



Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component

Volume III Annexes D, E, and F

Prepared by

Office of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and
Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs

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Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component

Annex D

Options for Rebalancing the Total Force

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Pre-decisional Working Papers

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Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Components

OBJ 2-5 Collaborative Workshop Outbrief to EXCOM



07 Oct 2010

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This brief provided the EXCOM with a summary of the Objective 2-5 Collaborative Workshop, held at The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) from 20-22 September 2010. This Workshop focused on the possible roles in which Reservists and National Guardsmen might be asked to serve in the future. One participant noted that after many years of sustained combat operations, the Reserve Component (RC) of today is the most well-trained and well-equipped force the United States has ever seen. The goal of this Workshop review is to summarize several strategies to integrate the RC with the Active Component (AC) so that this force does not atrophy, nor go into a full ‘strategic reserve’ as current conflicts come to a close. Some key points that Workshop participants were asked to address included refining assessments of AC-RC Rebalancing Options (seven options were identified during OBJ 2-4 Workshop in late August), an examination of operational capabilities (i.e., why is this important for National Defense), identification of conditions and standards and their implications, and finally, identification of specific AC-RC rebalancing cases for which cost-benefit analysis should be accomplished.

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Agenda


- **Governance and Objectives of Comprehensive Review**
- **Methodology of Objective 2-5 Workshop**
- **Rationale for potential Total Force adjustments**
- **Details on Total Force rebalancing options**
- **Next Steps and Timeline**

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The Agenda for the EXCOM presentation is shown here.



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This chart depicts the 'wiring diagram' for leadership oversight and organization of each portion of the Comprehensive Review. The group reviewed this with the EXCOM participants to ensure they were familiar with the governance for this study.


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<h2 style="margin: 0;">Objectives 2-5</h2>
<ol style="list-style-type: none">2. Leverage Department of Defense (DoD) plans for the future to determine how to use the capabilities and capacities of Guard and Reserve to best advantage 3. Determine those roles for which the Guard and Reserve are well suited to be considered as a force of first choice 4. Determine the conditions and standards that provide for a trained, ready, and available Guard and Reserve to meet Total Force demands while maintaining the support of service members, their families and employers. 5. Propose recommendations on rebalancing and Active Component/Reserve Component (AC/RC) mix to meet Combatant Commander (COCOM) demands based on the GEF and the cost-benefit analysis of these proposals
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Objectives 2 through 5 of the Comprehensive Review were examined. It was noted that the Workshops on Objectives 2-4 (and earlier with Objective 1) had been previously completed. The focus of this brief/EXCOM meeting is on Objective 5, which was just completed.

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The approach to the overall Comprehensive Review is depicted here. Note that Objective 5 focused on the rectangular area in the center. The next Workshop will focus on Objective 6, which deals with Law, Policy and Doctrine considerations.

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Workshop Objectives

- **Obtain additional key input presentations:**
 - IDA “Achieving Force Depth” Study
 - Joint Staff FY10 J-8 Force Sufficiency Assessment
 - Service Reviews (Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, Navy)

- **Refine Assessments of AC-RC Rebalancing Options**
 - 7 options identified during OBJ 2-4 Workshop in late August
 - Examine operational capabilities, i.e., why important for National Defense
 - Identify conditions and standards implications

- **Identify specific AC-RC Rebalancing Cases for which cost-benefit analysis should be accomplished**

- **Continue preparations for OBJ 2-6 Collaborative Workshop, scheduled for 26-27 Oct at JHU/APL**

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Workshop 5 Objectives:

The group reviewed the following presentations from speakers at JHU/APL:

- IDA “Achieving Force Depth” Study
- Joint Staff FY10 J-8 Force Sufficiency Assessment
- Service Reviews of the RC (Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, Navy)

The assessments of the AC-RC Rebalancing Options were refined, and 7 options were identified during the OBJ 2-4 Workshop in late August. The goal was to examine operational capabilities, (i.e., Why is this important for National Defense?) and then identify conditions and standards and their implications to both the AC and RC. Also identified were specific AC-RC Rebalancing Cases for which cost-benefit analysis should be accomplished for each one of the seven options. Finally, this Workshop also helped to identify and continue preparations for OBJ 2-6 Collaborative Workshop, scheduled for 26-27 Oct at JHU/APL.

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OBJ 5 Collaborative Analysis Workshop

85 Participants

- Workshop Held at JHU/APL 20-23 Sep
- 83 Attendees from COCOMs, Reserve Components, Services, OSD, Joint Staff, and JHU/APL
- 16 Presentation/ Discussion Sessions
 - In addition to verbal discussion, attendees submitted over 500 textual comments to Workshop electronic "Blog"
- 7 Breakout Groups To Examine Each AC-RC Rebalancing Option in Detail
- Survey Conducted To Assess
 - Relative utility of AC-RC rebalancing options

COCOMs

- COL William Bartheld, USAFRICOM
- Col Edward Rapp III, USAFRICOM
- MAJ Ivan Udeli, USAFRICOM
- Mr. Julian Saramago, USAFRICOM
- CDR Shaun Murphy, USCENTCOM
- CDR Jonas Jones, USEUCOM
- LtCol Kenneth Woodard, USJFCOM
- CAPT Anthony Rizzo, USNORTHCOM
- COL Neil Tolley, USNORTHCOM
- Col Steve Kirkpatrick, USSOCOM
- LtCol Mike Mawson, USSOCOM
- Col Daniel Heires, USSTRATCOM
- LtCol Rod Stevenson, USTRANSCOM

Reserve Components

- Lt Col Robert Siani, AFR
- Lt Col James Roberts, ANG
- COL Douglas Curell, ARNG
- LTC Mike Yocum, ARNG
- LTC David McLain, OCAR
- LTC Alan Schrews, OCAR
- MAJ James Erb, ARNG
- Col Gordon O'Very, OMFR
- Mr. James Grover, Office of the Chief of Navy Reserve
- COL Michael Steenson, NGB
- Col Mark Zechman, NGB
- LTC Norman Jenkins, NGB

Reserve Components (Cont.)

- LTC Michael Noyes, NGB
- Maj Sean Conroy, NGB
- Ms. Teresa Fitzpatrick, NGB
- Mr. Michael Petring, NGB
- Dr. John Taylor, NGB

Services

- Col Walter Ward, HQ Air Force
- Col Cathy Haverstock, SAF/MRR
- COL Norman Cotton, ASA (M&RA)
- COL Tony Kanellis, HQDA
- LTC Stephen Johnson, HQDA
- Mr. James Boatner, Army G8
- Mr. Joseph McInnis, Army
- Mr. Timothy Muchmore, Army G8
- Mr. Daniel Egbert, HQDA
- Col Kevin Wild, HQMC
- Maj Kenneth Casais, HQMC
- Maj Brian Miller, HQMC
- CAPT Robert Louzek, ASN-M&RA
- CDR Kathryn Scott, OPNAV
- LCDR Vidal Valentin, OPNAV
- CDR Kirby Sniffen, USCG
- Mr. Jeff Smith, USCG

Joint Staff

- COL David Sheridan, OCJCS
- LTC Robert Haldeman, JS J-8
- Mr. Robert Fancher, JS J-8

OSD

- Mr. Paul Patrick, OSD RA
- Mr. Robert Smiley, OSD RA
- Mr. Guy Stratton, OSD RA
- Col Michael Castaldi, OSD RA
- Col Gary Dickinson, OSD RA
- COL Vince Price, OSD RA
- Col Marc Sasseville, OSD RA
- COL John Scocos, OSD RA
- COL David Smith, OSD RA
- Col Stephen Waldron, OSD RA
- COL Robert Waring, OSD Policy
- LTC Stephen Beller, OSD
- LTC Michael Goodnow, OSD(I)
- Mr. Donald DeVries, OSD(I)
- Dr. Robert Atwell, IDA
- Mr. William Burns, IDA
- Dr. Drew Miller, IDA
- Mr. Michael Niles, IDA

JHU/APL



- Dr. Dean Simmons
- Mr. John Benedict
- Mr. Joseph Callier
- Mr. Randy Dean
- Mr. Jeff Hamman
- Mr. Keith Kowalski
- CAPT Randall Lynch, USN FEF
- Ms. Lesa McComas
- Mr. Stephen Phillips
- Mr. Edward Smyth
- Mr. Chris Wright

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Eighty-five participants attended the Objective 5 Workshop at JHU/APL. The participants were well-versed in Geographical and Functional COCOM requirements, as well as Service/Title 10 responsibilities, so this group was uniquely qualified to address the seven options that the group reviewed. General guidance to these attendees asked that they concentrate on what is best for the Defense Department and the Nation and less on their particular organization or themselves. Personnel were also asked to provide reach-back to their organizations, if warranted, during the Workshop.

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Rationale for Options

- **Overarching Justifications included:**
 - **Enhancing Total Force capabilities**
 - **Mitigating stress on the Total Force**
 - **Efficiently using limited DoD resources**
 - **Preserving national investment made in Guard and Reserves**
 - **Sustaining Department’s connection with American citizenry**
 - **Utilizing RC for requirements for which they are well suited, such as campaign plan activities:**
 - **Predictable**
 - **Consistent over time**
 - **Long term relationships enhance performance**
 - **Benefit from greater continuity in the sourcing solution**

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The rationale that was used by Workshop participants as they developed the seven options included enhancing Total Force capabilities, mitigating stress on the Total Force, efficiently using limited Department of Defense (DoD) resources. As noted, most of these have been revisited in previous Workshops and EXCOM meetings, but during the Workshop, it was important that participants kept these in focus as they developed their specific options. This is not a ‘shopping list,’ but perhaps guiding principles to ensure that a viable RC is established in the future.

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Rationale for Options (Cont)

- **Additional Motivations included:**
 - **Assisting in alleviating persistent DoD capability shortfalls**
 - **Providing some of Department's desired global posture through rotational units vice permanently stationed forward deployed units**
 - **Supporting the 2010 DPPG task of developing plans to align forces to support combatant commander's campaign plans**
 - **Examining differing methods of service within the RC**
 - **Investigating potential Guard and Reserve contributions toward fulfilling emerging DoD requirements**
 - **Furthering AC/RC integration within the Total Force**
 - **Expanding the Guard and Reserve's institutional support role**

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The Rationale list is continued here.

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Option	Description
1) Rebalance AC/RC mix to remedy capacity and BOG-Dwell shortfalls	Rebalance AC/RC capacity as appropriate to remediate established force capacity shortfalls (as determined by JS J-8 Force Sufficiency Assessments) and/or to enable units to reach desired BOG-Dwell ratios (as determined by JS J-8 OA10 Study)
2) Rely on rotational RC units to provide global posture	Rely on rotational RC units to provide global posture vice selected forward deployed forces
3) Align RC units, teams, and individuals with specific DoD components	Align specific RC units, teams, and individuals with selected COCOMs, Service functions, DoD Agency and Interagency partners in order to facilitate access to RC units, sub-units, teams, and personnel and thereby build long-term relationships
4) Specifically structure RC as a mix of operational and strategic elements	Selected RC units provide entire units, sub-units, teams, and/or individuals at deployment frequencies and durations required to meet COCOM operational needs
5) Adjust capabilities included within RC to meet emerging needs	Adjust capabilities included within RC to enhance Total Force capability to meet emergent cyber threats
6) Enhance AC-RC integration	Integrate selected RC elements into operational AC units and integrate selected AC elements into RC units
7) Rely on RC to provide selected institutional support	Selected RC units provide forces to accomplish Services' institutional support requirements

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The seven Rebalancing Options for review are listed here. Each Option had a specific break-out group assigned on the second day of the Workshop. Each break-out group was made up of approximately 15 members and included Service, COCOM, and RC participants. There was an OSD/RA and JHU/APL member in each group as well.

Each of these Options will now be fully developed on the following Quad Charts.

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 Option 1: Rebalance TF To Remedy Persistent Shortfalls 		
<p>Description: Use Joint Staff (J8) force sufficiency assessment tools to identify capabilities that are “over-stressed” based on Service and OSD prescribed BOG:Dwell objectives. Rebalance Total Force capacity as appropriate to remediate established force capacity shortfalls and/or enable AC/RC units to reach desired BOG:Dwell ratios.</p>	<p>Cost Cases: (1) Cost 4 additional Army Combat Heavy Engineer Companies to gain one rotational unit (assume 1:3 BOG:Dwell) and 8 additional RC companies (based on 1:5 RC BOG:Dwell) (2) Using Army data, compare costs for AC and RC to provide 30,000 support troops at an overseas location for the next 15 years at 1:3 for AC and 1:5 for RC with 9-month BOG and 60 days RC training the year prior to activation for the RC units.</p>	
<p>Examples: Use COCOM forecasted capability requirements and the Global Force Management (GFM) process to identify capability and capacity shortfalls. Specific examples include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Horizontal Engineering Companies • Vertical Engineering Companies • Military Police Companies • Naval Construction Battalions 	<p>Implementation Issues:</p> <p>(1) Determine if a shift in capability from AC to RC or RC to AC will require a corresponding shift in end-strength to maintain POR manpower for RC and AC.</p> <p>(2) Transferring capability from RC to AC may provide enhanced readiness time during non-deployment dwell periods.</p> <p>(3) No changes to law, policy, or doctrine are specifically associated with this option; however, access to RC will be needed for the foreseeable future.</p>	
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Option #1 focuses on reducing stress on the Total Force. The metrics that track stress on the force are understood and mature. The consequences of stressing the force have predictable consequences (e.g., equipment and personnel fatigue, low retention, reduced garrison readiness). Services, especially the Army, have made significant adjustments to the AC/RC mix over the last eight years. Examples include Military Intelligence, Military Police, and CA/PSYOP. However, changing AC or RC force structure to address stress or shortfalls in BOG: Dwell capacity is not a simple process.

Moving force structure from the AC to RC or vice versa will affect end-strength. If end-strength changes must be balanced by equivalent reductions -- significant analysis across the spectrum of operations must be conducted to determine where reductions should be taken. Because force structure changes are associated with changing the demand signal for manpower quality and quantity, no realignment can deliver instant results. People need to be recruited and trained to fill capacity / capability shortfalls. Any contemplated shift of capabilities from the AC to RC or RC to the AC must be predicated on a reliable and credible COCOM demand signal for forward presence capabilities.

Notes from the EXCOM membership during the brief: There is a desire (especially from the Army) to have the RC stay in “meaningful” rotations after Iraq and Afghanistan. This will carry over to employers and the public and may even enhance recruiting. The perception is that the mission must be important to the Nation, and employers will follow this lead.

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 Option 2: Rotational RC Units Provide Global Posture 	
<p>Description: Use RC units as rotational forces to provide global posture in lieu of forward deployed AC units in order to lower cost, improve AC BOG:Dwell ratios, or attain other efficiencies. Overall goal is to leverage the RC capabilities gained over the past decade in a way that enhances DoD's ability to accommodate anticipated future demands on our military forces.</p>	<p>Cost Cases: (1) Army AC and ARNG MLRS battalion to Korea with 9-mo BOG to same location, mobilization for one year, 60 days of training the year before mobilization, AC BOG:Dwell 1:3, RC BOG:Dwell 1:5, use in-place equipment. (2) Air Force AC and ANG F-15 fighter squadron or AC and ANG K-135 refueling squadron to Europe, 6-mo rotation, unaccompanied. Identify infrastructure cost savings: family housing, schools, day care, exchanges, health care.</p>
<p>Examples*: (1) RC units from CONUS provide MLRS Battalion, Fighter Wing, or Aerial Tanker Wing for Korea. (2) RC units from CONUS provide Fighter Wing or Aerial Tanker Wing for Europe.</p> <p>* Need not be exclusively an RC solution. Potential to rotate with like AC units IAW Service rotational readiness models</p>	<p>Implementation Issues: (1) Conditions and Standards: (a) Impacts on civilian career and/or family arising from non-combat deployments. (b) Appropriate training for specific in-place systems and platforms. (c) Medical readiness may be a concern for some RC personnel. (2) Law, Policy, and Doctrine: Need assured access to any RC units slated for rotation. DoD and Service policies may need to be revised.</p>
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Option 2 focuses on the use of Rotational RC units from the continental United States (CONUS) to provide stress relief to AC units at forward-deployed locations. This option was specifically proposed by participants during the 17-19 August 2010 Workshop, and specific units/locations were mentioned (i.e., Fires Brigade, Fighter Wing units and Aerial Tanker units for Korea; Fighter Wing units and Aerial Tanker units for Europe). Over the past decade tens of thousands of RC military personnel have successfully served in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other theaters of operation. During this time they have acquired significant operational expertise and experience, have contributed immeasurably to the conduct of numerous operations and have made the military's Total Force concept a reality. During this same period the demands placed upon our military forces have grown while the availability of forces have remained essentially constant or in some cases have decreased. These factors have combined to place considerable stress, particularly on the AC, in terms of unacceptable BOG/Dwell ratios.

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As articulated in the Joint Operational Environment, the anticipated future demands on American military forces are expected to remain extensive and varied. As such, it is prudent to consider options in which the RC can continue to effectively support the Total Force concept and leverage the RC capabilities gained over the past decade. One such employment option is to consider the use of specific RC units as rotational forces to provide global posture in lieu of AC forward deployed units. Such an RC employment option may well result in the achievement of improved BOG/Dwell ratios and other efficiencies. Based on such a rotational model, this option will examine the capabilities of six - eight RC units used as rotational forces in lieu of three AC units. The feasibility and potential efficiencies of this option were examined for specific types of units in specific theaters of operation.

Notes from the EXCOM membership during the brief: Assured access is the key to all of these options. Training must be standardized and carry RC through deployments.

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Option 3: Align RC Elements with Specific DoD Components	
<p>Description: Align specific RC units, teams, and individuals with selected COCOMs, Service functions, DoD Agency and/or Interagency partners in order to facilitate access to RC units, teams, and personnel and thereby build long-term relationships. 2010 DPPG task: Services develop plans for regional alignment to support COCOM campaign plans.</p>	<p>Cost Cases: (1) Estimate cost and staffing needs for a standard Joint Reserve Unit located at a GCC HQ. (2) Estimate costs for 20 rotations of 12-person Mobile Training Teams for 3-weeks each into AFRICOM AOR for a 15-year period assuming sourcing from (a) AC personnel on TAD/TDY or (b) traditional RC on AT. Account for infrastructure and support costs for the AC.</p>
<p>Examples: (1) Align RC units/personnel with selected COCOMs (e.g., AFRICOM) (2) Align specific RC units/personnel with specific Service functions (e.g., US Army TRADOC) (3) Align specific RC units/personnel with DoD agencies (e.g., DIA), but also consider Interagency partners for whole of government solutions.</p>	<p>Implementation Issues: (1) Conditions and Standards: (a) Assured access is key; (b) will need to communicate mission important to units, employers, families, American public. (2) Law, Policy, or Doctrine: (a) Title 10 gives the separate Services direct and doctrinally exclusive control over their respective RC elements; (b) Joint, multi-year funding is key to implementation of this; (c) "Assignment" may be appropriate for some COCOMs, "allocation" for others; (d) requires a common doctrine for building, generating or utilizing RC members for joint applications.</p>
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Option 3 focuses on the alignment of specific RC units, teams, and individuals with selected Joint Force Headquarters (JF HQs), COCOMs, and DoD and Service components in order to facilitate access to RC units, sub-units, teams, and personnel, thus building long-term relationships. Joint Force commanders desire enduring capabilities for security, engagement, relief and reconstruction activities that deliver continuity of effort and unique skills. Force providers welcome relief to AC OPTEMPO that RC employment can provide. Moreover, this provides assurance that the RC forces are available in an operational role when required. Over the past decade, the Department has experienced numerous instances where the employment of smaller, tailored teams has been critical to mission success (PRTs, ADTs, MTTs, etc.).

The RC is well-suited for predictable long term missions that count on the establishment and sustainment of long term relationships partners, and many contemporary requirements are of this nature. Significant value in having RC aligned to geographical or functional COCOMs so that relationships can be developed, so that aligned RC understand the theater and can be brought on active duty with minimal pre-deployment training. Engagement teams with wide variety of skills (across these teams) can conduct mentoring or "train the trainer" type missions to help professionalize partner militaries. DoD has lacked formally structured forces for many of these requirements and has therefore sourced many in an ad-hoc fashion with force packages that disband upon return from theater. Normal Service assignment and rotation patterns limit



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the AC's capacity to meet Joint Force Commander needs for persistent engagement forces with a range of appropriate skills, regional knowledge, and relationships sustained over time. Many of these activities are predictable and well-suited for RC.

Notes from the EXCOM Membership during the brief: Long-term relationships with COCOMs and other staffs are important. RC may be a good option for the COCOM's Standing Joint Force Headquarters, but once again, assured access will be the key enabler.



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 Option 4a: Create National or Regional RC Units 	
<p>Description: Create national or regional RC units staffed by personnel willing to serve more frequently and/or for longer periods of time in order to support on-going and future Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) and Building Partner Capacity (BPC) missions as well as institution support missions. Such <i>differentiation</i> within RC provides additional source for units/teams/ personnel required by important DoD missions.</p>	<p>Cost Cases: (1) Compare costs for 200-person unit sourced (a) from AC or (b) from RC by personnel willing to train/operate 90 days/yr and deploy for 9 months on 1:3 cycle. Examine 40, 60, 120, and 180 day AD periods and 1:2 and 1:4 BOG:Dwell ratios.</p>
<p>Examples: (1) RC units teamed exclusively with specific AC units, co-using equipment and facilities (similar to Air Force Reserve); (2) Army Reserve unit of drill sergeants aligned with TRADOC to provide “surge” capacity over peak Jun-Sep training period; (3) RC unit aligned with AFRICOM to provide needed TSC and BPC support. Aligned RC unit would be “first called”.</p>	<p>Implementation Issues: (1) Conditions and Standards: Large number of duty statuses is a complication; investigate whether pay, benefits, entitlements be made common across duty status types and services (2) Law, Policy, or Doctrine: Assured access to include necessary funding will be essential; specific enlistment contracts or similar means of obligating individuals should be explored.</p>
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Option 4 focuses on structuring the RC as a mix of operational and strategic elements by establishing national and/or regional RC units to deploy and support COCOMs and Services. This Option seeks to identify potential demands for RC elements as DoD draws down from current conflicts. This may lead to the potential to better operationalize RC for support to overseas activities and in defense of the homeland, with elements and capabilities providing strategic depth and surge capability when needed. This Option was broken down into three Sub-Options, but only the first was explored in detail during the break-out and plenary sessions.

Notes from the EXCOM Membership during the brief: Has anyone looked at using the RC’s unique abilities with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), Civil Affairs or Cyber? Mr. Smiley: Yes, we have...standby for option 5.

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 Option 5: Develop RC Capabilities to Meet Emerging Needs 		
<p>Description: Adjust capabilities included within RC to enhance Total Force capability to meet emerging demands arising from new challenges. Most promising options include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Creating cyber defense capabilities • Expanding intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations and intelligence analysis capabilities • Sustained engagement with selected foreign partner military establishments 	<p>Cost Cases: Identify cost savings that accrue to DoD by recruiting personnel who have acquired important training and skills outside the military, e.g., doctors, city planners, network security experts. In some cases, cyber security personnel have an 18-month training requirement.</p>	
<p>Examples:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cyber defense: develop a mix of units, small teams, and individuals to expand US cyber capabilities. In RC, emphasize recruitment and long-term retention of personnel already highly experienced in cyber defense in the civil sector. Employ these people in critical defense activities and in training. • ISR: expand existing efforts to include remote UAS operation. 	<p>Implementation Issues:</p> <p>(1) Acquisition and retention of highly-skilled RC cyber specialists from the civil sector expected to require bonus pays and focused application to challenging, rewarding duty</p> <p>(2) All DoD cyber operations must conform to legal considerations concerning personal privacy. DoD cyber operations also must follow certain policies with regard to interaction with other non-DoD entities. AC and RC equivalent in many of these issues.</p>	
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Option 5 focused on adjusting capabilities resident within the RC to enhance Total Force capabilities to meet United States Government (USG) goals of reducing risks to homeland security, demands for better knowledge and understanding of the changing and complex global security situation, increased demand for global Humanitarian Assistance (HA), reduce the potential risk caused by Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and engage emergent cyber threats. These goals are based upon QDR derived threats and potential future RC participation can be delineated as follows on the next page:

QDR missions requiring increased future DoD capability:

- Defend the US and support civil authorities at home:
 - RC can exploit close proximity and excellent local situation awareness.
- Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations:
 - RC has individuals with expert awareness of selected foreign regions and experience in intelligence analysis and ISR operations.
- Build the security capacity of partner states:
 - RC has highly experienced personnel well suited for training roles.



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- Prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction:
 - RC forces could add WMD detection systems to expand overall DoD and partner nation detection capacity.
- Operate effectively in cyberspace:
 - RC well suited to contribute key capability and capacity in this new mission.

Notes from the EXCOM Membership during the brief: May need to “incentivize” service to get RC to work some of these proposals. “Contracts” with companies may be the way to go also, to get at some of the niche areas. Is this a capability or capacity issue? Intel is already doing a lot of these things right at the COCOMs and in other agencies.



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 Option 6: Integration of AC and RC Units 		
<p>Description: Enhance AC-RC integration by (1) incorporating selected RC personnel or elements into operational AC units or (2) incorporating selected AC personnel or elements into RC units. Specific cases proposed for study are (1) ground-force rotary-wing aviation units in order to increase aircraft crew ratios, and (2) RC maneuver battalion within AC IBCT.</p>	<p>Cost Cases: (1) Rotary-wing aviation cost differential from 100% AC unit using (a) extra 20% RC manpower, (b) 80% AC manpower, 20% RC; and (c) 20% AC manpower, 80% RC. "Nominal" squadron structure: 30 officers, 15 SNCOs, and 155 enlisted. (2) Integrate ARNG maneuver Bn into Army IBCT. ARNG trains 90 days/year and rotates at 1:3. ARNG soldiers paid per day of duty but incentivized at \$10K/year.</p>	
<p>Examples: USN and USAF currently employ a variety of integrated and blended aviation units.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USN Mine Warfare Helicopter squadrons and Squadron Augmentation Units (SAUs) • USAF 78th Fighter Squadron (F-16) • From 1 to 50% of personnel in typical integrated squadron comes from other component (e.g., RC in AC unit). • Integration enhances readiness, flexibility, experience, and capability. 	<p>Implementation Issues:</p> <p>(1) Conditions and Standards: Possible leadership considerations with AC vs. RC command rotation duration, pay/personnel support, and equipment "ownership" concerns.</p> <p>(2) Law, Policy, or Doctrine: Title 10/32 integration, UCMJ administration, mobilization/deployment synchronization.</p>	
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Option 6 focuses on the Integration of selected RC elements into operational AC units and/or the integration of selected AC elements into RC units. Specifically, aviation units were chosen for this Study, as the Army is currently operating with too few rotary-wing sorties, based upon lack of pilots and not necessarily lack of airframes. Integration of RC personnel into AC units or AC personnel into RC units (both pilots and maintenance/support personnel) has been successfully utilized/demonstrated in numerous instances in the Air Force and Navy. This concept can be advantageous to both Active and Reserve Components and to DoD, if limitations are overcome, and when applied under the correct circumstances, integration may increase flexibility and efficiency, thus enhancing Service capabilities and capacity.

Notes from the EXCOM Membership during the brief: Army has already done this and it didn't go so well (4ID). We should go back and find out why we ended up "undoing" it. Admin (pay, personnel, UCMJ) will be the biggest obstacle with this Option. The USAF does this well already. May have to have more than one RC unit associated with each AC unit to make this work – this would also allow the unit a larger "surge" capability. The National Guard will require a significant cultural shift if asked to implement this option. This may end up being just a manpower enhancement – two sets of crews for the same equipment. But it will also guarantee that RC personnel receive training with front-line units with the latest equipment.

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 Option 7: RC Provides Selected Institutional Support 	
<p>Description: RC provides units, teams, or individuals to support Service Secretaries' Title 10 responsibilities for recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, training, servicing, mobilizing and demobilizing their assigned forces.</p>	<p>Cost Cases: (1) Replace 100 AC drill sergeants at Ft. Jackson with 100 RC drill sergeants who work 90-120 days/year during Ft. Jackson's peak Jun-Oct demand period. (2) Use an RC personnel services company to provide personnel services at an AC installation. RC company would work remotely and provide 5 personnel/day year round. Compare costs with those for 5 AC members or 5 civilians or contractors.</p>
<p>Examples: <i>Recruiting</i> – assist in attracting new service members <i>Training</i> – assist AC in training from initial individual training to unit pre-deployment <i>Administration</i> – assist with pay and personnel management <i>Depot Level Maintenance</i> – assist with major repair/refurbishment of platforms and equipment <i>Medical/Legal/Chaplaincy</i></p>	<p>Implementation Issues: (1) Conditions and Standards: While institutional support tasks are quite important, they do not carry the same cachet as overseas contingency operations; using RC in this way may adversely impact recruiting, retention, and family/employer support. (2) Law, Policy, or Doctrine: Assured access to include necessary funding to support RC employment for these tasks. Policy changes may be needed to enable remote provision of personnel services to AC.</p>
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Option 7 focuses on integrating designated units, teams, and/or individuals to support Service institutional organizations, such as recruiting, training, pay, personnel, Chaplaincy, doctors, dentists, and other base support activities. Service members performing institutional support represent a large portion of the overall force. As a result, effective and efficient integration with the RC will have a significant impact. In many cases, the RC can provide Institutional Support with little to no significant cost, especially for activities that do not require equipment or personal protective gear. The skill-sets needed to provide Institutional Support tasks are often resident in mid-career service members and/or civilians as a result of their experience. Thus they can immediately contribute once available. Most Institutional Support roles do not require the service member to deploy, and are thus conducive to periods where an RC member is seeking advanced education, is required to address family needs, or is dealing with long term medical issues that prevent deployment.

Notes from the EXCOM Membership during the brief: This is definitely a niche area as well. The Marine Corps does not work this way (Drill Instructor example).


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Option	Enhance Total Force Capability	Relieve Stress on AC	Preserve RC Readiness Gains	Straightforward Implementation	Reduce Total Force Cost
• (1) Adjust AC-RC Balance To Address AC Capacity Shortfalls	For Affected Skills	For Affected Skills	For Affected Skills	May Entail Equipment Purchases	Requires Offsets
• (2) RC Provides Rotational Units	✓	✓	✓	○	Requires Offsets
• (3) Align RC Units with Selected DoD Components	✓	✓	✓	○	✓
• (4a) Enhance RC Capability as Operational Force	✓	✓	✓	Need To Establish Regional/National Units	Requires Offsets
• (4b) Total Force "OPTEMPO Surge" (AC & RC increased demand)	✓	✓	✓	X	X
• (4c) Put "RC on the Shelf" (RC as Strategic Reserve)	X	Likely To Increase Stress on AC	X	✓	✓
• (5) Rebalance RC To Meet Emerging Needs	✓	✓	Adds Needed Capability	Depends on Capability/Skill Sets	Requires Offsets
• (6) Enhance AC-RC Integration	✓	✓	✓	○	✓
• (7) Use RC To Meet Some Institutional Needs	✓	✓	X	○	✓

This chart depicts the Workshop participant’s assessment of each Option and its potential to influence the noted force enhancement factors across the top. Note that most of the Options do well in enhancing the total force and relieving stress on the AC, while at the same time preserve RC readiness gains. However, many of the Options suffer from challenges during implementation and some may not necessarily save DoD money.

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
This chart depicts the rankings of the Options by Workshop Participants, shown first by all members, then broken out by our two largest groups. Note that the COCOM participants seemed to be more supportive of most of the Options, while the Services favored far fewer.

During the EXCOM, one participant asked, “Who will pay the bills for these options, or is it simply a ‘wash’ with RC and AC personnel substituting for one another? (rhetorical)...Will the AC end-strength need to be reduced?” The response indicated that “Understanding that these options are descriptive and not prescriptive – and also that it is not a “choose one option over another.” All are on the table and are recommendations only. We are not telling the Services or COCOMs what to do, only indicating some areas where efficiencies might be gained and where we as a group have identified strengths that the RC brings to the table that we don’t want to lose.”

It was also noted that most of the respondents to the survey (or at least a good majority of them) are RC personnel. Should we get a larger sampling on the rankings for these options, including more AC personnel? (Rhetorical)

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This is just an assessment/rank order of the Options based upon our Workshop participants and the survey they took at the end of the session. One participant noted that there seemed to be a feeling in the EXCOM that these options were ‘pick one’ as the best, then drop the rest. He reiterated that these were ‘choices’ as maybe a better word. They are not competing with one another, and picking one does not necessarily rule out the rest. Since they are descriptive, Services and COCOMs would be able to choose which ones worked best for their organization, or maybe some combination of multiple Options might be chosen.

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Questions

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Wrap-up around the VTC and EXCOM Room:

AFRICOM: Would like to see costing data from Objective 1 and have a chance to comment on it before the final report goes to SECDEF.

NORTHCOM: Sample size on Option Rankings needs to be larger.

JFCOM: Ensure that the Options we choose are aligned with GEF priorities. Keep the Options flexible, one size does not fit all.

TRANSCOM: Noted that the 4ID example should be included in the study as to why the Army failed to integrate RC and AC in a previous attempt.

SOUTHCOM: Increase survey pool. Very supportive of regionally aligned forces.



STRATCOM: Agree that cost data should be provided ahead of time.

CENTCOM: Need for more AC members on the Workshop Team. Ensure all Options stay on the table.

EUCOM: Agree with the above – one size does not fit all. How do these options play with the employers?

PACOM: We have many associate units today, especially with the AF Component. They are on the road a lot, and it is working. Employers have grown with us.

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 <h2 style="margin: 0;">Next Steps</h2> 
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> EXCOM Kickoff Meeting; 16 July 10; 1300-1400<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Army War College, Carlisle, PA; 21-22 Jul 10<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OBJs 1-3 Update to EXCOM; 5 Aug 10; 1330-1500<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OBJs 2-4 Collaborative Workshop, Laurel MD; 17-19 Aug 10<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Interim Report Submission; 1 Sep 10<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OBJ 2-4 Update to EXCOM; 7 Sep 10; 1330-1500<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OBJ 2-5 Collaborative Workshop, Laurel MD; 20-22 Sep 10<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Service Briefs to EXCOM; 30 Sep 10; 1330-1500<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OBJ 2-5 Outbrief to EXCOM; 7 Oct 10; 1330-1500<input type="checkbox"/> OBJ 6 Planning Meeting; 14 Oct 10<input type="checkbox"/> OBJ 2-6 Collaborative Workshop; Laurel MD; 26-27 Oct 10<input type="checkbox"/> OBJ 2-6 Outbrief to EXCOM; 4 Nov 10; 1330-1500<input type="checkbox"/> Close Out Briefing to EXCOM; 16 Nov 10; 1400-1530
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The Way Ahead for the Workshop/EXCOM process was briefed.

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Proposed Coordination Timeline



- 19 Nov - 2 Dec 10: Initial Coordination Draft; GO/FO/SES level**

- 3 - 15 Dec 10: Adjudicate comments; Brief co-sponsors**

- 16 Dec 10 - 6 Jan 11: Final Coordination Draft; Dept Head level**

- 7 Jan - 18 Jan 11: Adjudicate comments; Brief co-sponsors**


- 19 - 28 Jan 11: Submit final report thru USD (P&R) to SD
Provide to OUSD(P)/FD for DPPG reporting requirement**

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Proposed timeline for the final report presented for EXCOM review is shown here.

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This is a graphic depiction of the review timeline.



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Backups

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Workshop Agenda

Time	Mon Sep 20	Tues Sep 21	Weds Sep 22
8-9		Half-day Option Working Group sessions in WAL, WALPR, MP-6 (rooms N209, N217, S205, S212, S283)	AC-RC Option 3 [0800-0920]
9-10			AC-RC Option 4 [0935-1105]
10-11			AC-RC Option 5 [1105-1225]
11-12	Check-In WAL Bldg 26	[0800-1145]	
12-1	WAL Overview – Ms. Pak Intro – Mr. Smiley Overview – Dr. Simmons	Return to WAL Lunch (WAL) [1200-1250]	Lunch [1225-1310]
1-2	IDA: Achieving Force Depth	OBJ 6 Update – Mr. Stratton	
		USAF Review [1305-1345] USN Review	AC-RC Option 6 [1310-1430]
2-3	JS J-8: Force Sufficiency Assessment	AC-RC Option 1 [1400-1520]	AC-RC Option 7 [1445-1535]
3-4	USMC Review	AC-RC Option 2 [1520-1640]	Survey & Wrap Up – Ms. Pak, Mr. Smiley [1535-1615]
	USA Review		

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Working Group Assignments 1/2

<p style="text-align: center; margin: 0;"><u>Option 1</u></p> <p>COL Rob Waring Col Kevin Wild LTC David McLain CDR Shaun Murphy LTC Mike Yokum <u>Mr. Robert Fancher</u> Ms. Teresa Fitzpatrick Mr. Jim Grover Mr. Tim Muchmore Mr. Julian Saramago <u>Mr. Keith Kowalski, APL</u> Meets in WAL</p>	<p style="text-align: center; margin: 0;"><u>Option 2</u></p> <p>COL Norm Cotton COL Marc Sasseville <u>COL David Smith</u> LTC Steve Johnson CDR Kathryn Scott LtCol Barbara Lee LtCol Robert Siani LtCol James Roberts Maj Brian Miller <u>Mr. Ted Smyth, APL</u> Meets in WAL Planning Room</p>	<p style="text-align: center; margin: 0;"><u>Option 3</u></p> <p>CAPT Bob Louzek Col Gordon Overy <u>COL Vince Price</u> CDR Jonas Jones LTC Michael Noyes LtCol Rod Stevenson MAJ Mark McMahon Mr. Don Devries Mr. Drew Miller Mr. Mike Petring <u>Ms. Lesa McComas, APL</u> Meets in MP6 N209</p>	<p style="text-align: center; margin: 0;"><u>Option 4</u></p> <p>Col Gary Dickenson COL Tony Kanellis <u>COL John Scocos</u> COL Dave Sheridan Col Walter Ward LTC Michael Goodnow LTC Robert Haldeman LtCol Mike Mawson Maj Sean Conroy Dr. John Taylor <u>Mr. Jeff Hamman, APL</u> Meets in MP6 N217</p>	<p style="text-align: center; margin: 0;"><u>Option 5</u></p> <p>Col Daniel Heires Col Burt Rapp COL Mike Steenson <u>CAPT Bernie Upchurch</u> Col Zeke Zechman LTC Steve Beller CDR Kirby Sniffen LtCol Ken Woodard MAJ Ivan Udell Mr. James Palsha <u>Mr. Christopher Wright, APL</u> Meets in MP6 S205</p>
<p style="text-align: center; margin: 0;"><u>Option 6</u></p> <p>COL William Bartheld <u>CAPT Doug Bever</u> COL Doug Currel Col Cathleen Haverstock <u>CAPT Randy Lynch, APL</u> Col Neil Tolley LTC Norman Jenkins LTC Alan Schrews LCDR Vidal Valentine Mr. Jim Boatner Meets in MP6 S212</p>	<p style="text-align: center; margin: 0;"><u>Option 7</u></p> <p><u>Col Mike Castaldi</u> CAPT AJ Rizzo COL Debra Sinnott Col Steve Waldron Maj Kenneth Casais Mr. Dan Egbert Mr. James Erb Mr. Daniel George Mr. Joe McInnis Mr. Jeffrey Smith <u>Mr. Steve Phillips, APL</u> Meets in MP6 S283</p>	<p style="text-align: center; margin: 0;"><u>Float</u></p> <p>Mr. Paul Patrick Mr. Robert Smiley Mr. Guy Stratton Mr. Bob Atwell Mr. William Burns Mr. Michael Niles Mr. John Benedict Dr. Dean Simmons</p>	<p style="margin: 0;">On Tuesday Sep 21, Working Groups meet in indicated rooms in Bldg 26 or MP-6 for 0800-1145 sessions to refine AC-RC Option assessments</p>	

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Working Group Agenda

Time	Assessment Element	Goal
0800-0900	Background	Brief description of option, motivation for including, relevant historical experience
	Definition	Refine definition of option
0900-1000	Capabilities	Assess capabilities in each study scenario
1000-1100	Conditions & Standards	Identify applicable conditions and standards concerns & possible remedies
	Cost	Identify key cost drivers
1100-1145	Laws, Policies, Doctrine	Identify laws, policies, and doctrine likely to be affected and nature of necessary changes


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Capability Considerations

- For each study scenario, address:
 - Response Time
 - When is unit / team / individual available to deploy?
 - Relative Effectiveness
 - Does unit / team / individual provide desired capability?
 - Is unit / team appropriately equipped?
 - Is unit / team/ individual appropriately trained?
 - Number of Units Available
 - Do number of units support desired BOG-Dwell?
 - Others?

Scenarios

MCO

Large-Scale Stability Op

Steady State Engagement


HA/DR

HD/DSCA


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Conditions & Standards Considerations

Conditions & Standards Factor	Considerations
Assured Access	Is this factor important for this option? If so, how do we ensure desired accessibility?
Training	How do we ensure desired level of training?
Basing and Infrastructure	Are basing and infrastructure adequate to support this option? If not, what is needed?
Duty Status	Are existing duty status options adequate for this option? If not, what is needed?
Medical Readiness	Is RC medical readiness adequate to support this option? If not, what is needed?
National Support	Does RC have sufficient national support to enable implementation of this option? If not, what is needed?
Recruiting	How might this option affect recruiting?
Retention	How might this option affect retention?
Equipment Needs	Does RC have sufficient equipment to implement this option? If not, what is needed?
Planning Complexity	Does this option introduce additional complexity in planning, or does it simplify planning?
Others?	

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Cost Considerations

Cost Element	Potential Impact
Personnel	Cost increase or decrease due to changes in Active or Reserve Component personnel
Equipment	Cost increase or decrease due to changes in AC or RC equipment
Training	Cost increase or decrease due to changes in training for AC or RC units or personnel
Installations & Facilities	Cost increase or decrease due to changes in AC or RC installations or facilities

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Recommended Cases for Cost Estimates

Option	Cases Recommended for Cost Estimates	Projected Cost Results
1) Rebalance RC to remedy AC capacity and BOG-Dwell shortfalls	Compare costs for sourcing 4 additional engineering companies from the AC with those for sourcing 8 additional engineering companies from the RC	Over near-term, sourcing 8 new RC engineering companies will cost more than sourcing 4 new AC engineering companies owing to the cost of the equipment. Over the long term RC companies will cost less due to much lower cost of reserve duty
2) Rely on rotational RC units to provide global posture	Compare costs for (1) AC and ARNG MLRS Battalion personnel, (2) AC and ANG fighter squadron personnel, (3) AC and ANG refueling squadron personnel	Over 8-year time period, RC battalions and squadrons should cost less than similar AC units due to much lower cost of reserve duty
3) Align RC units, teams, and individuals with specific DoD components	<p>Using TRANSCOM's JRU as a model, determine the staff required to manage the "overhead" associated with directly aligned reserve forces – including any staff required at component level to coordinate with TRANSCOM. Compare to the base case consisting of only that staff required to manage the overhead of individual reserve components. Optional excursions: (1) Determine one-time costs associated with reorganizing a COCOM's reserve forces to the TRANSCOM paradigm; (2) Determine whether TRANSCOM-like unit alignment results in decreased pre-deployment training time.</p> <p>To determine cost-benefit advantage of align RC units with DoD components: (3) Compare cost for providing 20 5-person teams per year from AC to a GCC with the cost for providing 20 5-person teams per year from RC to the same GCC</p>	<p>Results should show that costs for establishing JRUs at COCOMs are not excessive and may be compensated for by reduction in pre-deployment training.</p> <p>Comparison of costs for sourcing 20 5-person teams from AC vice RC should show that RC teams are less expensive over an 8-year time period due to much lower cost of reserve duty</p>

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Option	Cases Recommended for Cost Estimates	Projected Cost Results
4a) Create national and/or regional units within RC staffed by personnel willing to be deployed more frequently and/or for longer periods	Compare costs for (1) sourcing 200-person unit with AC personnel and (2) sourcing same 200-person unit with RC personnel for different periods of active duty [40, 60, 90, 120 days] and different BOG-Dwell ratios [1:3, 1:4, 1:5]	Cost comparison should show that for certain AD periods and BOG-Dwell ratios that sourcing unit from RC is less expensive than sourcing unit from AC
5) Adjust capabilities included within RC to meet emerging needs	Compare costs for (1) sourcing 200-person "cyber" unit with AC personnel and (2) sourcing same 200-person unit with RC personnel	Cost comparison should show that sourcing unit from RC is less expensive than sourcing unit from AC
6) Enhance AC-RC integration	Compare costs for aviation squadrons with (1) 100% manpower from AC, (2) 80% manpower from AC, 20% from RC and (3) 20% manpower from AC, 80% from RC. "Nominal" Squadron for cost analysis assumed to include 200 total personnel [30 Officers / Warrant Officers (aviators), 15 SNCOs, and 170 E1-E6].	Cost comparison should show that unit cost declines as portion obtained from RC increases
7) Rely on RC to provide selected institutional support	Compare costs for (1) sourcing 100% of drill instructors from AC and (2) sourcing xx% of drill instructors from AC and 100-xx% from RC	Cost comparison should show that costs decline as fraction of drill instructors obtained from RC (i.e., xx) increases

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Consideration
Laws
Policies
Doctrine

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
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Questions (for each AC-RC Rebalancing Option)	Rating
1) Assess the feasibility of this option?	1 = difficult ... 5 = easy
2) To what extent will this option enhance Total Force capabilities?	1 = none ... 5 = substantial
3) To what extent does this option reduce stress on the AC?	1 = none ... 5 = substantial
4) To what extent does this option preserve the national investment and readiness gains achieved within RC over the past decade?	1 = none ... 5 = substantial
5) To what extent will this option affect DoD costs?	1 = large increase ... 3 = no effect ... 5 = large decrease
6) Without regard to specific examples, rate this option category in terms of its overall utility for rebalancing the AC-RC mix	1 = limited, 2 = marginal, 3 = fair, 4 = good, 5 = excellent
7) Is this the best example to use to illustrate this type of option	1 = yes ; 2 = no
8) If your answer is "no", please describe the option you recommend	Text response
9) Assess the feasibility of your preferred option	1 = difficult ... 5 = easy
10) Assess the capability benefit of your preferred option	1 = none ... 5 = substantial
11) Assess the cost impact of your preferred option	1 = large increase ... 3 = no effect ... 5 = large decrease
12) Please identify any conditions & standards impacts for your option	Text response
13) Please identify any law, policy, or doctrine impacts for your option	Text response

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Survey Assessment of Options

COCOM Participants

■ >5.2
 ■ <5.2 & >4.6
 ■ <4.6

	Cost Impact	Enhance Total Force Capability	Feasibility	Preserve RC Readiness	Reduce AC Stress	Imputed Utility	Overall Utility
Option 1	5.08	5.29	4.93	5.92	6.07	5.46	5.14
Option 2	5.83	5.83	5.50	6.67	6.83	6.13	6.33
Option 3	6.00	7.00	6.17	6.33	6.50	6.40	7.33
Option 4a	5.33	5.67	5.50	6.00	6.67	5.83	6.27
Option 4b	3.83	5.67	5.83	5.67	6.42	5.48	6.17
Option 4c	5.00	4.50	6.83	3.08	4.50	4.78	5.14
Option 5	4.82	6.27	6.45	5.50	6.64	5.94	6.82
Option 6	7.09	7.00	5.83	6.50	6.83	6.65	7.33
Option 7	5.55	4.50	6.83	4.17	5.67	5.34	6.17

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Survey Assessment of Options

Service & Reserve Component Participants

■ >5.2
 ■ <5.2 & >4.6
 ■ <4.6

	Cost Impact	Enhance Total Force Capability	Feasibility	Preserve RC Readiness	Reduce AC Stress	Imputed Utility	Overall Utility
Option 1	4.87	3.93	4.76	4.36	5.35	4.65	4.33
Option 2	5.23	4.79	5.24	5.76	6.52	5.51	5.75
Option 3	4.64	4.52	5.13	4.46	5.79	4.90	4.88
Option 4a	4.45	4.00	5.00	4.15	5.57	4.64	4.45
Option 4b	4.40	4.29	4.31	4.48	5.05	4.50	5.11
Option 4c	4.49	3.71	5.24	3.24	4.43	4.23	4.33
Option 5	4.45	4.87	5.69	3.91	5.77	4.94	4.98
Option 6	4.74	4.96	4.94	4.41	5.77	4.97	5.07
Option 7	5.25	4.92	6.62	3.32	5.89	5.20	4.34

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
Survey Assessment of Options

All Participants

■ >5.2
 ■ <5.2 & >4.6
 ■ <4.6



	Cost Impact	Enhance Total Force Capability	Feasibility	Preserve RC Readiness	Reduce AC Stress	Imputed Utility	Overall Utility
Option 1	4.75	4.73	4.90	5.02	5.69	5.02	5.00
Option 2	5.07	5.29	5.40	5.98	6.54	5.65	5.71
Option 3	4.91	5.58	5.80	5.41	5.98	5.54	5.81
Option 4a	4.74	4.63	5.42	4.81	5.89	5.10	5.08
Option 4b	3.94	4.67	4.76	5.04	5.78	4.84	5.49
Option 4c	4.92	4.15	5.96	3.46	4.58	4.61	5.00
Option 5	4.56	5.37	5.92	4.62	5.86	5.27	5.82
Option 6	5.57	5.62	5.36	5.23	6.15	5.59	6.02
Option 7	5.51	4.58	6.56	3.56	5.79	5.20	4.88

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

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

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<h2 style="margin: 0;">Option 4b: Increase Reliance on RC as Source for Rotational Units/Teams/IAs</h2>	
<p>Description: Increase NG and Reserve structure as required to support increased reliance on RC as a source for rotational units/teams/individuals who can support DoD needs to include: (1) MCO with 30, 60, 90 day mobilization/deployment timelines; (2) forward presence missions associated with Theater Security Cooperation/ Building Partner Capacity with 30-120 day mobilization/ deployment timelines; (3) HA/DR and HD/DSCA missions on short notice.</p>	<p>Cost Cases: None proposed. This option would increase total DoD cost since a larger fraction of the RC would be committed to rotational assignments.</p>
<p>Examples: Number of RC units, teams, and individuals committed to on-going or potential DoD operations would be increased as outlined above. Units and personnel that have not deployed recently should be considered first.</p> <div style="border: 1px solid gray; padding: 5px; background-color: #f0f0f0;"> <p>While increased reliance on the RC as a source of rotational forces may be required in times of national emergency, there is little motivation for using the RC in this way among workshop participants.</p> </div>	<p>Implementation Issues:</p> <p>(1) Conditions and Standards: Increased reliance on RC would likely require more frequent and/or longer deployments of units/teams/personnel, with adverse implications for national/employer/family support and eventually recruiting and retention.</p> <p>(2) Law, Policy, or Doctrine: Assured access to RC would be essential.</p>
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<h2 style="margin: 0;">Option 4c: Reduce Reliance on RC as Source for Rotational Units/Teams/IAs</h2>	
<p>Description: Increase non-rotational portion of RC with focus on MCOs that cannot be quickly won and large-scale natural or man-made disasters on domestic front (e.g., larger than Katrina).</p> <div style="border: 1px solid gray; padding: 5px; background-color: #f0f0f0;"> <p>Reducing reliance on the RC as a source for rotational units/teams/individuals would necessitate a significant Total Force realignment given how Service Active and Reserve Components are currently structured.</p> </div>	<p>Cost Cases: None proposed. Costing for this option would be complicated by the need to realign significant portions of Service Total Force capabilities to ensure that appropriate forces were available when needed. The costs associated with this realignment could offset the cost savings that would result from reducing the fraction of the RC units committed to rotational assignments.</p>
<p>Examples: (1) Transition significant portions of rarely/infrequently used MCO capabilities to RC (e.g., long range strike, CBRNE, armor forces, fires brigades) and maintain at C-1 readiness. (2) Ensure that these same RC elements are also prepared to respond as needed in the event of a major catastrophic domestic event (i.e., in HD/DSCA missions)</p>	<p>Implementation Issues:</p> <p>(1) Conditions and Standards: Ensuring equipment, personnel, and training requirements are fully funded and adequately managed will be difficult in an austere budget environment.</p> <p>(2) Law, Policy, or Doctrine: No changes to law, policy, or doctrine are specifically associated with this option.</p>
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Take Aways: Option 2 – Rotational RC Units Provide Global Posture



- Experience and expertise acquired by the RC over the past decade can be leveraged/sustained/enhanced through fulfillment of global posture needs
- Rotational RC capabilities in support of forward presence missions is feasible given continued national will (employer/family/state government) and host country support. Examples of capabilities recommended for further analysis:
 - U.S. Army Fires Brigade, Korea
 - USAF FWs/ARWs, Korea/Japan and the U.K.
- Coordination with the appropriate COCOM and host country may be required to achieve agreement on provision of different but comparable capabilities to those currently provided
- Use of RC as a rotational force may support service AC rebalancing efforts to meet higher demand capability needs or AC reduction
- Rotational force mobilization periods must be of short duration and may require changes to current authorities
- Rotational missions must be included in the GFM process

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Take Aways: Option 3 – Align RC Units with Selected DoD Components ^{1/3}



- Alignment of units and/or personnel can result in enhanced capability, especially for relatively predictable, persistent and consistent requirements that benefit from the establishment and sustainment of long-term relationships:
 - Host nation leaders and population
 - Coalition partners
 - USG Interagency Partners
- Many of the Security Cooperation activities within GCC campaign plans are of this nature as are focused Missions Areas with Functional COCOMs. National Guard and Reserves are well-suited for these types of requirements.
- Alignment options have OSD, JS, and Service senior leader attention, and Guard and Reserve should be part of the Total Force assessment on those options.
- Important to recognize that alignment for an important activity can always be “trumped” for vital missions of higher priority.

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Take Aways: Option 3 – Align RC Units with Selected DoD Components 2/3



- COCOMs would need to plan for how they'd organize to effectively manage and receive aligned units. TRANSCOM's Joint Reserve Unit (JRU) concept that has access to senior COCOM leadership could serve as an effective model.
- If/when implemented, COCOMs are an important voice in the planning, preparation and training of aligned units.
- Over time, unit alignment should result in decreased pre-deployment training time
- Joint, multi-year funding is key to implementation of aligned unit concept. SOCOM's MFP-11 funding could be a model for providing COCOMs with "purple money."
- Outreach/Strategic Communication plan required (sustain current efforts)
- Functional and Geographical COCOMs are key stakeholders in "approach" deliberations. One size may not fit all; assignment and allocation perhaps most effective

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Take Aways: Option 3 – Align RC Units with Selected DoD Components 3/3



- Alignment of Title 10 Reserves are a viable option for providing the DOD's Federal response in the Homeland
 - Desired capabilities are in the Reserves
 - Reserves, in general, would bring greater continuity with DHS/FEMA and other key stakeholders, to the mission than AC sourcing solutions
 - Should be able to organize Federal Reserve Force packages as required to meet the time standards in Homeland Defense Standing EXORD.



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 **Option 5: Potential for Added RC Contributions 1/2** 

QDR missions needing increased future DoD capability:

- ***Defend the US and support civil authorities at home***
 - *RC can exploit close proximity and excellent local situation awareness*
- ***Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations***
 - *RC has individuals with expert awareness of selected foreign regions and experience in intelligence analysis and ISR operations*
- ***Build the security capacity of partner states***
 - *RC has highly experienced personnel well suited for training roles*
- ***Prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction***
 - *RC forces could add WMD detection systems to expand overall DoD and partner nation detection capacity—emphasizing Homeland Defense*
- ***Operate effectively in cyberspace***
 - *RC well suited to contribute key capacity and leadership in this new mission*

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 **Option 5: Potential for Added RC Contributions 2/2** 



QDR missions needing increased future DoD capability:

- ***Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments;***
 - *Reserve Components (RC) currently provide some important capabilities supporting anti-access operations (e.g., F-15 fighter aircraft units)*
 - *Key needed improvements may include acquisition of developmental and/or conceptual advanced weapons systems (e.g., Long-Range Strike “Family of Systems” and selected wide-area surveillance systems), doctrinal development (e.g., “AirSea Battle”), conduct of major collective unit training and exercise events, and access to selected forward area basing and support. RC probably not well suited to make new near-term, high-leverage contributions in this area—accordingly, no initiatives offered in this functional area*

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 **Take Aways: Option 6 – Enhance AC-RC Integration** 

- **RC-AC mix in aviation squadrons has been utilized successfully in numerous instances.**
- **Integration may increase capabilities, flexibility and efficiency, if limitations can be overcome.**
- **Some Services have arrived at a roughly 80-20 mix of RC to AC or AC to RC personnel in aviation squadrons. Propose costing this model and further exploring its benefits.**

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 **Take Aways: Option 7 – RC Provides Institutional Support** 

- **Reserve Components have the potential to shore up institutional support**
- **In some cases, contractors may in fact be cheaper than RC**
- **Access/National Support is most dependent on voluntary/named operation MOB**



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OASD(RA)

***Comprehensive Review of the
Future Role of the Reserve
Components***

Mr. Bob Smiley



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The 80+ members of Workshop 5 were addressed with introductory comments from Mr. Smiley. This Workshop focused on the possible roles in which Reservists and National Guardsmen might be asked to serve or integrate with the Active Component in the future. He noted that participants were well-versed in Geographical and Functional COCOM requirements, as well as Service/Title 10 responsibilities (provide, train, and equip), so this group was uniquely qualified to address the 7 options that the group would review.

His guidance asked that participants concentrate on what's best for the Defense Department and the Nation, and less so on their particular organization or themselves. He also asked that personnel provide reach-back to their organizations, if warranted.

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Agenda

- **Governing Strategic Documents**
 - Terms of Reference (TOR)
 - Defense Planning and Programming Guidance (DPPG)
- **Guiding Questions**
- **Guidance for Workshop**
- **Vision on Final Report**
- **Review Timeline and Next Steps**

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Terms of Reference



- **Charter***
 - Conduct a comprehensive review of the future role of the RC including an examination of the balance between active and reserve forces
- **Objectives**
 - Establish a common DoD Total Force baseline costing methodology
 - How to use RC capabilities and capacities to best advantage
 - Roles for which Guard and Reserve well suited as a force of first choice
 - Conditions and standards that provide a trained and ready RC
 - Recommendations on AC/RC mix with associated cost-benefit analysis
 - Required law, policy and doctrinal changes

**Quadrennial Defense Review Report; Feb 2010*

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Defense Planning and Programming Guidance

- **DPPG approved by SecDef on 12 July 2010**
- **USD(P&R) present the SecDef a report on the future role of the RC**
- **Coordinate with:**
 - **USD(P)**
 - **D, CAPE**
 - **CJCS**
 - **CNGB**
 - **COCOM CDRs**
 - **Service Secretaries**
- **Interim report by 1 Sep 10 on potential programmatic issues**
- **Final report by 31 Jan 11**

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Guiding Questions

- **Is the Nation's security improved by using the RC on a rotational basis?**
- **Does this improvement come, in part, from the connectivity to the American people inherent in RC service?**
- **Is the country's defense posture improved by having access to a larger body of ready and capable forces (i.e., the AC and the RC)?**

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Guiding Questions (Cont)

- **What is DOD's overarching framework for utilization of the RC in support of the NSS and NDS?**
- **Does current RC policy and guidance adequately support of DoD's framework and associated employment considerations?**
- **Are there other methodologies to better manage involuntary mobilizations to meet requirements?**
- **What is the cost/benefit of continued access to and use of the RC in an operational role?**

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Guiding Questions (Cont)

- **Does the initiative(s) result in Departmental cost savings?**
- **Does the initiative(s) reduce stress on the AC?**
- **Does the initiative(s) preserve the national investment and readiness gains achieved within RC over the past decade?**

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What's needed from you

- **Robust participation, verbal and/or “blog,” in plenary and breakout sessions. Participants well-versed in:**
 - Geographical and Functional COCOM requirements
 - Service Title 10 responsibilities (provide, train, and equip)
- **Concentrate on what's best for the Defense Department and the Nation (less so on your organization/yourself)**
 - Our methods treat you like a Subject Matter Expert
 - Take this assumption seriously
 - More interested in rationale for position than the position itself
 - Reachback to your organization as needed/appropriate

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Vision on the Final Report

- **Provide senior DoD leadership descriptions of opportunities for the Guard and Reserve within the Total Force in both the contemporary and anticipated strategic environment.**
- **Opportunities recommended will include qualitative rationale:**
 - For why in best interest of nation and its security
 - For why in best interests of the Department
- **Want to identify specific examples within broader opportunity categories for cost/benefit analysis**

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 **Organization of Final Report** 

- **Foreword signed by Co-Sponsors**
- **Concise Executive Summary**
- **Extensive Main Body Report**
- **Annexes with detailed analysis IAW Objectives:**
 - **Annex A: OBJ 1**
 - **Annex B: OBJs 2-5**
 - **Annex C: OBJ 6**

Allocating significant time for vetting (Nov 10 – Jan 11)

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

 **Next Steps** 

- Objectives 2-5 Kickoff Meeting; 17 Jun 10**
- Requirements identification discussion; 30 Jun 10; 1000-1130**
- EXCOM Kickoff Meeting; 16 July 10; 1300-1400**
- Army War College, Carlisle, PA; 21-22 Jul 10**
- OBJs 1-3 Update to EXCOM; 5 Aug 10; 1330-1500**
- OBJs 2-4 Collaborative Workshop, Laurel MD; 17-19 Aug 10**
- Interim Report Submission; 1 Sep 10**
- OBJ 2-4 Update to EXCOM; 7 Sep 10**
- OBJ 2-5 Collaborative Workshop, Laurel MD; 20-22 Sep 10**
- OBJ 2-5 Outbrief to EXCOM; 30 Sep 10**
- OBJ 2-6 Collaborative Workshop; Laurel MD; 26-27 Oct 10**
- OBJ 2-6 Outbrief to EXCOM; 4 Nov 10**

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
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Opportunities in this Strategic Environment

Campaign (Steady State)	Contingency (Surge)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Predictable and recurring requirements Provides adequate time for planning and preparations Synonymous with engagement, shaping activities, Phase 0 tasks, campaign plans, security cooperation, building partner capacity and institutional support Potential to primarily source with RC units and personnel in operational role Demand signal not complete as Global Force Management concentrates on OCO requirements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unanticipated or relatively unforeseen contingencies Limited initial response time Potential to primarily source with AC and specific capabilities in strategic reserve Surge responsibilities can transition to include continually greater contributions from RC in operational role over time Anticipate lengthy Phases IV and V with requirements that become increasingly more predictable over time

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Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab



Status:

- University Affiliated Research Center
- National Security Analysis Department

Potential Role:

- Facilitate Pentagon EXCOM/Planner level sessions
 - Readahead and Executive Summary preparation
 - Maintain Review website
- Host Collaborative Analysis Workshops
 - Laurel, MD campus
 - NLT Sep 2010, Crystal City location at full operational capability
- Document research and analysis
- Conduct Interviews
- Perform key stakeholder surveys
- Final outbrief and report preparation

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Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Components

Workshop Overview

20 Sep 2010

Dr. L. Dean Simmons
JHU/APL
240 228 2835
dean.simmons@jhuapl.edu

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At the beginning of the Workshop 5, Dr. Simmons reviewed the goals and agenda and provided a summary of the outcome of the previous Workshops and the previous briefing to the EXCOM.

Following were the Workshop agenda items:

- Obtain additional key input from presentations:
 - IDA “Achieving Force Depth” Study
 - Joint Staff FY10 J-8 Force Sufficiency Assessment
 - Joint Staff J-3 Accessibility Assessment
 - Service Reviews
- Refine Assessments of AC-RC Rebalancing Options
 - Seven options identified during OBJ 2-4 Workshop in late August.
 - Examine operational capabilities, i.e., why important for National Defense.
 - Identify conditions and standards implications.
- Identify specific AC-RC Rebalancing Cases for which cost-benefit analysis should be accomplished.

Finally, the previous EXCOM (Objectives 2-4) notes were reviewed with the group and included the following:

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- OSD RA has requested Service briefs of their internal reserve reviews.
- Next Workshop should cover: authorities, access to, AC/RC balance, long-term BOG:dwel objectives, and periods of service (per DPPG).

Today's RC is the most ready in US history... we have a force we never envisioned, we need to understand it, and exploit our investment.

- Reserve Review is a DoD product, not an RC product.
- Study should be descriptive (what's possible), not prescriptive.
- HD missions are primary only for the NG; use of other RC elements is proscribed by US Code.
- Rebalancing options were well received, no suggestions for changes/additions.
- Very positive feedback from COCOM attendees (via VTC) "definitely on the right track", "good discussion of options."
- JS J-8 asked, "How can we get a better handle on the demand signal?"

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**Briefing Agenda**

- Obj 2-4 Collaborative Workshop
 - Key insights
 - EXCOM Feedback

- Obj 5 Collaborative Workshop
 - Objectives
 - Approach
 - End-of-workshop survey

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**Objectives 2-5**

2. Leverage DoD plans for the future to determine how to use the capabilities and capacities of Guard and Reserve to best advantage

3. Determine those roles for which the Guard and Reserve are well suited to be considered as a force of first choice

4. Determine the conditions and standards that provide for a trained, ready, and available Guard and Reserve to meet Total Force demands while maintaining the support of service members, their families and employers.

5. Propose recommendations on rebalancing and AC/RC mix to meet COCOM demands based on the GEF and the cost-benefit analysis of these proposals

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OBJ 2-4 Collaborative Analysis Workshop

72 Participants

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Workshop held at JHU/APL 17-19 Aug 70 attendees from COCOMs, Reserve Components, Services, OSD, Joint Staff, and JHU/APL 14 Presentation/ Discussion Sessions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> In addition to verbal discussion, attendees submitted over 1,500 textual comments to Workshop electronic "Blog" Surveys conducted to assess <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Demand for RC Contribution RC Best Uses RC Sourcing Options Conditions & Standards 	<p>COCOMs</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> COL William Bartheld, USAFRICOM Col Edward Rapp III, USAFRICOM MAJ Ivan Udell, USAFRICOM Mr. John Klesch, USAFRICOM Mr Richard McCalla, USAFRICOM Mr. Julian Saramago, USAFRICOM CDR Shaun Murphy, USCENTCOM CDR Jonas Jones, USEUCOM LCDR Valerie Lacroix, USEUCOM LtCol Kenneth Woodard, USJFCOM CAPT Anthony Rizzo, USNORTHCOM Col Steve Kirkpatrick, USSOCOM Col Daniel Heires, USSTRATCOM COL Troy Kok, USTRANSCOM <p>Reserve Components</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lt Col Robert Siani, AFR Lt Col James Roberts, ANG COL Douglas Curell, ARNG COL Robert Williams, ARNG LTC James Yocum, ARNG LTC Dale Fair, OCAR LTC David McLain, OCAR LTC Bryan Ross, ARNG Col Gordon O'Very, OMFR Mr. James Grover, Office of the Chief of Navy Reserve 	<p>Reserve Components (Cont.)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Col Mark Zechman, NGB LTC Norman Jenkins, NGB Lt Col Diane Belmessieri, NGB Major Sean Conroy, NGB MAJ James Erb, NGB Mr. Michael Petring, NGB Mr. Steven Wright, NGB <p>Services</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Col Walter Ward, HQ Air Force Col Cathleen Haverstock, SAF/MRR Lt Col Barbara Lee, AF/A5XW COL Scott Sharp, ASA (M&RA) LTC Stephen Johnson, HQDA Mr. James Boatner, Army G8 Mr. Joseph McInnis, Army Colonel Kevin Wild, HQMC LtCol Paul Webb, USMC Maj Kenneth Casais, HQMC CAPT Robert Louzek, ASN-M&RA CDR Kathryn Scott, OPNAV LCDR Vidal Valentin, USNavy CDR Kirby Sniffen, USCG Mr. Jeffrey Smith, USCG 	<p>OSD</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mr. Robert Smiley, OSD RA Mr. John Hastings, OSD RA Mr. Guy Stratton, OSD RA Col Michael Castaldi, OSD RA COL Walid Chebli, OSD RA COL Vince Price, OASD RA COL John Scocos, OSD RA COL David Smith, OSD RA COL Robert Waring, OSD Policy LTC Stephen Beller, OSD Mr. Donald DeVries, OSD(I) Mr. Robert Leach, OSD(AT&L) Dr. Drew Miller, IDA <p>Joint Staff</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> COL David Sheridan, OCJCS LTC Robert Haldeman, JS J-8 Mr. Robert Fancher, JS, J8 <p>JHU/APL</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Dr. Dean Simmons Mr. John Benedict Mr. Joseph Callier Mr. Randy Dean Mr. Jeff Hamman Mr. Keith Kowalski CAPT Randall Lynch, USN FEF Ms. Lesa McComas Mr. Stephen Phillips Mr. Edward Smyth
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OBJ 2: Using the RC to Best Advantage

Approach

- Reviewed
 - Guidance for Employment of the Force
 - OA-10 Study Results
 - Global Force Management Process
 - Integrated Security Constructs
 - Steady State Security Posture Vignettes
- Examined Total Force Employment in Planning Scenarios
 - Large-Scale Conventional Campaign: CC 3
 - Large-Scale Stability Operation: IR 3
 - Steady State Engagement Activities: SSSP 1-03
 - Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response: SSSP 1-06
 - Homeland Defense/Defense Support to Civil Authorities: SSSP 4-02

Source: Integrated Security Posture Defense Planning Scenario, April 2008

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OBJ 2: Using the RC to Best Advantage

RC seen as having:

- Primary role in Large-Scale Stability Ops, Steady State Engagement, and Homeland Defense
- Secondary role in Large-Scale Conventional Campaign, HA/DR, and Institutional Support

Results

Component	Large-Scale Conventional Campaign	Large-Scale Stability Operation	Steady State Engagement Activities	Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Response	Homeland Defense / Defense Support to Civilian Authorities	Institutional Support
Active Component	Primary	Primary	Primary-Secondary	Primary	Secondary	Primary
Reserve Component	Secondary	Primary	Primary	Secondary	Primary	Secondary
Government Civilians	Little	Secondary	Primary-Secondary	Primary	Primary	Secondary-Little
Contractors	Little	Secondary-Little	Secondary-Little	Secondary-Little	Secondary	Secondary-Little-None

Based on survey administered to Joint Staff, COCOM, Service, RC, & OSD attendees at JHU/APL Comprehensive Review Collaborative Workshop, 17-19 Aug 2010

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OBJ 3: Roles for Which RC Is Well Suited

Approach

- Examined Reserve Component employment for broad mission sets at Carlisle Workshop
 - Rotating Operational Forces (Home & Abroad)
 - Military Engagement Teams
 - Individual Augmentation
 - Institutional Support
- Prioritized missions / tasks at recent Collaborative Analysis Workshop (JHU/APL) based on attendee input

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RC Mission Sets Considered

Rotating Operational Force (Home & Abroad)	Units that rotate through their Service's Force Generation model, in accordance with the Service's readiness policy/requirements, from reset/maintenance through training and deployment. When in the available window will normally be assigned or designated for a mission that fulfills their Service's requirements, to include Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), Homeland Defense (HLD), or Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA).
Military Engagement Teams	Use of Service members (Civilian, Active or Reserve Component) to form relatively small, collective teams targeted to fulfill requirements for which the establishment and sustenance of long-term relationships are critical to mission success and for which continuity with the sourcing solution enhances mission performance. Should include host nation leaders and citizens, coalition partners, other USG agencies and NGOs.
Individual Augmentation	Use of Service members (Civilian, Active or Reserve Component) with or without unit affiliation, to perform duty to support mission requirements when an organization, command or unit is unable to achieve assigned mission with onboard resources. The duration of the duty will vary based on mission requirements for the supported command and availability of the member.
Institutional Support	Units or individual Reservists that support the Operational Force, normally in CONUS, and move through their Service's Force Generation Model. Supports the Service Secretary's Title 10 responsibility for Recruiting, Organizing, Supplying, Equipping, Training, Servicing, Mobilizing and Demobilizing forces.

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OBJ 3: Roles for Which RC Is Well Suited

40% scored SIGNIFICANT or higher, all scored MODERATE or higher

~60% scored SIGNIFICANT or higher, all scored MODERATE or higher

55% scored MODERATE or higher

Results	Rotating Operational Forces	Military Engagement Teams	Individual Augmentation	Institutional Support
	<p>Combat</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ★ Full spectrum Sustainment/Follow-on forces ★ Cyber ★ Nuclear C2 ★ Space C2 ★ Strategic Intel/Targeteering ★ Theater specific C2 ★ National C2 ★ ISR <p>Security</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ★ Anti-Terrorism Force Protection ★ FID & Irregular Warfare ★ Stability Ops ★ Cyber <p>Engagement</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ★ Theater Security Cooperation ★ Allied exercises ★ Security Force Assistance ★ Partnership Programs ★ Civil Affairs <p>Relief and Reconstruction</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ★ HA /DR ★ Infrastructure recovery, maintenance & construction ★ Medical Readiness Training 	<p>Operational</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ★ Stability Operations ★ Civil Affairs ★ Intelligence ★ Maritime Security ★ Information Operations ★ Air and Missile Defense <p>Support</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ★ Engineering ★ Logistics ★ Security <p>Homeland Defense</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ★ Homeland Defense & Security ★ Defense Support to Civil Authorities <p>Training</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ★ Professional Military Education ★ Conventional Military Operations <p>Services</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ★ Health Affairs 	<p>Operational: Cyber</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ★ Specific Combat Arms ★ Aviation Support ★ UAV – RPA Operators ★ PSYOPS ★ Civil Affairs <p>Support: Specific Logistics</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ★ Logistics ★ CBRNE Response ★ Engineers (combat & civil) ★ Force Protection ★ Military Police (confinement, criminal investigation) ★ Public Affairs <p>HQ Staff: Planners & Strategists</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ★ Operations/Action Officers ★ Intel ★ IT/C4I ★ Finance ★ Acquisition/Contracting ★ Specialized Experts: Scientists ★ Regional Experts ★ Human Resources ★ Environmental ★ Agriculture ★ Energy ★ Linguists ★ Services: Medical ★ Legal ★ Training: Training 	<p>Training: Basic Training</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ★ Advanced Individual Training ★ Instructor Support ★ Instructor Training ★ Officer Prof Dev Training ★ NCO Prof Dev Training ★ ROTC Support ★ Small Arms Instructors ★ Support Services to the Academies <p>Recruiting: Recruiting</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ★ Logistics: Central Issue Facilities ★ Transportation Support ★ Depot Maintenance <p>Services: Medical, Health, Dental</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ★ Legal ★ Admin: Pay /Admin Services ★ Personnel Support Activities ★ HQ Staff Augmentation ★ Spec Staff: EEO, POSH, Chaplains ★ IG Complaints/Fraud Investigations <p>Readiness: MOB Center Operations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ★ JRSOI ★ Certification: Training Evaluation ★ IG Inspection Teams ★ Exercise Validation <p>Public Affairs: Comm Support</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ★ Public Affairs ★ Security: Network Security ★ Base Security ★ Firefighters ★ Facilities: Engineering Construction

•Task rated SIGNIFICANT or higher (★) or MODERATE or higher (☆) by Joint Staff, COCOM, Service, RC, and OSD participants at JHU/APL Collaborative Analysis Workshop, 17-19 Aug 10

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OBJ 3: Roles for Which RC Is Well Suited

Rotating Operational Forces, Military Engagement Teams, and Individual Augmentees are all seen as playing comparable roles for sourcing RC needs

RC Sourcing Option	Large-Scale Conventional Campaign	Large-Scale Stability Operation	Steady State Engagement Activities	Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Response	Homeland Defense / Defense Support to Civilian Authorities	Institutional Support
Rotating Operational Forces	Primary	Primary	Primary	Primary-Secondary	Primary	Secondary
Military Engagement Teams	Secondary	Primary	Primary	Primary-Secondary	Primary	Secondary
Individual Augmentees	Primary-Secondary-Little	Primary-Secondary	Primary	Primary-Secondary	Primary	Primary-Secondary

Based on survey administered to Joint Staff, COCOM, Service, RC, & OSD attendees at JHU/APL Comprehensive Review Collaborative Workshop, 17-19 Aug 2010

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OBJ 4: Conditions & Standards

Approach

- Prior to Collaborative Analysis Workshop, JHU/APL team
 - Reviewed 43 recent studies focused on Reserve Component
 - Identified 30 issues in 12 areas
 - Identified 159 potential solutions
- At Collaborative Analysis Workshop
 - Workshop attendees identified 23 additional solution options
 - Survey used to establish Issue priorities
 - 11 issues rated as being of SIGNIFICANT concern
 - 109 of 182 solutions rated as having at least MODERATE benefit

The diagram is a 2x2 matrix with 'Reservist' in the center. The quadrants are: Military Unit (top-left), Personal Life (top-right), Military Career (bottom-left), and Civilian Career (bottom-right). A central circle labeled 'Reservist' contains 'Quality of Life', 'Pay & Benefits', and 'Family Support'. The Military Unit quadrant includes 'COCOM/Other Customer', 'Readiness', 'Availability', and 'Suitability'. The Personal Life quadrant includes 'Family'. The Military Career quadrant includes 'Military Job Training', 'Military Career Progression', and 'MOS:Owell Ratio'. The Civilian Career quadrant includes 'Civilian Job Training', 'Civilian Career Progression', and 'Minimize Business Disruption/Expense'. A 'Service' circle is on the left, and a 'Civilian Employer' circle is on the right. The diagram is labeled 'UNCLASSIFIED/DRAFT' and 'APL'.

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OBJ 4: Conditions & Standards

Red indicates issues with a score of 3.5 or above (i.e., midway between moderate and significant impact). Green indicates issues with a score of 2.5 or below (i.e., midway between minor and moderate impact).

Of Significant Concern

1. Deployment Notification & Predictability
2. Pay & Allowances (delays/errors in processing RC compensation)
3. Civilian Employer Satisfaction (Goodwill)
4. RC Career Path – JPME
5. RC Career Type – RC Duty Status (Simplify)
6. Small Business Concerns (small-business owner reservists)
7. Readiness – Training
8. Health Benefits (transition between civilian health care plans and TRICARE)
9. Small Business Concerns (burden on small business owners associated with hiring RC members)
10. Readiness (individual medical readiness)
11. Accessibility of RC members
12. Readiness (equipment)
13. Civilian Occupation and MOS (some civilian skillsets require surge levels not sustained in DoD)
14. Synergies between Civilian Employers and DoD
15. Suitability – Manning (unit-level manning is insufficient, requiring cross-leveling)
16. Health Benefits (RC members and their families do not fully understand their health care options)

Principal Concerns

- Underscored +
- Basing & Infrastructure
- National Support

17. Recruiting- Accession, Transfers (ability of RC to attract mid-career civilians and AC members)
18. Resourcing (some force generation model resource requirements are ill defined)
19. Pay and Allowances (lack of flexibility does not permit services to target pay as required)
20. Pay and Allowances (inconsistencies between RC and AC)
21. Health Benefits (insufficient post-deployment care for demobilizing RC)
22. Resourcing (RC equipment shortfalls)
23. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (protections to RC members)
24. Civilian Employer Compensation (burden of mandatory contributions to reservists' retirement accounts and health insurance premiums)
25. Suitability – Skillsets (RC not focused on irregular war, stability operations)

Remedies Implemented


26. Family Support
27. Retirement (differences between RC and AC)
28. Educational Benefits (eligibility criteria)
29. RC Career Path – RC-only Career Dwell (20 year career yields 3 MOB under 1:5 dwell)
30. Educational Benefits (amount)

Based on survey administered to Joint Staff, COCOM, Service, RC, & OSD reps at JHU/APL Comprehensive Review Collaborative Workshop, 17-19 Aug 10


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Red indicates issues with a score of 3.5 or above (i.e., midway between moderate and significant impact). Green indicates issues with a score of 2.5 or below (i.e., midway between minor and moderate impact).

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OBJ 5: Rebalancing the AC/RC Mix


Progress To Date

- Based on results of OBJ 2 and OBJ 3, identified 7 potential options for Rebalancing AC/RC mix


Work Remaining

- Assessment of Rebalancing Options to include Cost-Benefit considerations
- Identification of Conditions and Standards needed to implement Rebalancing Options
- Identification of Law, Policy, or Doctrinal changes needed to implement Rebalancing Options

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OBJ 5: AC/RC Rebalancing Options

Option	Description
1) Rebalance RC to remedy AC capacity and BOG-Dwell shortfalls	Rebalance RC capacity as appropriate to remediate established force capacity shortfalls within AC (as determined by JS J-8 Force Sufficiency Assessments) and/or to enable AC units to reach desired BOG-Dwell ratios (as determined by JS J-8 OA10 Study)
2) Rely on rotational RC units to provide global posture	Rely on rotational RC units to provide global posture vice selected forward deployed forces
3) Align RC units, teams, and individuals with specific DoD components	Align specific RC units, teams, and individuals with selected JF HQs, COCOMs, and DoD and Service components in order to facilitate access to RC units, sub-units, teams, and personnel and thereby build long-term relationships
4) Specifically structure RC as a mix of operational and strategic elements	Selected RC units provide entire units, sub-units, teams, and/or individuals at deployment frequencies and durations required to meet COCOM operational needs
5) Adjust capabilities included within RC to meet emerging needs	Adjust capabilities included within RC to enhance Total Force capability to meet emergent cyber threats
6) Enhance AC-RC integration	Integrate selected RC elements into operational AC units and integrate selected AC elements into RC units
7) Rely on RC to provide selected institutional support	Selected RC units provide forces to accomplish Services' institutional support requirements

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EXCOM Feedback

- OSD RA has requested Service briefs of their internal reserve reviews
- Next Workshop should cover: authorities, access to, AC/RC balance, long-term BOG:dwel objectives, and periods of service (per DPPG)
- Today's RC is the most ready in US history – we have a force we never envisioned, we need to understand it, and exploit our investment
- Reserve Review is a DoD product, not an RC product
- Study should be descriptive (what's possible), not prescriptive
- HD missions are primary only for the NG; use of other RC elements is proscribed by US Code
- Rebalancing options were well received, no suggestions for changes/additions
- Very positive feedback from COCOM attendees (via VTC) “definitely on the right track”, “good discussion of options”
- JS J-8 asked, “how can we get a better handle on the demand signal”

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
Workshop Objectives

- Obtain additional key input presentations:
 - IDA “Achieving Force Depth” Study
 - Joint Staff FY10 J-8 Force Sufficiency Assessment
 - Joint Staff J-3 Accessibility Assessment
 - Service Reviews
- Refine Assessments of AC-RC Rebalancing Options
 - 7 options identified during OBJ 2-4 Workshop in late August
 - Examine operational capabilities, i.e., why important for National Defense
 - Identify conditions and standards implications
- Identify specific AC-RC Rebalancing Cases for which cost-benefit analysis should be accomplished
- Continue preparations for OBJ 2-6 Collaborative Workshop, scheduled for 26-27 Oct at JHU/APL

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Workshop Agenda

Time	Mon Sep 20	Tues Sep 21	Weds Sep 22
8-9		Half-day Option Working Group sessions in WAL, WALPR, MP-6 (rooms N209, N217, S205, S212, S283)	AC-RC Option 3 [0800-0920]
9-10			AC-RC Option 4 [0935-1105]
10-11			AC-RC Option 5 [1105-1225]
11-12	Check-In WAL Bldg 26	[0800-1145]	
12-1	WAL Overview – Ms. Pak Intro – Mr. Smiley Overview – Dr. Simmons	Return to WAL Lunch (WAL) [1200-1250] OBJ 6 Update – Mr. Stratton	Lunch [1225-1310]
1-2	IDA: Achieving Force Depth	USAF Review [1305-1345]	AC-RC Option 6 [1310-1430]
2-3	JS J-8: Force Sufficiency Assessment	AC-RC Option 1 [1400-1520]	AC-RC Option 7 [1445-1535]
3-4	USMC Review	AC-RC Option 2 [1520-1640]	Survey & Wrap Up – Ms. Pak, Mr. Smiley [1535-1615]
	USA Review		

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Working Group Sessions

Option 1: Rebalance RC To Remedy AC Shortfalls WAL <u>Keith Kowalski/ Robert Fancher</u>	Option 5: Adjust Capabilities within RC MP6 S205 <u>Chris Wright/ CAPT Upchurch</u>
Option 2: Rotational Units Provide Global Posture WALPR <u>Ted Smyth/ COL Smith</u>	Option 6: Enhance AC-RC Integration MP6 S212 <u>CAPT Lynch/ CAPT Beyer</u>
Option 3: Align RC Units with COCOMs, Service Components MP6 N209 <u>Lesa McComas/ COL Price</u>	Option 7: Rely on RC for Some Institutional Support MP6 S283 <u>Steve Phillips/ Col Castaldi</u>
Option 4: RC Provides Both Operational and Strategic Reserves MP6 N217 <u>Jeff Hamman/ COL Scocos/ COL Sheridan</u>	On Tuesday Sep 21, Working Groups report to indicated rooms in Bldg 26 or MP-6 for 0800-1145 sessions to refine AC-RC Option assessments

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Working Group Assignments 1/2

<u>Option 1</u> COL Rob Waring Col Kevin Wild LTC David McLain CDR Shaun Murphy LTC Mike Yokum Mr. Robert Fancher Ms. Teresa Fitzpatrick Mr. Jim Grover Mr. Tim Muchmore Mr. Julian Saramago Mr. Keith Kowalski, APL Meets in WAL	<u>Option 2</u> COL Norm Cotton COL Marc Sasseville COL David Smith LTC Steve Johnson CDR Katheryn Scott LtCol Barbara Lee LtCol Robert Siani LtCol James Roberts Maj Brian Miller Mr. Ted Smyth, APL Meets in WAL Planning Room	<u>Option 3</u> CAPT Bob Louzek Col Gordon Overy COL Vince Price CDR Jonas Jones LTC Michael Noyes LtCol Rod Stevenson MAJ Mark McMahan Mr. Don Devries Mr. Drew Miller Mr. Mike Petring Ms. Lesa McComas, APL Meets in MP6 N209	<u>Option 4</u> Col Gary Dickenson COL Tony Kanellis COL John Scocos COL Dave Sheridan Col Walter Ward LTC Michael Goodnow LTC Robert Haldeman LtCol Mike Mawson Maj Sean Conroy Dr. John Taylor Mr. Jeff Hamman, APL Meets in MP6 N217
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Working Group Assignments 2/2




<u>Option 5</u>	<u>Option 6</u>	<u>Option 7</u>	<u>Float</u>
Col Daniel Heires Col Burt Rapp COL Mike Steenson CAPT Bernie Upchurch Col Zeke Zechman LTC Steve Beller CDR Kirby Sniffen LtCol Ken Woodard MAJ Ivan Udell Mr. James Palsha Mr. Christopher Wright, APL Meets in MP6 S205	COL William Bartheld CAPT Doug Beyer COL Doug Currel Col Cathleen Haverstock CAPT Randy Lynch, APL Col Neil Tolley LTC Norman Jenkins LTC Alan Schrews LCDR Vidal Valentine Mr. Jim Boatner Meets in MP6 S212	Col Mike Castaldi CAPT AJ Rizzo COL Debra Sinnott Col Steve Waldron Maj Kenneth Casais Mr. Dan Egbert Mr. James Erb Mr. Daniel George Mr. Joe McInnis Mr. Jeffrey Smith Mr. Steve Phillips, APL Meets in MP6 S283	Mr. Paul Patrick Mr. Robert Smiley Mr. Guy Stratton CSM Gipe Mr. Bob Atwell Mr. William Burns Mr. Michael Niles Mr. John Benedict Dr. Dean Simmons

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Working Group Agenda



Time	Assessment Element	Goal
0800-0900	Background	Brief description of option, motivation for including, relevant historical experience
	Definition	Refine definition of option
0900-1000	Capabilities	Assess capabilities in each study scenario
1000-1100	Conditions & Standards	Identify applicable conditions and standards concerns & possible remedies
	Cost	Identify key cost drivers
1100-1145	Laws, Policies, Doctrine	Identify laws, policies, and doctrine likely to be affected and nature of necessary changes

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Capability Considerations

- For each study scenario, address:
 - Response Time
 - When is unit / team / individual available to deploy?
 - Relative Effectiveness
 - Does unit / team / individual provide desired capability?
 - Is unit / team appropriately equipped?
 - Is unit / team/ individual appropriately trained?
 - Number of Units Available
 - Do number of units support desired BOG-Dwell?
 - Others?

Scenarios
MCO
Large-Scale Stability Op
Steady State Engagement
HA/DR
HD/DSCA

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Capability Summary

Capability Metric	Scenario				
	MCO	Large-Scale Stability	Steady State Engagement	HA/DR	HD/DSCA
Response Time?					
Provides Desired Capability?					
Appropriately Equipped?					
Appropriately Trained?					
Number of Units?					
Others?					

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Conditions & Standards Considerations

- Will proposed AC/RC mix affect
 - Assured access?
 - Training?
 - Basing and infrastructure?
 - Duty status?
 - Medical readiness?
 - National support?

- Other considerations
 - Recruiting?
 - Retention?
 - Equipment needs?
 - Planning complexity?
 - Other factors?

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Conditions & Standards Summary

Conditions & Standards Factor	Issue
Assured Access	Is this factor important for this option? If so, how do we ensure desired accessibility?
Training	How do we ensure desired level of training?
Basing and Infrastructure	Are basing and infrastructure adequate to support this option? If not, what is needed?
Duty Status	Are existing duty status options adequate for this option? If not, what is needed?
Medical Readiness	Is RC medical readiness adequate to support this option? If not, what is needed?
National Support	Does RC have sufficient national support to enable implementation of this option? If not, what is needed?
Recruiting	How might this option affect recruiting?
Retention	How might this option affect retention?
Equipment Needs	Does RC have sufficient equipment to implement this option? If not, what is needed?
Planning Complexity	Does this option introduce additional complexity in planning, or does it simplify planning?
Others?	


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Cost Summary




Cost Element	Potential Impact
Personnel	Cost increase or decrease due to changes in Active or Reserve Component personnel
Equipment	Cost increase or decrease due to changes in AC or RC equipment
Training	Cost increase or decrease due to changes in training for AC or RC units or personnel
Installations & Facilities	Cost increase or decrease due to changes in AC or RC installations or facilities

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Laws, Policies & Doctrine Summary



	Consideration
Laws	Are existing laws adequate to enable implementation of this option? If not, what changes are needed?
Policies	Are existing policies adequate to enable implementation of this option? If not, what changes are needed?
Doctrine	Is existing doctrine adequate to enable implementation of this option? If not, what changes are needed?

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3-4	USMC Review USA Review	AC-RC Option 2 [1600-1720]	Survey & Wrap Up – Ms. Pak, Mr. Smiley [1535-1615]

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Plenary Session

- Planned for Tuesday afternoon & Wednesday
- OSD(RA), JS, & JHU/APL leads will summarize Working Group assessments for each AC-RC rebalancing option
 - 80 minutes allocated for each summary session
 - Additional comments/concerns can be entered into GroupSystems “blog”
- Survey will be used to collect attendee views regarding AC-RC Rebalancing options
 - Results will be provided to OSD(RA) by Sep 27

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<h1 style="font-size: 2em;">Survey?</h1>			
Questions (for each AC-RC Rebalancing Option)	Rating		
1) Assess the feasibility of this option?	1 = difficult ... 5 = easy		
2) To what extent will this option enhance Total Force capabilities?	1 = none ... 5 = substantial		
3) To what extent does this option reduce stress on the AC?	1 = none ... 5 = substantial		
4) To what extent does this option preserve the national investment and readiness gains achieved within RC over the past decade?	1 = none ... 5 = substantial		
5) To what extent will this option affect DoD costs?	1 = large increase ... 3 = no effect ... 5 = large decrease		
6) Without regard to specific examples, rate this option category in terms of its overall utility for rebalancing the AC-RC mix	1 = limited, 2 = marginal, 3 = fair, 4 = good, 5 = excellent		
7) Is this the best example to use to illustrate this type of option	1 = yes ; 2 = no		
8) If your answer is "no", please describe the option you recommend	Text response		
9) Assess the feasibility of your preferred option	1 = difficult ... 5 = easy		
10) Assess the capability benefit of your preferred option	1 = none ... 5 = substantial		
11) Assess the cost impact of your preferred option	1 = large increase ... 3 = no effect ... 5 = large decrease		
12) Please identify any conditions & standards impacts for your option	Text response		
13) Please identify any law, policy, or doctrine impacts for your option	Text response		

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<h1 style="font-size: 3em;">Questions</h1>			


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 **Joint Advanced
Warfighting Division**

Achieving Force Depth
*Assessing the relationship between ready forces, operational
reserve and strategic reserve for 21st century challenges*



John Caldwell
Greg Conover
Ron Krisak
OSD-Reserve Affairs Workshop
John Hopkins APL

17 Sep 2010 For Official Use Only

This study was performed by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) under contract W91WAW-09-C-0003 for the Director for Force Structure, Resources and Assessment (J8) on the Joint Staff. This study was referenced numerous times throughout the Workshop.

Summary: Once the United States returns to some form of steady state operations post-Afghanistan, if the Reserve components are to retain their role as a inherent element of the Operational Force, changes must be made to current authorizations to ensure a coherent and reliable approach to their usage. As that issue is sorted, there appears to be significant management efficiencies to be gained by consolidating elements of the Reserve components.

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Task

- Due to the increased operating tempo of US military forces over the past several years, the reserve components, which traditionally have been held as the nation's strategic reserve, are now integrated into the operational force for the execution of on-going missions.
- While the problem may currently be most evident with the ground domain, the issue of the relationship between ready forces, operational reserve forces, and strategic reserve forces needs to be assessed in a comprehensive manner for all domains.

Task Objective: Study the requirement for strategic and operational reserves and, from a Department of Defense perspective, frame potential approaches to best leverage the totality of US military capacity, regardless of component, to meet operational requirements with effective expenditure of resources.

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Consistent with guidance from the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO), the objective of this study is to propose criteria for determining the character and maintenance of strategic and operational reserves. “Over the last eight years, the National Guard and Reserves have consistently demonstrated their readiness and ability to make sustained contributions to ongoing operations. The challenges facing the United States today and in the future will require us to employ National Guard and Reserve forces as an operational reserve to fulfill requirements for which they are well-suited in the United States and overseas. At the same time, within this operational reserve, our Nation must have a force generation model that provides sufficient strategic depth”.¹

Within the limits of task funding, the original sponsor intent was to address the confusing taxonomy associated with the topic of force generation by defining the meaning and relationship of the terms “strategic and operational reserves” and, with respect to the Total Force, take a fresh and unconstrained look at:

- Framing of the problem;

¹ ¹Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, p. 53.

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- Identifying the attributes and assumptions for Strategic verse Operational Reserves, “Fully Operational for What?”;
- An organizing construct or range of constructs for defining the character and balance between strategic and operational reserves; and
- The differentiation between strategic and operational reserves in terms of capabilities required.

In simple terms, the fundamental problem being addressed by this task is the need to create a framework for thinking about how the United States should apportion the military workload of securing the Nation among the full-time and part-time elements of the military.

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Guidance

1. Define terms (reserve, etc.), clarify relationships. Discontinue usage of current terms (operational reserve, strategic reserve)
2. Review the evolution of different approaches for providing forces and capabilities to meet the mission requirements of the National Defense Strategy. At a minimum, include within the review the following constructs:
 - Classic (Pre-9/11, strategic reserve, uneven readiness)
 - Current (rotational approach, ARFORGEN, etc.)
 - Rebalanced
3. Identify the relative advantages and disadvantages of each approach.
4. Where operational context is needed, use QDR Scenario B
5. Focus post-FYDP; assume resources are unconstrained
6. Expected product is an annotated briefing reflecting qualitative assessment of each approach.

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
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Slide-3

- As the character of this task developed, the sponsor provided clear guidance on and set specific priorities for the issues that were to be addressed by this study.
 - An initial objective was to bring greater clarity to the topical area by reviewing the general taxonomy that is in use today and making recommendations to change or adopt new definitions where needed. In the case of the terms “strategic and operational reserves”, it was recognized that there is such a high degree of miscommunication and confusion tied to their use, that they should both be jettisoned.
 - A second objective was to review past approaches to creating and maintaining reserves and recommend a new approach or approaches that could effectively “rebalance” the force given an assumption of reduced mission demand following the completion of operations underway in Iraq and Afghanistan.
 - Further guidance was to use Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Scenario B for whatever operational context was required; focus on expected requirements beyond the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP); and not constrain thinking in terms of any potential resource requirements.
- It was agreed that the study would report its results in the form of this annotated briefing.

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- Rather than start this study with a long discussion of terms and definitions, that task will be deferred until later in the report. However, before entering into a discussion of various force constructs, it is helpful to offer a basic framework for thinking about the challenges inherent to fielding a force to execute military missions. In its simplest form, such a force can be broken into two elements – those that deploy to execute operations and those that perform the functions necessary to field and sustain the deploying elements. The first can be thought of as the “operational force”, the second as the “National base” made up of the institutional, population, and materiel foundation that supports the fielding of that operational force.
- Each of these basic elements can be further divided in functional terms. To allow study participants to focus on the functions they perform, naming conventions will be addressed later.
- The operational force can be logically subdivided into four groups. First are those units that have been committed to perform particular missions or have been stationed forward to better posture them for further missions. By their mere presence, forward stationed units are likely to already be performing an important function such as signaling commitment to allies, while simultaneously being positioned to assume other missions, either locally or further abroad. The remainder of the operational force can be thought of in terms of progressive readiness to deploy, with those that have been resourced and trained for

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immediate deployment, followed by those who are still preparing and lastly by those that have just returned from deployments and are being refitted for future missions.

- The National base consists logically of three elements. The first is the institutional force that serves to establish, prepare, and sustain the operational force. The second are those elements that have not yet been brought into the force but that have been identified and maintained for potential use if needed. Lastly, is the vast set of national resources not yet identified or committed, but that would be potentially available to expand the military if faced with a major threat beyond the capability of the standing military to address.

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Construct 1: Classic

Characteristics:

- Emphasis upon the principles of economy of force and mass. Field only those forces necessary to ensure security during times of low threat, but mass rapidly to counter serious threats when they arise
- Tailored to relatively short, decisive conflicts
- Minimal standing force of regulars for initial response. Reinforcements embedded in a reserve component (militia, National Guard, etc.)
- Traditional reliance on volunteers to man the force during periods of “relative peace”; only sustained “peacetime” draft (1948-1975) was during Cold War
- Rapid (1 to 2 years) mobilization (combination of volunteers and draft) used to radically expand forces to respond to major conflicts; followed by rapid demobilization upon conflict termination
- Readiness, forward stationing, and resourcing treated as variables linked to role and perceived imminence of threat. Standing force maintained at higher level of readiness than reserve forces.
- Norms evolved as Nation grew from agrarian backwater to industrial superpower status

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For most of its history, the Nation has applied an extraordinarily consistent approach to generating military capabilities. Based upon the security needs of a particular era, the United States has fielded a minimal standing force of regular soldiers, sailors, Marines (and later airmen), to ensure a steady state of security and serve as the initial response force against any rising threat. Augmenting this standing force has been a reinforcing element held in reserve and generally maintained at a level of readiness no greater than necessary to allow for it to be brought up to “standard” in the time thought to be available to meet and defeat any rising threat. In the event these forces were deemed inadequate to defeat the threat, the United States quickly turned to its abundant population and industrial base to mobilize a “citizen force” of volunteers or draftees to defeat the enemy and, once victory was achieved, just as quickly demobilized this force to return to the previous status quo.

This “classic” approach proved to be both remarkably efficient and effective in meeting our National security needs. It was well founded upon the realities of its times in terms of potential threats, states of technological development and industrial capacity, and the availability of continental-scale resources, taking full advantage of the standoff time afforded by two “buffer oceans” and few near-by adversaries. Its conceptual foundation was also well based upon the principals of war, placing particular emphasis upon the utility of combining economy of force and mass.

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Classic (4 of 4)

	Domain	Threat	Active Duty Force	Avail Reserve	Force Source	Forward Stationed	Remarks
Post Cold War (1992-2000)	Ground	External	482,081 Army 10 divisions 174,700 USMC avg		Regulars, Reserve, National Guard	World Wide	Jun 99: 2 "Integrated Divs" (Regular HQ w/ NG bdes); ARNG 353K, USAR 207K
	Air	External	399,055 avg	FY97 ANG: 110,025	Regulars, Reserve, Air National Guard	World Wide	FY92 AF Selected Reserve: 80,000
	Maritime	External	373,193 318 ships		Regulars	World Wide	2000: 128 surface warships; 56 submarines
War on Terror (2001-2004)	Ground	Mixed	617,695 Army 12 divisions 177,207 USMC		Regulars, Reserve, National Guard	World Wide	Dec 04: 123,695 NG/USAR active, FY05 Army adopts ARFORGEN - NG part of "operational force".
	Air	Mixed	FY04: 376,600	FY04 ANG: 106,822	Regulars, Reserve, Air National Guard	World Wide	FY04 AF Selected Reserve: 72,000
	Maritime	External	373,197 292 ships		Regulars	World Wide	2004: 115 surface warships; 54 submarines

Linear Ground Response Capability

Tiered Readiness

Legend: ■ AC Unit ■ RC Unit

Combined with Air, Space,
and Sea-based capabilities
to deter and, if necessary,
defeat primarily state-based
threats


11/5/2010 Slide-6

Throughout the period of the Classic approach, force generation evolved somewhat differently across the various domains. For the more system-reliant Services in the air and maritime domains, processes were adopted that tended to rotate capabilities in and out of theater to allow for necessary maintenance and refit. While all Services lived within the Classic construct of standing active forces augmented by reserve forces under the ground rules established by mobilization policy and legislation, this rotational character in fielding forces in the air and maritime domains allowed both Services to more directly integrate reserve forces into their normal force flows and rotations. For the more personnel-focused ground domain, both the Army and the Marine Corps adopted a more linear approach tied to initial reliance on ready or forward stationed active forces that could be reinforced by first deploying additional active forces and then reserve component forces given sufficient time for them to be alerted, mobilized, trained, and deployed.

As the United States moved out of the Cold War and the successful completion of the Gulf War in 1991, force structure across all domains was significantly reduced in anticipation of an extended "strategic pause" in global conflict. From pre-Gulf War levels, approximate reductions in standing force size were Army 38%, Marine Corps 10%, Air Force 31%, and Navy 38%. Instead of an extended strategic pause, the events of September 11 2001 ushered in the

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War on Terror and the start of a period of continuous operations in Afghanistan and Iraq that would force a shift away from our time-tested Classic approach to force generation.




Before leaving our review of the Classic approach, it's useful to reflect upon the character and the relative magnitude of the numbers displayed on the preceding pages. Several things stand out:

- First, the extraordinary nature of the World War II effort that dwarfed all others that preceded or followed it. When examining the amount and range of forces generated in a very short time, it raises questions as to what was really required to accomplish this feat, what would be required if the United States ever had to do it again, and whether there is even still have the capability and capacity to do it again. In addressing those questions, it raises profound concerns dealing with such things as the impact of globalization on our industrial capacity, the impact of the information revolution upon both internal and external audiences in marshalling and sustaining National will and support, and the character of our population base among others.
- Second, the minimal nature of our forces pre-WWII compared to post-WWII.
- Third, the United States' pre-World War II "full mobilization" efforts produced force levels no greater than those that are routinely maintained today.

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- Fourth, the suggestion that the US has managed to meet its security needs in recent periods with fewer and fewer forces, reinforcing the notion that the US has been largely successful in substituting technology for mass.



Finally, when thinking about mobilizing reserve capability to augment standing forces, it is helpful to have a sense of how much of the United States' total manpower capacity is being used and how much remains available for potential use.

As portrayed in the graphic above, since the Civil War, American active forces have constituted from .3% to 51.4% of its available manpower from those age groups (18 to 44), normally considered as potentially capable of military service. It is important to recognize that not all of those in the "residual – available" category are in fact truly capable of being drawn upon for military service. That category still includes those individuals unfit for service due to medical, mental, criminal, physical, and a host of other disqualifying characteristics.


Once again, the extraordinary nature of the World War II experience stands out as the only one to use a large proportion of available manpower, with even the Civil War and World War I being comparatively insignificant.

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Equally revealing is the extraordinarily small part of the eligible male population tapped to support military operations since the end of the Cold War, with only 2.5% to 4.1% being engaged. This graphic starkly emphasizes that the United States government is asking the entire burden of military operations to be supported by a relatively tiny segment of its population.

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Construct 1: Classic

Advantages

- **Consistent with National values favoring a minimal standing Army**; reliance upon a “citizen-based” call to arms to defeat major adversaries ; and a peacetime reliance on sea (and later air) capabilities to secure both borders and international interests
- **Mobilization could traditionally leverage a large and growing population and the world’s largest and largely self-sustaining industrial base**
- **Costs minimized** by tailoring readiness and resourcing-levels to economic conditions and level of perceived threat.
- **Optimized to support relatively low-level steady-state military requirements punctuated by intense, relatively short duration conflicts of a conventional nature; took full advantage of strategic warning afforded by a “two-ocean buffer”**
- **Consistent with an international environment dominated by competition and conflict at the nation-state level**

Disadvantages from a 2015 Perspective

- Approach based on producing relatively standardized massed formations ill-suited to countering non-nation state hybrid threats
- **Difficult to sustain for long duration conflicts** and the elevated levels of continuous forward presence and engagement required by 21st Century Joint Operating Environment
- Mobilization can trigger strategic escalation
- Dependent upon a strong and sustained National will to execute – difficult to achieve and sustain in the information age
- Reliance on a reliable, responsive and robust industrial base inconsistent with economic globalization
- Not optimized to produce agile, tailorable, technology-enabled post-industrial age organizations
- **Tiered readiness creates tensions and inconsistencies across the force** impacting manpower, training, and materiel. Sub-optimizes utility and availability of reserve forces

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The Classic Approach to force generation endured from the Civil War to 2004 because it offered many advantages and relatively few disadvantages, making it a good fit for meeting America’s military needs over time.

Each of the advantages listed are profoundly important. Psychologically the Classic Approach was consistent with our National sense of self and harkened back to the days of colonial militia responding to the call to arms to defend home and hearth. It fit with America’s geographical, political, economic, and societal place in the world, taking full advantage of its two-ocean buffer for strategic stand-off/warning, the continental scale population and natural resources, its world-leading industrial capacity, its limited interest with engaging in international conflicts, and the engrained desire for limited government in terms of both reach and spending.

The disadvantages portrayed are from the perspective of today’s and the near-future’s requirements, not those of earlier eras. Each is important and helps explain why America moved away from the Classic Approach in 2005. Of particular importance is the fact that the

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immediate threat has changed to non-state actors using non-conventional means, reducing the utility of fielding large numbers of industrial era massed formations. The lengthy duration of current conflicts has raised the need to routinely rest and refit deployed forces, creating a demand to rotate forces in as their replacements. Finally, the necessity of employing reserve forces to sustain current operations raised to the forefront the fact that tiered readiness and uneven resourcing created tensions and problems that were counter-productive to mission accomplishment.

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Construct 2: Current Approach

Characteristics:

- Embraces the principle of economy of force. De facto assumption that force size and capabilities are largely fixed and limited to current operational force – no serious expectation of full mobilization
- Designed to operate in a strategic environment characterized by continuous non-conventional conflict primarily with non-nation state, hybrid opponents.
- Event based approach with a “supply based” model operating with “demand based” processes
- Expanded available force, rotated units to meet operational demand
- Continued reliance on volunteers to man operational force
- Progressive readiness across the operational force with resourcing tied to deployment progression. Resourcing no longer heavily tied to component identity.
- Relatively fixed all-volunteer force elevates management of human capital to a pre-eminent level

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By 2005, the Department faced a dilemma in having to source what appeared to be open-ended simultaneous counter-insurgency operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq with a relatively fixed all-volunteer force that was already showing, particularly with respect to ground forces, significant wear and tear from four years of continuous combat operations. It was already making full use of reserve force capabilities within the 200,000 manpower limitations of its authorities under Presidential Reserve Call-Up. It knew it could not continue to use the same personnel for multiple deployments without endangering the all-volunteer foundation of the force, but also did not want to lose the extraordinarily high professional competence and operational experience of that force by reverting to the mobilization tenets of the Classic Approach.

Their response to this dilemma was the adoption of a new force generation approach whose tenets are characterized above. It embraces the principle of economy of force in that it assumes that the size and composition of the force is largely fixed and that further mobilization is best avoided. It acknowledges that the nature of the threat has changed and that to be effective against it, forces will have to be increasingly tailored to match operational conditions and be prepared to sustain operations for as long as necessary to achieve our over-arching objectives. This new force generation solution can be seen as an event based approach with a “supply based” model operating with “demand based” processes. The Long War strategy

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recognizes the need for flexibility in terms of where to focus counter-terrorism efforts (event based), given that capabilities are finite (supply based), and that the unique operational character of the threat at any one time or place will drive the dimensions of the response (demand based). The key was seen as a balanced approach that would allow the United States the flexibility to both apply and sustain the forces needed for success.

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Current Approach

	Domain	Threat	Active Duty Force	Avail Reserve	Force Source	Forward Stationed	Remarks
War on Terror (2001-2004)	Ground	Mixed	615,242 Army 12 divisions 177,207 USMC		Regulars, Reserve, National Guard	World Wide	Dec 04: 123,695 NG/USAR active. FY05 Army adopts ARFORGEN - NG part of "operational force".
	Air	Mixed	FY04: 376,600	FY04 ANG: 106,822	Regulars, Reserve, Air National Guard	World Wide	FY04 AF Selected Reserve: 72,000
	Maritime	External	373,197 292 ships		Regulars	World Wide	2004: 115 surface warships; 54 submarines

Long War (2005-Today)	Ground	Mixed	1,132,200 Army * 73 Bde Cbt Tms 204,153 USMC		Regulars, Reserve, National Guard	World Wide	FY11 Regulars 569,000 (45 BCTs), NG 358,200 (28 BCTs), Reserve 205,000 USMC Reserve 40,000
	Air	Mixed	FY09: 332,700	FY08 ANG: 107,679	Regulars, Reserve, Air National Guard	World Wide	FY08 AF Selected Reserve: 67,500; IRR 49,406
	Maritime	External	329,304 283 ships		Regulars	World Wide	2009: 117 surface warships; 52 submarines
	Space / Cyber	Everywhere	??		??	??	

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* Total Operational Force – both active and inactive Slide-11

A critical aspect of this new approach that moves from a linear to a rotational force generation concept is that it largely erases the separation between active and reserve forces and treats them all as part of one operational force that can be managed through a process of progressive readiness to ensure that sufficient forces and capabilities are fully resourced, trained, and available for deployment when needed.

The immediate impact of combining the active and reserve forces into one operational force is depicted in the slide above. In essence, the size of the operational ground force is nearly doubled, albeit with units at different readiness stages, but planned in a manner that establishes common deployment and resourcing standards for all deploying units, be they active or reserve. Each unit is placed in a cyclical deployment sequence that seeks to control when it will deploy, when it will return, when it will rest, and when it will train for its next deployment, with resources allocated accordingly. A key variable to be managed is the “dwell ratio” – the time deployed in relation to the time made available for recovery and preparation for the next deployment. Although it has not yet been attained, the steady state dwell ratio targets set by the Secretary of Defense are 1:3 for active forces and 1:5 for reserve forces.


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While this new approach has a significant impact on ground forces, its effect upon the air and maritime domains is much less, for in many ways that had already adopted and were practicing its tenets of progressive deployments and readiness.

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Leading the way in this new approach to force generation was the Army. The Army recognized that they needed to organize around an expeditionary mindset that would produce units that were organized, trained, and equipped to go anywhere, able to operate upon arrival, and sustain that response for potentially lengthy and uncertain durations. In that vein, they adopted the Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN) in 2005. As the Army explains, “through ARFORGEN, the Army builds the readiness of units as they move through three force pools: Reset; Train-Ready; and Available.”

Regardless of component, while in the Reset pool, the returning unit’s focus is on reintegrating soldiers and families and completing individual education, development, and institutional training. During this time the institutional Army focuses on manning and equipping the unit so it can conduct collective training.

The focus of the Train-Ready force pool is restoring proficiency through unit training, with the unit leaving this force pool upon completing a culminating collective training event (CTE). This CTE ensures the unit achieves the capability as defined by operational requirements.

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Upon entering the Available force pool, a unit may be a Deployed Expeditionary Force (DEF) with a "deployed mission" or a Contingency Expeditionary Force (CEF) with a mission to accrue full spectrum capabilities in order to react to a global contingency. CEFs are also available to participate in Combatant Commander training exercises and Theater Security Cooperation events around the globe based on mission demand.² While the intent is for the rotation of forces to meet demand, it is also conceivable that the rotation could be stopped and all forces deployed as rapidly as possible and retained until the mission was accomplished.

² "Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)", HQ,US Army, G3/5/7, 8 Jun 2010 (U//FOUO)

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Construct 2: Current Approach

Advantages

- **Aligns with popular support for an all-volunteer professional military** to secure the Nation and protect it from external threats.
- **Optimized to provide open-ended support to relatively low-level steady-state military requirements and counter-insurgency operations.**
- **Consistent with an international environment dominated by competition and conflict with non-nation state opponents using non-conventional or hybrid means.**
- **Increases available forces by merging the traditional standing and reserve forces into a single operational force that spreads both operational experience and wear and tear across the force.**
- **Progressive readiness reduces inconsistent standards and resourcing requirements across the force.** Embraces common criteria for manpower, training, and materiel for all deploying units.
- Facilitates creation of well-trained and agile modular units that can be tailored to mission requirements.

Disadvantages from a 2015 Perspective

- Reinforces expectations that a standing professional military is sufficient to perform all security functions and that a significant mobilization of National resources to expand military capacity is unlikely/unnecessary.
- Places the entire load of military requirements upon a miniscule, all-volunteer portion of the overall population
- **Appears sub-optimized for conducting conventional operations against nation-state opponents.**
- Dependent upon a strong and sustained National will to execute – difficult to achieve and sustain in the information age
- Reliance on a reliable, responsive and robust industrial base inconsistent with economic globalization
- **Significantly increased costs to elevate performance levels and resourcing of all forces to common deployment standards.**
- Dependent upon an operational demand signal sufficient to justify the existing operational force. Unclear how the force would/should adapt to a reduced operational demand.

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The Current Approach has provided DoD an effective means for dealing with the unique challenges posed by what is now the longest continuous conflict in US history.


As the listed advantages suggest, it was developed specifically to fit current domestic and international environments and requirements. By limiting its focus to the uniformed active and reserve components as the manpower source for addressing the needs of the lengthy conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, it has allowed the civilian leadership to avoid the politically sensitive issue of a “return to the draft” and the military leadership to strengthen cohesion within the force by more fully embracing the reserve components as “equal” contributors to our counterinsurgency efforts, with expectations that resources will be applied to support common standards across the operational force. Perhaps most importantly, it has in essence doubled the size of the operational land forces, creating opportunities to spread the cumulative wear and tear of current operations across a larger population. It has also served to support a shift to a more modular approach to force design, enhancing the ability to tailor deployed forces to more effectively counter an unconventional, non-state opponent using hybrid forms of warfare.

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However, the Current Approach is not without its disadvantages. It reinforces the “illusion” that the Nation’s military needs can be indefinitely shouldered by a tiny volunteer force constituting less than 3.5% of the total military-age male population. It is believed to significantly increase the unit-cost of deploying forces by elevating common performance and resourcing levels across a much larger organizational structure. Perhaps most importantly, it ties institutional designs to what may be a relatively transitory set of circumstances which can change with the stroke of a pen should the President elect not to annually renew operational access to the reserves.

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Focusing just upon the Army, the view above is intended to give a sense of both the size and source of those Army forces that were placed upon active duty in the period since World War II and also a sense of uniformed Army capacity that was potentially available but remained untapped in the various elements of the Reserve components.

It is worth noting that in the period immediately after WWII, the United States benefited from a significant reservoir of combat experienced veterans that were retained in the Organized Reserve. That reservoir was tapped to a significant degree to support operations in Korea, causing issues to arise when veterans were called back to duty before other potentially available manpower pools were used. That helped lead to the creation of the Army Reserve, which together with the National Guard has formed the basic organization of ground reserves up to today.

While the previously mentioned anomaly of avoiding the use of the RC in Vietnam stands out, it is clear that we have tapped the RC to significant degrees to support operations in every other conflict. What is equally clear is that we have not either needed or have not elected to mobilize but a relatively small part of the RC for duty in those conflicts (roughly 41% for Korea; 20% for the Gulf; 22% for the initial period of GWOT). It is here that the Current Approach breaks with the Classic in order to come up with a new paradigm that allows for a measured access and use of those untapped assets. It is truly a different way of thinking about the character of the Operational Force.

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	<h2 style="margin: 0;">Today's Problem</h2>	
<p>What should happen if the operational demand signal goes down with the withdrawal of forces from Iraq and Afghanistan and it is no longer great enough to justify an operational force that encompasses all elements of the current active and reserve components? How should our force structure (air, land, sea, and space) be rebalanced to accommodate this changing strategic and operational environment?</p>		
11/5/2010	UNCLASSIFIED	Slide-15

Having achieved an appreciation of how the United States got to where it is today, it is now time to look to the future. The fundamental problem leading to a need for this study is framed above. In short, once Iraq and Afghanistan are finished, what should the US be prepared to do to ensure effective force generation to defeat future threats? Will the Current Approach continue to meet its needs? Should the US revert to the Classic Approach? Is a different approach needed to rebalance the force to effectively posture the US to deal with the threats envisioned in the next quarter century as described in the latest Joint Operating Environment (JOE)?

Very briefly, the world envisioned by the JOE calls for a force that is “adaptable, agile, and resilient”. It is expected to be a world where opportunities abound for a wide range of potential conflicts, including both state and non-state opponents potentially using both conventional and non-conventional capabilities. The cyber world and space open up as new domains. The expansion of nuclear proliferation is virtually assured. The intertwined nature of finances, crime, drugs, and terrorism may merge with demographic changes and migration to open up the potential for conflict on American soil in addition to conflicts abroad.³ The approach for generating forces to counter these threats will also need to be “adaptable, agile, and resilient”.

³ “The Joint Operating Environment 2010,” US Joint Forces Command, 18 Feb 2010.

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**Construct 3: Rebalance –
Assumptions**

- Joint Operating Environment 2010 in effect for 2015 and beyond
- Conventional
 - Places an emphasis upon maneuver warfare with heavy forces and precision strike across air, land, sea, and space domains
 - Synchronizing forces and capabilities represents greatest training challenge
 - Least probable; greatest amount of strategic warning likely
- COIN
 - Requires complex mix of kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities and methods with a ground centric focus upon the population
 - Greatest education challenge – emphasis upon cultural understanding and language skills
 - Requires non-traditional military skill sets (judicial, economic, agriculture, media, etc.)
 - Highly probable; least amount of strategic warning likely

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In considering an approach that will be most effective for force generation over the next quarter century, several assumptions need to be made that impact the fielding of the forces that will be needed to defeat the wide range of threats envisioned in the JOE.

For forces and capabilities needed to be effective in conventional warfare, we think the assumptions listed hold true. Maneuver warfare across all domains will remain key to conventional success and the forces engaged in conventional warfare will need to be able to operate in a kinetic world where they can both survive and deliver precise and lethal fires at the right time and place. The study team postulates that the synchronization required to bring those kinds of forces and capabilities effectively together represents the single greatest preparation and training challenge for future forces.

Forces and capabilities needed to be effective in non-conventional / counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare also face significant, but somewhat different challenges. We postulate that effective COIN operations require a complex mix of kinetic and non-kinetic forces and capabilities. While there are clearly training challenges in fielding such forces and capabilities, there may be an even greater education challenge that will require lengthy prior preparation to

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master the body of knowledge and develop the skills required to truly dominate a COIN environment.

From a force generation perspective, AC and RC forces in a steady state environment experience inherently different situations that in themselves create both challenges and opportunities. There is utility in recognizing these differences and leveraging them to advance the preparation of forces for combat.

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Construct 3: Option A – Return to Classic

Advantages

- **Consistent with traditional National values favoring a minimal standing Army**; reliance upon a publicly supported “citizen-based” call to arms to defeat major adversaries ; and a peacetime reliance on sea (and later air) capabilities to secure both borders and international interests
- **Costs minimized** by tailoring readiness and resourcing-levels to economic conditions and level of perceived threat.
- Mobilization could still leverage a large population and the world’s largest economic base
- Optimized to support relatively low-level steady-state military requirements punctuated by intense, relatively short duration conflicts of a conventional nature
- Able to leverage forward stationed forces for initial response and strategic warning
- Consistent with an international environment dominated by competition and conflict at the nation-state level

Disadvantages from a 2015 Perspective

- **Inconsistent with 21st Century Joint Operating Environment** . Difficult to sustain for long duration conflicts and elevated levels of continuous forward presence and engagement
- Approach originally based on producing relatively standardized massed formations – unclear if it can be structured to provide forces tailored to countering non-nation state hybrid threats
- Dependent upon a strong and sustained National will to execute – difficult to achieve and sustain in the information age
- Reliance on a reliable, responsive and robust industrial base that may no longer exist and is inconsistent with economic globalization
- Not optimized to produce agile, tailorable, technology-enabled post-industrial age organizations. Sub-optimized for leveraging Reserve civilian skills in COIN operations.
- **Tiered readiness reintroduces tensions and inconsistencies across the force** impacting manpower, training, and materiel. Sub-optimizes utility and availability of reserve forces

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The first option for a future approach to force generation is simply to return to the Classic Approach that proved so effective in the past. The characteristics of that approach (slide #5) and its relative advantages (above) are well established. The question is how well would it work against the environment and threats anticipated for the future?

The problems with such a fit are listed above. First and foremost, the JOE envisions an environment requiring sustained engagement of forces deployed abroad performing both combat and non-combat missions. These long, enduring commitments run counter to the Classic model’s design for short and decisive conflicts that will allow citizen-based forces to be quickly raised, used, and returned to their civilian occupations.

Second, the Classic Approach excelled at producing standardized industrial-age massed formations in large quantities that could be trained relatively quickly. The threats envisioned for both future conventional and non-conventional warfare will require highly trained forces that can master both the technology of future capabilities and the nuances of operating environments while being tailored to more precisely fit the conditions into which they are thrust.

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Finally, a return to the Classic Approach is likely to reverse the gains made in creating a more cohesive operational force under the Current Approach. Reintroducing the tensions inherent to tiered readiness should be avoided if possible.

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Construct 3: Option B - Continue Current Approach

Advantages

- **Aligns with popular support for an all-volunteer professional military** to secure the Nation and protect it from external threats.
- Optimized to provide open-ended support to relatively low-level steady-state military requirements and counter-insurgency operations.
- **Consistent with an international environment dominated by competition and conflict with non-nation state opponents using non-conventional or hybrid means.**
- Increases available forces by merging the traditional standing and reserve forces into a single operational force that spreads operational wear and tear across the force.
- **Progressive readiness eliminates inconsistent standards and resourcing requirements across the force.** Embraces common criteria for manpower, training, and material for all deploying units – enhances morale and sense of purpose within reinforcing force.
- Facilitates creation of well-trained and agile modular units that can be tailored to mission requirements.

Disadvantages from a 2015 Perspective

- Reinforces expectations that a standing professional military is indefinitely sufficient to perform all security functions and that a significant mobilization of National resources to expand military capacity is unlikely/unnecessary.
- **Dependent upon an operational demand signal to size the operational force. Reduced demand will inevitably lead to reduced funding and a likely return to either tiered readiness tied to extended dwell ratios or significant force reductions.**
- **Appears sub-optimized for conducting conventional operations against nation-state opponents.**
- Dependent upon a strong and sustained National will to execute – difficult to achieve and sustain in the information age
- Reliance on a reliable, responsive and robust industrial base inconsistent with economic globalization
- **Significantly increased costs to sustain performance levels and resourcing of all forces to common deployment standards.**

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If not the Classic Approach, why not just continue the Current Approach? Its nature (slide #13) and advantages (above) are also well understood. As before, the question is to what degree it would remain effective in the future environment envisioned by the JOE?

The problems anticipated with an attempt to continue the Current Approach are reflected above. As before, it attempts to continue the “illusion” that all military requirements can be satisfied by less than 5% of the potential military age population. There is an implicit assumption that the United States can still mobilize effectively to leverage that other 95%, but that assumption is suspect in the age of globalization.

Perhaps the most significant concern is that this rotational approach is dependent on the demand signal to keep the process moving. Assuming reduced demand post-Afghanistan, some significant force adjustment will be required. There is a sliding scale between force size and rotational tempo. If the force size is held reasonably constant, then dwell ratios for the reserve will need to be extended – leading almost inevitably to a return to the disadvantages of tiered readiness. If the AC is significantly reduced, then there is a institutionally fragile approach that is dependent on continuous access to the reserve and which may lack the responsive depth and breadth to deal with the anticipated wide range of conventional and non-


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conventional threats. The high unit cost to sustain common deployment standards also remains.

Finally, the anticipated high level of steady state engagement will make it difficult to meet BOG/dwell goals and also train sufficiently to be ready for conventional operations, particularly for RC units.

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While drawing from experience with the Classic and Current Approaches and without trying to radically change the fundamental thrusts of the force generation philosophies, the study team offers another option for consideration – the Reinforcing Force construct. Returning to the basic forces framework introduced at the start of this study, the group retains the Operational Force, but suggest some significant changes to its composition. First, draw the Generating Force into the Operational Force. By so doing, all uniformed AC and RC units become part of the Operational Force whether on active duty or not. The team also proposes retaining the rotational characteristics of the Current Approach to drive the deployment flow of sub-elements within the Operational Force.

Next, the team proposed to split the Operational Force into two elements, the Mission Force and the Reinforcing Force. The first is basically the “tip of the spear” forces. These are the forces that are already either deployed or are fully trained and ready to deploy on short notice. The remainder of the Operational Force is the Reinforcing Force which, like the Current Approach, consists of those AC and RC units that are in various stages of refit and training but have not yet attained a deployable status – they are in essence the totality of the uniformed reserve. The team also recognizes the essential role played by those institutional elements that form, train, and sustain the remainder of the force as a key element of the Operational Force – there are no operations without them.

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If the Operational Force is inadequate to deal with an impending threat, the Nation must either move to expand the Operational Force or go to partial or total mobilization. To facilitate mobilization, the team suggests that the US have those individuals who have been identified for potential service or equipment that has been so stored placed within the Augmentation Force. Finally, those resources resident within the Nation are recognized as Mobilization Assets.

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Construct 3: Option C – Reinforcing Force

Characteristics: Reinforcing Force serves as the reserve with mobilization as the “deep back-up”. Operational force units configured to focus primarily upon either conventional or counterinsurgency threats (some units types could be assigned to either or both), with all active and reserve component units functionally assigned into appropriate rotational schemes. Reduce operational force size; be prepared to mobilize if faced with major conflict.

- Embraces the principles of objective, simplicity, and economy of force.
- Designed to operate in a strategic environment characterized by low level steady state non-conventional conflict primarily with non-nation state, hybrid opponents and still respond effectively against nation-state based conventional threats
- Event based approach with a “supply based” model operating with “demand based” processes. Align training intensive functions (maneuver warfare) with active component; exploit continuity of reserve component with regional/cultural education.
- Smaller operational force operating on a rotational basis with reserve forces on a scheduled “train, mobilize, deploy” paradigm. Expand reserve component active duty commitment to 60 days/year for Trained/Ready 3 and Mission Force phases. Continued reliance on volunteers to man force.
- Progressive readiness across the operational force with resourcing tied to deployment progression. Resourcing no longer heavily tied to component identity.
- Relatively fixed all-volunteer force elevates management of human capital to a pre-eminent level. Consolidate Reserves with National Guard for greater efficiency; adjust authorities to ensure their availability for Federal missions.

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The Reinforcing Force construct embraces the principals of objective, simplicity, and economy of force. The objective is to ensure the availability of deployable forces that will be ready when needed and fully trained for anticipated missions across the full spectrum of potential requirements. The team proposes to retain the basic rotational force paradigm of the Current Approach to retain the benefits that have been experienced under its adoption. Additionally, some force reductions are anticipated across the AC and RC to most economically field a total force sized to anticipated missions and available resources.

There is utility in aligning force elements to different types of mission sets, principally conventional maneuver vs. counterinsurgency warfare. This provides a way to ensure that proficiency is not eroded in one type if the current mission focus happens to be on the other. The reality is that each requires a very different preparatory training and education scheme that deserves to be acknowledged.

Given the experience with the Current Approach, it would be prudent to authorize expanded annual training time of up to 60 days to RC elements when they move into the later stages of the Trained/Ready phase of the rotational model. New standards should be set to

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ensure development of cultural and language skills for anticipated counterinsurgency missions and every effort should be made to leverage the potential of distant training schemes.

With the consolidation of the AC and RC into the Objective Force, consideration should be given to merging the management of the Army Reserve under the National Guard. Authorizations should be adjusted to ensure the availability of both for Federal service.

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Construct 3: Option C – Reinforcing Force

<p><u>Advantages</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">– Aligns with popular support for an all-volunteer professional military.– Provides both open-ended support to relatively low-level steady-state military requirements / COIN operations and effective response to conventional threats.– Consistent with an international environment dominated by competition and conflict with non-nation state opponents using non-conventional or hybrid means yet still harboring conventional threats.– Increases available forces by merging the traditional standing and reserve forces into a single operational force that spreads both experience and wear and tear across the force. Smaller force saves funds.– Aligns training intensive maneuver warfare units to active component. Facilitates creation of well-trained and agile modular units that can be tailored to mission requirements. Leverages Reserve civilian skills for COIN missions.– Progressive readiness reduces inconsistent standards and resourcing requirements across the force. Embraces common criteria for manpower, training, and materiel for all deploying units – enhances morale and sense of purpose within reinforcing force.	<p><u>Disadvantages from a 2015 Perspective</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">– Funding pressure may still lead to tiered readiness tied to extended dwell ratios.– Dependent upon a strong and sustained National will to execute – difficult to achieve and sustain in the information age– Reliance on a reliable, responsive and robust industrial base inconsistent with economic globalization. Reliant on mobilization of national base to counter major threats.– Significantly increased per unit cost to sustain performance levels and resourcing of all forces to common deployment standards.– Shifting heavy forces into the active component due to intensive training requirement may end up having a significant portion of AC focused on least likely threat situation and reduce flexibility for armor personnel moving between components– Increased RC training commitment may diminish employer support.
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Like the other approaches, the Reinforcing Force construct has its advantages and disadvantages. Like the others, it seeks to maintain an all-volunteer approach to filling the ranks of the uniformed forces, but it also recognizes the limits of such an approach and seriously plans for that point where a threat arises that requires mobilization to leverage the full range of the Nation’s resources.

An advantage of this construct is that it recognizes that the future environment is likely to require availability and proficiency of forces against both conventional and COIN threats. It is sometimes forgotten that even OIF started with an intense dose of conventional warfare. A significant advantage of the Reinforcing Force construct over the Current Approach is its specific recognition of this importance of aligning the “right” force or capability against a mission that it is designed and prepared to execute.

Aligning heavy maneuver warfare units with the AC makes sense from a training perspective, recognizing that the challenge of maintaining dominance in the application of synchronized kinetic warfare cannot be achieved or maintained without the necessary and significant investment of time and training resources. Likewise there are aspects of COIN warfare that are advanced by the leveraging of skills drawn from the civilian sector. The

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development of targeted cultural understanding and language skills also begs for individual study through an educational approach that lends itself to the RC. This construct seeks to leverage these differences as fortuitous opportunities.

By managing the AC and RC as one Operational Force, the US should be able to achieve a higher level of coherence and efficiency across the total force. If resources require and the threat levels allow a significant force reduction, cuts should be made from a total force perspective, recognizing that all cuts will move the potential decision point for mobilization closer.

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**Construct 4:
Comprehensive Approach**

Characteristics: Adopt a Whole of Government Comprehensive Approach to resolving security challenges. Reduce “utility infielder” reliance on military by leveraging appropriate expertise and authorities across government to execute National Security Strategy. Organize a reduced operational force into contingency forces focused on responding to either conventional or counterinsurgency threats, with all active and reserve component units functionally assigned into appropriate rotational schemes. Reduce operational force size; be prepared to mobilize if faced with major conflict.

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Study guidance was to narrow the focus solely to the military and the DoD, yet the conduct of the research and thinking about the future could not help but stumble into the importance of thinking about the issues of force generation and force depth from a more whole of government or comprehensive approach.

It is widely recognized that the military has served and is serving out of necessity as the “utility infielder” that performs functions, particularly in COIN, for which it has not been chartered, trained, or resourced and for which other elements of the government have both responsibility and applicable expertise. This situation exists because those other elements of government have not been resourced nor have DoD and others collectively thought through the institutional arrangements and processes required for a more holistic application of our National capabilities.

Without belaboring the point, such an effort to develop a more comprehensive approach to future warfare is critically important and the study team recommends that such an effort be launched at the earliest opportunity. The result is likely to be significantly impact forces requirements, approaches to force generation, and the character of required force depth.

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	<p style="color: red; margin: 0;">UNCLASSIFIED</p> <p style="margin: 0;">DRAFT</p> <h2 style="margin: 0;">Selecting a Construct to Rebalance the Force</h2>	
<h3>Key Force Generation Factors</h3>		
Threat:	Actual or representative threat defined in sufficient detail to characterize response force mission requirements (force size and character)	
Response Time:	Time available to field necessary response force and capabilities – influenced by forward stationing of forces	
Readiness:	Minimum criteria for unit deployment – drives resourcing (manpower, equipment, condition, training) and availability	
Functionality:	Alignment of unit to mission to optimize performance – must exploit differences between AC and RC as a positive	
Cost:	Minimize whenever possible – not an issue at the extremes	
Authorities:	Criteria for RC force availability and usage – needs review	
Risk:	Minimize wherever possible – degree of strategic warning key	
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Having considered a range of approaches and their relative advantages and disadvantages, we reach the point of having to choose which one or which combination best fits our future needs for force generation and force depth. Fortunately, that decision rests with senior DoD leaders, and the charter of this study is but to lay out relevant possibilities and considerations.

As the leadership considers their options, it is important to recognize that each of the constructs addressed in this study either have been or could be effective in apportioning the “military load” among the full-time and part-time elements of the Department. The determining factors for which will be the most effective in the future is the volume of demand for military capability generated by that future strategic environment and the risk of high intensity, near-peer conflict.

The key force generation factors are reflected above. While the future is unknowable, our estimates and beliefs about these factors should guide our decisions for how to generate forces and create force depth. While the conditional details may change, the relationships of threat to response time to readiness levels have been long understood, are central to our established planning processes, and drive the degree of risk associated with any given choice

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The consideration of functionality sometimes gets less emphasis. While it is timeless and true that we “fight the war we get” as best we can, that should not be an excuse to understate the importance and potential benefits of “being right” in our approach and prior preparation for having the optimal force and capabilities ready to go when needed – one which fully leverages the inherent differences, both strengths and weaknesses, between the AC and RC. Sometimes treated as fixed, but in fact in need of serious review and adjustment, are the authorities and criteria for access to and use of RC forces, without which their availability to serve as a key element of the Operational Force is suspect.

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Mobilization Categories

Mobilization: The process by which the Armed Forces or a part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes: selective mobilization, partial mobilization, full mobilization, and total mobilization.

Title	15-Day Statute	Reserve Component Volunteers	Presidential Reserve Call-Up	Partial Mobilization	Full Mobilization	Total Mobilization
Statute	T10 USC § 12301(b)	T10 USC §12301(d)	T10 USC § 12304	T10 USC § 12302	T10 USC §12301(a)	T50 USC § 2071 & T10 USC § 2538
Situation	Service Secretaries (AT, opn msn, Invol; w/Gov consent)	Consent of member (& Governor for Guard)	President notifies Congress, no declaration of war or national emergency	President declares national emergency	Congress declares war or national emergency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Requirements beyond Full Mobilization •Permits creation of new force structure •Authority to mobilize industrial base •Authority to impose USG contract priority on industry & manufacturing
Reservists Affected	Ready Reserve	All	Selected Reserve & IRR	Ready Reserve	All (including inactive & retired)	
Force Limit	None specified	None specified	200,000 < 30,000 IRR	1,000,000	None	
Term Limit	15 days/year	Non stated	365 days	2 years	Duration plus 6 months	

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Reflected in the graphic are the current authorities controlling Federal access to the Reserve components under public law. Unlike the Service reserves, the National Guard operates under a dual set of authorities governed by both Title 10 (above) and Article 32 which looks to the respective state governors for authoritative leadership and guidance in the execution of state missions.

In the decade of continuous operations since 9/11, the first three categories (15-Day Statute, Reserve Component Volunteers, and Presidential Reserve Call-Up) have been the most heavily used of the various authorities. The Current Approach and its continuous usage of RC forces and capabilities has been dependent upon the annual renewal by the President of his notification to Congress under Title 10, Section 12304. For the Army in particular, this is an arguably fragile institutional approach to force generation. If for any reason of the moment the President should choose not to renew his declaration (ala President Johnson during the Vietnam period) , the DoD would have a serious disruption of its “queuing “ of deployable forces and would be very hard pressed to adjust in a timely or effective fashion.

If the RC is in fact going to serve as an integral part of the Operational Force in the execution of future steady state missions, a modification of authorities is in order. Steps should be taken to authorize a habitual usage of RC forces up to a certain level so that the Services can

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build a progressive readiness scheme that can be executed with confidence and coherence. The President and/or Congress will always be able to expand usage, but the system should be designed to routinely operate without their intervention. Mechanisms can certainly be created (and already exist to a degree) to cover state requirements which arise when their Guard units are deployed elsewhere.

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Definitions and Framework

- Terms to describe components (Active/Reserve), availability of forces, and character of missions are applied interchangeably and inconsistently in both formal publications and professional usage, leading to confusion and miscommunication. Further, historical usage of these terms may no longer be valid or appropriate for today's or tomorrow's needs and environment.
- Clarity and precision in the taxonomy related to the development and application of military forces and capabilities is needed and offered below.

<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Current <p><u>Strategic</u> – by itself not defined in JP1-02. JP 3-0 (Operations) discusses strategic level of war. Used primarily as a modifier, i.e. strategic concept, strategic estimate, strategic mining, strategic mission, etc.</p> <p><u>Operation</u> - A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission.. JP1-02</p> <p><u>Operational</u>– 1. Of or relating to an operation. 2. Of, engaged in, or connected with execution of military or naval operations in campaign or battle Webster's</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Proposed <p><u>Strategic</u> – Of, relating to, or marked by strategy, defined as the science and art of employing the political, economic, psychological, and military forces of a nation or group of nations to achieve their overarching security objectives against a state or non-state adversary. Adopt in JP1-02</p> <p><u>Operation</u> - No change. – remains in JP1-02</p> <p><u>Operational</u>– 1. Of or relating to an operation. 2. Of, engaged in, or connected with execution of military operations in campaign or battle Adopt in JP1-02</p>
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This slide reiterates the study's initial point of guidance, which is to try and "clean up" the taxonomy associated with the topics of force generation and force depth. In general, as indicated above, the problems are tied to usage of the same terms for different meanings in different contexts. Throughout this study, we have tried to use terms in a disciplined and consistent manner, illustrating their deeper meanings through graphics and dialogue. We will now walk back through the key terms to offer precise definitions and make recommendations on those that should be incorporated in Joint Publication 1-02, the official dictionary for military terms for DoD.

First is the widely used term "strategic". It is currently not in JP 1-02, it should be and we offer Webster's definition as one that well fits our needs.

Next are "operation" and "operational". "Operations is in JP 1-02 and no change is required. "Operational" is not and should be. We offer Webster's definition, updated for all domains, as one that well fits.

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Definitions and Framework (continued)

• Current

Operational force – not defined in JP 1-02, JP 3-0, or JP 5-0. Army and National Guard documents state ‘reserve units that are part and parcel of the operational force are fully integrated into the deployment cycle’.

Reserve - 1. Portion of a body of troops that is kept to the rear, or withheld from action at the beginning of an engagement, in order to be available for a decisive movement. 2. Members of the Military Services who are not in active service but who are subject to call to active duty.
JP1-02 Dictionary of Military Terms

Strategic reserve – not defined in JP 1-02, JP 3-0, or JP 5-0 (Planning). The 2010 Army Posture Statement talks about the ARFORGEN process ‘enabling our RC to remain an integral element of the operational force while providing the nation with strategic depth’.

• Proposed

Operational force – Units that are designed, manned, equipped, and trained to deploy and execute military missions along the full spectrum of operations, to include those units that project and control unmanned capabilities abroad.
Adopt in JP1-02

Reserve - Portion of a force that is kept to the rear, or withheld from action at the beginning of an operation, in order to be available for decisive action.
Change to JP1-02

Reserve Components - Members of the Military Services who are not in active service but who are subject to call to active duty. Adopt in JP 1-02

Strategic reserve – discontinue usage of this phrase.

National Base – the institutional, population, and materiel foundation that supports the fielding of military forces and the conduct of military operations.
Adopt in JP1-02

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The study team proposes “operational force” as a key new term in the framework. It is currently not in JP 1-02. The Army uses “operating force” in its publications, but defines it narrowly as applying only to combat forces. A new term is needed that can embrace those forces engaged in the execution of any military mission along the entire spectrum of operations and recommend the one above be incorporated in JP 1-02.

“Reserve” is a term given two related, but different meanings currently in JP 1-02. One is for an operational context, the other an institutional characterization applying to units or individuals not on active duty. Both of these applications are deeply ingrained, but the difference between its use in an operational context or as an institutional characterization should be more clearly articulated in JP 1-02.


“Strategic Reserve” is a term widely used and misused, causing confusion on a number of fronts. It is not currently defined in JP 1-02. Its common usage often vaguely implies that it is a force available to high level leaders, or to be applied to “big and serious” threats, or to be applied in depth behind other available forces against whatever threats they are facing. Propose to drop its usage.

Recommend adding “national base” as a framework description as indicated above.

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Definitions and Framework (continued)

<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Current <p><u>Operational reserve</u> – an emergency reserve of men and / or materiel established for the support of a specific operation. JP1-02 - Dictionary of Military Terms</p> <p><u>Reserve Components (RC) as an operational force</u>. RCs provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. In their operational roles, RCs participate in a full range of missions according to their Services' force generation plans. Units and individuals participate in missions in an established cyclic or periodic manner that provides predictability for the combatant commands, the Services, Service members, their families, and employers. In their strategic roles, RC units and individuals train or are available for missions in accordance with the national defense strategy. As such, the RCs provide <u>strategic depth</u> and are available to transition to operational roles as needed. DoDD 1200.17</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Proposed <p><u>Operational reserve</u> – discontinue the use of this term – remove from JP1-02</p> <p><u>Component relationship to the operational force</u>. All components (AC/RC) contribute both operational capabilities and force depth to meet US defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. In their operational roles, component units participate in a full range of missions according to their Services' force generation plans. Units and individuals participate in missions in an established cyclic or periodic manner that provides predictability for the combatant commands, the Services, Service members, their families, and, for the RC, their employers. As part of the Operational Force, non-deployed AC and RC units and individuals serve as the foundation for force generation and provide the bridge to leverage National resources if required by the national defense strategy. As such, all elements of the Reinforcing Force provide force depth and are available to transition to operational roles as needed.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Modify DoDD 1200.17</p>
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Operational reserve,” like “strategic reserve” is a source of considerable confusion, for many of the same reasons as its strategic brethren. Although it is currently defined in JP 1-02, the definition has little to do with its common usage. It is normally not thought of as just an “emergency reserve,” but one that is immediately available to the operational or tactical level commander to use as needed. Like “strategic reserve,” the team proposes to discontinue its use and have it dropped from JP 1-02.

While not addressed in JP 1-02, the definition of the Reserve components relationship to the Operational Force is discussed at length in DoDD 1200.17. Propose that the directive be modified as indicated above to make the characterization of that relationship consistent with the recommendations of this study. The major change here is to start thinking of and treating the RC as an integral element of the Operational Force. Depending where they reside at any given moment in the rotational scheme, both AC and RC units provide reinforcing capability and force depth

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Definitions and Framework (continued)

- Current

Generating Force – not defined in JP 1-02, JP 3-0, or JP 5-0. Army FM 1-01 defines term as those Army organizations whose primary mission is to generate and sustain the operational Army's capabilities for employment by joint commanders.

Augmentation Force - not defined in JP 1-02. Those individuals and materiel that have been identified or stored for potential activation into military service.

Mobilization Assets – not defined in JP 1-02. Those national resources that could be potentially leveraged to provide military capabilities in response to threats that exceed the capability or capacity of the Operational Force to defeat. These resources would include personnel, equipment, and facilities along with the industrial base to produce them.

- Proposed

Generating Force – Units and organizations that are designed, manned, equipped, and trained to generate and sustain the Operational Force's capabilities for employment by Joint commanders. Adopt in JP1-02

Augmentation Force - Those individuals and materiel that have been identified or stored for potential activation into military service. Adopt in JP1-02

Mobilization Assets – Those national resources that could be potentially leveraged to provide military capabilities in response to threats that exceed the capability or capacity of the Operational Force to defeat. These resources would include personnel, equipment, and facilities along with the industrial base to produce them. Adopt in JP1-02

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“Generating Force” is not defined in JP 1-02, but is one of the primary terms defined by the Army in FM 1-01 when describing the framework for ARFORGEN. The Army also talks of the “Operational Army” in much the same way as this study defines the Operational Force. Propose the adoption of the use of the term “Generating Force” as part of the Operational Force framework, with the definition above added to JP 1-02.

“Augmentation Force” is a new term and as such not defined in JP 1-02. Propose the definition above for this element of the Operational Force be added to JP 1-02.

“Mobilization Assets” is a new term and as such is not defined in JP 1-02. As a key element in the proposed forces framework, propose the definition above for this element be added to JP 1-02.

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Recommendations

- Adopt proposed taxonomy and consider adopting Construct 3 Option C – Reinforcing Force as new force paradigm.
- Seek legislation to institutionalize Reserve Components as part of the standing operational force. Change T10 USC Section 12304 to set new criteria for total numbers of RC that can be on active duty at any one time and expand authorized yearly training requirement to 60 days (30 AT / 30 IDT) when a RC unit moves into Train/Ready 3 phase. Conduct a thorough assessment of current authorizations to identify potential changes that would further facilitate access to Reserve Components as part of the Operational Force and ensure an effective mobilization process.
- Consider consolidating the Reserve and National Guard.
- Focus of this study has been on manpower. Continue study with an in-depth assessment of other force and capability factors, particularly materiel as it relates to the air and maritime domains and cyber warfare.
- Conduct an in-depth assessment of the mobilization process for Full/Total Mobilization with respect to the current and anticipated future National Base to establish its viability for supporting the National Security Strategy in an age of globalization and pervasive communication.
- Conduct an in-depth development of a Whole of Government/Comprehensive Approach Construct for rebalancing the Force

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The adoption and application of the proposed taxonomy will go a long way towards reducing the confusion created by the current practice of often using the same words in completely different contexts and with vague intent. Whichever construct is ultimately adopted, the US must align its thinking about force generation and force depth to the realities of a new era. While there is no perfect approach and each has its own set of merits and demerits, the Reinforcing Force construct has merit for further development and application.

Once there is a return to some form of steady state operations post-Afghanistan, if the Reserve components are to retain their role as a inherent element of the Operational Force, changes must be made to current authorizations to ensure a coherent and reliable approach to their usage. As that issue is sorted, there appears to be significant management efficiencies to be gained by consolidating elements of the Reserve components.

With its de facto focus upon manpower and the ground domain, this study is incomplete at best. At a minimum, there is a need to apply the ideas that have been raised more completely to the air and maritime domains. Recent events also argue for the investigation of cyber warfare as a whole new domain.

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There is a need for a serious in-depth assessment of US capability to mobilize in the era of globalization and pervasive communications. Research suggests that the historical approach and assumptions may be largely invalid.

Finally, there is a great and widely recognized need to develop a Whole of Government Comprehensive Approach to addressing security challenges. While beyond the objectives of this study, such an approach can be expected to have a great impact upon the requirements for force generation and depth.

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		Classic (1 of 4)					
	Domain	Threat	Active Duty Force	Avail Reserve	Force Source	Forward Stationed	Remarks
Civil War (1861-1865)	Ground	Internal	1,052,038		Regulars, Militia, Volunteers, Draft	No	
	Maritime	External	58,296 Over 600 ships		Regulars	Yes	1865: USMC 3,860 as naval infantry/security
Post-Civil War (1866-1898)	Ground	Internal/ Indians	27,400		Regulars	Western Frontier	
	Maritime	External	9,361 48 ships		Regulars	Yes	1880. Navy Act 1883 started expansion. USMC 2,200 avg.
Spanish-American War (1898-1900)	Ground	External	275,000 Army 5,414 USMC		Regulars 65,000 Volunteers 210,000	Cuba, Puerto Rico, Philippines	State militias excluded from service overseas. USMC expanded with greater use as an expeditionary land force
	Maritime	External	22,492 86 ships		Regulars	Yes	133 auxiliary vessels added by wartime procurement
Inter-War (1901-1913)	Ground	Primarily External	80,000 Army 8,200 USMC		Regulars	China, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Philippines, Panama	1903 Dick Act creates National Guard from state militias
	Maritime	External	52,202 342 ships		Regulars	Yes	1917: 160 surface warships; 44 submarines
World War I (1914-1919)	Ground	Primarily External	1,867,675 Army 43 divisions 52,819 USMC		Regulars, Reserve, National Guard, Draft	China, Philippines, France, Russia, Panama	1917 National Guard 397,700 in 16 divs (66k on border)
	Air	Primarily External	190,000 11,000 planes		Regulars, National Guard	Mexico, France, Russia	1917- 1,218 pers w/300 planes as part of Army Signal Corps
	Maritime	External	530,338 774 ships		Regulars	Yes	204 surface warships; 80 submarines

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To fully appreciate this “classic” approach to force generation, the study attempted to gain an appreciation of its actual application over cycles of relative peace and conflict during the course of the century and a half since the US Civil War.

The study team considered forces by domains, the general nature of the primary threats, the size and character of both active forces and reserves, the sources for both, whether forces were forward stationed, and tried to identify significant factors affecting force generation as they arose. Interesting observations include:

- Extreme scale of mobilization and demobilization back to standing forces. Post-Civil War regular Army only 2.6% of wartime force, Navy ships reduced by 92% after war. Pre-World War I Army only 3.9% of force mobilized to answer threat. Heavy reliance upon volunteers to expand forces.
- Over time, fluctuations in the size of the Navy were significant, but considerably less than those for ground forces. The Navy also always had an element of its force forward deployed.
- It took time to develop an organized reserve force and make it available for deployment outside the country. First significant use of the National Guard was for security operations along the Mexican border.

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- 1898 introduced a trend that would grow over time to use forward stationing to increase the United States' regional influence, posture forces for effective response to potential threats, and manage the amount of strategic warning available for additional force generation.
- Airpower exploded onto the scene during WW I, with a 156-fold increase in one year (1917 to 1918).⁴

⁴ "U.S. Army – A Complete History", Col Raymond K. Bluhm, Jr., Editor, The Army Historical Foundation, 2004. Ships: Department of the Navy -- Naval Historical Center, 805 Kidder Breese SE, Washington Navy Yard, Washington DC 20374-5060. Naval Personnel (1861 to 2005): "Navy Military Personnel statistics", Bureau of Naval Personnel, Department of the Navy. Naval Personnel (2009): website, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Financial Management and Comptroller.

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		Classic (2 of 4)						
	Domain	Threat	Active Duty Force	Avail Reserve	Force Source	Forward Stationed	Remarks	
Inter-War (1920-1940)	Ground	External	174,000 Army avg 18,700 USMC avg	NG: 180,000 ORC: 100,000	Regulars, Reserve, National Guard	China, Philippines, Panama	Dec 40: National Guard 235,000 w/ 147,700 active duty	
	Air	External	Approx 15,000		Regulars, National Guard	China, Philippines, Panama	1926 – Army Air Corps established	
	Maritime	External	125,202 394 ships		Regulars	Yes	1939: 178 surface warships; 58 submarines	
World War II (1941-1945)	Ground	External	8,167,000 Army 89 divisions 475,604 USMC		Regulars, Reserve, National Guard, Draft	World Wide	Jan 40: Regulars 210,000 Dec 40: Mob 140k/month, w/112,000 Reserve activated	
	Air	External	2,253,000		Regulars, Reserve, National Guard, Draft	World Wide	Jan 41: 101,180 Dec 41: 354,000 w/2,846 planes	
	Maritime	External	3,405,525 6,768 ships		Regulars	World Wide	1945: 833 surface warships; 232 submarines	
Early Cold War (1946-1950)	Ground	External	616,250 Army avg 10 divisions 84,500 USMC avg		Regulars, Reserve, National Guard, Draft	World Wide	1950: National Guard 325,000 in 27 divisions & 20 regiments	
	Air	External	411,277		Regulars, Reserve, Air National Gd, Draft	World Wide	Jul 47 Air Force created	
	Maritime	External	560,754 634 ships		Regulars	World Wide	1950: 161 surface warships; 72 submarines	
Korea (1950-1953)	Ground	External	1,596,419 Army 20 divisions 249,219 USMC		Regulars, Reserve, National Guard, Draft	World Wide	Jul 52: Army Reserve created; 138,600 National Guard in war	
	Air	External	518,675 58 wings	ANG: 49,500 48 wings	Regulars, Reserve, Air National Gd, Draft	World Wide	Dec 50: auth to grow to 68 wings & 1,061,000 by Jun 52; ANG to 80,000; SR 49,000	
	Maritime	External	809,388 1,122 ships		Regulars	World Wide	1953: 326 surface warships; 108 submarines	
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From World War I on, the National Guard became the primary element of ground reserve forces, retaining about half of its mobilized wartime strength for potential recall, with the Organized Reserve providing the remainder.

By 1930, efforts to form a coherent industrial mobilization plan took form in the Army's Industrial Mobilization Plan, which established the basic principles for leveraging the nation's economic potential to support war needs. Manpower planning followed a similar path, resulting in the Protective Mobilization Plan of 1937. Under that plan, general mobilization's first step would be the "induction of the National Guard into federal service, providing the Army an initial protective force of about 400,000. The Navy and this defensive force would then protect the nation while the Army engaged in an orderly expansion to planned strengths of 1, 2, or 4 million, as necessary. The Army's manpower planning included, for the first time prior to actual war, a definite training plan that specified the location, size, and schedules of replacement training centers, unit training centers, and schools. It also incorporated the details of unit and individual training programs and the production of a variety of training manuals."⁵

⁵ Chapter 2, American Military History, Volume II, pages 60-68.


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The force generation to conduct World War II was extraordinary by any measure. The expansion that took place for all domains dwarfed anything that had taken place before or has since. By December 1940, every month the Army was inducting new recruits in a volume roughly equal to the entire pre-war active Army. Equally significant, the size of standing forces retained after the war were much larger than their pre-war counterparts, particularly for the air and maritime domains.

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		<h2 style="margin: 0;">Classic (3 of 4)</h2>					
	Domain	Threat	Active Duty Force	Avail Reserve	Force Source	Forward Stationed	Remarks
Mid-Cold War (1953-1959)	Ground	External	862,000 Army 170,600 USMC avg		Regulars, Reserve, Draft	World Wide	1959 Army snapshot
	Air	External	840,028 avg		Regulars, Reserve, Air National Gd, Draft	World Wide	Increased strategic emphasis upon air power
	Maritime	External	635,207 860 ships		Regulars	World Wide	1959: 310 surface warships; 109 submarines
Vietnam (1960-1975)	Ground	External	950,000 Army avg 16 divisions 220,000 USMC avg		Regulars, Reserve, Draft	World Wide	Vietnam Peak Apr 69: 365,600 Army; XX USMC Army Selected Reserve (120k NatGd/30k USAR) designated as "strategic hedge"
	Air	External	802,242 avg	ANG: 67,000 w/27 wings	Regulars, Reserve, Air National Gd, Draft	World Wide	FY75 AF Selected Reserve: 48,000
	Maritime	External	752,347 932 ships		Regulars	World Wide	1968: 304 surface warships; 105 submarines
Late-Cold War (1976-1989)	Ground	External	773,800 Army avg 16 to 18 divisions 193,800 USMC avg		Regulars, Reserve, National Guard	World Wide	All Volunteer force. Nat Gd bdes used as "round outs"
	Air	External	582,070 avg	FY89 ANG: 116,061	Regulars, Reserve, Air National Guard	World Wide	Nov 89: Berlin Wall down Dec 89: Just Cause / Panama
	Maritime	External	605,802 592 ships		Regulars	World Wide	1989: 212 surface warships; 99 submarines
Gulf War (1990-1991)	Ground	External	909,496 Army avg 18 divisions 196,652 USMC		Regulars, Reserve, National Guard	World Wide	Fall 90: 200,000 Reserve Call Up. Iraq: Army deploys 227,800 incl 37,692 NG & 35,158 USAR
	Air	External	510,432	FY91 ANG: 117,786	Regulars, Reserve, Air National Guard	World Wide	12,404 ANG activated; 10,456 additional ANG volunteers entered active force
	Maritime	External	604,556 529 ships		Regulars	World Wide	1991: 188 surface warships; 87 submarines

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Since at least World War I, there has been constant tension over issues related to the readiness, composition, and resourcing of the reserve forces, with many of them related to the relative relationships of the National Guard and those reserve elements operating under Federal control. There have been multiple attempts in the past to address these issues, with the two most serious "consolidation" efforts being in 1948 and 1964. Due to perceived deficiencies in the reliability of the National Guard for rapid recall, the thrust of the 1948 Gray Report was to merge the Organized Reserve and the National Guard in a manner that, while retaining the National Guard name, largely turned it into a federally controlled force (which was soundly defeated by the National Guard's political clout). Conversely, the 1964 McNamara effort seeking organizational and resourcing efficiencies by merging the Army Reserve into the National Guard, was also soundly defeated by a combination of Congressional anti-McNamara angst and the Army Reserve's political allies. So "consolidation" has been tried both ways and it's failed, largely for reasons arguably having little to do with either efficiency or effectiveness.⁶

The normal cycle of expanding the force in the face of threats by a combination of mobilizing the National Guard and Reserve, along with filling new force structure with volunteers and the draft was disrupted during the Vietnam War. For the first time, for largely

⁶ "Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Components", Library of Congress, October 2007, pp 2-14.

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
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political reasons, the President elected to largely avoid calling upon the Reserve components and instead expanded the force to meet operational needs primarily through the draft, setting the stage for another generation of tension over the proper configuration and use of reserve forces.

While it is not the purpose of this study to delve deeply into the details of approaches for manning units once deployed, it is worth noting that the Vietnam experience based upon a rotational individual manning policy provided penetrating insights into the challenges posed by attempting to apply an individual replacement approach to sustain the manning of units in combat over lengthy periods. The combination of the draft with a lengthy conflict assured a state of constant personnel turbulence in units that severely undermined unit cohesion and effectiveness across the theater. This manning approach alone helps explain the profound qualitative differences between the Army of that era and those serving abroad today.

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ARFORGEN represents a complete transformation in how the Army builds readiness. Its objective is to provide a sustained flow of expeditionary Army capabilities at a tempo sustainable for an all-volunteer force. As depicted, the ARFORGEN model consists of three force pools—Reset; Train/Ready; Available. Since RC forces are intended to rotate at a slower rate than AC units, the RC unit’s Train/Ready pool is subdivided into three progressive levels of readiness with different training requirements and resourcing associated with each. At any given time, each of the three principal force pools contain a versatile force package, which is available for deployment at varying time intervals based on their current readiness level.

Through ARFORGEN, the Army is organizing their force structure to continuously supply a four-division corps of 15 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) and full spectrum enablers at a steady-state sustainable “boots on ground” (BOG)/Dwell rate of 1:3 (AC) and 1:5 (RC). This provides an operational headquarters, 4 tactical headquarters, 15 modular brigades and their support forces organized, trained and equipped for full spectrum operations.⁷

Further, as a primary reserve the model allows the Army to surge another ready four-division corps and its support forces from the Ready pool to respond to unexpected


⁷ “Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)”, HQ, US Army, G3/5/7, 8 Jun 2010 (U//FOUO).

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contingencies and to have two more corps available at longer commitment times to serve as a secondary reserve. However, this reduces the BOG:Dwell ratio for AC forces to 1:2 and for RC forces to 1:4.


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Prioritization of USMC Force Deployments

Current Approach: Ground (Marines)



Marine Corps force deployments priorities through the Marine Corps Service Campaign Plan (MCSCP):

1. OIF/OEF
2. Marines Aboard Ships
3. Other CCDR Requirements
4. Reconstitution
5. Unit Deployment Program (UDP)

a) Sustain an aggregate 2.0 MEU presence (inclusive of 1.0 MEU to CENTCOM and 31st MEU)
b) Unit/personnel deployment: BOG/dwell of 1:2 (AC) and BOG/dwell of 1:4 (RC)
c) Each MEF has assigned regions in which to focus training and cultural awareness

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The Marine Corps has retained their traditional expeditionary force organization based upon a MEF, MEB, MEU structure. They have adopted a rotational approach to force generation that is similar to ARFORGEN and captured in their MCSCP. In addition to providing programmatic guidance and direction for the operating forces for how to focus training, the MCSCP provides the Commandant's (CMC) priorities for managing their finite resources. Note that CMC's priorities beyond supporting OIF/OEF are to return the USMC to their Naval roots. "Other CCDR requirements" refers to engagement activities in support of Component Commander (CCDR) campaign plans. Note that UDP is the last priority- this reflects the continued challenge that the Marine Corps will be under to strike a balance between fighting in two wars and maintaining their amphibious proficiency.

The 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, normally stationed in Okinawa, is the Marine Corps' only permanently forward-based MEU. In mid-August 2004, the 31st MEU received deployment orders to the Central Command area of responsibility to support Operation Iraqi Freedom, returning to Okinawa upon mission completion.

The 31st MEU faces a unique challenge compared to other MEUs in that it has only 84 days to accomplish a standard six-month Pre-Deployment Training Cycle. Though the Marine


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Corps' other six MEUs re-qualify as Special Operations Capable (SOC) every 18 months, the 31st MEU re-qualifies every six months as new Major Subordinate Elements rotate to the MEU. This gives their Marines only 70 to 84 days to complete their qualification.⁸

⁸ Marine Corps Service Campaign Plan 2009-2015, Strategy & Plans Division, Plans, Policy, & Operations, HQ, USMC and USMC Forces Command Brief, 20 Jan 2010.

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The Navy's Fleet Response Plan (FRP) changes readiness postures and institutionalizes an enhanced surge capability. It calls for six of the Navy's 12 aircraft carriers to be available for deployment within 30 days and two more to be available in 90 days. Typically, the Navy will have two carriers based in the US deployed overseas, in addition to one carrier permanently stationed in Japan. The requirement to be able to swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping conflicts has necessitated a focus on developing new surge capabilities. The FRP will significantly increase the rate at which they can augment deployed forces.

A revised (IDRC) is being developed to provide more responsive maintenance, modernization, manning and training processes to allow the Fleet to consistently sustain FRP deployment objectives. In parallel, the Naval Reserve Force is embarked on a fully integrated active-reserve transformation to a more flexible unit structure. Part of this effort is focused on providing a rapid surge capability of aviators who have trained with specific active-duty units to rapidly boost their ability to generate combat sorties.

The FRP's enhanced and expanded readiness provides unprecedented responsiveness. Instead of predictable, lock-step, six-month deployments to pre-determined regions in support of the Global Naval Forward Presence Policy, the Flexible Deployment Concept allows units that

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have attained high readiness to embark on deployments of varied duration in support of specific national priorities from Homeland Defense to prosecution of the Global War on Terrorism often in multi-Carrier Strike Group formations. These deployments provide “presence with a purpose” and can also occur in less predictable patterns, thereby forcing potential adversaries to adjust to US operations. The sustained readiness created via the FRP will enable this Flexible Deployment Concept.⁹

⁹ Fleet Response Plan, HQ, USN, 2003.

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
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Current Approach: Air

The Air Force uses a complex rotational process to manage deployments of units and personnel tied to readiness and dwell times.



1. Functional Area Managers (FAMs) assess each capability's true deploy to dwell rate and place it in one of seven tempo bands. Band "A" is the Air Expeditionary Force baseline construct with five pairs of 4-month blocks. The other bands consist of different mixes of capabilities and dwell times.



2. AF capabilities that do not fall into Band "A" are sorted by OPSTEMPO and assigned to an appropriate band.



3. UTC's are then postured in pairs/blocks within each band, creating deployment vulnerability periods for airmen assigned to a given pair/block.

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The Air and Space Expeditionary Force (AEF) construct has evolved to provide combatant commanders the capabilities they require as part of the joint team. As a force management tool, the AEF battle rhythm has also evolved to now align with Global Force Management, providing agility in adaptive planning for the Air Force. The Global AEF provides a level of predictability and stability while being flexible enough to allow AEF operations to meet combatant commander requirements.

In the basic AEF construct, in addition to Band A, the other four AC bands consist of five 6-month blocks (Band B), four 6-month blocks (Band C), three 6-month blocks (Band D) and two 6-month blocks (Band E). The two RC mobilization bands consist of nine 6-month blocks (Band M) and eight 6-month blocks (Band N). Bands M and N are predicated on 6-month employment periods within a 9-month mobilization period.

All units (AC, ANG, AFR) are in Band A. It is only when there is a deployment requirement do they go into the other bands. M and N are reserved for the RC because it allows a period to prepare or recover, to include leave. Generically speaking the RC is scheduled into the AF AEF rotation just like their AC counterparts. RC elements are either at a 1:5 or 1:4 dwell depending on AC tasking and mobilization triggers that are predefined by the SECDEF.


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The RC also has assets that are enablers and tasked at the needs of the theater. All RC assets deploy to the max extent possible under volunteerism. However mobilization (PM) is authorized for certain career fields, if the mobilization triggers are met, and even then members still have the ability to volunteer.¹⁰

¹⁰ "Wing Leadership Guide to the AEF", Air Force Personnel Center, Directorate of AEF and Personnel Operations (AFPC/DPW), 1 Sep 2009. Clarification by: Michael E. Flanagan, Lt Col, USAF, NGB/A3X, Chief, Operational Plans and Execution Division

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Before leaving the review of the Classic and Current Approaches, it is helpful to focus in on certain aspects of the force composition since the “relative anomaly” of World War II.

First, in looking at the air and maritime domains, US forces have gradually declined in terms of total size over time. While achieving a certain degree of stability since the end of Cold War, today they are, in essence, at their lowest levels since World War II. Part of this is a reflection of the continuing emphasis upon increasingly sophisticated platforms, each of which can achieve the same or greater effects than its more numerous predecessors and part of it is a reflection of the reality that no potential peer competitor has yet emerged since the collapse of the Soviet Union to potentially challenge the US on conventional terms.

In terms of the ground domain, the Marine Corps has remained remarkably stable over the period, initially shrinking somewhat and then slightly growing as it shouldered a greater share of the counterinsurgency burden in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is clearly the Army that has ebbed and flowed over time in response to post-World War II operational demands. Like all the Services, it radically contracted after World War II, but after that it has been the force that has flexed the most in response to conflict abroad. That progression is worth a closer look.

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Reserve Components

NOBLE EAGLE / ENDURING FREEDOM / IRAQI FREEDOM

Unique SSAN Activations as of: July 20, 2010

Currently Activated: 116,877

Deactivated Since 9/11: 659,965

Total: 776,842

Reserve Component	*Current Involuntary Activations	**Current Voluntary Activations	Total Currently Activated	Total Deactivated Since 9/11	Total Activated Since 9/11
ARNG	53,245	6,089	59,334	269,507	328,841
USAR	19,503	9,831	29,334	162,795	192,129
USNR	6,274	117	6,391	40,124	46,515
USMCR	3,123	1,730	4,853	52,249	57,102
ANG	3,135	6,648	9,783	75,846	85,629
USAFR	2,178	4,220	6,398	52,679	59,077
USCGR	420	364	784	6,765	7,549
TOTAL	87,878	28,999	116,877	659,965	776,842

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
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As a point of reference, this graphic depicts the current and cumulative usage of the seven uniformed Reserve components in support of recent homeland security missions and military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The volume ebbs and flows with each week, but the proportions have stayed relatively constant, with the Army National Guard and Army Reserve constituting the bulk of RC forces deployed at any given time. For its much smaller size, the Marine Corps also makes significant use of its RC elements. The Air Force makes regular and relatively routine use of the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve in their integrated approach to fielding Air Expeditionary Forces and individual flight crews. Of all the Reserve components, those of the maritime domain (Navy and Coast Guard) appear to rely least upon their Reserves to support afloat operations.

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This illustrative graphic, based upon the rotational scheme of the Current Approach, shows the basic elements of the approach proposed for the Reinforcing Force construct that would allow units to move between the Mission Force and the Reinforcing Force. Using illustrative BOG/Dwell ratios of 1:2 for the AC and 1:4 for the RC, it shows the basic steps an AC and RC unit would flow through after they come off one deployment and prepare for their next deployment. Both would flow through the “RESET, TRAIN/READY, and AVAILABLE” pools, receiving training and resourcing as defined for each force pool in the progression. In this case, the TRAIN/READY pool for the RC is divided into three stages, each with different training objectives and resourcing levels. The BOG/Dwell ratio is a variable that can be managed to control the availability of forces for deployment.

Of note, some forces will be designated to prepare for conventional missions, some for COIN, and certain types of units could be expected to prepare for both. Once either an AC or RC units reaches the aim point (P1/S1/R2/T3)¹¹ for entry into the last TRAIN/READY stage, they would be considered available for accelerated use, becoming a “primary reserve” and could be assigned contingency missions to prepare for. If needed desperately enough, even units in the RESET and early TRAIN/READY stages could be given additional resources to accelerate their potential deployment – as such, units in those early stages can be considered a “secondary

¹¹ Readiness Categories: P=personnel; S=supply/equip on hand; R=readiness/maintenance; T=training

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reserve". When an RC unit reaches the TRAIN/READY 3 stage, they should be authorized additional training resources of 30 days active duty training (AT) and 30 days inactive duty training (IDT).

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***Comprehensive Review of the
Future Role of the Reserve
Components***

**Executive Committee (EXCOM)
Update**

**30 Sep 2010
1330-1500
Pentagon Rm 3D921**

A/O 5-Nov-10 14:01

1

During the previous EXCOM, Services were asked to provide briefings which included organizational perspectives on Reserve manning, training and equipment issues. This meeting and brief also afforded DoD stakeholders an opportunity to inform the EXCOM of their concerns with the ongoing study efforts and their unique positions on Reserve related issues.

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Agenda



- **Co-Chair Opening Remarks**
- **Service presentations on future RC roles**
 - **Navy (1330-1345)**
 - **Marine Corps (1345-1400)**
 - **Army (1400-1415)**
 - **Air Force (1415-1430)**
 - **Coast Guard (1430-1445)**
- **Review Timeline and Next Steps**
- **EXCOM remarks**

A/O 5-Nov-10 14:01

2



Invitation Memo



- **Purpose:**
 - **Include other organizational perspectives**
 - **Afford DoD stakeholders opportunity to inform this initiative on study efforts and positions on issues**
- **Services briefed planner-level audience at the 20-22 September Collaborative Workshop at JHU/APL**

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Next Steps




- Objectives 2-5 Kickoff Meeting; 17 Jun 10
- Requirements identification discussion; 30 Jun 10; 1000-1130
- EXCOM Kickoff Meeting; 16 July 10; 1300-1400
- Army War College, Carlisle, PA; 21-22 Jul 10
- OBJs 1-3 Update to EXCOM; 5 Aug 10; 1330-1500
- OBJs 2-4 Collaborative Workshop, Laurel MD; 17-19 Aug 10
- Interim Report Submission; 1 Sep 10
- OBJ 2-4 Update to EXCOM; 7 Sep 10
- OBJ 2-5 Collaborative Workshop, Laurel MD; 20-22 Sep 10
- Service Briefs to EXCOM; 30 Sep 10
- OBJ 2-5 Outbrief to EXCOM; 7 Oct 10
- OBJ 2-6 Collaborative Workshop; Laurel MD; 26-27 Oct 10
- OBJ 2-6 Outbrief to EXCOM; 4 Nov 10

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Review Timeline

Orange: OBJ 1
 Green: OBJs 2-5
 Yellow: OBJ 6



Jun 10	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan 11	Feb	Mar
	Publish TOR	05 Aug OBJs 1-3 EXCOM Update		7 Oct EXCOM OBJs 2-5 Results	4 Nov OBJ 2-6 Products To EXCOM				
Co-Chair MTG OASD-RA Joint Staff	7 Jul OBJ 1 Edit Package	11 Aug Final OBJ 1 Products	7 Sep EXCOM OBJs 2-4 Results	13 Oct OBJ 6 MTG #1	Prep Review Close out Briefing	Final report vetting and consensus building			
17 Jun OBJs 2-5 Kickoff MTG	16 Jul EXCOM Kick-Off MTG	Coord Interim Report		20 Oct OBJ 6 MTG #2	16 Nov EXCOM Close Out Briefing				
21 Jun OBJ 1 Assemble Package		17-19 Aug OBJs 2-4 Workshop	20-22 Sep OBJ 2-5 Workshop		Final report Prep				
22-23 CNGR CNAS	21-22 Jul MTG 3 AWC								
30 Jun OBJs 2-5 MTG 2		31 Aug Submit Interim Rpt	30 Sep EXCOM Service Briefs	26-27 Oct OBJ 2-6 Workshop			31 Jan Rpt to SecDef	Collaborative Analysis Workshops JHU	

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Headquarters U.S. Air Force

Integrity - Service - Excellence

**Air Force TFI/TFE
1968-2010 and Beyond**



U.S. AIR FORCE

Briefer: Col Cathy Haverstock
OPRs: SAF/MR
AF/A8
AF/A9
21 Sep 2010

1

The USAF Briefing emphasized the fact that the Air Force has been integrating RC and AC units for some time, noting that these “Associations maximize each Component’s strengths, but preserve unique cultural differences.” The challenge is to find the right mix of forces for mission effectiveness. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird adopted the Total Force concept in August 1970 with Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger declaring it policy in August 1973. The Total Force and Reserve Associate concepts took some years to reach full acceptance.


Specifics for this initiative include:

- Host Unit has primary responsibility for its unit members and is equipped / assigned with the physical resources (aircraft or weapon systems).
- Associate Unit – has primary responsibility for its unit members but shares the aircraft or weapon systems assigned to the host.
- Organizational constructs (associate units only):
 - Classic Associate – Regular component (Host) unit retains principal responsibility for weapon system, shares with reserve unit (Associate), for example: C-17 mission at Hickam.
 - Active Associate – Reserve component (Host) unit has principal responsibility for weapon system, shares with Regular component unit (Associate), for example: F-16 mission at McEntire.

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- ARC Associate – Two or more ARC units integrate. One retains principal responsibility for weapon system (Host), shares with other ARC unit (Associate), example: AFRC/ANG KC-135 at Tinker.
- Operational Direction (OPDIR) is provided as Associate unit Commanders issue orders to their respective members, directing them to follow the orders of the functional supervisors to whom they are attached or detailed.



Outline

U.S. AIR FORCE

- **Historical Context**
- **TFI 101**
- **TFE Analytic Framework**
 - **Major Drivers**
- **Way Forward for AF**

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History of Associations

U.S. AIR FORCE




"As Air Force leadership looked to the future with Vietnam ending, greater efficiencies could be had by an Air Force, whose members, active and reserve, trained to the same standards and utilized the same equipment and weapon systems. The Air Force Reserve's C-124s sat hard broke en route to Vietnam on enough occasions. Desiring more augmentation from the Air Force Reserve and yet unable to procure enough new C-141s, the Air Force initiated in 1968 the associate concept whereby Air Force Reserve personnel would associate with an active duty unit equipped with new C-141s and C-9As, flying and performing maintenance along side active duty personnel. Additionally, a Rand study, completed in 1967, declared that regular and reserve forces were complementary systems of a Total Force. The challenge then, as it is today, was to find the right mix of forces for mission effectiveness. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird adopted the Total Force concept in August 1970 with Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger declaring it policy in August 1973. Total Force and the new reserve associate concepts took some years to reach full acceptance."

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


Catalysts for Change


U.S. AIR FORCE



Base Realignment & Closure 2005 (BRAC)



Commission on National Guard and Reserve



Quadrennial Defense Review




2010 Air Force Posture Statement

Additional Vectors:
• NDAA 08-10

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FTF to Total Force Integration

U.S. AIR FORCE

<p>Nov 04 Phase I</p> 	<p>Sep 05 BRAC</p>	<p>Feb 06 Phase II</p> 	<p>Jun 06 Phase III</p>	<p>Mar 07 Phase IV</p>	<p>Aug 08 Mar 09 List Adjustments</p>	<p>Oct 09 TFI Part II</p>
<p>Phase I 6 Initiatives</p>	<p>Phase II (64) Phase III (43)</p>			<p>Phase IV (138)</p>	<p>TFI List (138)</p>	<p>TFI List (142)</p>
<p>SECAF/CSAF Letter</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Working Groups, IPTs & GOSCs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish, Investigate, Continue... 113 initiatives Phase II - BRAC mitigation Phase III - Clean-Up 		<p>2008 President's Budget: 96 initiatives / \$2.5B Milpers, O&M, Milcon</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Added New Initiatives • Included Phases I-III 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Omnibus List" • New Initiatives • FY10 POM Input 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Reemphasis for TFI" • Emphasize Associations • Alignment to AFCS • Assessments at FOC
	<p>08 PB \$2.5B (Refine mission requirements ID funding)</p>			<p>10 PB ~\$359M</p>		
<p>ADHOC Process</p>	<p>Enclaved Manpower Resolution</p>			<p>Codified Process</p>	<p>Strategic Assessment</p>	
<p>The TFI process was evolutionary – now codified!</p>						
<p><i>Integrity - Service - Excellence</i></p>						



CONSISTENT COMMUNICATION

U.S. AIR FORCE

▶ **"Total Force"**

▶ **"Total Force Enterprise (TFE)"**

The three components working together make up the USAF: RegAF, ANG, AFRC

▶ **"Total Force Integration (TFI)"**

USAF initiative/program to produce a more capable, more affordable Air Force composed of Regular, Guard and Reserve Airmen by modernizing our force and changing organizational constructs – led by AF/A8XF, Total Force Integration division

▶ **"TFI Initiatives or Associations"**

Associations/missions approved by CSAF and funded in corporate structure





U.S. AIR FORCE



- Classic Association
- Active Association
- ARC Association
- New/Emerging Missions to ARC

TFI LIST

CSAF Approved


"Establish an ANG Classic Associate unit in F-22A at Langley AFB"

OPR: ACC; OCR: ANG

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Frameworks for Integration

U.S. AIR FORCE

CORE CONCEPTS

- **Host Unit** – has primary responsibility for its unit members and is equipped / assigned with the physical resources (aircraft or weapon systems)
- **Associate Unit** – has primary responsibility for its unit members but shares the aircraft or weapon systems assigned to the host


■ **Organizational constructs** (associate units only):

- **Classic Associate** – Regular component (Host) unit retains principal responsibility for weapon system, shares w/ reserve unit (Associate) *Example: C-17 mission at Hickam*
- **Active Associate** – Reserve component (Host) unit has principal responsibility for weapon system, shares with Regular component (Associate) unit *Example: F-16 mission at McEntire*
- **ARC Associate** – Two or more ARC units integrate. One retains principal responsibility for weapon system (Host), shares with other ARC unit (Associate) *Example: AFRC/ANG KC-135 at Tinker*

■ **Operational Direction (OPDIR)** – Associate unit Commanders issue orders to their respective members, directing them to follow the orders of the functional supervisors to whom they are attached or detailed

*Associations maximize each Components' strengths
but preserve unique cultural differences*

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Classic

Active

ARC

Assessment of TFI Associations

U.S. AIR FORCE

Operational					IOC		Pre - IOC
McChord C-17 AFRC	Lackland AFRC C-5	Hill F-16 AFRC	Vandenberg JSPOC ANG	Hickam AOC ANG	Birmingham ANG KC-135	Barksdale B-52 AFRC	Burlington ANG F-16
Charleston C-17 AFRC	Scott AFRC C-40	Patrick Space Range ANG	Vandenberg JSPOC AFRC	Wright-Patt NAISC ANG	March AFRC KC-135	Whiteman B-2 ANG	Dannelly ANG F-16
Travis (3) C-17/C-5/KC-10 AFRC	Barksdale AFRC B-52 FTU	Rome NRO Support ANG	Holloman RPA FTU AFRC	Elmendorf F-22 AFRC	Charleston AFRC Red Horse	Nellis RedHorse AFRC	Ft Worth AFRC F-16
Dover (2) C-17/C-5 AFRC	Cheyenne ANG C-130	Fairchild KC-135+ ANG	Beale DGS-2 ANG	McGuire Intel ANG	Peterson AFRC C-130	Holloman F-22 AFRC	Homestead AFRC F-16
Luke F-16 FTU AFRC	Rosecrans ANG AATTC	Goodfellow Intel Training ANG	Beale DGS-2 ANG	Langley LSC ANG	Scott ANG KC-135	Seymour-J F-15E FTU AFRC	Barksdale AFRC A-10
Offutt Wg Operations ANG	McEntire ANG F-16	Lackland IO ANG	MacDill KC-135 AFRC	Langley DGS-1 ANG	Keesler AFRC C-130	Langley DGS-1 AFRC	Whiteman AFRC A-10
USAF A DA-20 AFRC	Pope AFRC C-130	Langley F-22 ANG	Elmendorf C-17 ANG	Minot SPs ANG	Pease ANG KC-135	Lackland BMT AFRC	Hickam ANG KC-135 (BRAC)
Tinker E-3A AFRC	Seymour-J AFRC KC-135	Hurlburt Training Center AFRC	Beale RQ-4 ANG	Scott LSC ANG	Schriever SST Range AFRC	Davis Monthan A-10 FTU AFRC	Elmendorf ANG C-130 (BRAC)
Randolph (2) UPT/Training AFRC	Niagara AFRC C-130 ANG	Lackland Aircrew CoE AFRC	Beale RQ-4 AFRC	Hickam C-17 ANG	Schriever SBIRS AFRC	Moody A-10 AFRC	Hickam ANG F-22
Schriever Various Space AFRC	Tinker AFRC KC-135 ANG	Tyndall F-22 FTU ANG	Peterson RAIDRs AFRC	Langley F-15 AFRC	Hurlburt Red Horse AFRC	Hickam CSS ANG	Grand Forks ANG RPA (BRAC)
Langley/Peterson (2) INOSC AFRC	Cannon RPA AFSOC AFRC	Tyndall F-22 FTU AFRC	Nellis USAFWC ANG	Anderson Red Horse ANG			Shaw F-16 AFRC
McGuire (2) C-17/KC-10	Eglin Test Wing AFRC	Ft Gordon CSS ANG	Nellis USAFWC AFRC				Hurlburt AOC AFRC
Malmstrom RedHorse ANG	Wardner Robins JSTARS ANG						Altus KC-135/C-17 FTU AFRC


*Blended Wing

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as of 30 Jun 10 10

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TFE Context


U.S. AIR FORCE

- For the TFE Business Case to be credible, stakeholders need assurance that its analytic methodology is transparent, repeatable, and defensible.
- The TFE Analytic Framework operates at the strategic level and is a decision support system for developing strategic guidance for the Air Force enterprise
 - The TFE Analytic Framework includes all Air Force components (Regular, Guard, and Reserve) to include Civilians
 - The TFE Analytic Framework provides macro-level component balance options based on transparent, repeatable, and defensible criteria
 - Costs are a critical aspect in developing the component balance
- The TFE Analytic Framework provides macro-level options that are then examined at the operational and tactical level

Address Total Force decisions holistically at the enterprise level

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U.S. AIR FORCE

Way Forward

- Senior Leader vectors in two weeks on our Framework's Major Drivers
- Inform POM13 APPG regarding desired force balance

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13



U.S. AIR FORCE

Total Force Enterprise

QUESTIONS?

AF/A9 Studies & Analyses, Assessments and Lessons Learned

af.a9rp@pentagon.af.mil

Lt Col Cheryl Beineke (703) 696-8359

AF/A8XF Total Force Integration Office

Col Anne Gorney (703) 692-6623

SAF/MR Assistant Secretary (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)

Col Cathy Haverstock (703) 697-6429

Col Brian Arnold (703) 693-9504

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TRM

***Transforming the Army's Reserve
Components into an "Operational
Force"***

**DoD Comprehensive Review of the Future Roles of
the Reserve Components
30 Sep 10**

ASA-(M&RA)

Introductions

On behalf of Mr. Lamont, the ASA (M&RA), I am honored to provide the committee with an update on the status of Army policy initiatives related to the transformation the Army's Reserve Components to an Operational Force.


This effort began with the completion of the AI4 Task Force and the transfer of the Six Essential Tasks from Annex I of the Army Campaign Plan to the various HQDA lead agencies, on 20 August 2009.

Our direction, or azimuth if you will, for this effort is DOD Directive 1200.17, "Management of the Reserve Components as an Operational Force." This directive along with the Secretary of Defense's memorandum on the Utilization of the Total Force, provides Secretary of Defense policy for managing the Reserve Components as an operational force.

The following slides highlight the current state of play for the development of 13 Secretary of the Army level policies or "policy actions" needed to "Codify the Operational Reserve."

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TRM
DoDD 1200.17

ASA (M&RA)

ACP Annex I



**Department of Defense
DIRECTIVE**

NUMBER 1200.17
October 20, 2008
(USOPARA)

SUBJECT: Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force

References: (a) Title 10, United States Code
(b) Title 32, United States Code
(c) Joint Publication 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," as amended

1. PURPOSE: This Directive establishes the overarching set of principles and policies to promote and support the management of the Reserve Components (RC) as an operational force.

2. APPLICABILITY: This Directive applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DOD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities in the Department of Defense.


3. DISTRIBUTION: See Classify.

4. EFFECT: In DOD policy that:

a. The RC provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements and in the full spectrum of conflict including under austere (2008, 1200, 1204, and 1206) conditions; and

b. The Active Components (AC) and RC are integrated as a total force based on the attributes of the particular component and individual competencies.

i. Historical Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) are total force missions. Use of DOD in operational contexts with statutory responsibilities in operations involving public forces and non-federalized National Guard forces with federal force status. Federal command and control and non-federalized National Guard forces under their command and control.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Office of the Adjutant General
Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment
Washington, DC 20315-5000

SAMARA SEP 04 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Codifying Transformation of the Reserve Components

1. Request your assistance in identifying prospective Army policy and legislative proposals for the Secretary of the Army to consider in support of DOD Directive 1200.17, "Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force." The Army has managed its reserve components as an operational force for several years. It is time to prepare policy and legislative change to institutionalize this transformation.


2. Management and Reserve Affairs will lead the development of an "Operational Reserve Elements" legislative package for the Secretary of the Army and Secretary of Defense to consider for inclusion in the FY 2010-2011 United States Budget (USRB) proposals.

3. Request addressees identify a General Officer to assist me with this effort, and provide the name with contact information to this office, attention: Reserve and Reserve Affairs (RAMR). RAJA to 13 Sep 09. In addition, addressees are encouraged to submit USRB proposals in memorandum paper format, to 13 Sep 09. A General Officer Working Committee will address these proposals, 1 Oct 09, 1300 LNO (2407). For additional information, contact COK, Room 3000g in 3700-101-01 or ramr@army.mil.

Thomas E. Sargent
THOMAS E. SARGENT
Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Management and Reserve Affairs)

DISTRIBUTION:
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COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PROGRAMS
CHIEF, U.S. ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
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THE SECRETAR GENERAL
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
INDIA GUAVA (SAMARA) STRATEGIC INITIATIVES GROUP

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Army Campaign Plan
2009

19 February 2009

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ASA-(M&RA) 2

The ASA (M&RA) is the lead agent in the Department of the Army for the development of Secretary of the Army level policies, legislative initiatives and major programming recommendations required to transform the Army's Reserve Components into an Operational Force.

Our direction, or azimuth if you will, for this effort is DOD Directive 1200.17, "Management of the Reserve Components as an Operational Force."

The following slides highlight desired outcomes for codifying the "Operational Reserve" (RC as an Operational Force) and associated policy actions for utilization and integration of the Army's Total Force.

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“Codifying an Operational Reserve”

TRM

□ **Stakeholders**

- ASA (M&RA), FORSCOM, TRADOC, ARNG, USAR, G-1, G-3/5/7, G-4, G-8, OCLL, DAS, OTSG & OTJAG

□ **References**

- DoDD 1200.17 “*Managing the RC as an Operational Force*”
- Army Campaign Plan (ACP) Annex I, (*Transitioning the Army’s RC into an Operational Force*)

□ **Objectives**

- Develop Secretary of the Army Policies for the Total Army
 - Develop Unified Legislative Budget (ULB) Proposals
 - Inform Programming Decisions (Fund an Operational Reserve)?
-

ASA-(M&RA)

3

Stakeholders:

Key references include the previously mentioned DoDD 1200.17 and the Annex I to the ACP. However, DoDD 1200.17 takes precedence.

The objectives include the development of the Secretary of the Army level policies and supporting ULB proposals. Approved policies or ULB actions will in turn inform future Army programming decisions related to the transformation of the RC into an operational force.

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 **Transforming the Army's RC into an Operational Force**

TRM
Desired Outcomes

- 1. Efficient delivery of trained & ready Soldiers to RC units**
- 2. Sustain family & employer support for Guard/Reserve**
- 3. Policies for utilization & integration of the Total Army**
- 4. Investments in the Operational Reserve (OR)**



ASA-(M&RA)

- Transforming to an Operational Reserve will require the Army to develop policies and make targeted investments in support of the following four desired outcomes
- The primary sources of un-readiness in the RC are (1) the lack of management tools for ensuring only Soldiers which are Duty Military Occupational Skill Qualified (DMOSQ) for the units in which they are assigned and (2) the lack of resources to ensure members of the RC are medically ready in sufficient time to deploy with their units. A “universal” Army TTHS policy is needed to ensure the most effective and efficient management of individual Soldier readiness across the Total Force. **Medical readiness cannot be surged.** The Army must develop a means to improve steady-state medical/dental readiness in the Reserve Components in order to sustain an operational reserve.
- Efforts by DoD to transform the Reserve Components into an operational force require DoD to consider new incentive programs family and employer support beyond the current recognition programs. **An incentive to consider is healthcare.** Currently, RC members incur a cost to sustain Medical Readiness as a “condition of employment”. In addition, providing healthcare benefits to RC members will strength the ability of RC members to compete in an increasingly competitive private sector job market.

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- Despite progress to date, the Reserve Components remain under- resourced for the demands of sustaining the RC as an operational force. Transforming to an Operational Reserve will require the Army to develop policies and make targeted investments in the Guard and Reserve (e.g., RC collective training, full-time manning/equivalents, and medical/dental readiness).
- The utilization of the Army's Total Force necessitates the development of a Secretary of the Army-level policy for the most efficient utilization and integration of the Total Army. I'll discuss that in the next two charts.

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Integration of the Total Force (1 of 2)

TRM

Army “Total Force Policy”

- Address AC/RC Balance (by capability)
- Deploy “integrated” AC/RC force packages
- Set common “BOG” deployment timeframes
- Standardize pre-deployment readiness validation for AC/RC



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ASA-(M&RA)

- The utilization of the Army’s Total Force necessitates the development of a Secretary of the Army-level policy for the most efficient utilization and integration of the Total Army.
- Integrating the Army’s three components as a Total Force requires the Army to optimally balance capabilities between Active Component (AC) and the Reserve Components (RC); utilize reserve forces in the most efficient manner, and employ the Total Force using a common set of principles.
- To achieve the Secretary of Defense’s goals for utilization of the Total Force, the Army must continually evaluate and optimally balance capabilities between the AC and RC, to achieve rotational capacity of 1:2 (AC) and 1:5 (RC) by type of military capability.
- To facilitate the integration of AC/RC forces in support of Army operations, the Army should utilize a common period of time for employment. Army force generation plans should ensure AC/RC forces are employed as integrated force packages to the maximum extent possible, and within the same time period of utilization.
- To maximize the employment of RC forces in support of Army operations, the Army should streamline the activation and pre-deployment readiness validation procedures in order to achieve an operational environment in which Army units train together and are employed as integrated force packages.
- Procedures and authorities for validating pre-deployment readiness should be the same for AC/RC units and personnel.

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Integration of the Total Force (2 of 2)

TRM

Utilizing the RC as an “Operational Force”

- Amend title 10 USC
- Allow SECDEF-level “limited” authority to involuntarily activate members of the SELRES in accordance with force generation plans
- Allow for the programmed utilization of RC capabilities for steady-state requirements as approved in the annual NDAA



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ASA-(M&RA)



TRM

Questions?

ASA-(M&RA)

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Building A Balanced Army

HQDA, ODCS G-3/5/7-FM
Mr. Dan Egbert

As of 15 Sep 10

PREDECISIONAL/CLOSEHOLD/FOUO

1



Agenda

Agenda:

- Strategic Guidance
- Total Army Analysis (TAA)
- AC / RC Balance
- TAA 12-17 Summary
- Growth in Selected Structure (AC & RC)
- RC Unique Enablers
- RECAP

As of 15 Sep 10

PREDECISIONAL/CLOSEHOLD/FOUO

2

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A Balanced Army that can:

- Prevail in today's protracted counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns
- Engage to help other nations build the capacity to deny their countries to terrorists
- Support civil authorities at home and abroad
- Deter and defeat hybrid threats and hostile state actors

Our goal is to build a **versatile mix** of **tailorable and networked organizations**, operating on a **rotational cycle**, to provide a **sustained flow** of trained and ready forces for **current commitments** and to hedge against **unexpected contingencies**, at a **tempo** that is predictable and sustainable for our All-Volunteer Force.

As of 15 Sep 10

PREDECISIONAL/CLOSEHOLD/FOUO

3



Strategy directed, doctrinally based, resource informed analytical process to develop the best balanced force supply based force (ARFORGEN) within Army End-Strength

- Quantitative Analysis
 - Based on OSD-approved Strategic Planning Guidance
 - Produces CBT/CS/CSS Doctrinal Structure Requirements for support to all Combat Forces and other services
- Qualitative Analysis
 - Addresses OSD / Combatant Commander Guidance and Inputs
 - Addresses Army Senior Leader and ACOM Guidance and inputs
- Examines Requirements & Resources for the Operating & Generating Force
- Culminates in Senior Leader Department of the Army (SLDA) Decision captured in the Army Structure (ARSTRUC) Message
- Establishes force structure for all Components for the POM

As of 15 Sep 10

PREDECISIONAL/CLOSEHOLD/FOUO

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ANNEX D

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AMERICA'S ARMY:

THE STRENGTH OF THE NATION

UNCLASS/FOUO

AC/RC Balance

Army G-3/5/7

Goal: Rebalance and restructure both the AC and RC force to hasten the transformation of a post cold war Army into a force capable of effectively addressing war fighting requirements in the new strategic environment

Key Considerations:

- Identify/resolve unit stress given persistent shortfalls
- Eliminate the need for involuntary mobilization of the Reserve Component during the first 15-30 days of a rapid response operation
- Rebalance structure to maximize readiness and rotational availability while preserving Homeland Defense/Homeland Security (HLD/HLS)

AMERICA'S ARMY:


THE STRENGTH OF THE NATION

UNCLASS/FOUO

Balancing Organizational Capabilities

Army G-3/5/7

- Develop Operating Force Capabilities based on
 - OSD Guidance / QDR Strategy
 - Current Operational Demands
 - Potential HLD and state missions
- Incorporate ARFORGEN (supply based)
- Monitor Balance across Components
- Maintain Institutional Army Capabilities



Institutional Army and TTHS



Joint Manninging Documents / OSD

Key Considerations

- Strategic Demand
- End Strength Plan
- Recurrent, Assured Access to RC
- Program Resources
- Capability Balance (CBT, CS and CSS)
- COMPO Balance
- Build rotational capacity

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Pre-decisional Working Papers

Capabilities	FY03	FY09 AC/RC	FY11 AC/RC	1:2/1:4 Capacity	FY13 AC/RC	1:2/1:4 Capacity
CBT Avn Bde (CAB)	19	19 (11/8)	20 (12/8)	5	20 (12/8)	5
Patriot Bn	12	13 (13/0)	14 (14/0)	5 ↑	15 (15/0)	5 ↑
*Eng Construction Co	171	209 (30/179)	211 (37/174)	38 ↑	212 (38/174)	39 ↑
Clearance Co	0	15 (7/8)	23 (12/11)	6 ↑	28 (12/16)	6 ↑
Sapper Co	0	47 (14/33)	57 (17/40)	12 ↑	62 (16/46)	12 ↑
MAC	0	39 (9/30)	40 (7/33)	7	44 (7/37)	8 ↑
MP CBT Spt Co	118	183 (63/120)	192 (63/129)	40 ↑	192 (63/129)	40 ↑
Medical Area Spt Co	35	50 (13/37)	53 (14/39)	10	56 (14/42)	11 ↑
EOD Co	49	62 (48/14)	64 (50/14)	19 ↑	64 (50/14)	19 ↑
Public Affairs Det	12	44 (11/33)	49 (14/35)	9	49 (14/35)	9
**Truck Co	212	187 (36/151)	186 (28/158)	33 ↓	189 (21/168)	32 ↓
***Cargo Co	24	29 (14/15)	33 (12/21)	7	38 (12/26)	8 ↑
Contracting Tm	0	132 (49/83)	159 (76/83)	38 ↑	166 (83/83)	40 ↑
SF Bn	21	23 (17/6)	25 (19/6)	7	26 (20/6)	8 ↑
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Shadow (TUAS)	8	64 (50/14)	81 (50/31)	21 ↑	94 (63/31)	26 ↑

* Includes Vert/Horz/ESC
 ** Includes Cargo/POL
 *** Include ACC/CTC
 ++ No Documented Demand – Used as ILO

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NOTE: Outlined red numbers identify where current demand exceeds capacity at 1:2 / 1:4

PREDECISIONAL/CLOSEHOLD/FOUO

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AMERICA'S ARMY: THE STRENGTH OF THE NATION	UNCLASS/FOUO	RC Unique Enablers
<i>Army G-3/5/7</i>		
RC Unique Enabler Force (FY 2017)		
Commands		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Theater Aviation Commands • Theater Engineer Commands 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Civil Affairs Commands • Military Police Commands 	
Functional and Special Functional Support Brigades		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Theater Aviation Sustainment Maintenance Group (TASM-G) • Theater Information Operations Group • Theater Aviation Brigades* 		
<p style="text-align: center; color: blue;">EAB Combat</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GMD Battalions • EAB 155SP FA BNs 	<p style="text-align: center; color: blue;">EAB Combat Support</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chemical Company (Heavy Redesign) • Chemical Company (BIDS) • Chemical Company (MX SMOKE) • Asphalt Teams • Quarry Platoons • Engineer Support Platoon • Well Drilling Teams • Real Estate Teams • Engineer Facility Detachments • Explosive Hazards Teams • Power Line Company • MP Camp Liaison Detachment • MP Theater Detainee Reporting Center DET • MP Guard Company • Military Intelligence BN (TECHINT) • Military Intelligence BN (Theater Support) • Military Intelligence BN (Linguists) 	<p style="text-align: center; color: blue;">EAB Combat Service Support</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Minimal Care Detachments • Medical Logistics Support Company (Theater Army) • QM Petroleum Pipeline & TML Operations BN • QM Petroleum Supply Battalion • QM Petroleum Liaison Team • QM Tactical Water Distribution (Hose Line) • Chaplain Detachments (Alpha/Bravo/Corps/Div) • Legal Operations Detachments (Train/Multiple) • Regional Trial Defense Teams / Trial Defense Teams • Component Repair Company • Broadcast Operations (Public Affairs Detachment) • Trailer Transfer Point Teams • Port Management Teams • Transportation Light Medium Truck Company • Transportation Railway Operation Company • Tactical Medium Cargo Truck Company (Off-Road) • Theater Distribution Augmentation Element
<p style="text-align: center; color: blue;">Other Support</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Theater Aviation Battalions • Aviation Support Battalions • Field Support Battalion (TIOG) • General Support Battalion (TIOG) 		
* Capability expected to be in the AC in the near future.		
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AMERICA'S ARMY:
THE STRENGTH OF THE NATION

UNCLASS//FOUO

Army G-3/5/7

Questions

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PREDECISIONAL/CLOSEHOLD//FOUO

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AMERICA'S ARMY:
THE STRENGTH OF THE NATION

UNCLASS//FOUO

Army G-3/5/7

RECAP

- Army continuously adjusts AC/RC mix and balance through TAA
- Army desire is to minimize change in the RC; allows RC to stabilize and build readiness
- ARNG and USAR Operating Force is balanced within end strength – but OSD/Army Senior Leader Guidance, and QDR Initiatives will affect force mix
- End Strength remains at 547.4K AC / 358.2K ARNG / 206K USAR
- Must have assured, predictable access to the RC

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Back Ups

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PREDECISIONAL/CLOSEHOLD/FOUO

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ARFORGEN:

- The Army's core process for force generation resulting in recurring periods of availability of trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of civil authorities and Combatant Commander requirements .
- Units cycle through three force pools: RESET, Train/Ready and Available. Each of the three force pools contains a balanced force capability to provide a sustained flow of forces for current commitments and to hedge against unexpected contingencies.
- Establishes the basis to plan and execute Army-wide unit resourcing:
 - As a model, ARFORGEN supports the Army's Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process.
 - As a process, it synchronizes the Army's efforts to provide land forces and other capabilities required by our Nation.




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AMERICA'S ARMY:
THE STRENGTH OF THE NATION

Army G-3/5/7

Possible RC Missions

DSCA defined: Defense support to civil authorities -- defined as : Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, National Guard, DoD civilians, DoD contract personnel, and DoD component assets, in response to requests or assistance from civil authorities for special events, domestic emergencies, designated law enforcement support, and other domestic activities.


Support includes:

1. CCMFR to respond t a CBRE event
2. Homeland response force -- ARNG forces established in each of the 10 FEMA regions that focus on planning, training, and exercising to respond to regional disaster
3. Major disasters -- hurricanes, earthquakes, wildfires, and other man-made or natural disasters that result in suffering and damage of a severity or magnitude that overwhelm the capabilities of federal, state, and local civil authorities.
4. Civil emergencies -- civil disturbances, postal strikes, mass immigration, environmental incidents, and other emergencies that endanger life and property or disrupt normal governmental functions.
5. Law enforcement response to terrorist attack -- measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism.
6. Response or consequence management -- measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to local governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the adverse consequences of a serious incident.
7. Federal Incident Management -- provides for the coordination of existing federal response plans and provides the vehicle within which the vertical integration of command, control, and communications can be managed throughout the response process-from local, through state, and through federal.
8. Technical assistance -- actions to identify, assess, or decontaminate personnel and/or property potentially exposed to HAZMAT and to dismantle, transfer, and/or dispose of contaminated/contaminating materials, equipment, or property.

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AMERICA'S ARMY:
THE STRENGTH OF THE NATION

Army G-3/5/7

Possible RC Missions

Current: Identify appropriate missions optimized for the Army Reserve and Army National Guard while simultaneously providing operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. Units and Soldiers participate in missions in a manner that provides predictability for the combatant commands, the Army, Soldiers, Families, and employers.

ARFORGEN: Generates a continuous flow of 20-21 trained and ready BCTs plus enablers in the available force pool to meet SFA and AFA force requirements.

- Security Force Assistance (Iraq/Afghanistan) ~ 12-14 BCTs plus enablers.
- Army Foundational Activities ~ 8-9 BCTs plus enablers.

Possible RC Missions:

- Identify those Army Foundational Activity missions that are optimal for RC forces such as:

Consequence Management	Theater Security cooperation
Non combatant evacuation ops	Maritime Intercept Ops
Foreign Humanitarian Asst	Post Iraq/Afghanistan stabilization msn
Homeland Defense	Defense Support to Civil Authorities
- Backfill AC Fixed Theater structure with rotational RC forces from the available force pool.

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AMERICA'S ARMY:
THE STRENGTH OF THE NATION

Army G-3/5/7

UNCLASS/FOUO

Capabilities Residing only in the Reserve Components

BRANCH	TYPE UNIT CAPABILITY	INVENTORY		REMARKS
		ARNG	USAR	
AV	Security and Support Battalion (LH Alcora)	8		Units have always been RC structure.
AV	UH60 Theater Assault Bn	3		Units have always been RC structure.
AV	ARNORTH Avn Maint Team	1		Units have always been RC structure.
AV	Fixed Wing HHC for Theater FW BN (C2s C-12 UC-36)	1	1	Units have always been RC structure.
AV	ARNORTH C-23 Cargo Bn (C2s C-23 Sherpas)	1		Units have always been RC structure.
AV	Theater Avn Brigade HQ	3	1	Units have always been RC structure.
AV	53rd Theater Avn Brigade - ARNORTH 1st Army CCBOR	1		Units have always been RC structure.
AV	Theater Avn Support Maint Group	4		Units have always been RC structure.
EN	Asphalt Team	16	7	
EN	Quarry Platoon	9	0	
EN	Equipment Support Platoon	10	3	
EN	Well Drilling Team HQ	1	0	
EN	Well Drilling Team	6	0	
EN	Real Estate Team	0	2	
EN	Engineer Facility Detachment	4	16	
EN	Theater Engineer Command	0	2	
CHAP	Chaplain Det - Corps	2	2	Units have always been RC structure.
CHAP	Chaplain Det - Div	6	10	Units have always been RC structure.
CHAP	Chaplain Det - Alpha	0	6	Units have always been RC structure.
CHAP	Chaplain Det - Bravo	0	25	Units have always been RC structure.
MP	MP VR Camp Liaison Detachment	0	5	
MP	MP Command	1	1	Units have always been RC structure.
MP	Theater Detention Reporting Center	1	1	Units are collocated with MP Commands.
MP	Military Police Guard Company	18	13	One AC unit until FY11.
JA	Legal Support Hqs	1	23	
JA	Legal Services Tm	0	72	
JA	Regional Trial Defense Tm	8	10	
JA	Trial Defense Tm	18	46	
JA	Sr. Judge Advocate	0	12	
JA	Military Judge Tm	0	18	
MI	MI TECHINT BN	0	5	TAA 10-15 decision made this multi-Compo unit. Compo pure.
MI	MI Theater Support BN	0	5	
MI	Lingvist Battalion	5	0	1 of 6 ARNG MI BN converts into Interrogation BN per TAA 10-15.
OO	Component Repair Company	11	0	Being redesignated to provide deployable modular platoons.
TC	Medium Truck Co (Corps Cargo)	22	0	
TC	Trans Railway Operating Co	0	2	TAA 10-15 decision reduce from 2 of 4 companies and redesign.

36 RC only capabilities from Previous Decisions/Actions

BRANCH	TYPE UNIT CAPABILITY	INVENTORY		REMARKS
		ARNG	USAR	
CM	Chemical Co (H-VY Redesign)	15	16	5 AC companies converted to CHEM CO (CBT SPT) (SRC)
CM	Chemical Co (BICS)	0	10	AC Bio Detection capability retained in the Stryker equipped
FA	FA BN TESSP Split ops	7	0	TAA 12-17 decremented last 155SP EAB Battalion from the AC
QM	HHC, QM Petroleum Pipeline & Terminal Operations BN	0	4	AC Decrement last remaining unit
QM	HHD, QM Petroleum Supply BN	0	9	AC Decrement last remaining unit
QM	QM Assault Hoseline Augmentation TM	0	13	AC Decrement 2 units programmed to activate
QM	QM Petroleum Liaison TM	0	17	AC Decrement 2 remaining units
QM	QM Tactical Water Distribution (HOSELINE)	8	6	AC Decrement 2 units programmed to activate
QM	Brigade Water Distribution PLT (Augmentation)	1	2	New SRC. ARNG and USAR adds pending.
TC	Trailer Transfer Point Team	0	39	AC Decrement last remaining unit
TC	Port Management Team	0	18	AC Decrement last remaining unit
TC	Light Medium Truck Co	29	0	AC Decrement last 3 remaining units
LOG	Theater Dist Augmen Element	0	4	New capability (2006) with low current ops demand.

13 new RC only capabilities resulting from TAA 12-17

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AMERICA'S ARMY:
THE STRENGTH OF THE NATION

Army G-3/5/7

UNCLASS/FOUO



Service Manpower Comparison (OF versus GF)

Service	Forces (%)	Infrastructure (%)
Army	71%	29%
Navy	55%	45%
Marine Corps	68%	32%
Air Force	56%	44%

Source: Defense Manpower Requirements Report, FY2009, ODUSD(PI)(RQ)



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AMERICA'S ARMY: THE STRENGTH OF THE NATION		UNCLASS//FOUO Key Enabler Units (All COMPOs) 1:2/1:4 BOG:DWELL				
Army G-3/5/7						
Capabilities	FY03	FY09 AC/RC	FY11 AC/RC	1:2/1:4 Capacity	FY13 AC/RC	1:2/1:4 Capacity
CBT Avn Bde (CAB)	19	19 (11/8)	20 (12/8)	5	20 (12/8)	5
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* Includes Vert/Horz/ESC
 ** Includes Cargo/POL
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NOTE: Outlined red numbers identify where current demand exceeds capacity at 1:2 / 1:4

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AMERICA'S ARMY: THE STRENGTH OF THE NATION		UNCLASS//FOUO RC Unique Enablers
Army G-3/5/7		
RC Unique Enabler Force (FY 2017)		
Commands		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Theater Aviation Commands • Theater Engineer Commands 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Civil Affairs Commands • Military Police Commands 	
Functional and Special Functional Support Brigades		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Theater Aviation Sustainment Maintenance Group (TASM-G) • Theater Information Operations Group • Theater Aviation Brigades* • Regional Support Groups* • GMD Brigade 		
EAB Combat <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GMD Battalions • EAB 155SP FA BNs 	EAB Combat Support <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chemical Company (Heavy Redesign) • Chemical Company (BIDS) • Chemical Company (MX SMOKE) • Asphalt Teams • Quarry Platoons • Engineer Support Platoon • Well Drilling Teams • Real Estate Teams • Engineer Facility Detachments • Explosive Hazards Teams • Power Line Company • MP Camp Liaison Detachment • MP Theater Detainee Reporting Center DET • MP Guard Company • Military Intelligence BN (TECHINT) • Military Intelligence BN (Theater Support) • Military Intelligence BN (Linguists) 	EAB Combat Service Support <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Minimal Care Detachments • Medical Logistics Support Company (Theater Army) • QM Petroleum Pipeline & TML Operations BN • QM Petroleum Supply Battalion • QM Petroleum Liaison Team • QM Tactical Water Distribution (Hose Line) • Chaplain Detachments (Alpha/Bravo/Corps/Div) • Legal Operations Detachments (Train/Multiple) • Regional Trial Defense Teams / Trial Defense Teams • Component Repair Company • Broadcast Operations (Public Affairs Detachment) • Trailer Transfer Point Teams • Port Management Teams • Transportation Light Medium Truck Company • Transportation Railway Operation Company • Tactical Medium Cargo Truck Company (Off-Road) • Theater Distribution Augmentation Element
Other Support <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Theater Aviation Battalions • Aviation Support Battalions • Field Support Battalion (TIQG) • General Support Battalion (TIQG) 		
* Capability expected to be in the AC in the near future.		
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TRM

Codifying an Operational Reserve

**Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Manpower & Reserve Affairs)
ASA (M&RA)
September 20, 2010**

ASA (M&RA)

- The ASA (M&RA), in collaboration with Army stakeholders, is identifying the major policy implications for transitioning the Army's Reserve Components into an operational force, as well as the associated opportunities such a transformation will provide Army policy makers for achieving the most cost effective Total Force.

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“Managing” the Reserve Components

TRM

- Guard and Reserve contribution is *five times* what it was before 9/11; Army RC workload has increased more than *seven times*
- DoD requires the Military Departments to “*manage*” their RCs as an operational force (DoDD 1200.17)
- Defining the term “RC as an Operational Force”:

“The RCs provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. In their respective operational roles, RCs participate in a full range of missions according to their Services’ force generation plans. Units and individuals participate in missions in an established cyclic or periodic manner that provides predictability for the combatant commands, the Services, Service Members, their families, and employers. In their strategic roles, RC units and individuals train or are available for missions in accordance with the national defense strategy. As such, the RCs provide strategic depth and are available to transition to operational roles as needed”

(DoDD 1200.17)

ASA (M&RA) 2

- Since employing the reserves in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, DoD has increased the operational tempo of the Reserve Components to sustain global commitments. The contribution of the National Guard and Reserves’ to our nation’s defense efforts has risen to almost five times the level it was before 9/11; the Army National Guard and Army Reserve workload has increased more than seven times.
- In January 2008, after releasing two interim reports, the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves submitted its final report to Congress. The Commission concluded, “The reliance (on the Reserve Components) should grow, even after the demands for forces associated with current operations are reduced”. The report noted that “Their service in the operational force will be required in peacetime, and they will continue to provide a cost-effective means of ensuring that strategic requirements to meet a large wartime threat are also available.”
- In October 2008, in recognition of this increased reliance on the Reserve Components to support the nation’s defense, the Secretary of Defense published a directive for management of the Reserve Components. The Secretary of Defense now requires the Secretaries of the Military Departments to “manage” their respective RCs as an operational force to meet U.S. military requirements across the full spectrum of conflict, as identified by the President and the Secretary of Defense. NEXT SLIDE
- The definition of the term RCD as an operational force, must be taken within the broader context of DoDD 1200.17, which is to “manage” all of the RC as an operational force.

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Transforming the Army's RC into an Operational Force

TRM

- Complies with Secretary of Defense policies for managing the RC as an operational force (DoDD 1200.17)
- Provides proportional RC support to the Army's force supply model (aka 1/5/20/90K)
- Achieves the most cost-effective Total Force
 - ARNG and USAR account for 51% of the Army's military end strength for 16% of the base budget (FY10)
 - **Costs per Soldier** (manpower, training, equipping, organization costs and operating costs) ~\$135K (AC), ~\$36K (ARNG), ~\$35K (USAR)
 - Near-term investments in RC (POM 12-16) can position the Army to better manage the risks of declining resources in the long-term

ASA (M&RA) 3

- The war-time experiences of the past decade validate the need to institutionalize the policies, procedures and legislation conducive to achieving the most efficient utilization of the Total Force, through the transitioning of DoD Reserve Components into an operational force.
- The primary rationale for the Army's efforts to transform the Reserve Components into an operational force is to ensure the Army is complying with the Secretary of Defense's directives for managing the Reserve Components as an operational force.
- In the near term, we must ensure the RC is capable of providing enduring proportional support to the Army's force generation supply model.
- However, transforming the Reserve Components into an operational force provides an opportunity for the Army to achieve the most cost effective use of its Total Force through investing in and relying on the Army's Reserve Components to take on a greater role in our nation's defense
- The Reserve Components provide nearly 36% of the total military end strength for 7.8 percent of the base budget in FY 2010. Specific to the Army, the ARNG and USAR account for 51% of the Army's military end strength for 16% of the base budget.
- Finally, investing in the Operational Reserve will position the Army to better manage the risks of declining resources for the Army, over the long-term.

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Operational Reserve

TRM

Desired Outcomes

- 1. Efficient delivery of trained & ready Soldiers to RC units**
- 2. Sustain family & employer support for Guard/Reserve**
- 3. Policies for utilization & integration of the Total Army**
- 4. Investments in the Operational Reserve (OR)**



ASA (M&RA) 4

- Despite progress to date, the Reserve Components remain under- resourced for the demands of sustaining an operational force.
- Transforming to an Operational Reserve will require the Army to develop policies and make targeted investments in support of the following four desired outcomes
- The ASA (M&RA) is the lead agent in the Department of the Army for the development of Secretary of the Army level policies, legislative initiatives and major programming recommendations required to transform the Army’s Reserve Components into an Operational Force.
- In October, the Honorable Thomas Lamont approved for development a list of thirteen policy actions related to an Operational Reserve.
- These actions are in various stages of development and will be included in a report to the Under Secretary of the Army.
- In addition, we have submitted a Unified Legislative Budget proposal requesting a Secretary of Defense –level activation authority for an Operational Reserve to support peace-time force generation requirements of the Military Departments.
- Finally, the transformation to an Operational Reserve will require some targeted “investments” in the Army’s Reserve Components

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Efficient Delivery of Trained & Ready Soldiers to RC Units

TRM

- **Optimized Training, Transient, Holding and School (TTHS) Capability for the Guard/Reserve**
- **Investments in Medical/Dental Readiness Programs**
- **AR 40-501 “Standards of Medical Fitness”**



ASA (M&RA) 5

- First, the Army must develop a means for improving readiness levels within the RC through significant improvement of individual medical and training readiness.
- The primary sources of un-readiness in the RC are (1) the lack of management tools for ensuring only Soldiers which are Duty Military Occupational Skill Qualified (DMOSQ) for the units in which they are assigned and (2) the lack of resources to ensure members of the RC are medically ready in sufficient time to deploy with their units.
- The Army has three different authorizations, philosophies and statutory obligations for managing Soldiers who are not yet trained or are not currently ready and available. The ARNG and USAR each manage their Trainees, Transients, Holders, and Student accounts differently from the Active Component.
- Each of the components requires a TTHS account to allow them to optimize the management of their force. The AC is authorized approximately 71K Soldiers (~13% of AC end-strength) within a TTHS account, allowing the AC to segregate non-deployable Soldiers from AC units. In contrast the relative small size of the ARNG (~2.5% of end-strength) and USAR (2% of end-strength) TTHS accounts are not sufficient to make full use of a TTHS mechanism.

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- A “universal” TTHS policy is needed to ensure the most effective and efficient management of individual Soldier readiness across the Total Force. Moreover, the universal policy should require all components to utilize a common set of (personnel accounting) rules for each of the TTHS categories and be appropriately sized to each components end strength objective.
- Army National Guard (ARNG) and US Army Reserve (USAR) Medical Readiness is at ~52%; below the DoD minimum medical standard (75%) much less the goal (100%), prescribed in Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 6025.19. **Medical readiness cannot be surged.** The Army must develop a means to improve steady-state medical/dental readiness in the Reserve Components in order to sustain an operational reserve.
- In addition to the enhancements identified above, the Army should revise Army Regulation 40-501, paragraph 9-3, which currently states “maintenance of health and fitness is an individual Soldier’s responsibility.” The Army should not impose standards of Medical Readiness as a “condition of employment” without affording the members of an Operational RC a means to treat correctable Medical Readiness conditions that limit their service.

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Sustaining Family & Employer Support for the Guard/Reserve

TRM

- **A Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) for providing DoD health benefits to RC members (families)?**
- **Expand private sector partnerships with the Guard & Reserve**



ASA (M&RA) 6

- To sustain an Operational Reserve, we must sustain family and employer support for the Guard and Reserve. Efforts by DoD to transform the Reserve Components into an operational force require DoD to consider new incentive programs family and employer support beyond the current recognition programs.
- **An incentive to consider is healthcare.** Currently, RC members incur a cost to sustain Medical Readiness as a “condition of employment.”
- The Department of Defense should consider providing RC Members TRICARE Prime or TRICARE Prime Remote at no cost, as a **benefit** of membership, which coincidentally would negate the need for many existing selective treatment programs, and offset some of the cost of implementation.
- While there remains concern over the potential cost and risks associated with providing all RC Members TRICARE Prime or TRICARE Prime Remote, the current national debate on health care necessitates the Army to review the current benefit packages (including health care) for an operational reserve force.
- Providing medical coverage to RC Soldiers and their family members would provide an excellent recruiting / retention benefit for the RC, provide a continuum of care for personnel transferring from the AC to the RC (i.e., continuum of service).

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- In addition, providing healthcare benefits to RC members will strength the ability of RC members to compete in an increasingly competitive private sector job market. Moreover, this expands opportunities for partnering with the private sector to sustain support for the Guard and Reserve for an Operational Reserve.
- This partnership approach is already underway. For example, the Army Reserve’s Employer Partnership Initiative provides a way to develop capabilities and skills that both the Army and the civilian workforce share. Through this mutually beneficial public-private venture, the Army Reserve and Employer Partners agree to explore efforts to jointly recruit, train, employ, and retain qualified candidates for employment. In doing so, employers have access to a pool of potential workers who have unique skills, capabilities, and leadership experience gained through military service.

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Polices for Utilization & Integration of the Total Force

TRM

- **An Army “Total Force Policy”**
 - **Address AC/RC Balance (by capability)**
 - **Deploy “integrated” AC/RC force packages**
 - **Set common “BOG” deployment timeframes**
 - **Standardize pre-deployment readiness validation for AC/RC**



ASA (M&RA) 7

- An Operational Reserve, requires new policies for utilization and integration of the Army’s three components.
- The utilization of the Army’s Total Force necessitates the development of a Secretary of the Army-level policy for the most efficient utilization and integration of the Total Army.
- Various Secretary of Defense policies require the Secretaries of the Military Departments to utilize their active and reserve forces as an integrated force and within prescribed goals for frequency of deployments and duration of involuntary activations of the Reserve Components.
- Integrating the Army’s three components as a Total Force requires the Army to balance capabilities between Active Component (AC) and the Reserve Components (RC); utilize reserve forces in the most efficient manner, and employ the Total Force using a common set of principles.
- To achieve the Secretary of Defense’s goals for utilization of the Total Force, the Army must continually evaluate and optimally balance capabilities between the AC and RC, to achieve rotational capacity of 1:2 (AC) and 1:5 (RC) by type of military capability.
- To facilitate the integration of AC/RC forces in support of Army operations, the Army should utilize a common period of time for employment. Army force generation plans should

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ensure AC/RC forces are employed as integrated force packages to the maximum extent possible, and within the same time period of utilization.

- To maximize the employment of RC forces in support of Army operations, the Army should streamline the activation and pre-deployment readiness validation procedures in order to achieve an operational environment in which Army units train and are employed as integrated force packages.
- Procedures and authorities for validating pre-deployment readiness should be the same for AC/RC units and personnel.

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Investments in the Operational Reserve

TRM

- **RC Full-Time Support (FTS)**
- **RC Collective Training man-days and OPTEMPO**
- **RC Medical/Dental Readiness**



ASA (M&RA) 8

- Despite progress to date, the Reserve Components remain under- resourced for the demands of sustaining an operational force. Transforming to an Operational Reserve will require the Army to develop policies and make targeted investments in the Guard and Reserve.
- Transitioning to an Operational Reserve will require policy decisions on additional resources for the two Reserve Components within the base budget, including additional resources for collective training, Full Time Manning and medical/dental readiness.
- These investments are necessary to increase the Army’s capacity to administer our formations and manage unit readiness within an Operational Reserve force.
- Finally, in support of these 4 desired end states, the ASA (M&RA) is preparing a report to the USA/VCSA highlighting topical areas related to these end states and recommendations for the development of Secretary of the Army level policies, legislative initiatives and major programming decisions.

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TRM

Questions/Issues

ASA (M&RA)

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**FUTURE ROLE OF THE MARINE
CORPS RESERVE**

(2010 QDR Comp Review of the Future Role of the RC)

HQMC, PP&O (PLN)
30 Sept 2010

For the USMC, the Ready Reserve includes both individuals and units; however, the unit structure, capability, and training generally mirrors AC. The Marine Corps has limited “niche” capabilities resident in RC, and the capability to perform the full range of USMC missions between the AC and RC is the same. The RC is designed to provide capabilities at the Regiment/Group level and below, either as stand-alone personnel, AC augmenters, reinforcements, or with the reconstitution of forces. USMC Global Force Management process determines AC or RC sourcing and is determined by mission requirements, unit readiness, suitability, and availability. USMC force planning, organization and concept of employment within the Total Force construct does not support assignment of specific mission sets to designated units, active or Reserve. The AC/RC ‘mix’ evaluation is a “continuing action” for the USMC, and is in the process of being reviewed by the Force Structure Review Group (FSRG) within the Total Force concept. A formal Service position will be released following the conclusion of the FSRG.

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USMC Reserve



- Ready Reserve = individuals and units:
 - Unit structure, capability & training generally mirrors AC
 - Limited “niche” capabilities resident in RC (CAG, PRPC)
 - Capability to perform range of missions btwn AC and RC is the same
- RC designed to provide capabilities at the Regt/Group level & below:
 - Stand alone
 - AC augmentation, reinforcement, or reconstitution of forces
- USMC GFM process determines AC or RC sourcing & is determined by:
 - Mission requirements
 - Unit readiness, suitability, and availability

1



USMC Reserve ISO OCO



Lessons learned:

- Effectively provided capabilities & individuals to augment the MAGTF & support full range of AC requirements
- AC/RC ‘mix’ fully supported CCDR rotational requirements within the USMC force cap of 202K AC and 39.6K RC, and enabled sustainment of operational requirements within dwell constraints
- Provided ‘strategic depth’ to support other contingencies if needed
- Supporting mob authorities and supplemental funding is a must in providing a sustainable Op Reserve

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Constraints on Future Role of the RC



- Supporting mobilization authorities and supplemental funding will bound the potential role and frequency of a future Op Reserve:
 - Requirement for a “volunteer” Op Reserve will limit capabilities available
 - No current analysis that shows RC is ‘cheaper’ option over AC

3



Service Outlook on Future Role of the RC (1 of 2)



- Remain consistent with the USMC Total Force construct, supported by force planning goals
- Maintain capabilities to support the augmentation, reinforcement, or reconstitution of the AC
- Continue effective management through the Service’s GFM process = best force for the requirement, and best way to determine AC/RC sourcing solution within the Total Force concept

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Service Outlook on Future Role of the RC (2 of 2)



- In assessing current USMC requirements and CCDR demand signal, future concept of employment of the USMC RC could include the following:
 - CCDR Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) requirements
 - CCDR exercises
 - Operational augmentation and reinforcement ISO of Crisis Response
 - Provide a strategic depth ISO major contingency operations
 - Periodic augment and reinforcement ISO rotational force requirements
- DSCA mission for USMC Reserves is not a primary mission – USMC GFM process will determine best choice to support:
 - AC = Primary USMC choice AFTER USANG shortfalls identified
 - RC = Response time and available equipment is always a factor⁵



Conclusions



- USMC force planning, organization and concept of employment within the Total Force construct does not support assignment of specific mission sets to designated units, active or Reserve.
- AC/RC 'mix' evaluation is a “continuing action” for the USMC.
 - Continued evaluation within the Total Force concept and current force planning goals.
 - Will be reviewed in the Nov 10 FSRG within the Total Force concept.
 - Formal service position following the conclusion of the FSRG.

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The Navy has been reviewing RC roles and implementing the AC/RC Mix for past seven years. Through this process, the USN has been able to identify capability requirements demanded by mission generators (which are dynamic through time), then assign missions to appropriate mix of AC/RC elements of its Total Force. Navy leadership considers capabilities, capacity, training intensity, duration, and frequency in this decision. Navy's Total Force has both strategic and operational elements which in the composite, lead to a blended force of complementary and mirroring capabilities. This blended force cost-effectively mitigates risk. The deliberative, capabilities-based approach evolved during eight years of war without a reduction in simultaneous sustained global presence. Navy does not anticipate reductions in operations Post-OEF/New Dawn--new missions will emerge for the Navy, while traditional missions endure--contingencies will become increasingly complex.

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One Navy

“We are one force today. One Navy, with an Active Component and a Reserve Component.”



- Forward Presence
- Deterrence
- Sea Control
- Power Projection
- Maritime Security
- Humanitarian Assistance & Disaster Response




Admiral Gary Roughead
Chief of Naval Operations

Delivering Capabilities to the Nation

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Approaching the Issue

Chartered in the QDR:
Conduct a comprehensive review of the future role of the Reserve Component (RC) including an examination of the balance between active and reserve forces

- Recognize the robust systematic approach—*Prudens Futuri...* “Thoughtful for the future”
- Navy has been reviewing RC roles and implementing the AC / RC Mix for past seven years
- Beyond this study, a **DELIBERATIVE PROCESS** is vital to execute an adaptable, dynamic force mix framework



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Navy's Deliberative Process

- Identify capability requirements demanded by core capability missions (dynamic through time)
- Assign missions to appropriate mix of AC/RC elements of our Total Force
 - Consider *capabilities, capacity, training intensity, duration, frequency*


Navy Analysis Examples: Zero Based Review (2004), FTS Flagpole (2006), Reserve Capability Review (2008, 2010)



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


Navy Enterprise

Combatant Commanders

CNO

Fleet Readiness Enterprise



Providers
MPT&E
NAVSEA
NAVAIR
SPAWAR

Providers
NAVFAC
NAVSUP
CNIC
ONR
BUMED

Total Force:
AC Sailors
RC Sailors
Navy Civilians

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Complement and Mirror

- Navy's Total Force has both strategic and operational elements
- Composite blended force of complementary and mirroring capabilities

- **Complement:** Skills and expertise to complete the Total Force inventory of capabilities
- **Mirror:** Skills and expertise that match the AC to offer greater capacity at lower carrying cost

ONE NAVY... A Composite Warfighting Force

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Capability Snapshot

Warfighting Capability


Force Mix
RC
AC

Intra Theater Fleet Logistics Support (VR)	▲
SOUTHCOM E-2C Surveillance (VAW)	▲
NSW(SOF) Helicopter Support (HSC)	▲
Expeditionary Logistics (ELSF)	▲
Adversary Squadrons (VFC)	▲
Maritime Expeditionary Security (MESF)	▲
Navy Expeditionary Combat (NECC)	▲
Naval Construction Force (Seabees)	▲
Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (CNBG)	▲
Intelligence	▲
Navy Individual Augmentees (IA)	▲
Expeditionary Electronic Attack (VAQ)	▲
Primary & Advanced Pilot/NFO Training (SAU)	▲
Maritime Patrol Squadrons (VP)	▲

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
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Force Structure Examples

Maritime Expeditionary Security Force


- Force Structure
 - 6 AC / 7 RC MSRONS
 - Total Force: 6,378
 - (2,642 AC / 3,736 RC)
- Echelon IV Commands
 - MESGRU 1 San Diego, CA
 - MESGRU 2 Portsmouth, VA
- Echelon V Commands
 - Various, CONUS
 - MSRON
 - 3 BOATDET
 - 3 SECDET
 - C4I Capability w/in HQ element







42% AC
58% RC

Naval Construction Force

- Force Structure
 - 9 AC / 12 RC NMCB
 - Total Force: 15,124
 - (7,058 AC / 8,066 RC)
- Echelon IV Command
 - 1NCD Little Creek, VA
 - 1NCD FWD Pearl Harbor, HI
- Echelon V Commands
 - AC Gulfport, MS, Little Creek, VA, Port Hueneme, CA
 - RC Various, CONUS



48% AC
52% RC



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Navy Solutions

- Blended force cost-effectively mitigates risk
- Deliberative capabilities-based approach evolved during eight years of war without a reduction in simultaneous sustained global presence




One size does NOT fit all

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Reset In Stride

- **Navy does not anticipate reductions in operations Post-OEF/New Dawn**
 - N81 Maritime Security Study – projected demand
 - CNA Study – historical examples
- **Navy employed in Phase Zero operations**
 - COCOM TSC Engagement Increases
 - Naval Component Commanders remain forward deployed

New missions emerge for the Navy, while traditional missions endure. Contingencies become increasingly complex.

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Looking Forward

- **OBJECTIVE-6: What does Navy need to facilitate the RC “of the future”?**
 - EXCOM endorsement of Navy approach
 - Future Pay and Personnel Solution
 - Title 10, Section 1230X: Deployment authority
 - Funding for deployable reserve
 - *Enable the Continuum of Service*

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BACK-UP SLIDES

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FY2000-FY2016 Strength

Data provided by ASN (M&RA) and FMBE

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	FY00	FY01	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	FY11	FY12	FY13	FY14	FY15	FY16
Army	480,000	480,000	480,000	480,000	482,400	502,400	512,400	512,400	525,400	532,400	562,400	569,400	547,400	547,400	547,400	547,400	547,400
Army NG	350,000	350,526	350,000	350,000	350,000	350,000	350,000	350,000	351,300	352,600	358,200	358,200	358,200	358,200	358,200	358,200	358,200
AF	360,877	357,000	358,800	359,000	359,300	359,700	357,400	334,200	329,563	317,050	331,700	332,200	332,800	332,800	332,800	332,800	332,800
Navy	372,037	372,642	376,000	375,700	373,800	365,900	352,700	340,700	329,098	326,323	328,800	328,700	327,936	324,597	322,435	322,605	324,160
Army Res	205,000	205,300	205,000	205,000	205,000	205,000	205,000	200,000	205,000	205,000	205,000	205,000	205,000	206,000	206,000	206,000	206,000
MC	172,518	172,600	172,600	175,000	175,000	178,000	179,000	180,000	189,000	194,000	202,100	202,100	202,100	202,100	202,100	202,100	202,100
Air NG	106,678	108,022	108,400	106,600	107,030	106,800	106,800	107,000	106,700	106,756	106,700	106,700	106,700	106,700	106,700	106,700	106,700
AF Res	73,708	74,358	74,700	75,600	75,800	76,100	74,000	74,900	67,500	67,400	69,500	71,200	71,400	72,300	72,400	72,400	72,400
Navy Res	90,288	88,900	87,000	87,800	85,900	83,400	73,100	71,300	67,800	66,700	65,500	65,500	64,064	64,140	61,031	60,973	61,013
MC Res	39,624	39,558	39,558	39,558	39,600	39,600	39,600	39,600	39,600	39,600	39,600	39,600	39,600	39,600	39,600	39,600	39,600

**FY11 and later data is notional, based on Service POM-12 briefs, and draft NDAA 2011 legislation currently in the House. FY12 MPN (Navy) includes 3,836 of over strength that currently exists in the Navy BES12 OCO request, while FY13 and out does not because that amount is determined on a year to year basis.

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Reserve & Leadership Directorate

Future Role of the Coast Guard Reserve

(2010 QDR Comp Review of the Future Role of the RC)


September 30, 2010



In the mid-1990, the USCG completely integrated its Reserve component into the Active Component with the 'Team Coast Guard' approach. This strategy has worked out well to-date, however a post-9/11 assessment of CG Reserve processes, functions, and organization found 80 actionable gaps with six critical issues, including Strategic Foundation (Contingency Plans/Mission Prioritization; AC/RC Mix; Optimal Force Structure; Reserve Program Roles and Responsibilities; Integrated Information Systems), Recruiting/Strategic HR Planning, Reserve Training and Qualifications, Mobilization/Demobilization Processes, Physical Qualifications and Pay Problems. These issues are currently being addressed as the CG grows the total force, re-defines its concept of employment and develops a Force Generation Model for IAs using a regional concept of force packages.

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USCG Reserve Historical Perspective



Post 9/11 Review

An assessment of CGR processes, functions, and organization found 80 actionable gaps with six critical issues:

1. Strategic Foundation

- (Contingency Plans/Mission Prioritization; AC/RC Mix; Optimal Force Structure; Reserve Program Roles & Responsibilities; Integrated Information Systems)

2. Recruiting/Strategic HR Planning

3. Reserve Training and Qualifications

4. Mobilization/Demobilization processes

5. Physical Qualifications

6. Pay Problems



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Primary Functions



Competencies

- **Boat Operations**
- **Contingency Planning and Response**
- **Expeditionary Warfare and Defense Operations**
- **Marine Safety**
- **Port Security**
- **Law Enforcement**
- **Mission Support**



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Way Ahead for Coast Guard Reserve Forces



- **Grow the Force**
- **Define Concept of Employment**
- **Develop Force Generation Model for IAs using regional concept of force packages**



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Option 1: Rebalance AC / RC to Remedy Persistent Forward Presence Capability Shortfalls


22 Sept 2010

Keith Kowalski – JHU / APL
Robert Fancher – Joint Staff / J8


1

Option #1 focuses on reducing stress on the Total Force. The metrics that track stress on the force are understood, and mature. The consequences of stressing the force have predictable consequences (e.g., equipment and personnel fatigue, low retention, reduced garrison readiness). Services, especially the Army have made significant adjustments to the AC / RC mix over the last eight years. Examples include Military Intelligence, Military Police, and CA / PSYOP. However, changing AC or RC force structure to address stress or shortfalls in BOG: Dwell capacity is not a simple process.

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Bottom Line...



- Services adjust AC / RC capability and capacity regularly
- Changing AC / RC mix has long term implications
- If overall endstrength and AC / RC ratio is unchanged, then capability or capacity increases must be supported by a complementary endstrength decrease


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Moving force structure from the AC to RC or vice versa will affect endstrength, if endstrength changes must be balanced by equivalent reductions -- significant analysis across the spectrum of operations must be conducted to determine where reductions should be taken. Because force structure changes are associated with changing the demand signal for manpower quality and quantity, no realignment can deliver instant results. People need to be recruited and trained to fill capacity / capability shortfalls.

Any contemplated shift of capabilities from the AC to RC or RC to the AC must be predicated on a reliable and credible COCOM demand signal for forward presence capabilities.

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AC-RC Option #1:

Rebalance AC/RC to Remedy Capacity Shortfalls



Option	Description	Specific Forces To Be Examined
#1 – Rebalance AC/RC to Remedy Capacity and BOG-Dwell Shortfalls	Use Joint Force sufficiency assessment tools to identify capabilities that are "over-stressed" based on BOG-Dwell objectives. Rebalance AC/RC capacity as appropriate to remediate established force capacity shortfalls (as determined by JS J-8 Force Sufficiency Assessments) and/or to enable AC/RC units to reach desired BOG-Dwell ratios	Analyze force structure elements associated with large scale stabilization, MCO, and foundational activities, HA/DR, and HLD/DSCA. Examine Service plans to address existing capacity shortfalls

Project the availability of the POR force based on 1) near term utilization and 2) projected long term requirements. When capability shortfalls are identified, determine if realignment between total force components will alleviate / mitigate the shortfall.

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Option #1 uses data, analysis, and assessment methodology used by the Joint Staff (J8) to determine if capacity shortfalls exist when available forces are mapped against COCOM current and future requirements. In the J8 process, the Total Force is assessed to determine appropriate sourcing strategies for COCOM requirements. Where shortfalls are persistent (i.e., beyond the FYDP), rebalancing the AC/RC may make sense. A shift in force structure from the RC to AC has consequences for people, training, and equipment. AC capability / capacity might be a candidate to be moved into the RC if BOG: Dwell objectives can be met by the AC with a smaller number of units but the over capacity (with respect to the rotational requirement) of the Total Force must be maintained to address requirements in other warfighting scenarios.

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Updated 7 Sep 10

Working Groups


Option 1: Rebalance RC To Remedy AC Shortfalls WAL <u>Keith Kowalski/ Robert Fancher</u>	Option 5: Adjust Capabilities within RC MP6 S205 <u>Chris Wright/</u> <u>CAPT Upchurch</u>
Option 2: Rotational Units Provide Global Posture WALPR <u>Ted Smyth/ COL Smith</u>	Option 6: Enhance AC-RC Integration MP6 S212 <u>CAPT Lynch/ CAPT Beyer</u>
Option 3: Align RC Units with COCOMs, Service Components MP6 N209 <u>Lesa McComas/</u> <u>COL Price</u>	Option 7: Rely on RC for Some Institutional Support MP6 S283 <u>Steve Phillips/</u> <u>Col Castaldi</u>
Option 4: RC Provides Both Operational and Strategic Reserves MP6 N217 <u>Jeff Hamman/</u> <u>COL Scocos/ COL Sheridan</u>	

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The Option #1 working group was facilitated by Keith Kowalski (JHU/APL) and Robert Fancher (JS/J8).

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Option 1: Rebalance AC/RC to Remedy Capacity and BOG-Dwell Shortfalls



Methodology

- Identify capability requirement
 - *Use FY10 GFMAP Demand*
- Determine rotational force capacity shortfall based on a range of BOG:Dwell objectives (i.e., service, OSD)
- Assess rebalance strategies to reduce shortfalls
 - *Key components of rebalancing:*
 - **Capability attributes** – Response, training, equipment
 - **Conditions & Standards** – Assured access, training, basing, duty status, medical readiness, support, recruiting & retention, planning complexity
 - **Cost** – personnel, equipment, training, installations
 - **Laws, Policy, & Doctrine**


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In this option, the study team used the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) demand for capabilities, projected capacities of the total force using service and OSD established BOG: Dwell objectives, and the changes in capacities reflected in service program and budget submissions.

A capability was believed to be a candidate for realignment if: 1) a high percentage of the total force's capability resided in the RC, 2) capacity shortfalls were persistent and significant, and 3) shortfalls could not be mitigated by other capabilities (i.e. in lieu of forces).

The subset of COCOM capability shortfalls that could be mitigated by a realignment of AC and RC capacity were assessed by the working group to identify potential operational issues, scenario specific challenges, conditions and standards, costs, laws, policies, and doctrine.

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This slide represents the Joint process to determine sourcing solutions for COCOM capability requirements. The Reserve Roles and Missions assessment used the product of this process to inform the AC / RC capacity and capability realignment discussion. As can be seen in the diagram, there are a number of alternative ways to mitigate a capacity shortfall without moving force structure between the AC and RC.

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Component Shift Assumptions



- Rebalancing is a response to a rotational force shortfall
 - Three active units are required to support one steady-state deployed unit
 - More than three reserve units are required to support one steady-state deployed unit (possibly as high as 8)
- Topline component endstrength does not change

Context for how we addressed capability, cost, conditions, law and standards


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Two significant assumptions constrain the analysis space. First, the steady state requirement for a capability requires a minimum of three active component units and more than three (as high as eight) to maintain a 1.0 forward presence capability. Second, the AC and RC top line endstrength does not change. Consequently, adding AC endstrength to accommodate a capacity shift from the RC requires an equivalent reduction in AC endstrength and the possible shift of some other capability to the RC.


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Option 1: Rebalance AC/RC to Remedy Shortfalls

AC to RC Capacity Shift



Capability Metric	Scenario				
	MCO	Large-Scale Stability	Steady State Engagement	HA/DR	HD/DSCA
Initial Response Time?	Potentially increased based on where in the TPFDD the capability is needed.	No change to predictable rotational deployments	No change to predictable rotational deployment	Increase response time to instantaneous reqt	No change, unless AC moves NG this may decrease time, if RC increases
Provides Desired Capability?	Doctrinally, Capabilities in AC and RC are the same – No change to capability.				
Appropriately Equipped?	More equipment may be needed to provide similar rotational force capacity in RC as AC (minimum 2 to 1). Caveats: Air squadrons may not be affected because personnel supply rotational capacity on top of forward deployed equipment			Army has GP forces capable of responding but NG equipment sets may be better equipped to support DSCA	
Appropriately Trained?	Doctrinally, units in AC and RC are trained to same level. RC may be more "experienced"				More experience in NG
Number of Units?	Capacity may increase because more units are required to support rotational requirement	To maintain rotational capacity, more units may be required.			
Others?	Difference between rotational and surge capacity				

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Even though the working group assessed specific capability shifts to remedy persistent COCOM capability gaps, the analysis of high-level capability metrics are grouped into two main subsets: Move capacity from AC to RC and move capacity from RC to AC.

The issues and impacts to COCOM warfighting, engagement, phase IV and V operations, HA/DR, and Homeland Defense are believed to be sufficiently pervasive to inform this assessment at a high level without considering the specific capability issues.

When assessing a shift of capability from the AC to RC all option groups assessed a standard set of capability metrics against a standard set of generic scenarios.

Initial response time was evaluated as potentially increasing if capability was shifted from AC to RC. For large-scale stability and steady state engagement scenarios, the deployment of the capability is not believed to be affected due to the predictable pace of deployments and scheduling of engagement activities. It is believed that response to HA / DR events would be delayed due to access issues concerning mobilization of the RC. If AC capacity is moved to the National Guard, response time to support HD/DSCA may be decreased.


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Shifting AC capacity to the RC will result in units with the required training and demonstrated capability necessary to respond to the range of military operations. However, more equipment may be needed to provide similar rotational force capacity. During DoD support to HD/DSCA missions, GP forces are likely to be capable of responding, however National Guard equipment sets are better positioned to support HD/DSCA missions. The working group concluded that MCO capacity would increase due to an overall increase in the number of units needed to support a rotational commitment.


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Option 1: Rebalance AC/RC to Remedy Shortfalls

RC to AC Capacity Shift



Capability Metric	Scenario				
	MCO	Large-Scale Stability	Steady State Engagement	HA/DR	HD/DSCA
Initial Response Time?	Decreases response time.	No change to predictable rotational deployments	No change to predictable rotational deployment	Decreases response time to instantaneous reqt	Increases response time if RC reduction is from the NG
Provides Desired Capability?	Doctrinally, capabilities in AC and RC are the same – No change to capability.				
Appropriately Equipped?	Yes. Less overall equipment may be required.				Army has GP forces capable of responding but NG equipment sets may be better equipped to support DSCA
Appropriately Trained?	Doctrinally, Capabilities in AC and RC are the same – No change to capability.				More experience in NG
Number of Units?	Capacity may decrease because fewer units are required for FA rotational reqts To maintain rotational capacity, fewer units may be required.				
Others?	Difference between rotational and surge capacity				


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A capacity shift from the RC to the AC will reduce MCO response time because more forces will be in the active component and will be able to surge to the major conflict or swing between theaters if already deployed. Similarly, HA/DR response time should decrease because more forces are available and RC access to the RC is not required. Large-scale stability and engagement activities would not be affected. Homeland Defense and Disaster assistance response time may increase – especially if the RC reductions affect the National Guard.

Training total force elements to deliver a desired capability, either for the AC or RC is believed to be equivalent -- forces will be trained to deliver a specified capability without regard to the component. Less equipment may be required if RC capacity is moved to the AC because the turnaround ration for equipment will increase (e.g., engineering equipment set will deploy once every three years in the AC vice once every 5 to 8 years in the RC). Naturally, this increased OPTEMPO will wear out equipment quicker. Further analysis is required to determine equipment procurement and operation and support cost implications. The overall number of TF units assigned to provide a capability might be reduced if more capacity is shifted to the AC in order to meet rotational force deployments. This capacity decrement would need to be balanced against MCO requirements.


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Option 1: Rebalance AC/RC to Remedy Shortfalls

Conditions & Standards



Conditions & Standards Factor	Issue	<i>Move RC Capacity to AC</i>	<i>Move AC Capacity to RC</i>
Assured Access	Is this factor important for this option? If so, how do we ensure desired accessibility?	Reduce Access issues	Access issues increase
Training	How do we ensure desired level of training?	More time available to train new skills in AC.	More time required to train
Basing and Infrastructure	Are basing and infrastructure adequate to support this option? If not, what is needed?	If capacity is increased, it will likely not be in the same place as RC capacity currently resides – Enhancements to existing infrastructure likely	Enhancements to existing infrastructure likely
Duty Status	Are existing duty status options adequate for this option? If not, what is needed?	N/A	N/A
Medical Readiness	Is RC medical readiness adequate to support this option? If not, what is needed?	More time available to achieve medical readiness.	More time required to achieve medical readiness

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The next four slides show a direct comparison of conditions and standards, cost, laws, policies, and doctrine between a shift of RC capacity to the AC or the alternative shifting capacity from AC to the RC. Assured access issues increase when AC capacity is moved to the RC. Ensuring access to Reserve and National Guard units and equipment will be essential. Training issues may increase with a rotational force comprised of more RC. If more RC is supporting rotational deployments, a greater percentage of the operational force will be in a non-ready state due to the lack of training, pre-deployment training will ensure deployed forces are ready however as a percentage of the force, less overall units will be ready. If one considers an all RC force (1:5 BOG:Dwell) to an all AC force (1:3 BOG:Dwell), 100% of the AC force will be within 24 months of a deployment certification event compared to only 60% of the RC force (the deployed unit plus the unit that just returned and the unit getting ready to deploy).

Infrastructure would likely require additional investment to support a shift to or from the AC. It may be possible to recruit reservists to convert an AC equipment set to fill an RC unit requirement but it is unlikely that the base that supported the AC unit could support two to three times the number of units without some infrastructure enhancements. When the flow of equipment is moving from the RC to the AC, capacity may be less of an issue than location. If the equipment was


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not located near similar AC units, synergies in training, administration, maintenance, and repair would not be realized.

Similar to training, increasing the number of RC personnel will increase the resources (time, facilities, and personnel) to maintain other readiness factors such as medical.


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Option 1: Rebalance AC/RC to Remedy Shortfalls

Conditions & Standards




Conditions & Standards Factor	Issue	<i>Move RC Capacity to AC</i>	<i>Move AC Capacity to RC</i>
National Support	Does RC have sufficient national support to enable implementation of this option? If not, what is needed?	No expected issues unless local political issues affect de-scoped RC	No change
Recruiting	How might this option affect recruiting?	Largely unaffected Easier to recruit to AC to specific skill. Bring troops to units in AC	Recruiting is more locally focused.
Retention	How might this option affect retention?	Largely unaffected	Largely unaffected
Equipment Needs	Does RC have sufficient equipment to implement this option? If not, what is needed?	No Change	No Change
Planning Complexity	Does this option introduce additional complexity in planning, or does it simplify planning?	Reduces planning complexity because more reqt is sourced w/AC.	More complexity is introduced into rotation of more reserve units
Others?			

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Two additional issues may present a challenge to moving AC capacity to the RC and increasing the dependence on the RC to fill rotational deployments missions. First, recruiting will be more challenging because RC and NG recruiting is locally focused. Increasing the RC will place greater pressure on reserve recruiters that fill assignments from regional vice national population pools. A given geographic region may not be capable. Transplanting reservists to fill RC positions is not envisioned. Second, planning complexity increases when COCOM forward presence requirements are satisfied with a higher ratio of the RC. Planners must factor in RC access, readiness (i.e., equipment, medical, administrative), and training delays to fill deployment requirements.


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Option 1: Rebalance AC/RC to Remedy Shortfalls

Cost Summary




Cost Element	Potential Impact	<i>Move RC Capacity to AC</i>	<i>Move AC Capacity to RC</i>
Personnel	Cost increase or decrease due to changes in Active or Reserve Component personnel	If endstrength of all components remains same, no topline change. However, cost of capability will be impacted by the RC and AC cost calculus	
Equipment	Cost increase or decrease due to changes in AC or RC equipment	Unknown, depends on the capability.	
Training	Cost increase or decrease due to changes in training for AC or RC units or personnel	Unknown, depends on the capability.	
Installations & Facilities	Cost increase or decrease due to changes in AC or RC installations or facilities	Will likely increase	Will likely increase.

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Cost is highly sensitive to the specific assumptions established for the “realignment” scenario. At a service level if endstrength does not change, top line personnel costs do not change. Equipment costs will likely be the dominant cost driver, however if multiple RC units train on one set of equipment and deploy on top of another set in theater – equipment costs may not be significantly higher. Training, installation, and facility costs would likely increase if capacity shifts from the AC to the RC.


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Option 1: Rebalance AC/RC to Remedy Shortfalls

Laws, Policies & Doctrine





	Consideration	Move RC Capacity to AC	Move AC Capacity to RC
Laws	Are existing laws adequate to enable implementation of this option? If not, what changes are needed?	Yes, realignment of some capacity to AC will mitigate need for laws that affect access to RC	May increase need to access RC through legislation
Policies	Are existing policies adequate to enable implementation of this option? If not, what changes are needed?	Capability exists in both AC and RC, no new policy is required	Capability exists in both AC and RC, no new policy is required
Doctrine	Is existing doctrine adequate to enable implementation of this option? If not, what changes are needed?	Yes, capability exists in both AC and RC doctrinal changes are not required	Yes, capability exists in both AC and RC doctrinal changes are not required
Others?			

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Continuing to utilize the RC in rotational deployments to satisfy COCOM steady state engagement requirements will further exacerbate the need to address legal access to the RC and mobilizing reservist to “non-named” operations.

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**Option 1: Rebalance AC/RC to Remedy Shortfalls**

Take Aways



- Methodology requires reliable estimate of steady state demand for capabilities
- Many ways to address a short-term rotational force capacity shortfall that may be more effective and less turbulent than changing AC / RC Force mix
- Services appropriately address AC/RC mix continuously
- Recommend the cost group assess a shift of Horizontal Engineer Company capacity (i.e. from RC to AC)

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Rebalancing capabilities and capacities within the AC/RC are considered during each POM development cycle. Services consider cost, capability and risk when modifying the Total Force capabilities and capacities. When COCOM shortfalls are identified, there are many ways to resolve these gaps without changing the AC/RC mix. As an illustration of the methodology, the horizontal engineer company capability is a persistent shortfall that is not expected to be remedied in the near term. The Option # 1 Working Group recommended that the Cost Group analyze a shift of some RC capacity of Horizontal Engineering Companies to the AC.

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Option 2: Rotational RC Units Provide Global Posture

21 Sept 2010



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Option 2 focuses on the use of Rotational RC units from CONUS to provide stress relief to AC units at forward-deployed locations. This option was specifically proposed by participants during the 17-19 August 2010 Workshop, and specific units/locations were mentioned (i.e., Fires Brigade, Fighter Wing units and Aerial Tanker units for Korea; Fighter Wing units and Aerial Tanker units for Europe). Over the past decade, tens of thousands of RC military personnel have successfully served in Iraq, Afghanistan and other theaters of operation. During this time, they have acquired significant operational expertise and experience, have contributed immeasurably to the conduct of numerous operations, and have made the military's Total Force concept a reality. During this same period, the demands placed upon US military forces have grown while the availability of forces have remained essentially constant or in some cases have decreased. These factors have combined to place considerable stress, particularly on the AC, in terms of unacceptable BOG/Dwell ratios. As articulated in the Joint Operational Environment, the anticipated future demands on US military forces are expected to remain extensive and varied. As such, it is prudent to consider options in which the RC can continue to effectively support the Total Force concept and leverage the RC capabilities gained over the past decade. One such employment option is to consider the use of specific RC units as rotational forces to provide global posture in lieu of AC forward deployed units. Such an RC employment option may well result in the achievement of improved BOG/Dwell ratios and other efficiencies. Based on such a rotational model, this option will examine the capabilities of 6-8 RC units used as rotational forces in lieu of 3 AC units. The feasibility and potential efficiencies of this option will be examined for specific types of units in specific theaters of operation.

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Workshop Agenda

Time	Mon Sep 20	Tues Sep 21	Weds Sep 22
8-9		Half-day Option Working Group sessions in WAL, WALPR, MP-6 (rooms N209, N217, S205, S212, S283) [0800-1145]	AC-RC Option 3 [0800-0920]
9-10			AC-RC Option 4 [0935-1105]
10-11			AC-RC Option 5 [1105-1225]
11-12	Check-In WAL Bldg 26		Lunch [1225-1310]
12-1	WAL Overview – Ms. Pak Intro – Mr. Smiley Overview – Dr. Simmons	Return to WAL Lunch (WAL) [1200-1250]	
1-2	IDA: Achieving Force Depth	JS J-3 Accessibility Assessment [1250-1340]	AC-RC Option 6 [1310-1430]
		OBJ 6 Update – Mr. Stratton	
2-3	JS J-8: Force Sufficiency Assessment	USAF Review	AC-RC Option 7 [1445-1535]
		AC-RC Option 1 [1440-1600]	
3-4	USMC Review USA Review	AC-RC Option 2 [1600-1720]	Survey & Wrap Up – Ms. Pak, Mr. Smiley [1535-1615]

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 **Background** 

Rely on Rotational RC Units to Provide Global Posture: Option #2

2) Rely on rotational RC units to provide global posture	Rely on rotational RC units to provide global posture vice selected forward deployed forces	RC units from CONUS provide Fires Brigade, Fighter Wing units, and Aerial Tanker units for Korea; Fighter Wing units and Aerial Tanker units for Europe
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- **This option was specifically proposed by participants during the 17-19 August 2010 Workshop**
 - “Predictable long term missions(e.g., stability operations) are well suited for RC employed in a rotational model”
 - “Air RC can be easily plugged into steady state rotational missions”
 - “Little gain by using rotational units as in-place units – benefit would be greater in the use of geographically aligned RC rotational units as *Arriving U.S. Forces*”

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- By strict definition, US Army Institutional Support career fields are:
 - Comptroller
 - Academy Professor
 - Operations Research/Systems Analysis
 - Nuclear Research and Operations
 - Operations, Plans, and Training
- *Institutional Support Career Field (ISCF)*. Focuses on the increasingly technical and complex nature of running the Army as an organization. The emphasis in this career field is management, planning, and programming of Army resources both near-term and into the future years, projecting requirements, and developing capabilities in the mid- and long-term. The functional areas in this career field are FA 43 (Human Resource Management), FA 45 (Comptroller), FA 47 (Academy Professor, USMA), FA 49 (Operations Research/Systems Analysis (ORSA), FA 50 (Force Management), and FA 52 (Nuclear Research and Operations) and FA 59 (Strategic Plans and Policy.)


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Motivation




- Over the past decade tens of thousands of RC military personnel have successfully served in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other theaters of operation. During this time they have acquired significant operational expertise and experience, have contributed immeasurably to the conduct of numerous operations and have made the military's Total Force concept a reality.
- During this same period the demands placed upon our military forces have grown while the availability of forces have remained essentially constant or in some cases have decreased. These factors have combined to place considerable stress, particularly on the AC, in terms of unacceptable BOG/Dwell ratios.
- As articulated in the Joint Operational Environment the anticipated future demands on our military forces are expected to remain extensive and varied. As such, it is prudent to consider options in which the RC can continue to effectively support the Total Force concept and leverage the RC capabilities gained over the past decade. One such employment option is to consider the use of specific RC units as rotational forces to provide global posture in lieu of AC forward deployed units. Such an RC employment option may well result in the achievement of improved BOG/Dwell ratios and other efficiencies.
- Based on such a rotational model, this option will examine the capabilities of 6-8 RC units used as rotational forces in lieu of 3 AC units. The feasibility and potential efficiencies of this option will be examined for specific types of units in specific theaters of operation.

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Workshop Template Topics



Assessment Element	Goal
Background	Brief description of option, motivation for including, relevant historical experience
Definition	Refine definition of option
Capabilities	Assess capabilities in each study scenario
Conditions & Standards	Identify applicable conditions and standards concerns & possible remedies
Cost	Identify key cost drivers
Laws, Policies, Doctrine	Identify laws, policies, and doctrine likely to be affected and nature of necessary changes

For each Rotational Unit consider the above elements


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Capability Considerations




- For each rotational unit and study scenario, address:
 - Response Time
 - When is unit / team / individual available to deploy?
 - Relative Effectiveness
 - Does unit / team / individual provide desired capability?
 - Is unit / team appropriately equipped?
 - Is unit / team/ individual appropriately trained?
 - Number of Units Available
 - Do number of units support desired BOG-Dwell?
 - Others?


Scenarios
MCO
Large-Scale Stability Op
Steady State Engagement
HA/DR
HD/DSCA

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Capability Template



Capability Metric	Scenarios				
	MCO	Large Scale Stability	Steady State Engagement	HA/DR	HD/DSCA
Response Time?					
Provides Desired Capability?					
Appropriately Equipped?					
Appropriately Trained?					
Number of Units?					

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Conditions & Standards Considerations

- Will proposed AC/RC mix affect
 - Assured access?
 - Training?
 - Basing and infrastructure?
 - Duty status?
 - Medical readiness?
 - National support?

- Other considerations
 - Recruiting?
 - Retention?
 - Equipment needs?
 - Planning complexity?
 - Other factors?

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Conditions & Standards Template


Conditions & Standards Factor	Issue
Assured Access	Is this factor important for this option? If so, how do we ensure desired accessibility?
Training	How do we ensure desired level of training?
Basing and Infrastructure	Are basing and infrastructure adequate to support this option? If not, what is needed?
Duty Status	Are existing duty status options adequate for this option? If not, what is needed?
Medical Readiness	Is RC medical readiness adequate to support this option? If not, what is needed?
National Support	Does RC have sufficient national support to enable implementation of this option? If not, what is needed?
Recruiting	How might this option affect recruiting?
Retention	How might this option affect retention?
Equipment Needs	Does RC have sufficient equipment to implement this option? If not, what is needed?
Planning Complexity	Does this option introduce additional complexity in planning, or does it simplify planning?
Others?	

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Laws, Policies & Doctrine Template



	Consideration
Laws	Are existing laws adequate to enable implementation of this option? If not, what changes are needed?
Policies	Are existing policies adequate to enable implementation of this option? If not, what changes are needed?
Doctrine	Is existing doctrine adequate to enable implementation of this option? If not, what changes are needed?

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Background: Fires Brigade, Korea



- **Mission:** On order the 210th Fires Brigade provides fires in support of ACC operations and GCC's counter fire fight. On order, transitions to offensive operations.
- The 2nd Infantry Division and its artillery has served continuously in Korea since 1965. The Division Artillery was reorganized in Nov 2006 and renamed the 210th Fires Brigade.



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Rotational Unit RC Option: Fires Brigade, Korea

Current AC Fires Brigade assigned to Korea:

- 210th Fires Brigade
- 1-38th FA (MLRS)
- 6-37th FA (MLRS)
- 70 BSB
- 579th SIG
- 333TAB



Issues:

- What is the proposed duration of the rotation?
- Does the option imply rotation of the entire brigade or do we also consider battalion/battery level rotation?
- Are there sufficient numbers of MLRS and HIMARS Bns in ARNG to support desired BOG/Dwell?
- Is there a potential use of personnel from ARNG HIMARS Bns?
- What are the training implications?
- What are the HIMARS vs. MLRS effectiveness issues?
- Are there C2 and legal authority issues that must be addressed ?

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
		UNCLASSIFIED/DRAFT						FY 10 (Active Component)					
Korea	Ft. Leavelle	Organic	X 17th FIB HQ WA0UAA	II 5-3 FA HIMARS WH9XAA	II 208 BSB WCBGAA	I 256 SIG WHUEAA	I E26 TAB WH5NAA	I 657 FSC HIMARS WB1UAA	Assigned	II 1-377 FA 155mm T WH9VAA	II 1-94 FA HIMARS WAF7AA	I 606 FSC 155mm T WB1KAA	I 125 FSC HIMARS WJHNAA
	Ft Bragg	Organic	X 18th FIB HQ WA0WAA	II 3-27 FA HIMARS WFASAA	II 188 BSB WDEKAA	I 206 SIG WCFGAA	I D/26 TAB WH5RAA	I 135 FSC HIMARS WHFWAA	Assigned	II 1-321 FA 155mm T WE7ZAA	II 3-321 FA 155mm T WH90AA	I 583 FSC 155mm T WBS5AA	I 54 FSC 155mm T WB08AA
	Ft Hood	Organic	X 41st FIB HQ WANPAA	II 2-20 FA MLRS WA2UAA	II 589 BSB WG07AA	I 324 SIG WDWDA	I A/26 TAB WE8AAA	I 67 FSC MLRS WEU8AA	Assigned	II 1-21 FA MLRS WAG4AA	I 575 FSC MLRS WDQ5AA		
	Ft Sill	Organic	X 75th FIB HQ WE8LAA	II 2-18 FA MLRS WA1QAA	II 100 BSB WDQCAA	I 258 SIG WCESAA	I C/26 TAB WA27AA	I 69 FSC MLRS WB5GAA	Assigned	II 3-13 FA MLRS WGD1AA	II 1-17 FA 155mm SP WAINAA	I 66 FSC MLRS WB2WAA	I 571 FSC 155mm SP WB1HAA
	Ft Sill	Organic	X 214th FIB HQ WA08AA	II 1-38 FA MLRS WHMRAA	II 70 BSB WJYAA	I 579 SIG WHSUAA	I F/333 TAB WH55AA	II 6-37 FA MLRS WAJRAA	Assigned	II 1-14 FA HIMARS WA1XAA	II 2-5 FA 155mm SP WA2TAA	I 578 FSC HIMARS WB4DAA	I 609 FSC 155mm SP WB1LAA

A/FBHQ/341/136 HIMARS 33/2/282 (FSC 5/1/188) MLRS 33/2/282 (FSC 5/1/158) 155T 32/2/362 (FSC 5/1/129) FOUO AS OF AUG 2010

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Fires Brigade Capability Considerations

Capability Metric	Scenarios				
	MCO	Large Scale Stability	Steady State Engagement	HA/DR	HD/DSCA
Response Time?	No difference	No difference	No difference	No difference	No difference
Provides Desired Capability?	Potential effect decrease MLRS vs. HIMARS	Largely unaffected	Fires Bde capability is not a driver	Fires Bde capability is not a driver	Fires Bde capability is not a driver
Appropriately Equipped?	MLRS vs HIMARS	MLRS vs HIMARS	Fires Bde capability is not a driver	Fires Bde capability is not a driver	Fires Bde capability is not a driver
Appropriately Trained?	MLRS vs HIMARS; training reqd	MLRS vs HIMARS; training reqd	Not an issue	Not an issue	Not an issue
Number of Units?	Few RC MLRS Bns; sufficient HIMARS	Few RC MLRS Bns; sufficient HIMARS	Not an issue	Not an issue	Not an issue
Others?					

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Conditions & Standards Factor	Issue
Assured Access	Assuming that appropriate units are identified, proper planning should permit access
Training	HIMARS crews and maintenance personnel must be trained in advance on MLRS (assumes equipment in place)
Basing and Infrastructure	Basing and infrastructure for AC adequate for RC
Duty Status	Decision needed as to duration of rotational tour. Are there issues for ARNG units as to tour length?
Medical Readiness	With appropriate lead time RC medical readiness should be comparable to that required of forward deployed AC.
National Support	A potential issue for RC deployments to non combat areas. Does state political support exist?
Recruiting	Potentially a positive impact on recruiting
Retention	Potentially a positive impact on retention; however, civilian career, family issues could be negative
Equipment Needs	Assuming that MLRS training is available to RC and RC operates MLRS "in place" systems, this is not an issue
Planning Complexity	No significant challenges
C2/legal authority issues	Potential impediments exist in terms of laws and policies

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	<h2>Rotational Unit RC Option: Air Support, Korea</h2>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> RC units from CONUS provide Fighter Wing and Aerial Tanker Wing for Korea Assigned forces of interest in Korea: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Osan AFB: 51st Fighter Wing <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 51st Operations Group 25th Fighter Squadron (OA-10) 36th Fighter Squadron (F-16 C/D) 51st Mission Support Group 51st Maintenance Group 51st Medical Group - Kunsan AFB: 8th Fighter Wing <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 8th Operations Group 35th Fighter Squadron (F-16 C/D) 80th Fighter Squadron (F-16 C/D) 8th Maintenance Group 8th Mission Support Group 8th Medical Group 		
Kadena AFB: 18 th Wing 18 th Operations Group 909th Aerial Refueling Squadron (KC- 135)		
<div style="border: 1px solid black; background-color: #e0ffe0; padding: 5px; margin-bottom: 10px;"> Note: Air Force wide A-10, F-15C/D, F-15E, and F-16 squadrons are listed as - Currently stressed - Units with reset/reconstitution issues - Representative of major combat or enabling forces </div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; background-color: #e0ffe0; padding: 5px;"> Note: NGB/A8X recommends focus on Osan AFB vice Kunsan AFB units </div>		
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Osan AFB: 51st Fighter Wing

<ul style="list-style-type: none">- 51st Operations Group- 25th Fighter Squadron (A-10)- 36th Fighter Squadron (F-16 C/D)- 51st Operations Support Squadron- 51st Medical Group- 51st Aeromedical Squadron- 51st Dental Squadron- 51st Medical Operations Squadron- 51st Medical Support Squadron	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- 51st Maintenance Group- 51st Aircraft Maintenance Squadron- 51st Maintenance Operations Squadron- 51st Maintenance Squadron- 51st Munitions Squadron- 51st Mission Support Group- 51st Civil Engineer Squadron- 51st Communications Squadron- 51st Logistics Readiness Squadron- 51st Force Support Squadron- 51st Security Forces Squadron
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Issues:

- Do we consider FW and/or individual squadron rotation ?
- Does squadron rotation impact FW training and readiness?
- Are fighter aircraft types and variants considered as interchangeable by the COCOM?

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Air Reserve Fighter Squadrons


- **301st Fighter Wing (F-16 C), NAS Joint Reserve Base (JRB), Ft Worth, TX**
- **419th Fighter Wing, (F-16), Hill AFB, UT**
- **442nd Fighter Wing, (A-10), Whiteman AFB, MO** "Pool" of A-10 and F-16 Squadrons
- **482nd Fighter Wing, (F-16C), Homestead Air Reserve Base, FL**
- **944th Fighter Wing, (F-16), Luke AFB, AZ [also trains USAF, AFR, ANG, and Allied F-16 pilots]**
- **477th Fighter Group, (F-22A), Elmendorf AFB, AK**

All units fall under command of 10th Air Force, NAS JRB, Ft Worth, TX


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Air National Guard Fighter Squadrons

- 100th Fighter Squadron (F-16 C/D), Montgomery, AL
- 103rd Fighter Squadron, (A-10), Willow Grove, PA
- 104th Fighter Squadron, (A-10), Martin State Airport, MD
- 107th Fighter Squadron, (A-10), Selfridge ANG Base, MI
- 112th Fighter Squadron, (F-16 C/D), Toledo, OH
- 114th Fighter Squadron, (F-15 C), Kingsley Field, OR
- 119th Fighter Squadron, (F-16C), Atlantic City, NJ
- 120th Fighter Squadron, (F-16 C/D), Buckley AFB, CO
- 121st Fighter Squadron, (F-16 C/D), Andrews AFB, MD
- 122nd Fighter Squadron, (F-15C), NAS JRB, New Orleans, LA
- 123rd Fighter Squadron, (F-16 C/D), Buckley AFB, CO
- 124th Fighter Squadron, (F-16 C/D), Des Moines, IA
- 125th Fighter Squadron, (F-16C), Tulsa, OK
- 131st Fighter Squadron, (F-15C), Barnes Municipal Airport, MA
- 134th Fighter Squadron, (F-16C), Burlington, VT
- 138th Fighter Squadron, ((F-16), Syracuse, NY
- 148th Fighter Squadron, (F-16A), Tucson, AZ
- 149th Fighter Squadron, (F-22A), Langley AFB, VA
- 152nd Fighter Squadron, (F-16 C/D), Tucson, AZ
- 157th Fighter Squadron, (F-16C), McEntire JNG Base, SC
- 159th Fighter Squadron, (F-15C), Jacksonville, FL
- 160th Fighter Squadron, F-16 C/D), Montgomery, AL
- 162nd Fighter Squadron, (F-16 C/D), Springfield-Beckley Airport, OH
- 163rd Fighter Squadron, (F-16 C/D), Fort Wayne, IN

NOTE: There appears to be a sufficient "pool" of A-10 and F-16 Squadrons



F-16




A-10


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Air National Guard Fighter Squadrons

- 170th Fighter Squadron,(F-16 C/D), Abraham Lincoln Airport, IL
- 172nd Fighter Squadron, (A-10), Kellogg Regional Airport, MI
- 175th Fighter Squadron, (F-16 C/D), Sioux falls, SD
- 176th Fighter Squadron, (F-16 C/D), Dane County, WI
- 179th Fighter Squadron, (F-16C), Duluth, MN
- 182nd Fighter Squadron, (F-16 C/D), Kelly Field Annex, TX
- 184th Fighter Squadron, (A-10), Fort Smith, AS
- 186th Fighter, Squadron, (F-15C), Great Falls, MT
- 188th Fighter Squadron, (F-16 C/D), Kirtland AFB, NM
- 190th Fighter Squadron, (A-10), Boise, ID
- 194th Fighter Squadron, (F-16C), Fresno, CA
- 195th Fighter Squadron, (F-16 E/F), Tucson, AZ
- 199th Fighter Squadron, (F-15C, F-22A), Hickam AFB, HI

NOTE: There appears to be a sufficient "pool" of A-10 and F-16 Squadrons



F-15

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Air Reserve Refueling Squadrons



- 434th Air Refueling Wing, Grissom AFB, IN
- 459th Air Refueling Wing, Andrews AFB, MD
- 507th Air Refueling Wing, Tinker AFB, OK
- 916th Air Refueling Wing, Seymour Johnson AFB, NC
- 927th Air Refueling Wing, MacDill AFB, FL
- 931st Air Refueling Group, McConnell AFB, KS

All units fall under command of 4th Air Force at March ARB, CA

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NOTE: There appears to be sufficient Air Reserve Refueling Squadrons


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Air National Guard Refueling Squadrons

- 117th Air Refueling Wing, Birmingham, AL
- 168th Air Refueling Wing, Eielson AFB, AK
- 161st Air Refueling Wing, Phoenix, AZ
- 126th Air Refueling Wing, Scott AFB, IL
- 185th Air Refueling Wing, Sioux City, IA
- 190th Air Refueling Wing, Topeka, KS
- 101st Air Refueling Wing, Bangor, ME
- 186th Air Refueling Wing, Meridian, MS
- 155th Air Refueling Wing, Lincoln, NE
- 157th Air Refueling Wing, Pease ANGB, NH
- 108th Air Refueling Wing, McGuire AFB, NJ
- 121st Air Refueling Wing, Columbus, OH
- 137th Air Refueling Wing, Will Rogers ANGB, OK (an associate organization with 507th ARW)
- 171st Air Refueling Wing, Coraopolis, PA
- 134th Air Refueling Wing, McGhee Tyson ANGB, TN
- 151st Air Refueling Wing, Salt Lake City, UT
- 141st Air Refueling Wing, Fairchild AFB, WA
- 128th Air Refueling Wing, Milwaukee, WI

KC-135



NOTE: There appears to be sufficient Air National Guard Refueling Squadrons

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FW/ARW Korea, Capability Considerations

Capability Metric	Scenarios				
	MCO	Large Scale Stability	Steady State Engagement	HA/DR	HD/DSCA
Response Time?	No difference	No difference	No difference	No difference	No difference
Provides Desired Capability?	AC and RC comparable	AC and RC comparable	AC and RC comparable	AC and RC comparable	AC and RC comparable
Appropriately Equipped?	AC/RC comparable	AC/RC comparable	AC/RC comparable	AC/RC comparable	AC/RC comparable
Appropriately Trained?	Similar training	Similar training	Similar training	Similar training	Similar training
Number of Units?	Sufficient RC	Sufficient RC	Sufficient RC	Sufficient RC	Sufficient RC
Other?					

* Potential AC force reduction savings if RC can assume mission

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FW/ARW Korea: Conditions & Standards

Conditions & Standards Factor	Issue
Assured Access	Assuming that appropriate units are identified, proper planning should permit access
Training	Wing/squadron training should be achievable prior to rotation
Basing and Infrastructure	Basing and infrastructure for AC adequate for RC
Duty Status	Decision needed as to duration of rotational tour. Are there issues with RC tour length?
Medical Readiness	With appropriate lead time RC medical readiness should be comparable to that required of forward deployed AC
National Support	A potential issue for RC deployments to non combat areas. Does state political support exist?
Recruiting	Potentially a positive impact on recruiting
Retention	Potentially a positive impact on retention; however, civilian career/family issues could be negative
Equipment Needs	This should not be an issue, assuming that support equipment remains in place and A/C are rotated
Planning Complexity	No significant challenges are anticipated
C2/legal authority issues	Potential impediments exist in terms of laws and policies


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Rotational Unit RC Option: Air Support, UK

- RC units from CONUS provide Fires Brigade, Fighter Wing Equivalent, and Aerial Tanker Wing for Korea; **Fighter Wing and Aerial Tanker Wing for Europe**
- **Assigned forces of interest in U.K.:**
 - **RAF Lakenheath:**
 - 48th Fighter Wing**
 - 492nd & 494th Fighter Squadrons (F-15E)**
 - 493rd Fighter Squadron (F-15 C/D)**

F-15E not projected to meet interim AC/RC BOG/Dwell rotation goals

- **RAF Mildenhall:**
 - 100th Aerial Refueling Wing**
 - 351st Aerial Refueling Squadron (KC-135)**

BOG/Dwell Goals
AC = 1:4
RC = 1:5


Issues:

- Must UK rotational units be F-15 squadrons?
- Are there sufficient RC and ANG F-15 squadrons to support UK rotation?


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48th Fighter Wing

- **48th Operations Group**
 - **492nd Fighter Squadron (F-15E)**
 - **494th Fighter Squadron (F-15E)**
 - **493rd Fighter Squadron (F-15 C/D)**
 - **56th Rescue Squadron (HH-60G)**
- **48th Maintenance Group**
- **48th Mission Support Group**
- **48th Medical Group**

Located at RAF Lakenheath, U.K.



F-15C



F-15D

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Air Reserve Fighter Squadrons

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- 419th Fighter Wing, (F-16), Hill AFB, UT
- 442nd Fighter Wing, (A-10), Whiteman AFB, MO
- 482nd Fighter Wing, (F-16C), Homestead Air Reserve Base, FL
- 944th Fighter Wing, (F-16), Luke AFB, AZ [also trains USAF, AFR, ANG, and Allied F-16 pilots]
- 477th Fighter Group, (F-22A), Elmendorf AFB, AK

All units fall under command of 10th Air Force, NAS JRB, Ft Worth, TX

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Note:
There are no F-15 C/D/E Squadrons in the Air Force Reserve

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Air National Guard Fighter Squadrons

- 100th Fighter Squadron (F-16 C/D), Montgomery, AL
- 103rd Fighter Squadron, (A-10), Willow Grove, PA
- 104th Fighter Squadron, (A-10), Martin State Airport, MD
- 107th Fighter Squadron, (A-10), Selfridge ANG Base, MI
- 112th Fighter Squadron, (F-16 C/D), Toledo, OH
- 114th Fighter Squadron, (F-15 C), Kingsley Field, OR
- 119th Fighter Squadron, (F-16C), Atlantic City, NJ
- 120th Fighter Squadron, (F-16 C/D), Buckley AFB, CO
- 121st Fighter Squadron, (F-16 C/D), Andrews AFB, MD
- 122nd Fighter Squadron, (F-15C), NAS JRB, New Orleans, LA
- 123rd Fighter Squadron, (F-16 C/D), Buckley AFB, CO
- 124th Fighter Squadron, (F-16 C/D), Des Moines, IA
- 125th Fighter Squadron, (F-16C), Tulsa, OK
- 131st Fighter Squadron, (F-15C), Barnes Municipal Airport, MA
- 134th Fighter Squadron, (F-16C), Burlington, VT
- 138th Fighter Squadron, ((F-16), Syracuse, NY
- 148th Fighter Squadron, (F-16A), Tucson, AZ
- 149th Fighter Squadron, (F-22A), Langley AFB, VA
- 152nd Fighter Squadron, (F-16 C/D), Tucson, AZ
- 157th Fighter Squadron, (F-16C), McEntire JNG Base, SC
- 159th Fighter Squadron, (F-15C), Jacksonville, FL
- 160th Fighter Squadron, F-16 C/D), Montgomery, AL
- 162nd Fighter Squadron, (F-16 C/D), Springfield-Beckley Airport, OH
- 163rd Fighter Squadron, (F-16 C/D), Fort Wayne, IN



F-15E




F-22A

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Air National Guard Fighter Squadrons



- 170th Fighter Squadron, (F-16 C/D), Abraham Lincoln Airport, IL
- 172nd Fighter Squadron, (A-10), Kellogg Regional Airport, MI
- 175th Fighter Squadron, (F-16 C/D), Sioux falls, SD
- 176th Fighter Squadron, (F-16 C/D), Dane County, WI
- 179th Fighter Squadron, (F-16C), Duluth, MN
- 182nd Fighter Squadron, (F-16 C/D), Kelly Field Annex, TX
- 184th Fighter Squadron, (A-10), Fort Smith, AS
- **186th Fighter Squadron, (F-15C), Great Falls, MT**
- 188th Fighter Squadron, (F-16 C/D), Kirtland AFB, NM
- 190th Fighter Squadron, (A-10), Boise, ID
- 194th Fighter Squadron, (F-16C), Fresno, CA
- 195th Fighter Squadron, (F-16 E/F), Tucson, AZ
- **199th Fighter Squadron, (F-15C, F-22A), Hickam AFB, HI**




F-15E


Note: There are only six F-15 C Squadrons in the Air National Guard; there are no F-15E squadrons

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100th Air Refueling Wing



- **100th Operations Group**
 - **351st Air Refueling Squadron (15 KC-135R/ 27 KC-135 crews)**
 - 100th Operations Support Squadron
- **100th Maintenance Group**
 - 100th Maintenance Operations Squadron
 - 100th Maintenance Squadron
- **100th Mission Support Group**
 - 100th Civil Engineer Squadron
 - 100th Communications Squadron
 - 100th Logistics Readiness Squadron
 - 100th Force Support Squadron
 - 100th Security Forces Squadron

Located at RAF Mildenhall, U.K.



Refuels U.S. and Partner nations (20 million square miles)

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Air Reserve Refueling Squadrons


- 434th Air Refueling Wing, Grissom AFB, IN
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- 916th Air Refueling Wing, Seymour Johnson AFB, NC
- 927th Air Refueling Wing, MacDill AFB, FL
- 931st Air Refueling Group, McConnell AFB, KS

All units fall under command of 4th Air Force at March ARB, CA

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NOTE: There appears to be sufficient Air Reserve Refueling Squadrons

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Air National Guard Refueling Squadrons

- 117th Air Refueling Wing, Birmingham, AL
- 168th Air Refueling Wing, Eielson AFB, AK
- 161st Air Refueling Wing, Phoenix, AZ
- 126th Air Refueling Wing, Scott AFB, IL
- 185th Air Refueling Wing, Sioux City, IA
- 190th Air Refueling Wing, Topeka, KS
- 101st Air Refueling Wing, Bangor, ME
- 186th Air Refueling Wing, Meridian, MS
- 155th Air Refueling Wing, Lincoln, NE
- 157th Air Refueling Wing, Pease ANGB, NH
- 108th Air Refueling Wing, McGuire AFB, NJ
- 121st Air Refueling Wing, Columbus, OH
- 137th Air Refueling Wing, Will Rogers ANGB, OK (an associate organization with 507th ARW)
- 171st Air Refueling Wing, Coraopolis, PA
- 134th Air Refueling Wing, McGhee Tyson ANGB, TN
- 151st Air Refueling Wing, Salt Lake City, UT
- 141st Air Refueling Wing, Fairchild AFB, WA
- 128th Air Refueling Wing, Milwaukee, WI


KC-135




NOTE: There appears to be sufficient Air Reserve Refueling Squadrons

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FW/ARW UK, Capability Considerations




Capability Metric	Scenarios				
	MCO	Large Scale Stability	Steady State Engagement	HA/DR	HD/DSCA
Response Time?	No difference	No difference	No difference	No difference	No difference
Provides Desired Capability?	AC and RC comparable	AC and RC comparable	AC and RC comparable	AC and RC comparable	AC and RC comparable
Appropriately Equipped?	AC/RC comparable	AC/RC comparable	AC/RC comparable	AC/RC comparable	AC/RC comparable
Appropriately Trained?	Similar training	Similar training	Similar training	Similar training	Similar training
Number of Units?	Sufficient RC	Sufficient RC	Sufficient RC	Sufficient RC	Sufficient RC
Other?					

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FW/ARW UK: Conditions & Standards

Conditions & Standards Factor	Issue
Assured Access	Assuming that appropriate units are identified, proper planning should permit access
Training	Wing/squadron training should be achievable prior to rotation
Basing and Infrastructure	Basing and infrastructure for AC adequate for RC
Duty Status	Decision needed as to duration of rotational tour. Are there issues with RC tour length?
Medical Readiness	With appropriate lead time RC medical readiness should be comparable to that required of forward deployed AC
National Support	A potential issue for RC deployments to non combat areas. Does state political support exist?
Recruiting	Potentially a positive impact on recruiting
Retention	Potentially a positive impact on retention; however, civilian career/family issues could be negative
Equipment Needs	This should not be an issue, assuming that support equipment remains in place and A/C are rotated
Planning Complexity	No significant challenges are anticipated
C2/legal authority issues	Potential impediments exist in terms of laws and policies

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Cost Considerations for Fires Brigade in Korea and FW/ARW in Korea & UK	
Cost Element	Potential Impact
Personnel	<u>Potential cost savings</u> of employing 6-8 RC capabilities (in a rotation) compared to the total cost of 3 AC capabilities over the same period
Equipment	<u>Little/no equipment cost impact</u> if RC falls in on AC equipment and/or if RC brings their own; however, some costs could be incurred if there is a need to upgrade the RC equipment via additional procurement
Training	<u>Additional training costs</u> could be incurred if some RC need to be trained on MLRS (if their previous training was exclusively on HIMARS)
Installations & Facilities	<u>Significant cost savings</u> could be evident if infrastructure to support AC families can be eliminated due to rotational RC concept

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Laws, Policies & Doctrine for Fires Brigade in Korea and FW/ARW in Korea and UK	
	Consideration
Laws	Existing laws need to be examined dependent on the proposed tour duration and C2 related issues
Policies	Policies/laws pertaining to C2/legal authority may need to be revised
Doctrine	No anticipated doctrinal impacts


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Other Issues, Considerations or Options




Other potential units to be addressed and recorded during
Option 2 Breakout Session

- Identify other unit types appropriate for RC rotation
 - Heavy Brigade Combat Team
 - Military Intelligence Brigade
 - Combat Aviation Brigade
 - Sustainment Brigade
 - Medical Brigade
 - Assign RC forces with DSCA, UAV operations, intell, space, cyber, and training expertise to NORTHCOM on a rotational basis to accomplish CONUS missions wrt HD/DSCA (proposed during August 2010 Workshop)
- Identify AC vs. RC cost/benefit implications

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Survey?

**119 questions
(13 x 9 options) +
name & org**



Questions (for each AC-RC Rebalancing Option)	Rating
1) Assess the feasibility of this option?	1 = difficult ... 5 = easy
2) To what extent will this option enhance Total Force capabilities?	1 = none ... 5 = substantial
3) To what extent does this option reduce stress on the AC?	1 = none ... 5 = substantial
4) To what extent does this option preserve the national investment and readiness gains achieved within RC over the past decade?	1 = none ... 5 = substantial
5) To what extent will this option affect DoD costs?	1 = large increase ... 3 = no effect ... 5 = large decrease
6) Without regard to specific examples, rate this option category in terms of its overall utility for rebalancing the AC-RC mix	1 = limited, 2 = marginal, 3 = fair, 4 = good, 5 = excellent
7) Is this the best example to use to illustrate this type of option	1 = yes ; 2 = no
8) If your answer is "no", please describe the option you recommend	Text response
9) Assess the feasibility of your preferred option	1 = difficult ... 5 = easy
10) Assess the capability benefit of your preferred option	1 = none ... 5 = substantial
11) Assess the cost impact of your preferred option	1 = large increase ... 3 = no effect ... 5 = large decrease
12) Please identify any conditions & standards impacts for your option	Text response
13) Please identify any law, policy, or doctrine impacts for your option	Text response



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Questions

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AC-RC Option 3

14 September 2010


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Option 3 focuses on the alignment of specific RC units, teams, and individuals with selected JF HQs, COCOMs, and DoD and Service components in order to facilitate access to RC units, sub-units, teams, and personnel, thus building long-term relationships. Joint Force Commanders desire enduring capabilities for security, engagement, relief, and reconstruction activities that deliver continuity of effort and unique skills. Force providers welcome relief to AC OPTEMPO that RC employment can provide. Additionally, this provides assurance that the RC forces are available in an operational role when required. Over the past decade, the Department has experienced numerous instances where the employment of smaller, tailored teams has been critical to mission success (PRTs, ADTs, MTTs, etc.) The RC is well-suited for predictable long term missions that count on the establishment and sustainment of long term relationships partners, and many contemporary requirements are of this nature. Significant value in having RC aligned to geographical or functional COCOMs so that relationships can be developed, so that aligned RC understand the theater and can be brought on active duty with minimal pre-deployment training. Engagement teams with wide variety of skills (across these teams) can conduct mentoring or “train the trainer” type missions to help professionalize partner militaries. DoD has lacked formally structured forces for many of these requirements and has therefore sourced many in an ad-hoc fashion with force packages that disband upon return from theater. Normal Service assignment and rotation patterns limit the AC’s capacity to meet Joint Force Commander needs for persistent engagement forces with a range of appropriate skills, regional knowledge, and relationships sustained over time. Many of these activities are predictable and well-suited for RC.

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Option Description



Option	Description	Specific Forces To Be Examined
Align RC units, teams, and individuals with specific DoD components	Align specific RC units, teams, and individuals with selected JF HQs, COCOMs, and DoD and Service components in order to facilitate access to RC units, sub-units, teams, and personnel and thereby build long-term relationships	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A. Align RC units/personnel with selected COCOMs B. Align specific RC units/personnel with specific Service functions C. Align specific RC units/personnel with DOD agencies (consider Interagency partners for whole of government solutions)

• *“To provide trained Reserve Component (RC) personnel to augment and fully integrate into the combatant commander’s staff, leveraging military experience, civilian skills, and availability to meet peacetime, crisis and wartime requirements on a timely basis.”*

We will return to the issue of “alignment” later in this brief.


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References:


- Duklis, Peter S. The Joint Reserve Component Virtual Information Operations Organization (JRVIO); Cyber Warriors Just a Click Away. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 09 April 2002.
- Hopkins, Donna L. Joint Reserve Forces: An Evolution in Military Affairs. *JFQ Spring* 1998.
- *How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook*. 2007- 2008.
- <http://www.jfcom.mil/reserve/jru.htm>.
- http://www.jfcom.mil/reserve/jru_history.htm.
- OSD(RA) RTM, Military Engagement Teams (METs) [Information Paper], 25 March 2010.
- Summers, Clark. “Splicing the Reserve Component Stovepipe- Joint Reserve Command.” Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 18 March 2008

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Motivation for Including in Study




- Joint Force Commanders desire enduring capabilities for security, engagement, relief and reconstruction activities that deliver continuity of effort and unique skills. Force providers welcome relief to AC OPTEMPO that RC employment can provide. Provides assurance that the RC forces are available in an operational role when required. Over the past decade, the Department has experienced numerous instances where the employment of smaller, tailored teams has been critical to mission success (PRTs, ADTs, MTTs, etc.) The RC is well-suited for predictable long term missions that count on the establishment and sustainment of long term relationships partners, and many contemporary requirements are of this nature.
- Significant value in having RC aligned to geographical or functional COCOMs so that relationships can be developed, so that aligned RC understand the theater & can be brought on active duty with minimal predeployment training. Engagement teams with wide variety of skills (across these teams) can conduct mentoring or “train the trainer” type missions to help professionalize partner militaries.
- DoD has lacked formally structured forces for many of these requirements and has therefore sourced many in an ad-hoc fashion with force packages that disband upon return from theater. Normal Service assignment and rotation patterns limit the AC’s capacity to meet Joint Force Commander needs for persistent engagement forces with a range of appropriate skills, regional knowledge, and relationships sustained over time. Many of these activities are predictable and well-suited for RC.

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References:

- Duklis, Peter S. The Joint Reserve Component Virtual Information Operations Organization (JRVIO); Cyber Warriors Just a Click Away. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 09 April 2002.
- Hopkins, Donna L. Joint Reserve Forces: An Evolution in Military Affairs. *JFQ Spring 1998*.
- *How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook*. 2007- 2008.
- <http://www.jfcom.mil/reserve/jru.htm>.
- http://www.jfcom.mil/reserve/jru_history.htm.
- OSD(RA) RTM, Military Engagement Teams (METs) [Information Paper], 25 March 2010.
- Summers, Clark. “Splicing the Reserve Component Stovepipe- Joint Reserve Command.” Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 18 March 2008

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Relevant Historical Experience



- 1991: TRANSCOM formed a joint transportation Reserve unit to meet strategic mobility requirements in the face of dwindling assets.

- Joint Staff approved the Joint Reserve Unit (JRU) concept in 1995.

- USJFCOM, then Atlantic Command, implemented their formal JRU in 1996; currently the only JRU that incorporates all seven of the armed service components (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Army and Air National Guard, and Coast Guard Reserve).

- Other COCOMs and DoD agencies subsequently established some variation on the JRU concept.

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References:

- AFRICOM Reserve Personnel Management Guide, Version 1, current as of Apr 2010 : “JRU – Joint Reserve Unit. Is an old term. Has been replaced by individual units for each service. Army ARE, Navy NOSC, and Air Force Det 21.”
- Duklis, Peter S. The Joint Reserve Component Virtual Information Operations Organization (JRPIO); Cyber Warriors Just a Click Away. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 09 April 2002.
- <http://www.jfcom.mil/reserve/jru.htm>
- http://www.jfcom.mil/reserve/jru_history.htm
- OSD(RA) RTM. Military Engagement Teams (METs) [Information Paper], 25 March 2010.
- Summers, Clark. Splicing the Reserve Component Stovepipe- Joint Reserve Command. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 18 March 2008.
- Thie, Harry, Harrell, Margaret C., Kirby, Sheila Nataraj. Crego, Al. Yardley, Roland J., and Nagda Sonia. *Framing a Strategic Approach for Reserve Component Joint Officer Management*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006.

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COCOM Perspectives*



- AFRICOM – most requirements ISO TSC mission call for small teams (2-6 personnel) for 1-4 weeks duration on a persistent basis (continued engagement 2-4 times per year). Theater aligned RC forces are critical due to need to develop relationships with specific countries over a long period of time. TSC requirements include forces that have linguistic and cultural knowledge/ experience which cannot be provided by AC forces (the vast majority of which PCS every 3 years & rarely serve in same unit more than once). The RC MET would be a good fit to AFRICOM requirements if they were aligned vice allotted forces.
- STRATCOM – requires “Forces For” aligned units that are trained & equipped to achieve their unique missions, i.e., nuclear C2, cyber, etc. – these are not missions suited for GPF
- NORTHCOM – RC has a major role in HLD in addition to DSCA role. Recognizing that NG will be the “first responders”, one way to ensure “speed of response” would be to provide NORTHCOM with a large number of allocated forces (perhaps geographically oriented/organized relative to established FEMA regions)

* Based on August workshop blog comments

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Specific Proposed Solutions*



- Identify an Army NG MI structure aligned to NORTHCOM to provide support during a HLD crisis – Army MI could come out of border states and/or key target states – develops relationships with NORTHCOM and includes participation in exercises and preparations for various events
- Agricultural development team made up of professional farmers in Army could become a unique MET and go into theater for 30 days per year
- VADM Jacoby (director of Military Intelligence) has recommended to USD (I) & to Congress that CENTCOM develop a true JRU (not the notional one that exists today)
- NAS JRB NOLA would be an ideal location for a joint RC force regionally aligned to the Gulf Coast region and focused on DSCA response (for hurricanes, oil spills, etc.)
- A good construct would be a JTF JRU regionally aligned with FEMA regions, OPCON to the COCOM CDR, manned as rotational RC forces/units and using IMAs as a surge/augment force
- METs should reside in RC – looks like a robust civil affairs activity
- National Guard could be aligned to COCOMs via the use of JTMD similar to SOCOM

* Based on August workshop blog comments

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Sub-Options and Approaches



- **Three sub-options under consideration:**
 - A. Align RC units/personnel with selected COCOMs
 - B. Align specific RC units/personnel with specific Service functions
 - C. Align specific RC units/personnel with DOD agencies (consider Interagency partners for whole of government solutions)

- **For each sub-option, three possible approaches to alignment (JP1-02):**
- **Assignment:** “To place units of personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively permanent, and/or where such organization controls and administers the units or personnel for the primary function, or the greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel.”
- **Apportionment:** “In a general sense, distribution for planning of limited resources among competing requirements.”
- **Allocation:** “In a general sense, distribution for employment of limited forces and resources among competing requirements.”

[Combatant Commanders] want trained, experienced augmentees with minimum administrative exertion. (D. L. Hopkins)

Synergy between AC and RC cannot be achieved easily if Reservists are assigned and administered as service contributions...rather than as members of joint commands. (D.L. Hopkins)

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Key Evaluation Criteria



- **Responsiveness to Joint Force Commander needs**
- **Availability to higher priority Departmental needs**
- **Provision of administration/support**

Commanders' key requirements:

- 1. Ability to write orders**
- 2. Ability to pay for forces**

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Definitions (JP1-02)







- **Administrative Control (ADCON):** “Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations.”
- **Operational Control (OPCON):**Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command.
- **Tactical Control (TACON):** “Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.”

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 <h2 align="center">Sub-Option A: Align RC units/ personnel with selected COCOMs</h2> 					
Capability Metric	Scenario				
	MCO	Large-Scale Stability	Steady State Engagement	HA/DR	HD/DSCA
Response Time?	<u>Aligned unit provide "plug" that GFP needs? (i.e. Army AABs)</u>	Decreased due to easier access to pool of RC volunteers	Decreased due to easier access to pool of RC volunteers	<u>Habitual relationships can enhance responsiveness</u> access to pool of RC volunteers	Decreased due to easier access to pool of RC volunteers
Provides Desired Capability?	<u>Could provide a pool of regional/cultural experts ISO MCO force flow</u>	Provides better continuity from habitual relationships	Better continuity with host nation, coalition partners, Interagency partners	Provides better continuity ; COCOM capable of issuing orders and funding due to short notice?	Potential to NOT source with rotational forces but with permanent Title 10 RC structure
Appropriately Equipped?	<u>Equipment requirements tailored for nature of mission</u>	<u>Equipment requirements tailored for nature of mission</u>	<u>Equipment requirements tailored for nature of mission</u>	<u>Equipment requirements tailored for nature of mission</u>	<u>Equipment requirements tailored for nature of mission</u>
Appropriately Trained?	<u>Expertise acquired from immersion during dwell invaluable</u>	Greater continuity means reduced predeployment TNG time	How does COCOM influence preparation? TNG oversight role?	TNG should focus on crises for that region (e.g. monsoons in south Asia) Continuity means reduced requirement for training	Equip specifically for DOD component of national response
Number of aligned Units?	<u>Leverage individuals from aligned units for MCO deploying units?</u>	<u>Align collective unit with COCOM that becomes an SC force provider?</u>	<u>Spread collective unit across rotational availability model?</u>	<u>Pilot program to ascertain optimal number of aligned units?</u>	<u>Alignment concept could include COCOMs with US territories</u>
Others?	COCOMs could include aligned units in contingency plans	DOD part of Whole of Government (WOG) solutions	Key for predictable, persistent, recurring challenges	Relationships could leveraged no notice incidents	OCONUS/CONUS needs similar; "dual-use force?"

 <h2 align="center">Sub-Option B: Align Specific RC Units/ Personnel w. Specific Service Functions</h2> 					
Capability Metric	Scenario				
	MCO	Large-Scale Stability	Steady State Engagement	HA/DR	HD/DSCA
Response Time?	<u>Focused capability for SVC duties in large-scale ops</u>	Decreased due to easier access to pool of RC volunteers	Decreased due to easier access to pool of RC volunteers	Decreased due to easier access to pool of RC volunteers	Decreased due to easier access to pool of RC volunteers
Provides Desired Capability?	<u>For Service functions where unit turnover is counterproductive</u>	<u>Aligned unit prepares for specific Service function exclusively</u>	<u>Aligned units should not be ad-hoc but part of force structure</u>	<u>Aligned unit mission can always be trumped for higher priorities</u>	USG partners prefer same organizations for recurring exercises
Appropriately Equipped?	<u>Equipment requirements tailored for mission</u>	<u>Equipment requirements tailored for mission</u>	<u>Equipment requirements tailored for mission</u>	<u>Equipment requirements tailored for mission</u>	<u>Equipment requirements tailored for mission</u>
Appropriately Trained?	<u>Assist operational force as part of generating force?</u>	Greater continuity means reduced requirement for training	Greater continuity means reduced requirement for training	<u>Functional expertise toward response & consequence mgt</u>	<u>Focus on the range of domestic crises - all hazards</u>
Number of aligned Units?	<u>Base on # of functions SVC wants fence forces for</u>	<u>Should anticipate long duration</u>	Potentially takes aligned unit out of SVC rotation models		
Others?	In general, can leverage civilian skill sets				

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Sub-Option C: Align Specific RC Units/Personnel with DOD Agencies					
Capability Metric	Scenario				
	MCO	Large-Scale Stability	Steady State Engagement	HA/DR	HD/DSCA
Response Time?	Largely unaffected	Decreased due to easier access to pool of RC volunteers	Decreased due to easier access to pool of RC volunteers	Decreased due to easier access to pool of RC volunteers	Decreased due to easier access to pool of RC volunteers
Provides Desired Capability?	<u>Habitual relationship enhances performance</u>	<u>If with IA, promotes WOG approaches (an NSS priority)</u>	<u>DOD can export competencies, such as planning processes</u>	<u>DOD can export surge capacity ideas, to include mgmt of an RC</u>	<u>DHS/FEMA will be USG lead; leverage RC expertise with civil authorities provides better continuity</u>
Appropriately Equipped?	<u>Equipment requirements tailored for mission</u>	<u>Equipment requirements tailored for mission</u>	<u>Equipment requirements tailored for mission</u>	<u>Equipment requirements tailored for mission</u>	<u>Equipment requirements tailored for mission</u>
Appropriately Trained?	Largely unaffected	Yes – greater continuity means reduced requirement for training	Yes – greater continuity means reduced requirement for training	Yes – greater continuity means reduced requirement for training	Yes – greater continuity means reduced requirement for training
Number of Units?	Largely Unaffected	Largely Unaffected	Largely Unaffected	Largely Unaffected	Largely Unaffected
Others?	Willingness to be utilized at rate different than typical SELRES	Recurring exercises/rehearsals have the same DOD 'face'	SecDef has promoted "IA funding" for WOG solutions	In general, look to leverage civilian skill sets	

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Sub-Option Conditions & Standards (1 of 2)			
Sub-Opt.	A. Align w. COCOM	B. Align w. Service	C. Align w. Agency
Factor			
Assured Access	Access should be enhanced (improved timeliness, continuity).	Access should be enhanced (improved timeliness, continuity).	Access should be enhanced (improved timeliness, continuity).
Training	Skills not easily transferable between COCOMs (D.L. Hopkins) Would require (expensive) modifications to RC career paths and training doctrine to ensure assignability/promotability of JRU members (D.L. Hopkins)	No significant impact.	No significant impact.
Basing and Infrastructure	No significant impact. Potential travel savings if unit is staffed with individuals in the geographic area.	No significant impact. Potential travel savings if unit is staffed with individuals in the geographic area.	No significant impact. Potential travel savings if unit is staffed with individuals in the geographic area.
Duty Status	Legal implications: Title 10 gives the separate Services direct and doctrinally exclusive control over their respective Reserve Component formations. (Summers, Navy Planner's Memo 2002)	No significant impact.	No significant impact.
Medical Readiness	No significant impact.	No significant impact.	No significant impact.

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Sub-Option Conditions & Standards (2 of 2)			
Factor	A. Align w. COCOM	B. Align w. Service	C. Align w. Agency
National Support	No significant impact.	No significant impact.	No significant impact.
Recruiting	No significant impact.	No significant impact.	No significant impact.
Retention	Potential positive if sustained relationship with particular COCOM is appealing.	Potential positive if sustained relationship with particular COCOM is appealing.	Potential positive if sustained relationship with particular COCOM is appealing.
Equipment Needs	No significant impact.	No significant impact.	No significant impact.
Planning Complexity	Services' Reserve Components are "stovepiped" and not structured for joint applications. (Summers)	No significant impact.	No significant impact.
	Currently no formal, deliberate planning or common doctrinal method for building, generating or utilizing RC members for joint applications. (Summers)		
Others?	Required end-strength offsets make option unpalatable to services. (Navy Planner's Memo 2002) Requires "purple money" (Groupware comments).	No significant impact.	No significant impact.
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Approach Conditions & Standards (1 of 2)			
Factor	Assignment	Apportionment	Allocation
Assured Access	Greatest degree of COCOM control. Assigned forces readily available to COCOM for planning, preparation and execution	Creates responsive availability challenges for COCOMs in that apportionment only distributes forces for planning	As a distribution for employment, allocation should be responsive to COCOM demands
Training	No significant impact.	No significant impact.	No significant impact.
Basing and Infrastructure	No significant impact.	No significant impact.	No significant impact.
Duty Status	Title 10 legal implications. Potential for COCOM to take available joint, multi-year funds and place the quantity of RC units/personnel on full-time duty	No significant impact.	No significant impact.
Medical Readiness	No significant impact.	No significant impact.	No significant impact.
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Approach Conditions & Standards (2 of 2)			
Factor	Assignment	Apportionment	Allocation
National Support	No significant impact.	No significant impact.	No significant impact.
Recruiting	No significant impact.	No significant impact.	No significant impact.
Retention	No significant impact.	No significant impact.	No significant impact.
Equipment Needs	No significant impact.	No significant impact.	No significant impact.
Planning Complexity	High degree of coordination required to reorient assigned forces to other priorities.	Facilitates the Department's ability to reorient apportioned forces to other priorities	Requires a moderate degree of coordination for the Department to reorient allocated forces to other priorities
Others?	Potential for COCOMs to have to assume administration of assigned forces	Very limited COCOM administration concerns	Very limited COCOM administration concerns

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Institutional Resistance



- N-1: End strength offsets are required to resource the joint and strength being requested.
 - Funding for the JRIU billets is being requested through the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP). Under current end strength constraints, additional end strength obtained for the JRIU would require an equivalent offset from Navy, regardless of GDIP funding. Navy does not support providing end strength offsets to JRIU.
- N2: The potentially significant legal implications of establishing a Joint Reserve unit have not been sufficiently researched.
 - Under the proposed JRIU, Naval Reservists would fall under joint, rather than Navy, command and control. The various consequences of this precedence-setting (sic) command structure must be identified and considered. In addition, the impact upon Navy's ability to mobilize Naval Reservists who are assigned to the JRIU must be considered.



FOR CHIEF RESERVE RESERVE: GOOD EXAMPLE OF BARRIERS OR RESISTANCE TO BUILDING JOINT UNITS.

“Good example of barriers or resistance to building Joint units.”



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 <h2 align="center">Cost Considerations</h2> 		
Sub-options:		
A. Align w. COCOM	B. Align w. Service	C. Align w. Agency
Increased PME costs for RC members.		
Approaches:		
Assignment	Apportionment	Allocation
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 <h2 align="center">Laws, Policies & Doctrine Sub-Options</h2> 			
	A. Align w. COCOM	B. Align w. Service	C. Align w. Agency
Laws	Title 10 gives the separate Services direct and doctrinally exclusive control over their respective Reserve Component formations.		Title 10 gives the separate Services direct and doctrinally exclusive control over their respective Reserve Component formations.
Policy	Modifications to RC career paths to ensure assignability/promotability of RC members. Purple" money.	Purple" money.	Modifications to RC career paths to ensure assignability/promotability of RC members. Purple" money.
Doctrine	Modifications to training doctrine to ensure assignability/promotability of RC members.		Modifications to training doctrine to ensure assignability/promotability of RC members.
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 Laws, Policies & Doctrine Approaches 			
	Assignment	Apportionment	Allocation
Laws	Title 10 gives the separate Services direct and doctrinally exclusive control over their respective Reserve Component formations.		Title 10 gives the separate Services direct and doctrinally exclusive control over their respective Reserve Component formations.
Policy	Purple" money.	Purple" money.	Purple" money.
Doctrine	Common doctrine for building, generating or utilizing RC members for joint applications.	Common doctrine for building, generating or utilizing RC members for joint applications.	Common doctrine for building, generating or utilizing RC members for joint applications.

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 Summary of Assessment Elements Sub-Options 			
Assessment Element	A. Align w. COCOM	B. Align w. Service	C. Align w. Agency
Capabilities			
Conditions & Standards			
Cost			
Laws, Policies, Doctrine			

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 Summary of Assessment Elements Approaches 			
Assessment Element	Assignment	Apportionment	Allocation
Capabilities			
Conditions & Standards			
Cost			
Laws, Policies, Doctrine			

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 Survey? 	
1) Assess the feasibility of this option?	1 = easy ... 5 = difficult
2) To what extent will this option enhance Total Force capabilities?	1 = none ... 5 = substantial
3) To what extent does this option reduce stress on the AC?	1 = none ... 5 = substantial
4) To what extent does this option preserve the national investment and readiness gains achieved within RC over the past decade?	1 = none ... 5 = substantial
5) To what extent will this option affect DoD costs?	1 = large increase ... 3 = no effect ... 5 = large decrease
6) Is this the best example to use to illustrate this type of option?	1 = yes ; 2 = no
7) If your answer is "no", please describe the option you recommend	Text response
8) Assess the feasibility of your preferred option	1 = easy ... 5 = difficult
9) Assess the capability benefit of your preferred option	1 = none ... 5 = substantial
10) Assess the cost impact of your preferred option	1 = large increase ... 3 = no effect ... 5 = large decrease
11) Please identify any conditions & standards impacts for your option	Text response
12) Please identify any law, policy, or doctrine impacts for your option	Text response
13) Without regard to specific examples, rate this option category in terms of its overall utility for rebalancing the AC-RC mix	1 = limited, 2 = marginal, 3 = fair, 4 = good, 5 = excellent

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Assignment Approach



- **Analysis:**
 - Exceeds allocation and apportionment in terms of degree of COCOM control
 - Assigned forces readily available to COCOM for planning, preparation and execution
 - High degree of coordination required to reorient assigned forces to other priorities. That said, there's recent precedence of tasking assigned forces to higher priority missions outside of COCOM AOR
 - EUCOM and Korea forces to OIF/OEF
 - Potential for COCOMs to have to assume administration of assigned forces
 - Potential for COCOM to take available joint, multi-year funds and place the quantity of RC units/personnel on full-time duty

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Apportionment Approach



- **Analysis:**
 - A level of control exceeded by both allocation and assignment
 - Creates responsive availability challenges for COCOMs in that apportionment only distributes forces for planning
 - Facilitates the Department's ability to reorient apportioned forces to other priorities
 - Very limited COCOM administration concerns

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Allocation Approach




- **Analysis:**
 - In terms of degree of control, exceeds apportionment but exceeded by assignment
 - As a distribution for employment, allocation should be responsive to COCOM demands (Access)
 - Requires a moderate degree of coordination for the Department to reorient allocated forces to other priorities
 - Limited COCOM administration concerns

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A. Align Units/Personnel with selected COCOMs



- **Definition:** The JRU is a command and control organization responsible for subordinate reserve units that incorporate all seven of the armed service reserve components (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Army National Guard, Air National Guard, and Coast Guard Reserve). The JRU consolidates administrative, training, and security functions common to all reserve component service elements.

```
graph TD; CJRU[Commander Joint Reserve Unit] --- AR[AR Element]; CJRU --- USNR[USNR Element]; CJRU --- USAFR[USAFR Element]; CJRU --- USMCR[USMCR Element]; CJRU --- USCGR[USCGR Element]; CJRU --- ARNG[ARNG Element]; CJRU --- ANG[ANG Element];
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- Thie, Harry, Harrell, Margaret C., Kirby, Sheila Nataraj. Crego, Al. Yardley, Roland J., and Nagda Sonia. *Framing a Strategic Approach for Reserve Component Joint Officer Management*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006.

Also from RAND: The Joint Reserve Directorate (JRD)...functions as a bridge between the active and reserve units—a one-stop shop through which reserve expertise can be quickly and efficiently accessed, and [the JRU at JFCOM] is the only reserve directorate at the unified command level.

There are 27 Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers located throughout...CONUS), and each of them is tasked with providing resources and reserve support to the defense intelligence community.


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B. Align Specific RC Units/Personnel with Specific Service Functions



- Service can draw whatever assets are required from the aligned Reserve unit.



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
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C. Align Specific RC Units with Selected DoD Agencies



- (Consider Interagency partners for whole of government solutions.)
- DoD/Service can draw whatever assets are required from the aligned Reserve unit.





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Option 4: Structuring RC as a Mix of Operational and Strategic Elements

15 Sept 2010
Breakout Group
Read-Ahead

COL John Scocus
OSD-RT&M(RA)

John Benedict
Jeff Hamman
JHU/APL

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Option 4 focuses on structuring the RC as a mix of operational and strategic elements by establishing national and/or regional RC units to deploy and support COCOMs and Services. This Option seeks to Identify potential demands for RC elements as DoD draws down from current conflicts. This may lead to the Potential to better operationalize RC for support to overseas activities and in defense of the homeland, with elements and capabilities providing strategic depth and surge capability when needed. This Option was broken down into three Sub-Options, but only the first was explored in detail during the break-out and plenary sessions.


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Workshop Agenda



Time	Mon Sep 20	Tues Sep 21	Weds Sep 22
8-9		Half-day Option Working Group sessions in WAL, WALPR, MP-6 (rooms N209, N217, S205, S212, S283) [0800-1145]	AC-RC Option 3 [0800-0920]
9-10			AC-RC Option 4 [0935-1105]
10-11			AC-RC Option 5 [1105-1225]
11-12	Check-In WAL Bldg 26		
12-1	WAL Overview – Ms. Pak Intro – Mr. Smiley Overview – Dr. Simmons	Return to WAL Lunch (WAL) [1200-1250]	AC-RC Option 6 [1310-1430]
1-2	IDA: Achieving Force Depth	JS J-3 Accessibility Assessment [1250-1340] OBJ 6 Update – Mr. Stratton	
2-3	JS J-8: Force Sufficiency Assessment	USAF Review AC-RC Option 1 [1440-1600]	
3-4	USMC Review USA Review	AC-RC Option 2 [1600-1720]	Survey & Wrap Up – Ms. Pak, Mr. Smiley [1535-1615]

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Summary: On Tuesday September 21st, assigned members of the Option 4 breakout group meet to discuss, assess and refine the details of the option. The assigned members were as follows:

Assigned Members

- Col Gary Dickenson
- COL Tony Kanellis
- COL John Scocos
- COL Dave Sheridan
- Col Walter Ward
- LTC Michael Goodnow
- LTC Robert Haldeman
- LtCol Mike Mawson
- Maj Sean Conroy
- Dr. John Taylor
- Mr. Jeff Hamman, JHU/APL

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Option Description

Option	Description	Specific Forces To Be Examined
Specifically structure RC as a mix of operational and strategic elements	Selected RC units provide entire units, sub-units, teams, and/or individuals at deployment frequencies and durations required to meet COCOM operational needs	<p>4a - Establish national and/or regional RC units to deploy and support COCOMs and Services</p> <p>4b - Increase NG and Reserve structure to account for AC - RC rebalance</p> <p>4c - Increase non-rotational (e.g., non-ARFORGEN) portion of RC with focus on both really big MCOs and big natural or man-made disasters on domestic front.</p>

“Due to the increased operating tempo of US military forces over the past several years, the reserve components, which traditionally have been held as the nation’s strategic reserve, are now integrated into the operational force for the execution of on-going missions.

While the problem may currently be most evident with the ground domain, the issue of the relationship between ready forces, operational reserve forces, and strategic reserve forces needs to be assessed in a comprehensive manner for all domains.”¹

¹ “Achieving Force Depth. Assessing the relationship between ready forces, operational reserve and strategic reserve for 21st century challenges”, IDA study for J8, Aug 2010

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Summary: The description of Option 4 was developed the Objective 2-4 Workshop held at JHU/APL in late August. The option was selected for assessment due to the potential impact it could have on total force capabilities.



On the first day of the Objective 2-5 Workshop, a brief was presented to the plenary titled “IDA: Achieving Force Depth” that addressed important aspects of Option 4. Specifically, the presented brief discussed and assessed how the reserve component (RC) has been used in past conflicts and specifically during the current operational operations (since 9/11). While prior to 9/11, the RC was used as a “strategic” force, vice an “operational” force. Since 9/11, the RC has been integrated with active components (AC) and used as operational forces. The IDA study looked at three different sub-options to include 1) returning to a “classic” RC approach, 2) continuing with the “current” approach, and 3) “rebalancing” the RC to support the AC. All these sub-options were used in the Option 4 breakout discussions.

Related Group Comments:

- “chairman has stated that he doesn't want the RC to snap back - keep the “strategic reserve” relevant and sharp enough that they can be relied upon and rotate through “operational reserve” on a 1:4 or 1:5”

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 **Motivation for Including in Study** 



Objective 5: Propose recommendations on rebalancing and AC/RC mix to meet COCOM demands based on the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) and the cost-benefit analysis of these proposals

- ***Access the cost/benefit of continued access to and use of the RC in an operational or strategic role.***

- ***Identify potential demands for RC elements...***
 - Potential to better operationalize RC for support to overseas activities and in defense of the homeland
 - Elements & capabilities required to provide strategic depth & surge capability when needed

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 **Motivation for Including in Study** 


From the 17 - 19 August Objective 2-4 workshop, proponent comments for maintaining a key “strategic” role for RC:

- For the Army Reserve we have a portion of our force that is “strategic”, i.e., the Non-ARFORGEN portion of the force which represents about 17K personnel
- Need enough AC and RC to provide “strategic” depth
- When fiscal reality hits, the RC will suffer deep cuts – the deeper the cuts the more “strategic” RC will become
- Should stay focused on preparation for really big MCOs and really big natural disasters (capability for recovery) – preparing for disaster is what a “strategic” reserve force is designed for – most important job – forgotten due to push of current events – need to have big enough “strategic” reserve to avert disaster in a really big MCO
- “Strategic” doesn’t mean “sitting on the bench”, e.g., can be fully engaged in HLD & DSCA missions during periods that rotational units/teams/individuals are not deployed overseas
- Needs to be not only a focus on current requirements & capabilities based on demand signal but the evaluation of what could be a shortfall with the current AC if a major conflict [high end MCO] should erupt and a different demand signal occurred – a “strategic” reserve should have some standing capabilities to help shore up this potential shortfall.
- Related Proposal: Need to maintain heavy (armor) forces for MCOs, e.g., keep 30% in AC and rest in RC since cost is less
- Related Proposal: LR strike, CBRNE, etc. used infrequently or only in largest engagements – could keep some of this capability in “strategic” reserve (but must maintain at C-1 readiness)


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Motivation for Including in Study




From the 17 - 19 August Objective 2-4 workshop, proponent comments for maintaining a key “operational” role for RC:


- Our AC force is too small to execute NMS and one of the big reasons we need to have an “operational” RC [without an RC, one must either give up much of NMS or abandon the All-Volunteer Force and go back to a draft - unlikely except in a dire national emergency]. In a future of shrinking budgets & high op tempos, RC becomes even more “operationally” relevant
- RC forces are best for building long-term relationships and conducting persistent engagement with partners all over the world [reinforcing the need for a significant “operational” force]
- RC’s best primary use should be “operational” in its contingency/surge/long-term mission roles – i.e., should be looking at how to maintain higher readiness & shorten spool-up /response times
- Don’t believe that OSD is looking at going back to a “strategic” reserve; the desire is for an “operational” reserve which implies better defined and funded missions
- Related Proposal: Cash in heavy force structure for medium (Stryker) forces that can perform in a wider range of conflicts; similarly, could cash in some structure like Fires Brigades, F15 squadrons, etc. to build more specialized niche type capabilities

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Motivation for Including in Study



From the 17 - 19 August Objective 2-4 workshop, comments regarding issues relevant to Strategic vs. Operational emphasis

- Are we planning for war or peace?
- The only way to pay for a very large “strategic” reserve equipped and trained is to stand down portions of the AC (in order to gain the necessary funding, personnel & equipment)
- “Strategic” reserve is a luxury that we may not be able to afford in this Operating Environment – too much is going on to have forces “sitting on the bench”
- “Strategic reserve” should not translate to tiered (or no) readiness and under-resourcing
- We could benefit from an acceptable definition of “strategic reserve” – are we talking about strategic impact? Level of war? Suspect that we are talking about accessibility of the RC – a strategic reserve is less accessible to a COCOM than an “operational reserve”. A strategic reserve is thus a time-related issue. Note: a strategic reserve can include AC (e.g., CONUS-based) with the definition of strategic reserve being based on time it takes to make a unit C-1 or C-2 and place it under the control of a CCDR.

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Key Factors

- **Future Expected Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO), e.g.,**
 - **Optempo** remains **relatively high** due to steady state activities (such as global engagements with various partners) and other demands (continued efforts to counter violent extremists)
 - **Optempo** goes back to closer to **pre-9/11 levels** (due to significantly reduced demand in post-OIF/OEF era)
- **Future DoD Budget Cuts, e.g.,**
 - Only **limited cuts** are evident for DoD (from flat budgets to 5-10% cuts in funding) due to critical national security challenges
 - **Significant cuts** occur to DoD budget (1/3 or more reduction possible over next 20 years according to JOE 2010)
 - Due to intense fiscal pressures on overall federal budget
 - Results in corresponding reductions in AC end strength

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
Summary: The initial key factors taken into consideration for Option 4 included the expected future OPTEMPO and DoD budget cuts.

For OPTEMPO, the group was given two levels: Relatively high due to steady state activities and on-going operations or lower OPTEMPO closer to what was the norm before 9/11. The high OPTEMPO level stresses the AC and most likely requires use of the RC to avoid undesirable BOG/Dwell. Low OPTEMPO results in the AC capable of supporting operations within BOG/Dwell.

The group decided not to consider the potential impact of budget cuts as this factor was deemed beyond the scope of the breakout session objectives.

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Summary: The above slide was presented to the breakout group to inform them of the different levels of OPTEMPO to be considered. As mentioned in the previous slide, two levels were considered (Low and High OPTEMPO).

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Historical Variations in DoD Budgets and Active Duty Military (Including Army) Personnel

Era w/ relatively low RC optempo (exception: RC use during 1990 Gulf War)

Year	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000
DoD Budget (B)	141	377	344	333	406	293	303	405	410	332	312
AD Military (M)	1.46	2.93	2.48	2.65	3.06	2.13	2.05	2.15	2.04	1.52	1.38
AD Army (K)	593	1109	873	969	1322	784	777	781	732	509	482

Era w/ high RC optempo* (2002-2012+) plus era w/ uncertain RC optempo (2015-2020 and beyond)

Year	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030
DoD Budget (B)	495**	534**	?	?	?	?
AD Military (M)	1.38	1.42	?	?	?	?
AD Army (K)	488	562	?	?	?	?

*100-200K+ RC personnel on duty (compared to <10-30K during period 1986-2001)

** Excludes funding for Overseas Contingency Ops (OCO), e.g., would increase 2010 funding shown to \$664B


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Summary: The above slide was presented to the breakout group to inform them of DoD budgets during low and high OPTEMPO. As mentioned in the previous slide, the breakout group decided to not consider budget constraints during the discussion, assessment of Option 4.


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Specific Options for Structuring RC as a Mix of Operational & Strategic Elements (Option Category 4)



- **Similar demand for RC operational element as today**
 - **Specific Sub-Option 4A:** Establish national and/or regional RC units staffed with volunteer personnel who can deploy with frequency and duration needed by supported COCOMs and Services
- **Increased demand for RC operational element compared to today**
 - **Specific Sub-Option 4B:** Increase NG and Reserve structure to account for rebalance of AC and RC mix to conduct the following:
 - MCO with 30, 60, 90 day mobilization / deployment timelines
 - Forward presence missions
 - IW/SFA/BPC/COIN mission with 30-120 day mobilization/ deployment timelines
 - HLD/DSCA/disaster relief missions on short notice
- **Opportunity for an increase in the RC strategic element compared to today (due to reduced operational demand, closer to pre- 9/11)**
 - **Specific Sub-Option 4C:** Increase non-rotational (e.g., non-ARFORGEN) portion of RC with focus on both really big MCOs that cannot be quickly won & really big natural or man-made disasters on domestic front (e.g., that have even larger regional/national impacts than a Katrina event)
 - Transition significant portions of rarely/infrequently used MCO capabilities to RC (e.g., long range strike, CBRNE, heavy (armor) forces, fire brigades) but maintain at C-1 readiness
 - Ensure that these same RC elements are also prepared to respond as needed to help in the recovery from a major catastrophic domestic event, i.e., are dual-hatted for MCOs and HLD/DSCA roles

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Summary: Three sub-options were developed for Option 4 discussions.

Sub-Option 4A proposed to establish national and/or regional RC units staffed with volunteer personnel who are “aligned” and can deploy with frequency and duration needed by supported COCOMs and Services. The volunteer personnel are from the RC and have agreed to serve in the established RC units for periods of time and/or frequency greater than what is normally required (i.e. one weekend a month, two weeks a year). The expectation is that many RC personnel will elect this type of service for multiple reasons to include being able to plan for future deployments, supporting critical and meaningful operations.

Sub-Option 4B proposed that RC units will be required to support and conduct extended deployments due to high OPTEMPO and stresses to the AC. Specifically, RC units could be deployed for 30-120 day deployments to support MCOs, forward presence missions, IW/SFA/BPCA/COIN missions and short notice HLD/DSCA disaster relief missions.

Sub-Option 4C proposed that due to low OPTEMPO as compared to today, that the portions of the RC will revert to a non-rotational basis and be structured to support large scale MCOs or HLD/DSCA operations that are protracted. Additionally, AC units that support rarely/infrequently used capabilities (e.g. long-range strike, CBRNE, heavy armor forces, fire brigades) be transitioned to non-rotational RC units and maintained at a lower level of readiness.

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Related Group Comments:

- *Need to align all RC units to COCOM's on a continuous basis for training and missions. By aligning units to COCOMs they do develop not only skill sets but also a working relationship.*
- *Better explanation of 4C: US is risking neglect of big strategic reserve for full mobilization in the event of either very large (WW II style) fights, combat in the event of HEMP attacks where our conventional technological advantage is lost, or a widespread disaster on home front (bioterrorism, high lethality viral pandemic), or other very bad, "Black Swan" events occur. These are not "COCOM operational needs"; no one really plans for the horribly big disasters or unforeseeable big conflicts. Some parts of OSD deliberately constrain the Defense Planning Scenarios and "demand signal" to avoid having services submit requests that are unfundable.*
- *COCOM RC joint service wedges of long term RC augmentation unit - senior grades which maintain expertise for years into the future - resolves CDR concerns that their staffs are ion a constant state of motion/PCS.*
- *Regionally align larger units to COCOMs and create relationship which would provide ODT or TSC opportunities that have "campaign continuity" within their AORs.*


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Specific Options for Structuring RC as a Mix of Operational & Strategic Elements (Option Category 4)



- **Similar demand for RC operational element as today**
 - **Specific Sub-Option 4A:** Establish national and/or regional RC units staffed with volunteer personnel who can deploy with frequency and duration needed by supported COCOMs and Services

- **Increased demand for RC operational element compared to today**
 - **Specific Sub-Option 4B:** Increase NG and Reserve structure to account for rebalance of AC and RC mix to conduct the following:
 - MCO with 30, 60, 90 day mobilization / deployment timelines
 - Forward presence missions
 - IW/SFA/BPC/COIN mission with 30-120 day mobilization/ deployment timelines
 - HLD/DSCA/disaster relief missions on short notice

- **Opportunity for an increase in the RC strategic element compared to today (due to reduced operational demand, closer to pre- 9/11)**
 - **Specific Sub-Option 4C:** Increase non-rotational (e.g., non-ARFORGEN) portion of RC with focus on both really big MCOs that cannot be quickly won & really big natural or man-made disasters on domestic front (e.g., that have even larger regional/national impacts than a Katrina event)

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Capability Considerations: Sub-Option 4A									
Capability Metric	Sub-Option 4A – similar demand for RC operational element as today. Establish national and/or regional RC units staffed with volunteer personnel who can deploy with frequency and duration needed by supported COCOMs and Services								
	MCO								
Response Time?	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <thead> <tr> <th style="background-color: #d9ead3; text-align: center;">Large-Scale Stability</th> <th style="background-color: #d9ead3; text-align: center;">Steady State Engagement</th> <th style="background-color: #d9ead3; text-align: center;">HA/DR</th> <th style="background-color: #d9ead3; text-align: center;">HD/DSCA</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td style="background-color: #d9ead3;"> <u>Decreased</u> due to easier access to pool of RC volunteers </td> <td style="background-color: #d9ead3;"> <u>Decreased</u> due to easier access to pool of RC volunteers </td> <td style="background-color: #d9ead3;"> <u>Decreased</u> due to easier access to pool of RC volunteers </td> <td style="background-color: #d9ead3;"> <u>Decreased</u> due to easier access to pool of RC volunteers </td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Large-Scale Stability	Steady State Engagement	HA/DR	HD/DSCA	<u>Decreased</u> due to easier access to pool of RC volunteers	<u>Decreased</u> due to easier access to pool of RC volunteers	<u>Decreased</u> due to easier access to pool of RC volunteers	<u>Decreased</u> due to easier access to pool of RC volunteers
Large-Scale Stability	Steady State Engagement	HA/DR	HD/DSCA						
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Provides Desired Capability?	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tbody> <tr> <td style="background-color: #d9ead3;"> <u>Largely unaffected</u> </td> <td style="background-color: #d9ead3;"> <u>Yes</u> – particularly if good match to civilian skill-sets </td> <td style="background-color: #d9ead3;"> <u>Yes</u> – particularly if good match to civilian skill-sets </td> <td style="background-color: #d9ead3;"> <u>Yes</u> – particularly if good match to civilian skill-sets </td> <td style="background-color: #d9ead3;"> <u>Yes</u> – particularly if good match to civilian skill-sets </td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	<u>Largely unaffected</u>	<u>Yes</u> – particularly if good match to civilian skill-sets	<u>Yes</u> – particularly if good match to civilian skill-sets	<u>Yes</u> – particularly if good match to civilian skill-sets	<u>Yes</u> – particularly if good match to civilian skill-sets			
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Summary: Each sub-option was assessed based on its impact to overall AC or RC capabilities. The breakout session results are provided in the chart above.

The breakout group agreed that aligning RC units at the national and/or regional commands (Sub-Option 4A) would increase capability across the spectrum of scenarios. A few comments were made by breakout participants on whether adequate authority policy could be implemented to provide the national and/or regional units access to the RC in a timely manner. Also, members believed that aligning RC units to national and/or regional commands based on geological location should be given a priority.

Related Group Comments:

- *The challenge is not RC accessibility but what authority exists to provide COCOM 's forces demand in a timely manner.*
- *Establish units which have professional subspecialties currently within the force structure (I.e., doctors, medical professionals) which can be used for longer durations by placing all of their drill time/AT together and they meet once or twice a year with the preponderance of their time with real world hands on training.*

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- *The decision of which units to align to COCOMs should be sensitive to location of units (I.e., Illinois based units are in area where large Polish population may be a benefit to EUCOM while a unit in a Spanish population area might benefit SOUTHCOM.*

The states may also have developed SPP relationships - where state and or fed reserve units located proximate to NG elements can leverage those relationships to further their missions/associations.

- *Big picture: A force that can respond to a crisis quickly--More aligned in the Regular Force. Stability Operations: On-going with specific capabilities and/or skills. Predictable and stable--More aligned to RCs. Strategic force--Respond to the "Big" MCO. All RC--IRR, Stand-by and those members not indentified in the other 2 categories.*

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Capability Considerations: Sub-Option 4B					
Capability Metric	Sub-Option 4B– increased demand for RC operational element compared to today. Increase NG and Reserve mix to account rebalance of AC and RC capabilities				
	MCO	Large-Scale Stability	Steady State Engagement	HA/DR	HD/DSCA
Response Time?	Increased - for short to moderate warning times	Neutral - for most warning times anticipated	Neutral - for most warning times anticipated	Neutral/Decreased – depending on situation	Largely unaffected
Provides Desired Capability?	Could be issues w/ RC in a more prominent operational role	Yes – with increased RC capacity/focus	Yes – with increased RC capacity/focus	Yes – with increased RC capacity/focus	Largely unaffected
Appropriately Equipped?	Could be issues w/ RC in a more prominent operational role	Need to address – to match increased RC force structure	Need to address – to match increased RC force structure	Need to address – to match increased RC force structure	Largely unaffected
Appropriately Trained?	Could be issues w/ RC in a more prominent operational role	Need to address – to match increased RC force structure	Need to address – to match increased RC force structure	Need to address – to match increased RC force structure	Largely unaffected
Number of Units?	Increased NG & Reserve structure ISO MCO	Increased NG & Reserve structure ISO Stability Ops	Increased NG & Reserve structure ISO SS Engagements	Increased NG & Reserve structure ISO HA/DR	Increased NG & Reserve structure ISO HD/DSCA
Others?					

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Summary: Each sub-option was assessed based on it’s impact to overall AC or RC capabilities. The breakout session results are provided in the chart above.

The breakout group was not in agreement that increasing the demand for RC units as compared to today’s operational tempo would increase total force capability across the spectrum of scenarios (Sub-Option 4B). Concerns with regard to whether RC units included whether they could meet expected response times, provide a necessary capability, be adequately equipped and trained. These concerns were considered significant for large scale conflicts (MCOs) and less significant for humanitarian assistance or homeland defense. Regardless of the type of scenario applied, the group felt that a larger RC force would be necessary to implement this option as the current force was not capable of meeting an increased demand.

Related Group Comments:

- *The Air Sovereignty Alert mission demands that the ANG pilots sign an MOU that instantaneously transfers them from T.32 to T.10 upon a triggering event. Why not for other missions?*
- *Reservists want predictability and stability--it is an easier sell to their family and employer.*

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- *Suggest shifting lesser-used MDS (Raptors, Buffs, and Bones) to the ARC and shifting aerial refueling and strategic lift to the AC. Keep end strength the same in all 3 parts of the Total Force. The Army can look similarly at some of its lesser-used platforms and missions.*

- *State Defense Forces (SDF's) in the States have only a State mission; State Active Duty is the response status authorized by the Governor. Individual SDF's are assigned specific missions in the States based on the requirements from the TAG/Gov. NGB J5 is the lead for these organizations in the States (NGR 10-4).*

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Capability Considerations: Sub-Option 4C					
Capability Metric	Sub-Option 4C – opportunity for an increase in the RC strategic element compared to today. Increase non-rotational (e.g., non-ARFORGEN) portion of RC with focus on both really big MCOs that cannot be quickly won & really big natural or man-made disasters on domestic front				
	MCO	Large-Scale Stability	Steady State Engagement	HA/DR	HD/DSCA
Response Time?	<u>Decreased</u> for follow-on forces in a protracted MCO	<u>Could be issues</u> w/ RC less operational	<u>Could be issues</u> w/ RC less operational	<u>Largely Unaffected</u>	<u>Decreased/ Neutral</u>
Provides Desired Capability?	<u>Yes</u> – as follow-on forces ISO protracted MCO	<u>Could be issues</u> w/ RC less operational	<u>Could be issues</u> w/ RC less operational	<u>Largely Unaffected</u>	<u>Yes</u> - for recovery ops in domestic emergencies
Appropriately Equipped?	<u>Yes</u> – as follow-on forces ISO protracted MCO	<u>Could be issues</u> w/ RC less operational	<u>Could be issues</u> w/ RC less operational	<u>Largely Unaffected</u>	<u>Yes</u> - for recovery ops in domestic emergencies
Appropriately Trained?	<u>Yes</u> – for follow-on forces ISO protracted MCO	<u>Could be issues</u> w/ RC less operational	<u>Could be issues</u> w/ RC less operational	<u>Largely Unaffected</u>	<u>Yes</u> - for recovery ops in domestic emergencies
Number of Units?	<u>Increased</u> due to major focus on MCO emergencies	<u>Decreased</u> due to major focus on MCO & HD/DSCA emergencies	<u>Decreased</u> due to major focus on MCO & HD/DSCA emergencies	<u>Largely Unaffected</u>	<u>Increased</u> due to major focus on HD/DSCA emergencies
Others?					

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Summary: Each sub-option was assessed based on its impact to overall AC or RC capabilities. The breakout session results are provided in the chart above.

The breakout group felt that the capability of RC units to support the total force as more strategic force had many concerns. Specifically, they did not believe that convert a portion of the RC force to a strategic force would provide increased support to large-scale stability and/or steady-state engagements. For large scale conflicts (MCOs) the group felt it was possible for strategic RC units to provide follow-on support to the AC.

Related Group Comments:

A big emergency, "traditional" reserve force (with cheap, simple equipment stockpiled) and a better means of calling up these people will not only help with meeting needs for big disaster MCOs/HD/viral pandemic events, but also get a bigger pool of potential volunteers for pursuing options 4a and 4b with volunteers. 90% of these personnel may volunteer for nothing but their disaster total mobilization duty, but if even a small percent volunteers for operational deployments, special duties--then you've got a huge increase in the numbers available and can access people who are not interested in even 39 days duty.

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Overall Implications for Various Scenarios if Specific Sub-Options Chosen (Given the Prevailing Factors) in Order to Influence the Structure of RC as a Mix of Operational & Strategic Elements					
	MCO	Large Scale Stability	Steady State Engagement	HA/DR	HLD/DSCA
<p>Sub-Option 4A: Establish national and/or regional RC units staffed w/ volunteer personnel who can deploy w/ frequency & duration needed by supported COCOMs & Services</p>	Potentially Neutral (limited apparent impact on MCOs)	Potentially Positive (increased RC capacity & capability ISO stability ops)	Potentially Positive (increased RC capacity & capability ISO steady state engagements)	Potentially Neutral (limited apparent impact on OCONUS HA/DR)	Potentially Positive (increased RC capacity & capability ISO HLD/DSCA)
<p>Sub-Option 4B: Increase NG & Reserve structure to account for rebalance of AC & RC mix to conduct following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •MCO w/ 30, 60, 90 day mobilization/ deployment timelines •Forward presence missions •IW/SFA/BPC/COIN mission w/ 30-120 day mobilization/ deployment timelines •HLD/DSCA/DR missions on short notice 	Potentially Negative (reduced ability to respond to very short warning MCOs)	Potentially Positive (increased RC capacity ISO stability ops to compensate for reduced AC)	Potentially Positive (increased RC capacity ISO steady state engagements to compensate for reduced AC)	Potentially Neutral (limited apparent impact on OCONUS HA/DR)	Potentially Positive (increased RC capacity ISO HLD/DSCA)
<p>Sub-Option 4C: Increase non-rotational (e.g., non-ARFORGEN) portion of RC with focus on both really big MCOs & really big natural or man-made disasters on domestic front</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Transition significant portions of rarely/ infrequently used MCO capabilities to RC •Able to respond as needed to help in recovery from a major catastrophic domestic event 	Potentially Positive (increased RC capacity ISO a protracted MCO)	Potentially Negative (reduced RC availability ISO stability ops)	Potentially Negative (reduced RC availability ISO steady state engagements)	Potentially Neutral (limited apparent impact on OCONUS HA/DR)	Potentially Positive (increased RC capacity ISO HLD/DSCA recovery ops)

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Cost Considerations

Sub-Options	Cost Considerations				
	AC Manpower	RC Manpower	Training	Equipment	Installations & Facilities
Sub-Option 4A: Establish national and/or regional RC units staffed with volunteer personnel who can deploy with frequency and duration needed by supported COCOMs and Services	No savings unless reduce AC structure	Some efficiencies may be evident	Some savings may occur due to better matching w/ civilian skills	No savings are apparent	Some costs may occur for reorganized volunteer units
Sub-Option 4B: Increase NG and Reserve structure to account for rebalance of AC and RC mix	Some savings/efficiencies may be evident from better use of AC force	Significant costs will be needed for increased NG and Reserve force structure	Significant costs will be needed for increased NG and Reserve force structure	Significant costs will be needed for increased NG and Reserve force structure	Significant costs could be needed for increased NG and Reserve force structure
Sub-Option 4C: Increase non-rotational (e.g., non-ARFORGEN) portion of RC with focus on both really big MCOs that cannot be quickly won & really big natural or man-made disasters on domestic front	Could have significant costs if try to compensate for reduction in RC as operational force with more AC structure	Reduced costs with less frequent use of RC in operational roles (unless increase AC structure to compensate)	Reduced costs with less frequent use of RC in operational roles (unless increase AC structure to compensate)	Reduced costs with less frequent use of RC in operational roles (unless increase AC structure to compensate)	Largely unaffected

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Summary: Each sub-option was assessed to identify cost considerations that would impact the sub-option. The breakout session results are provided in the chart above.

The breakout group agreed that implementation of Sub-Option 4A would result in little cost savings as compared to the current RC force structure. The group felt that Sub-Option 4B would result in increased costs based on the greater demand for RC units and conversely, potential savings could be realized with Sub-Option 4C due to less frequent use of strategic RC units.

Related Group Comments:

- In considering 4b; remember that there will be no budget cuts for the Guard--DoD budget cuts will come out of the AC and Reserve forces because of the political power of the Guard, unbeatable Congressional support. Guard will only give up a mission or assets if they don't want to do it. Given the bad economic climate, Congressman fighting for pork for their district--Guard will not lose funding or assets overall

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<h1 style="margin: 0;">Conditions & Standards</h1>	
Conditions & Standards Factor	Sub-Option 4A – similar demand for RC operational element as today. Establish national and/or regional RC units staffed with volunteer personnel who can deploy with frequency and duration needed by supported COCOMs and Services
Assured Access	OK - Relies on pools of <u>volunteers</u>
Training	Perhaps – But <u>on the job training</u> with repeated assignments to a given COCOM <u>should mitigate</u>
Basing and Infrastructure	Perhaps – But <u>comparable to that for SPP</u> – should not be a major impediment
Duty Status	OK - Existing duty status options appear <u>adequate</u> for this option
Medical Readiness	OK - <u>Nothing abnormal</u> , i.e., no RC medical readiness issues beyond the norm & reliance on volunteer pools (vice large units) should mitigate
National Support	OK - <u>Volunteer nature</u> of this option <u>should mitigate</u> most national support issues
Recruiting	OK - <u>Only positive</u> impact on recruiting since on volunteer basis
Retention	OK - <u>Only positive</u> if sustained relationship with particular COCOM is appealing
Equipment Needs	OK - <u>Not heavily equipment related</u> – mostly about personnel and their inherent skills
Planning Complexity	Perhaps – Although simplifies COCOM planning (if can count on pool of experienced volunteers), this option <u>falls outside normal ARFORGEN type model</u> (a complication)
Others?	OK – <u>None evident</u>

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Summary: Each sub-option was assessed to identify conditions and standards that would impact the sub-option. The breakout session results are provided in the chart above.

The breakout group agreed that there are several concerns with regard to Sub-Option 4A conditions and standards to include assured access, training, duty status, medical readiness and planning complexity. For assured access the concern was whether RC components (units, teams or IAs) could be relied upon to volunteer as aligned components to the designated national and/or regional commands. A concern was noted that additional training would be necessary for RC components that are aligned to the AC commands, though it was felt that this concern could be mitigated by on the job training spread over repetitive deployments. Duty status and medical readiness of the selected RC components is a recurring concern that is not specific to Sub-Option 4A, but that could impact the ability to implement the option. The group identified a planning complexity to the Sub-Option in whether the GFMB process could adequately support the alignment of RC units to the AC commands or whether the process would need to be modified.

Related Group Comments:

- *I agree, but this will mean that the T.10 parent services must recognize the value of SPP. The NG deals with problems created by AC myopia. Take Illinois for example. These Guardsmen regularly go back and forth to Poland for exercises and training. Illinois is linked with its*

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neighbor Michigan. Michigan's State Partner is Latvia. Now we leverage two geographically close North American states with two geographically close Eastern European nations. What a synergy! But the AC leadership PCS every 18-36 months and each new commander has a different (if they have a view at all) of the role of SPP. Rather than enjoy the corporate memory provided by the NG, the new leadership attempts to restructure the program in accord with their own vision.

- Do we have the ability to create an access authority (if it doesn't already exist) to support COCOM TSC/BPC requirements with involuntary mobilization for more than 30 days? 12304 needs to be examined by OSD and Congressional staffers to get us this answer. if it does or we need another authority then longer involuntary activations will eventually become the norm for the COCOMs, Services, the RC and their civilian mobilization authorities. How do we involuntarily mobilize for other than named operations yet maintain the appropriate amount of civilian oversight to provide enough rigor to prevent disruption in civilian lives unnecessarily.

- Going to war is not supposed to be easy. Why not 12301(b) which allows the service secretary to order the unit to active duty for 15 days a year? Good for an exercise. There is your annual training as well.

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<h1 style="margin: 0;">Conditions & Standards</h1>	
Conditions & Standards Factor	Sub-Option 4B – increased demand for RC operational element compared to today. Increase NG and Reserve mix to account for rebalance of AC and RC capabilities
Assured Access	Yes – This is a very high use of RC as an operational force & <u>access could be an issue</u>
Training	Yes – RC would potentially have <u>increased</u> steady state engagement & large scale stability operations roles with <u>requisite training</u>
Basing and Infrastructure	Yes – Structural increase to NG & Reserves to compensate for AC reductions <u>could present basing/infrastructure issues</u>
Duty Status	OK - Existing duty status options appear <u>adequate</u> for this option
Medical Readiness	Perhaps – <u>But nothing abnormal</u> , i.e., no RC medical readiness issues beyond the normal considerations for RC units
National Support	Yes – Very high utilization of RC as an operational force (even more than today) <u>could be problematic wrt national support</u>
Recruiting	Yes – <u>Could have negative effect</u> if high RC optempo is viewed as undesirable
Retention	Yes - <u>Could have negative effect</u> if high RC optempo & frequent deployments are resented by some personnel/ family/ civilian employers
Equipment Needs	Perhaps – <u>But</u> may be <u>mitigated by</u> equipment available from <u>AC forces</u>
Planning Complexity	Perhaps – <u>But</u> increasing rotational component of RC and <u>incorporating into force generation models</u> (e.g., ARFORGEN) <u>should mitigate</u>
Others?	OK – <u>None evident</u>



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Summary: Each sub-option was assessed to identify conditions and standards that would impact the sub-option. The breakout session units results are provided in the chart above.

The breakout group had concerns with regard to Sub-Option 4B conditions and standards. As noted on the previous slide, group members felt that the current RC force was not able to meet an increased operational demand without increasing in size. Additional training of RC units would be necessary to allow them to take on missions normally associated with AC units. As in Sub-Option 4A, the group members had concerns with regard to RC unit duty status and medical readiness. The breakout group was concerned that an increased use of RC units could adversely impact RC national support, recruiting and retention. Finally, concerns were raised on whether additional equipment could be procured for RC use and the planning of RC unit rotation within the current AC unit rotation process.

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 <h1 style="margin: 0;">Conditions & Standards</h1> 	
Conditions & Standards Factor	Sub-Option 4C – opportunity for an increase in the RC strategic element compared to today. Increase non-rotational (e.g., non-ARFORGEN) portion of RC with focus on both really big MCOs that cannot be quickly won & really big natural or man-made disasters on domestic front
Assured Access	OK – <u>Would enhance access to RC</u> in case of dire national emergency
Training	Perhaps – If needed level of readiness (e.g., for large MCO) cannot be accomplished, e.g., if <u>training during planned pre-deployment phase of mobilization proves inadequate</u>
Basing and Infrastructure	OK – <u>If RC has access to needed equipment during drills w/o basing/infrastructure issues</u>
Duty Status	OK - Existing duty status options appear <u>adequate</u> for this option
Medical Readiness	OK - <u>Nothing abnormal</u> , i.e., no RC unit medical readiness issues beyond the normal
National Support	OK – <u>Should be general national support</u> for using RC for dire national emergencies
Recruiting	OK – <u>No perceived impediment</u> to recruiting
Retention	OK - <u>No perceived impediment</u> to retention
Equipment Needs	Perhaps – <u>May be some</u> cases in which RC personnel have <u>equipment availability issues</u>
Planning Complexity	OK – Although it may restrict options (by having these RC elements outside normal service force generation models), it actually simplifies planning for national emergencies
Others?	OK – <u>None evident</u>

Summary: Each sub-option was assessed to identify conditions and standards that would impact the sub-option. The breakout session results are provided in the chart above.

The breakout group had several concerns with regard to the conditions and standards associated with Sub-Option 4C. Specifically the ability of strategic RC units to meet the necessary level of training prior to deployment. This training could impact either the length of time necessary for an RC unit to deploy or the readiness level when deployed. Additionally, the group felt was unsure whether strategic RC units would be adequately equipped for pre-deployment training and deployment especially if that equipment came from a strategic stockpile.

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Potential Laws, Policies & Doctrine			
Laws, Policies & Doctrine	<u>Sub-Option 4A</u> – similar demand for RC operational element as today. Establish national and/or regional RC units staffed with volunteer personnel who can deploy with frequency and duration needed by supported COCOMs and Services	<u>Sub-Option 4B</u> – increased demand for RC operational element compared to today. Increase NG and Reserve structure to account for rebalance of AC and RC mix	<u>Sub-Option 4C</u> - opportunity for an increase in the RC strategic element compared to today. Increase non-rotational (e.g., non-ARFORGEN) portion of RC with focus on both really big MCOs that cannot be quickly won & really big natural or man-made disasters on domestic front
Laws	Laws restricting use of RC in non-named operations	Laws restricting use of RC in non-named operations	None apparent
Policies	Policies that discourage RC members from frequently volunteering	Policies (and laws) that limit HLD/DSCA role of military (including Reserves)	None apparent
Doctrine	Doctrine (and policies) within military/ services that prevent RC members from getting credit for joint duty	Doctrine (and policies) within military/ services that impede optimally rebalancing of AC & RC capabilities, e.g., impediments to RC general/flag officers being in key leadership roles	None apparent
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Summary: Each sub-option was assessed to identify laws, policies and doctrine that may impact the sub-option. The breakout session results are provided in the chart above.

Several breakout group concerns were noted with regard to potential laws, policy and doctrine. Specifically for Sub-Option 4A and 4B, laws restricting the use of RC units in non-named operations would need to be modified or passed. Also, for Sub-Option 4A, the group members felt that current policy discouraged RC members from frequently volunteering beyond the established minimums. The group recommended that a reserve business process review be conducted to identify what policies could be modified or implemented to facilitate RC members who are willing to volunteer for duties beyond the established minimums.


Related Group Comments:

Each category above would need adjustments to law changes/Policy to allow for an agile force that can be easily restructured and used. If you were in the Stability force, you may need an authority to non-vol mobilize members but it must be predictable.


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Summary of Specific Options Chosen (Given the Stated Prevailing Factors)
To Influence Structure of RC as Mix of Operational & Strategic Elements




Assessment Element	<u>Sub-Option 4A</u> – similar demand for RC operational element as today.	<u>Sub-Option 4B</u> – increased demand for RC operational element compared to today.	<u>Sub-Option 4C</u> – opportunity for an increase in the RC strategic element compared to today.
Capabilities	Potential <u>positive</u> impact on large scale stability ops, steady state engagements & HLD/DSCA	Potential <u>positive</u> impact on large scale stability ops, steady state engagements & HLD/DSCA; but potential <u>negative</u> impact on response to short warning MCOs	Potential <u>positive</u> impact on protracted MCOs and HLD/DSCA; but potential <u>negative</u> impact on large scale stability ops & steady state engagements
Conditions & Standards	<u>Perhaps</u> some training, basing/ infrastructure & planning complexity issues	<u>Potentially significant</u> assured access, training, basing/ infrastructure, national support, recruiting, retention issues	<u>Perhaps</u> some training & equipment needs issues
Cost	Potentially <u>modest</u> cost <u>increases</u>	<u>Potentially significant</u> cost <u>increases</u> to resolve stated conditions & standards issues	<u>Uncertain</u> cost impact
Laws, Policies, Doctrine	<u>Potentially significant</u> <u>hurdles</u> to overcome	<u>Potentially significant</u> <u>hurdles</u> to overcome	<u>Few if any</u> issues in this arena

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Other Issues, Considerations or Options



- To be addressed and recorded during Option 4 breakout session.

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Questions (for each AC-RC Rebalancing Option)	Rating
1) Assess the feasibility of this option?	1 = difficult ... 5 = easy
2) To what extent will this option enhance Total Force capabilities?	1 = none ... 5 = substantial
3) To what extent does this option reduce stress on the AC?	1 = none ... 5 = substantial
4) To what extent does this option preserve the national investment and readiness gains achieved within RC over the past decade?	1 = none ... 5 = substantial
5) To what extent will this option affect DoD costs?	1 = large increase ... 3 = no effect ... 5 = large decrease
6) Without regard to specific examples, rate this option category in terms of its overall utility for rebalancing the AC-RC mix	1 = limited, 2 = marginal, 3 = fair, 4 = good, 5 = excellent
7) Is this the best example to use to illustrate this type of option	1 = yes ; 2 = no
8) If your answer is "no", please describe the option you recommend	Text response
9) Assess the feasibility of your preferred option	1 = difficult ... 5 = easy
10) Assess the capability benefit of your preferred option	1 = none ... 5 = substantial
11) Assess the cost impact of your preferred option	1 = large increase ... 3 = no effect ... 5 = large decrease
12) Please identify any conditions & standards impacts for your option	Text response
13) Please identify any law, policy, or doctrine impacts for your option	Text response

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Back-Up Material

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Mobilization



Mobilization: The process by which the Armed Forces or a part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes: selective mobilization, partial mobilization, full mobilization, and total mobilization.


Title	15-Day Statute	Reserve Component Volunteers	Presidential Reserve Call-Up	Partial Mobilization	Full Mobilization	Total Mobilization
Statute	T10 USC § 12301(b)	T10 USC §12301(d)	T10 USC § 12304	T10 USC § 12302	T10 USC §12301(a)	T50 USC § 2071 & T10 USC § 2538
Situation	Service Secretaries (AT, opn msn, Invol; w/Gov consent	Consent of member (& Governor for Guard)	President notifies Congress, no declaration of war or national emergency	President declares national emergency	Congress declares war or national emergency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Requirements beyond Full Mobilization •Permits creation of new force structure •Authority to mobilize industrial base •Authority to impose USG contract priority on industry & manufacturing
Reservists Affected	Ready Reserve	All	Selected Reserve & IRR	Ready Reserve	All (including inactive & retired)	
Force Limit	None specified	None specified	200,000 < 30,000 IRR	1,000,000	None	
Term Limit	15 days/year	Non stated	365 days	2 years	Duration plus 6 months	

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Capability Considerations



- For each study scenario, address:
 - Response Time
 - When is unit / team / individual available to deploy?
 - Relative Effectiveness
 - Does unit / team / individual provide desired capability?
 - Is unit / team appropriately equipped?
 - Is unit / team/ individual appropriately trained?
 - Number of Units Available
 - Do number of units support desired BOG-Dwell?
 - Others?


Scenarios

MCO
Large-Scale Stability Op
Steady State Engagement
HA/DR
HD/DSCA


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Conditions and Standards Template




Conditions & Standards Factor	Consideration
Assured Access	Is this factor important for this option? If so, how do we ensure desired accessibility?
Training	How do we ensure desired level of training?
Basing and Infrastructure	Are basing and infrastructure adequate to support this option? If not, what is needed?
Duty Status	Are existing duty status options adequate for this option? If not, what is needed?
Medical Readiness	Is RC medical readiness adequate to support this option? If not, what is needed?
National Support	Does RC have sufficient national support to enable implementation of this option? If not, what is needed?
Recruiting	How might this option affect recruiting?
Retention	How might this option affect retention?
Equipment Needs	Does RC have sufficient equipment to implement this option? If not, what is needed?
Planning Complexity	Does this option introduce additional complexity in planning, or does it simplify planning?
Others?	

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Laws, Policies, and Doctrine Template



	Consideration
Laws	Are existing laws adequate to enable implementation of this option? If not, what changes are needed?
Policies	Are existing policies adequate to enable implementation of this option? If not, what changes are needed?
Doctrine	Is existing doctrine adequate to enable implementation of this option? If not, what changes are needed?

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Historical Examples of Scenario Categories

- **Large-scale Conventional Campaign (MCO)**
 - Examples: Iraq (early OIF)

- **Large-scale Stability Operations** – security, reconstruction, development
 - Examples: Iraq, Afghanistan

- **Steady State Engagement Activities** – Building Partner Capacity, Theater Security Cooperation, Security Force Assistance
 - Examples: Horn of Africa, Philippines, Colombia

- **Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response (HA/DR)**
 - Examples: Haiti earthquake, Indonesia tsunami, Pakistan earthquake

- **Homeland Defense/Defense Support to Civil Authorities (HD/DSCA)**
 - Examples: Katrina

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Broad Mission Sets Considered

OASD(RA)

<p align="center"><u>Rotating Operational Forces (Home & Abroad)</u></p>	<p>Units that rotate through their Service's Force Generation model, in accordance with the Service's readiness policy/requirements, from reset/maintenance through training and deployment. When in the available window will normally be assigned or designated for a mission that fulfills their Service's requirements, to include Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), Homeland Defense (HLD), or Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA).</p>
<p align="center"><u>Military Engagement Teams</u></p>	<p>Use of Service members (Civilian, Active or Reserve Component) to form relatively small collective teams targeted to fulfill requirements for which the establishment and sustainment of long-term relationships are critical to mission success and for which continuity with the sourcing solution enhances mission performance. Should include host nation leaders and citizens, coalition partners, other USG agencies and NGOs.</p>
<p align="center"><u>Individual Augmentation</u></p>	<p>Use of Service members (Civilian, Active or Reserve Component) with or without unit affiliation, to perform duty to support mission requirements when an organization, command or unit is unable to achieve assigned mission with onboard resources. The duration of the duty will vary based on mission requirements for the supported command and availability of the member.</p>
<p align="center"><u>Institutional Support</u></p>	<p>Units or individual Reservists that support the Operational Force, normally in CONUS, and move through their Service's Force Generation Model. Supports the Service Secretaries Title 10 responsibility for Recruiting, Organizing, Supplying, Equipping, Training, Servicing, Mobilizing and Demobilizing forces.</p>

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Option 5: Adjust Capabilities Included within RC to Enhance Total Force Capability to Meet Emerging Threats

Working Paper/Draft Rev 1.

15 Sept 2010

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Option 5 focused on adjusting capabilities resident within the RC to enhance Total Force capabilities to meet USG goals of reducing risks to homeland security, demands for better knowledge and understanding of the changing and complex global security situation, increased demand for global Humanitarian Assistance (HA), reduce the potential risk caused by Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and engage emergent cyber threats. These goals are based upon QDR derived threats and potential future RC participation can be delineated as follows:


QDR missions requiring increased future DoD capability:

- Defend the US and support civil authorities at home:
 - RC can exploit close proximity and excellent local situation awareness.
- Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations:
 - RC has individuals with expert awareness of selected foreign regions and experience in intelligence analysis and ISR operations.
- Build the security capacity of partner states:
 - RC has highly experienced personnel well suited for training roles.
- Prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction:
 - RC forces could add WMD detection systems to expand overall DoD and partner nation detection capacity.
- Operate effectively in cyberspace:
 - RC well suited to contribute key capability and capacity in this new mission.


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Background




AC/RC Rebalancing Option #5

<p>5) Adjust capabilities included within RC to meet emerging needs</p>	<p>Adjust capabilities included within RC to enhance Total Force capability to meet</p> <p>5A) Goal of reducing risks in homeland security</p> <p>5B) Demands for better knowledge and understanding of the changing and more complex global security situation</p> <p>5C) Prospective increased demand for global Humanitarian Assistance (HA)</p> <p>5D) Goal of reduced risks from Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)</p> <p>5E) Emergent cyber threats</p>	<p>5A) Improve responsiveness in DoD contributions to Homeland Defense through provision of increased RC Homeland Response Force (HRF) capability</p> <p>5B-1) Expand RC contributions to ISR and intelligence analysis</p> <p>5B-2) Expand RC foreign area specialist personnel and increase cooperation with foreign partner states</p> <p>5C-1) Develop RC capability and responsiveness for rapid delivery of HA through added medical clinical and environmental diagnostics against infectious diseases</p> <p>5C-2) Develop RC capability and responsiveness for rapid delivery of HA through added capacity to deliver food, provide shelter, and assist host nation security forces</p> <p>5D) Expand RC contributions to detection of WMD threats prior to attack</p> <p>5E) Establish cyber units and capability within the RC to support COCOM, Service and state future cyber warfare mission requirements</p>
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Needed Additional DoD Capabilities



- *The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) analysis “strongly suggested that the Department must further rebalance its policy, doctrine, and capabilities to better support the following six key missions:*
 - *Defend the US and support civil authorities at home;*
 - *Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations;*
 - *Build the security capacity of partner states;*
 - *Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments;*
 - *Prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction; and*
 - *Operate effectively in cyberspace.*



- *QDR findings consistent with 2010 Joint Operating Environment (JOE) observations*
 - *JOE adds emphasis on the potential for high demands for humanitarian assistance, which may aid in preventing or limiting insurgency and instability*

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Potential for Added RC Contributions

QDR missions needing increased future DoD capability:

- *Defend the US and support civil authorities at home*
 - *RC can exploit close proximity and excellent local situation awareness*
- *Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations*
 - *RC has individuals with expert awareness of selected foreign regions and experience in intelligence analysis and ISR operations*
- *Build the security capacity of partner states*
 - *RC has highly experienced personnel well suited for training roles*
- *Prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction*
 - *RC forces could add WMD detection systems to expand overall DoD and partner nation detection capacity*
- *Operate effectively in cyberspace*
 - *RC well suited to contribute key capability and capacity in this new mission*

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Potential for Added RC Contributions

QDR missions needing increased future DoD capability:

- *Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments;*
 - *Key needed improvements may include acquisition of developmental and/or conceptual advanced weapons systems (e.g., Long-Range Strike “Family of Systems” and selected wide-area surveillance systems), doctrinal development (e.g., “AirSea Battle”), conduct of major collective unit training and exercise events, and access to selected forward area basing and support. RC probably not well suited to make near-term, high-leverage contributions in this area—accordingly, no initiatives offered in this functional area*

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Sub-Option 5A: Improved Homeland Defense

- FY11 President's Budget introduced major initiative to recast DoD Homeland Security force structure:
 - Hold the largely active force CCMRF at one fully-structured unit (Defense CBRNE Response Force, DCRF)
 - Expand capabilities and increase responsiveness
 - Recast two other planned CCMRFs into largely C2 elements (Consequence Management C2 Elements, C2CRE)
 - Expand capacity to respond to multiple simultaneous events
 - Create 10 Homeland Response Forces (HRF) from within existing National Guard endstrength
 - HRF to comprise ~570 Guard personnel, having medical, search and rescue, decon, and C2 capabilities
 - One HRF will be based in each FEMA Region
 - First two to be in place by end-FY11, remainder by FY12
 - Sustain Civil Support Team (WMD-CST) and CBRNE Enhanced Force Response (CERFP) Elements

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


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HRFs and FEMA Regions

HRFs will be established in Massachusetts (supported by CT and VT), New York (supported by NJ), Pennsylvania, Georgia, Texas, Missouri, Utah, and California, each covering one FEMA Region (shown below)





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 **Specific Option for Adding RC Capability for Homeland Defense (Sub-Option Category 5A)** 

- Expand RC contributions through:
 - Increased number of HRFs to reduce distance from potential events, improving expected response time
 - Reconsider HRF force structure, drawing as possible from information developed during FY11 program development
 - Evaluate mobility support needed for timely HRF arrival at disaster events
 - Consider extent to which HRFs might have multiple potential roles, depending upon need
 - For example, consider long-warning major force elements (e.g., Heavy Brigades) having additional short-warning roles in disaster response and consequence management

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 **Sub-Option 5B: Improved Global Awareness** 

- Two mission areas promoted in the QDR for “rebalancing” to gain improved capabilities that offer the prospect for additional, related RC contributions:
 - Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations
 - Build the security capacity of partner nations
- The “emerging” aspect of these missions includes an enhanced need for knowledge and experience of foreign culture, society

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 Global Awareness: DoD Operational Need 

- QDR 2010 observes
“The US and its allies face a complex and uncertain security landscape in which the pace of change continues to accelerate.”
- DoD needs improved knowledge and understanding of foreign state and non-state actors to best meet US security needs
 - Many operational needs concern regions and countries unfamiliar to most DoD personnel

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 Possible Initiatives for Enhanced Awareness 

```
graph TD; A[Sub-Option 5B-2  
Cooperative efforts with partner states] --> B[Increased combined force training and integrated operations]; B --> C[GOAL  
Improved knowledge and understanding of foreign state circumstances and issues and also of non-state actor challenges]; D[Improved ISR collection capabilities] --> C; E[Sub-Option 5B-1  
Independent efforts to gain information, in particular against uncooperative targets or denied areas] --> F[Expanded intelligence analysis]; F --> C; G[Added DoD foreign area specialists; Expanded training of foreign personnel; other?] --> C;
```

Sub-Option 5B-2
Cooperative efforts with partner states

Increased combined force training and integrated operations

GOAL
Improved knowledge and understanding of foreign state circumstances and issues and also of non-state actor challenges

Improved ISR collection capabilities

Added DoD foreign area specialists; Expanded training of foreign personnel; other?



Expanded intelligence analysis

Sub-Option 5B-1
Independent efforts to gain information, in particular against uncooperative targets or denied areas

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 **Sub-Option 5B: Key Factors** 

- DoD currently has shortfalls in desired ISR and intelligence analysis capabilities
 - Significant backlog in analysis of ISR data
- DoD currently has shortfalls in personnel with understanding and experience of many foreign cultures and societies
 - DoD foreign area specialist programs vary by service and are limited in scope
 - DoD resources for conduct of training and exercises with and for foreign partners are limited

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 **Specific Option for Adding RC Capability for ISR Operations and Intelligence Analysis (Option Category 5B-1)** 



- Expand RC contributions in ISR operations and support
 - Increase capability to operate and support Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS).
 - Primary emphasis on operations controlled remotely from bases in the United States
 - Consider other possibilities, including space ops support (but may overlap with Institutional Support option)
- Expand RC contributions in intelligence analysis
 - Build on existing infrastructure, contributions, and procedures
 - Primary emphasis on intelligence operations conducted at bases in the United States

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 **Specific Option for Adding RC Capability for Foreign Area Specialization for Operations and Training (Option Category 5B-2)** 

- Expand RC personnel assigned as foreign area specialists
 - Provide support for forward area operations on a rotational, short-term basis consistent with traditional RC patterns
 - Conduct training for US active duty forces and also for foreign partner nations
- Expand RC participation in exercises and training conducted with foreign nations
 - Provide support for forward area operations on a rotational, short-term basis consistent with traditional RC patterns
 - Provide training for foreign partner nations
 - For example, F-16s about to be provided to Iraq

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 **Sub-Option 5C: Improved Capability for Humanitarian Assistance** 

- Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2010 emphasizes the possibility of a major future DoD role in global Humanitarian Assistance (HA) operations:
 - Migrations occurring in war-torn or otherwise stressed areas of the globe with the resulting disruptions of culture, politics, and economics and the potential for further dislocations and troubles
 - The implications for future conflict are ominous if energy supplies cannot keep up with demand and should states see the need to militarily secure dwindling energy resources...
 - Localized food shortages, with major problems stemming from the actual food distribution situation
 - Water stress or scarcity, with some estimates that ~40% of the world's population may experience serious water shortages
 - Climate change
 - Possibility of pandemic infectious disease events



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 Sub-Option 5C: Improved Capability for Humanitarian Assistance 

- Potential DoD roles in provision of Humanitarian Assistance (HA):
 - Evacuation from distressed area
 - Provision of basic shelter
 - For example, “tent cities”—developed in such advanced concepts as the STAR-TIDES project
 - Provision of food and water
 - Support for local security
- Potential DoD capabilities for provision of HA support:
 - Mobility forces
 - Airlift, sealift
 - Availability of consumables
 - Pre-packaged food, water purification capabilities
 - Management and security
 - Management and coordination of operations (e.g., air traffic control)
 - Contributions to local physical security

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 Improved RC Capability for Humanitarian Assistance (HA) 

Description of Sub-Options 5C-1 and 5C-2 under development

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 **Sub-Option 5D: Reduce WMD Risks** 

- DoD has wide-ranging Counter-WMD efforts:
 - Mature Chemical/Biological Defense Program (CBDP) with established management, implementation, and oversight responsibilities
 - Army Executive Agent for DoD-wide joint C/B functions
 - Joint Program Executive Office (JPEO) for acquisition
 - Program Analysis and Integration Office (PAIO) for joint evaluation and oversight
 - Defense Laboratory Network (DLN) initiative in progress
 - Developing Nuclear Defense efforts
 - Major ongoing contributions to Counter-Proliferation efforts
 - FY11 PB incorporated several important initiatives
 - WMD-Elimination operational headquarters
 - Expanded detection and elimination capabilities

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 **Key Factors--RC Contributions for Reduced WMD Risks** 

- WMD Detection of clandestine threats is challenging
 - Absent intelligence queuing, technical detection means have very limited range
 - DoD and other US Government Agencies are developing improved detection and analysis tools over the mid- and long-term
 - In the near term, wider distribution of short-range detection and analysis equipment is an option
 - Overall near-term radiological detection effort may be limited by shortage of detector material
 - Biological detection emphasizes consequence management (diagnosis, medical response)


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Specific Option for Adding RC Capability for Counter-WMD Capabilities (Option Category 5D)




- Expand RC contributions in intelligence support for Counter-WMD operations
 - Develop WMD knowledge in RC intelligence units
- Expand RC capability in selected Counter-WMD units
 - Expand radiological and biological detection and analysis capabilities in Army Chemical Corps RC units
 - Consider acquiring additional radiological detection systems (e.g., PDX-2, STIRS derivative)
 - Build on DoD's PB11 initiatives
 - Consider adding mobile biological lab facilities for increased deployment coverage
 - Field added capability for identification of infectious diseases as well as threat biological agents (specific options may be appearing in PB12 program review under other agencies' initiative) (overlaps with Option 5C-1)
 - Consider RC role in expanding DoD hospital responsiveness to biological and infectious disease threats


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Sub-Option 5E: DoD Cyber Mission




- Cyberspace Operations is the one substantially new mission area of the six named in the QDR as needing improved capabilities
 - DoD currently has several top-level reviews underway of cyber policy, cyber capabilities, and cyber analysis
 - These current inquiries offer an excellent opportunity for consideration of a wide range of concepts, including assignment of significant roles to RC

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Current DoD Cyber Reviews




- Cyber Front End Assessment (FEA)
 - Timed to support FY12 PB decisions
- DPPG Cyber Workforce Study
 - Report scheduled for completion 31 January 2011
- STRATCOM Cyber Analysis Campaign Plan
 - Scheduled for JROC review (October?)
- FY12-16 FYDP Program/Budget Review (expected to include cyber issues)

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Sub-Option 5E Cyber Mission: Key Factors





- DoD has committed to improve cyber operations capability
 - Established US CyberCom, under StratCom
 - Made policy decisions to coordinate some activities with government, national civil, and international partners
 - Military Departments have created cyber commands
- DoD is still considering the details of desired program scope, goals, and resources
 - Decisions expected beginning in fall 2010
 - Timely to consider RC roles and responsibilities now

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 **Specific Option for Adding RC Cyber Operations Capability
(Option Category 5E)** 

- Identify candidate RC elements for DoD cyber force concepts as current DoD studies come to fruition during fall/winter 2010/2011
 - Consider adapting existing infrastructure to accommodate or contribute to expanded role
 - RC intelligence units with specialized infrastructure (e.g., JWICS terminals) are attractive candidate resources for shared efforts, for example—investigate feasibility
 - Estimate specialized additional infrastructure and training needed
 - Develop an initial estimate of the availability and capability of existing RC personnel for assignment to cyber operations

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 **Capability Matrices** 

- Capability matrices developed only for Sub-Options 5B and 5E; others in preparation


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Capability Matrix: Sub-Option 5B-1




Capability Metric	Sub-Option 5B-1— Increase RC capability for Intelligence, Surveillance , and Reconnaissance (ISR), including Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) operation. Increased RC contributions to intelligence analysis.				
	MCO	Large-Scale Stability	Steady State Engagement	HA/DR	HD/DSCA
Response Time?	Probably satisfactory	Probably satisfactory	Probably satisfactory	Little or no relevancy	Little or no relevancy
Provides Desired Capability?	Increased capability —no data on overall goals	Increased capability —no data on overall goals	Increased capability —no data on overall goals	Little or no relevancy	Little or no relevancy
Appropriately Equipped?	Some additional support equipment likely needed	Some additional support equipment likely needed	Some additional support equipment likely needed	Little or no relevancy	Little or no relevancy
Appropriately Trained?	Some training will be needed but not expected to be a problem given funding	Some training will be needed but not expected to be a problem given funding	Some training will be needed but not expected to be a problem given funding	Little or no relevancy	Little or no relevancy
Number of Units?	Not known at this time	Not known at this time	Not known at this time	Little or no relevancy	Little or no relevancy
Others?					

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Capability Matrix: Sub-Option 5B-2




Capability Metric	Sub-Option 5B-2—Increased RC personnel providing foreign area specialization skills, supporting training and exercises of US and partner nation forces. Increased RC contributions to training of foreign personnel.				
	MCO	Large-Scale Stability	Steady State Engagement	HA/DR	HD/DSCA
Response Time?	Not relevant	Likely to be insufficient for a major crisis	Likely gaps in country coverage	Not relevant	Not relevant
Provides Desired Capability?	Not relevant	Likely to be insufficient for a major crisis	Likely gaps in country coverage	Not relevant	Not relevant
Appropriately Equipped?	Not relevant	Not relevant	Not relevant	Not relevant	Not relevant
Appropriately Trained?	Not relevant	Likely gaps in country coverage	Likely gaps in country coverage	Not relevant	Not relevant
Number of Units?	Not relevant	Likely gaps in country coverage	Likely gaps in country coverage	Not relevant	Not relevant
Others?	Not relevant			Not relevant	Not relevant

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Capability Matrix: Sub-Option 5E




Capability Metric	Sub-Option 5E – Add RC cyber operations capability				
	MCO	Large-Scale Stability	Steady State Engagement	HA/DR	HD/DSCA
Response Time?	Cyber attacks can come with no warning; steady-state posture key	Cyber attacks can come with no warning; steady-state posture key	Cyber attacks can come with no warning; steady-state posture key	Cyber attacks can come with no warning; steady-state posture key	Cyber attacks can come with no warning; steady-state posture key
Provides Desired Capability?	DoD goals not yet determined	DoD goals not yet determined	DoD goals not yet determined	DoD goals not yet determined	DoD goals not yet determined
Appropriately Equipped?	Equipment needs not yet set, but probably short of some items	Equipment needs not yet set, but probably short of some items	Equipment needs not yet set, but probably short of some items	Equipment needs not yet set, but probably short of some items	Equipment needs not yet set, but probably short of some items
Appropriately Trained?	DoD needs not yet set, but some training will be necessary	DoD needs not yet set, but some training will be necessary	DoD needs not yet set, but some training will be necessary	DoD needs not yet set, but some training will be necessary	DoD needs not yet set, but some training will be necessary
Number of Units?	None exist yet; goal not yet determined	None exist yet; goal not yet determined	None exist yet; goal not yet determined	None exist yet; goal not yet determined	None exist yet; goal not yet determined
Others?					

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Conditions and Standards Matrix



Conditions & Standards Factor	Sub-Option 5B-1 – Expand RC contributions to ISR and intelligence analysis
Assured Access	<u>No particular issues evident</u>
Training	Perhaps – but only because of added funding needed
Basing and Infrastructure	Perhaps – But should not be a major impediment
Duty Status	OK - Existing duty status options appear <u>adequate</u> for this option
Medical Readiness	OK - <u>Nothing abnormal</u> , i.e., no RC medical readiness issues beyond the norm & reliance on volunteer pools (vice large units) should mitigate
National Support	OK - <u>Volunteer nature</u> of this option <u>should mitigate</u> most national support issues
Recruiting	OK - <u>Only positive</u>
Retention	OK - <u>Only positive</u>
Equipment Needs	OK - <u>Not heavily equipment related</u> – mostly about personnel and their inherent skills
Planning Complexity	<u>Probably not</u>
Others?	<u>None evident</u>

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Conditions & Standards Factor	Sub-Option 5B-2 – Expand RC foreign area specialist personnel and increase cooperation with foreign partner states
Assured Access	Perhaps –Requires sustained commitment to support operations in a particular region or country. Long-term tenure of individuals in this status uncertain.
Training	Perhaps – Requires training for a comparatively small number of individuals who may be widely separated when called for duty.
Basing and Infrastructure	Not a relevant factor
Duty Status	OK - Existing duty status options appear <u>adequate</u> for this option
Medical Readiness	OK - <u>Nothing abnormal</u> , i.e., no RC unit medical readiness issues beyond the normal
National Support	OK – <u>Should be general national support</u> for using RC to support engagement with critical foreign partners and countries in need of assistance
Recruiting	OK – <u>No perceived impediment</u> to recruiting
Retention	OK - <u>No perceived impediment</u> to retention
Equipment Needs	Not a relevant factor
Planning Complexity	Some potential issues. Scheduling operations and activities with foreign nations involves many factors and timing to accommodate individual RC personnel availability sometimes may be impossible
Others?	OK – <u>None evident</u>

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Conditions & Standards Factor	Sub-Option 5E – Establish cyber units and capability within the RC to support COCOM, Service and state future cyber warfare mission requirements.
Assured Access	<u>No particular issues evident</u>
Training	Perhaps – DoD programs and goals yet to be determined
Basing and Infrastructure	Perhaps – But should not be a major impediment
Duty Status	OK - Existing duty status options appear <u>adequate</u> for this option
Medical Readiness	OK - <u>Nothing abnormal</u> , i.e., no RC medical readiness issues beyond the norm & reliance on volunteer pools (vice large units) should mitigate
National Support	OK - <u>Volunteer nature</u> of this option <u>should mitigate</u> most national support issues
Recruiting	OK - <u>Only positive</u>
Retention	OK - <u>Only positive</u>
Equipment Needs	OK - <u>Not heavily equipment related</u> – mostly about personnel and their inherent skills
Planning Complexity	<u>Probably not</u>
Others?	<u>None evident</u>

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Potential Laws, Policies & Doctrine Matrix (data only for Sub-Options 5B and 5E)

Laws, Policies & Doctrine	<u>Sub-Option 5E</u> -Establish cyber units and capability within the RC to support COCOM, Service and state future cyber warfare mission requirements.	<u>Sub-Option 5B-1</u> – Expand RC contributions to ISR and intelligence analysis	<u>Sub-Option 5B-2</u> -Expand RC foreign area specialist personnel and increase cooperation with foreign partner states
Laws	Laws restricting use of RC in non-named operations	Laws restricting use of RC in non-named operations	Laws restricting use of RC in non-named operations
Policies	None apparent	None apparent	Not all services have established foreign area officer programs. Could be an issue.
Doctrine	None apparent (doctrine not yet mature)	None apparent. There already are significant current RC contributions in these areas.	None apparent (but see note above)

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Summary of Specific Options Chosen to Improve RC Contributions to the Total Force to Meet Emerging Threats (data only for 5B and 5E)

Assessment Element	<u>Sub-Option 5E</u> – Establish cyber units and capability within the RC to support future cyber warfare mission requirements.	<u>Sub-Option 5B-1</u> – Expand RC contributions to ISR and intelligence analysis	<u>Sub-Option 5B-2</u> – Expand RC foreign area specialist personnel and increase cooperation with foreign partner states
Capabilities	Potential <u>positive</u> impact on DoD capabilities against a cyber attack, which might take place with no warning	Potential <u>positive</u> impact on the full range of operations, where the demand for wider and more persistent coverage has grown significantly in recent years	Potential <u>positive</u> impact on the full range of operations outside the United States, limited by the likely small number of individuals available for many countries
Conditions & Standards	<u>Perhaps</u> some training and basing/ infrastructure issues, reflecting shared use of secure facilities and IT equipment.	Potential for <u>some issues</u> given need for some additional equipment and training. But given adequate funding the problems should be overcome readily.	<u>Potential issues</u> . Timing of foreign activities will depend upon many factors. Timely availability from a small number of RC specialists for specific event is uncertain.
Cost	Some <u>modest equipment and facility costs</u> to be expected	Some <u>modest equipment and facility costs</u> to be expected.	<u>Overall costs would depend upon scope of the program. Funding would grow in proportion to the number of countries supported</u>
Laws, Policies, Doctrine	Unknown. DoD policies and programs are not yet fully defined.	None apparent. There are significant RC contributions of this kind underway at present	Not all services have established foreign area specialists. May be a policy issue.

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Other Issues, considerations or options

- TBD

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Back-Up Material

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Blog Comments Related to Adjusting RC Capability to Meet Emerging Threats (Option Category #5)



- Pros/Cons Discussion:
 - Pro: RC units well suited to missions with civilian skill-sets: Medical, Engineer, CA/PSYOPS, etc.
 - Pro: Certain CONUS based missions such as DSCA, UAV ops, intelligence, space, cyber, training ops, etc. are perfect for the ARC
 - Pro: RC could move say 40% of its forces into “niche” areas where AC doesn’t want to go (in order to stay focused on full spectrum force capabilities)
 - Pro/Con: Specialized units by exception and tied to specific requirements
 - Con: The future environment for which we must prepare doesn’t always present a clear demand signal (e.g., from the COCOMs)
 - Con: RC doesn’t want to become too specialized or runs the risk of becoming irrelevant
 - Con: Potentially makes RC less relevant to preventing/ deterring future conflict
 - Con: GPF can execute these niche missions through task organization or with limited pre-deployment training/ equipping which mitigates requirement to become too specialized (or running the risk of becoming irrelevant)
- Example: USAF has already made decision to place several specialized missions solely in its RC
- Proposals (specific/general) offered up by participants:
 - Cyber makes good sense for RC since skill-sets are located in civilian side, and services are not going to be able to train and develop PhD computer skills needed for cyber
 - Move some BCTs from ARNG into the USAR and replace with Multifunctional or Sustainment Brigades (to provide governors with personnel and equipment to respond to HLD and DR events vice “bodies” from a HBCT)
 - “F-22 is a silver bullet niche mission” (SecDef Gates) – why not put this capability primarily into RC since it’s a gold-plated platform that will rarely be used?
 - RC units can play significant role in reachback capabilities that are in high demand during COIN ops [to augment AC capacity] – including space, ISR, PED, IO, cyber, etc., i.e., performed at CONUS and a good fit to RC

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
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The slide features a white background with a blue horizontal bar at the top. In the top left corner is the Department of Defense seal, and in the top right corner is the Army seal. The main text is centered and reads: "Option 6: Integration of AC and RC Units" followed by "15 November 2010". A small number "1" is located in the bottom right corner of the slide frame.

Option 6 focuses on the Integration of selected RC elements into operational AC units and/or the integration of selected AC elements into RC units. Specifically, aviation units were chosen for this Study, as the Army is currently operating with too few rotary-wing sorties, based upon lack of pilots and not necessarily lack of airframes. Integration of RC personnel into AC units or AC personnel into RC units (both pilots and maintenance/support personnel) has been successfully utilized/demonstrated in numerous instances in the Air Force and Navy. This concept can be advantageous to both Active and Reserve Components and to DoD, if limitations are overcome, and when applied under the correct circumstances, integration may increase flexibility and efficiency, thus enhancing Service capabilities and capacity.


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Workshop Agenda




Time	Mon Sep 20	Tues Sep 21	Weds Sep 22
8-9		Half-day Option Working Group sessions in WAL, WALPR, MP-6 (rooms N209, N217, S205, S212, S283) [0800-1145]	AC-RC Option 3 [0800-0920]
9-10			AC-RC Option 4 [0935-1105]
10-11			AC-RC Option 5 [1105-1225]
11-12	Check-In WAL Bldg 26		
12-1	WAL Overview – Mr. Dean Intro – Mr. Smiley Overview – Dr. Simmons	Return to WAL Lunch (WAL) [1200-1250]	
1-2	IDA: Achieving Force Depth	JS J-3 Accessibility Assessment [1250-1340]	AC-RC Option 6 [1310-1430]
		OBJ 6 Update – Mr. Stratton	
2-3	JS J-8: Force Sufficiency Assessment	USAF Review	AC-RC Option 7 [1445-1535]
		AC-RC Option 1 [1440-1600]	
3-4	USMC Brief USA Brief (if available) USN Brief (if available)	AC-RC Option 2 [1600-1720]	Survey & Wrap Up – Mr. Smiley [1535-1615]


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Option Description/Definition



Option	Description	Specific Forces To Be Examined
Enhance AC-RC integration	Integrate selected RC elements into operational AC units and/or integrate selected AC elements into RC units	Integrate RC aircrews into AC rotary-wing aircraft units or vice-versa.

“To provide trained Reserve Component (RC) personnel to augment and fully integrate into Active Component (and vice-versa) aviation units, leveraging military experience, civilian skills, and availability to meet peacetime, crisis and wartime requirements on a timely basis.”

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References:

- Duklis, Peter S. The Joint Reserve Component Virtual Information Operations Organization (JRVIO); Cyber Warriors Just a Click Away. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 09 April 2002
- Hopkins, Donna L. Joint Reserve Forces: An Evolution in Military Affairs. *JFQ Spring*, 1998.
- *How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook*. 2007- 2008
- <http://www.jfcom.mil/reserve/jru.htm>
- http://www.jfcom.mil/reserve/jru_history.htm
- OSD(RA) RTM. Military Engagement Teams (METs) [Information Paper], 25 March 2010.
- Summers, Clark. Splicing the Reserve Component Stovepipe- Joint Reserve Command. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 18 March 2008.

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Motivation for Including in Study



- **Integrating RC personnel into AC units or AC personnel into RC units, especially in the Service aviation communities (both pilots and maintenance/support personnel), has been successfully utilized/demonstrated in numerous instances.**
- **This concept can be advantageous to both Active and Reserve Components and to DoD, if limitations are overcome.**
- **When applied under the correct circumstances, integration may increase capabilities, flexibility and efficiency, thus enhancing Service capability and capacity.**

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References:

- Duklis, Peter S. The Joint Reserve Component Virtual Information Operations Organization (JRVIO); Cyber Warriors Just a Click Away. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 09 April 2002
- Hopkins, Donna L. Joint Reserve Forces: An Evolution in Military Affairs. *JFQ Spring*, 1998.
- *How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook*. 2007- 2008
- <http://www.jfcom.mil/reserve/jru.htm>
- http://www.jfcom.mil/reserve/jru_history.htm
- OSD(RA) RTM. Military Engagement Teams (METs) [Information Paper], 25 March 2010.
- Summers, Clark. Splicing the Reserve Component Stovepipe- Joint Reserve Command. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 18 March 2008.

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Goods and Others



- Several successful examples include the USAF (78th FS, numerous AR Squadrons), the Navy (HM, VAQ, VFC), and in the USCG's 'Team Coast Guard' approach.
- Some not-so successful examples include 4ID and ARNG 49AD, USMC "trust" of RC units during DESERT STORM and geo-location issues for Navy personnel.

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Enhance AC-RC Integration




- Background:
 - Integrate selected RC elements into operational AC units and integrate selected AC elements into RC units.
 - Specifically, integrate RC aircrew and maintenance personnel into AC rotary-wing aircraft units.
- Factors:
 - Significant experience enhancements to both Components.
 - Potential cost savings.
 - Limitations must be overcome, including geography, culture, legislative issues, leadership concerns and equipment/training compatibility.

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Capabilities – Helicopter Squadron Examples




- In each of the previously reviewed scenarios, AC and RC helicopter units have been employed. In several instances, RC units have deployed to relieve the burden of multiple AC rotations to combat zones. In other cases, all or parts of RC squadrons have been deployed with AC units.


- Conventional Operations
 - Iraq and Afghanistan
- Stability Operations
 - Iraq and Afghanistan
- Steady State Engagement
 - CJCS Exercise Program
 - AFRICOM Exercise NATURAL FIRE (Uganda)
- HA/DR
 - Pakistan Flood Relief
- HD
 - Hurricane Katrina Relief

Scenarios
MCO
Large-Scale Stability Op
Steady State Engagement
HA/DR
HD/DSCA

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USAR and ARNG Helo Issues



- Force Structure
 - 19 Combat Aviation Brigades
 - 11 AC
 - 8 ARNG
 - Total Rotary Wing Assets
 - 55% AC
 - 40% ARNG
 - 5% RC
 - Correct Mix?
- OPTEMPO/ITEMPO – RC and AC crew to aircraft ratio is 1:1
 - Compare to some USAF crew ratios of 5:1
- Some aircraft unable to meet theater requirements
- RC and ARNG aviation units want to deploy as a whole, not piecemeal
- ARNG and RC Training and Travel Issues
 - Average Aviator travels 3-4 hours for training (co-location)
 - Units out of sync with higher HQ and other units for deployments (ARFORGEN)
- Others?

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USAFR and ANG Helo Issues



- State Partnership Program support to COCOMs – future? (fixed wing already participate)
- Challenges meeting State and National obligations (DR vs. Deployments)
- Aging Aircraft
- Others?



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USNR Helo Issues



- Force Structure
 - 38 Rotary Wing Squadrons
 - 33 AC
 - 3 RC
 - 2 Blended
 - Squadron Augment Units
 - Total Rotary Wing Assets
 - 92% AC
 - 8% RC
 - Correct Mix?
- Organizationally Integrated
 - All squadrons under operational control of AC Wings
- Common Type/Model/Series
- Commonality vs Specialization
 - Two RC squadrons provide dedicated Naval Special Warfare Support
- Others?



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USMCR Helo Issues



- 4th MAW Augmentation to deployed MAWs
 - High OPTEMPO for some units/personnel
- Aging assets
 - However deployed units, be they AC or RC, deploy with the best assets
- Not meeting dwell goals, especially for Medium Lift Squadrons (HMLA)
- Others?



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USCGR Helo Issues



- Operational surges/OPTEMPO increases (Katrina)
- Limited aviation personnel
- Others?



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Capability Metric	Scenario				
	MCO	Large-Scale Stability	Steady State Engagement	HA/DR	HD/DSCA
Response Time?	NC Fully trained/integrated RC members = more personnel available for operations. Will require additional funding/training to achieve commonality.	NC Fully trained/integrated RC members = more personnel available for operations. Will require additional funding/training to achieve commonality.	+	+	+
Provides Desired Capability?	+	+	+	+	+
Appropriately Equipped?	???	???	+	+	+
Appropriately Trained?	-	-	+	NC	NC
Number of Units?	+	+	+	NC	NC
Others?					

+ = RC Integration Enhances Overall Force Capability
 NC = No Change to Overall Force Capability
 - = RC Integration Degrades Overall Force Capability

On number of units, not sure if the numbers will increase, but overall capacity should increase due to common training and equipment and increased utilization of assets.

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Conditions & Standards Factor	Issue
Assured Access	With proper and timely training, as well as correct equipment. Expectation of high participation.
Training	Co-location required for full integration. Currency and flight hour issues.
Basing and Infrastructure	Adequate bases, but co-location issues.
Duty Status	Title 10 vs. Title 32 and UCMJ issues – need MOA.
Medical Readiness	No issues.
National Support	No issues.
Recruiting	RC, ARNG, ANG have no issues meeting recruiting goals for aviation.
Retention	Pilot numbers are sufficient, but some maintenance shortages.
Equipment Needs	Similar TMS is a must for training and deployment.
Planning Complexity	Training and TMS issues make operating together more difficult.
Others?	See Next Slide

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Conditions and Standards - Others
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Culture (rank, experience – USAF example) • Similar geographical location for training • Leadership issues – UCMJ, command opportunities (USCG), two commanders (USAF), AC vs. RC CO rotation (USAF/USN) • Equipment Compatibility • Standardization • Training <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – 39 vs. 365 days – USMC “I&I” example – Best Practice? • FTS RC pay and personnel support <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Full time RC or Remote? • Materiel “Ownership” (USCG and USAF)

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Cost Considerations




- No incremental cost to retain status quo
- Potential increased costs for AC-RC helicopter squadron integration:
 - Equipment upgrades/compatibility
 - Training and travel
 - Separate, Congressionally appropriated funds for AC, RC and ARNG/ANG Components.
- Potential cost savings (non-helo examples)
 - RC supporting some functions within a squadron, vice whole RC unit being integrated.
 - C-17 example with B-757 mechanics
 - CNATRA RC Business Model
 - RC = 15% of Instructor Pilots
 - Produce 21% of Student “X’s”

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Cost Considerations: AC-RC Integration



	Cost Considerations				
	AC Manpower	RC Manpower	Training	Equipment	Others?
Integration of RC and AC Helicopter Units	<p>-</p> <p>If units are integrated, less AC personnel may be required and RC personnel will most likely come at a lesser cost.</p>	<p>+</p> <p>May add cost to a AC unit for additional training and travel for training.</p>	<p>+ / NC</p> <p>If units have same TMS of aircraft, cost will not be significant. If not, additional funds will be required to bring RC personnel readiness to AC levels (pilot and support personnel).</p>	<p>+ / NC</p> <p>If units have the same TMS of aircraft, cost will not be significant. If not, additional funds will be required to bring RC personnel readiness to AC levels (pilot and support personnel).</p>	

+ = Integration Increases Overall Cost
 NC = No Change to Overall Cost
 - = Integration Decreases Overall Cost

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Laws, Policies, and Doctrine



- No law, policy, or doctrine changes if status quo is retained
- Identify laws, policies, and doctrine changes needed to implement AC-RC Option
- Laws
 - Army: Command Legal Authority (AC/USAR vs. ARNG troops and Posse Comitatus Act), Law Enforcement with ARNG,
 - USAF and ANG – Title 10 vs. Title 32 Authorities
 - UCMJ
- Policies
 - Pay and Personnel administration (if administratively integrated)
- Doctrine (USCG “Team Coast Guard” example)

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Recommended RC/AC Helo Integration



- Can part of an AC squadron deploy to a “crisis” and then have RC members fill-in at a later date?
- Are Round-Out Units feasible (i.e., 1 Company in a Battalion or 1 Squadron in a Wing)?
- How do “Off-Ramp” personnel fit in (continuity/continuum of service)?
- 80%/20% “model” – correct mix?
 - How does this unit work?

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Questions (for each AC-RC Rebalancing Option)	Rating
1) Assess the feasibility of this option?	1 = easy ... 5 = difficult
2) To what extent will this option enhance Total Force capabilities?	1 = none ... 5 = substantial
3) To what extent does this option reduce stress on the AC?	1 = none ... 5 = substantial
4) To what extent does this option preserve the national investment and readiness gains achieved within RC over the past decade?	1 = none ... 5 = substantial
5) Is this the best example to use to illustrate this type of option	1 = yes ; 2 = no
6) To what extent will this option affect DoD costs?	1 = large increase ... 3 = no effect ... 5 = large decrease
7) If your answer is "no", please describe the option you recommend	Text response
8) Assess the feasibility of your preferred option	1 = easy ... 5 = difficult
9) Assess the capability benefit of your preferred option	1 = none ... 5 = substantial
10) Assess the cost impact of your preferred option	1 = large increase ... 3 = no effect ... 5 = large decrease
11) Please identify any conditions & standards impacts for your option	Text response
12) Please identify any law, policy, or doctrine impacts for your option	Text response
13) Without regard to specific examples, rate this option category in terms of its overall utility for rebalancing the AC-RC mix	1 = limited, 2 = marginal, 3 = fair, 4 = good, 5 = excellent

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BACK-UP

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Conditions and Standards Template



Conditions & Standards Factor	Issue
Assured Access	Is this factor important for this option? If so, how do we ensure desired accessibility?
Training	How do we ensure desired level of training?
Basing and Infrastructure	Are basing and infrastructure adequate to support this option? If not, what is needed?
Duty Status	Are existing duty status options adequate for this option? If not, what is needed?
Medical Readiness	Is RC medical readiness adequate to support this option? If not, what is needed?
National Support	Does RC have sufficient national support to enable implementation of this option? If not, what is needed?
Recruiting	How might this option affect recruiting?
Retention	How might this option affect retention?
Equipment Needs	Does RC have sufficient equipment to implement this option? If not, what is needed?
Planning Complexity	Does this option introduce additional complexity in planning, or does it simplify planning?
Others?	

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Option 7: Employing RC for Institutional Support

Working Paper/Draft Rev 6.
14 Sept 2010

Stephen Phillips 240 228 2793 stephen.phillips@jhuapl.edu	Col Michael Castaldi 703 693 1357 michael.castaldi@osd.mil
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Option 7 focuses on integrating designated units, teams, and/or individuals to support Service institutional organizations, such as recruiting, training, pay, personnel, Chaplaincy, doctors, dentists, and other base support activities. Service members performing institutional support represent a large portion of the overall force. As a result, effective and efficient integration with the RC will have a significant impact. In many cases, the RC can provide Institutional Support with little to no significant cost, especially for activities that do not require equipment or personal protective gear. The skill-sets needed to provide Institutional Support tasks are often resident in mid-career service members and/or civilians as a result of their experience. Thus, they can immediately contribute once available. Most Institutional Support roles do not require the service member to deploy, and are thus conducive to periods where an RC member is seeking advanced education, is required to address family needs, or is dealing with long term medical issues that prevent deployment.

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Time	Mon Sep 20	Tues Sep 21	Weds Sep 22
8-9		Half-day Option Working Group sessions in WAL, WALPR, MP-6 (rooms N209, N217, S205, S212, S283) [0800-1145]	AC-RC Option 3 [0800-0920]
9-10			AC-RC Option 4 [0935-1105]
10-11			AC-RC Option 5 [1105-1225]
11-12	Check-In WAL Bldg 26		Lunch [1225-1310]
12-1	WAL Overview – Ms. Pak Intro – Mr. Smiley Overview – Dr. Simmons	Return to WAL Lunch (WAL) [1200-1250]	
1-2	IDA: Achieving Force Depth	JS J-3 Accessibility Assessment [1250-1340] OBJ 6 Update – Mr. Stratton	AC-RC Option 6 [1310-1430]
2-3	JS J-8: Force Sufficiency Assessment	USAF Review AC-RC Option 1 [1440-1600]	AC-RC Option 7 [1445-1535]
3-4	USMC Review USA Review	AC-RC Option 2 [1600-1720]	Survey & Wrap Up – Ms. Pak, Mr. Smiley [1535-1615]

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Option Description



Option 7: Institutional Support

Option	Description	Specific Forces To Be Examined
7) Rely on RC to provide selected institutional support	Selected RC units provide forces to accomplish Services' institutional support requirements	From existing RC structure, designate units, teams, and/or individuals to support recruiting, training, and base support activities

*"Institutional Support Career Field (ISCF). Focuses on the increasingly technical and complex nature of running the Army as an organization. The emphasis in this career field is management, planning and programming of Army resources both near-term and into the future years, projecting requirements, and developing capabilities in the mid and long-term. The functional areas in this career field are FA 43 (**Human Resource Management**), FA 45 (**Comptroller**), FA 47 (**Academy Professor**, USMA), FA 49 (Operations Research/Systems Analysis (ORSA)), FA 50 (**Force Management**), and FA 52 (Nuclear Research and Operations) and FA 59 (Strategic Plans and Policy.) "*

"Career Field and Functional Area Information," Army Development System XXI Task Force.
<http://www.army.mil/adsxxi/cfa.htm>, accessed 9 Sep 2010.

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- By strict definition, US Army Institutional Support career fields are:
 - Comptroller
 - Academy Professor
 - Operations Research/Systems Analysis
 - Nuclear Research and Operations
 - Operations, Plans, and Training

- *Institutional Support Career Field (ISCF)*. Focuses on the increasingly technical and complex nature of running the Army as an organization. The emphasis in this career field is management, planning and programming of Army resources both near-term and into the future years, projecting requirements, and developing capabilities in the mid and long-term. The functional areas in this career field are FA 43 (Human Resource Management), FA 45 (Comptroller), FA 47 (Academy Professor, USMA), FA 49 (Operations Research/Systems Analysis (ORSA)), FA 50 (Force Management), and FA 52 (Nuclear Research and Operations) and FA 59 (Strategic Plans and Policy.)

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Motivation for Including in Study



Option 7: Institutional Support

- Service members performing Institutional Support represent a large portion of the overall force. As a result, effective and efficient integration with the RC will have a significant impact.
- In many cases, RC can provide Institutional Support with little to no significant cost, especially for activities that do not require equipment or personal protective gear.
- The skillsets needed to provide Institutional Support tasks are often resident in mid-career service members and/or civilians as a result of their experience. Thus they can immediately contribute once available.
- Most Institutional Support roles do not require service member to deploy, and are thus conducive to periods where member is seeking advanced education, needs to address family needs, or is dealing with long term medical issues that prevent deployment.

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Background

Option 7: Institutional Support

- “One very simple way to decide whether an activity is operational or institutional is to ask whether the organization that conducts the activity is defined by an MTOE or a TDA document. MTOEs define the mission and structure of organizations staffed solely by military personnel and derived from a standard Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) that allows quick integration of these military units with other military units into a cohesive, deployable military force that can meet the stated needs of a combatant commander. **TDA**s, on the other hand, define organizations staffed by military and government civilian personnel that are tailored to the needs of a particular fixed location.”

Camm, Frank *et al.*, *What the Army Needs to Know to Align its Operational and Institutional Activities*, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Arroyo Center, 2007, 13.

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- “One very simple way to decide whether an activity is operational or institutional is to ask whether the organization that conducts the activity is defined by an MTOE or a TDA document. MTOEs define the mission and structure of organizations staffed solely by military personnel and derived from a standard Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) that allows quick integration of these military units with other military units into a cohesive, deployable military force that can meet the stated needs of a combatant commander. TDAs, on the other hand, define organizations staffed by military and government civilian personnel that are tailored to the needs of a particular fixed location.”
- TDA = Table of Distribution & Allowances

Reference:

- Camm, Frank *et al.*, *What the Army Needs to Know to Align its Operational and Institutional Activities*, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Arroyo Center, 2007, 13.

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 **Background** 

Option 7: Institutional Support

- **Institutional organizations** provide the infrastructure necessary to raise, train, equip, deploy, and ensure the readiness of all Army forces. The training base provides military skills and professional education to every Soldier—as well as members of sister services and allied forces. It also allows The Army to expand rapidly in time of war. The industrial base provides world-class equipment and logistics for The Army. Army installations provide the power-projection platforms required to deploy land forces promptly to support combatant commanders. Once those forces are deployed, the institutional Army provides the logistics needed to support them.
- Without the institutional Army, the operational Army cannot function. Without the operational Army, the institutional Army has no purpose.

<http://www.army.mil/info/organization/>

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- **Institutional organizations** provide the infrastructure necessary to raise, train, equip, deploy, and ensure the readiness of all Army forces. The training base provides military skills and professional education to every Soldier—as well as members of sister services and allied forces. It also allows The Army to expand rapidly in time of war. The industrial base provides world-class equipment and logistics for The Army. Army installations provide the power-projection platforms required to deploy land forces promptly to support combatant commanders. Once those forces are deployed, the institutional Army provides the logistics needed to support them.
- Without the institutional Army, the operational Army cannot function. Without the operational Army, the institutional Army has no purpose.

Reference:

- <http://www.army.mil/info/organization/>

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Background

Option 7: Institutional Support

- **Service Secretaries**
 - ...is (are) responsible for, has the authority necessary to conduct all affairs of the Department of the _____, including the following functions:
 - Recruiting (Army) Title 10, Chapter 303, §3013.
 - Organizing
 - Supplying
 - Equipping (including research and development) (Navy) Title 10, Chapter 503, §5013.
 - Training
 - Servicing
 - Mobilizing (Air Force) Title 10, Chapter 503, §5013.
 - Demobilizing
 - Administering (including the morale and welfare of personnel).
 - Maintaining
 - The construction, outfitting, and repair of military equipment
 - The construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings, structures, and utilities and the acquisition of real property and interests in real property necessary to carry out the responsibilities specified in this section

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- Secretary of the _____
 - ...is responsible for, has the authority necessary to conduct all affairs of the Department of the ____, including the following functions:
 - Recruiting
 - Organizing
 - Supplying
 - Equipping (including research and development)
 - Training
 - Servicing
 - Mobilizing
 - Demobilizing
 - Administering (including the morale and welfare of personnel).
 - Maintaining
 - The construction, outfitting, and repair of military equipment
 - The construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings, structures, and utilities and the acquisition of real property and interests in real property necessary to carry out the responsibilities specified in this section

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Key Factors

Option 7: Institutional Support

Table 2.1
Different Ways to Distinguish Operational from Institutional Activities

Option	Operating Force	Institutional Army
Roles and responsibilities identified in Title 10	Forces the Army maintains for combatant commanders to use in contingencies	Organizes, trains, and equips forces maintained for combatant commanders to use in contingencies
Type of manpower document used	Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE)	Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA)
Treatment in Total Army Analysis (TAA)	Operating Force	Generating Force

Whether identified as “Institutional Army” or “Generating Force,” or some other moniker, the support functions in each are congruent.

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Reference:

- Camm, Frank *et al.*, *What the Army Needs to Know to Align its Operational and Institutional Activities*, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Arroyo Center, 2007, 13.


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Key Factors



Option 7: Institutional Support

Table 2.2
Government Manpower Required in Generating Force

Activity	Total (thousands)	Military (thousands)	DA civilian (thousands)	% Military
Training	133	99	33	74
Medical	63	35	29	56
Army management headquarters	60	41	19	68
Installations	45	6	39	13
Sustainment	40	4	36	10
Acquisition and fielding of systems	26	3	23	12
Personnel management	23	16	8	70
Security	15	5	10	33
Readiness and mobilization	13	7	6	54
Information management	10	2	8	20
Intelligence	9	5	4	56
Total	437	223	214	51

NOTE: The numbers in the table are requirements at the beginning of the TAA-11 review of the Generating Force, August 2003. Department of the Army (DA) civilians are Army civilian government employees. Contractors play a key role here; no reliable counts of contract employees are available. Typical total counts of

Significant manpower is needed in the Generating Force/ for Institutional Support Functions.

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- Can fulfill a need that the AC will not be able to supply in time of full MOB?

Reference:

- Camm, Frank *et al.*, *What the Army Needs to Know to Align its Operational and Institutional Activities*, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Arroyo Center, 2007, 13.

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 **Key Factors** 

Option 7: Institutional Support

- These functions do not require a long-lead time to ensure readiness of the MOB RC member or small element;
 - Recruiting, training, pay/personnel admin, medical, legal, chaplaincy
- Tasks may leverage distributed IT network
 - Recruiting, pay/personnel admin
- In some cases functions rely on longstanding experience or civilian occupational skillsets;
 - Training, depot-level maintenance, medical, legal, chaplaincy
- Support could be done in post-retirement “second- career” to retain and leverage difficult to replace experience and expertise.
 - Depot-level maintenance, recruiting, training, admin, medical, legal, chaplaincy

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 **Working Definition** 


Option 7: Institutional Support

- Institutional Support – roles and functions that do not require long, intensive training to maintain proficiency, and therefore allow for both short-notice and short-term (surge) recall/MOB
- Examples include; recruiting, training, pay and personnel administration, depot-level maintenance, routine medical/legal/chaplaincy assistance
 - Others?


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Specific Sub-Options




Option 7: Institutional Support


- **Recruiting** – RC members to assist AC w/ attracting new members, especially in response to anticipated manpower shortfalls
- **Training** –RC members to assist AC w/ training along whole spectrum from initial individual training to unit pre-deployment certification
- **Administration** – RC members to assist AC w/ functions such as pay and personnel management
- **Depot Level Maintenance** – RC members to assist AC w/ major repair/refurb of equipment and platforms
- **Medical/Legal/Chaplaincy** – RC members to assist AC w/ performing medical, legal, religious functions, especially in times of surge

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Conditions and Standards Template



Conditions & Standards Factor	Issue
Assured Access	Is this factor important for this option? If so, how do we ensure desired accessibility?
Training	How do we ensure desired level of training?
Basing and Infrastructure	Are basing and infrastructure adequate to support this option? If not, what is needed?
Duty Status	Are existing duty status options adequate for this option? If not, what is needed?
Medical Readiness	Is RC medical readiness adequate to support this option? If not, what is needed?
National Support	Does RC have sufficient national support to enable implementation of this option? If not, what is needed?
Recruiting	How might this option affect recruiting?
Retention	How might this option affect retention?
Equipment Needs	Does RC have sufficient equipment to implement this option? If not, what is needed?
Planning Complexity	Does this option introduce additional complexity in planning, or does it simplify planning?
Others?	

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Conditions and Standards Matrix	
Option 7: Institutional Support	
Conditions & Standards Factor	RECRUITING – RC members to assist AC w/ attracting new member, especially in response to shortfalls
Assured Access	Yes – will need to put means in place to track accountability of distributed RC members
Training	OJT - One time, short duration initial requirement and/or OJT followed by familiarization with current manpower needs
Basing and Infrastructure	Yes – distributed, local tasking means employing facilities in place, or none at all
Duty Status	Yes – may need to address policies for short term MOB if duration exceeds normal AT, allow enhanced flex for visits
Medical Readiness	Yes - no RC medical readiness issues beyond the norm & reliance on volunteer pools (vice large units) should mitigate
National Support	Yes – will enhance national support as RC seen as part and parcel of one's local community through interaction w/ neighbors conducting recruiting functions
Recruiting	N/A
Retention	Positive – will have a positive impact by shifting or sharing AC burden and providing non-deploy period for RC members, enhances continuum of service
Equipment Needs	Yes – RC members can share equipment (IT systems) w/ AC component or operate using POC, personal PC w/ appropriate security
Planning Complexity	Yes – Can present a planning challenge as various recruiting needs ebb and flow. Model may require short notice surge response by RC members
Others?	
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Conditions and Standards Matrix	
Option 7: Institutional Support	
Conditions & Standards Factor	TRAINING – RC members to assist AC w/ training to include whole spectrum from initial training to unit predeploy cert
Assured Access	Yes – can mitigate by creating IMA-like unit for training functions
Training	No – RC will have pers with experience needed to act as trainers at all levels
Basing and Infrastructure	No - ...if MOB for RC integration. Additional infrastructure will be needed for expanded force. Integration through annual requirements will have minimal impact
Duty Status	Yes
Medical Readiness	Yes – RC not significantly impacted for Med readiness compared to other options, types of service
National Support	Not required
Recruiting	Positive – will enable RC members to contribute with minimal impact while pursuing education, dealing with family issues, etc.
Retention	Positive – will enable RC members to contribute with minimal impact while pursuing education, dealing with family issues, etc., enhances continuum of service
Equipment Needs	No – but equipment shortages is not a specific RC integration problem.
Planning Complexity	Yes – but manageable. Must work to develop appropriate means for RC to relieve, share the workload of training when needed.
Others?	
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- Leverage IDT/AT funding to support the services

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	<h1>Conditions and Standards Matrix</h1>	
Option 7: Institutional Support		
Conditions & Standards Factor	Administration – RC members to assist AC w/ functions such as pay and personnel management	
Assured Access	Yes- should consider leveraging ability to account, employ RC members in a distributed fashion	
Training	One system – to ensure the RC are employed to support AC elements and vice versa, they can do so effectively	
Basing and Infrastructure	No – ...if MOB for RC integration. Additional infrastructure will be needed for expanded force. Integration through annual requirements will have minimal impact	
Duty Status	Yes	
Medical Readiness	Yes – RC not significantly impacted for Med readiness compared to other options, types of service	
National Support	Not required	
Recruiting	Positive – will attract RC members who for a variety of reasons can MOB, but not deploy	
Retention	Positive – when managed properly as a response to surge operations, ensuring that service member personnel and pay issues are handled in a timely manner.	
Equipment Needs	No ~ perhaps minor additional IT hardware/software	
Planning Complexity	Yes – but manageable. Must work to develop appropriate means for RC to relieve, share the workload of training when needed.	
Others?		
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	<h1>Conditions and Standards Matrix</h1>	
Option 7: Institutional Support		
Conditions & Standards Factor	Depot Level Maintenance – RC members to assist AC w/ major repair/refurb of equipment and platforms	
Assured Access	Yes- should develop revised IMA-like duty status to ensure easy access	
Training	Civilian Occupation – leverage civilian occupation to ensure proficiency	
Basing and Infrastructure	No – ...if MOB for RC integration. Additional infrastructure will be needed for expanded force. Integration through annual requirements will have minimal impact	
Duty Status	Yes – should allow for short term, possibly shift-work-like service	
Medical Readiness	Yes – RC not significantly impacted for Med readiness compared to other options, types of service	
National Support	Not required	
Recruiting	Positive – will attract RC members who for a variety of reasons can MOB, but not deploy	
Retention	Positive. – will enable RC members to contribute with minimal impact while pursuing education, dealing with family issues, etc. May be eligible for second-career/post-retirement service	
Equipment Needs	No	
Planning Complexity	Yes – but manageable. Must work to develop appropriate means for RC to relieve, share the workload of training when needed.	
Others?		
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- “FT State” concept - NG supports dispersed RC members such as ROTC cadre, recruiters.
- Verify services have depot level maintainers in uniform/reservists.

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Conditions and Standards Matrix	
Option 7: Institutional Support	
Conditions & Standards Factor	Medical/Legal/Chaplaincy – RC members to assist AC in performing medical, legal, religious functions, especially in times of surge
Assured Access	No
Training	Civilian Occupation – leverage civilian occupation to ensure proficiency
Basing and Infrastructure	No - ...if MOB for RC integration. Additional infrastructure will be needed for expanded force. Integration through annual requirements will have minimal impact
Duty Status	Yes – should allow for short term, flexible service
Medical Readiness	Yes – RC not significantly impacted for Med readiness compared to other options, types of service
National Support	Yes – will enhance national support as RC seen as part and parcel of one's local community through interaction w/ neighbors conducting medical/legal/religious functions
Recruiting	Positive – will attract RC members who for a variety of reasons can MOB, but not deploy
Retention	Minimal - – may enhance quality of medical/legal/religious services and thus improve morale.
Equipment Needs	No
Planning Complexity	Yes – but manageable. Must work to develop appropriate means for RC to relieve, share the workload of training when needed.
Others?	

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- Consider pay issues for RC members
 - Dr's tend to lose money on MOB duty, religious do not.

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Cost Summary Template




Cost Element	Potential Impact
Personnel	Cost increase or decrease due to changes in Active or Reserve Component personnel
Equipment	Cost increase or decrease due to changes in AC or RC equipment
Training	Cost increase or decrease due to changes in training for AC or RC units or personnel
Installations & Facilities	Cost increase or decrease due to changes in AC or RC installations or facilities

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Cost Summary




Option 7: Institutional Support


Cost Element	Potential Impact
Personnel	Cost will likely decrease with support of RC personnel, especially in cases such as recruiting and admin functions that can be performed remotely
Equipment	In most cases, either no, or insignificant cost impact as minimal extra equipment is needed, no personnel protective gear required
Training	Cost of training remains the same, leverage use of RC members allows for surge ops, and thus smaller, more economical steady state cadre
Installations & Facilities	No cost impact, especially when implementing remote participation

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Laws, Policies, and Doctrine Template


	Consideration
Laws	Are existing laws adequate to enable implementation of this option? If not, what changes are needed?
Policies	Are existing policies adequate to enable implementation of this option? If not, what changes are needed?
Doctrine	Is existing doctrine adequate to enable implementation of this option? If not, what changes are needed?

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Laws, Policies, and Doctrine

Option 7: Institutional Support

	Consideration
Laws	Are existing laws adequate to enable implementation of this option? If not, what changes are needed?
Policies	No. Policy should allow for enhanced flexibility in who is allowed to affiliate with the RC, that they may only MOB INCONUS for institutional support, their requirements for satisfactory drill completion, and providing for a robust continuum of service.
Doctrine	Doctrine is adequate. No significant changes would be needed, even if RC members providing institutional support MOB and deploy – current practices apply. [This option has less impact on scenarios than others in the study.]

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Questions (for each AC-RC Rebalancing Option)	Rating
1) Assess the feasibility of this option?	1 = difficult ... 5 = easy
2) To what extent will this option enhance Total Force capabilities?	1 = none ... 5 = substantial
3) To what extent does this option reduce stress on the AC?	1 = none ... 5 = substantial
4) To what extent does this option preserve the national investment and readiness gains achieved within RC over the past decade?	1 = none ... 5 = substantial
5) To what extent will this option affect DoD costs?	1 = large increase ... 3 = no effect ... 5 = large decrease
6) Without regard to specific examples, rate this option category in terms of its overall utility for rebalancing the AC-RC mix	1 = limited, 2 = marginal, 3 = fair, 4 = good, 5 = excellent
7) Is this the best example to use to illustrate this type of option	1 = yes ; 2 = no
8) If your answer is "no", please describe the option you recommend	Text response
9) Assess the feasibility of your preferred option	1 = difficult ... 5 = easy
10) Assess the capability benefit of your preferred option	1 = none ... 5 = substantial
11) Assess the cost impact of your preferred option	1 = large increase ... 3 = no effect ... 5 = large decrease
12) Please identify any conditions & standards impacts for your option	Text response
13) Please identify any law, policy, or doctrine impacts for your option	Text response

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<h1 style="font-size: 2em;">Back-Up Material</h1>	

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 UNCLASSIFIED/DRAFT 
<h1 style="margin: 0;">Depot Level Maintenance</h1>
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• “Lean Six Sigma initiatives throughout the Army are developing ways to make individual processes better, faster, and cheaper. Because these initiatives are designed and implemented locally, they tend to focus on performance metrics relevant to individual local processes. For example, a depot-level maintenance initiative might release resources to the operating force by increasing the utilization rate of depot maintenance assets. Such an initiative could also inadvertently reduce overall support to deployed forces by increasing customer wait times—a performance factor potentially beyond the scope of the local depot initiative.”
UNCLASSIFIED/DRAFT 25

References:

- Camm, Frank *et al.*, *What the Army Needs to Know to Align its Operational and Institutional Activities*, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Arroyo Center, 2007, 13.
- USA example: <http://www.tobyhanna.army.mil/>
- USAF example : <http://www.robins.af.mil/units/402ndmaintenancewing/index.asp>
- USN example: <http://www.navsea.navy.mil/shipyards/puget/default.aspx>

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 <p style="text-align: center;">UNCLASSIFIED/DRAFT</p> <h1 style="text-align: center;">Medical</h1> 
<p>“...each of these institutional activities is of particular importance to the Army leadership in its own right. Medical services address the immediate support of troops in theater and of wounded soldiers when they return from theater; both receive broad attention in the general media’s coverage of the war in Iraq and Afghanistan today.”</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">UNCLASSIFIED/DRAFT</p> <p style="text-align: right;">26</p>

References:

- Camm, Frank *et al.*, *What the Army Needs to Know to Align its Operational and Institutional Activities*, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Arroyo Center, 2007, 13.

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**Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Components:
Questions for the Services**

1) Capstone Question: What would you like this effort to do for your organization?

A: Serve to inform decision and policy makers about the future role of the USCGR as well as foster alignment, where appropriate, with DoD partners.

2) After Iraq and Afghanistan operations wind down, can we continue to use the RC as an operational force for normal, routine missions?

A: Yes.

-Will Servicemembers, families and employers support this?

A: This remains a significant unknown. Basic assumption is "yes" if utilization is predictable and meaningful.

- How would you envision RC use in 2015 and beyond?

A: Yes.

- What would be the demand signal that causes you to use them?

A: Reduced active duty end-strength or lack of growth to meet requirements. Continued/new surge requirements that exceed active duty capability/capacity.

3) How would you define and execute assured access?

A: Predictable availability of qualified personnel to meet both steady-state and surge requirements. Statutes that enable access

4) Several comments have been made throughout this process that current law or policy is insufficient to properly, or more fully, operationalize the Reserve.

What specific changes would you recommend be made to current law or policy to facilitate the process?

A: Authority to recall the Ready Reserve under 10 U.S.C. 12304.
Expanded authority to recall the Ready Reserve under 14 U.S.C.
Inability to maintain leave balance across periods of AD.
Continuity of medical/dental care for self & family from SELRES to various forms of AD and return to SELRES.

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5) Many High Demand/Low Density (HD/LD) capabilities have remained as such over the course of the last several years.

Are there potential solutions to these capacity shortfalls in the Reserve Component (RC)?

A: Deployable Force Support Packages to include:

Engineering/logistics

Admin

Command & Control

Medical

Integrated Command Structure for domestic response

Boat Crews

-What are your critical HD/LD capabilities today, and what do you think they will be in 2015?

Port Security Units

USMC:

- 1) You mentioned there is no current analysis that shows RC is cheaper than AC. Have you ever attempted to do a cost analysis?
 - If so, what was your methodology?
 - Did it take into account the pay, allowance, support costs, and part-time nature of the RC?

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OASD (RA)								
ABSTRACT OF CORRESPONDENCE								
TO:		PDASD/RA <i>10/19/10</i>						
FROM:		DASD-RA (RT&M)						
OUTGOING TO:								
SUBJECT:		Comprehensive Review Post-EXCOM Questions for the Services						
<p>BACKGROUND/SUMMARY OF MATERIAL:</p> <p>The Co-Sponsors of the Comprehensive Review afforded the Services and all key DOD stakeholders the opportunity to inform the governing bodies for this review of their study efforts and positions on RC issues. The information provided in these briefs to the Executive Committee (EXCOM) raised awareness on actions being taken or contemplated by the Services and will help to shape this review to ensure it addresses Service needs.</p> <p>Some of the presentations raised additional questions that the EXCOM would like to see addressed. Enclosed is a memorandum to the Services requesting they provide responses to the questions posed in Tab A in order to ensure the EXCOM better understands their positions and that the review addresses the Services' concerns.</p> <p>Coordination: N/A</p> <p>Recommendation: Sign memorandum</p> <p>POC: CAPT Doug Beyer, douglas.beyer@osd.mil, 703-695-4125</p>								
HANDLING:		ROUTINE						
ACTION REQUIRED:		PDASD/RA sign memo						
CONTROL NO.: NA <i>PR 002994-10</i>		SUSPENSE: 15 Oct				CLASSIFICATION: UNCLAS		
NAME	PREPARED BY	CLEARED BY	CLEARED BY	CLEARED BY	CLEARED BY	CLEARED BY	CLEARED BY	CLEARED BY
	CAPT Beyer	<i>MS</i> Mr. Smiley	Mr. Patrick	CAPT Snyder				
ACTIVITY	Director of Readiness	PDASD RT&M	DASD RT&M	MA				
INITIALS	<i>DCB</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>PA</i>	<i>CS</i>				
DATE	<i>13 Oct 10</i>	<i>14 Oct 10</i>	<i>15 Oct 10</i>	<i>16 Oct</i>				

DCB

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SACCP COVER SHEET
UNCLASSIFIED

PRIORITY Normal	SUSPENSE DATE	CORRESPONDENCE DATE	CONTROL NUMBER PR002994-10
REQUEST TYPE All other items	RESPONSE TYPE For Appropriate Action		
ORIGINATOR OASD/RA/RTM	RECIPIENT OASD/RA		

SUBJECT Comprehensive Review Post-EXCOM Questions for the Services
--

COMMENTS

No Comments

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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1500 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1500

OCT 19 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHIEFS OF THE MILITARY SERVICES
COMMANDANT, COAST GUARD
DIRECTOR OF THE JOINT STAFF


SUBJECT: Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component

Work is well underway on the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)-directed comprehensive review of the future role of the Reserve Components. Both the QDR and the Deputy Secretary of Defense's approved Terms of Reference (TOR) for this review call for this initiative to incorporate the total range of views on the balance between active and reserve forces.

Inclusion of the perspectives from on-going analysis in your organizations is key to the comprehensive nature of our review. Our Co-Sponsors, the VCJCS and the ASD Reserve Affairs, felt it important that we afforded you and all key DOD stakeholders the opportunity to inform the governing bodies for this review of your study efforts and positions on this issue. We appreciated the presentations given by your designated representatives to both the comprehensive review's Planner-level Issue Teams and Executive Committee (EXCOM). The information provided in these briefs has raised awareness on actions being taken or contemplated by the Services and will help to shape this review to ensure it addresses Service needs.

Some of the presentations raised additional questions that the EXCOM would like to see addressed. Request each of the Services provide responses to the attached questions in order to ensure the EXCOM better understands your positions and that the review addresses your concerns.

Please forward your responses to Colonel Vince Price at (703) 693-8632, email: vince.price@osd.mil or Colonel David Smith at (703) 693-2217, email: david.smith@osd.mil at your earliest convenience, keeping in mind our November 2010 milestone for report finalization and coordination.



David L. McGinnis
Principal Deputy

Attachments:
As stated



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cc:

Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation

Director, Comptroller

Director, Joint Staff J8

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Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Components: Questions for the Services

- 1) *Capstone Question: What would you like this effort to do for your organization?*
- 2) After Iraq and Afghanistan operations wind down, can we continue to use the RC as an operational force for normal, routine missions?
 - Will Servicemembers, families and employers support this?
 - How would you envision RC use in 2015 and beyond?
 - What would be the demand signal that causes you to use them?
- 3) How would you define and execute assured access?
- 4) Several comments have been made throughout this process that current law or policy is insufficient to properly, or more fully, operationalize the Reserve. What specific changes would you recommend be made to current law or policy to facilitate the process?
- 5) Many High Demand/Low Density (HD/LD) capabilities have remained as such over the course of the last several years. Are there potential solutions to these capacity shortfalls in the Reserve Component (RC)?
 - What are your critical HD/LD capabilities today, and what do you think they will be in 2015?

USMC:

- 1) You mentioned there is no current analysis that shows RC is cheaper than AC. Have you ever attempted to do a cost analysis?
 - If so, what was your methodology? Did it take into account the pay, allowance, support costs, and part-time nature of the RC?

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1. Capstone Question: What would you like this effort to do for your organization?

The Department of Defense (DoD) must now codify the transformation from a strategic reserve to an Operational Reserve to sustain the overall readiness of the Total Force in an era of fiscal austerity and continuing threats. We must invest sufficiently in the policies, laws, and budgets required to enable the Guard and Reserves to fulfill their critical operational role in U.S. national security.

2. After Iraq and Afghanistan operations wind down, can we continue to use the RC as an operational force for normal, routine, missions?

The short answer is that this question has already been settled. In October 2008, in recognition of the increased reliance on the Reserve Components (RC) to support the nation's defense, the Secretary of Defense published Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 1200.17, "Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force". This directive *requires* the Secretaries of the Military Departments to manage their respective RCs as an operational force to meet U.S. military requirements across the full spectrum of conflict.

The longer answer is yes, and not only *can* we continue to use the RC as an operational force, we *must*. As the final report of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve (CNGR) noted, "there is no reasonable alternative to the nation's continued increased reliance on the reserve components as part of its operational force for missions at home and abroad." Without the use of the National Guard and Reserves as an operational force, the nation would have needed to reinstitute the draft to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a nation, our track record in forecasting the future is poor; we need an operational reserve to give us the flexibility to mobilize and fight in far less time than returning to the obsolete "mobilize-train-deploy" model of tiered readiness would provide.

Will Service Members, families and employers support this?

Service Members absolutely will support this. Army RC retention is astonishingly high for a force fighting two wars over the course of a decade – in the Army National Guard (ARNG), they recently met 105.5% of their retention goal. The senior leaders of both the ARNG and the US Army Reserve have been vocal in their support for continuing to use the Army's RC as an operational force, and make it clear that they are reflecting the prevailing opinion among their rank and file. The acting Director of the ARNG, MG Carpenter, recently commented that "We are going to lose those Soldiers in a minute if we don't continue to challenge them."

For Army Families, the picture is somewhat more nuanced. At the recent Association of the US Army (AUSA) convention, the fatigue and strain of a decade of war were obvious in the attitudes of the members of the Family Readiness Groups (FRGs) who attended in force. Nonetheless, the general feeling seemed to be that – with sufficient dwell time – the Families would continue to support their Soldiers' desires to remain in the Army. Dwell time is the key – it remains well below the 2-3 years after a one year deployment that most experts agree is necessary to recover the resiliency necessary to undertake another tour.

For employers, predictability is also crucial. This is important to RC Soldiers and their Families as well, but for employers, it provides some sense that they won't be losing their employee imminently.

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How would you envision RC use in 2015 and beyond?

The new paradigm for the Army RCs is for them to be “available, trained, and equipped for predictable routine deployment.” The Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model calls for them to be used no more than 1 year in every six (1:5). We would anticipate that the overall use of the Army RC will be broadly consistent with these guidelines from 2015 on.

What would be the demand signal that causes you to use them?

This can be covered by the all-purpose acronym DOTS (Depends On The Situation). The fact is that we need easier access to the Army RCs; we cannot rely on the RCs as part of the operational force without assured access.

3. How would you define and execute assured access?

For the Total Force concept to succeed, military and civilian leadership must be assured of access to the RC: an RC that cannot be mobilized is not an Operational Reserve. The primary impediment to assured accessibility is the lack of programmed resources that support RC readiness. Additionally, the RC are obviously the subject matter experts on mobilization and should therefore be responsible for this process, further streamlining mobilization procedures and allowing for more rapid deployment of RC forces.

4. Several comments have been made throughout this process that current law or policy is insufficient to properly, or more fully, operationalize the Reserve. What specific changes would you recommend be made to current law or policy to facilitate the process?

These principles should be the basis of an Army Total Force Policy:

1. Balance: The Army must evaluate and balance capabilities between AC and RC to sustain rotational force requirements as prescribed by SECDEF’s guidelines for the use of the Total Force. The optimal balanced Army Force Generation model cycle is based on a 5 year rotation cycle. To sustain this balance, no less than twenty percent of any capability should be in any one component. Without this balance, the burden of deployments will fall disproportionately on a few Soldiers depending on specialty and component. It was this lack of balance, in part, that led the then Chief of the Army Reserve, Lt. Gen. Ron Helmley, to state that “There are in fact, capabilities in the Army Reserve, such as medical support and Civil Affairs, for which there is no alternative.”

2. Integration: To facilitate the integration of AC/RC forces in support of Army operations, the Army should set a common time period for employment. Army force generation plans should ensure AC/RC forces are employed as integrated force packages as much as possible, and within the same time period of use. Synchronizing AC/RC employment time will enable units to train, deploy, and redeploy together as a cohesive operational force and still adhere to the SECDEF’s 12 month mobilization policy. Without this, AC units may deal with as many as three different RC units during their rotation. This is disruptive and provides less opportunity for integration and cohesion between AC and RC. It could also breed resentment and even mistrust of the RC because of their shorter tours.

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3. One Standard for Readiness: Pre-deployment readiness validation procedures and authorities should be the same for Active/Reserve Forces to achieve an operational environment in which Army AC/RC units train and are employed as integrated force packages. Currently the AC and RC do not share a readiness validation process; RC readiness is challenged, while AC readiness is assumed. Ironically, AC units do not even have to obtain fully mission capable status until about a month after arriving in the operational area. This double standard underscores the reality that our Army is really comprised of three Armies in one. The Army must develop common standards for all common unit types that are based on the operational environment where they will be employed. The alternative is the suboptimal use of time and resources continually re-validating RC units on training they've already received; while possibly skipping mission-related training for AC units that may have been focused on garrison tasks.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
1000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20350-1000

NOV -8 2010

**MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESERVE
AFFAIRS**

SUBJECT: Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component

In response to your memorandum dated October 19, 2010, the Department of the Navy submits the attached responses to the questions posed by the Co-Chairs of the Executive Committee for the Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component (RC). In order for the Navy and the Marine Corps to utilize their Total Force more effectively, and to meet the requirements of the Combatant Commanders, the major outcome of this review should focus on changes to both law and policy that will allow additional, involuntary access to both individuals and units of the Ready Reserve in support of the National Security Strategy. Current authorities are insufficient to recall or mobilize RC forces involuntarily for non-emergency situations. Having this access will give the Service Chiefs the flexibility they need to make the fiscal and sourcing decisions that will define the future use of the Reserves.

The Department of the Navy also recognizes that the mobilization authority alone, although the essential first step in the equation, is not the only issue that needs to be evaluated to employ an operational Reserve in the future. We support continuing efforts to survey the pulse of impacted employers and families, and the review/development of cost models to assist all Services in determining the right force mix to satisfy future demands.

My point of contact for this matter is CAPT Robert Louzek, Staff Director, Reserve Affairs, (703) 695-5302, robert.e.louzek@navy.mil.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D. Biddick".

Dennis Biddick
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Reserve Affairs)

Attachments:
As stated

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ACTION MEMO


November 3, 2010

FOR: DIRECTOR, STRATEGY AND POLICY DIVISION (N51) 

FROM: CAPT C.B. Ryker, Policy Branch Head (N512) 

SUBJECT: Comprehensive Review of the Future role of the Reserve Components:
Questions for the Services

- The Co-Chairs of the Executive Committee (EXCOM) for this review generated a set of questions to be answered by the Services prior to the next EXCOM meeting on 9 November
- DASN(RA) forwarded these questions to OPNAV N3N5 and Office of Chief of Navy Reserve (OCNR) via the TV4 tasker system (TAB A)
- The OCNR Strategic Planning Division (N0955) has provided a draft paper that addresses each question (TAB B)
- After a review by N512, recommend submitting answers to DASN(RA) with minor change to the answer number 5. This change is based on a memo provided by USFF identifying the Navy's Low Density/High Demand communities and ratings (TAB C)

RECOMMENDATION: Concur with TAB B.
Approve  Disapprove

COORDINATION: TAB D

ATTACHMENTS:
As stated

Prepared By: LCDR V. Valentin, N512, (703) 697-4040

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Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Components: Questions for the Services

Q1: Capstone Question: *What would you like this effort to do for your organization?*

A1: The Navy has been shaping its Total Force since 2003. To enable this efficient and effective Total Navy force the Comprehensive Review needs to:

1. Endorse Navy's approach to balancing the Total Force with a capabilities-based, blended Force.
2. Support efforts to advance an integrated pay and personnel solution to enable a truly seamless Total Force and allow efficient lane changes between components to maximize capabilities and capacity in our Force.
3. Put in place the appropriate deployment authority to employ our Reserve Component in a periodic and predictable basis according to the required Force apportionment.
4. Enable funding to exercise that authority and employ our Reserve Component in the appropriate missions of the blended Total Force.
5. Identify and eliminate barriers to service that impede a true Continuum of Service for our Sailors.

Q2: After Iraq and Afghanistan operations wind down, can we continue to use the RC as an operational force for normal, routine missions?

- Will Service members, families and employers support this?
- How would you envision RC use in 2015 and beyond?
- What would be the demand signal that causes you to use them?

A2: The Navy and all other Services are currently focused on the CENTCOM AOR. However, U.S. and Navy engagement around the world has continued unabated. This is the steady-state nature of our rotational forward deployed Navy and will change but not decrease when the current hostilities in the Middle East conclude. This point is made clear in CNO's guidance for 2011—"As ground forces draw down in the Middle East, the need for a strong naval presence will grow in importance. Naval presence is essential to shaping a favorable security environment globally, especially in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean, areas closely tied to our nations' economic prosperity." The Navy's operational tempo will not diminish after Afghanistan and Iraq ground operations wind down; in fact, it will likely increase as the ground forces reset and reconstitute and our national focus continues its global perspective and forward presence requirements take on renewed and expanded importance. Quoting from the Naval Operations Concept 2010:

"The steady-state operations of sea-based naval forces enhance joint access by gaining familiarity with forward operating areas while also fostering the international relationships that may alleviate diplomatic impediments to access." "Forward postured naval forces deter adversaries; demonstrates U.S. commitment to our international partners; and respond rapidly to tension, coercion, crises and conflicts. Forward presence facilitates all other naval missions, most importantly sea control, which is a necessary condition for the deployment and sustained employment of any joint or multinational force."

- As he looks to the future, the CNO sees, "...continued disorder in the global security environment, a slow economic recovery, and increasing demand on our Navy." Faced with a continuation or potential expansion of the current operational tempo, the Navy will

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continue to rely on its Reserve in an operational context, and our Reserve Sailors will continue to answer the call as they have during the past nine years. Our challenges will continue to be real and meaningful. Our articulation and shaping of these challenges will in turn garner the support of families and employers that enable the service of our Reserve Sailors.

- Navy's core capabilities and strategic imperatives are designed to meet the Combatant Commanders' requirements using the Total Force; these are enduring attributes which will be viable and necessary in 2015 and beyond. Navy's Total Force uses a deliberative, capabilities-based process to provide the appropriate Active / Reserve force mix to maintain core capabilities across mission sets to satisfy dynamic current and future Combatant Commander requirements and mitigate risk. Our process has enabled Navy over the past seven years to streamline its uniformed manpower inventory and balance its Active/Reserve force mix in a deliberate and conscious manner to meet mission requirements while sustaining global rotational operations.
- Navy's Total Force has both strategic and operational elements and has evolved into a composite blended force of complementary and mirroring capabilities. The Maritime Strategy defines the "ends" the Navy delivers to the nation. The "means" to deliver capability and capacity are underpinned by our Total Force. Demand for Navy unique skills will determine how much Total Force capacity is required triggering logical use of our RC.

Q3: How would you define and execute assured access?

A3: Assured access could be defined as the ability to access a capability and/or capacity resident in the Reserve Component through recall or mobilization—involuntary if necessary—of an individual or unit when and as quickly as needed without regard for contingency status. Current authorities are sufficient to support assured access in times of war or national emergency. However, a change to law or statute is required before the Services can count on assured access (involuntary mobilization/recall) during non-emergency situations.

Q4: Several comments have been made throughout this process that current law or policy is insufficient to properly, or more fully, operationalize the Reserve. What specific changes would you recommend be made to current law or policy to facilitate the process?

A4: The Navy supports the current Omnibus submission from OSD RA that recommends SECDEF-level activation of members (without their consent) and units of the Selected Reserve to meet routine Fleet deployment/rotational requirements. As currently written and practiced (EXORD), 10 USC 12304 is too limited in scope to meet the persistent, global requirements of the Fleet. Access to Navy Reserve capabilities and capacities a non-12301/12302 environment limits future options to utilize overall Total Force capabilities and is too restrictive.

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Q5: Many High Demand/Low Density (HD/LD) capabilities have remained as such over the course of the last several years. Are there potential solutions to these capacity shortfalls in the Reserve Components (RC)?

- What are your critical HD/LD capabilities today, and what do you think they will be in 2015?

A5: To the maximum extent possible, the Navy attempts to recruit and retain low density/high demand (LD/HD) skill sets in its Reserve Component. In addition, steps are taken to ensure that Reserve Sailors who possess these LD/HD capabilities are used only to fill associated requirements. For example, as the Executive Agent for IA requirements, US Fleet Forces is charged with balancing the theater demand signal, needs of the Sailor, and maintaining Fleet Readiness. Due to their specialized skill sets LD/HD communities present a unique challenge to striking this balance. Navy personnel who fall within the LD/HD guidelines definition are only used to fill IA requirements in their specific skill set. As stated above, this definition is necessary to adequately balance the needs of theater with the demands of the Fleet.

- Navy's critical LD/HD capabilities are associated with the intelligence, cryptology, cyber warfare, and electronic warfare communities. This is expected to continue in 2015 necessitating the access and employment of our Reserve Sailors with LD/HD skills.

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
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
3000 MARINE CORPS PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-3000

4 Nov 10

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESERVE AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: USMC Response to questions for the record (QFR) concerning
the comprehensive review of the future role of the Reserve
Component

Per the ASD(RA) memo dated 19 October 2010, enclosed are the
Marine Corps answers to the QFR. Point of Contact is Col K.H. Wild,
USMC (703) 692-4383.


J. F. KELLY
Lieutenant General, USMC

Attachments:
As stated

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
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
3000 MARINE CORPS PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-3000

4 Nov 10

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR RESERVE
AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: USMC Response to questions for the record (QFR) concerning
the comprehensive review of the future role of the Reserve
Component

Per the ASD(RA) memo dated 19 October 2010, enclosed are the
Marine Corps answers to the QFR. Point of Contact is Col K.H. Wild,
USMC (703) 692-4383.


J. F. KELLY
Lieutenant General, USMC

Attachments:
As stated

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1) Capstone Question: What would you like this effort to do for your organization?

To develop policy that enables the Services to improve their use of the Reserve Component in an operational manner consistent with each Service's unique operational requirements. For the Marine Corps, development of policy relating to an Operational Reserve Force must be viewed in the context of improving the Total Force.

2) After Iraq and Afghanistan operations wind down, can we continue to use the RC as an operational force for normal, routine missions?

Yes, however the role of the Marine Corps Reserve should remain consistent with the Marine Corps Total Force construct, supported by current force planning goals, i.e. creating and maintaining capabilities within the RC to support the augmentation, reinforcement, or reconstitution of the AC. The Marine Corps should continue to manage the use of the RC through the Service's existing force allocation process; developing the best available Total Force sourcing solutions in support of validated CCDR requirements.

The Marine Corps is presently conducting a total force structure review of future capacities and capabilities necessary to accomplish its premier role and mission. As part of this review, future use of the Reserve Component is being carefully considered. Given that the Marine Corps is expected to be most ready when others are least ready, the Marine Corps would not support a directed increase in utilization of the RC not otherwise grounded in solid study of requirements, capacities, and capabilities, as well as the impact on structure and funding of the Active Component.

- Will Service members, families and employers support this?

Although MARFORRES has not conducted a formal study on this matter, discussions with Marine Reservists indicate they are supportive with being mobilized once every five years. Specifically, Marines have cited that the use of the Force Generation Model as a means to predict when they might be placed on Active Duty is particularly helpful towards that end. Additionally, we have recently learned that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs is planning to leverage the Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR) to survey 80,000 employers in the February 2011 timeframe to ascertain the level of support among employers for an operational reserve in a post OIF/OEF environment.

It should be noted that over the past two years, the Marine Corps has successfully solicited a significant number of volunteers from the Marine Corps Reserve to mobilize in support of operational deployments (both in support of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) and in support of CJCS validated CCDR Global Force Management (GFM) operational requirements). In all cases, Marine Reservists volunteered with the understanding that the Marine Corps would issue involuntary mobilization orders under USC Title 10, 12302 (Partial Mobilization).

Recent discussions indicate mobilization, for non-crisis scenarios, will not fall under USC Title 10, 12302 involuntary orders. Proposed legislative changes will permit involuntary access to the reserves for non-crisis scenarios for up to 365 days using involuntary orders. Consistent access to an operational reserve is predicated upon passage of this legislation.

Encl (1)

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- How would you envision RC use in 2015 and beyond?

The RC, as part of the Total Force, should train and employ to prevent and deter conflict, and, when required, defeat adversaries across the range of military operations with an all volunteer force. The Service should maintain assured access to the RC for CCDR rotational, emergent, and theater security cooperation (TSC) force requirements in order to source optimized Total Force solutions in support of the President's National Security Strategy. Moreover, an all volunteer RC should be supported by a sustainable force generation model that enables recruiting and retention efforts.

Specific lines of operation include strategic depth (i.e., contingency operations) and AC operational tempo relief (i.e., CCDR TSC Phase 0 operations, exercises, crisis responses, and SPMAGTFs).

The current Force Structure Review Group is addressing the Total Force and future RC role.

- What would be the demand signal that causes you to use them?

Ideally, CCDR requirements (the "demand signal") levied upon the Service would be analyzed as part of a Total Force solution. Required RC capabilities would be identified against available RC forces within the Force Generation Model (eight to ten months prior to the mobilization date). Predictable and routine mobilizations are best suited for the RC.

3) How would you define and execute assured access?

Assured access consists of the authorities and resources necessary for Services to employ their Reserve Components (as part of the Total Force) in support of contingency operations declared by the President of the United States, as well as non-contingency operational requirements validated and approved by the Secretary of Defense.

4) Several comments have been made throughout this process that current law or policy is insufficient to properly, or more fully, operationalize the Reserve. What specific changes would you recommend be made to current law or policy to facilitate the process?

Currently, only the President of the United States can authorize involuntary mobilization of the Reserve Components using authorities contained in Title 10. Under all circumstances, involuntary mobilization authorities are associated with contingency operations that offer graduated responses.

Employing the RC as an operational force beyond contingency operations requires modifications to authorities enabling the President to involuntarily mobilize the RC to support CCDR operational requirements that are necessary to support the National Security Strategy. Involuntary mobilization enables the Services to generate risk-informed, total force sourcing decisions.

Title 10 authorities that enable the use of volunteers are inappropriate when the requirement is to generate unit capabilities from the RC. Risk associated with developing stable sourcing solutions to meet operational requirements is influenced when RC service members can elect to refuse orders prior to execution.

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Operational use of the RC can be more fully achieved when involuntary mobilization authorities enable access to RC forces to support operational requirements across the spectrum of operations, consistent with the National Security Strategy.

5) Many High Demand/Low Density (HD/LD) capabilities have remained as such over the course of the last several years. Are there potential solutions to these capacity shortfalls in the Reserve Component (RC)?

The Marine Corps has taken measures to mitigate the HD/LD issue in the active component through increased accession and retention of critical MOSs, and through the growth to an AD end strength of 202,000. While the service has attained its authorized end strength, the Corps is continuing to shape its force to meet the HD/LD requirements. Although SMCR force structure and capabilities generally mirror-image the active component, certain HD/LD capabilities are not desirable in the RC due to challenges associated with the recruitment, training, and sustainment of required specialized HD/LD skill sets (e.g., EOD, SIGINT, etc.). In any event, the RC will continue to augment and reinforce the active component as part of the Total Force consistent with global demand for Marine Corps forces.

-What are your critical HD/LD capabilities today, and what do you think they will be in 2015?

The Marine Corps has convened a Force Structure Review Group (FSRG) that will make recommendations to the Commandant of the Marine Corps regarding future force structure changes necessary to enable the Marine Corps to support the National Security Strategy.

USMC: You mentioned there is no current analysis that shows RC is cheaper than AC. Have you ever attempted to do a cost analysis?

The Marine Corps is currently participating in an internal OSD study of the costs of operationalizing Reserve Components. At this time results are in a draft form and not ready for release.

- If so, what was your methodology? Did it take into account the pay, allowance, support costs, and part-time nature of the RC?

As this comprehensive review has shown, cost modeling is complex and challenging. We have seen a collective inability to produce an agreeable cost model sufficient to inform comparative assessment of relative cost of employing AC forces vice their RC equivalent. It is generally agreed that activated RC forces are slightly more costly than their AC equivalent. However, RC capability that is not activated (e.g., in dwell) is significantly more cost effective during that period.

As we prepare for a period of economic austerity, I encourage efforts toward the development of a comprehensive cost model that will better contribute to the overall service asset allocation discussion. That said, it could be argued that relative cost will seldom be the primary factor in a Marine Corps decision to operationally employ RC capability. Employed Reserve forces will always be part of a Total Force solution. There is no price for success on the battlefield and mission accomplishment.

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Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component

Volume III Annex E

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***Comprehensive Review of the
Future Role of the Reserve
Components***

**OBJ 2-6 Collaborative Workshop
Outbrief to EXCOM**

03 Nov 2010

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On 26-27 October 2010, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs [OASD (RA)] and the Joint Staff J-8 hosted a collaborative analysis workshop to support accomplishment of Objective 6 of the Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Components. The workshop was held at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory in Laurel, MD. Participants included representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Services, and each of the Combatant Commanders.

This presentation briefly describes the conduct of the workshop and presents the key findings and observations. Mr. Guy Stratton delivered the presentation to the Study's Executive Committee on 3 November 2010.

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Agenda


- **Governance and Objectives of Comprehensive Review**
- **Methodology for Objective 2-6 Workshop**
- **Law, Policy & Doctrinal Changes**
 - **Desired by Services and COCOMs**
 - **Needed to implement AC-RC Rebalancing Options**
 - **Needed to provide trained, equipped, ready, and available Guard and Reserve to meet Total Force demands (i.e., Conditions and Standards)**
- **Next Steps and Timeline**

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The agenda covered the following items:

- A comprehensive review of the study's overall governance and objectives.
- The methodology used in the Objective 2-6 Workshop that was held at Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) on 26-27 October, 2010.
- Law, policy, and doctrinal change recommendations that emerged from the Objective 2-6 Workshop, including those desired by the Services and COCOMs, those needed to fully implement the seven AC/RC force rebalancing options proposed in the study, and those associated with the conditions and standards required to provide trained, equipped, ready and available Guard and Reserve forces to meet Total Force demands.
- The study's next steps and timeline to completion.

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The study’s co-sponsors are General James E. Cartwright, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and The Honorable Dennis M. McCarthy, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. The co-chairs are Mr. David L. McGinnis, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and Lieutenant General Larry O. Spencer, Director, Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment, J8, The Joint Staff. The Strategic Initiatives Group of OASD (RA) is the review secretariat, and JHU/APL provides external support to the study.

The study is advised by an Executive Committee (EXCOM) composed of General and Flag Officers and members of the Senior Executive Service, representing the stakeholders: the Services, the Joint Staff, Offices of the Undersecretaries of Defense (OUSDs), the National Guard Bureau (NGB), the Office of General Counsel (OGC), the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (OSD CAPE), the Combatant Commanders (COCOMs), the Director of Net Assessment and the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB).

Three issue teams have been responsible for the conduct of the study:

- Issue Team, Objective 1 is addressing the DoD Baseline Costing Methodology. It is led by Mr. John Hastings from OASD(RA), and the key stakeholders are CAPE, the Joint Staff, the Comptroller, and the Services.

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- Issue Team, Objectives 2-5 is addressing requirement identification and analysis. It is co-led by Mr. Robert Smiley from OASD(RA) and the Joint Staff J-8. All stakeholders are involved with this issue team.
- Issue Team, Objective 6 is focused on adjustments to Law, Policy and Doctrine. It is co-led by Mr. Guy Stratton from OASD(RA) and Mr. James Schwenk of OGC. All stakeholders are involved with this issue team.

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
Objectives 2-6

2. Leverage DoD plans for the future to determine how to use the capabilities and capacities of Guard and Reserve to best advantage
3. Determine those roles for which the Guard and Reserve are well suited to be considered as a force of first choice
4. Determine the conditions and standards that provide for a trained, ready, and available Guard and Reserve to meet Total Force demands while maintaining the support of service members, their families and employers.
5. Propose recommendations on rebalancing and AC/RC mix to meet COCOM demands based on the GEF and the cost-benefit analysis of these proposals
6. Propose needed law, policy, and doctrinal changes required to meet the demands and conditions determined in objectives 2-5 above

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This brief focused on objective 6: law, policy, and doctrinal changes required to meet the demands and conditions previously determined in objectives 2-5.

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This slide describes the study methodology leading up to the Objective 6 workshop, held at JHU/APL.

Objective 2 (Leverage DoD plans for the future to determine how to use the capabilities and capacities of Guard and Reserve to best advantage) was addressed by stakeholders in a workshop held in Carlisle, PA on July 21-22. Participants in this workshop also identified a broad set of roles for which the RC appeared to be well suited. These broad roles were further refined in a workshop held at JHU/APL on 17-19 August 2010 that addressed Objective 3 (Determine those roles for which the Guard and Reserve are well suited to be considered as a force of first choice) and seven AC/RC force rebalancing options were identified for further study. The August workshop also addressed Objective 4 (Determine the conditions and standards that provide for a trained, ready, and available Guard and Reserve to meet Total Force demands while maintaining the support of service members, their families and employers).

The seven force rebalancing options were explored in considerable detail during a workshop held at JHU/APL on September 20-22 that focused on Objective 5 (Propose recommendations on rebalancing and AC/RC mix to meet COCOM demands based on the GEF and the cost-benefit analysis of these proposals).

The Objective 1 cost methodology and conditions and standards considerations were brought to bear on candidate solutions associated with each of the AC/RC force rebalancing options.

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Working Sessions

<u>Overview</u>	<u>Agenda</u>	<u>Questions</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Purpose: Services and COCOMs desired Contributions to OBJ 6• Attendees: OSD RA, JS, Services, Reserve Components, COCOMs• Date: Oct 13, 2010 (VTC) Oct 26-27, 2010 (Collaborative Workshop)	<p>OBJ 6 Overview</p> <p>OGC Perspective</p> <p>Desired Service and COCOM Contributions</p> <p>Law and Policy Implications of Rebalancing Options</p> <p>Law and Policy Implications to Conditions and Standards</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• How you would like to be able to employ the Reserve Component• Why you can't do that now, to include identifying the specific constraining statute or policy• How you would change law, policy, or doctrine to do what you would like to do• What risk will be incurred if you can't get the desired change

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A separate working group meeting/VTC was held prior to the 26-27 October workshop to provide the Services and COCOMs with the opportunity to present their desired changes to law, policy and doctrine. Representatives from OSD(RA), the Joint Staff, the Services, Reserve Components, and COCOMs were in attendance.


The Services and COCOMs were requested to address four questions in their briefs:

- How you would like to be able to employ the Reserve Component?
- Why you can't do that now, to include identifying the specific constraining statute or policy?
- How you would change law, policy, or doctrine to do what you would like to do?
- What risk will be incurred if you can't get the desired change?


Following this working group meeting, the Services and COCOMs refined their presentations; revised presentations were again presented at the October workshop; these revised briefings are included in this report.

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OBJ 6 Collaborative Analysis Workshop



<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Workshop Held at JHU/APL 26-27 Oct • 86 Attendees from COCOMs, Services, Reserve Components, OSD, Joint Staff, IDA, CNA, & JHU/APL • 11 Presentation/ Discussion Sessions Covering <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JS J-3 Assured Access Review • Law, Policy & Doctrinal Changes Desired by Services & COCOMs • USCG AC-RC Integration Lessons Learned • Law, Policy & Doctrinal Changes Needed To Implement AC-RC Rebalancing Options • Law, Policy & Doctrinal Changes Needed To Meet Conditions & Standards • In addition to verbal discussion, attendees submitted over 750 textual comments to Workshop electronic "Blog" 	<h3>86 Participants</h3> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%; vertical-align: top;"> <p><u>COCOMs</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MAJ Ivan Udell, USAFRICOM • Mr. Richard McCalla, USAFRICOM • Mr. Julian Saramago, USAFRICOM • CDR Shaun Murphy, USCENTCOM • CDR Jonas Jones, USEUCOM • LtCol Kenneth Woodard, USJFCOM • CAPT Anthony Rizzo, USNORTHCOM • Col Steve Kirkpatrick, USSOCOM • LtCol Mike Mawson, USSOUTHCOM • Col Daniel Heires, USSTRATCOM • COL Troy Kok, USTRANSCOM • LtCol Rod Stevenson, USTRANSCOM <p><u>Reserve Components</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COL Douglas Curell, ARNG • COL Timothy Pheil, ARNG • Mr. Raymond Holdeman, ARNG • COL Dale Fair, OCAR • LTC David McLain, OCAR • Col Gordon O'Very, OMFR • CDR John Alcorn, OCNR • Mr. James Grover, OCNR • COL Michael Steenson, NGB • Col Gary Szabo, NGB • Col Nilda UrrutiaEstrany, NGB • Col Mark Zechman, NGB • LTC Matthew Sprenger, NGB • LtCol James Roberts, NGB • LtCol John Selmer, NGB • Maj Sean Conroy, NGB • MAJ James Erb, NGB </td> <td style="width: 50%; 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The October workshop held at JHU/APL was attended by 86 representatives of Services, COCOMs, Reserve Components, and OSD and Joint Staffs, as well as the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), and JHU/APL.


The workshop featured 11 Presentation/Discussion Sessions covering the following topics:

- JS J-3 Assured Access Review
- Law, Policy, and Doctrinal Changes Desired by Services and COCOMs
- USCG AC-RC Integration Lessons Learned
- Law, Policy, and Doctrinal Changes Needed To Implement AC-RC Rebalancing Options
- Law, Policy, and Doctrinal Changes Needed To Meet Conditions & Standards


These presentations are included as attachments to this report. The workshop's lively verbal discussion was augmented with the JHU/APL Workshop Analysis Laboratory's "Blog" feature, which logged over 750 textual comments.

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Law & Policy Changes Desired by Services & COCOMs



Title 10, USC

- Amend §12304 to provide Secretarial authority to involuntarily activate RC units/personnel in support of steady-state/non-contingency operations, e.g., language consistent with OSD-RA ULB 08-12B (USA)
- Amend §12304 to provide ability to involuntarily mobilize RC units in support of operational requirements beyond OCO – concur with related OSD Omnibus submission (USMC)
- Amend §12304 to provide SECDEF-level involuntary activation of members and units of the SELRES to meet routine Fleet deployment/rotational requirements (USN)

- Amend appropriate sections to provide COCOM Commanders with authority to mobilize and activate assigned RC forces voluntarily or involuntarily in support of major UCP assigned mission as well as contingency operations, homeland defense, HADR (COCOMs)
- Amend appropriate sections to provide COCOMs with a funding source that can be administered by them to fund RC operational support rather than relying on funding from Service components

- QRMC—CNGR
 - Training, Employment and Compensation
 - 30 (t) Legal Authorities

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This slide summarizes the major recommendations presented by the Services and COCOMs.

The service briefs recommended amendments to Title 10, USC as follows:

- Army proposal: Amend §12304 to provide Secretarial (either Service or SECDEF) authority to involuntarily activate RC units/personnel in support of steady-state/non-contingency operations. The Army observed that over-reliance on volunteers to fill requirements can have a detrimental effect on unit integrity, and that not all requirements can be met with volunteers, particularly those requirements for trained and organized units.
- Marine Corps proposal: Amend §12304 to provide ability to involuntarily mobilize RC units in support of operational requirements beyond Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). This was similar to the Army proposal.
- Navy proposal: Amend §12304 to provide SECDEF-level involuntary activation of members and units of the SELRES to meet routine Fleet deployment/rotational requirements. This was also similar to the Army proposal.

The COCOMs provided consolidated input, which recommended the following:

- Amend appropriate sections of Title 10, USC to provide COCOM Commanders with the authority to mobilize and activate assigned RC forces voluntarily or involuntarily

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in support of major Unified Command Plan (UCP) assigned mission as well as contingency operations, homeland defense, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations.

- Amend appropriate sections of Title 10, USC to provide COCOMs with a funding source that can be administered by them to fund RC operational support rather than relying on funding from Service components.

Concurrent with this study, it was noted that the 11th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) is in the process of reviewing the 30+ authorities under which RC members can perform duty, and compensation disruptions associated with changes in duty status.

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Option	Description
1) Rebalance AC/RC mix to remedy capacity and BOG-Dwell shortfalls	Rebalance AC/RC capacity as appropriate to remediate established force capacity shortfalls (as determined by JS J-8 Force Sufficiency Assessments) and/or to enable units to reach desired BOG-Dwell ratios (as determined by JS J-8 OA10 Study)
2) Rely on rotational RC units to provide global posture	Rely on rotational RC units to provide global posture vice selected forward deployed forces
3) Align RC units, teams, and individuals with specific DoD components	Align specific RC units, teams, and individuals with selected COCOMs, Service functions, DoD Agency and Interagency partners in order to facilitate access to RC units, sub-units, teams, and personnel and thereby build long-term relationships
4) Create national or regional RC units staffed by personnel willing to serve longer or more often	Selected RC units provide entire units, sub-units, teams, and/or individuals at deployment frequencies and durations required to meet COCOM operational needs
5) Adjust capabilities included within RC to meet emerging needs	Adjust capabilities included within RC to enhance Total Force capability to meet emergent cyber threats
6) Enhance AC-RC integration	Integrate selected RC elements into operational AC units and integrate selected AC elements into RC units
7) Rely on RC to provide selected institutional support	Selected RC units provide forces to accomplish Services' institutional support requirements

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These are the seven candidate rebalancing options that were reviewed in the September workshop. These options are not considered to be mutually exclusive.

1. Rebalance AC/RC mix to remedy capacity and BOG-Dwell shortfalls. Rebalance AC/RC capacity as appropriate to remediate established force capacity shortfalls (as determined by JS J-8 Force Sufficiency Assessments) and/or to enable units to reach desired BOG-Dwell ratios (as determined by JS J-8 OA10 Study)
2. Rely on rotational RC units to provide global posture. Rely on rotational RC units to provide global posture vice selected forward deployed forces
3. Align RC units, teams, and individuals with specific DoD components. Align specific RC units, teams, and individuals with selected COCOMs, Service functions, DoD Agency and Interagency partners in order to facilitate access to RC units, sub-units, teams, and personnel and thereby build long-term relationships
4. Create national or regional RC units staffed by personnel willing to serve longer or more often. Selected RC units provide entire units, sub-units, teams, and/or individuals at deployment frequencies and durations required to meet COCOM operational needs. (Three versions of this option were identified initially; options 4b and 4c were subsequently dropped from consideration.)

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5. Adjust capabilities included within RC to meet emerging needs. Adjust capabilities included within RC to enhance Total Force capability to meet emergent cyber threats.
6. Enhance AC-RC integration. Integrate selected RC elements into operational AC units and integrate selected AC elements into RC units.
7. Rely on RC to provide selected institutional support. Selected RC units provide forces to accomplish Services' institutional support requirements.

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 Option 1: Rebalance TF To Remedy Persistent Shortfalls  UNCLASSIFIED/DRAFT	
<p>Description: Use Joint Staff (J8) force sufficiency assessment tools to identify capabilities that are “over-stressed” based on Service and OSD prescribed BOG:Dwell objectives. Rebalance Total Force capacity as appropriate to remediate established force capacity shortfalls and/or enable AC/RC units to reach desired BOG:Dwell ratios.</p>	<p>Cost Cases: (1) Cost 4 additional Army Combat Heavy Engineer Companies to gain one rotational unit (assume 1:3 BOG:Dwell) and 8 additional RC companies (based on 1:5 RC BOG:Dwell) (2) Using Army data, compare costs for AC and RC to provide 30,000 support troops at an overseas location for the next 15 years at 1:3 for AC and 1:5 for RC with 9-month BOG and 60 days RC training the year prior to activation for the RC units.</p>
<p>Examples: Use COCOM forecasted capability requirements and the Global Force Management (GFM) process to identify capability and capacity shortfalls. Specific examples include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Horizontal Engineering Companies• Vertical Engineering Companies• Military Police Companies• Naval Construction Battalions	<p>Law, policy, and doctrine changes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Revise existing laws and/or policies to achieve desired deployment length and achieve BOG:Dwell objectives• Ensure that laws and/or policies are provided to enable service secretaries to modify RC/AC authorizations within Program of Record (POR) to meet emerging operational demands

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For each option, the description, examples, and cost cases were refined in the September workshop. The October workshop focused on defining law, policy, and doctrine changes required to implement the option. This option was closely related to the “Access” category addressed under conditions and standards, and the Services’ and COCOMs’ recommendations for enhanced access, described earlier in this brief.

Option 1 proposed using Joint Staff (J8) force sufficiency assessment tools to identify capabilities that are “over-stressed” based on Service and OSD prescribed BOG:Dwell objectives, and rebalancing Total Force capacity as appropriate to remediate established force capacity shortfalls and/or enable AC/RC units to reach desired BOG:Dwell ratios. Required law, policy and doctrine changes identified were:

- Revise existing laws and/or policies to achieve desired deployment length and achieve BOG:Dwell objectives.
- Ensure that laws and/or policies are provided to enable service secretaries to modify RC/AC authorizations within Program of Record (POR) to meet emerging operational demands.

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 Law Changes Applicable To All Rebalancing Options 

Law Changes

- **Revise Title 10 §12304 to ensure responsive access to, and mobilization of, the RC**
- **Expand Title 10 §10147 authorities for longer active duty training requirements**
- **Amend standard written agreements Title 10 § 12301(b)/12311 for non-consecutive periods of active duty service**
- **Ensure that laws and/or policies are in place to provide required medical, dental, and family readiness support programs to deploying RC personnel**
- **Reorganize and consolidate all current RC Legislation—QRMC**



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The workshop identified a number of required law changes that are applicable to all of the rebalancing options. These changes are:

- Revise Title 10 §12304 to ensure responsive access to, and mobilization of, the RC.
- Expand Title 10 §10147 authorities to permit longer active duty training requirements.
- Amend the standard written agreements described in Title 10 § 12301(b)/12311 for non-consecutive periods of active duty service.
- Ensure that laws and/or policies are in place to provide required medical, dental, and family readiness support programs to deploying RC personnel
- Reorganize and consolidate all current RC Legislation. As previously described, the 11th QRMC is in the process of reviewing RC duty status and compensation issues.

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 **Policy Changes Applicable To All Rebalancing Options** 

Policy Changes


- **Establish policies, procedures, and/or contractual agreements between civilian employers, RC employees, the USG that facilitate deployments and their predictability**
- **Establish policies that will provide common pay, benefits, and entitlements for across the services (COCOM issue)**
- **Ensure that policies and procedures support viable RC training prior to deployment, career path development, and “continuum of service”**
- **Develop common but flexible set of procedures and infrastructure for COCOMS to manage aligned RC forces**
- **Assigned or align RC forces with COCOMs**
- **Establish rapid activation procedures services/COCOM**

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The workshop also identified a number of required policy changes that are applicable to all of the rebalancing options. These changes are:

- Establish policies, procedures, and/or contractual agreements between civilian employers, RC employees, the USG that facilitate deployments and their predictability.
- Establish policies that will provide common pay, benefits, and entitlements for across the services. This issue was of particular concern to the COCOMs.
- Ensure that policies and procedures support viable RC training prior to deployment, career path development, and “continuum of service.”
- Develop a common but flexible set of procedures and infrastructure for COCOMS to manage aligned RC forces.
- Assign or align RC forces with COCOMs.
- Services and COCOMs establish rapid activation procedures.



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The August workshop addressed conditions and standards that were binned into four main categories:

- **Military Unit:** those conditions and standards that affect a unit's assured access to RC members, and sustained readiness. Subcategories included suitability, accessibility, readiness, facilities, and resourcing.
- **Military Career:** those conditions and standards that affect an individual's career and job satisfaction. Subcategories included military training, military career progression, and BOG:Dwell ratio.
- **Civilian Career:** those conditions and standards that affect a reservist's relationship with his or her civilian employer. Subcategories include civilian job training, civilian career progression, and minimization of business disruption and expense associated with the mobilization of reservists.
- **Personal Life:** those conditions and standards that impact a reservist's personal well-being. Subcategories included quality of life, including pay and benefits and family support.

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  <p style="text-align: center;">UNCLASSIFIED/DRAFT</p> <h2 style="text-align: center;">RC Career & Duty Status</h2>	
<p>DoD Needs To Be Able To:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Attract and retain the right mix and caliber of individuals<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Provide competitive and equitable pay and benefits• Provide rewarding and appropriate career opportunities• Avoid forcing a choice between service and family or civilian career• Spread the burden of service across AC and RC• Provide greater flexibility for both DoD and service-members by establishing a <i>continuum of service</i><ul style="list-style-type: none">• Reduce obstacles to voluntary service• Provide lateral entry opportunities to attract recruits to priority specialties• Permit members to shift back and forth between the AC and RC within Service endstrength constrains	
<p>Hindrances:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Absence of an integrated pay system across service components can complicate/delay pay to RC members• Reliance on Title 10 and 32 provisions to define different duty statuses complicates pay administration• Current personnel policies present roadblocks to potential RC members with valuable skills	<p>Necessary Changes To Law, Policy, or Doctrine:</p> <p>Law: Modify Titles 10 and 32 to enable provision of consistent pay and benefits for active service across AC and RC</p> <p>Policy: Reduce number of duty status categories to Title 10 Active Duty, Title 10 Federal Service, Title 10 Inactive (Reserve), Title 32 full-time National Guard, Title 32 Inactive National Guard, Title 14 Active Duty (being covered by QRMC)</p> <p>Policy: Establish a common pay system for active and reserve members within each Service</p> <p>Policy: Adopt a standardized policy/interpretation of entitlements and benefits while on orders</p>
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DoD must attract and retain the right mix and caliber of individuals, and provide greater flexibility for both DoD and members by establishing a continuum of service. Recommendations to implement this are:


- Law: Modify Title 10 and 32 to enable provision of consistent pay and benefits for active service across AC and RC.
- Policy: Reduce number of duty status categories to Title 10 Active Duty, Title 10 Federal Service, Title 10 Inactive (Reserve), Title 32 full-time National Guard, Title 32 Inactive National Guard, Title 14 Active Duty.
- Policy: Establish a common pay system for active and reserve members within each Service.
- Policy: Adopt a standardized policy/interpretation of entitlements while on orders.

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Training & Equipment Readiness



DoD Needs To Be Able To:

- **Provide a trained and ready RC force as appropriate to meet commanders' requirements**
 - Maintain RC readiness to ensure forces are fully capable and interoperable with their AC counterparts
 - Build capability/capacity in regional expertise and in specialized skillsets (e.g., cyberwarfare, irregular warfare)
- **Ensure RC units are provided with appropriate equipment to perform their missions**
 - Consider the total force in procurement plans so that RC and AC equipment is the same, vice sending older equipment to RC
 - Maintain the highest readiness levels, or develop a rapid replacement plan, for RC equipment that is employed for homeland security (Title 32) missions

<p>Hindrances:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Resourcing shortfalls have resulted in an RC force that is not always as capable as AC equivalent• Funding/authority limitations on RC units' ability to train for upcoming deployments• Failure to leverage RC members' civilian skillsets• Law/policy prevent RC members from being recalled/assigned based on civilian skillsets	<p>Necessary Changes To Law, Policy, or Doctrine:</p> <p>Law: Provide authorities and funding sufficient to enable RC units to achieve readiness comparable to AC</p> <p>Law and Policy: Enable consideration of civilian skills when determining employment and compensation of selected RC service members</p> <p>Policy: Adopt flexible AT schedules that can be aligned with cyclic requirements of Service force generation models</p> <p>Policy: Ensure policies governing the armed forces stipulate that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Services recognize integrated AC/RC force when procuring equipment• Forces identified as first responders to domestic catastrophes are manned, trained, and equipped accordingly
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DoD must provide a trained and ready RC force as appropriate to meet commanders' requirements, and ensure RC units are provided with appropriate equipment to perform their missions. Recommendations to implement this would provide authorities and funding sufficient to enable RC units to achieve readiness comparable to AC:


- Law and Policy: Enable consideration of civilian skills when determining employment & compensation of selected RC service members.
- Policy: Adopt flexible AT schedules that can be aligned with cyclic requirements of Service force generation models.
- Policy: Ensure policies governing the armed forces stipulate that:
 - Services recognize integrated AC/RC force when procuring equipment.
 - Forces identified as first responders to domestic catastrophes are manned, trained, and equipped accordingly.

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Medical Readiness



DoD Needs To Be Able To:

- **Ensure RC service members are medically ready to deploy whenever needed.**
 - Enable RC members to obtain necessary medical/dental care
 - Incentivize RC members to maintain medical/dental readiness

<p>Hindrances:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Not all RC members have easy access to affordable medical care• Real or perceived lack of opportunity to receive care at military treatment facilities• Insufficient deployment-notification lead-time• Lack of incentives (either positive or negative) for RC members to maintain medical readiness• Cumbersome medical readiness tracking systems (e.g., ability to track inoculations received from civilian health care providers)	<p>Necessary Changes To Law, Policy, or Doctrine:</p> <p>Law: Reduce out-of-pocket expenses for restorative dental care (currently 20–50%) under the TRICARE Dental Program</p> <p>Policy: Provide annual dental screening at no cost</p> <p>Policy: Require service members to be medically ready at the same time they complete annual training requirements</p> <p>Policy: Streamline medical readiness tracking systems to permit ready integration of civilian health care records</p>
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DoD must ensure RC service members are medically ready to deploy whenever needed. Recommendations to implement this are:

- Law: Reduce out-of-pocket expenses for restorative dental care (currently 20–50%) under the TRICARE Dental Program.
- Policy: Provide annual dental screening at no cost.
- Policy: Require service members to be medically ready at the same time they complete annual training requirements.
- Policy: Streamline medical readiness tracking systems to permit ready integration of civilian health care records.

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Facilities and Infrastructure

DoD Needs To Be Able To:

- **Ensure RC units are provided with appropriate facilities to perform their missions.**
- **Control infrastructure costs while preserving the readiness investment in the RC.**
 - Garner efficiencies through shared, pooled usage of training facilities and equipment .
 - Utilize simulations to provide a level of qualification or currency prior to full proficiency qualification in preparation for deployment.
- **Develop a robust plan for adjusting infrastructure during times of RC surge whether CONUS or OCONUS**
 - Anticipate potential for surge with infrastructure and funding
 - Develop means for distributed operations when feasible (e.g., institutional support, cyber warfare).



<p>Hindrances:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Procurement policy that considers the RC as a separate force when building infrastructure • Stovepiping of training resources • Infrastructure constructed without consideration of need to support surge operations and/or policies that do not provide flexibility needed for distributed operations	<p>Necessary Changes To Law, Policy, or Doctrine:</p> <p>Policy: Adopt policies that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Establish a system to effectively share training facilities and equipment across all service components• Take into account DoD's need to surge RC when building infrastructure• Allow for flexible, distributed means to provide institutional support
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DoD must ensure RC units are provided with appropriate facilities to perform their missions, control infrastructure costs while preserving the readiness investment in the RC, and develop a robust plan for adjusting infrastructure during times of RC surge whether CONUS or OCONUS. Recommendations are to adopt policies that:

- Establish a system to effectively share training facilities and equipment across all service components.
- Take into account DoD's need to surge RC when building infrastructure.
- Allow for flexible, distributed means to provide institutional support.

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<h2>National Support</h2>	
DoD Needs To Be Able To:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Maximize the predictability and notice of deployments<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Avoid forcing RC members into a choice between RC service and civilian jobs/family obligations• Accommodate exceptions for RC members willing to volunteer for assignments subject to less predictable recall• Maintain the support of RC members' civilian employers through outreach and incentives• Maintain the support of the American public<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Ensure RC members have "meaningful" assignments• Ensure RC membership is representative of the nation as a whole	
Hindrances:	Necessary Changes To Law, Policy, or Doctrine:
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Predictability and notice of deployments:<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Lack of consistent policy requiring sufficient (e.g., 1 year) advance deployment notification for most RC members• Limited contract options for RC members fulfilling special roles, e.g., voluntary agreements to be available on short notice as required to respond to emergent circumstances• RC viewed as "force of last resort" vice "force of choice," exacerbating unpredictability of deployments• Support of RC members' civilian employers:<ul style="list-style-type: none">• DoD strategic communication efforts are not sufficiently robust to maintain a strong connection to civilian employers• Support of the American public:<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Access-related obstacles may prevent RC from being meaningfully engaged across the range of military operations• Increasing lack of broad geographic/demographic representation in RC has weakened connection to American public	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Policy: Maintain a consistent policy requiring sufficient (e.g., 1 year) advance deployment notification for the majority of RC members• Policy: Adjust Service rotational policies to avoid "one size fits all," and include both a strategic force that looks more like the traditional model and an operational rotating force• Policy: Tailor the terms of RC members' contracts to their specific roles• Policy: Expand RC recruitment policies to attract mid-career members with broader geographic/cultural/ technical backgrounds
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DoD must maximize the predictability and notice of deployments, while accommodating exceptions for members willing to volunteer for less predictable assignments. In addition, DoD must maintain the support of RC members' civilian employers through outreach and incentives, and maintain the support of the American public. Recommendations are to establish policies that:

- Maintain a consistent policy requiring sufficient (e.g., 1 year) advance deployment notification for the majority of RC members.
- Adjust Service rotational policies to avoid "one size fits all," and include both a strategic force that looks more like the traditional model and an operational rotating force.
- Tailor the terms of RC members' contracts to their specific roles.
- Expand RC recruitment policies to attract mid-career members with broader geographic/cultural/ technical backgrounds.

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Key Take-Aways

- Current authorities do not prohibit options, however some changes to laws and policies would facilitate their implementation
- Assured access is key if Reserve Component is to be used as an operational force – Revise Title 10 §12304 to enable involuntary access to RC as a rotational, operational force to augment AC (FY 12 Omnibus)
 - Revision of law is required to ensure that DoD can gain access to RC for President's national security strategy in addition to contingency operations
 - Amend Title 14 to provide the Secretary for Homeland Security the ability to recall USCGR members for an additional 120 days for a major contingency
- COCOMs want “Purple Money” and authority to recall and mobilize reservists voluntarily or involuntarily
- Establishing suitable conditions and standards to enable an operational reserve can be facilitated by changes in policy
 - Reduction in the number of duty status from over 30 to just 6 (per QRMC)
- Follow-on Studies: 2011 QRMC Report, Continuum of Service, Medical Readiness and Family and Employers

EXCOM Concurrence

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The EXCOM concurred with the following key takeaways from the October workshop.



Although current authorities do not prohibit implementation of the seven AC/RC force mix options, the identified changes to laws and policies would facilitate their implementation.

Assured access is key to the use of the Reserve Component as an operational force. In accordance with the FY 12 Omnibus, the study recommends revision of Title 10 §12304 to enable involuntary access to the reserve component as a rotational, operational force to augment the active component. This revision is required to ensure that DoD can gain access to the reserve component to execute the President's national security strategy, as well as for contingency operations. In addition, a similar amendment to Title 14 is required to provide the Secretary for Homeland Security the ability to recall USCGR members for an additional 120 days for a major contingency.

In addition to the above changes, COCOMs desire non-service-specific “Purple Money” and authority to enable them to recall and mobilize reservists, either voluntarily or involuntarily. Policy changes are also required to establish suitable conditions and standards to enable an operational reserve. These include a reduction in the current 30+ different duty statuses. As previously discussed, the 11th QRMC is addressing this issue.

The study recognizes the value of subsequent studies, including the 2011 QRMC Report, Continuum of Service, Medical Readiness and Family and Employers.



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Questions

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<h2>Next Steps</h2>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> EXCOM Kickoff Meeting; 16 July 10; 1300-1400<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Army War College, Carlisle, PA; 21-22 Jul 10<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OBJs 1-3 Update to EXCOM; 5 Aug 10; 1330-1500<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OBJs 2-4 Collaborative Workshop, Laurel MD; 17-19 Aug 10<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Interim Report Submission; 1 Sep 10<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OBJ 2-4 Update to EXCOM; 7 Sep 10; 1330-1500<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OBJ 2-5 Collaborative Workshop, Laurel MD; 20-22 Sep 10<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Service Briefs to EXCOM; 30 Sep 10; 1330-1500<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OBJ 2-5 Outbrief to EXCOM; 7 Oct 10; 1330-1500<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OBJ 6 Planning Meeting; 14 Oct 10<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OBJ 2-6 Collaborative Workshop; Laurel MD; 26-27 Oct 10<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OBJ 2-6 Outbrief to EXCOM; 3 Nov 10; 1330-1500<input type="checkbox"/> Close Out Briefing to EXCOM; 16 Nov 10; 1400-1530		
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One EXCOM meeting remains on the agenda, scheduled for November 16, 2010. The focus of this EXCOM session will be an outbrief on Objective 1 (Costing Methodology) of this study.

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Proposed Coordination Timeline



- 19 Nov - 2 Dec 10: Initial Coordination Draft; GO/FO/SES level**

- 3 - 15 Dec 10: Adjudicate comments; Brief co-sponsors**

- 16 Dec 10 - 6 Jan 11: Final Coordination Draft; Dept Head level**


- 7 Jan - 18 Jan 11: Adjudicate comments; Brief co-sponsors**

- 19 - 28 Jan 11: Submit final report thru USD (P&R) to SD
Provide to OUSD(P)/FD for DPPG reporting requirement**

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Following the final EXCOM briefing, the draft report of this study will undergo two rounds of review. This is the schedule to complete the review, adjudicate comments, and produce a final report to the Secretary of Defense by 28 January 2011.



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This graphic illustrates the major meetings and workshops, milestones, and reports associated with this study. Formal kickoff began with a meeting of the EXCOM on 18 July. Subsequent meetings of the EXCOM took place on 5 August, 7 September, 30 September, 7 October, 3 November, and 18 November. The Carlisle Workshop was held on 21-22 July; the Objectives 2-4 Workshop on 17-19 August; the Objectives 2-5 Workshop on 20-22 September; and the Objectives 2-6 Workshop on 26-27 October. Following each workshop, the cognizant Issue Team provided a progress update to the EXCOM.

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Backups

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Backup slides for the main EXCOM brief, as well as the briefings presented during the October workshop follow, without annotation.

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 **Workshop Objectives** 

- **Obtain additional key input presentations:**
 - Joint Staff J3 Assured Access Assessment
 - Coast Guard AC-RC Integration Lessons Learned

- **Identify law, policy, and doctrinal changes**
 - Desired by Services and COCOMs
 - Necessary to implement AC-RC Rebalancing Options developed during review
 - Necessary to provide trained, equipped, ready, and available Guard and Reserve to meet Total Force demands (i.e., Conditions & Standards)



- **Begin preparations for EXCOM Close-Out Presentation on 16 Nov**

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 **Law & Policy Changes** 
Desired by Services & COCOMs ^{1/2}

Title 10, USC


- Amend §12304 to provide Secretarial authority to involuntarily activate RC units/personnel in support of steady-state/non-contingency operations, e.g., language consistent with OSD-RA ULB 08-12B (USA)
- Amend §12304 to provide ability to involuntarily mobilize RC units in support of operational requirements beyond OCO – concur with related OSD Omnibus submission (USMC)
- Amend §12304 to provide SECDEF-level involuntary activation of members and units of the SELRES to meet routine Fleet deployment/rotational requirements (USN)
- Amend appropriate sections to provide COCOM Commanders with authority to mobilize and activate assigned RC forces voluntarily or involuntarily in support of major UCP assigned mission as well as contingency operations, homeland defense, HA/DR (COCOMs)
- Amend appropriate sections to provide COCOMs with a funding source that can be administered by them to fund RC operational support rather than relying on funding from Service components
- Amend §12310 to enable expanding AGR utilization at Clear AFS, AK – FY12 Omnibus submission (USAF)
- Amend §1142 to allow Service Secretaries to waive 90-day requirement for reserve members to receive pre-separation counseling when infeasible due to operational requirements (USMC)—Current FY 13 ULB initiative
- Amend §101 “definitions” to include USCGR mobilized under Title 14 for purposes of benefits and credits (USCG)

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Law & Policy Changes Desired by Services & COCOMs 2/2



Title 10, USC

- Amend §127321(f)(2)(b) to allow eligibility for early retirement credit for mobilized USCGR members (USCG)
- Amend §1076(a)(2) to allow reservists and families to become eligible for TRICARE whenever reservists are ordered to active service (i.e., remove “more than 30 days” limitation) (NGB)


Title 14, USC

- Amend to provide the Secretary for Homeland Security the ability to recall USCGR members for an additional 120 days for a major contingency as defined by the Stafford Act or the Emergency Assistance Act (USCG)

Policy


- Alleviate policy disconnects/dissimilarities between AC and RC that inhibit a true Total Force (USA)
- Amend DoDD 1235.10 to treat voluntary active duty the same as involuntary active duty (NGB)
- Establish a JCS/JROC review that will allow COCOMs to request specific RC forces that are critical to their UCP missions to be aligned or assigned as a standing COCOM force (COCOMs)
- Direct the Services to develop Rapid Activation procedures (24-96 hour recall for specific capabilities) similar to PACFLT proposed Rapid Activation Program (COCOMs)
- Develop several COAs for Joint Staff/JROC determination of standard RC organization structure at each COCOM (e.g., JRU) (COCOMs)

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Implementing AC/RC Rebalancing Options: Required Law or Law/Policy Changes 1/2



Modification Required	AC/RC Option Affected
Revise Title 10 §12304 to ensure responsive access to and mobilization of the RC	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
Ensure that laws and/or policies are in place to provide required medical, dental, and family readiness support programs to deploying RC personnel	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
Revise existing laws and/or policies to enable more frequent and longer periods of service by RC personnel	4, 7
Revise existing laws and/or policies to achieve desired deployment length and achieve BOG:Dwell objectives	1
Ensure that laws and/or policies enable Service Secretaries to modify RC/AC authorizations within Program of Record (POR) to meet emerging operational demands	1
Ensure that laws and/or policies are revised to permit RC access to and use of sensitive and restricted information	5
Revise existing laws and/or policies for temporary spot promotions, recognizing skill relative to mission needs during mobilization	5

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**Implementing AC/RC Rebalancing Options:
Required Law or Law/Policy Changes** 2/2

Modification Required	AC/RC Option Affected
Ensure that laws and/or policies employ the RC in institutional support roles as volunteers or when necessitated by operational missions – not as a means to correct personnel shortfalls	7
Eliminate legal and/or policy impediments (such as age or physical fitness requirement) to the full implementation of a “continuum of service” personnel management system	7

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**Implementing AC/RC Rebalancing Options:
Required Policy Changes** 1/2

Modification Required	AC/RC Option Affected
Establish policies, procedures, and/or contractual agreements between civilian employers, their RC employees, and the USG that facilitate RC deployments and their predictability	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
Reorganize and consolidate all current RC categories to better provide an operational reserve capability and provide strategic depth. Establish policies to facilitate movement between categories	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
Establish policies that will provide common pay, benefits, and entitlements for duty status within a reserve category	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
Ensure that policies and procedures support viable RC training prior to deployment, career path development, and “continuum of service”	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
Develop guidelines for establishment of a common but flexible set of procedures and infrastructure to manage aligned RC forces	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
Using SOCOM's MFP-11 funding process as a model, establish similar “purple” fund policies for other COCOMs	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
Restructure RC components as necessary to enable ready access to needed forces	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7


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Implementing AC/RC Rebalancing Options: Required Policy Changes 2/2




Modification Required	AC/RC Option Affected
Establish a common pay and personnel system to support integrated units	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
Ensure that policies are established to support RC equipment needs to include RC use of AC equipment and facilities	2, 4, 6
Establish policies to identify and provide appropriate credit and compensation to critical civilian skill sets used during RC service	4, 5
Establish policies and procedures to support the long-term alignment of RC capabilities with selected COCOMs and other DoD/interagency organizations	3
Establish policy that allows for equal application of UCMJ and NJP regulations across variety of RCs	6
Establish policy that supports appointment of RC members to integrated unit leadership structure	6


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Option 2: Rotational RC Units Provide Global Posture







<p>Description: Use RC units as rotational forces to provide global posture in lieu of forward deployed AC units in order to lower cost, improve AC BOG:Dwell ratios, or attain other efficiencies. Overall goal is to leverage the RC capabilities gained over the past decade in a way that enhances DoD's ability to accommodate anticipated future demands on our military forces.</p>	<p>Cost Cases: (1) Army AC and ARNG MLRS battalion to Korea with 9-mo BOG to same location, mobilization for one year, 60 days of training the year before mobilization, AC BOG:Dwell 1:3, RC BOG:Dwell 1:5, use in-place equipment. (2) Air Force AC and ANG F-15 fighter squadron or AC and ANG K-135 refueling squadron to Europe, 6-mo rotation, unaccompanied. Identify infrastructure cost savings: family housing, schools, day care, exchanges, health care.</p>
<p>Examples*: (1) RC units from CONUS provide MLRS Battalion, Fighter Wing, or Aerial Tanker Wing for Korea. (2) RC units from CONUS provide Fighter Wing or Aerial Tanker Wing for Europe.</p> <p>* Need not be exclusively an RC solution. Potential to rotate with like AC units IAW Service rotational readiness models</p>	<p>Law, policy and doctrine changes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Revise existing laws and/or policies to support non-combat rotational mobilization and deployment • Ensure that policies are established to support RC equipment needs to include RC use of AC equipment and facilities

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	<h2 style="margin: 0;">Option 3: Align RC Elements with Specific DoD Components</h2>	
<p>Description: Align specific RC units, teams, and individuals with selected COCOMs, Service functions, DoD Agency and/or Interagency partners in order to facilitate access to RC units, teams, and personnel and thereby build long-term relationships. 2010 DPPG task: Services develop plans for regional alignment to support COCOM campaign plans.</p>	<p>Cost Cases: (1) Estimate cost and staffing needs for a standard Joint Reserve Unit located at a GCC HQ. (2) Estimate costs for 20 rotations of 12-person Mobile Training Teams for 3-weeks each into AFRICOM AOR for a 15-year period assuming sourcing from (a) AC personnel on TAD/TDY or (b) traditional RC on AT. Account for infrastructure and support costs for the AC.</p>	
<p>Examples: (1) Align RC units/personnel with selected COCOMs (e.g., AFRICOM) (2) Align specific RC units/personnel with specific Service functions (e.g., US Army TRADOC) (3) Align specific RC units/personnel with DOD agencies (e.g., DIA), but also consider Interagency partners for whole of government solutions.</p>	<p>Law, policy and doctrine changes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish policies and procedures to support the long-term alignment of RC capabilities with selected COCOMs and other DoD/interagency organizations • Develop guidelines for establishment of a common but flexible set of procedures and infrastructure to manage aligned RC forces • Using SOCOM's MFP-11 funding process as a model, establish similar "purple" fund policies for other COCOMs • Restructure RC components as necessary to enable ready access to needed forces 	
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	<h2 style="margin: 0;">Option 4a: Create National or Regional RC Units</h2>	
<p>Description: Create national or regional RC units staffed by personnel willing to serve more frequently and/or for longer periods of time in order to support on-going and future Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) and Building Partner Capacity (BPC) missions as well as institution support missions. Such <i>differentiation</i> within RC provides additional source for units/teams/ personnel required by important DoD missions.</p>	<p>Cost Cases: (1) Compare costs for 200-person unit sourced (a) from AC or (b) from RC by personnel willing to train/operate 90 days/yr and deploy for 9 months on 1:3 cycle. Examine 40, 60, 120, and 180 day AD periods and 1:2 and 1:4 BOG:Dwell ratios.</p>	
<p>Examples: (1) RC units teamed exclusively with specific AC units, co-using equipment and facilities (similar to Air Force Reserve); (2) Army Reserve unit of drill sergeants aligned with TRADOC to provide "surge" capacity over peak Jun-Sep training period; (3) RC unit aligned with AFRICOM to provide needed TSC and BPC support. Aligned RC unit would be "first called".</p>	<p>Law, policy and doctrine changes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Revise existing laws and/or policies to enable more frequent and longer periods of service by RC personnel • Establish policies to identify and provide appropriate credit and compensation to critical civilian skill sets used during RC service • Ensure that policies are established to support RC equipment needs to include RC use of AC equipment and facilities 	
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<h2 style="margin: 0;">Option 5: Develop RC Capabilities to Meet Emerging Needs</h2>	
<p>Description: Adjust capabilities included within RC to enhance Total Force capability to meet emerging demands arising from new challenges. Most promising options include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Creating cyber defense capabilities • Expanding ISR operations and intelligence analysis capabilities • Sustained engagement with selected foreign partner military establishments 	<p>Cost Cases: Identify cost savings that accrue to DoD by recruiting personnel who have acquired important training and skills outside the military, e.g., doctors, city planners, network security experts. In some cases, cyber security personnel have an 18-month training requirement.</p>
<p>Examples:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cyber defense: develop a mix of units, small teams, and individuals to expand US cyber capabilities. In RC, emphasize recruitment and long-term retention of personnel already highly experienced in cyber defense in the civil sector. Employ these people in critical defense activities and in training. • ISR: expand existing efforts to include remote UAS operation. 	<p>Law, policy and doctrine changes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Revise existing laws and/or policies to provide appropriate credit and compensation to critical civilian skill sets used in RC service • Ensure that laws and/or policies are revised to permit RC access to and use of sensitive and restricted information • Revise existing laws and/or policies for temporary spot promotions, recognizing skill relative to mission needs during mobilization
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<h2 style="margin: 0;">Option 6: Integration of AC and RC Units</h2>	
<p>Description: Enhance AC-RC integration by (1) incorporating selected RC personnel or elements into operational AC units or (2) incorporating selected AC personnel or elements into RC units. Specific cases proposed for study are (1) ground-force rotary-wing aviation units in order to increase aircraft crew ratios, and (2) RC maneuver battalion within AC IBCT.</p>	<p>Cost Cases: (1) Rotary-wing aviation cost differential from 100% AC unit using (a) extra 20% RC manpower, (b) 80% AC manpower, 20% RC; and (c) 20% AC manpower, 80% RC. "Nominal" squadron structure: 30 officers, 15 SNCOs, and 155 enlisted. (2) Integrate ARNG maneuver Bn into Army IBCT. ARNG trains 90 days/year and rotates at 1:3. ARNG soldiers paid per day of duty but incentivized at \$10K/year.</p>
<p>Examples: USN and USAF currently employ a variety of integrated and blended aviation units.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USN Mine Warfare Helicopter squadrons and Squadron Augmentation Units (SAUs) • USAF 78th Fighter Squadron (F-16) • From 1 to 50% of personnel in typical integrated squadron comes from other component (e.g., RC in AC unit). • Integration enhances readiness, flexibility, experience, and capability. 	<p>Law, policy and doctrine changes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure that policies are established to support RC equipment needs to include RC use of AC equipment and facilities • Establish policy that allows for equal application of UCMJ and NJP regulations across variety of RCs • Establish policy that supports appointment of RC members to integrated unit leadership structure • Establish a common pay and personnel system to support integrated units
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 <h2 style="display: inline;">Option 7: RC Provides Selected Institutional Support</h2> 	
<p>Description: RC provides units, teams, or individuals to support Service Secretaries' Title 10 responsibilities for recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, training, servicing, mobilizing and demobilizing their assigned forces.</p>	<p>Cost Cases: (1) Replace 100 AC drill sergeants at Ft. Jackson with 100 RC drill sergeants who work 90-120 days/year during Ft. Jackson's peak Jun-Oct demand period. (2) Use an RC personnel services company to provide personnel services at an AC installation. RC company would work remotely and provide 5 personnel/day year round. Compare costs with those for 5 AC members or 5 civilians or contractors.</p>
<p>Examples: <i>Recruiting</i> – assist in attracting new service members <i>Training</i> – assist AC in training from initial individual training to unit pre-deployment <i>Administration</i> – assist with pay and personnel management <i>Depot Level Maintenance</i> – assist with major repair/refurbishment of platforms and equipment <i>Medical/Legal/Chaplaincy</i></p>	<p>Law, policy and doctrine changes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Revise existing laws and/or policies to enable alternate and/or longer periods of service by RC personnel • Ensure that laws and/or policies employ the RC in institutional support roles as volunteers or when necessitated by operational missions – not as a means to correct personnel shortfalls • Eliminate legal and/or policy impediments (such as age or physical fitness requirements) to the full implementation of a “continuum of service” personnel management system
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 <p style="text-align: center;">UNCLASSIFIED/DRAFT</p> <h2 style="display: inline;">Assured Access ^{1/2}</h2> 	
<p>DoD Needs To Be Able To:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure JF commanders have ready access to RC members as needed to support: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Repetitive, limited-duration missions (e.g., annual exercises) • Short notice “pop up” missions (e.g., HA/DR) • Requirements for individuals with specialized experience, knowledge or skills (vice entire units) • Dual status operations involving both Title 10 and Title 32 forces (e.g. DSCA) • Maintain the integrity of RC units to ensure continued viability/availability <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Avoid cross-leveling that “hollows out” units • Recruit and retain qualified members; ensure reserve service remains an attractive choice 	
<p>Hindrances:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Law/policy/procedural obstacles prevent short-notice deployments in support of operational missions • Law restricts mobilization to Contingency Operations vice broader aim of meeting National Security Objectives • Limited access to Title 10 RC capabilities for HD/DSCA • Some Service policies hinder mobilization of individuals 	<p>Necessary Changes To Law, Policy, or Doctrine:</p> <p>Law: Endorse ULB-proposed change to Title 10, §12304 which would:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enable reserve call-up to support National Security Objectives, vice just Contingency Operations • Enable Services to involuntarily activate SELRES in accordance with force generation plans <p>Law: COCOMs desire further mobilization law change:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Authority and funding to order voluntary or involuntary mobilization of RC members to meet COCOM's UCP mission requirements • OSD allocation of “Purple” 0100 fund to COCOMs, based on OpTempo (allowing flexibility to COCOMs for Reserve P&A (ADOS/ADSW/MPA)
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Assured Access 2/2



DoD Needs To Be Able To:

- **Ensure JF commanders have ready access to RC members as needed to support:**
 - Repetitive, limited-duration missions (e.g., annual exercises)
 - Short notice “pop up” missions (e.g., HA/DR)
 - Requirements for individuals with specialized experience, knowledge or skills (vice entire units)
 - Dual status operations involving both Title 10 and Title 32 forces (e.g. DSCA)
- **Maintain the integrity of RC units to ensure continued viability/availability.**
 - Avoid cross-leveling that “hollows out” units
 - Recruit and retain qualified members; ensure reserve service remains an attractive choice

Hindrances:

- Law/policy/procedural obstacles prevent short-notice deployments in support of operational missions
- Law restricts mobilization to Contingency Operations vice broader aim of meeting National Security Objectives
- Limited access to Title 10 RC capabilities for HD/DSCA
- Some Service policies hinder mobilization of individuals

Necessary Changes To Law, Policy, or Doctrine:

Law: Revise 10 USC §12304(b) for involuntary mobilization authority of non-NG RC members for natural/man-made disasters

Policy: Establish a Joint Reserve Unit (JRU) at each COCOM to standardize the management and operational use of all Joint Reserve personnel and equipment

Policy: Conduct a review of the Services' activation procedures to ensure they are sufficiently responsive to demand signal

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Assured Access to the Reserve Components

COL John K. Bartolotto
Reserve Component Operations Assistant to the DJ3

20 September 2010

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Assured Access to the Reserve Components

Nature of Briefing

- Decisional
- Obtain JCS concurrence on recommendations to SecDef to assure continued access to the Reserve Components (RC) over the next five years

Context / Assumptions

- Identify RC access statutes and policies
- Describe how Services access RC
- Provide mobilization history Apr 09 - Apr 10
- Analyze and articulate findings
- Recommend statute / policy provisions

Desired Outcomes

- Retain title 10 Mobilization Authorities
- Continue 14 Sep 01 Presidential Proclamation 7463 (Declaration of National Emergency)
- Align DoDI 1235.12 with DoDD 1235.10





Actions Taken to Date

- Study conducted from 13 Apr – 16 Jun 10
- OPSDEPS 25 Jun 10
- Socialization completed with ASD-RA and USD P&R

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AC Strength and RC Mobilization History



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RC Evolution

Pre-2001

- Low-utilization
- Low training and equipment investments
- Limited force sustainment contributions
- Limited utilization of civilian skills
- "Strategic Reserve" mentality
- Recruitment and retention challenges

Current

- High-utilization
- High training and equipment investment
- High force sustainment contributions
- Increased utilization of civilian skills sets (ADTs, PRTs, CA)
- "Operational Reserve" mentality
- Recruitment and retention exceeded

"We have obviously adjusted to the fight...is this the right baseline to proceed into the future and are all Services OK with that?" - CJCS

Future of the RC...Are we playing to our strengths?

Are we well postured to leverage the RC to:

- Ensure RC capabilities are maximized to enhance departmental flexibility and responsiveness?
- Optimize Service efficiencies?
- Exploit civilian skill sets?
- Satisfy Homeland Defense and GFM demands?
- Enhance strategic agility?

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
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Strategic Context

- **Quadrennial Defense Review (Feb 10)**
 - **Defense Strategy Priority Objectives**
 - Prevail in today’s wars
 - Prevent and deter conflict
 - Prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies
 - Preserve and enhance the All-volunteer Force
 - **Keeping Faith with the RC**
 - “An RC available, trained and equipped for predictable routine deployments”
 - “To fulfill requirements for which they are well suited”

- **JFCOM Joint Operating Environment (Feb 10)**
 - Trends influencing the world’s security
 - Contextual world
 - Implications for the Joint Force
 - Future opportunities

Accessing the RC for Operations



- Four out of five mobilization authorities currently used
- All Services access RC utilizing these in conjunction with DoD policies
- Access incomplete without associated funding allocated to the Services to manage

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Service Overall Mobilization History 1 Apr 09 – 1 Apr 10

Overall by Service	Public Law Mobilization Notification Timelines		DoD Policy Mobilization Notification Timelines		Total Pax Mob
	<30 Days	30-90 Days	90-180 Days	>180 Days	
USAR	832 (4%)	2,967 (14%)	12,174 (58%)	5,138 (24%)	21,111
ARNG	1,033 (2%)	1,034 (2%)	25,842 (50%)	23,774 (46%)	51,683
USMC	114 (2%)	1,154 (16%)	5,013 (75%)	447 (7%)	6,728
USN	319 (4%)	3,108 (39%)	2,470 (31%)	2,071 (26%)	7,968
AFRC	0 (0%)	1,784 (37%)	1,323 (27%)	1,744 (36%)	4,851
ANG	108 (1%)	947 (9%)	4,497 (45%)	4,507 (45%)	10,059
TOTAL	2,406 (2%)	10,994 (11%)	51,319 (50%)	37,681 (37%)	102,372

- 87% IAW DoDD 1235.10 notification policy (90 days (Std); 180 days (Goal))
- Data a combination voluntary / involuntary filled emergent, planned / rotational missions
- Total IAs 10,226 out of 102,372 (USA 1,715; USMC 1,575; USN 6,895; and USAF 41)

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Service Haiti HA Mobilization History 12 Jan 10 – 1 Jun 10

Haiti HA by Service	Public Law Mobilization Notification Timelines		DoD Policy Mobilization Notification Timelines		Total Pax Mob
	<30 Days	30-90 Days	90-180 Days	>180 Days	
USAR	633 (100%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	633
ARNG	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0
USMC	5* (100%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	5*
USN	987* (100%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	987*
AFRC	965* (100%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	965*
ANG	1,197* (100%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1,197*
TOTAL	3,787* (100%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	3,787*


* Includes volunteers on 12301 (b) or 12301 (d) orders

Less than 30 days notification is to be expected in a crisis

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
- Current statutes (Title 10, United States Code and Public Law 110-181) and DoD policies (DoDD 1235.10 and DoDI 1235.12) are adequate to access RC forces provided the Presidential Proclamation 7463, “Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks,” is continued
- DoDD 1235.10 and DoDI 1235.12 contain conflicting mobilization notification goals and standards
- Access required to meet both emergent and rotational requirements
- Must balance threats and risks against AC/RC access
- Service AC/RC mix adjustments ongoing and necessary

Army FY12 Operating Force Mix



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Army Projected Force Structure Goals



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Conclusion

- Enduring and emergent requirements present risk and warrant AC/RC mix refinement
- AC is not structured to solely provide optimum sourcing solutions to meet Nation's needs
- RC utilization:
 - Preserves / enhances the All-Volunteer Force by increasing its capacity and capabilities
 - Provides more efficient and effective use of defense assets
 - Provides return on training and equipment investments made in RC over past nine years
 - Contributes to the sustainability of force
 - Utilizes unique civilian skills resident in RC
 - Maintains the US Military's strong connection with the American people
 - RC unit manning realities lead to cross leveling of personnel / cascade of shortfalls
 - Off-Ramps and curtailments present unique challenges to RC members, families and employers due to employment, financial and contractual obligations
 - Operational Reserve funding is located in OCO and not in base POM

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Recommendations

C NC

- Retain current title 10 USC Mobilization Authorities

C NC

- Continue annual extensions of Presidential Proclamation 7463 of 14 September 2001, "Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks" to support requirements and continued assured access to the RC
 - Reviewed NLT 1 Jul of each year by the JCS
 - Submitted NLT 1 Sep of each year

C NC

- Align DoDI 1235.12 with DoDD 1235.10 for involuntary mobilization notification of 90 days, with a goal of 180 days (DoDD 1235.10 Encl 2, para 1a)

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Way Ahead

- Obtain SecDef approval of the recommendations

- Coordinate JCS recommendations with QDR directed Comprehensive Review of Future Roles of the RC

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Headquarters U.S. Air Force

Integrity - Service - Excellence

AF TFI Policy Review



Briefer: Col Cathy Haverstock
SAF/MRR

U.S. AIR FORCE

1


Col Cathy Haverstock, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, briefed the October Workshop participants on statutory, regulatory, and Air Force policy changes associated with the Air Force's implementation of Total Force Integration. The key points from the presentation are summarized here:

Statutory

- Title 10 vs. Title 32 issues
 - Command - Federal, State, Combined Operational Direction
 - SAF/GC and AF/JA proposed amendment to 10 USC § 12310 enabling expanded AGR utilization at Clear AFS, AK (FY12 Omnibus submission)
- End Strength Limits and Accounting
- Funding – MPA vs RPA appropriations; funding of approved initiatives; Flying Hours

Regulatory (DoD and AF)

- While DoDDs and DoDIs are typically Army-centric, suggesting mobilization as primary access to RC, nothing in them limits access to the RC



Range of Authorities Governing TFI Policy

U.S. AIR FORCE

- **Statutory**
 - Title 10 vs Title 32 issues
 - Command - Federal, State, Combined Operational Direction
 - SAF/GC and AF/JA proposed amendment to 10 USC § 12310 enabling expanded AGR utilization at Clear AFS, AK (FY12 Omnibus submission)
 - End Strength Limits and Accounting
 - Funding – MPA vs RPA appropriations; funding of approved initiatives; Flying Hours
- **Regulatory (DoD and AF)**
 - While DoDDs and DoDIs are typically Army-centric, suggesting mobilization as primary access to RC, *nothing in them limits our access to the RC*
- **AF Policy and Historical Practices**
 - Personnel - Different personnel statuses; Law requires three separate AF components but does not require three separate personnel management systems
 - Installations - Shared Use of Airfields, Facilities, Utilities, First-Term Amn basing
 - Presentation of forces - UTCs

Integrity - Service - Excellence

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AF Policy and Historical Practices

- Personnel - Different personnel statuses; Law requires three separate AF components but does not require three separate personnel management systems
- Installations - Shared Use of Airfields, Facilities, Utilities, First-Term Airmen basing
- Presentation of forces - UTCs

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RC participants at the October workshop were provided with a brief given to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the requirement for assured access to the RC. This brief was initially provided to the operations deputies in June 2010, and was subsequently refocused and provided to the JCS in September 2010.

The purposes of the study were to identify the rules for accessing the RC, and to determine whether DoD is in compliance with those rules. The review covered the period from WWII to the present day; all data was provided by the services.



The study concluded that DoD has mobilized RC members in accordance with the law, but noted the risk associated with reliance on overseas contingency operation funding. The study recommended the following:

- Retain current Title 10 mobilization authorities.
- Continue annual extensions of Presidential Proclamation 7463 of 14 September 2001, subject to annual review.
- Align DoDI 1235.12 with DoDD 1235.10 for involuntary mobilization notification of 90 days, with a goal of 180 days.

The JCS concurred with all recommendations, but have not yet forwarded the recommendations to SECDEF.

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US Army Input
OBJ 2-6 Workshop

*Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of
the Reserve Components*



MAJ Blake Stone, ASA (M&RA)
26 Oct 2010

13 Oct 2010 1




MAJ Blake Stone, ASA (M&RA) briefed the participants at the October workshop on the Army's desired operational reserve legal authorities. The Army desires an amendment to Title 10 Article 12304 to provide SECDEF or service secretaries with the authority to involuntarily activate RC members in support of steady state, non-contingency operations. Unlike other services, whose needs might be met with volunteers, the Army specifically requires the ability to involuntarily recall members to maintain the integrity of units.

As an associated policy requirement, the Army requires a new Total Force policy to ensure that AC and RC members are able to train and deploy together in a coordinated manner.



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 **Operational Reserve Legal Authorities** 




- **Desired Authority:** Amendment to §12304
- **Current barrier(s):** No Secretarial authority to involuntarily activate RC units/personnel in support of steady-state/non-contingency operations.
- **Recommended changes:** Language consistent with OSD-RA ULB 08-12B
- **Risk if not changed:** Limited to current training authorities and volunteers – hence no Operational Reserve
- **Options impacted:** 2, 4(a), 4(b), 6, 7

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 **Army Policy Implications** 

- **Desired Authority:** New Army Total Force Policy
- **Current barrier(s):** Policy disconnects/dissimilarities between AC and RC inhibit a true Total Force.
- **Recommended changes:**
 - Deploy as integrated AC/RC force packages
 - Common AC/RC BOG deployment timeframes
 - Common Pre-deployment validation standards
 - Annual analysis of Total Force balance by capability
- **Risk if not changed:** Lack of common BOG and “forming-up teams” prior to deployment prohibits true integration of an Operational Reserve into Total Force operations.
- **Options impacted:** 2, 4(a), 4(b), 6, 7

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National Guard Bureau

Mr. Michael Petring
NGB-J5
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Michael.petring@us.army.mil

**This briefing is
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Mr. Michael Petring, from the National Guard Bureau J5, briefed October workshop participants on the following law, policy, and doctrine changes recommended by the National Guard:

- Amend Title 10, section 101 (d)(3) to provide family medical coverage to the families of active service members.
- Treat voluntary and involuntary active duty the same for purposes of BOG/Dwell, to remove the existing disincentive for volunteers.
- Provide equitable benefits to members of the AC and RC.
- Utilize existing Title 32 authority to provide access to National Guard forces in CONUS for COCOM support missions.

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National Guard

The National Guard operates in three distinct legal statuses:

- State Active Duty (per State Law): State funded /State controlled – Used for Domestic Missions
- Title 32 Duty Status (Title 32 USC): Federal funding/State controlled – Used for federal training and Domestic Missions
- Federal Active Duty (Title 10 USC): Federal funding/Federal control: Used to support federal missions to include overseas contingency operations

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Background on NG duty statuses for those who are not familiar with them.

NOTE: Active component DoD and non-NG RC of DoD operated solely in Title 10 status. The USCG may operated in Title 14, Title 10 or both.

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Duty Status - 10 USC 101(d)

The term "**active service**" means service on active duty or full-time National Guard duty. **10 USC 101(d)(3)**

The term "**full-time National Guard duty**" means training or other duty, other than inactive duty, performed by a member of the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air National Guard of the United States in the member's status as a member of the National Guard of a State or territory, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or the District of Columbia under section 316, 502, 503, 504, or 505 of title 32 for which the member is entitled to pay from the United States or for which the member has waived pay from the United States. **10 USC 101(d)(5)**

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AC/RC Force Mix
Policy, Doctrine, Law Considerations

- Continue progress making pay/benefits **equitable** across the components
 - Equitable doesn't mean Equal
 - However, "Service" should be the same for RC and AC
 - OCO, Theater Engagement Teams, DEEP WATER HORIZON
 - If you're on orders, you're on orders; pay/benefits determined by cumulative days of Service
 - Some policies/laws use the phrase "active duty" versus "active service"...words mean things, especially in law!
- Essential to establishing DoD **continuum of service**

Federal law and DoD policies related to personnel pay/benefits should be reviewed. NGB provides some examples in the slides that follow.

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A true continuum of service must be established in order to be successful in providing National Guard personnel that may be cycled into and out of **active service** (on-ramped and off-ramped) frequently in the course of their NG career.

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Family Medical Coverage

- **Desired Authority:** Provide medical coverage to the families of RC service members while the SM is on active service (10 USC 101(d)(3))
- **Current barrier(s):** Reservists must be ordered to active duty for more than 30 days for their families to become eligible for TRICARE. The Public Law authority for member TRICARE is 10 USC 1074 and the authority for family TRICARE is 10 USC 1076(a)(2)
- **Recommended changes:** Amend 10 USC 1076(a)(2) to allow reservists and their families to become eligible for TRICARE when reservists are ordered to active service (remove the “more than 30 days” limitation).
- **Risk if not changed:** Major obstacle to establishing a true continuum of service, and may impact retention if service members cannot easily maintain medical coverage for their families.
- **Options impacted:** 3, 4a, 4b, 4c, 5, 6, 7

Tier I 

Tier II 

Tier III 

5


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Voluntary / Involuntary Active Duty

- **Desired Authority:** Treat voluntary active duty (such as under 10 USC 12301(d) authority) the same as involuntary active duty (such as under 10 USC 12302 authority)
- **Current barrier(s):** DoDD 1235.10, Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve, Enclosure 2 Guidelines, states at para 2.c., "Time spent on active duty by an RC member under section 12301(d) of Reference (c) is considered dwell time."
- **Recommended changes:** Rescind para 2.c
- **Risk if not changed:** Disincentive to voluntary mobilizations
- **Options impacted:** 1, 2, 3, 4a, 4b, 4c, 5, 6, 7

Tier I 

Tier II 

Tier III 

6

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Other NGB Concerns/Topics

- **Equitable benefits for service** - Obtain benefits equivalent to active duty benefits for RC member when the service member reaches active duty milestones
 - Cumulative service
 - Active service
 - e.g., max Chapter 33 GI Bill benefits at 1460 days cumulative active service
- **Leverage existing T32 authority to access NG forces in CONUS for COCOM support missions**

7

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DoDD 1235.10, Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve, Enclosure 2 Guidelines, states at para 2.c., "Time spent on active duty by an RC member under section 12301(d) of Reference (c) is considered dwell time."

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Back-Up

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Tasking

Identify / Describe


- **Desired Authority**: What is it that you want authority to do?
- **Current Barrier(s)**: Why do you think you can't do it now (if possible, identify the specific constraining statute or policy)?
- **Recommended Changes**: How would you change law, policy, or doctrine to do what you would like to do?
- **Risk**: What risk will be incurred if you can't get the desired change?



Stated tasking for Objective 6.

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	<p style="margin: 0;">UNCLASSIFIED/DRAFT</p> <h2 style="margin: 0;">AC/RC Rebalancing Options</h2>
Option	Description
1) Rebalance AC/RC mix to remedy capacity and BOG-Dwell shortfalls	Rebalance AC/RC capacity as appropriate to remediate established force capacity shortfalls (as determined by JS J-8 Force Sufficiency Assessments) and/or to enable units to reach desired BOG-Dwell ratios (as determined by JS J-8 OA10 Study)
2) Rely on rotational RC units to provide global posture	Rely on rotational RC units to provide global posture vice selected forward deployed forces
3) Align RC units, teams, and individuals with specific DoD components	Align specific RC units, teams, and individuals with selected COCOMs, Service functions, DoD Agency and Interagency partners in order to facilitate access to RC units, sub-units, teams, and personnel and thereby build long-term relationships
4) Specifically structure RC as a mix of operational and strategic elements	Selected RC units provide entire units, sub-units, teams, and/or individuals at deployment frequencies and durations required to meet COCOM operational needs
5) Adjust capabilities included within RC to meet emerging needs	Adjust capabilities included within RC to enhance Total Force capability to meet emergent cyber threats
6) Enhance AC-RC integration	Integrate selected RC elements into operational AC units and integrate selected AC elements into RC units
7) Rely on RC to provide selected institutional support	Selected RC units provide forces to accomplish Services' institutional support requirements ¹⁰
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US Navy Input
OBJ 2-6 Workshop

*Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of
the Reserve Components*



CAPT Robert Louzek, ASN-M&RA
26 Oct 2010

13 Oct 2010 1




CAPT Robert Louzek, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), briefed participants at the October workshop on the Navy's desired changes to law, policy, and doctrine. The Navy recommends modification to Title 10 section 12304 to provide SECDEF with the authority to involuntarily activate RC members to meet routine deployment and rotational requirements. The Navy concurs with the Omnibus submission from OSD (RA) proposing this change.

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 **Activation Authority** 

- **Desired Authority:** SECDEF-level activation of members (without their consent) and units of the Selected Reserve to meet routine Fleet deployment/rotational requirements
- **Current barrier(s):** 12304 as currently written and practiced (EXORD) too limited in scope to meet the persistent, global requirements of the Fleet
- **Recommended changes:** see Omnibus submission from OSD RA
- **Risk if not changed:** Access to RC capabilities and capacities limited in a non-12301/12302 environment, which limits future options to rebalance overall TF capabilities
- **Options impacted:** 2, 3, 5, 6, 7



 Tier I  Tier II  Tier III

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USMC OBJ 6 Working Group
Desired Policy/Law/Doctrine Changes
(2010 QDR Comp Review of the Future of the RC)

Maj Brian Miller, HQMC
26 October 2010



13 Oct 2010 UNCLASSIFIED 1

Maj Brian Miller, HQMC, briefed the October workshop participants on law, doctrine, and policy changes desired by the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps' highest priority issue is to provide the services with the authority to involuntarily mobilize RC units to support operational retirements, beyond the current authority associated with overseas contingency operations. To this end, the Marines concur with changes to Title 10, section 12302 proposed in the OSD Omnibus submission to allow involuntary mobilizations of not more than 365 days.

The Marine Corps also desires a change to Title 10, section 1142, to waive the 90-day requirement for RC members to receive pre-separation counseling. Such counseling is often infeasible due to operational requirements, because RC members are often still forward deployed at the 90-day point. In addition, the Marine Corps recommends reviewing RC members' dental coverage.




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Involuntary Mobilization Authority

- **Desired Authority:** Ability to involuntarily mobilize RC units to support operational requirements, beyond OCO.
- **Current barrier(s):** Once OCO mobilization authorities (10 USC 12302 under Pres Proc 7463) expire, USMC no longer able to involuntarily mobilize UNITS long-term to meet CCDR demand signal.
- **Recommended changes:** Concur w/ changes/additions to 10 USC 12304 proposed in the OSD Omnibus submission to allow involuntarily mobilizations of not more than 365 consecutive days, with force cap similar to 12304. Ensure use of the new AUTH does not necessitate declaration of a contingency operation as defined in USC 101(a)(13).
- **Risk if not changed:** Lack of invol authority limits USMC ability to source unit requirements and generate total force sourcing solutions.
- **Options impacted:** All

Tier I Tier II Tier III 




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Pre-separation Counseling Requirements



- **Desired Authority:** Modify current law (10 USC 1142) to waive 90-day requirement for Reserve members to receive pre-separation counseling when operational requirements make it infeasible to meet the statutory requirement.
- **Current barrier(s):** Law requires pre-separation counseling to be conducted NLT 90 days before the conclusion of all periods of active duty in excess of 180 days. Most mobilized Reserve Marines are still forward deployed at the 90-days prior to separating from active duty.
- **Recommended changes:** Provide the Service Secretaries the flexibility to waive the 90-day requirement for Reserve members still forward deployed at the 90-day mark. Counseling be given at the earliest time consistent with not interfering with operational requirements.
- **Risk if not changed:** Deployed RC units will have to provide pre-separation counseling while still engaged in operations, thereby distracting from mission focus and reinforcing differences between AC/RC.
- **Options impacted:** All

Tier I Tier II Tier III 

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 **Other USMC Concerns/Points** 

- 1095 rule – USMC does not recommend any changes to the current policy.
- Reserve medical/dental: Existing TRS (Tri-Care Reserve Select), EID (Early Identified Deployers) TRICARE and TA (Transitional Assistance)-180 coverage is sufficient for ensuring RC members are medically ready. *Recommend reviewing dental coverage to determine if coverage that mirrors TRS/E-ID/TA-180 can be provided in a cost-effective manner.*
- USMC Equipment transfer between AC and RC are not negatively impacted by title 10 or DoD/OSD policy/doctrine.
- Intersection between the issues addressed in OSD Future of the Reserve Study and the CNGR. Issue of the Reserves should be studied holistically.

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- **Commissions conclusions based on the following assertions:**
 - All-Volunteer Force is endangered without Continuum of Service reforms.
 - Current military retirement does not meet today's military needs.
 - The current force is too expensive and needs to change in order to survive.
 - Employer support for the operational reserve concept is sustainable.
 - An operational reserve will be as capable as the current force.
- **However, in reality:**
 - The All Volunteer Force has never been stronger – even after nine years of combat operations.
 - Proposed changes to military retirement system will not save money and will hurt retention.
 - The operational reserve concept costs the same as the active component yet may be unsustainable.
 - While recommendations increase RC readiness, aggregate readiness suffers.

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Reserve & Leadership Directorate

U.S. COAST GUARD RESERVE Legislative Changes and Proposals

Mr. Jeffrey Smith, HQ USCG
26 October 2010



Mr. Jeffrey Smith, Headquarters, US Coast Guard, briefed the October Workshop participants on the legislative changes and proposals of particular interest to the Coast Guard. The following changes were proposed:

- Change Title 14: DHS ability to recall for an additional 120 Days for a major contingency as defined by the Stafford Act and the Emergency Assistance Act.
- Change Title 10 Section 101 “Definitions” to include USCGR mobilized under Title 14 for purposes of benefits and credit.
- Change Title 10 Section 127321(f)(2)(b) for the purpose of eligibility for early retirement credit for mobilized members.

U.S. COAST GUARD RESERVE Legislative Changes and Proposals

- **Change Title 14: DHS ability to recall for an additional 120 Days for a major contingency as defined by the Stafford Act & Emergency Assistance Act.**
- **Change Title 10 Sect 101 “Definitions” to include USCGR mobilized under Title 14 for purposes of benefits and credit.**
- **Change Title 10 127321(f)(2)(b) for the purpose of eligibility for early retirement credit for mobilized members.**





- 30 days recall authority

Post 9/11:

- Pre-mobilization recall authority
- 60 days mobilization twice in two years for total of 120 days mobilization with 60 days dwell between recalls.

Requested:

- Ability to recall for 120 days
- Sec DHS determine dwell



COCOM Consolidated Input
Pre-working Group Meeting

*Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of
the Reserve Components*

26 Oct 2010

COL Troy Kok, USTRANSCOM J9-D

13 Oct 2010 1

At the October workshop, TRANSCOM representative Col. Troy Kok presented a coordinated brief produced following a 22 September meeting of the “Joint Reserve Advisory Group” composed of COCOM Joint Reserve Directors and Flag Officer Mobilization Assistants . This brief represents the COCOM representatives’ common issues associated with Reserve Component management. Although it does not represent complete consensus, the Reserve Division Chiefs (at the Action Officer level) agree that these are the policy/legal issues that need to be addressed with respect to achieving recommendations provided by Objectives 2 through 5.

The advisory group proposed changes organized into three tiers:

- Tier I – Immediate: Initiatives/changes to RC Operational Support that are already within current policy, doctrine, legal constraints. (Quick wins/do now)
- Tier II - intermediate: Changes that require policy changes but are still within legal constraints.
- Tier III – long Term: Changes that will require legislative changes to existing Laws (Title 10/32)



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The group's top five recommended changes were:

- COCOM Mobilization Authority (tier 3)
- Rapid Activation (Voluntary and/or involuntary) (tier 2)
- "Purple" Money for RC Operational Support (tier 3)
- Standardized RC Organization (tier 1)
- Standardized RC Entitlements (tier 2)

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Tasking

- How you would like to be able to employ the Reserve Component (RC), i.e., what is it that you want authority to do? (***Desired Authority***)
- Why do you think you can't do it now (if possible, identify the specific constraining statute or policy)? (***Current Barrier(s)***)
- How would you change law, policy, or doctrine to do what you would like to do? (***Recommended Changes***)
- What risk will be incurred if you can't get the desired change? (***Risk if not changed***)

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Objective 2-5 Recommendations

- (1) Adjust AC-RC Balance To Address AC Capacity Shortfalls
- (2) RC Provides Rotational Units
- (3) Align RC Units with Selected DoD Components
- (4a) Enhance RC Capability as Operational Force
- (4b) Increased Operational Role for RC
- (4c) Enhance RC Capability as Strategic Reserve
- (5) Rebalance RC To Meet Emerging Needs
- (6) Enhance AC-RC Integration
- (7) Use RC To Meet Some Institutional Needs

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Tiered Approach to Objective 6

- Tier I – Immediate: Initiatives/changes to RC Operational Support that are already within current policy, doctrine, legal constraints. (Quick wins/do now)
- Tier II - intermediate: Changes that require policy changes but are still within legal constraints.
- Tier III – long Term: Changes that will require legislative changes to existing Laws (Title 10/32)

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Bottom Line Up front (BLUF)

- COCOM Mobilization Authority
- Rapid Activation (Voluntary and/or involuntary)
- “Purple” Money for RC Operational Support
- Standardized RC Organization
- Standardized RC Entitlements

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COCOM Mobilization Authority

- **Desired Authority:** COCOM Commander's want the authority to mobilize and activate assigned RC forces involuntarily and voluntary in support of major regional conflicts, homeland defense, HA/DR, etc. as well as for day-to-day operational support.
- **Current barrier(s):** Current policy and law (Title 10; Title 32) does not grant this authority.
- **Recommended changes:** Grant COCOM Commanders the authority to involuntarily mobilize reservists.
 - May need to caveat the following:
 - Number of troops; not in a current deployment cycle; not dwell prohibited
 - Specific Units already under ADCON/OPCON of the COCOM or geographically co-located
 - Duration of activation
 - Who arbitrates conflict between COCOMs
- **Risk if not changed:** COCOM Commanders unable to respond to certain contingencies in AOR.
- **Options impacted:** 2, 3, 4a, 4b, 4c, 5, 6, 7



 Tier I

 Tier II

 Tier III


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Rapid Activation (Voluntary and/or involuntary)

- **Desired Authority:** COCOM Commander's want timely access to Reserve Component to meet rapid response for certain contingencies (I&W time frames, HA/DR, etc.). In some cases, a 24-96 hour window is required.
- **Current barrier(s):** Activation procedures, reserve readiness requirements could accommodate specific capabilities to be on a "short tether", however, services do not have any specific policy/procedure to formalize this as a requirement.
- **Recommended changes:** Direct services to develop Rapid Activation procedures.
 - 24-96 hour recall capability (Vol and/or non-Vol), Rapid Order Processing, VOCO orders process
 - Specific capabilities (for contingencies; JTF Augmentation; AC can include in OPLANS/CONOPS, etc.)
 - Limited in scope/ Establishment of contingency fund site for orders
 - Increased individual readiness; signed contact/acknowledgement of short tether
 - PACFLT Proposed Rapid Activation Program model (Separate Presentation)
- **Risk if not changed:** COCOM unable to make use of RC in early stages of contingency, disaster, etc.
- **Options impacted:** 2, 3, 4a, 4b, 4c, 5, 6

 Tier I



 Tier II

 Tier III




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 **“Purple” Money for RC Operational Support** 

- **Desired Authority:** COCOMs want a funding source that can be administered by the COCOMs to fund RC operational support (long tours) rather than rely on each service component’s funding, priorities, order types, account types, etc. All RC Support would fall under the same guidelines, travel restrictions, entitlements, when funded by this funding source.
- **Current barrier(s):** Current budget processes and funding execution for RC support and responsibility rest at each service component’s comptroller.
- **Recommended changes:** Provide a dedicated “Purple” fund for COCOMs. Will require JS oversight. Similar to the Commercial Ticket Program (CTP).
- **Risk if not changed:** Services unable to meet COCOM demand signal for operational support do to funding limitations.
- **Options impacted:** 3, 4a, 4b, 5, 6




 Tier I  Tier II  Tier III

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 **Standardized RC Organization** 


- **Desired Authority:** Establishment of a JRU and assigned Specialized Units at each COCOM, to standardize the management and operational use of all Joint Reserve manpower requirements, vetted under one umbrella organization with IMA GO leadership. This would also provide an operational chain for potential future allocation/assignment of reserve unit assets to COCOM theaters of operation.
- **Current barrier(s):** Unique COCOM organization hierarchies. Lacks COCOM Reserve Director consensus.
- **Recommended changes:** Develop several COAs to Joint Staff for recommended standard RC organization structure at each COCOM.
 - Single JRU; Joint Reserve Division
 - J1, J3, Special assistant to the Commander
 - JRU/IMA combined Construct (Similar to JIOCs)
 - Specialized Units (i.e. , County Teams/IT units/CS) assigned to COCOMS for specific long term missions
 - Includes AGR/FTS strategy for distribution and usage among COCOMs
- **Risk if not changed:** Less effective and efficient use of the RC. Causes confusion on behalf of our AC customer (each COCOM is different). May cause conflicts/negatively impact the mission where operations cross several COCOM boundaries
- **Options impacted:** 3, 4a, 4b, 4c, 6

 Tier I  Tier II  Tier III


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Standardized Interpretation of RC Entitlements



- **Desired Authority:** COCOMS desire that all services adopt standardized policy/interpretation of entitlements while on orders. Current disparities are easy to see in a Joint environment.
- **Current barrier(s):** Each services interpretation, policies, and execution of funding have resulted in significant differences in reserve personnel entitlements while on orders.
- **Recommended changes:** Establish a standard policy for RC entitlements while on orders in support of Joint Commands. Each service would be required to adopt this policy.
- **Risk if not changed:** Continued disparity in entitlement and pay for RC personnel working side-by-side, equal in rank, and supporting the same mission.
- **Options impacted:** 3, 4a, 4c, 6, 7


 Tier I

 Tier II


 Tier III

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Option/Tier Assessment/Summary





Option	COCOM Mobilization Authority	RAPID Activation	"Purple" Reserve Funding	COCOM Standard Organization (JRU)	Standard Entitlements
• (1) Adjust AC-RC Balance To Address AC Capacity Shortfalls					
• (2) RC Provides Rotational Units	✓	✓			
• (3) Align RC Units with Selected DoD Components	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
• (4a) Enhance RC Capability as Operational Force	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
• (4b) Increased Operational Role for RC	✓	✓	✓	✓	
• (4c) Enhance RC Capability as Strategic Reserve	✓	✓	✓		✓
• (5) Rebalance RC To Meet Emerging Needs	✓	✓		✓	
• (6) Enhance AC-RC Integration	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
• (7) Use RC To Meet Some Institutional Needs	✓				✓
TIER	III	II	III	I	II

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Questions?



Active-Reserve Integration in the Coast Guard

IDA Document D-1864 (1996)
Horowitz & Brinkerhoff
24 October 2010

13 Oct 2010 1

At the October workshop, Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) representative John Brinkerhoff recapped the findings of a 1996 study on the US Coast Guard's movement toward full integration of the reserve and active components. The briefing was included in the agenda to inform the participants on the relevant lessons learned from this earlier effort, and covered the history of how the Coast Guard was formed, the missions of the Coast Guard and its relationship to DoD, the evolution of the Coast Guard Reserve, efforts to form an integrated "Team Coast Guard," challenges, the current (circa 1996) Coast Guard Posture, and lessons learned.

From the mid-1980s through the date of the study, the Coast Guard integrated its pay, manpower and personnel systems. The briefer identified the biggest hurdle to integration as outmoded laws, policies, and systems that had to be adapted to the integrated organization.



Topics



- How the Coast Guard was formed
- Coast Guard Missions
 - Relationship with DOD
- Evolution of the Coast Guard Reserve
- Creating Team Coast Guard
 - Consolidation of Administration
- Challenges
- Current Posture
- Lessons Learned

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An Organization Formed by Integration



- 1799: Revenue Cutter Service in Treasury
 - Law Enforcement
 - Coastal Security (National Security)
- 1915: Merged with Life Saving Service
- 1939: Integrated the Lighthouse Service
- 1946: Integrated Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation
- Also:
 - Air-Sea Rescue
 - Weather Ships
 - Ice Breaking in the Arctic and Great Lakes
 - Loran

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3



Coast Guard Missions



- Law Enforcement
 - Interdiction of Contraband
 - Interdiction of Alien Migrants
 - Enforcement of Marine Safety Regulations
 - Protection of Living Marine Resources
- Domestic Marine Safety
 - Boating safety, ice breaking, search and rescue, channel marking, inland waterways management

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Coast Guard and DoD



- The Coast Guard is an Armed Force under DHS but not a Military Service under DoD
- The law allows transfer of the Coast Guard to the Department of the Navy in time of war
- Transferred to DoN for WWI and WWII:
 - After Armistice in 1918, Navy refused to return the Coast Guard to the Treasury and Harding had to order it.
 - In 1945, Navy again tried to retain the Coast Guard
 - No transfers for any post-WWII operations
 - Small and declining use in current campaigns

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Basic Facts



- Active Duty Strength: 40,000
- Selected Reserve Strength:
 - Drilling Reservists: 8,000
 - Reserve Program Administrators: 75
- Civilian Employees: 5,000
- Coast Guard Auxiliary
 - 30,000 volunteers
 - Their own boats
 - Boating Safety: education, courtesy inspections, safety patrols, search and rescue

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Evolution of the Coast Guard Reserve



- Expanded for WWII by adding reservists
 - Regular Reservists staffed increase for the war
 - Temporary Reservists converted to Auxiliary
 - Served voluntarily part-time on shore duty & security
- 1950-1970: Coast Guard Reserve Roles
 - Port Security and Navy Augmentation
 - Not aligned with the Regular Coast Guard
 - Poor training and lack of Support
- 1972: Congress said:
 - Use it or lose it
 - Transfer to the Navy Reserve

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Twenty Years of Tension

- 1970s and 1980s:
 - USCGR focused on National Security by providing port security units to augment the Navy
 - Small boats for waterside patrols
 - Disorganized use of volunteers to augment active Coast Guard for civil missions
- 1989: SPARCS Study:
 - It's not either civil or national security: it's both
 - The Coast Guard no longer has a separate, distinct wartime mission
 - The peacetime mission is the wartime mission

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Stages of Integration

- Augmentation: Help out where needed
- Alignment: Separate but parallel structures
 - 1992: Integrate reservists into active units
 - Identification of surge requirements for mission areas
 - Co-location of reserve and active units
 - Active units train reservists
 - 1994: Reserve Organization Study
 - Active units have operational control of reserve units
 - Administration by regional reserve support activities

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Consolidation of Pay Systems



- 1985: Start of automation
 - Active Coast Guard adopted JUMPS
 - Pay and Personnel Center
 - Two separate and incompatible systems
 - Reserve pay was still done manually & had big errors
- 1990: Persian Gulf War
 - Problems in bringing reservists to Active duty
 - No technical problems
 - Took time to reconcile gaps and errors
 - Some resistance by stakeholders
- 1993: single pay system in effect

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Consolidation of Billet Files



(Manpower Spaces)

- Three Billet Files
 - Personnel Allowance List (PAL) (active and civilians)
 - Reserve Personnel Allowance List (SELRES and FTS)
 - Contingency Personnel Allowance List (IRR and Retd)
- Internal Management Problem
 - Working out differences within CG Headquarters
 - Goal of 1996 to achieve a combined file
- PAL currently includes AC, SELRES, & civilians

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Consolidation of Personnel Management



- 1991: Persian Gulf War
 - Two separate systems: PMIS & RPMIS
 - RC records done manually at units
 - Problems in moving personnel to and from AD
 - Reservists going on AD basically had to start all over
 - Changed RPMIS from decentralized manual system to a regional automated system
- 1995: Source Data Automation System II
 - Manages both AC and RC personnel data
 - Unit data sent to 53 PESRUs

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Integration



- Field Organizations
 - Place Reservists under direct OPCON of active commanders
 - Integrate AC/RC administrative control
 - Eliminate RC unit commanders
 - Integrate reserve staffs into other staffs
 - Retain three deployable port security units (400 personnel)
- District Headquarters
 - Reassign Readiness and Reserve staff functions
- Coast Guard Headquarters
 - Eliminate Office of Readiness and Reserve
 - Create Office of Reserve and Training

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Challenges circa 1996

- Reserve Career Management
 - Command is no longer the path to promotion
 - Deputies, advisors, and staff officers
 - Up-or-Out Policy
 - Running Mate System
 - Elitism in Coast Guard Leadership
- Reserve Full-Time Support
 - RPA Program is all officers on high level staffs
- Reserve Identity
- Cultural Integration

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Situation in 2010

- Team Coast Guard still exists
 - Most Reservists are assigned to active units
 - Six Port Security Units (140 RC and 5 AC each)
 - Assignments to Higher Staffs
 - Apparently no major problems
 - Reservists fear loss of identity
- Reserve Force Readiness System
 - Provide support for Reserve Training
 - Oversee allocation/mobilization of Reservists

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Current Feedback



- One Active unit commander:
 - Appreciated having junior reservists to augment for civil functions and surge
 - Believed senior reservists were underemployed
 - Thought reserve administration to be a burden
- An RPA Warrant Officer:
 - Dedicated to and satisfied with his duties
- Any other comments???

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Lessons Learned



- AC/RC administration can be integrated
- An RC can be combined with an AC
 - But that does not mean it is desirable to do so
- Old think survives despite changes in context
 - Transfer of the Coast Guard to the Navy
 - Adherence to DoD policy on RC issues
- Reservists can provide useful augmentation to an active component on a sustained basis when well trained and properly motivated

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TF Rebalancing Options Laws, Policies, and Doctrine Changes

27 October 2010

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A/O 11-Nov-10 14:31

1

RC participants at the October workshop discussed change proposals for law, policy, and doctrine associated with seven AC/RC force rebalancing options that were the focus of the September workshop. These options are considered “descriptive,” and represent examples of ways in which to potentially employ the RC; the options are not mutually exclusive.

The seven rebalancing options reviewed were:

1. Rebalance AC/RC mix to remedy capacity and BOG-Dwell shortfalls
2. Rely on rotational RC units to provide global posture
3. Align RC units, teams, and individuals with specific DoD components
4. Specifically structure RC as a mix of operational and strategic elements
5. Adjust capabilities included within RC to meet emerging needs
6. Enhance AC-RC integration
7. Rely on RC to provide selected institutional support


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For each option, the participants addressed the following four questions:


- How you would like to be able to employ the Reserve Component
- Why you can't do it now, to include identifying the specific constraining statute or policy
- How would you change law, policy, or doctrine to do what you would like to do
- What risk will be incurred if you can't get the desired change

In addition, a common set of recommendations relating to law, policy, and doctrine changes necessary to the implementation of all seven options was discussed.

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Background




- September Workshop developed 7 TF Rebalancing Options
- Options are “descriptive” – they are examples of ways in which to potentially employ the RC
- Options have been briefed to and accepted by Workshop participants and the EXCOM
- A final opportunity to relook the options to ensure that appropriate law, policy, and doctrine changes have not been overlooked
- Suggested law, policy, and doctrine changes shown were extracted from comments made at the September Workshop

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AC/RC Rebalancing Options



Option	Description
1) Rebalance AC/RC mix to remedy capacity and BOG-Dwell shortfalls	Rebalance AC/RC capacity as appropriate to remediate established force capacity shortfalls (as determined by JS J-8 Force Sufficiency Assessments) and/or to enable units to reach desired BOG-Dwell ratios (as determined by JS J-8 OA10 Study)
2) Rely on rotational RC units to provide global posture	Rely on rotational RC units to provide global posture vice selected forward deployed forces
3) Align RC units, teams, and individuals with specific DoD components	Align specific RC units, teams, and individuals with selected COCOMs, Service functions, DoD Agency and Interagency partners in order to facilitate access to RC units, sub-units, teams, and personnel and thereby build long-term relationships
4) Specifically structure RC as a mix of operational and strategic elements	Selected RC units provide entire units, sub-units, teams, and/or individuals at deployment frequencies and durations required to meet COCOM operational needs
5) Adjust capabilities included within RC to meet emerging needs	Adjust capabilities included within RC to enhance Total Force capability to meet emergent cyber threats
6) Enhance AC-RC integration	Integrate selected RC elements into operational AC units and integrate selected AC elements into RC units
7) Rely on RC to provide selected institutional support	Selected RC units provide forces to accomplish Services' institutional support requirements

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Desired Input

For each of the rebalancing options identify desired changes to law, policy, and/or doctrine by describing:

- How you would like to be able to employ the Reserve Component?
- Why you can't do it now, to include identifying the specific constraining statute or policy?
- How would you change law, policy, or doctrine to do what you would like to do?
- What risk will be incurred if you can't get the desired change?

Be as specific as possible in your comments

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Laws, Policies, and Doctrine Changes Common to Multiple Rebalancing Options

- Revise appropriate laws and/or policies to ensure responsive access to and mobilization of the RC
- Establish policies, procedures, and/or contractual agreements between civilian employers, their RC employees, and the USG that facilitate RC deployments and their predictability
- Reorganize and consolidate all current RC categories to better provide an operational reserve capability and provide strategic depth. Establish policies to facilitate movement between categories
- Establish policies that will provide common pay, benefits, and entitlements for duty status within a reserve category
- Ensure that policies and procedures support viable RC training prior to deployment, career path development, and "continuum of service." *


* Those policies and procedures that allow for easier transition among varying levels of participation in the military and that serve to make the transition between active and reserve statuses seamless

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Accessing the Reserves




<i>Involuntary</i>	<i>Voluntary</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Operational Mission – National Emergency up to 2 years (current 12304) • Operational Reserve unrelated to Operational Mission (proposed 12304) • Training (may need to revise to provide desired flexibility) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contracts or other means to ensure promised service is provided • Financial or service credit incentives

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Option 1: Rebalance TF To Remedy Persistent Shortfalls





<p>Description: Use Joint Staff (J8) force sufficiency assessment tools to identify capabilities that are “over-stressed” based on Service and OSD prescribed BOG:Dwell objectives. Rebalance Total Force capacity as appropriate to remediate established force capacity shortfalls and/or enable AC/RC units to reach desired BOG:Dwell ratios.</p>	<p>Cost Cases: (1) Cost 4 additional Army Combat Heavy Engineer Companies to gain one rotational unit (assume 1:3 BOG:Dwell) and 8 additional RC companies (based on 1:5 RC BOG:Dwell) (2) Using Army data, compare costs for AC and RC to provide 30,000 support troops at an overseas location for the next 15 years at 1:3 for AC and 1:5 for RC with 9-month BOG and 60 days RC training the year prior to activation for the RC units.</p>
<p>Examples: Use COCOM forecasted capability requirements and the Global Force Management (GFM) process to identify capability and capacity shortfalls. Specific examples include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Horizontal Engineering Companies • Vertical Engineering Companies • Military Police Companies • Naval Construction Battalions 	<p><u>Law, policy and doctrine changes:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Revise existing laws and/or policies to achieve desired deployment length and achieve BOG:Dwell objectives • Ensure that laws and/or policies are provided to enable service secretaries to modify RC/AC authorizations within Program of Record (POR) to meet emerging operational demands



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 <h2 style="display: inline-block; margin: 0 20px;">Option 2: Rotational RC Units Provide Global Posture</h2> 	
<p>Description: Use RC units as rotational forces to provide global posture in lieu of forward deployed AC units in order to lower cost, improve AC BOG:Dwell ratios, or attain other efficiencies. Overall goal is to leverage the RC capabilities gained over the past decade in a way that enhances DoD's ability to accommodate anticipated future demands on our military forces.</p>	<p>Cost Cases: (1) Army AC and ARNG MLRS battalion to Korea with 9-mo BOG to same location, mobilization for one year, 60 days of training the year before mobilization, AC BOG:Dwell 1:3, RC BOG:Dwell 1:5, use in-place equipment. (2) Air Force AC and ANG F-15 fighter squadron or AC and ANG K-135 refueling squadron to Europe, 6-mo rotation, unaccompanied. Identify infrastructure cost savings: family housing, schools, day care, exchanges, health care.</p>
<p>Examples*: (1) RC units from CONUS provide MLRS Battalion, Fighter Wing, or Aerial Tanker Wing for Korea. (2) RC units from CONUS provide Fighter Wing or Aerial Tanker Wing for Europe.</p> <p>* Need not be exclusively an RC solution. Potential to rotate with like AC units IAW Service rotational readiness models</p>	<p>Law, policy and doctrine changes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Revise existing laws and/or policies to support non-combat rotational mobilization and deployment • Ensure that policies are established to support RC equipment needs to include RC use of AC equipment and facilities • Ensure that laws and/or policies are in place to provide required medical, dental, and family readiness support programs to deploying RC
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 <h2 style="display: inline-block; margin: 0 20px;">Option 3: Align RC Elements with Specific DoD Components</h2> 	
<p>Description: Align specific RC units, teams, and individuals with selected COCOMs, Service functions, DoD Agency and/or Interagency partners in order to facilitate access to RC units, teams, and personnel and thereby build long-term relationships. 2010 DPPG task: Services develop plans for regional alignment to support COCOM campaign plans.</p>	<p>Cost Cases: (1) Estimate cost and staffing needs for a standard Joint Reserve Unit located at a GCC HQ. (2) Estimate costs for 20 rotations of 12-person Mobile Training Teams for 3-weeks each into AFRICOM AOR for a 15-year period assuming sourcing from (a) AC personnel on TAD/TDY or (b) traditional RC on AT. Account for infrastructure and support costs for the AC.</p>
<p>Examples: (1) Align RC units/personnel with selected COCOMs (e.g., AFRICOM) (2) Align specific RC units/personnel with specific Service functions (e.g., US Army TRADOC) (3) Align specific RC units/personnel with DoD agencies (e.g., DIA), but also consider Interagency partners for whole of government solutions.</p>	<p>Law, policy and doctrine changes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish policies and procedures to support the long-term alignment of RC capabilities with selected COCOMs and other DoD/interagency organizations • Develop guidelines for establishment of a common but flexible set of procedures and infrastructure to manage aligned RC forces • Using SOCOM's MFP-11 funding process as a model, establish similar "purple" fund policies for other COCOMs • Restructure RC components as necessary to permit ready access to needed forces
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 <h2 style="display: inline;">Option 4a: Create National or Regional RC Units</h2> 		
<p>Description: Create national or regional RC units staffed by personnel willing to serve more frequently and/or for longer periods of time in order to support on-going and future Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) and Building Partner Capacity (BPC) missions as well as institution support missions. Such <i>differentiation</i> within RC provides additional source for units/teams/ personnel required by important DoD missions.</p>	<p>Cost Cases: (1) Compare costs for 200-person unit sourced (a) from AC or (b) from RC by personnel willing to train/operate 90 days/yr and deploy for 9 months on 1:3 cycle. Examine 40, 60, 120, and 180 day AD periods and 1:2 and 1:4 BOG:Dwell ratios.</p>	
<p>Examples: (1) RC units teamed exclusively with specific AC units, co-using equipment and facilities (similar to Air Force Reserve); (2) Army Reserve unit of drill sergeants aligned with TRADOC to provide “surge” capacity over peak Jun-Sep training period; (3) RC unit aligned with AFRICOM to provide needed TSC and BPC support. Aligned RC unit would be “first called”.</p>	<p>Law, policy and doctrine changes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Revise existing laws and/or policies to enable more frequent and longer periods of service by RC personnel • Establish policies to identify and provide appropriate credit and compensation to critical civilian skill sets used during RC service • Ensure that policies are established to support RC equipment needs to include RC use of AC equipment and facilities 	
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 <h2 style="display: inline;">Option 5: Develop RC Capabilities to Meet Emerging Needs</h2> 		
<p>Description: Adjust capabilities included within RC to enhance Total Force capability to meet emerging demands arising from new challenges. Most promising options include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Creating cyber defense capabilities • Expanding ISR operations and intelligence analysis capabilities • Sustained engagement with selected foreign partner military establishments 	<p>Cost Cases: Identify cost savings that accrue to DoD by recruiting personnel who have acquired important training and skills outside the military, e.g., doctors, city planners, network security experts. In some cases, cyber security personnel have an 18-month training requirement.</p>	
<p>Examples:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cyber defense: develop a mix of units, small teams, and individuals to expand US cyber capabilities. In RC, emphasize recruitment and long-term retention of personnel already highly experienced in cyber defense in the civil sector. Employ these people in critical defense activities and in training. • ISR: expand existing efforts to include remote UAS operation. 	<p>Law, policy and doctrine changes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Revise existing laws and/or policies to provide appropriate credit and compensation to critical civilian skill sets used in RC service. • Ensure that laws and/or policies are revised to permit RC access to and use of sensitive and restricted information • Revise existing laws and/or policies for temporary spot promotions, recognizing skill relative to mission needs during mobilization. 	
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<h2 style="margin: 0;">Option 6: Integration of AC and RC Units</h2>	
<p>Description: Enhance AC-RC integration by (1) incorporating selected RC personnel or elements into operational AC units or (2) incorporating selected AC personnel or elements into RC units. Specific cases proposed for study are (1) ground-force rotary-wing aviation units in order to increase aircraft crew ratios, and (2) RC maneuver battalion within AC IBCT.</p>	<p>Cost Cases: (1) Rotary-wing aviation cost differential from 100% AC unit using (a) extra 20% RC manpower, (b) 80% AC manpower, 20% RC; and (c) 20% AC manpower, 80% RC. “Nominal” squadron structure: 30 officers, 15 SNCOs, and 155 enlisted. (2) Integrate ARNG maneuver Bn into Army IBCT. ARNG trains 90 days/year and rotates at 1:3. ARNG soldiers paid per day of duty but incentivized at \$10K/year.</p>
<p>Examples: USN and USAF currently employ a variety of integrated and blended aviation units.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USN Mine Warfare Helicopter squadrons and Squadron Augmentation Units (SAUs) • USAF 78th Fighter Squadron (F-16) • From 1 to 50% • of personnel in typical integrated squadron comes from other component (e.g., RC in AC unit). • Integration enhances readiness, flexibility, experience, and capability. 	<p>Law, policy and doctrine changes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure that policies are established to support RC equipment needs to include RC use of AC equipment and facilities • Establish policy that allows for equal application of UCMJ and NJP regulations across variety of RCs • Establish policy that supports appointment of RC members to integrated unit leadership structure • Establish a common pay and personnel system to support integrated units
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<h2 style="margin: 0;">Option 7: RC Provides Selected Institutional Support</h2>	
<p>Description: RC provides units, teams, or individuals to support Service Secretaries’ Title 10 responsibilities for recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, training, servicing, mobilizing and demobilizing their assigned forces.</p>	<p>Cost Cases: (1) Replace 100 AC drill sergeants at Ft. Jackson with 100 RC drill sergeants who work 90-120 days/year during Ft. Jackson’s peak Jun-Oct demand period. (2) Use an RC personnel services company to provide personnel services at an AC installation. RC company would work remotely and provide 5 personnel/day year round. Compare costs with those for 5 AC members or 5 civilians or contractors.</p>
<p>Examples:</p> <p><i>Recruiting</i> – assist in attracting new service members</p> <p><i>Training</i> – assist AC in training from initial individual training to unit pre-deployment</p> <p><i>Administration</i> – assist with pay and personnel management</p> <p><i>Depot Level Maintenance</i> – assist with major repair/refurbishment of platforms and equipment</p> <p><i>Medical/Legal/Chaplaincy</i></p>	<p>Law, policy and doctrine changes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Revise existing laws and/or policies to enable alternate and/or longer periods of service by RC personnel • Ensure that laws and/or policies employ the RC in institutional support roles as volunteers or when necessitated by operational missions – not as a means to correct personnel shortfalls • Eliminate legal and/or policy impediments (such as age or physical fitness req’ments) to the full implementation of a “continuum of service” personnel management system
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Other Comments?

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Other Reference Material

Law/Policy/Doctrine:

- Provide flexible compensation schemes/target compensation on needed skills and capabilities (Wormuth)
- Delineate command and control for civil support missions involving mixed Title 10, Title 32, and State forces. (Brookings SSI Colloquium)
- Leverage the use of innovative contracting mechanisms between the Department of Homeland Security and the private sector. (DSB)
- Phase out ADOS (Active Duty Operational Support) (EANGUS CNGR)
- Better integration of reserve officers into senior staff positions throughout DoD where their expertise and experience will be more relevant (RFPB 2008)
- Re-engineer mobilization and demobilization policies, practices, and procedures to reverse the trend toward lengthier mobilization times, and enable improved predictability and notification (New Guard and Reserve, 2010)
- Create training policies and procedures that enable the RC to train to higher readiness prior to mobilization and expansion of opportunities for joint and coalition training (New Guard and Reserve, 2010)

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Scenarios Considered



Examined Total Force Employment in the following Planning Scenarios:

- Large-Scale Conventional Campaign: CC 3
- Large-Scale Stability Operation: IR 3
- Steady State Engagement Activities: SSSP 1-03
- Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response: SSSP 1-06
- Homeland Defense/Defense Support to Civil Authorities: SSSP 4-02

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Conditions and Standards

Law, Policy, and Doctrine Change Proposals

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At the October workshop, RC study participants addressed change proposals for law, policy, and doctrine associated with the conditions and standards that had been previously considered in the August workshop. As an outcome of the earlier workshop, six main categories of conditions and standards were identified:

- RC career type/RC duty status (simplify)
- Readiness (training)
- Readiness (individual medical readiness)
- Accessibility of RC members
- Basing and Infrastructure
- National Support

For the issues previously identified that were associated with each of these categories, participants addressed four key questions:

- What does DoD need to be able to do to effectively manage the RC?
- What is hindering DoD's ability to do that now?
- What law/policy/doctrine needs to change?
- What risk will be incurred without the desired change?

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Key Questions:



1. What does DoD need to be able to do to effectively manage the RC?
2. What is hindering DoD's ability to do that now?
3. What law/policy/doctrine needs to change?
4. What risk will be incurred without the desired change?


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OBJ 4: Conditions and Standards



Of Significant Concern

1. Deployment Notification and Predictability
2. Pay and Allowances (delays/errors in processing RC compensation)
3. Civilian Employer Satisfaction (Goodwill)
4. RC Career Path – JPME
5. RC Career Type – RC Duty Status (Simplify)
6. Small Business Concerns (small-business owner reservists)
7. Readiness – Training
8. Health Benefits (transition between civilian health care plans and TRICARE)
9. Small Business Concerns (burden on small business owners associated with hiring RC members)
10. Readiness (individual medical readiness)
11. Accessibility of RC members

Principal Concerns

- Underscored +
- Basing & Infrastructure
- National Support

12. Readiness (equipment)
13. Civilian Occupation and MOS (some civilian skillsets require surge levels not sustained in the RC)
14. Synergies between Civilian Employers and DoD
15. Suitability – Manning (unit-level manning is insufficient, requiring cross-leveling)
16. Health Benefits (RC members and their families do not fully understand their health care options)

Remedies Implemented

17. Recruiting- Accession, Transfers (ability of RC to attract mid-career civilians and AC members)
18. Resourcing (some force generation model resource requirements are ill defined)
19. Pay and Allowances (lack of flexibility does not permit services to target pay as required)
20. Pay and Allowances (inconsistencies between RC and AC)
21. Health Benefits (insufficient post-deployment care for demobilizing RC)
22. Resourcing (RC equipment shortfalls)
23. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (protections to RC members)
24. Civilian Employer Compensation (burden of mandatory contributions to reservists' retirement accounts and health insurance premiums)
25. Suitability – Skillsets (RC not focused on irregular war, stability operations)
26. Family Support
27. Retirement (differences between RC and AC)
28. Educational Benefits (eligibility criteria)
29. RC Career Path – RC-only Career Dwell (20 year career yields 3 MOB under 1:5 dwell)
30. Educational Benefits (amount)



Based on survey administered to Joint Staff, COCOM, Service, RC, & OSD reps at JHU/APL Comprehensive Review Collaborative Workshop, 17-19 Aug 10

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Red indicates issues with a score of 3.5 or above (i.e., midway between moderate and significant impact). Green indicates issues with a score of 2.5 or below (i.e., midway between minor and moderate impact)

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 <h2>Conditions and Standards Principal Concerns</h2> 	
<p><u>RC Career Type – RC Duty Status (Simplify)</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">2. Pay and Allowances (delays/errors)4. RC Career Path – JPME5. RC Duty Status Types17. Recruiting19. Pay and Allowances (lack of flexibility)20. Pay and Allowances (inconsistencies)27. Retirement (differences)29. RC-only Career Dwell	<p><u>Readiness (medical)</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">8. Health Benefits (transition between civilian health care plans and TRICARE)10. Readiness (individual medical readiness)16. Health Benefits (RC members and their families do not fully understand their health care options)21. Health Benefits (insufficient post-deployment care for demobilizing RC)
	<p><u>Accessibility of RC members</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">11. Accessibility of RC members18. Resourcing (force generation models)
	<p><u>Basing & Infrastructure</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">12. Readiness (equipment)22. Resourcing (RC equipment shortfalls)
<p><u>Readiness – Training</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">7. Readiness – Training13. Civilian Occupation and MOS14. Synergies between Civilian Employers and DoD15. Suitability – Manning (cross-leveling)25. Suitability – Skillsets28. Educational Benefits (eligibility criteria)30. Educational Benefits (amount)	<p><u>National Support</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">1. Deployment Notification & Predictability3. Civilian Employer Satisfaction6. Small Business Concerns (small-business owner reservists)9. Small Business Concerns (employers)23. SCRA24. Civilian Employer Compensation26. Family Support
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Conditions and Standards

Laws, Policies, and Doctrine Issue Areas

- 1. RC Career Type/RC Duty Status**
- 2. Readiness – Training**
- 3. Readiness – Medical**
- 4. Accessibility**
- 5. Basing & Infrastructure**
- 6. National Support**

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Conditions and Standards rolled into this section:

2. Pay and Allowances (delays/errors in processing RC compensation)
4. RC Career Path (JPME)
5. RC Career Type – RC Duty Status (Simplify)
17. Recruiting
19. Pay and Allowances (lack of flexibility does not permit services to target pay as required)
20. Pay and Allowances (inconsistency between RC and AC)
27. Retirement (differences between RC and AC)
29. RC-only Career Dwell



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RC Career Type/RC Duty Status

What does DoD need to be able to do?



- Attract and retain the right mix and caliber of individuals.
 - Provide competitive and equitable pay and benefits.
 - Provide rewarding and appropriate career opportunities.
 - Avoid forcing a choice between service and family or civilian career.
 - Spread the burden of service across AC and RC.
- Provide greater flexibility for both DoD and service-members by establishing a *continuum of service*.
 - Reduce obstacles to voluntary service.
 - Provide lateral entry opportunities to attract recruits to priority specialties.
 - Permit members to shift back and forth between the AC and RC within Service endstrength constraints.

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 **RC Career Type/RC Duty Status** 



What is hindering DoD's ability to do that?

- Absence of an integrated pay system across service components can complicate/delay pay to RC members.
- Reliance on Title 10 and 32 provisions to define different duty statuses complicates pay administration.
- Current personnel policies present roadblocks to potential RC members with valuable skills.

Note: these are mostly pay/status related

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 **RC Career Type/RC Duty Status** 

What law/policy/doctrine needs to change?

- Law: Modify Title 10 and 32 to enable provision of consistent pay and benefits for active service across AC and RC.
- Policy: Reduce number of duty status categories to Title 10 Active Duty, Title 10 Federal Service, Title 10 Inactive (Reserve), Title 32 full-time National Guard, Title 32 Inactive National Guard, Title 14 Active Duty
- Policy: Establish a common pay system for active and reserve members within each Service.
- Policy: Adopt a standardized policy/interpretation of entitlements while on orders.

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RC Career Type/RC Duty Status

What risk will be incurred without the desired change?

- AC will not be able to access RC members when needed.
- RC members with valuable experience will leave the service due to:
 - Inequity in pay.
 - Inability to balance RC service and civilian life.
- Mid-career professionals with valuable skills will not be available to the RC.

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Conditions and Standards

Laws, Policies, and Doctrine Issue Areas

1. **RC Career Type/RC Duty Status**
- ➔ 2. **Readiness – Training**
3. **Readiness – Medical**
4. **Accessibility**
5. **Basing and Infrastructure**
6. **National Support**

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Conditions and Standards rolled into this section:

2. Pay and Allowances (delays/errors in processing RC compensation)
4. RC Career Path (JPME)
5. RC Career Type – RC Duty Status (Simplify)
17. Recruiting
19. Pay and Allowances (lack of flexibility does not permit services to target pay as required)
20. Pay and Allowances (inconsistency between RC and AC)
27. Retirement (differences between RC and AC)
29. RC-only Career Dwell

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Readiness – Training

What does DoD need to be able to do?

- Provide a trained and ready RC force as appropriate to meet commanders' requirements.
 - Maintain RC readiness to ensure forces are fully capable and interoperable with their AC counterparts.
 - Build capability/capacity and in regional expertise and specialized skillsets (e.g., cyberwarfare, irregular warfare).

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Readiness – Training

What is hindering DoD's ability to do that?

- Resourcing shortfalls have resulted in an RC force that is not always as capable as AC equivalent:
 - Funding/authority limitations on RC units' ability to train for upcoming deployments.
- Failure to leverage RC members' civilian skillsets.
 - Law/policy prevent RC members from being recalled/assigned based on civilian skillsets.

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Readiness – Training

What law/policy/doctrine needs to change?

- Law: Provide authorities and funding sufficient to enable RC units to achieve readiness comparable to AC.
- Law and Policy: Enable consideration of civilian skillsets when determining employment & compensation of selected RC service members
- Policy: Adopt flexible AT schedules that can be aligned with cyclic requirements of Service force generation models.

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Readiness – Training

What risk will be incurred without the desired change?

- RC units will not be a trained and ready force as appropriate to meet commanders' requirements.
 - RC readiness will not be fully capable and interoperable with their AC counterparts.
 - RC will lack capability/capacity and in regional expertise and specialized skillsets (e.g., cyberwarfare, irregular warfare).

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Conditions and Standards

Laws, Policies, and Doctrine Issue Areas

- 1. RC Career Type/RC Duty Status**
- 2. Readiness – Training**
- 3. Readiness – Medical**
- 4. Accessibility**
- 5. Basing and Infrastructure**
- 6. National Support**

1st Army reported that ... 5 percent of soldiers at mobilization stations are not medically ready and 40 percent are not dentally ready due to a lack of training days to accomplish the medical readiness tasks along with other mobilization requirements ... an alert order 30 to 40 days prior to mobilization does not “allow enough time to seek dental treatment.” They recommended to the Commission that under the Army Force Generation Model, units scheduled to deploy should be given an alert order one year prior to their deployment. [CNGR]

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Conditions and Standards rolled into this section:

2. Pay and Allowances (delays/errors in processing RC compensation)
4. RC Career Path (JPME)
5. RC Career Type – RC Duty Status (Simplify)
17. Recruiting
19. Pay and Allowances (lack of flexibility does not permit services to target pay as required)
20. Pay and Allowances (inconsistency between RC and AC)
27. Retirement (differences between RC and AC)
29. RC-only Career Dwell

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Readiness – Medical

What does DoD need to be able to do?

- Ensure RC forces are medically ready to deploy whenever needed.
 - Enable RC members to obtain necessary medical/dental care.
 - Incentivize RC members to maintain medical/dental readiness.

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Readiness – Medical

What is hindering DoD's ability to do that?

- Not all RC members have easy access to affordable medical care.
- Real or perceived lack of opportunity to receive care at military treatment facilities.
- Insufficient deployment-notification lead-time.
- Lack of incentives (either positive or negative) for RC members to maintain medical readiness.
- Cumbersome medical readiness tracking systems (e.g., ability to track inoculations received from civilian health care providers).

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Readiness – Medical

What law/policy/doctrine needs to change?

- Law: Reduce out-of-pocket costs for restorative dental care (currently 20–50%) under the TRICARE Dental Program.
- Policy: Provide annual dental screening at no cost.
- Policy: Require service members to be medically ready at the time they complete annual training requirements.
- Policy: Streamline medical readiness tracking systems to permit ready integration of civilian health care records.

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Readiness – Medical

What risk will be incurred without the desired change?

- RC units will not be available for deployment when needed.
- RC members who are medically unfit for deployment will be inappropriately retained.
- Qualified/valuable RC members may attrite due to frustrations associated with medical care.

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Conditions and Standards

Laws, Policies, and Doctrine Issue Areas

1. **RC Career Type/ RC Duty Status**
2. **Readiness – Training**
3. **Readiness – Medical**
- ➔ 4. **Accessibility**
5. **Basing and Infrastructure**
6. **National Support**

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Conditions and Standards rolled into this section:

2. Pay and Allowances (delays/errors in processing RC compensation)
4. RC Career Path (JPME)
5. RC Career Type – RC Duty Status (Simplify)
17. Recruiting
19. Pay and Allowances (lack of flexibility does not permit services to target pay as required)
20. Pay and Allowances (inconsistency between RC and AC)
27. Retirement (differences between RC and AC)
29. RC-only Career Dwell

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Accessibility

What does DoD need to be able to do?

- Ensure JF commanders have ready access to RC members as needed to support:
 - Short notice “pop up” missions (e.g. , HA/DR).
 - Repetitive, limited duration missions (e.g., annual exercises).
 - Dual status operations involving both Title 10 and Title 32 forces (e.g. DSCA).
 - Requirements for individuals with specialized experience, knowledge or skills (vice entire units).
- Maintain the integrity of RC units to ensure continued viability/availability.
 - Avoid cross-leveling that “hollows out” units.
 - Recruit and retain qualified members; ensure reserve service remains an attractive choice.

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http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/CALL/docs/10-16/ch_3.asp provides a discussion of C2 issues associated with combining Title 10 and 32 forces

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Accessibility

What is hindering DoD's ability to do that?

- Law/policy/procedural obstacles prevent short-notice deployments in support of operational missions.
- Law restricts mobilization to Contingency Operations vice broader aim of meeting National/Foreign Policy Objectives.
- Limited access to Title 10 Reserve Component (RC) capabilities for HD/DSCA.
- Service policy hinders mobilization of individuals

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Second and fourth bullets from AFRICOM brief

Aug 26, 2008

Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of the Army (M&RA); Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (M&RA); Assistant Secretary of the Navy (M&RA)

SUBJECT: Reserve Component Alert/Mobilization Decision Process Implementation

The SecDef's goal is 180 days between mobilization order approval and the mobilization date. If mobilization orders are requested inside 180 days, the Military Department Secretaries shall provide justification in the SecDef Notification Matrix or the SDOB. Involuntary mobilization requests with less than 90 days between mobilization order approval and the mobilization date require SecDef approval.

- Reference

<http://ra.defense.gov/documents/quickwins/RC%20Alert-MOB%20Decision%20Process%20Implementation%2008-08.pdf>

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Accessibility

What law/policy/doctrine needs to change?

- Endorse ULB proposed mobilization law change:
 - National/ Foreign Policy Objectives, vice just Contingency Operations.
 - Service ability to involuntarily activate SELRES in accordance with force generation plans.
- COCOMs desire mobilization law change:
 - Funding and authority to order RC members for voluntary mobilizations.
 - Funding and authority to order RC members for involuntary mobilizations.
 - OSD allocation of “Purple” 0100 fund to COCOMs , based on OPTEMPO (allowing flexibility to COCOMs for Reserve P&A (ADOS/ADSW/MPA).
- Revise 10 USC 12304(b) for involuntary mobilization authority of non-NG RC members for natural/man-made disasters.
- Conduct a review of Services’ activation procedures to ensure they are sufficiently responsive to demand signal.
- Establish a JRU at each COCOM, to standardize the management and operational use of all Joint Reserve manpower requirements.

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- AFRICOM
- NORTHCOM
- Air Force
- Army
- Marines
- COCOM consolidated

12301 (d) At any time, an authority designated by the Secretary concerned may order a member of a reserve component under his jurisdiction to active duty, or retain him on active duty, with the consent of that member. However, a member of the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air National Guard of the United States may not be ordered to active duty under this subsection without the consent of the governor or other appropriate authority of the State concerned.

§ 12304. Selected Reserve and certain Individual Ready Reserve members; order to active duty other than during war or national emergency:

- (b) Support for Responses to Certain Emergencies.— The authority under subsection (a) includes authority to order a unit or member to active duty to provide assistance in responding to an emergency involving — (1) a use or threatened use of a weapon of mass destruction; or (2) a terrorist attack or threatened terrorist attack in the United States that results, or could result, in significant loss of life or property.



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Accessibility

What risk will be incurred without the desired change?

- RC will not be effectively utilized.
- AC will be overtaxed or COCOM needs will not be fully met, particularly in early stages of contingency response.
- Resource constraints will hinder services' ability to meet COCOM demand signal for operational support.
- DoD will not achieve a full return on investment in RC operational readiness.

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Conditions and Standards

Laws, Policies, and Doctrine Issue Areas

1. **RC Career Type/ RC Duty Status**
2. **Readiness – Training**
3. **Readiness – Medical**
4. **Accessibility**
- ➔ 5. **Basing and Infrastructure**
6. **National Support**

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Conditions and Standards rolled into this section:

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Basing and Infrastructure

What does DoD need to be able to do?

- Ensure RC units are provided with appropriate equipment and facilities to perform their missions.
 - Consider the total force in procurement plans so that RC and AC equipment is the same vice sending older equipment to RC.
 - Keep in the highest readiness, or develop a rapid replacement plan for RC equipment that is employed for homeland security (Title 32) missions.
- Develop a robust plan for adjusting infrastructure during times of RC surge whether CONUS or OCONUS.
 - Policy should anticipate potential for surge with infrastructure and funding.
 - Develop means for distributed operations when able, such as for institutional support, cyber warfare.

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Ensure RC units are provided with appropriate equipment and facilities to perform their missions.

- Consider the total force in procurement plans so that RC and AC equipment is the same vice sending older equipment to RC.
- Keep in the highest readiness, or develop a rapid replacement plan for RC equipment that is employed for homeland security (Title 32) missions.



Develop a robust plan for adjusting infrastructure during times of RC surge whether CONUS or OCONUS.

- Policy should anticipate potential for surge with infrastructure and funding.

(Examples:

 - Marines in Turkey living in tents on the lawn in front of empty BOQ/BEQ because not funded properly.
 - VMAQ Sqrdn in Afghanistan based one hour away from their airbase.
 - Surges do not consider response w/institutional support such as medical to support).
- Develop means for distributed operations when able, such as for institutional support, cyber warfare.

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Basing and Infrastructure



What is hindering DoD's ability to do that?

- Procurement policy that considers the RC as a separate force when equipping and building infrastructure.
 - RC employment is *integrated* requiring integrated basing and equipment procurement.
 - Dual nature of some RC missions for homeland defense require potential for homeland defense as the surge requirement.
- Infrastructure constructed without surge operations taken into consideration and/or policies that resist flexibility provided by distributed operations.
 - Construct infrastructure, institutional support plan that anticipates surge.
 - Many institutional support requirements need little more than a CAC reader.

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Homeland defense as the surge requirement: Read that if the Louisiana National Guard is in Iraq, they cannot respond to Haiti or Hurricane Katrina. As a result, a plan needs to be in place to surge RC units from other states if events such as these emerge.

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Basing and Infrastructure

What law/policy/doctrine needs to change?

- Ensure laws governing the armed forces stipulate that:
 - The services recognize integrated AC/RC force for equipment procurement.
 - Forces identified as first responders to domestic catastrophes are manned, trained, and equipped to the highest, and have identified supernumeraries if needed.
- Put a policy in place that:
 - Appoints a dedicated program executive office to oversee the FSS levels of readiness.
 - Considers DoD will continue to surge RC in the foreseeable future when building infrastructure.
 - Allows for flexible, distributed means to provide institutional support.

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Basing and Infrastructure

What risk will be incurred without the desired change?

- AC/RC integration will be hindered.
- Outdated equipment will adversely affect the readiness of RC units.

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Conditions and Standards

Laws, Policies, and Doctrine Issue Areas

1. RC Career Type/ RC Duty Status
2. Readiness – Training
3. Readiness – Medical
4. Accessibility
5. Basing and Infrastructure
- ➔ 6. National Support

...for a number of Americans, service in the military, no matter how laudable, has become something for other people to do. In fact, with each passing decade fewer and fewer Americans know someone with military experience in their family or social circle.
- Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense, in a lecture at Duke University, September 29, 2010

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Conditions and Standards rolled into this section:

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29. RC-only Career Dwell

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National Support

What does DoD need to be able to do?

- Maximize the predictability and notice of deployments.
 - Avoid forcing RC members into a choice between RC service and civilian jobs/family obligations.
 - Accommodate exceptions for RC members willing to volunteer for assignments subject to less predictable recall.
- Maintain the support of RC members' civilian employers through outreach and incentives.
 - Maintain the support of the American public.
 - Ensure RC members have “meaningful” assignments.
 - Ensure RC membership is representative of the nation as a whole.

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National Support

What is hindering DoD's ability to do that?

- Predictability and notice of deployments:
 - Lack of consistent policy requiring sufficient (e.g., 1 year) advance deployment notification for most RC members.
 - Limited contract options for RC members fulfilling special roles, e.g., voluntary agreements to be available on short notice as required to respond to emergent circumstances.
 - RC viewed as “force of last resort” vice “force of choice,” exacerbating unpredictability of deployments.
- Support of RC members' civilian employers:
 - DoD efforts are not sufficiently robust to maintain a strong connection to civilian employers.
- Support of the American public:
 - Access-related obstacles may prevent RC from being meaningfully engaged across the ROMO.
 - Increasing lack of broad geographic/demographic representation in RC has weakened connection to American public.

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National Support

What law/policy/doctrine needs to change?

- Policy: Maintain a consistent policy requiring sufficient (e.g., 1 year) advance deployment notification for most RC members.
- Policy: Adjust Service rotational policies to avoid "one size fits all," and include both a strategic force that looks more like the traditional model and an operational rotating force.
- Policy: Tailor the terms of RC members' contracts to their specific roles.
- Policy: Expand RC recruitment policies to attract mid-career members with broader geographic/cultural/technical backgrounds.

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National Support

What risk will be incurred without the desired change?

- RC members won't be retained in sufficient numbers to meet commitments.
- RC won't be effectively utilized across the ROMO.
- American public will become increasingly disconnected from/indifferent to the military.

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Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component

Annex F

Master Glossary

ANNEX F
Pre-decisional Working Papers

ANNEX F
Pre-decisional Working Papers

4ID	4th Infantry Division (U.S. Army)
AC	Active Component
ACC	Air Combat Command
ACIP	Aviation Career Incentive Pay
ACP	Army Campaign Plan
ADC	Additional Duties Commitment
ADCON	Administrative Control
ADOS	Active Duty for Operational Support
ADSW	Active Duty for Special Work
ADT	Active Duty Training
ADTs	Active Duty for Training
AEF	Air and Space Expeditionary Force
AFB	Air Force Base
AFPC	Air Force Personnel Center
AFR	Air Force Reserve
AFRC	Air Force Reserve Component
AFRICOM	African Command
AGR	Active Guard/Reserve
AJPME	Advanced Joint Professional Military Education
AMC	Army CONOPS Model / Air Mobility Command
ANG	Air National Guard
AOR	Area of Responsibility
APPG	Army Planning Priorities Guidance
ARARA	American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
ARFORGEN	Army Force Generation Model
ARNG	Army National Guard
ASA	Assistant Secretary of the Army
ASAP	As Soon As Possible
AT	Annual Training
ATC	Air Traffic Control / Air Transport Command / Air Training Command / Army Training Center
BAH	Basic Allowance for Housing
BCT	Brigade Combat Teams
Bde	Brigade
BLUF	Bottom Line Up Front
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defense
Bns	Battalions
BOATDET	Boat Detachments
BOG	Boots on Ground
BPC	Building Partner Capacity
BRAC	Base Realignment Commission

ANNEX F
Pre-decisional Working Papers

BSI	Base Support Installation
BUMED	Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
C2	Command and Control
C3	Command, Control, and Communication
C4	Command, Control, Communication, and Computing
C4I	Command, Control, Communication, Computers, and Intelligence
CA	Civilian Authorities
CA&PE	Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
CAC	Common Access Card
CAE	Computer-Aided Engineering
CAG	Commander Air Group
CAN	Center for Naval Analyses
CAP	Civic Assistance Project
CBA	Cost Benefit Analysis
CBDP	Chemical/Biological Defense Program
CBO	Congressional Budget Office
CBRNE	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives
CCDR	Component Commander
CCIF	Combatant Commander Initiative Fund
CCIR	Commander's Critical Information Requirements
CCJO	Capstone Concept for Joint Operations
CCMRF	CBRNE Consequence Management Reaction Force
CEF	Contingency Expeditionary Force
CENTCOM	Central Command
CERFP	CBRNE Enhance Response Force Package
CGR	Coast Guard Reserve
CIMIC	Civil Military Cooperation
CIV	Civilian
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions
CM	Consequence Management
CMC	Crises Management Center
CMF	Citizen Military Forces
CMO	Civil-Military Operations
CN	Counter-narcotics
CNGB	Chief, National Guard Bureau
CNGR	Commission on the National Guard and Reserves
CNIC	Commander Navy Installations Command
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
COAs	Course-of-Action
COCOM	Combatant Commander
COIN	Counter Insurgency

ANNEX F
Pre-decisional Working Papers

comms	Communications
CONUS	Continental United States
COP	Common Operating Picture
COST	Contingency Operations Support Tool
CRAF	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CS	Civil Support
CSAF	Chief of Staff of the Air Force
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
CSS	Combat Support Services
CST	Civil Support Team
CT	Counter-Terrorism
CTE	Collective Training Event
CTP	Commercial Ticket Program
DASD	Direct Access Storage Device
DCA	Defensive Counterair
DCE	Distributed Computing Environment
DCO	Defense Coordinating Officer
DEF	Deployed Expeditionary Force
DepSecDef	Deputy Secretary of Defense
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIV	Division
DLN	Defense Laboratory Network
DMDC	Defense Management Data Center
DMOSQ	Duty Military Occupational Skill Qualified
DoD	Department of Defense
DoDD	Department of Defense Directive
DoDI	Department of Defense Instruction
DoL	Department of Labor
DoN	Department of the Navy
DOPMA	Defense Officer Personnel Management Act
DoS	Department of State
DPPG	Defense Planning and Programming Guidance
DPW	Directorate of Personnel Operations
DSCA	Defense Support of Civil Authorities
E	Enlisted
EANGUS	Enlisted Association of the National Guard of the United States
EEO	Equal Employment Opportunity
EID	Early Identified Deployers
ELSF	Expeditionary Logistics Support Force
EPI	Employer Partnership Initiative

ANNEX F
Pre-decisional Working Papers

EPLO	Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer
ESP	Employer Support Payment
EUCOM	European Command
EW	Electronic Warfare
EXCOM	Executive Committee
FAMs	Functional Area Managers
FCM	Force Costing Model
FE	Foreign Exchange / Facilities Engineer / Functional Element / For Example
FEA	Front End Assessment
FEHBP	Federal Employees Health Benefits Plan
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FG	Fighter Group / Functional Group / Force Generation / Force Goals
FHA	Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FO	Flag Officer
FRP	Fleet Response Plan
FSRG	Force Structure Review Group / Family Support Readiness Group
FSS	Federal Supply System
FTCA	Federal Tort Claims Act
FTRS	Full-Time Reserve Service
FTS	Full-Time Support
FTSS	Full-Time Support Staff
FW	Fighter Wing
FY	Fiscal Year
FYDP	Future Year Defense Program
GAO	Government Accounting Office
GCC	Geographic Combatant Command
GDF	Guidance for the Development of the Force
GEF	Guidance for Employment of the Force
GFM	Global Force Management
GFMAP	Global Force Management Allocation Plan
GO/FO/SES	General Officer/Flag Officer/Senior Executive Service
GOSC	Global Operations and Security Center / General Officer Steering Committee
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HA	Humanitarian Assistance
HA/DR	Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Response
HBCT	Heavy Brigade Combat Team
HCA	Humanitarian and Civic Assistance
HD	Homeland Defense

ANNEX F
Pre-decisional Working Papers

HDIP	Hazardous Duty Incentive Pay
HIMARS	High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
HLD	Homeland Defense
HMLA	Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron
HN	Host Nation
HNS	Host Nation Support
HQ	Headquarters
HRF	Homeland Response Force
HS	Homeland Security
HSC	Homeland Security Council
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
HVT	High-Value Tasks
I&W	Indications and Warnings
IA	Individual Augmentees
IADT	Initial Active Duty for Training
IAW	In Accordance With
IBCT	Infantry Brigade Combat Team
ICs	Integrated Security Constructs
IDA	Institute for Defense Analyses
IDAD	Internal Defense and Development
IDRC	Inter-Deployment Readiness Cycle
IDT	Inactive Duty Training
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IG	Image Generator
IMA GO	Individual Mobilization Augmentee General Officer
IMAs	Individual Mobilization Augmentees
IMR	Individual Medical Readiness
ING	Inactive National Guard
INS	Inertial Navigation System
IR	Infrared
IR 3	Integrated Resource Requirements Review Board
IRGC	Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
IRR	Individual Ready Reserve
ISCF	Institutional Support Career Field
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
IT	Information Technology
IW	Irregular Warfare
JDA	Japan Defense Agency
JFCOM	Joint Forces Command
JFHQ	Joint Force Headquarters

ANNEX F
Pre-decisional Working Papers

JFTR	Joint Federal Travel Regulation
JHU/APL	The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory
JIMP	Joint, Interagency, Multinational, and Public
JIOC	Joint Information Operations Center
JMD	Joint Manning Document
JOE	Joint Operating Environment
JP	Joint Publication
JPEO	Joint Program Executive Office
JPME	Joint Professional Military Education
JRD	Joint Reserve Directorate
JROC	Joint Required Operational Capability
JRSOI	Joint Reception Staging Onward Movement and Integration
JRU	Joint Reserve Unit
JRVIO	Joint Reserve Component Virtual Information Operations
JS	Joint Staff
JTF	Joint Task Force
JTFR	Joint Federal Travel Regulation
JWICS	Joint Warfare Intelligence Communications System
LNO	Liaison Officer
LOC	Lines of Communication
LOG	Logistics
LR	Legislation/Rules
M&RA	Manpower and Reserve Affairs
MAGTF	Marine Air Ground Task Force
MAW	Mission Analysis Workshop
MCO	Major Combat Operations
MCSCP	Marine Corps Service Campaign Plan
MCT	Maritime Counter-Terrorism
MEB	Marine Expeditionary Brigade / Maneuver Enhancement Brigade
MED	Medical
MEDRET	Medical Readiness Training
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MESF	Maritime Expeditionary Security Force
MESGRU	Maritime Expeditionary Security Group
METL	Mission Essential Task List
METs	Military Engagement Teams
MEU	Marine Expeditionary Unit
MFP	Major Force Program
MFP-11	Major Force Program-11 (USSOCOM funding mechanism)
MGIB	Montgomery GI Bill
MGIB SR	Montgomery GI Bill Selected Reserve

ANNEX F
Pre-decisional Working Papers

MILDEC	Military Deception
MLRS	Multiple Launch Rocket System
MOB	Mobilization
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
MPA	Military Pay and Allowances / Military Pay Appropriations
MPT&E	Manpower, Personnel, Training and Education
MREIDLs	Military Reservist Economic Injury Disaster Loans
MSN	Mission
MSRONs	Maritime Expeditionary Security Squadron (Navy)
MTTs	Mobile Training Teams
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVAIR	Naval Air Systems Command
NAVFAC	Naval Facilities Engineering Command
NAVSEA	Naval Sea Systems Command
NAVSUP	Naval Supply Systems Command
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NECC	Navy Expeditionary Combat Command
NG/USAR	National Guard/U.S. Army Reserve
NGB	National Guard Bureau
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
NJP	Non-judicial Punishment
NLT	No Later Than
NMCB	Naval Mobile Construction Battalion
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense Command
NORTHCOM	Northern Command
NPOESS	National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
NSIAD	National Security and International Affairs Division
NSS	Naval Supply Service / National Security Strategy
NSW	Navy Special Warfare
NV	Heimevernet (Norwegian Home Guard)
NV ANG	Nevada Air National Guard
OA-10	Operational Availability 2010 (Study)
OBJ	Objectives
OCA	Offensive Counterair
OCO	Overseas Contingency Operations
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OGC	Office of General Council
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom

ANNEX F
Pre-decisional Working Papers

ONR	Office of Naval Research
OPCON	Operational Control
OPDIR	Operational Direction
OPSEC	Operation Security
OPSTEMPO	Operations Tempo
OPTEMPO	Operational Tempo
OR	Operational Reserve
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSD/RA	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs
OSMIS	Operating and Support Management Information System
OUSDs	Office of the Undersecretaries of Defense
P&R	Personnel & Readiness (OSD)
PACOM	Pacific Command
PAIO	Program Analysis and Integration Office
PAL	Personal Allowance List
PB	President's Budget
PCA	Permanent Change of Assignment /Posse Comitatus Act
PESRUs	Personnel Reporting Unit
PIA/IMC	Planned Incremental Availability / Integrated Maintenance Concept
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PMIS	Personnel Management Information System
POR	Program of Record
POSH	Prevention of Sexual Harassment
PR	Personal Recovery
PRC	Presidential Reserve Call-up
PRL	Primary Reserve List
PRTs	Provincial Reconstruction Teams
PYSOP	Psychological Operations
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
QRF	Quick Reaction Force
QRMC	Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation
RC	Reserve Component
RCCs	Reserve Component Categories
reqd	Required
RFF	Request for Forces
RFPB	Reserve Forces Policy Board
RIRP	Reserve Income Replacement Program
ROA	Reserve Officers Association
ROMO	Range of Military Operations

ANNEX F
Pre-decisional Working Papers

ROPMA	Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act
ROT	Rotational Operational Forces
ROTC	Reserve Officers Training Corps
RPA	Remotely Piloted Aircraft
RPA	Retiree Pay Accrual
RPMIS	Real Property Management Information System
RUF	Rules for Use of Force
SAR	Search and Rescue
SAUs	Squadron Augmentation Units
SCRA	Servicemembers Civil Relief Act
SD	Secretary of Defense
SDOB	Secretary of Defense Operations Book
SECARMY	Secretary of the Army
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SECDET	Security Detachment
SECFOR	Security Force
SELRES	Selected Reserves
SFA	Security Force Assistance
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SNCO	Senior Non-Commissioned Officer
SO	Stability Operations
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOUTHCOM	Southern Command
SPAWAR	Space and Naval Warfare Command
SSCRA	Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act
SSSP	Steady State Security Posture
SSTR	Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction
STIRS	Smart Threads Integrated Radiation Sensor
STRATCOM	Strategic Command
SWarF	Senior Warfighter Forum
TA	Transitional Assistance
TAC	Theater Security Cooperation
TACON	Tactical Control
TAD/TDY	Theater Air Defense/Temporary Duty
TAMP	Transition Assistance Management Program / Theater Aviation Maintenance Program / TRADOC Architecture Management Program
TBMD	Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
TDA	Table of Distribution and Allowances
TF	Task Force
TFE	Total Force Enterprise
TFI	Total Force Integration

ANNEX F
Pre-decisional Working Papers

TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TOR	Terms of Reference
TOS	Terms of Service
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
TRANSCOM	Transportation Command
TRS	Tricare Reserve Select
TSC	Theater Security Cooperation
TSP	Thrift Savings Plan
TTHS	Training, Transient, Holding, and School
UAS	Unmanned Aerial Systems
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UCMJ	Uniform Code of Military Justice
UCP	Unified Command Plan
UDP	Unit Deployment Program
ULB	Unified Legislative Budget
US	United States
USA	United States Army
USAF	United States Air Force
USAFR	United States Air Force Reserve
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAR	United States Army Reserve
USAWC	United States Army War College
USC	United States Code
USCGR	United States Coast Guard Reserve
USD (P&R)	Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness)
USD (P)	Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
USERRA	Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act
USFFC	United States Fleet Forces Command
USG	United States Government
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USMCR	United States Marine Corps Reserve
USN	United States Navy
USNR	United States Navy Reserve
USW	Undersea Warfare
UTC	Unit Type Code
UW	Unconventional Warfare
VAQ	Electronic Attack Squadron (Navy)
VAW	Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron (Navy)
VETS	Veterans
VFC	Fighter Squadron Composite (Navy)

ANNEX F
Pre-decisional Working Papers

VP Fixed Wing Patrol Squadron (Navy)
VR Fleet Logistics Aviation Squadron (Navy)
VRF Voluntary Reserve Forces
VTC Video Teleconference
VTU Video Teleconferencing Unit

WAL Warfare Analysis Laboratory
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
WOG Whole of Government
WOT War on Terror
WWI World War I
WWII World War II

DRAFT

ANNEX F
Pre-decisional Working Papers

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