

The Case for Linking Doctrine and Training

5 Mar 2004

Issue: Chartered by the Commanding Officer, TRACEN Yorktown, the Doctrine Study Team examined links between doctrine and training to determine if linking doctrine and training resulted in enhanced mission performance. As part of its research, the team rediscovered the March 1995 “Report of Field Commander’s Concept of Doctrine” that defined levels of doctrine and doctrine models, provided justification for linking doctrine to training, budget and resource planning, and made recommendations to implement a Training & Doctrine Command. The team deemed the study findings even more relevant for 2004. See Appendices A (Report of Field Commander’s Concept of Doctrine Executive Summary) and B (Report’s Chapter VI, Training Linkages to Doctrine).

Discussion: Three current examples highlight the immediate need to link doctrine and training.

Example 1 – Buoy Tender Replacement Project: In 1996, CGC JUNIPER entered operational service as the first of 16 new 225’ WLB Sea-going buoy tenders. After numerous mishaps and close calls, RADM Ernest Riutta commissioned the Buoy Tender Systems Study (BTSS) to examine why the new fleet had fallen short of expectations. Critical doctrine for the new fleet, linked to training, was never developed. No training Personnel Qualification System (PQS) existed for the new ships. Entire crews reported with no pipeline training. There was no formal training for buoy deck riggers, crane operators, or buoy deck supervisors until Dec 2003 when the computer-based Buoy Deck Interactive Courseware was approved. To this day, the Requirements of Capability (ROC) and Projected Operating Environment (POE), which provide specific guidance regarding Operational Capabilities and Operating Environment, are still not approved for the fleet. Due to this shortfall, the CGC WALNUT just completed joint forces service in Iraq with no built in systems to deal with Chemical, Biological, or Nuclear attacks. The crew fabricated counter-measure wash-down systems using styrofoam, plastic trash bags, and a series of pipes in hopes of offering some protection. With no doctrine to guide decision-making in selecting resources, Theater Commanders routinely sent WALNUT to missions that neither the ship nor crew were equipped or trained to perform.

Example 2 – Maritime Safety & Security Teams (MSST's): The lack of formalized doctrine for MSST's is directly affecting interagency operability, operational deployment, and training for these new units. Each Commanding Officer interprets his/her view of the MSST mission (e.g., non-compliant at-sea boardings, domestic port security, dive operations, K-9 operations, and vertical insertion/vertical delivery). Each Captain of the Port or Tactical Commander sends MSST's to missions based on his or her discretion. As the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) looks for single sources of doctrine to follow, the Coast Guard's lack of “blueprints” sets it squarely at the back of major agency stakeholders. To demonstrate the magnitude of need for swift information flow, the Commandant personally called the OinC of a small-boat station to get information directly. Well-developed clear doctrine and training can specifically facilitate time critical and sensitive communications through the chain of command.

Example 3 - Doctrine linked to CPRL: COMDTINST M3010.11B, (Level II doctrine) provides guidance to create the Coast Guard's Contingency Personnel Requirements List (CPRL), Personnel Allowance List (PAL) and Reserve Personnel Allowance Listing (RPAL), but without integrating doctrine and requirements for the qualification and training process, this publication is essentially useless. During Homeland Security Planning, this lack directly accounted for numerous inconsistencies and shortcomings. Lack of CPRL knowledge and common visibility in the CG chain of command produced numerous data calls to collect necessary information for mobilization decisions. Several units could not use CPRL personnel because they were not qualified and/or trained, nor did their specialties match unit PALs or RPALs. Reserve activation in support of Operations LIBERTY SHIELD/IRAQI FREEDOM was not in compliance with established CPRL for mobilization contingency. Recall of full Military Outload (MOL) CPRL was not authorized. Many reservists were individually selected and recalled from RPAL vice CPRL assigned billets. Non-standardized recall of reservists led to mobilization inadequacies and inequities. Active Component (AC) personnel filled CPRL billets at the expense of normal daily USCG missions. PAL and RPAL staffing were not aligned with CPRL requirements. The RPAL is not of sufficient strength, appropriate make up, and mix of rates to support all CG Contingency Personnel Requirements Lists (CPRLs - MOL, HLS, etc) as required in 9700/9800 series plans. During surge ops, PPE and LE gear were significantly under-resourced; hundreds of reservists were recalled to active duty without needed PPE. Recall notifications to reservists were too short-notice and non-standard. Hundreds of man-hours per day and thousands of dollars were spent generating, processing, tracking, and disseminating information due to lack of sufficient doctrine and a USCG enterprise-wide standard mobilization readiness information tool. The effect at the CG unit level was personnel without the proper training to complete the mission.

Recommendation:

The hard nucleus around which DHS forms, the Coast Guard must develop doctrine to maximize interoperability and tell Coast Guard members how to perform missions. This doctrine must be rapidly deployed throughout the training system. The Doctrine Study Team believes predictions in the 1995 Field Commander's Report are the Coast Guard's current reality. As the fledgling DHS gains greater national recognition, it will require a Center of Excellence for linking doctrine and training to bring overlapping interests together for optimizing mission effectiveness. The Coast Guard should lead the way by standing up a single-point command for developing doctrine, driving training and budget requirements, linking doctrine with training, and capturing lessons learned.

Doctrine Team Charter

Issue: COMDT G-OCS has expressed interest in working with TRACEN Yorktown and G-WTT to speed development, approval, and deployment of Boat Forces doctrine. G-OCS has also indicated some willingness to relocate its current doctrine resources to the TRACEN. Not surprisingly, however, G-OCS is focused only on its program and has not examined the needs of the many other programs serviced by the formal training system or building a model that will work best for all programs and the training system. The initial G-OCS proposal also does not appear to have considered a Coast Guard Doctrine Study completed by G-CCS in 1999 and earlier studies in 1994, 1995, and 1996.

Background: COMDT's 1999 Doctrine Study (*see ALDIST 222/99*) concluded that the Coast Guard's "Ad Hoc" model lacked any centralized point for doctrine development and produced piecemeal and stove-piped guidance. There was no mention of problems with timely development or deployment of doctrine. The 1999 study recommended, among several other items, an institutional approach where doctrine was closely linked to, but separate from, the education and training system. (Create a Coast Guard Doctrine Command.) Additionally, the Workforce Performance & Training Strategy (WFPTS) from 1999, recommended Education and Training Providers increase capability to include doctrine support (executive summary pp. xi).

Mission: The Doctrine Team will holistically examine the goal of speeding the development of doctrine and its deployment throughout the training system. As appropriate, suggest changes to accomplish this goal, ensuring alignment with the strategic direction of G-WTT. Take an initial "fix" by reviewing the history of this issue, studying & validating issues raised by G-OCS, reviewing the status of the WFPTS recommendations with G-WTT, and determining what role the TRACEN(s) currently play in doctrine development. (*See the Workforce Performance and Training Strategy, ALDIST 142/99 and an 11/18/99 list assembled by T-OPS-INTEL.*)

The team should not enter this project with any preconceived assumptions. Determine if there is an opportunity for significant improvement to workplace performance or readiness via faster development and deployment of doctrine and, if so, suggest how the TRACEN(s) can contribute to these improvements in a resource-constrained environment.

Stay focused on improving field performance and readiness via fast and relevant doctrine. Ensure your problem statements, findings, and recommendations are data-driven whenever possible. Any suggested changes should be capable of implementation in phases within the overall framework.

At a minimum, coordinate your efforts with G-WTT, TRACEN Petaluma, and other appropriate portions of the training system. Report out by NLT 1 March 2004 with periodic reports to the CO beginning in November 2003.

Doctrine Meeting Notes of 25SEP03

- CAPT Burhoe started the meeting with comments to include the reason for the Study Team, and what results he would like accomplished. **The Deliverable will conclude with a White Paper defining doctrine and the benefits of doctrine, providing options for linking training and doctrine, and providing a framework and organizational model for doctrine development.**
- The following questions were stated:
- **What is our goal?** To look at the establishment of a Doctrine Command that facilitates an effective link between doctrine and training to enhance Coast Guard mission performance.
- **Defining what doctrine the TRACEN produces?**
- **Look at how closely training is linked to doctrine?**
- **Should training and doctrine be linked?**
- **What problem are we solving?** The Coast Guard does not have a formalized program for the development of doctrine, and there are no formal connections among doctrine, training, and resources in our Service.
- **What is Doctrine?** Doctrine is a set of organizational procedures, parameters, and standards that provide relevant, unifying, and understandable direction to an organization. The Coast Guard doctrine should describe the Coast Guard's end-state in support of the National Strategy For Homeland Security's Objectives.
- Take a look at G-OCS and determine the consequences of establishing a separate Boat Forces Training and Doctrine Command at TRACEN Yorktown.

There are three levels of doctrine:

Level I – Identifies strategic policy above the CG (DHLS, National Strategy) and provides a broad interpretation of how the CG should implement it. Level I - Strategic doctrine, states the fundamental principles for employment of CG forces to attain national objectives. (See Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security, CG Pub 3-01)

Level II – Defines multi- tactics and techniques of each program element as related to Level I. The guiding principle of level II is intra-service teamwork to achieve service essential task objectives. (basically, this is how the CG wants us to do our jobs, i.e., homeland security, personnel, logistics, operations, intelligence, planning, comms) Level II - Operational doctrine, establishes principles and rules governing organization, direction, and employment of CG forces in the accomplishment of basic operational missions. It embodies the concepts and principles derived from the strategic doctrine. (there is currently no Level II Doctrine for Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security)

Level III - Tactical doctrine establishes detailed tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) that guide the accomplishment of specific objectives. (look at unit plans)

Doctrine, as defined by the Joint Chiefs, *“presents fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces. Doctrine is authoritative. It provides the distilled insights and wisdom gained from our collective experience with warfare. Doctrine facilitates clear thinking and assists a commander in determining the proper course of action under the circumstances prevailing at the time of decision”*. (Joint Warfare – Joint Pub 1)





U.S. COAST GUARD

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DOCTRINE OVERVIEW

Doctrine Definition

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Level I Doctrine – Strategic or Capstone

- Identifies strategic policy above USCG (e.g., DHS, National Strategy) and provides a broad interpretation of how USCG should implement it.
- Level I - Strategic or Capstone Doctrine - states the fundamental principles for employment of USCG forces service-wide to attain national objectives.
- Examples:
 - USCG: America's Maritime Guardian, CG Pub 1
 - Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security, CG Pub 3-01

Capstone Doctrine

- Linked to National Strategy
- Commandant's Direction
- Enduring fundamental beliefs
- Roles and Authorities
- Core Attributes

Level II Doctrine – Operational Integration

- Defines multi-unit tactics and techniques of each program element as related to Level I. The guiding principle of level II is intra-service teamwork to achieve service essential task objectives.
- Level II - Operational Doctrine - establishes principles and rules governing organization, direction, and employment of USCG forces in the accomplishment of basic operational missions. It embodies the concepts and principles derived from the strategic (capstone) doctrine.
- Examples:
 - Maritime Law Enforcement Manual
 - Search and Rescue (SAR) Manual
 - Marine Safety Manual

Operational Integration Doctrine

- Missions
- Functions
- Force Employment
- Resource Plans and Organization

Level III Doctrine – Tactical Employment

- Tactical Employment Doctrine, individual unit doctrine, establishes detailed unit-level tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) that guide the accomplishment of specific objectives.
- Tactics & Techniques:
 - Products of Lessons Learned
 - Employment of Forces and Specific Resources
- Examples:
 - Coast Guard unit-level plans/SOP's

Doctrine Models

- Empowered Model
- Coordinating Model
- Ad Hoc Model

Empowered Model

- Combines responsibility for creating and implementing doctrine in one part of an organization.
- Including doctrine in all levels of training institutionalizes doctrine.
- Example: Training and Doctrine Command

Coordinating Model

- Establishes a single point for creating and promulgating doctrine but may not be empowered to direct implementation of doctrine.
- Provides centralized focus for doctrine development and point of accessibility for doctrine issues in/outside organization.
- Example: Doctrine Commands

Ad Hoc Model

- Decentralization - organizational components may develop and implement elements of doctrine within their program areas, but no central point exists for creating, promulgating, or implementing organizational doctrine.
- Coast Guard's current Doctrine Model – no one CG program or command has centralized control of doctrine development/implementation.
- May be effective, but may not be as efficient as formalized centralized approach.
- May lead to lack of coordination between programs, stovepipes, and inconsistent doctrine.

Institutionalizing Doctrine in USCG

- Doctrine must have buy-in at all levels within the Coast Guard.
- Doctrine must link directly to training and education.
- Doctrine system must have a clear feedback loop for lessons learned and be flexible enough to account for change when needed.

Institutionalizing Doctrine in USCG

- Doctrine must be consistent with that of other agencies (and programs) jointly involved in attaining the same strategic objectives – essential for joint interoperability with DOD, DHS & other agencies, particularly in post-9/11 world.
- Doctrine products must be easily accessible to customers both within and outside the Coast Guard (critical for joint interoperability issues).
- A Hierarchy of Doctrine must be organized with a logical system for numbering and organizing doctrinal pubs.