October 26, 2000

Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley
President, Nuclear Generation Group
Commonwealth Edison Company
ATTN: Regulatory Services
1400 Opus Place, Suite 500
Downers Grove, IL 60515

SUBJECT: DRESDEN - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-237-00-17(DRS); 50-249-00-17(DRS)

Dear Mr. Kingsley:

On September 29, 2000, the NRC completed an inspection at your Dresden Nuclear Generating Station. The results were discussed with Mr. Swafford and other members of your staff. The enclosed report presents the results of that inspection.

This inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to inservice inspection, safety, compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your license. Specifically, the inspectors evaluated the implementation of your inservice inspection program for monitoring degradation of the reactor coolant system boundary, risk significant piping system boundaries, and the containment boundary. Within these areas the inspection consisted of a selective examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, the inspectors identified two issues of very low safety significance (Green). These issues were determined to involve violations of NRC requirements. However, because of their safety significance and because they have been entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these issues as Non-cited violations, in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the Non-Cited Violations, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Dresden Nuclear Generating Plant.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the *Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS)*. *ADAMS is accessible from* the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

John M. Jacobson, Chief
Mechanical Engineering Branch
Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 50-237; 50-249
License Nos. DPR-19; DPR-25

Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-237-00-17(DRS);
50-249-00-17(DRS)

cc w/encl: D. Helwig, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Services
C. Crane, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations
H. Stanley, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
R. Krich, Vice President, Regulatory Services
DCD - Licensing
P. Swafford, Site Vice President
R. Fisher, Station Manager
D. Ambler, Regulatory Assurance Manager
M. Aguilar, Assistant Attorney General
State Liaison Officer
Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket Nos:	50-237; 50-249
License Nos:	DPR-19; DPR-25
Report No:	50-237-00-17(DRS); 50-249-00-17(DRS)
Licensee:	Commonwealth Edison Company
Facility:	Dresden Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3
Location:	6500 N. Dresden Road Morris, IL. 60540
Dates:	September 22 - 29, 2000
Inspectors:	K. GreenBates, NRC Engineering Specialist B. Metrow, Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IDNS)
Approved by:	John M. Jacobson, Chief Mechanical Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety

NRC's REVISED REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS

The federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) recently revamped its inspection, assessment, and enforcement programs for commercial nuclear power plants. The new process takes into account improvements in the performance of the nuclear industry over the past 25 years and improved approaches of inspecting and assessing safety performance at NRC licensed plants.

The new process monitors licensee performance in three broad areas (called strategic performance areas) reactor safety (avoiding accidents and reducing the consequences of accidents if they occur), radiation safety (protecting plant employees and the public during routine operations), and safeguards (protecting the plant against sabotage or other security threats). The process focuses on licensee performance within each of seven cornerstones of safety in the three areas:

Reactor Safety	Radiation Safety	Safeguards
● Initiating Events	● Occupational	● Physical Protection
● Mitigating Systems	● Public	
● Barrier Integrity		
● Emergency Preparedness		

To monitor these seven cornerstones of safety, the NRC uses two processes that generate information about the safety significance of plant operations: inspections and performance indicators. Inspection findings will be evaluated according to their potential significance for safety, using the Significance Determination Process, and assigned colors of GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW or RED. GREEN findings are indicative of issues that, while they may not be desirable, represent very low safety significance. WHITE findings indicate issues that are of low to moderate safety significance. YELLOW findings are issues that are of substantial safety significance. RED findings represent issues that are of high safety significance with a significant reduction in safety margin.

Performance indicator data will be compared to established criteria for measuring licensee performance in terms of potential safety. Based on prescribed thresholds, the indicators will be classified by color representing varying levels of performance and incremental degradation in safety: GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW, and RED. GREEN indicators represent performance at a level requiring no additional NRC oversight beyond the baseline inspections. WHITE corresponds to performance that may result in increased NRC oversight. YELLOW represents performance that minimally reduces safety margin and requires even more NRC oversight. And RED indicates performance that represents a significant reduction in safety margin but still provides adequate protection to public health and safety.

The assessment process integrates performance indicators and inspection so the agency can reach objective conclusions regarding overall plant performance. The agency will use an Action Matrix to determine in a systematic, predictable manner which regulatory actions should be taken based on a licensee's performance. The NRC's actions in response to the significance (as represented by the color) of issues will be the same for performance indicators as for inspection findings. As a licensee's safety performance degrades, the NRC will take more and increasingly significant action, which can include shutting down a plant, as described in the Action Matrix.

More information can be found at: http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000237-00-17(DRS), IR 05000249-00-17(DRS), on 09/22 - 09/29/2000, Commonwealth Edison Company, Dresden Station, Units 2 and 3. Inservice Inspection (ISI) and Identification and Resolution of Problems report. Two green findings were identified which were considered Non-Cited Violations.

This reactor safety engineering specialist report covers the initial baseline inspection of the effectiveness of the licensee's inservice inspection program for monitoring degradation of the reactor coolant system boundary, risk significant piping system boundaries, and the containment boundary. The inspectors used inspection procedures IP 71111-08, “Inservice Inspection” and IP 71152, “Identification and Resolution of Problems” to conduct the inspection. The inspection identified two green findings which were considered Non-Cited Violations.

Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity

- Green. The inspectors identified that the licensee failed to properly implement temperature requirements during ultrasonic examinations of three reactor vessel assembly welds. The examinations had recorded temperatures which exceeded procedural limits for the maximum temperature difference between examination and calibration block surface temperatures. Both licensee and contractor personnel had reviewed and approved the exams. Review of other manual UT examinations found an additional seven-weld examinations where ultrasonic temperature requirements also appeared to have been exceeded due to the misplacement of the field thermometer in relation to where the ultrasonic beam was traveling. In addition, licensee/contractor procedural requirements for ultrasonic examination scanning speed were not met for one weld.

  The safety significance of these issues was very low based on the absence of adverse consequences, and because the licensee has another outage opportunity to make-up the examinations prior to the end of the ten-year ISI interval. The failure to follow procedures and control special processes which could result in the failure to detect degradation of a reactor coolant boundary component, was considered a Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion IX, “Control of Special Processes” (Section 1RO8).

- Green. The inspectors identified two examples of a failure of the corrective action program to properly evaluate inservice inspection related corrective actions. While reviewing original construction radiographs to better characterize an indication found during a 1999 ultrasonic examination of a core spray weld, the licensee failed to evaluate an indication discovered on the film which had not been dispositioned on the original reader sheet. In a second instance, the licensee did not properly evaluate the required inspection scope expansion when two snubbers were found with defects.

  The safety significance of these issues was considered very low based on the absence of adverse consequences and the fact that the licensee has another outage opportunity to resolve the examinations. Failure to promptly identify and correct issues found during the examination of ASME Code piping and components was considered a Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action” (Section 4OA1).

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status

The inspection was conducted during the Unit 3 refueling outage (D3R16) which is the third of three period examinations planned for the Third Ten Year Inservice Inspection (ISI) interval. Both Dresden Units are committed to American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section XI, 1989 Edition (no addenda), with several relief request exceptions. For the selection and examination of Class 1 and 2 piping welds (Code Categories B-J, BF, CF1 and CF2) the licensee is implementing prior to NRR approval, a risk-based ISI program based on Code Case N-578-1. This resulted in a reduction of 111 nondestructive ISI examinations during the outage. The licensee had a contingency plan in place to make-up the examinations if NRR approval is not granted.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R08 Inservice Inspection Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the implementation of the licensee's inservice inspection program for monitoring degradation of vital system boundaries. This inspectable area verifies aspects of the Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity cornerstones for which there are no indicators to measure performance. Nondestructive testing activities were reviewed including the planning, scope, and method employed, as well as portions of applicable test procedures and initial findings. The inspectors observed in-progress examinations and flaw evaluations. Lastly, the inspectors reviewed Dresden's activities associated with ISI problem identification and resolution. As part of this review, the inspectors:

(1) Observed a sample of in-progress ISI activities including, reactor vessel category C-B reactor recirculation nozzle to shell weld ultrasonic examinations, reactor top head to flange weld magnetic particle examinations, reactor recirculation nozzle inner radius ultrasonic examinations, and visual examinations of recirculation pump motor snubbers and a shutdown cooling piping penetration;

(2) Reviewed Dresden's evaluation process for indications discovered through ISI testing;

(3) Reviewed the radiographs and radiographic documentation for shutdown cooling system, core spray, and low pressure coolant injection system welds;

(4) Reviewed a sample of non-destructive examination procedures;

(5) Reviewed the status of the Dresden Third Ten Year Interval Inservice Inspection Program Plan and associated relief requests and ASME Code cases; and

(6) Reviewed a sample of refueling outage inservice inspection examination records and interviewed ComEd and GE contractor ISI personnel.

b. Findings

In general, inservice inspection activities were found to be adequate to monitor degradation of the reactor coolant system boundary; however, the inspectors identified one green finding in this area which was considered a Non-Cited Violation.

Ultrasonic Examination Requirements Not Met for Reactor Vessel Assembly Welds

During the D3R16 September 2000 refueling outage, the licensee failed to properly implement the temperature criteria of Dresden/GE procedure UT-DRD-300V3, "Manual UT of Reactor Vessel Welds," during three reactor vessel ultrasonic ASME Code category C-B reactor recirculation nozzle-to-shell weld inservice inspection examinations. The examinations (N2C2, N2H2, N2K2) had recorded temperatures which exceeded procedural limits for the maximum temperature difference between field examination and calibration block surface temperatures. As the licensee failed to implement the criteria for at least three welds, this problem was not considered to be an isolated occurrence. The procedural temperature criteria exceeded was more than an administrative limit (i.e., has the potential to effect the accuracy of the exam), and both contractor and licensee Level III personnel had reviewed and approved the examinations. Due to the potential to adversely effect the examination results for a reactor coolant boundary component, this issue was considered to be more than of minor significance.

Review of other manual UT examinations found an additional seven weld examinations, three shell-to-nozzle welds (N2A2, N2F2, N2J2), and four recirculation nozzle inner radius examinations (N2A1, N2C1, N2F1,N2J1) where ultrasonic examination temperature requirements also appeared to have been exceeded due to the misplacement of the field thermometer in relation to where the ultrasonic beam was traveling.

In addition, inspectors observed that the ultrasonic procedure UT-GE-311 "Manual UT of Nozzle Inner Radii," requirement for a maximum scanning frequency of three inches per second was exceeded for one recirculation nozzle inner radius examination (N2-1).

The safety significance of these issues was considered very low based on the absence of adverse consequences, and because the licensee has another outage opportunity to make up the examinations prior to the end of the ten year ISI interval; therefore, the finding did not meet the initial SDP screening and is considered to be green. To correct the error, the licensee documented recognition that the inspections could not be credited as performed into both their corrective action and inservice inspection programs. The failure to follow procedures and control special processes which could result in the failure to detect degradation of a reactor coolant boundary component, was considered a Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures & Drawings" in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy (NCV 50-249-00-17-01(DRS)).

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Identification and Resolution of Problems

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a sample of condition reports/evaluation records issued for problems identified in the inservice inspection area to verify the identification of ISI problems at an appropriate threshold. The inspectors also verified that the corrective actions were appropriately evaluated.

b. Findings

The inspectors concluded that in regards to ISI related issues, the corrective action program was functional and typically identified and corrected conditions adverse to quality. However, the inspectors identified two examples of a failure of the corrective action program to properly evaluate inservice inspection related corrective actions. This issue was characterized as a green finding and a Non-Cited Violation.

Condition Reports D2000-05294 & 05296 ISI Expanded Scope Not Properly Evaluated

The licensee conducted ISI of supports per Code case N-491-1, "Alternative Rules for Examination of Class 1, 2, 3, and MC Components Supports." This Code case is approved without condition in the current revision to RG 1.147. During visual examination, two constant load supports M564J Sheet 18 and M564L Sheet 26 in the main steam system were found with loose bolting on the support base plate. The licensee initiated Condition Reports D2000-0505294 & D2000-05296 to document the as-found condition of the above and require sample expansion.

Code Case N-491-1, 2430(a), requires that scope expansion be extended to additional supports within the system, equal in number and of the same type and function as those scheduled for examination during the inspection period. However, contrary to Code case N-491-1, 2430(a), the licensee's sample expansion failed to identify the correct number of supports of the same type and function of those scheduled for examination during the period. This caused four supports to be examined instead of the required five. When brought to the ISI coordinator's attention, the fifth support, M564M Sheet 22, was immediately examined so as to bring the total to five. The following day, the ISI coordinator initiated CR D2000-05456 to determine and correct the method of the original sample expansion.

Condition Report D1999-0282 - Core Spray Weld Flaw Evaluation Not Complete

On May 10, 1999, the licensee identified a flaw in Class 2 core spray weld 12-32 during the Dresden D2R16 ISI ultrasonic examinations (UT). The flaw exceeded Section XI IWB-3510 standards and Condition Report D1999-02082 was initiated to evaluate the acceptability of the weld for continued service. Inspector review of the CR evaluation and disposition identified issues which had not been appropriately resolved.

When prior volumetric examinations for this weld were reviewed, an as-found condition was discovered on the radiograph (RT). An indication was identified on the film approximately 15 inches from the flaw identified by UT; the radiographic indication was marked with an arrow and the word "Code." However, the as-found indication was not recorded and dispositioned on the original reader sheet. Upon identifying this unrecorded indication, the licensee failed to generate a condition report to resolve the as-found condition identified on the RT. Consequently the 1999 core spray weld acceptability evaluation did not appear to be a complete evaluation or rigorous one, as the second indication found in the weld had not been addressed. To correct the error, the licensee documented the RT indication in CR D2000-05581.

Therefore, the inspectors found that the licensee had failed to properly evaluate ISI related corrective actions in two instances. The safety significance of the above condition reports was considered very low based on the absence of adverse consequences, and because the licensee has another outage opportunity to resolve the examinations prior to the end of the ten year ISI interval; therefore, the issue did not meet the initial SDP screening and is considered to be green. Failure to promptly identify and correct issues found during the examination of ASME Code piping and components was considered a Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, "Corrective Actions" in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy (NCV 50-237-00-17-02(DRS); 50-249-00-17-02(DRS)).

4OA5 Management Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on September 29, 2000. The licensee acknowledged the results presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

ComEd

J. Bashor, Programs Engineering Supervisor
B. Casey, ISI Coordinator
R. Fisher, Plant Manager
R. Geier, Senior Engineer
T. Green, ComEd Level III
K. Hall, Site Deputy Level III
R. Kelly, NRC Coordinator
M. Korchwnsky, Operations Program Superintendent
J. Nalewajka, NO Assessment Manager
R. May, Site Deputy Level III, Quad Cities
M. Porter, ComEd QC
B. Rybak, Licensing Engineer
P. Swafford, Site VP
R. Todd, QC Inspector
T. Wojtulewicz, Engineering Lead Assessor, NO

Nondestructive Examination (NDE) General Electric Contract Personnel

P. Hayes, NDE Level II
R. Money, NDE Level II
H. Schlortt, NDE Level III
S. Snyder, Production Supervisor
P. Weeks, NDE Level II

Hartford

R. Raney, Authorized Nuclear Inspector/Inservice Inspector

NRC

D. Smith, Senior Resident Inspector, RIII
B. Dickson, Resident Inspector

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Open and Closed During This Inspection

50-249/00-17-01(DRS)	NCV	Failure to follow procedure for inservice inspection reactor assembly welds (Section 1R08)
50-237/249/00-17-02(DRS)	NCV	Failure to Properly Evaluate ISI Corrective Actions (Section 40A1)

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ANII	Authorized Nuclear Inservice Inspector
ASME	American Society of Mechanical Engineers
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
ComEd	Commonwealth Edison Company
ISI	Inservice Inspection
NCV	Non-Cited Violation
NDE	Nondestructive Examination
NO	Nuclear Oversight
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRR	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRC)
QC	Quality Control
RT	Radiographic Testing
UT	Ultrasonic Testing

PARTIAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Condition Reports Resulting from Inspection

D2000-05456	"ISI Sample Expansion Failed to Identify the Correct Number of Supports," September 2000
D2000-05456	"Expanded Scope for Snubbers may not meet Code," September 28, 2000
D2000-05550	"NRC Identifies Inconsistent Documentation on Radiographs," October 2, 2000
D2000-05561	"GE violated UT Examination Procedure and ASME Section XI for Examination of Reactor Assembly Welds," October 3, 2000
D2000-05581	"Inadequate NDE Evaluation Performed During ISI," September 27, 2000

Condition Reports/ISI Evaluation Reports

D1998-00244	"Recirc Weld Inspection Category Incorrectly Classified," January 16, 1998
D1998-00514	"Potential ASME Code Changes Missed in Previous 3 Years," January 29, 1998
D1998-00576	"Piping Not Properly Classed For ISI," January 30, 1998
D1998-02938	"No traceability for Section XI Relief Valve," April 23, 1998
D1999-00156 ;	"Inappropriate PMT for Rx Bldg Ventilation Isolation Valves," January 7, 1999
D1999-00904	"QC 2492609915701 - QC Identifies that a NDE Inspector Performed UT Thickness Exams Without Evidence of Certification," February 18, 1999
D1999-00944	"NDE for 3-0220-1 Valve does not meet ASME Section XI Requirements," February 17, 1999
D1999-01054	"ISI & ANII Bypassed on Package Routing, Required Code Reviews/Approvals Not Obtained," February 23, 1999
D1999-01092	"ASME Weld Records for 3-0220-1 Valve Incorrect," February 25, 1999
D1999-02082	"Core Spray Weld 12-32 Flaw Exceeds Section XI Standard," May 10, 1999
D1999-02248	"NO Identifies Welding Work Package Deficiencies and Potential Non-conformance," June 2, 1999
D1999-02318	"NO Identifies Welding Work Package Deficiencies," May 26, 1999
D2000-02766	"Incorrect ISI Class 1 RCPB Boundary on Core Spray System," May 11, 2000
D2000-04508	"90 Day Post Outage ISI Summary Report Discrepancies," July 27, 2000
D2000-05137	"ISI Examination of Drywell Basement Moisture Barrier," September 19, 2000
D2000-05190	Reactor Head Vent Piping Flange Bolting Found Damaged During ISI Inspection," September 19, 2000
D2000-05293	"Jet Pump Beam #5 and #8 Found Cracked during IVVI," September 21, 2000
D2000-05294	" ISI Support Examination M564J Sheet 18," September 22, 2000
D2000-05296	" ISI Support Examination M564L Sheet 26," September 22, 2000
D2000-05302	"Cracked Shroud Head Bolts Identified during IVVI UT Examinations," September 22, 2000
D2000-05376	"Lost Code Packages," September 27, 2000

Procedures

ComEd Nondestructive Examination ProcedureNDT-A; “Radiographic Examination NDT-A,” August 16, 1999

ComEd Nondestructive Examination Procedure; “Radiographic Examination NDT-A1, Acceptance Criteria for Welds,” August 16, 1999

ComEd Nondestructive Examination Procedure; “Radiographic Examination NDT-A2, Acceptance Criteria for Welds,” August 16, 1999

UT-DRD-300V3; “Manual UT of Reactor Vessel Welds,” Revision 1

GE-UT-311; “Manual UT of Nozzle Inner Radii and Bore,” Revision 6

ComEd Nondestructive Testing Procedure NDT-C-65; “Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Austenitic Pipe Welds,” May 2000

Quality Assurance Audits

NO Assessment report NOA-12-00-ES03; “D2R16 ISI & IST Assessment,” May 9, 2000
NO/QC Field Observation 25774-12; “D2R16 NDE Exams Audit,” April 17, 2000
NO/QC Field Observation 25774-13; “D2R16 NDE Reports Audit” April 20, 2000
NO/QC Field Observation 34889-13; “D3R16 UT Surveillance Audit,” September 17, 2000
NO/QC Field Observation 34889-51; “D3R16 PT Surveillance Audit,” September 18, 2000
NO/QC Field Observation 34889-66; “D3R16 MT Surveillance Audit,” September 18, 2000

Miscellaneous

ComEd JMHLTR: 00-0051; “Dresden Unit 2 Inservice Inspection (ISI) Summary Report - Fall 1999 Inservice Inspection Period,” January 19, 2000

ComEd JMHLTR: 99-0063; “Dresden Unit 3 Inservice Inspection (ISI) Summary Report - Spring 1999 Inservice Inspection Period,”May 13, 1999

Radiographic Examination & Review Report No. LK-3472, “Shutdown Cooling System 14" Feedwater Pipe to Gate Valve Butt Weld,” March 23, 2000

Radiographic Examination & Review Report No. MQS-RT-219, “Shutdown Cooling System FW-1, 16" Feedwater Pipe to Valve Butt Weld,” September 2, 1995

Radiographic Examination & Review Report No. MQS-RT-238, “Shutdown Cooling System FW-2, 16" Feedwater Pipe to Valve Butt Weld,” September 14, 1995

Radiographic Examination & Review Report No. MQS-RT-240, “Shutdown Cooling System FW-1, 16" Feedwater Pipe to Pipe Butt Weld,” September 14, 1995

Radiographic Examination & Review Report No. MQS-RT-241, “Shutdown Cooling System FW-10, 16" Feedwater Pipe to Pipe Butt Weld,” September 14, 1995

Radiographic Examination & Review Report No. MQS-RT-238, “Shutdown Cooling System FW-2, 16" Feedwater Pipe to Valve Butt Weld,” September 14, 1995

ComEd Doc. ID SGRVP-98-0023; “Dresden Unit 2 Jet Pump 15/16 Riser Flaw Evaluation Report,” April 10, 1998

GE-NE-523-B13-01869-054; “Jet Pump Riser Weld Flaw Evaluation Handbook for Dresden Unit 2 and 3,” Revision 0

Ultrasonic Examination Summary Sheet D3R16-009; September 27, 2000

Ultrasonic Examination Summary Sheet D3R16-034; September 23, 2000

Ultrasonic Calibration and Examination Record Manual Piping and Components Data Report No. D3R16-009, September 25, 2000

Ultrasonic Calibration and Examination Record Manual Piping and Components Data Report No. D3R16-027, September 23, 2000

Ultrasonic Calibration and Examination Record Manual Piping and Components Data Report No. D3R16-034, September 23, 2000

Dresden Work Package No. 970049207-02; “U3 LPCI C Pump Suction ISOL MOV, Replace Valve and Overhaul Actuator,” March 13, 2000

NRR Approval Letter; “Use of 1998 Edition of Subsections IWE and IWL of the ASME Code for Containment Inspection,” September 18, 2000

NRR Approval Letter; “Approval Granted for Alternative to Reactor Vessel Weld Examinations,” February 25, 2000

NRR Approval Letter; “Temporary Relief for Visual Examination of Snubbers,” July 7, 2000.

ASME Code Case N-491-1, “Alternative Rules for Examination of Class 1, 2, 3, and MC Components Supports.”