, Farley Plant
Southern Nuclear Operating
Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution

William D. Oldfield
SAER Supervisor
Southern Nuclear Operating Company
Electronic Mail Distribution

J. D. Woodard
Executive Vice President
Southern Nuclear Operating
Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution

State Health Officer
Alabama Department of Public Health
RSA Tower - Administration
Suite 1552
P. O. Box 303017
Montgomery, AL 36130-3017

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Distribution w/encl:
F. Rinaldi, NRR
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC)

REGION II

Docket Nos.: 50-348 and 50-364

License Nos.: NPF-2 and NPF-8

Report Nos.: 50-348/01-03 and 50-364/01-03

Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC)

Facility: Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2

Location: 7388 N. State Highway 95
Columbia, AL 36319

Dates: July 1, 2001 to September 29, 2001

Inspectors: T. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector (SRI)
C. Rapp, Senior Project Engineer
G. Hopper, Senior Licensing Examiner
D. Forbes, Radiation Specialist (Sections 2OS2)
W. Sartor, Emergency Preparedness Specialist
(Sections 1EP2 thru 1EP5 and 4OA2.1 thru 4OA2.3)

Approved by: Stephen J. Cahill, Chief
Reactor Projects, Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000348/01-03, IR 05000364/01-03, on 07/01/2001-09/29/2001, Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2, routine resident report.

This integrated inspection report covers a 13-week period of inspection conducted by resident inspectors, two visiting regional inspectors, a regional radiation specialist, and a regional emergency planning specialist. The inspectors did not identify any findings. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply are indicated "No Color" or by the severity of the applicable violation. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) website at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html>.

A. Inspector Identified Findings

None

B. Licensee Identified Violations

Violations of very low significance identified by the licensee have been reviewed by an inspector. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee appear reasonable. These violations are listed in section 4OA7 of this report.

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status

Both Unit 1 and Unit 2 operated at 100% rated thermal power (RTP) throughout the report period except for brief periods during scheduled testing and maintenance.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial system walk downs to verify the systems listed below were properly aligned when redundant systems or trains were out of service as required by licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-16, Conduct of Operations - Operations Group, and FNP-0-SOP-0, General Instructions to Operations Personnel. The walk downs included a review of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), plant procedures and drawings, and control room and infield checks of valves, switches, components, electrical power line-ups, support equipment, and instrumentation.

- Unit 2 Service Water
- Unit 1 Emergency AC power (B train)
- Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW)
- Unit 1 Component Cooling Water (CCW)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a walk down of six fire areas located in the auxiliary, diesel, and service water buildings to verify the licensee's implementation of fire protection requirements of licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-36, Fire Surveillance and Inspection, FNP-0-AP-37, Fire Brigade Organization, FNP-0-AP-38, Use of Open Flame, and FNP-0-AP-39, Fire Patrols and Watches. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's control of transient combustibles, the operational readiness of the fire suppression system, and the material condition and status of fire dampers, doors, and barriers. The inspectors also evaluated the adequacy of compensatory measures, including fire watches, were in place for degraded fire barriers. The inspectors compared the requirements in the UFSAR Appendix 9B, Fire Protection Program, to verify that the licensee's implementing procedures were adequate.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed cleaning and eddy current testing of the 1C Component Cooling Water (CCW) heat exchanger to verify that the licensee had adequately identified and resolved any potential heat exchanger deficiencies which could mask degraded performance, common cause heat sink performance problems that have the potential to increase risk, and heat sink performance problems that could result in initiating events or affect multiple heat exchangers in mitigating systems. The inspectors reviewed the results of the eddy current testing which recommended plugging seven additional tubes. The inspectors also reviewed the calculation that supported a 118 tube plugging limit to verify that the additional plugged tubes did not adversely affect heat removal capacity.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed portions of the licensed operator training and testing program per procedure FNP-0-AP-45, Farley Nuclear Plant Training Program. The inspectors observed scenarios for a loss of coolant accident, a steam break, and a steam generator tube rupture. The inspectors assessed high risk operator actions, overall performance, self-critiques, training feedback, and management oversight.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation of functional failures, maintenance preventable functional failures, repetitive failures, availability and reliability monitoring, and system specialist involvement. The inspectors interviewed maintenance personnel, system specialists, the maintenance rule (MR) coordinator, and operations personnel. The following equipment was evaluated for compliance with 10 CFR 50.65 and licensee procedures FNP-0-M-87, Maintenance Rule Scoping Manual, FNP-0-SYP-19, Maintenance Rule Performance Criteria, FNP-0-M-89, FNP Maintenance Rule Site Implementation Manual:

- Turbine Drive Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) Pump
- 2B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) exhaust failure
- Safety-related breakers
- Unit 2 2B Service Water (SW) pump system

- 1B Containment Spray Pump
- Mallory Capacitor failures

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed licensee activities against the requirements in procedures FNP-0-ACP-52.1, Guidelines for Scheduling of On-Line Maintenance, AP-FNP-0-AP-52, Equipment Status Control and Maintenance Authorization, and FNP-0-AP-16. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's planning and control of these work activities to verify if the licensee had adequately identified and resolved risk challenges for emergent work for the following systems:

- 1B EDG exhaust failure
- 2C EDG 9 month preventative maintenance (PM)
- 2B SW pump motor replacement
- 1C and 2B Charging Pumps
- 2A Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump
- Unit 2 SW cyclone separator and other concurrent work

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operability evaluations to assess the technical adequacy, consideration of degraded conditions, and identification of compensatory measures. Inspectors reviewed the evaluations against the design bases as stated in the UFSAR and Functional System Descriptions. The licensee's evaluations were compared to the requirements of licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-16 and FNP-0-ACP-9.2, Operability Determination, for the following systems:

- OD-01-06, Service Water Recirculation Piping Weld Deficiencies at Discharge Pond Flume
- 1B EDG cylinder exhaust temporary repair
- 1B Containment Spray Pump Room Cooler Overload Trips
- OD-01-08, Unit 1 TDAFW Pump Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS)
- OD-01-09, Battery Charger Capacitors

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Work-Arounds

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operator work-arounds to assess if system functional capability or human performance were affected. The inspectors reviewed the cumulative effects of the operator work-arounds on the operators' ability to implement abnormal or emergency operating procedures, potential to increase an initiating event frequency, and potential to affect multiple mitigating systems. Additionally, the prioritization and actions required to address the operator work-arounds as required by licensee procedure FNP-0-ACP-17, Operator Work-Arounds, were evaluated for the following systems:

- Unit 2 charging flow control valve (FCV122) bypassed
- Unit 1 Main Turbine vibration measurements

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed plant modifications to verify the implementation of licensee procedure FNP-0-AP-8, Design Modification Control. This included verification that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of risk significant structures, systems, and components (SSC) would not be degraded through the modifications and the modifications would not place the plant in an unsafe condition. The inspectors reviewed the following Design Change Packages (DCPs):

- S01-1(2)-9704(5), TDAFW Monitoring and Testing System - Units 1 and 2
- S01-1(2)-9687(8), Machine Guarding for Charging Pumps - Units 1 and 2
- S01-0-9472, High Voltage Switch Yard Breaker Replacement

The inspectors also observed the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) approval of these DCPs, discussed the modifications with the engineering and operations, and reviewed the related procedures and drawings.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures FNP-0-ACP-52.1, Guidelines for Scheduling of On-Line Maintenance, and AP-FNP-0-AP-52, Equipment Status Control and Maintenance Authorization, to verify post-maintenance test procedures and test

activities were adequate to verify system operability and functional capability for the following systems:

- 2C EDG
- 2A and 2B Charging Pumps
- 2A RHR Pump
- 1B EDG
- Unit 1 TDAFW
- 2C CCW Pump

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-24, Test Control, FNP-0-M-050, Master List of Surveillance Requirements, and FNP-0-AP-16 to verify system and component operability. The inspectors also reviewed system Technical Specification (TS) and design requirements to verify the acceptance criteria for the following surveillance test procedures was appropriate:

- FNP-0-STP-80.17, Diesel Generator 1C Operability Test
- FNP-1-STP-80.1, Diesel Generator 1B Operability Test
- FNP-1-STP-22.23, Turbine Driven AFW Pump Trip and Throttle Valve Indicator Test
- FNP-1-STP-22.19, AFW Normal Flowpath Verification
- FNP-2-STP-11.1, 2A RHR Quarterly Inservice Test
- FNP-1-STP-22.2, 1B Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) Pump Quarterly Inservice Test
- FNP-2-STP-627.2, Leak Testing of the Containment Purge System

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed open temporary modifications, referred to as Minor Departures (MDs), and associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening criteria against the system design bases information and documentation. The inspectors reviewed MD implementation, configuration control, post-installation test activities, drawing and procedure updates, and operator awareness for the following MDs:

- MD 01-02671, Temporary Patch for the 1B EDG exhaust manifold piping
- MD 01-02665, Seal Weld Unit 1 Main Condenser water Box (BA) East Upper Man way

- MD 01-02667, Jumper Alteration for 2C Steam Generator (SG) Feed Water Bypass Valve Controller Card
- MD 01-02669, Temporary Leak Repair on SG FT Valve N2N21V0023A/2C
- MD 01-02676, Raise the Alarm Setpoint for the Unit Pressurizer Cabinet
- MD 01-02667, Jumper Alteration for 2C SG Feed Water Bypass Valve Controller Card

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness (EP)

1EP2 Alert and Notification System Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector evaluated the alert and notification system (ANS) design and the testing program. The system consisted of 3 sirens and approximately 3202 Tone Alert Radios within the 10-mile emergency planning zone. The radios were tested weekly and the sirens had a weekly silent test, quarterly growl test, and an annual full cycle test.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP3 Emergency Response Organization Augmentation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the design of the emergency response organization augmentation system and the maintenance of the licensee's capability to staff emergency response facilities within stated timeliness goals.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed changes to the Emergency Plan and the emergency action levels (EALs) to determine whether any of the changes decreased the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan. The current Farley Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan was Revision 35, dated May 4, 2001. The review was performed against 10CFR 50.54(q) to verify there was no decrease in plan effectiveness.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP5 Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector evaluated the efficacy of licensee programs that addressed weaknesses and deficiencies in emergency preparedness. Items reviewed included exercise and drill critique reports and the corrective actions identified therefrom. There had been no actual implementations of the Emergency Plan since the last inspection.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed two emergency drills on July 18 and August 29 to verify the licensee was properly classifying the event, making required notifications, making protective action recommendations, and conducting self-assessments.

b. Issues and Findings

No findings were identified.

2. RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety (OS)

2OS2 As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed pertinent information regarding plant collective exposure history, current exposure trends, and ongoing or planned activities in order to assess current performance and exposure challenges to evaluate if the licensee was implementing ALARA processes as required by 10 CFR 20.1101(b) and licensee procedures FNP-O-AP-90, ALARA Policy and Implementation, Revision 3. The inspectors also reviewed implementation of licensee procedures FNP-O-RCP-19, Pre and Post Job ALARA Planning For Work In Radiation Controlled Areas Of The Plant, Revision 16; FNP-O-ACP-15.0, Pre-Job Briefing, Revision 6; and FNP-O-RCP-8, Duties and Responsibilities Of The ALARA Review Committee, Revision 3. During plant tours, the inspectors evaluated plant ALARA policy by evaluating radiation worker performance; the use of low dose waiting areas; the use of temporary shielding; and the use of cameras, teledosimetry, and communications for controlling personnel exposures. The inspectors reviewed pre-outage planning exposure estimates for five planned refueling outage activities and reviewed source term reduction initiatives with ALARA and chemistry personnel.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensee procedure FNP-0-AP-54, Preparation and Review of NRC Performance Indicator Data and the TS, to verify the second quarter of 2001 PI data for High Pressure Injection System and Residual Heat Removal System Unavailability, Safety System Functional Failures in the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and, Reactor Coolant System Leakage and Activity in the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone. The inspectors reviewed portions of Unit 1 and Unit 2 Operator Logs for 2001, the daily morning reports (including the daily Condition Report (CR) descriptions), the monthly operating reports, Licensee Event Reports (LER), NRC Inspection Reports, and several Limiting Conditions of Operation (LCO's). The inspectors also interviewed licensee personnel associated with the PI data collection, evaluation, and distribution.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness (EP)

.1 Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Drill/Exercise Performance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector assessed the accuracy of the performance indicator (PI) for ERO drill and exercise performance (DEP) through review of documentation. In addition, the inspectors reviewed and discussed the licensee's methodology for calculating the DEP PI. The inspector verified the 95.8% reported for the previous eight quarters ending June 2001.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 ERO Drill Participation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector assessed the accuracy of the PI for ERO drill participation through review of source records for selected individuals. The inspector verified the 94.2% reported for the previous eight quarters ending June 2001.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Alert and Notification System Reliabilitya. Inspection Scope

The inspector assessed the accuracy of the PI for the alert and notification system reliability through review of the licensee's records of the siren tests for the previous 12 months.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA3 Event Follow-up.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-364/2001-001, Reactor Trip Due to Main Generator Neutral Connecting Bolt Failure

This event was discussed in Section 4OA3 of Integrated Inspection Report 50-348/01-02 and 50-364/01-02. There were no inspector identified findings of significance. A licensee identified violation is discussed in Section 4OA7. The licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program as CR 2001001535.

.2 (Closed) LER 50-364/2001-002, Reactor Trip Due to Turbine Trip from the Turbine Latch Mechanism Problem

This event was discussed in Section 4OA3 of Integrated Inspection Report 50-348/01-02 and 50-364/01-02. The licensee entered this event into its corrective action program as CR 2001001558. No new information was presented in the LER.

4OA5 OtherInstitute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Plant Assessment Report Reviewa. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the final INPO plant assessment report of Farley conducted in June 2001. The inspectors reviewed the report to ensure that issues identified were consistent with the NRC perspectives of licensee performance and if any significant safety issues were identified that required further NRC follow-up.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Meetings

.1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mike Stinson, Plant General Manager, and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 1. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

.2 Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) - Annual Assessment Meeting and Annual Meeting with State and Local Officials

The NRC Resident Inspectors, the Division of Reactor Projects Branch Chief assigned to the Farley Nuclear Plant, and the Region II Administrator met on July 13, 2001, with SNC to discuss the NRC's ROP annual assessment of safety performance for the Farley Nuclear Plant for the period of April 2, 2000 - March 31, 2001. The major topics addressed were: the NRC's assessment program, the results of the Farley assessment, and the NRC's Agency Action Matrix. Attendees included SNC site management, members of plant staff, and local officials.

4OA7 Licensee Identified Violations

The following findings of very low significance were identified by the licensee and are a violation of NRC requirements which met the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as a NCV. If the licensee denies these NCVs, they should provide a response with the basis of their denials, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant.

NCV Tracking Number

Requirement Licensee Failed to Meet

NCV 50-364/01-03-01

TS 5.4.1.a requires written procedures be implemented covering the activities listed in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Rev. 2, Appendix A, February 1978, including turbine generator maintenance. The failure to properly torque the bolting for the main generator neutral transformer in accordance with maintenance procedure FNP-2-EMP-1905.01, Main Generator Tagging and Back Feed, on May 2, 2001, was a violation of TS 5.4.1.a. This failure resulted in a loss of the main generator and a turbine/reactor trip when the bolting failed on June 23, 2001. This issue was placed in the licensee's corrective action program as CR 2001001535 (Section 4OA3.1).

NCV 50-364/01-03-02

TS 5.4.1.a requires written procedures be implemented covering the activities listed in Regulatory Guide 1.33,

Rev. 2, Appendix A, February 1978, including surveillance testing. The failure to properly establish the initial conditions for the Unit 2 feedwater level control system switches in accordance with surveillance test procedure FNP-2-STP-213.17, High Steam Line Flow SI Functional Test and Calibration, on August 25, 2001, was a violation of TS 5.4.1.a. This procedure omission resulted in a minor transient on the steam generator level control system, which was recovered by operator actions. This issue was placed in the licensee's corrective action program as CR 2001002123 (Section 4OA3.2).

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

R. V. Badham, Administration Manager
 C. L. Buck, Chemistry/Health Physics Manager
 R. M. Coleman, Outage and Modification Manager
 C. D. Collins, Operations Manager
 K. C. Dyar, Security Manager
 D. E. Grissette, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support
 J. R. Johnson, Assistant General Manager - Operations
 R. R. Martin, Engineering Support Manager
 B. L. Moore, Maintenance Manager
 C. D. Nesbitt,, Training Recovery Manager
 W. D. Oldfield, Safety Audit Engineering Review Supervisor
 L. M. Stinson, Plant General Manager
 R. J. Vanderbye, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
 L. Williams, Training Manager

ITEMS OPEN AND CLOSED

Opened

NCV 50-348, 364/2001-03-01, Failure to Follow Maintenance Procedure
 NCV 50-348,364/01-03-02, Failure to Properly Establish the Initial Conditions for the Unit 2 Feedwater Level Control System Switches

Closed

NCV 50-348, 364/01-03-01, Failure to Follow Maintenance Procedure
 NCV 50-348,364/01-03-02, Failure to Properly Establish the Initial Conditions for the Unit 2 Feedwater Level Control System Switches