QGI Incorporated

October 8, 1999

Captain J. Boland, USN
C/O Commander, U.S. Coast Guard
431 Crawford Street
Portsmouth, VA 23704

Dear Captain Boland:

Enclosed is the final draft of the Coast Guard doctrine hierarchy study: *U. S. Coast Guard Doctrine: A Systems Proposal.*

I would like to thank you and the Atlantic Area Staff members who contributed to its development. It was a pleasure working with you. If you have any further questions, please contact Mr. Frank Moen at the below number.

The report does not reflect all of the suggestions made. As the Coast Guard wrestles with the implementation of a Doctrine System, I am sure there will be modifications. That is as it should be. The report represents a viable proposal which the Coast Guard can implement immediately with current resources.

Sincerely,

Richard J. Asaro

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Policy provides direction on "What to perform." Doctrine provides the guidance on "How to perform it." The Coast Guard has no shortage of either doctrine or policy. The problems investigated in this report concern the identification, organization and application of doctrine, especially its organization into a system. The goals of such a system are:

- Elimination of redundant and contradictory doctrine,
- Enhancement of "user friendliness",
- Provision for an easy feedback and change implementation mechanism,
- Integration of doctrine across Coast Guard programs, especially elements of training, acquisition, planning and budgeting,
- A simpler system for users in other Services, other agencies, the private sector, and local/ state/ foreign governments.

As prior internal Coast Guard studies have revealed, the Coast Guard has an extensive body of *de facto* doctrine, which has generally has been developed and promulgated on an informal and decentralized basis. To address the doctrine requirements noted above, this report recommends the creation of a formal, centralized, and hierarchical system of doctrine.

The methodology in developing this report involved solicitation of comments from the field and analysis of those suggestions, a review of recent Coast Guard efforts at doctrine organization, a literature search of best practices from the Joint Chiefs of Staff doctrine system, other Services doctrine systems, and interviews with selected Coast Guard leadership. The interviews sought specific input on existing doctrine, doctrine that ought to be developed, advantages and disadvantages of the current system, the use of paper and electronic methods for publication of doctrine, and what resources would be needed to develop a formal Coast Guard doctrine system.

An important concern was to recommend solutions that were realistic in terms of likely available resources. For the most part, recommendations involve directing resources already committed to doctrine development onto a slightly different work path. For example, as publications reach their normal revision point they should re-written to ensure they are integrated across program areas, eliminate redundancy, and can be electronically searched.

The approach to Coast Guard doctrine recommended in this report will meet the needs of today's operating environment and will position the Coast Guard to adopt to the challenges of the 21st Century and the Coast Guard's Deep Water future.

SECTION I: BACKGROUND

1.0 Introduction

The *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (JP 1-02) defines doctrine as the...

> Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.

Putting this definition into a Coast Guard context, Coast Guard doctrine is a statement of officially sanctioned beliefs and operating principles, which describe and guide the proper use of Coast Guard units in operations. It is what the Service has come to understand, based on its experience to date. The Coast Guard promulgates and teaches this doctrine as a common frame of reference on the best way to prepare and employ the Coast Guard.

Accordingly, Coast Guard doctrine shapes the manner in which it organizes, trains, equips and sustains its forces. Doctrine prepares the Coast Guard for future uncertainties and, combined with Coast Guard core values, provides a common set of understandings on which Coast Guard personnel base their decisions. Doctrine consists of the fundamental principles by which the Coast Guard guides its actions in support of national missions and objectives. It is the linchpin of successful operations, and Coast Guard doctrine is meant to codify accumulated wisdom and provide a framework for the way it prepares for, plans, and conducts operations. In application, doctrine must be treated with judgment, but must never be dismissed out of hand or through ignorance of its principles.

Coast Guard doctrine is an accumulation of knowledge that is gained primarily from the study and analysis of experience, which may include equipment tests or exercises as well as operations. As such, doctrine reflects what has usually worked best. In those less frequent instances in which experience is lacking or difficult to acquire, doctrine may be developed through analysis of theory and postulated actions. It must be emphasized that doctrine development is never complete. Innovation has always been a key part of sound doctrinal development and must continue to play a central role. Doctrine is constantly changing as new experiences and advances in technology point the way to the force of the future.

In the past, there has been a cultural bias within the Coast Guard against "doctrine." Conventional wisdom held that doctrine would restrict the ability of the commander in the field to exhibit the adaptability and flexibility for which the multi-missioned Coast Guard was renowned. Therefore, it was often maintained that the Coast Guard did not have or need doctrine. In fact, the Coast Guard

has a plethora of doctrine. A 1995 internal study found over 2,000 doctrinal elements spread throughout the Coast Guard's Publication, Directives and Report system

Paradoxically, the Coast Guard simultaneously may have "too much" and "not enough" doctrine. It may have "too much" because doctrine is meant to be senior level guidance on performing the fundamental operations of the Coast Guard. It should come from limited sources at the highest levels of the organization and be both consistent and integrated across mission areas. With 281 "Capstone" elements identified in the 1995 study, there are potentially too many to be consistent, limited, or integrated.

There is "not enough" doctrine in that there are fundamental operational activities for which there is no current formal guidance.

1.2 History

In late 1994, the Coast Guard Area Commanders jointly commissioned a study of the Coast Guard's doctrine. The document was published in June 1995 as the "Report of Field Commanders' Concept of Doctrine" [hereinafter: The 1995 Study]. The Executive Summary, Functional Essentials for Institutionalizing Doctrine, Conclusions and Recommendations of the 1995 Study are included in Appendix C to this report. The 1995 Study concluded that it was appropriate for the Coast Guard to "...subscribe to a doctrinal approach to the way it does business." The reasons it gave have only become "more so" in the years intervening. At the time the 1995 Study was completed, the Coast Guard was also completing substantial studies on Training and Streamlining. It was felt that implementation of the doctrine study should follow the implementation of the other two studies and be integrated with them.

Following the 1995 Study, a Focus Group was established to examine and implement its report. While the Focus Group did not result in any formal doctrine establishment, it did plant seeds. These led to activities in various locations which moved the Coast Guard forward with the concept of a doctrinal system. A number of schools at Reserve Training Center Yorktown are working toward an electronic system for their areas of doctrinal responsibility. Coast Guard Liaison Officers with the Navy Warfare Development Center (NWDC) and the Joint Doctrine Division in the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) J-7 Directorate have substantially increased the Coast Guard's understanding of doctrine. The officer at NWDC produced Naval Warfare Publication NWP 3-07.4, *Maritime Counter Drug and Alien Migrant Interdiction Operations*, which was approached specifically as a doctrinal publication. NWP 3-10, *Naval Coastal Warfare*, was produced through a contracted effort for the Coast Guard's Maritime Defense Zone responsibilities. The JCS recently decided in June 1999 to revise its Capstone Publication, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces* (JP 1). The Coast Guard will be involved with that revision. The Coast Guard seal is now placed on the covers of joint publications, and there are over 100 references to the Coast Guard in those publications. CAPT John S. Clay, formerly of the Focus Group noted above, published an article in the Joint Forces Quarterly (Winter 96/97), "The Fifth Service Looks At Doctrine," which summarized Coast Guard philosophy. The then Director of Operations Policy, RADM James D. Hull, implemented this current effort to build on the previous work.

1.3 Report Methodology

A conclusion of The 1995 Study and follow-on Focus Group was that the Coast Guard needed a doctrinal system. With that as a premise, this report examines what a Coast Guard doctrinal system might look like and how it might be deployed.

The Chief of Staff promulgated ALDIST message 222/99 (Appendix B) for the purpose of explaining the Doctrine System Project and soliciting field input. The message listed nine reasons for having a doctrinal system and sought comments on the need, system structure, and current doctrinal gaps.

Data collection for this report included interviews with various members of the Coast Guard leadership. More than 40 interviews were conducted with Headquarters, Area and field staffs, along with the Coast Guard Liaison Officers at the Navy Warfare Development Center and Joint Chiefs of Staff. Interviewees who represented programs were asked to list the single most important publication containing doctrine for their program, as well as to suggest areas requiring doctrine development (Summary of comments in Appendix J. Additional research consisted of reviewing recent Coast Guard studies, relevant articles from the "Joint Forces Quarterly" magazine, and selected Service and joint doctrine publications.

Alien Migrant Interdiction Operations (AMIO) rely heavily on a network of cooperation with other organizations. Interoperability is critical

SECTION II: ANALYSIS

2.0 Introduction

Both The 1995 Study and the follow-up Focus Group supported the need for a Coast Guard doctrine system (see Appendix C for the Conclusion and Recommendations of The 1995 Study and Appendix D for CAPT Clay's article relevant to the Focus Group). This section summarizes their conclusions and lists the elements supporting a doctrinal system. It discusses what constitutes a doctrinal system and suggests a system that a Coast Guard Doctrinal System should emulate.

2.1 Doctrine Drivers

While different organizations may have different reasons for utilizing a system of doctrine, those reasons can be summarized as saving time, money and personnel. This further translates as operating more effectively and efficiently—doing the right things right, the first time. The 1995 Study identified seven important attributes or "drivers" for an effectively implemented doctrinal system.

- Unity of Vision
- Efficiency
- External Links
- Training Links
- Focus
- Unity of Effort
- Empowerment

ALDIST 222/99, which announced the project that produced this report, listed nine practical reasons for having doctrine in the Coast Guard. These reasons support the 1995 Study drivers.

- Standard guidance (unity of vision, efficiency, focus, unity of effort)
- Single research source (efficiency)
- Basis for planning and conducting Coast Guard operations (all)
- Training and exercise reference point (training links, focus, unity of effort)
- Basis for assessing future doctrine requirements (efficiency, training links, focus, empowerment)
- Reference for non-Coast Guard planners working with the Coast Guard (efficiency, external links, focus, unity of effort)
- Facilitated updates to directives and publications (efficiency)
- Consistent interface across mission areas at the national and international levels (unity of vision, external links, unity of effort)

The interview process suggested some additional advantages that a systematic approach to doctrine would bring to the Coast Guard:

- Decreased learning time for personnel new to a program or the organization
- Focus on "need to know" information vice "nice to know"
- A framework into which new guidance can be integrated and cross-linked
- Easier access to Coast Guard information for those who are already familiar with a doctrinal approach to organizational guidance
- A basis for assessing hardware acquisition
- Enhanced Coast Guard jointness as one of the five military Services

The imperatives of the final bullet are discussed in a December 1998 article in the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, "Coast Guard Is Joint," by CAPT A.J. Hindle, USCG (Ret.).

The Coast Guard participates in NATO exercises, as well as operating with the U.S. Navy

A final "driver" is the role the Coast Guard plays vis-à-vis the Navy. When the Navy had a 600-vessel fleet, the Coast Guard's deep-water assets were a small percent of the total available. In the era of a 330-ship Navy, the situation has dramatically changed. The Coast Guard has 41 High and Medium Endurance cutters. These represent a substantial fleet-in-being that potentially can make a significant contribution to naval operations in appropriate scenarios. The interaction between the Coast Guard and Navy may increase even further if the National Fleet approach is followed for future Coast Guard vessel acquisitions. Under this scenario, interoperability becomes an even more significant issue. A formal Coast Guard doctrinal system can be a great enabler for Navy / Coast Guard operations.

The Coast Guard trains foreign personnel from over 100 countries

2.2 Current State

The current Coast Guard method of handling doctrine is non-systematic, ad hoc, decentralized, and lacks cross-program integration. The 1995 Study found over 2,000 doctrinal elements distributed over 100 publications. There was no integration of that doctrine; almost all of it was developed within the confines of a particular program's "stovepipe." There was no formal connection between doctrine, training, and resources. There was no standardized approach to doctrine development, and there was no mechanism for updating doctrine to reflect the changing operational environment. In many instances there was no formal mechanism to cycle back lessons-learned from actual operations into training centers and publication preparation. This resulted in sub-optimization of operational procedures and prevented unity of effort. (The 1995 Study, p.1)

> The ultimate value of the [doctrine] system will be to create unity of purpose. It does this by linking strategic guidance to practical, day-to-day operations. It integrates prevention and response processes regardless of the mission and establishes horizontal and vertical linkages for guidance.
>
> — Captain John S. Clay, USCG

Ironically, the Coast Guard currently commits considerable personnel resources to developing and revising its *de facto* doctrine. Thus, any discussion of Coast Guard doctrine becomes an issue of coordinating and focusing those efforts to develop a systems approach, while improving processes and leveraging technology to put it into place.

Coast Guard personnel interact with many government agencies and local interest groups during oil spill responses.

2.3 Doctrinal Systems

The term "Doctrinal System" refers to the means by which an organization structures its operating guidance. A system typically consists of the following elements:

- Exclusivity Criteria
- Taxonomy
- Management Plan

2.3.1 Exclusivity Criteria

The first function of a doctrinal system is to determine what information is doctrinal and what is not.

Doctrine is <u>not</u> an all embracing "how to" of every task or activity. There is a lower level of detail below which doctrine does not go. The criteria for separating doctrine from other guidance or

direction may vary among from organization to organization. However, generally there are four tests for information to reach the level of doctrine:

- Does the information reflect the fundamental principles of the organization?
- Does the information require judgement in its execution?
- Does the information support the operations of the organization?
- Will the guidance withstand the test of time (normally three to five years)?

2.3.2 Taxonomy

Having determined what information is appropriate doctrine, a doctrinal system next classifies the doctrine according to a taxonomy. Typically, this results in a hierarchical approach, with several layers of guidance of increasing specificity.

A Doctrine System provides guidance for such diverse operations as Drug Interdiction and Aids to Navigation.

In a hierarchical structure, doctrine publications are organized in tiers beginning with the broadest issues in a capstone publication and moving to lower tiers dealing with narrower spheres of activity. A typical hierarchy contains the following types of publications.

(1) "Capstone Publication" — a document that links the activities of the organization to the national strategy and policy guidance of the national command authorities. It is flag level guidance of the broadest nature, a strategic-level document for the organization.

(2) "Keystone Publications" — also flag level guidance, but at a second tier. In the general staff model organization typical of militaries worldwide, these pubs link national goals to the staffing functions of the general staff. There may also be publications, called "keystone doctrine," at the keystone level within each of the staff areas.

(3) "Doctrine"— the third tier that provides guidance on specific topics within each of the staffing functions. Doctrine is not meant to be inclusive of all knowledge in a field. It should be selective and apply to only the fundamental principles of the organization's activities.

The designation of this tier as "doctrine" can be a source of confusion, as the system as a whole is referred to by the same term. However, it is usually clear from the context which connotation is intended.

(4) "Tactics, Techniques and Procedures"— This is the fourth and final tier in the doctrine hierarchy. This level deals with the methods of employing forces to accomplish missions. The guidance in this level can be quite detailed in describing how to execute a task.

- Tactics—address deployment of individual units
- Techniques—address systems or elements of systems within those units and how to deploy them. More specifics detail than Tactics.
- Procedures—address step-by-step descriptions of an activity aimed at the operator of the unit (in the case of a procedure) or an equipment operator. At some lower level of non-operations activity, the procedure is no longer "doctrine" and is included in some other communication system—directives, instructions, technical manuals, etc. This lower limit is often ill defined within the other Services and consequently varies widely.

Required guidance that does not meet the exclusivity criteria for the doctrinal system may still be promulgated in another form.

2.3.3 Management Plan

In broadest terms, a doctrinal system can be managed on either a centralized or decentralized basis. Experience in the Services and Joint Staff has shown that a centralized approach is more effective and more conducive to long-term system integrity. The management scheme must provide for a number of important functions. It must ensure that:

- Exclusivity and limitation considerations for candidate doctrine are met
- Revisions are timely performed (every 3-5 years)
- Format, terminology and level of content is consistent for the entire organization
- Doctrinal coordination occurs vertically and horizontally through the organization and with identified parties outside the organization
- Duplication of doctrine is eliminated
- The clearance process is expedited and timely performed
- There is a senior officer to whom doctrinal disputes may be appealed for adjudication
- A compliance mechanism is in place to ensure doctrine is being followed
- A feedback mechanism exists and is properly used
- Cross-linkages to the training system are maintained
- External liaison to Service and joint doctrine elements is maintained.

2.4 The Joint Doctrine System Model

While the Coast Guard could develop a unique doctrinal system, there is a great deal of advantage in modeling one after the Joint Doctrine System. This approach offers numerous advantages. Most importantly, the joint system is widely utilized and understood, both within the Department of Defense and among many in the non-military sectors that work with DoD. It is a system that, despite the inherent difficulty in reconciling the varying procedures and cultures of the Services, has enjoyed a high degree of success.

The joint doctrine system generally follows the model outlined in Section 2.3 above. Appendix K has a diagram of the hierarchy. It also has examples of tables of content from selected Joint Pubs to demonstrate the differing levels of content detail. It should be noted that Keystone Publications and their sub-set, Key Doctrine, are considered one tier. In practice, Key Doctrine is only found under the Operations (J-3) staffing element. However, nothing precludes such a breakout in the other elements.

The joint doctrine system consists of a series of publications that are divided into two levels:

Above-the-line publications. The upper level publications in the hierarchy of joint publications, which includes capstone, keystone, and other key joint doctrine publications that the Chairman signs and are intended to be used by combatant commanders, subunified commanders, joint task force commanders, Service Chiefs, and Joint Staff directors

Below-the-line publications. The lower level publications in the hierarchy of joint publications, which includes supporting joint doctrine and JTTP publications that are signed by the Director, Joint Staff and contain specific mission area guidance for the joint community. Included in this level are reference publications and those describing joint personnel and administration, intelligence support, operations other than war, force protection and employment, combat support, transportation and logistic support, planning, and C4 systems support.

The joint doctrine system publications are distributed both in paper and electronic format. Electronically, publications are available on CD-ROM and on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff' Doctrine Home Page. The joint doctrine system is evolving to support Joint Vision 2010. The Joint Doctrine Electronic Information System (JDEIS) is under development with an initial operating capability in 2002.

Modeling after the joint doctrine system would enhance interoperability and reinforce the growing sense of Coast Guard jointness. The Coast Guard has an ongoing concern to ensure it is recognized as one of the five military services of the United States. References to the Coast Guard are found throughout joint publications, beginning with *Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces* (JP 1).

A detailed examination of a Coast Guard Doctrinal System that follows the joint model is contained in Section III of this report.

SECTION III: A DOCTRINAL SYSTEM PROPOSAL

3.0 Introduction

The Coast Guard Doctrinal System (CGDS) model suggested below is based on the JCS system. If interoperability with the other services is an important goal for the Coast Guard, then a CGDS resembling that of the JCS provides the greatest potential benefits. Adopting the JCS model also allows the Coast Guard to leverage much of the developmental effort that has gone into that system.

Arguably, the most important aspect of a CGDS is how it deals with doctrine for field operations. There are some options as to how the system presents guidance for the "hands-on" work of the Coast Guard. The Operations element (the "3-0" part) of the model could be organized along several lines: four Mission Areas, five Roles, or five Strategic Goals. The field interview process yielded different opinions on how this part of a CGDS should be set up, but this report recommends that the Mission Areas approach be utilized. This maximizes similarity with the JCS system and underscores the reality that both traditional Coast Guard "operations" and Marine Safety program activities are operational.

This section also discusses the value of an electronic system for distribution of doctrinal material compared to a paper based system, and recommends a deployment strategy for the CGDS.



The importance of doctrine is not determined by the size of the asset.

3.1 A Coast Guard Doctrinal System (CGDS)

Based on the Section 2.3 discussion of a general doctrinal system and the advantages offered by the Coast Guard using an adaptation of the Joint Doctrine System, the following model is offered for use as a Coast Guard Doctrinal System (CGDS).

3.1.1 Exclusivity

The Coast Guard should employ the following criteria to determine what should be included in the CGDS.

- Does the information reflect the fundamental principles of the organization?
- Does the information require judgement in its execution?
- Does the information support the operations of the organization?
- Will the guidance withstand the test of time (normally three to five years)?

3.1.2 Taxonomy

Following the joint model, the CGDS should utilize the joint doctrine publication hierarchy. CGDS publications would fall into the following tiers. Publications in a given tier contain the same level of detail in their guidance.

Capstone Publication – Titled Coast Guard Pub 1, this document would provide broad, enduring, and general guidance from the Commandant to the Assistant Commandants and Area Commanders at the organizational strategic level. It is a link between national goals and policy, and Coast Guard operations. At the time of the preparation of this report, Pub 1 was still under development.

Keystone Publications – These publications also provide flag-level guidance, linking the Capstone Publication to the general staff model functional areas. Generally speaking, this level of doctrine is aimed at the director, office chief, and district commander levels of the Coast Guard leadership. In the joint doctrine numbering system, these are the 1-0 (etc.) level pubs. Coast Guard equivalent Keystone Publications would include:

Coast Guard Keystone Publications:

CG 1-0 Personnel & Administration
CG 2-0 Intelligence
CG 3-0 Operations
CG 4-0 Logistics
CG 5-0 Strategic Planning
CG 6-0 C4 Systems
CG 7-0 Training
CG 8-0 Force Structure, Resources, and Assessments

The joint system does not yet include 7-0 and 8-0 series publications.

Included in this tier, but within the Operations (3-0) arena, would be the fundamental guidance in the execution of the four mission areas of the Coast Guard: Maritime Safety, Maritime Law Enforcement, Marine Environmental Protection, and National Defense. These four publications would be known as "Key Doctrine."

Key Doctrine:

CG 3-20 National Defense
CG 3-40 Maritime Law Enforcement
CG 3-60 Marine Environmental Protection
CG 3-80 Maritime Safety

Doctrine – This level of doctrine publication provides direction within a specific functional area to field commanders and staff elements, elaborating on a topical aspect of the keystone and keystone doctrine publications. In general terms, doctrine is written by the program managers for commanding officers and officers-in-charge.

In the publication hierarchy, these publications would be numbered CG 1-01, CG 2-09, CG 3-12, etc. The publication number system in the Operations functional area (3-0) can become rather complex, and, because of the Coast Guard Mission Areas approach to this area, departures from the joint doctrine publication numbering system will be required. The recommended approach is to use blocks of numbers not normally used for joint publications. This has the added advantage of signaling the uniqueness of some Coast Guard missions. Under this scheme, Coast Guard Operations doctrine publications in this tier might be numbered as follows:

- Cross-Mission Area Doctrine — CG 3-01 through CG 3-19
- National Defense — CG 3-21 through CG 3-39
- Maritime Law Enforcement — CG 3-41 through CG 3-59
- Marine Environmental Protection — CG 3-61 through CG 3-79
- Maritime Safety — CG 3-81 through CG 3-99

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) – The fourth and lowest tier of doctrine of the CGDS deals with the methods of employing forces to accomplish missions. These can be quite specific in describing how to execute a task. The Naval Warfare Publications (NWPs) are an excellent example of this type of doctrine. TTP level of doctrine still presumes judgement involved in the actual execution of a task; there are still so many variables that it is impossible to anticipate all of them in a written document. At the procedural level, however, there may be very little latitude in the process, as the direction deals with well established methodology and a known "best way" to perform the task. The number of variables is manageable. Examples of procedures might be those for boarding a vessel, inspecting a cargo tank, conducting a rifle range qualification, or taking oil pollution samples.

TTP publications, which elaborate on doctrine level publications on a single topic basis, are indicated by a decimal suffix. For example, a doctrine-level publication *Cutter Operations* (CG 3-01) might be supported by the TTP pubs *Cutter Organization Manual* (CG 3-01.1) and *Cutter Training and Qualifications Manual* (CG 7-01).

Below the Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures pub level, but not considered part of CGDS, are directives and guidance that do not qualify as doctrine. While there likely will always be a need for material at this level, primarily due to the its perishable nature, a well-run doctrinal system should help reduce the requirement for directives of this type. The delineation between TTP and non-doctrine may be difficult to ascertain.

Recalling the definition of doctrine, whatever the level of doctrine under consideration, the judgment of the commander is ultimately required in its application.

Additional Numbering System Considerations.

The Coast Guard may desire to introduce other Service pubs in their entirety into the CGDS. This could be accomplished with a dual numbering scheme, with a CGDS number being assigned to the existing pub. If practical, the numbers should be the same, although this may not be possible because of the recommended mission area approach to the CG 3-0 series.

The diagram at Appendix H illustrates a national Coast Guard doctrinal publication hierarchy and gives a brief description of the pubs contained therein. As noted earlier, and indicated in the Publication Hierarchy, the doctrine for a topic exists in almost every case; however, it is usually distributed among several publications

3.1.3 Management Plan

Based on the experience of the Services and the Joint Staff, this report recommends that the CGDS be a centralized system, because the decentralized approach to doctrine that the Coast Guard took in the past helped create many of the problems that this project was asked to address. Specifically, it recommends the creation of a Coast Guard doctrine command. While initialization of a doctrinal system may be left to a temporary organization, its maintenance and management will ultimately require full-time attention. Contractor support would be very useful in the deployment phase.

Permanent Structure

The permanent CGDS management structure should consist of two major elements. This report recommends that the Coast Guard establish a Coast Guard Doctrine Working Group. The equivalent and model for this organization is the Joint Doctrine Working Party, which consists of representatives of the Services and combatant commands and a few non-voting observers. Meeting

twice a year, this forum provides a means of systematically addressing doctrinal issues. The agenda includes project proposals, scope development, validation, and other matters related to developing and maintaining doctrine and interoperability. Appendix I provides a sample charter and additional details on the functions of a doctrine working group.

The second recommended element is a Doctrine Command. The Doctrine Staff would:

- Coordinate the production and revision of all doctrine in the Coast Guard
- Ensure its timely dissemination
- Manage the electronic and print aspects of production and maintenance
- Ensure consistent doctrine and terminology
- Serve as a clearing house for Coast Guard doctrine liaison officers with other services
- Serve as the collection point for field feedback on lessons learned
- Provide liaison with other services doctrine staffs
- Develop and maintain a Coast Guard Doctrine Electronic Database System (CGDEDS).

Coast Guard and Marines participating in joint military exercises

Other Services and the JCS has have chosen to combine their training and doctrine functions. The Army has the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and joint training/exercises and joint doctrine are vested in the Joint Warfighting Center (under the aegis of US Atlantic Command). However, because a CGDS would represent a fresh start for doctrine in the Coast Guard, this report recommends that a doctrine initiative be kept separate from the training program, though closely

coordinated with it. To do otherwise would risk the CGDS being dwarfed by the larger training establishment. The question could be revisited once the CGDS is firmly established in its own right.

This report also recommends that the CGDS be placed in a headquarters unit under the direction of the Chief of Staff. It is believed that this level of "top cover" will be required to ensure a strong start for the program.

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There is also a question of where a Coast Guard doctrine unit should be located. As the focus of the CGDS should be on field operations, the report recommends that it not be located in Headquarters. This reports recommends placing the unit as a tenant command at RTC Yorktown, where it would enjoy close proximity to many of the Coast Guard service schools that would provide doctrine-based instruction. A Yorktown location would also provide the unit with access to the "Tidewater Connection," the concentration of Service and Joint doctrinal activity (US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Joint Warfighting Center, and service doctrine detachments) in the Hampton Roads area.



USCGC HAMILTON: Off the waters of South Korea, participating in Operation Foal Eagle

3.2 Paper and Electronic Systems

Key to the management of a Coast Guard Doctrinal System (CGDS) is the means by which an important sub-process is handled. This is the storage and distribution of doctrinal publications. Generally speaking, the pubs may be printed and stored in hardcopy (mail distribution), stored electronically and distributed on CD-ROM (mail distribution), or stored and distributed electronically. The Coast Guard should decide early in the process of establishing the CGDS as to which process, or combination of the three, that it will follow. This section of the report will briefly discuss the methods and make a recommendation on which to adopt. This reports presumes that the Coast Guard, regardless of what distribution method is utilized, will employ appropriate information handling technologies to realize efficient staff clearance of new and revised doctrinal publications.

3.2.1 Hardcopy Printing - Mail Distribution

This approach is standard practice today. Publications are printed, often involving a substantial lead-time, in sufficient quantities for distribution by mail according to a standard distribution list in designated quantities. An additional quantity must be retained in a central warehouse for new distributions and replacement copies, but in practice units requesting copies frequently find them not in stock. Mailing costs may be several dollars per publication. This approach is time and labor intensive. There is an added consideration of revisions, which require that a publication be republished in its entirety upon revision or that a change be printed and distributed for manual insertion into the original publication. This creates a substantial problem with version control, as well as placing an administrative burden on recipients. Locating information can be a problem, as well, as the researcher must know in which publication the information resides. The receiving unit may also have a storage problem.

The chief advantages of this system are its familiarity and the availability of hardcopy high-quality text and images to the end user.

3.2.2 CD-ROM "Printing" – Mail Distribution

This approach eliminates the warehousing problem associated with paper versions of doctrinal publications, as well as the storage requirements for the end users. Under this method, publications in the CGDS would be stored electronically and distributed by CD-ROM. Version control becomes greatly simplified, as the issuance of new or updated publications is simply a matter of mailing a new CD to the distribution list as needed or at an established interval. Doctrine material can be printed locally as required.

In situations where the weight of the publications may be a concern, particularly aboard ship, there is a considerable weight savings by either eliminating certain hardcopy pubs in favor of electronic versions or reducing the numbers of printed copies kept on board. The Navy conducted a study for their SPRUANCE Class destroyers. If they removed just the paper records, manuals and documents, they could save between 50-100 tons. If they also removed all of the associated paper storage or use devices: safes, copiers, typewriters, file cabinets, paper clips, they would save 208 tons per vessel.

Even if there were only a reduction in the amount of paper, savings could be realized. One CD-ROM, 620 Megabytes capacity, can store the equivalent of 325,000 pages of text—about the size of 10 full sets of the Encyclopedia Britannica. Production and mailing of CD-ROMs can offer a substantial cost advantage to the organization.

In the Joint Doctrine System, the cost of "printing" and mailing a CD-ROM is less than the cost of mailing a paper publication. Experienced contractor support is available for CD-ROM preparation and distribution.
The chief disadvantage of the method is that the end user must have access to the required computer equipment. This, however, should be an increasingly smaller problem with the full deployment of Coast Guard Standard Workstation III.

3.2.3 Electronic Distribution

This approach would eliminate the physical distribution of either paper or electronic media. Instead, the doctrine publications would be stored centrally for Internet or intranet access by users.

The obvious problem with this approach would be in providing access to deployed users.

3.2.4 An Amalgamated Approach

The best approach for the Coast Guard is an amalgamation of all three methods. In reality, that is the current state for Coast Guard publications handling in general. The entire Coast Guard publication library, *de facto* doctrine included, is available on CD-ROM and from the Internet. However, the distribution of revisions of the disk appears not to be timely, 18 months having passed since the previous version was sent to units. The CGDS would have to feature more frequent distribution. The current version of the publications CD-ROM, in preparation for distribution, does appear on the Internet (**http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-s/g-si/g-sii/dpri/dprindex.htm**). This approach could be carried a step further with on-line updating, in which a user would access a central database to check for revisions of a publication being used. The update could then be downloaded for printing or local electronic retention. Presently, units receive paper revisions to documents on disk, forcing them to maintain a system that is neither "fish nor fowl".

Perhaps the greatest value of an electronic method, whether CD-ROM or central database access, is the ability to search for information and to link that information to other publications in an electronic library. An electronic system can be cross-linked so that a search on "alien interdiction," for example, would locate all such references in the Coast Guard system, not just the one pub with which the user may be familiar. Additionally, electronically stored publications can have hyperlinks embedded that give immediate access to related topics simply by clicking on the hyperlink.

An electronic method is faster, less expensive (in terms of printing, storage space, handling and mailing costs) and provides a degree of flexibility unavailable in the paper-only system. The update process is much faster. The method can provide cross-links to related publications, as will be discussed in more detail below.

Another potential convenience concerning classified publications is the elimination of page checks and destruction errors. Only the disk itself would require accountability.

The evidence would indicate a favorable view of an electronic system. However, there are reasons to keep the paper: familiarity, necessity in some field use situations, and availability when power and all else fails. Some units may be too small for effective computer use, or situations may exist where computer systems are not appropriate. Paper publications will still serve a need. However, savings of time and effort can be realized by minimizing the amount of doctrinal hardcopy printed, distributed, and stored.

This report recommends an evolution to an electronic-based CGDS during the revision and update cycle for the existing body of Coast Guard doctrinal material, a notional period of five years. The system should feature CD-ROM distribution with a on-line update capability. Effort should be made to minimize the number of paper hardcopies of doctrinal publications.

It would appear that significant progress could be made with current resources if they are redirected to implement a centralized CGDS instead of continuing to support the de-centralized approach now used. State-of-the-art contractor support is available.

3.3 Coast Guard Doctrine Electronic Database System (CGDEDS)

This concept of a systematic approach to doctrine and information flow goes beyond simply keeping pubs in electronic format. Using a computer database allows one to search, cross index and hyperlink doctrine and supporting material. The information available for cross-indexing and hyperlinking might include:

- Significant reference articles: Commandant's Strategy, Performance Plans, Commandant's Direction, the annual State of the Coast Guard address, Naval Institute *Proceedings* articles, Coast Guard Magazine (either complete issues or selected articles), and other Coast Guard publications. Some Navy pubs are now distributed "on-line" only, a possibility for some Coast Guard pubs.
- Selected joint doctrine applicable to the Coast Guard's operations,
- Historical information: articles on Coast Guard history, recent operations (with lessons learned), other historical reference of interest to Coast Guard operations,
- Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (possibly with a Coast Guard addendum),
- International background information for countries visited by the Coast Guard, those with whom the U.S. has treaties or agreements affecting the Coast Guard, or those with whom the Coast Guard has a training relationship (over 100 in 1999),
- Non-doctrinal guidance in the Coast Guard Directives System.
- Photos and Graphics: information for use in public presentations, the equivalent of a "Power Point" presentation on standard Coast Guard subjects for Coast Guard speakers' bureaus around the country.

A CGDEDS might offer the following features:

- Rapid search and retrieval using multiple search routines
- Full or partial database search based on user needs
- Terminology database linked to the doctrine database, linked to Joint doctrine
- Links to related subjects, including training and educational materials
- Access by other systems having a link to Coast Guard or Joint doctrine
- Ability to quickly identify redundancies.

The CGDEDS would be of immense use in building a doctrinal system. An example of the potential of a CGDEDS is suggested in the figure below. It supposes that a search of the phrase "boarding procedures" was run on a CGEDDS. These might be typical results.



Coast Guard doctrine forms the base upon which all operations are built.
Doctrine found on the surface of the sphere is easily searched.

Other CGDEDS Uses:

The primary focus of this study and the above comments on CGDEDS is support of a Coast Guard Doctrine System. However, once an information system is in place, its capabilities could be used for purposes other than the CGDS.

Outlook

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are currently developing an electronic database to support the joint doctrine system. OC Incorporated, the author of this report, is designing the system. When the Joint Doctrine Electronic Information System (JDEIS) is fielded, the Coast Guard will have access to it. The system is intended to be unclassified; however, a classified system will be developed as well.

While a CGDEDS may not come into effect for years, the planning should begin as soon as possible. A key element of the information gathering and sorting process is the input of "kernels of information," summary data for later retrieval. This is an easy process while a pub is being written or revised, but it becomes considerably more difficult after the fact.

3.4 Deployment Strategy

This section makes the following assumptions:

- There will be some institutional resistance to a Coast Guard Doctrinal System at first.
- Implementation resources for the CGDS will be constrained.
- Implementation will likely occur over multiple years as resources become available and benefits from prior steps are measured and accepted.

Ideally, the entire system would be attacked at once with multiple activities occurring simultaneously, much the same way TQM or Streamlining was implemented. This was the approach taken by the other Services, and the results for them justified the effort. Working from the assumptions, however, the sequence below is designed to get the greatest benefits considering the realities of the situation. It seeks to use existing systems or resources to start the process and later transitions to the establishment of a permanent management organization. However, some management is critical, and therefore the first step is the creation of an ad hoc Doctrine Implementation Team or similar organization to implement the initial phases. For success in the deployment of the CGDS, the implementation team must be vested with authority similar to that possessed by the Streamlining Team. Contractor support by doctrine experts can greatly facilitate CGDS deployment.

The next section lists a number of measures that should be undertaken to launch the CGDS. The list is not necessarily sequential, as many of the activities shown can be worked in parallel, consistent with available resources.

3.4.1 Deployment Proposal

1. *Charter a CGDS Implementation Team* with appropriate authority to implement the doctrine system for the Coast Guard.
2. *Define Terms*: Create a Coast Guard-unique addendum to *Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (JP 1-02). It should include resolution of program terms such as Military Law Enforcement or Enforcement of Laws and Treaties, Maritime Safety and Marine Safety, National Defense and National Security, etc. Clear terms of reference are essential to jointness and interoperability.
3. *Charter and Convene the Coast Guard Doctrine Working Group* to assist in subsequent activity. See Appendix I.
4. *Identify Existing Coast Guard Doctrinal Pubs* Rigorously apply the exclusivity criteria to determine what is truly doctrinal. A straw man can be found in Appendix F.
5. *Identify Gaps* in Coast Guard doctrine. (Appendix G)
6. *Arrange Existing and Proposed Doctrine under the Coast Guard Doctrinal Hierarchy.*
7. *Identify Ownership* of existing and proposed doctrinal publications.
8. *Begin Keystone Publication Development*. Direct appropriate organizational elements to write the Keystone Publications for each functional area. These serve at the guide for the revision of doctrine and TTP tier publications.
9. *Establish a Schedule of Revision for Existing Doctrinal Publications*. Apply the exclusivity criteria. It is anticipated this might take five years before all appropriate pubs are reviewed and the doctrine organized. This should be a low marginal cost activity, as these publications would have been reviewed under the current directives system using existing resources.
10. *Streamline the Doctrinal Publication Revision Procedures.* For the CGDS to establish and retain credibility with the operators, it must be responsive to lessons learned and other feedback.
11. *Links CGULLS to the CGDS*. It should be integrated with the doctrine revision process to ensure the lessons learned in the field from using the doctrine and TTP are incorporated into revisions
12. *Develop a Schedule for Development of New Doctrinal Publications.* This must be a topic of high-level command interest, hence the recommendation for placing the CGDS effort under the Chief of Staff.
13. *Develop the Coast Guard Doctrine Electronic Database System*: This is essential to a transition to a paperless or reduced paper doctrinal system. Even if an electronic doctrinal system is not immediately implemented, it would be extremely effective, and ultimately money saving, to collect information as publications are revised or developed. The ultimate goal is a system that is electronically searchable, cross-indexed, and hyperlinked across other publications.
14. *Incorporate Doctrine into Training*: Work with the Coast Guard training system to ensure that classroom, correspondence, and computer based training are based in Coast Guard doctrine.
15. *Establish a Coast Guard Doctrine Command*. Establish a central authority to manage the CGDS.

SECTION IV: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.0 Introduction

The Coast Guard's ad hoc approach to doctrine met Service needs in the past. However, its growing responsibilities, greater number of operating arenas, and increasing number of interacting organizations (nationally and internationally) have led to the obsolescence of that approach. The organizational conditions existing at the time of The 1995 Doctrine Study may have changed, the Streamlining and Training Studies recommendations having been implemented. But, the conclusions and recommendations from The 1995 Study are still valid. The Coast Guard is still in need of a doctrinal system and needs to link training and doctrine. This project resulted in additional conclusions and recommendations.

4.1 Conclusions

- The Coast Guard needs an addendum to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (JP 1-02). This would help provide common terms of reference for both internal and external users of the CGDS.

- The Joint Doctrine System is very successful. While it s continues to evolve, it is fairly fixed in its form and structure. Among the Services and external users, it is a known system and enjoys widespread acceptance.

- There should be a systems approach to Coast Guard doctrine. While the Assistant Commandant for Operations could conceivably establish a G-O unique doctrinal system, for greatest benefit, a doctrinal system must be Coast Guard-wide. This system should be the responsibility of the Chief of Staff.

- There are significant potential savings and efficiencies in going to electronic methodologies for developing, revising, distributing, and storing doctrinal publications.

4.2 Recommendations

- Adopt the Coast Guard Doctrinal System recommended in Section III, including the doctrinal publication hierarchy.

- Create a Coast Guard Doctrine Command at Reserve Training Center Yorktown.

- Keep the Coast Guard Doctrine System separate from, though closely linked to, the Coast Guard training system.

- Commence execution of the implementation plan included in Section 3.4.

- Establish an ad hoc Implementation Team to implement the doctrinal system.

- Establish the Coast Guard Doctrine Working Group and a Coast Guard Doctrine Working Committee (the latter as needed)

- Expedite publication of Coast Guard Pub 1. As the Capstone doctrinal publication, it will serve as an important guide-on for the development of lower level doctrinal publications.

- Contract for outside assistance during the development stage of the doctrine project. While some resources currently devoted to publication development and revision can be reprogrammed, it likely will be difficult to identify sufficient billets to get the CGDS underway and maintain the required momentum to firmly establish the system.

- Ensure those involved in doctrinal development and publication have the appropriate equipment and software. This, too, is a contractible processes.

- Provide CD-ROM capability for all workstations. This will greatly facilitate the ready access to and timely distribution of doctrinal and other material via electronic media.

- Establish a Coast Guard electronic publications system for developing, revising and storing doctrine. Reduce the number of, but not necessarily totally eliminate, copies of each publication sent to each unit.

- Incorporate Coast Guard doctrine and definitions into the Joint Doctrine Electronic Information System

- Establish a Coast Guard Doctrine Electronic Database System that is cross-indexed and hyperlinked to the Joint Doctrine Electronic Information System..

Appendix A

Statement of Work

The Statement of Work developed from Coast Guard contract # DTCGG8-99-P-DDX075 dated May 4, 1999. The contract was amended once (on June 17, 1999) to move the final draft report deliverable date to August 31, 1999.

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD
OFFICE OF DEFENSE OPERATIONS

STATEMENT OF WORK
FOR

Contractor Support for Development of USCG Doctrine Hierarchy

1. Introduction. The United States Coast Guard (USCG) has a requirement for contractor support to develop a doctrine hierarchy. The tasks covered in this statement of work will assist the USCG in executing our responsibilities in developing doctrine.

2. Purpose. This document defines tasks to be accomplished by contractor in support of the USCG doctrine development effort. These tasks include all necessary efforts to research, design, and develop the USCG Doctrine Hierarchy and report the result of these efforts for USCG review and consideration. A USCG doctrine system will support USCG operations and is envisioned as a potential basis for future USCG training, planning, and procurement.

3. Scope. This task requires contractor technical services to perform basic research, analysis, design, development, and production of the final product. The tasks to be performed under this document include: conducting initial message coordination with USCG Headquarters, and drafting the initial message to USCG major commands and training centers; attending coordination meetings with USCG representatives; conducting research and analysis of existing USCG doctrine, policies, and instructions; and developing a report outlining a proposed USCG Doctrine Hierarchy. The report should address the option of a computer-based system. The final report will provide a discussion of the proposed USCG Doctrine Hierarchy with supporting rationale.

4. Tasks. The following contractual tasks have been identified to support the USCG in the development of the proposed report and USCG Doctrine Hierarchy. The contractor shall deliver to the USCG all required information, data, and deliverables in hardcopy and electronic format (Microsoft Office component).

4.1. Conduct Preliminary Coordination and Development of Draft Message. The contractor shall coordinate with USCG representatives to develop a draft initial coordination message for distribution to USCG commands to initiate the project. The Contractor shall provide the draft message to HQ USCG for approval and distribution. This message will explain the doctrine hierarchy development effort, solicit input for development of the report and USCG Doctrine Hierarchy, and request identification of local point of contacts. Input and feedback received from this coordination message will provide baseline information for analysis of USCG doctrine needs.

4.2. Conduct Research and Analysis. The contractor shall review and analyze background materials, extant USCG doctrine, policies, and instructions, and input from USCG representatives obtained in response to message addressed in paragraph 4.1. This review and analysis will encompass the breadth and scope of the four USCG core competencies (maritime safety, maritime law enforcement, environmental protection, and national defense).

4.3 Develop Report and USCG Doctrine Hierarchy. The contractor shall produce, after review and analysis of all inputs, a report that addresses the methodology, findings and recommendations. The report will include recommendations for specific doctrine development requirements and options (including a computer-based system). It shall include a graphic representation of the USCG Doctrine Hierarchy using Microsoft PowerPoint software.

5. Travel. All contractor travel will be as required and approved by USCG. USCG will fund all contractor travel. Anticipated travel includes: three trips to USCG Headquarters, Washington, DC; one trip to the US Coast Guard Academy, New London, CT; one trip to USCG Pacific Area/Maritime Defense Zone Pacific, Alameda, CA; two trips USCG Atlantic Area Command/Maritime Defense Zone Atlantic, Portsmouth VA; and two trips to USCG Reserve Training Center, Yorktown VA.

6. Government Furnished Equipment. The USCG will provide all required inputs and materials for inclusion in the USCG Doctrine Hierarchy and report in both hardcopy and electronic formats. The USCG will provide ready access to all materials required for the execution of this Statement of Work.

7. Security. Access to classified information, up to and including SECRET, may be required to perform these tasks. Classified material will be handled in accordance with the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM) and DD-254 (Department of Defense Contract Security Classification Specification) included with the contract.

8. Place of Performance. Contractor's office, USCG Headquarters, and other places of travel as determined by USCG.

9. Inspection and Acceptance. Data and deliverables shall be submitted to:

COMMANDANT (G-OPD)
U S COAST GUARD HEADQUARTERS
2100 2ND ST SW RM 3121
WASHINGTON DC 20593-0001

10. Milestones.

Start Date	14 May 99
Coordination Message	21 May 99
Draft USCG Doctrine Hierarchy and Report	30 June 99
Final USCG Doctrine Hierarchy and Report	30 July 99

Appendix B

ALDIST 222/99---Text

R 221305Z JUN 99 ZYB ZUI ASN-CAA173000326
> FM COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC//G-CCS//
> TO ALDIST
> BT
> UNCLAS //N16000//
> ALDIST 222/99
> COMDTNOTE 1600
> SUBJ: COAST GUARD DOCTRINE STUDY
> 1. WE HAVE INITIATED A STUDY TO DEVELOP A SYSTEM BY WHICH COAST GUARD COULD CODIFY ITS VAST ARRAY OF OPERATIONAL (INCLUDES O AND M OPERATIONS) PROCEDURES PRESCRIBED IN MANUALS, PUBLICATIONS, AND STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES INTO A LOGICAL SYSTEM OR HIERARCHY OF DOCTRINE.
> 2. THE OVERALL OBJECTIVES OF THIS DOCTRINE SYSTEM ARE:
> A. PROVIDE STANDARD GUIDANCE THROUGHOUT THE SERVICE.
> B. GATHER ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION ON DOCTRINE TOPICS INTO A SINGLE SOURCE.
> C. PROVIDE A COMMON BASIS FOR PLANNING AND CONDUCTING COAST GUARD OPERATIONS.
> D. PROVIDE REFERENCES FOR TRAINING AND EXERCISES.
> E. PROVIDE A BASIS FOR ASSESSING FUTURE DOCTRINE REQUIREMENTS.
> F. PROVIDE A READY REFERENCE FOR NON-COAST GUARD PLANNERS CONSIDERING COAST GUARD INVOLVEMENT IN JOINT / INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS.
> G. FACILITATE UPDATES OF DIRECTIVES AND PUBLICATIONS, ESPECIALLY IF A TRANSITION FROM A PAPER BASED TO AN ELECTRONIC SYSTEM IS DESIRED.
> H. CONSISTENT INTERFACE NATIONALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY ACROSS ALL COAST GUARD MISSION AREAS.
> 3. WHILE THE DETAILS WILL BE DEVELOPED OVER THE COURSE OF THE STUDY, IN GENERAL TERMS WE ENVISION A DOCTRINE HIERARCHY CONSISTING OF A CAPSTONE DOCUMENT, COAST GUARD PUB 1, PROVIDING THE OVERVIEW OF COAST GUARD OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT. THIS CAPSTONE PUBLICATION WOULD ALSO PROVIDE GENERAL GUIDANCE FOR SUPPORTING KEYSTONE DOCTRINE IN EACH OF THE COAST GUARD MISSION AREAS. WITHIN EACH MISSION AREA THERE MAY BE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES (TTP) PUBLICATIONS. THESE TTP WOULD BE SIMILAR TO, AND MAY ACTUALLY INCLUDE, NAVAL WARFARE PUBLICATIONS (NWP). THE NAVAL DOCTRINE COMMAND RECENTLY DEVELOPED NAVAL WARFARE PUBLICATIONS ON ALIEN MIGRATION – INTERDICTION OPERATIONS, AND COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS, WHICH WILL SOON BE DISTRIBUTED TO ALL UNITS.
> 4. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ARE BEING SOLICITED TO ASSIST IN THE

> DEVELOPMENT OF THIS COAST GUARD DOCTRINE SYSTEM. SPECIFICALLY, WE ARE SEEKING INPUT REGARDING THE STRUCTURE, USES, AND SPECIFIC TOPICS THAT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED IN DOCTRINAL LITERATURE. INCLUDE YOUR POC, TELEPHONE NUMBER AND E-MAIL ADDRESS. COMMENTS ARE REQUIRED NLT 9 JULY 99.
> 5. IN THE COMING WEEKS, YOU MAY BE CONTACTED BY MEMBERS OF OC INCORPORATED, WHO ARE ASSISTING IN THE COMPLETION OF THIS STUDY. THESE MEMBERS ARE MR. RICHARD ASARO, MR. AL HINDLE, MR. FRANK MOEN, AND MR. JOHN WALLACE.
> 6. COMDT POINT OF CONTACT IS CAPT KEITH CODDINGTON (G-OPD), (202) 267-2039, E-MAIL: KCODDINGTON@COMDT.USCG.MIL.
> 7. INTERNET RELEASE AUTHORIZED.
> 8. VADM T. W. JOSIAH, CHIEF OF STAFF, SENDS.
> BT
> NNNN
>

Appendix C

Excerpts: 1995 USCG Doctrine Study
"Field Commanders' Concept of Doctrine"

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As the Coast Guard seriously undertakes a reexamination of its internal organization and training, the time is right to subscribe to a doctrinal approach to the way it does business. Rather than perpetuating "can-do!" and reactive management, the Coast Guard now has the opportunity to put in place a mechanism for capturing the wisdom contained in its corporate history, its innovations, and its everyday experiences; and to apply that wisdom to a coherent and overarching vision for advancing the long-term goals and objectives of the Coast Guard. Doctrine will help the Coast Guard be a customer-focused organization, and would minimize internal competition for resources and cyclical emphasis on individual programs. It would align the Coast Guard's own strategic goals with the goals and expectations of its external customers, constituents, and fellow agencies.

Doctrine will guide every member of the Coast Guard to orient individual efforts with the intent of the National Security Strategy, DOT Strategic Plan, the Commandant's Direction, and the Executive Business Plan. Doctrine can bring coherence and synthesis to the Coast Guard's collective effort and carry the Coast Guard confidently into the future as the world's premiere maritime service.

The U.S. Armed Forces have doctrine programs that dovetail with the Joint Chiefs of Staff Doctrine for the National Military Strategy. By studying the experiences of doctrinal systems in the other Services, the strengths and weaknesses of doctrine implementation were identified. What has worked well for the other Services and what to avoid in the stand up of our system are captured in the "functional essentials."

The Coast Guard has "doctrine like" publications and guidance, written and implemented now on a daily basis. These have been developed in an ad hoc, uncoordinated manner by different programs and authors. The guidance is not linked together, nor is it linked to any overall doctrine. These publications are changed without reference to any framework, and without consideration for other evolving efforts. Doctrine dynamics would ensure a continuous critical examination of the missions, lessons learned, training and capability in the Coast Guard.

The Coast Guard is in a unique situation with our training and streamlining studies to start a formalized doctrine system that takes advantage of the lessons learned from the other Services and incorporates them into our reorganized structure in a low cost, non intrusive way. Combining doctrine and training ensures that field experience and experimentation are captured and redistributed, helps maintain the relevance and credibility of doctrine for day-to-day operations, and smooths the process by which members of the Coast Guard are enculturated with doctrine. Where once there was little knowledge about doctrine and experience with its use, there now exists a growing groundswell of understanding, desire, and commitment.

A doctrinal system makes good managerial sense. It creates a focus and order for executive vision and values. It is a sales tool for our interactions with Congress, the other Services, and our civilian customers. It meshes well with our TQM efforts as a vehicle to capture and distribute our "success stories" and incorporate our lessons learned to prevent reinventing the wheel. Doctrine puts our umbrella over TQM by focusing TQM efforts. Without Doctrine, disoriented TQM could perfect the unnecessary. Doctrine is the glue that links and holds those processes together to create the unity of purpose for the Coast Guard.

A Coast Guard Doctrine system can be evolutionary, and it does not have to be created and perfected overnight. The cost of such a system can be controlled by the rate at which we implement the process. It is of utmost importance to commit to doctrine process for the continued professional strength of the Coast Guard.

FUNCTIONAL ESSENTIALS FOR INSTITUTIONALIZING DOCTRINE

Based on the previous case studies, we have identified 10 functional essentials for institutionalizing doctrine. Including these essentials as elements of any model for doctrine development and institutionalization will take best advantage of the lessons learned from the other organizations studied.

* There must be a buy–in at all levels of the chain of command.

* Doctrine is best inculcated into the organization when doctrine links directly to education and training.

* Doctrine should be applicable and credible to the day to day operations of the organization. Beyond capstone publications, an intellectual consistency between the strategic objectives and the tactical and operational levels of Service doctrine should exist. This objective will be assisted by a logical system for numbering and organizing doctrinal publications that shows how they relate to each other.

* Although doctrine has a role in justifying programs and budget levels, it should focus on the process by which the service accomplishes its mission.

* Doctrine institutionalization requires some degree of organizational, personnel, and visionary stability. A learning curve must be overcome when changing functional responsibility and/or personnel assignments for doctrine development. On the other hand, consistency of vision produces its own momentum and leads to a deeper and wider institutionalization of doctrine.

* Links must be established between doctrine and decision–making regarding how the organization is trained, organized, and equipped.

* Doctrine should not be limited to existing technology. Capstone doctrine should lead technology.

* Doctrine must be consistent with that of other agencies jointly involved in attaining the same strategic objectives.

* Any doctrinal system should be flexible in its ability to change doctrine when needed.

* The products of a doctrinal system must be accessible to users both inside and outside of the organization.

CONCLUSIONS

The Field Commanders' Concept of Doctrine Team developed papers describing the benefits a doctrine system would have to the Coast Guard and the problems created without one. The common points in these papers were distilled into seven "unifying themes." The need to improve unity of vision, efficiency, external links, training links, focus, unity of effort and empowerment emerge clearly as doctrine drivers. **The Team has concluded that the need for a doctrinal system exists.**

The team surveyed training centers and programs in the Coast Guard and determined that elements of doctrine currently exist throughout our publications. Additionally, a joint and service publications review reveals many references to the Coast Guard within existing joint and service doctrine publications. The Coast Guard currently has the responsibility as lead agency or primary review authority on several of them. **The Team has concluded that these doctrine-like elements are currently being developed, reviewed, and implemented in a fragmented, ad hoc way.**

Alternatives for implementing a system to develop doctrine have been examined through the study of the experiences of the other services from the historical perspective. Doctrine systems of the other services range from a capstone, coordination type model, to a fully empowered, continuous model. **The Team has concluded that, based on the experience of others, there are a wide variety of ways that the Coast Guard could implement doctrine. Further, the different doctrine models used yield markedly different results.**

The Training and Streamlining Study Teams are currently looking at different ways to improve the Coast Guard's efficiency. Identification and correction of problems within the training system are complementary to the purpose of a doctrine system. As new organizations are created within the Coast Guard, doctrinal assignments may be made without further disruption. **The Team has concluded that an opportunity now exists to start a doctrine system in conjunction with the ongoing Coast Guard training and streamlining efforts.**

History shows that doctrine requires inculcation and enculturation up and down the chain of command. Study of the other Services' experience shows the success of linking doctrine development to training. This facilitates inculcation, as well as captures the feedback and changes from lessons learned. U.S. Army and Marine Corps experience with training and doctrine commands provides a model for implementation. **The Team has concluded that doctrine should be linked to training to ensure rapid delivery to agency personnel. Further, the Team has concluded that the training and doctrine command concept would further this effort.**

While the linkage to training will ensure doctrine reaches the students attending the classes, an analysis of the experience of the other Services shows that buy-in at the executive level is necessary to ensure that doctrine is incorporated into the day to day business of the agency. Further, linkages must be established at executive levels to acquisition and operations coordination so trained people, the right equipment,. and desired tasks are brought together in a coordinated fashion. **The Team has concluded that executive linkages are necessary in a Coast Guard doctrine system.**

Historically, doctrine has been in development since the 1500's. Within the U.S. Marine Corps, it has been formalized since the 1920's. All the Services have a differing approach to doctrine development and have achieved varying results based on effort, resources, and focus. **The Team has concluded that doctrine development can be evolutionary and that implementation is affected by resources and commitment.**

The study of the experiences of the other Services resulted in a list of ten "functional essentials." They result from the lessons learned by the other agencies studied. These "functional essentials" form the criteria for a model doctrine system. They are influenced by the agency's organizational structure as well as the number, experience, power, and personality of the assigned doctrine staff. **The Team has concluded that the "functional essentials" form the basis for a standard to design and measure successful implementation of an actual doctrine system .**

Appendix D

"The Fifth Service Looks At Doctrine"

by Captain John S. Clay, USCG



Patrol boat *Nunivak* off Haiti for Uphold Democracy.

U.S. Air Force (Val Gempis)

The Fifth Service Looks at Doctrine

By JOHN S. CLAY

EDITOR'S *Note*

For the Coast Guard, establishing a doctrine system is a momentous project. The thoroughgoing review of doctrine currently being conducted by the fifth service justifies serious consideration by every service. Under this examination the Coast Guard regards doctrine development as a process that standardizes how it thinks about and does its job, how it acquires dynamic feedback, and how it articulates its image as an institution. In this, the Coast Guard sees doctrine as a unifying vision. It must link its strategy and daily operations and facilitate development of acquisition requirements. This highly rational effort is thrusting our fifth service toward the desired systematic end-state.

Captain John S. Clay, USCG, is chief of the Office of Defense Operations at Headquarters, U.S. Coast Guard, and has twice commanded Coast Guard cutters.

The Coast Guard, having no doctrine command, chartered a field commanders' concept of doctrine team in 1994. Directed by operational flag officers, the team presented its findings to the commandant the following year. Common areas identified by the team as needing improvement were distilled into seven themes: unity of vision, efficiency, external links, training links, focus, unity of effort, and empowerment. These themes emerged as doctrine drivers. The team reported the need for a doctrine system and recommended that one be established. But



Port security for *USS Iwo Jima* during Desert Shield.

DOD

C-130s on flight line at Barbers Point, Hawaii.

U.S. Coast Guard

no publication describes the unique contribution of the Coast Guard

because findings by other teams (training and streamlining) were pending at the time, and the form of the Coast Guard was thus unclear, the doctrine team recommended that a focus group be appointed to develop and analyze specific options and costs of implementing such a system. The following article represents a status report on efforts by the doctrine focus group that was chartered by the commandant under the Directorate for Reserve and Training.

An inventory of Coast Guard publications and directives reveals that its current guidance is poorly organized. There is no standard approach to developing guidance throughout the service or across programs. Manuals are dated, and information and advice that logically should be included in them are often written into instructions to circumvent a cumbersome review process. Moreover, guidance is neither linked to higher level strategy nor connected to critical programs. Areas such as search and rescue, law enforcement, marine safety, and alien migration incidents are not treated in comparable ways. We have developed specific sets of guidance for each mission without looking for common ground. Operators must carry a library of manuals with them on patrol.

In addition, as the field commanders' report warned,

. . . there is no established mechanism to cycle the valuable knowledge accrued through operational experience and experimentation back to academia and training centers. . . . operational experience and experimentation tend to remain within local circles as opposed to becoming updates in the service as a whole, sub-optimizing operational procedures and preventing unity of effort.

The Current State

Organizational and system improvements occur only after failure. Lessons learned by one unit are not applied by others. How would the commanding officer of *USCGC Juniper* (the latest 225-foot buoytender) prepare for a catastrophe such as the downing of TWA flight 800? Does he know the underlying priority of people, environment, and property? Where does he seek guidance during that critical period between stimulus and response to incidents? The answers are not readily available. There is no collection of documentation that fully explains what our daily business is, how we do it, or how everything fits into an integrated system. There is no publication for internal or external consumption that describes the unique contribution of the Coast Guard to the public.

The inability to link daily business to a strategic vision also further complicates the process of generating requirements for system acquisitions. We

face the formidable task of developing a deep-water mission area analysis from scratch. The result is a series of directives, publications, and indexes that meets program needs but fails to capture the linkages and common features inherent in many of these processes. This leads to problems in both efficiency and effectiveness.

Does this mean we cannot do our jobs or that we anticipate operational failure? Not at all. But the current decremental budget environment and the reduction of 4,000 personnel is a cause for concern. Increasingly we encounter overlap among our programs in operational events such as the North Cape spill, escort of the Cuban-American flotilla, and defense operations in Haiti.

How did we get into this position? As the Coast Guard assumed more and more missions, guidance was written from a narrow, programmatic viewpoint. Time and exigency forced program managers to develop highly focused, specific guidance that gave little thought to a service strategic plan. While the guidance was often good, it failed to step outside the program's view and explain the larger impact daily actions have on the Coast Guard as a whole.

The long-term planning and budgeting process appears to drift among three main strategies: activities-based, resource based, and outcome-based. Activities-based, long-term planning focuses on missions that provide the most money in our budget. Concentrating counternarcotics operations in the Caribbean is a good example. Resource-based program managers compete for available funds for hardware. Those who promise the greatest savings may get the most money. Outcome-based, long-range planning utilizes risk assessments to formulate strategic planning. Outcomes are achieved when unit level tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) are linked to our strategic plan. This is the most effective way to ensure long-term resource support.

In recent years the Coast Guard, recognizing its historical ties to the defense establishment, has exploited joint and naval doctrine activities by having the unique non-redundant capabilities that it brings to national military strategy included in both joint and naval doctrine publications. Indeed, the Chairman has acknowledged the important role of the Coast Guard on his team by including the Coast Guard seal on the covers of all joint doctrine publications. In addition, the commandants of the Coast Guard and Marine Corps along with the Chief of Naval Operations will sign version 1.0 of the universal naval tasks list in which all three sea services incorporate their military operational and tactical essential tasks under one cover.

> a good doctrine system will increase intellectual capital

Desired State

Our vision is a system that facilitates the effective management of intellectual capital and improves the organization's speed of learning. We must replace the current stovepipe system with an outcome-based process of policy and procedures that integrates high level strategy documents and low level unit TTP. Some parts of this system are already in place, having proven their worth in several national and international crises. The focus is on developing a doctrine system to forge the horizontal and vertical links that will join these "islands of guidance" into a coherent system. We do not advance scrapping current guidance but rather seek to better organize and understand it. Simply stated, we are not trying to grow another bureaucratic arm but to connect the dots.

Doctrine can mean different things to different people. First one must understand what it is not. Doctrine is not a collection of weighty tomes designed to sit prominently on a sagging shelf. Nor is it a decree, proclaimed but never updated. It is a body of fundamental principles that guide service actions in support of national objectives. A doctrine system captures the best knowledge available about how to do things yet still accommodate judgment, innovation, and change. A good doctrine system will increase intellectual capital. The three levels shown in figure 1 illustrate such a system: level I, strategic; level II, multi-unit or force; and level III, individual unit.

Keystones are functionally derived from the capstone. The Coast Guard is currently in the process of writing its capstone together with the Center for Naval Analyses. Keystones define the way we function across other services and other Federal, state, and local organizations. Level I, national, contains strategic direction. Capstone and keystone documents translate national policy and budgetary guidance of government agencies into applicable strategic direction for our service. That direction identifies strategic policy above the Coast Guard and provides a

Figure 1. The Doctrine System



broad interpretation of how the service should implement it. The guiding principle of level I is joint, combined, and interagency teamwork to achieve national objectives.

Level II is the operational tier of doctrine where multi-unit tactics and techniques (MTT) are defined. It deals with specific movements and synchronized coordination of multiple units in time and space. At present, the closest examples of this level of guidance are portions of the search and rescue, maritime law enforcement, and marine safety manuals. The guiding principle of level II is intra-service teamwork to achieve service essential task objectives.

When the level of detail focuses on unit actions and tasks instead of multi-unit employment, a break is made to level III. As we transition from operational doctrine and multi-unit tactics and techniques (level II) to single-unit TTP, we no longer must operate with other units. Commanding officers are empowered and responsible for carrying out these TTP as they see fit, but consistent with service regulations and directives, safety considerations, and assigned missions. Guidance ceases to be doctrine at level III. The principle here is unit empowerment and intra-unit teamwork to achieve unit essential task objectives.

However, a doctrine system does not exist until another active ingredient is added, the near real-time feedback loops seen in figure 2. The current migration by the Coast Guard to a standard, Windows-NT based operating system, the availability of software applications, and pressing need for information sharing make this an ideal time for such an initiative. We envision a Coast Guard doctrine system in which after-action reports and doctrine/TTP lessons learned are captured during hot washups and automatically forwarded without operator intervention into an information system that permits the efficient review and updating of doctrine and "best-in-service" MTT and TTP data bases. Under such a system, lessons from Somalia, for example, extend beyond the participants. Cutters share tactics and techniques in executing a mission and strategic planners have access to a feedback mechanism based on real data.



HH-60J Jayhawk dropping litter basket.

U.S. Coast Guard

Figure 2. Real-Time Feedback Loops



The Benefits

A doctrine system is intended to achieve four objectives. First, it will standardize how we think about and do things as an institution. Since the 1980s the Coast Guard has undergone three transformations in its image. Early in that decade we were good guys. We were known for search and rescues and for helping the boating public through an extensive safety program. That image changed dramatically when our law enforcement program was greatly expanded and we earned the moniker "Smokies of the Sea." By the early 1990s our image became softer and environmentally more responsive because of our role in several highly publicized environmental crises. Two things are worth noting



U.S. Coast Guard (Steve Sapp)

Removing suspected drugs from freighter in Miami.

about these images of the Coast Guard. First, the transformations did occur and, second, they just happened. A doctrine system provides a forum for managing such changes.

Second, the doctrine system will standardize a methodology for doing the business of the Coast Guard. Without a direct link between the strategic and tactical, operators respond to crises based on whatever ad hoc knowledge and procedures are available in their immediate environment.

Third, it will provide a dynamic feedback system that allows us to capture the best methods and continuously improve, better manage our intellectual capital, and increase the speed of learning within the Coast Guard. Today we represent one of the most highly educated and trained services in American history. Countless operations are performed flawlessly every day. Given that, what does doctrine add? In a word, efficiency. Feedback loops are designed to capture new experience and innovations which furnish best-in-service data bases and an operational level doctrine library that links essential local tasks with strategic, long-term objectives.

Lastly, this system will enable us as an institution to clearly articulate the qualities, values, and principles that define the Coast Guard.

Implementation begins with developing capstone and keystone doctrine, then integrates all operational guidance to strategic level and finishes by fielding an on-line database to automatically capture lessons learned. It ensures the identification, capture, and availability of the best-in-service practices. It empowers multi-unit operational commanders to download best-in-service MTT and improve it as their own MTT, unit commanders to download best-in-service TTP and improve it as their own TTP, and training centers to automatically capture the deltas between best-in-service and modified MTT/TTP and own the process of updating and training to best-in-service MTT/TTP.

> the doctrine system will standardize a methodology for doing business

The ultimate value of the system will be to create unity of purpose. It does this by directly linking strategic guidance to practical, day-to-day operations. It integrates prevention and response processes regardless of the mission and establishes horizontal and vertical linkages for guidance. It considers the unit people on-scene as key elements of the strategic process by empowering them to own TTP and automatically capturing their changes for consideration in future updates to TTP, MTT, and higher level guidance.

Finally, such a doctrine system is necessary in order to obtain the information superiority described in *Joint Vision 2010*.

Since the commandant's doctrine focus group has not completed its work, it is premature to speculate on options and potential costs; but as this article goes to press the results will likely have been briefed to both the chief of staff and the commandant of the Coast Guard. The bottom line is that the doctrine focus group confirmed the findings of the earlier work by the field commanders' concept of doctrine team, added value, and will recommend a doctrine system for the Coast Guard. If approved by the commandant, this effort will be expanded to include other critical constituencies within the Coast Guard and focus on a detailed implementation plan with cost estimates. **JFQ**

Appendix E

"Coast Guard *Is* Joint"

by Captain Alexander J. Hindle, Jr., USCG (ret)

WINNER,
COAST GUARD ESSAY CONTEST

Coast Guard *Is* Joint

By Captain Alexander J. Hindle, Jr.,
U.S. Coast Guard (Retired)



Strong Coast Guard joint capabilities are important—both to the Coast Guard and to national security in the 21st century.

The future of the U.S. armed forces increasingly is joint. The landmark document *Joint Vision 2010* and its supporting publication, *Concept for Future Joint Operations*, lay out the rationale for this assertion. The 1997 National Military Strategy echoes the requirement that the services, explicitly including the U.S. Coast Guard, must be interoperable—institutionally, organizationally, intellectually, and systemically—to field the full-spectrum force required to meet the challenges of the 21st century. The December 1997 report of the National Defense Panel notes that "all operations will be increasingly joint, combined, and interagency." The implications for the Coast Guard should be apparent. Its relevance as a major contributor to the national security of the nation lies in its ability to be joint.

Indeed, the Coast Guard widely is recognized as a member of the joint community through simple but important things such as the Coast Guard seal appearing on joint publications, the display of the Coast Guard flag alongside those of the other services, and the inclusion of the Coast Guard in military recruiting advertisements. In addition, several Coast Guard manuals have been promulgated as joint publications, and Coast Guard ships and planes are included in joint capabilities reference materials. The Pentagon and the unified commanders welcome the inclusion of Coast Guard officers on their staffs and generally seek an increase in that presence. The demand for Coast Guard participation in joint exercises and operations exceeds the ability to meet it. At issue is whether the current level of effort will be enough to meet the demands of joint interoperability in the 21st century. The service needs to consider how much additional emphasis it should place on jointness.

First, a qualifier. By "joint" when talking about the Coast Guard, we do not mean joint in the sense of the Goldwater-Nichols Act (Defense Reorganization Act of 1986). The Coast Guard is not a Department of Defense (DoD) military service, and that statute does not apply to it. However, the objectives inherent in Goldwater-Nichols are just as applicable to the Coast Guard as to its sister services, especially because the Coast Guard becomes a specialized service within the Navy during times of war or when directed by the President.

What is meant by Coast Guard jointness is day-to-day interoperability and unity of effort with DoD. It means that the Coast Guard consciously and aggressively establishes as much common ground with DoD as feasible. Jointness, however, does not mean that the Coast Guard should lose its unique identity as a military service and federal agency, but rather that there are benefits for all involved if the Coast Guard seeks to maximize its joint identity.

Coast Guard jointness underscores the service's military nature as a fundamental, enduring, and defining characteristic of the organization. Without the military framework, the Coast Guard would be just another federal agency—a small one at that—performing a multitude of disparate functions, most of which could be performed by other agencies. In a classic example of the whole being greater than the sum of the parts, the Coast Guard uses its military essence to provide an effective, efficient multimission service for the American people.

Coast Guard jointness ensures the service interoperability that has enabled the Coast Guard to participate successfully in high-profile events, such as the Cuban and Haitian operations of 1994, the 1996 response to the Brothers to the Rescue shootdown in the straits of Florida, and the 1996 TWA Flight 800 response. Jointness is the lubricant that allows such operations to proceed smoothly; that allows the Coast Guard to call upon the support of the other services when needed. The enablers of this interoperability are the common language, standards, and doctrine of jointness. Even though the Coast Guard often is first on scene during natural disasters or national security concerns, it frequently lacks the capacity to complete the mission alone. Without the capability of achieving timely and effective interoperability, the ability of the Coast Guard to perform in a crisis would be endangered, and along with that, its raison d'etre.

Other factors are involved, but this operational success wrought by joint interoperability was instrumental in bringing the Coast Guard (relative) fiscal success in the difficult budgetary atmosphere of the mid-1990s. The service is ready to meet the millennium largely intact, although reduced in personnel strength by approximately 10% compared to the start of the 1990s. The annual infusion of $300 million from DoD into the Coast Guard budget, upon which the service depends, arguably is contingent on Coast Guard jointness. Jointness also provides the Coast Guard with benefits in acquisition, personnel, and infrastructure support, and helps Coast Guard personnel receive equal treatment in legislation addressing military benefits.



J. BOUVIA

Maritime interdiction is a Coast Guard skill; here, a team prepares to board the Iraqi cargo ship *Zanoobia*.

What Does the Coast Guard Bring to Jointness?

The Coast Guard provides a relevant, nonredundant, and complementary military capability. While its warfighting capabilities are modest, it does fill a niche in the maritime arena that is likely to expand as a shrinking U.S. Navy concentrates its assets in high-capability ships. Then-Vice Admiral James M. Loy pointed out that a projected fleet of a new class of "maritime security" cutters could represent a sizable portion of the nation's naval force by 2020.[3] In September 1998, the Navy and Coast Guard signed a memorandum of agreement that committed the two services to cooperate in the development of a national fleet of future ships and cutters. The Coast Guard's "acceptable presence" around the world, created by its humanitarian missions, also provides the State Department and DoD with a useful maritime tool in cases where a gray hull or fuselage might not be welcome. Several Unified Commanders-in-Chief (CinCs) have recognized this and have used the Coast Guard to help shape the peacetime environments in their areas of responsibility.

The National Military Strategy, along with the National Defense Panel report, envisions increased interagency operations for the military services. The Coast Guard can assist DoD in dealing with other agencies as it addresses new, nontraditional threats under the broadening concept of national security. The Coast Guard has extensive experience in dealing with the civil sector on domestic issues with which the other services may be coming to grips for the first time. For example, the Coast Guard makes extensive use of the Incident Command System, a command-and-control arrangement widely used at all levels of the public and private sectors and which DoD is likely to encounter increasingly in future interagency operations.

What "Purple Work" Is the Coast Guard Doing?

At present the Coast Guard makes modest contributions of its assets to various joint operations and has been, upon occasion, the supported joint force commander. Recent examples of joint operations include Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Haitian embargo operations, Haitian and Cuban mass migrations, Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, and Cuban Freedom Flotilla events. In addition, Coast Guard cutters and aircraft regularly are provided for Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) operations, and the service has deployed cutters to Europe in support of U.S. European Command initiatives with Baltic, Mediterranean, and Black Sea nations. High-endurance cutters have deployed to the Arabian Gulf in support of the U.S. Central Command, and maritime law-enforcement detachments (LEDets) assist in the enforcement of the Iraqi embargo. The Coast Guard has made similar contributions to Operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic. Cutters, port-security units, and Coast Guard/Navy harbor defense commands are written into the contingency plans of the warfighting CinCs. In addition, Coast Guard assets regularly participate in a wide variety of joint exercises.

More than 55% of the Coast Guard's liaison billets can be characterized as joint or interagency billets. Another 25% of the billets are assigned with the Navy, and most of them enjoy some degree of wider joint exposure. Key among the external assignments are the Coast Guard flag officers assigned as commanders of JIATFs East and West. Other joint assignments are the captains assigned to the unified CinCs, the Pentagon Joint Staff, and the Secretary of Defense Strategic Study Group. A commander is well placed in the Pentagon Joint Doctrine Division (J-7).

The Coast Guard assigns only a select few of its senior officers to joint senior services schools. Five senior officers are sent each year to joint courses at the National War

College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces. An additional six commanders are sent to the Army, Air, and Naval War Colleges for the senior courses, where they receive valuable exposure to joint issues.

The Coast Guard has been actively involved with the Pentagon process that is expanding upon the concepts in *Joint Vision 2010*. The Coast Guard Director of Operations Policy is a member of the flag-level Joint Vision Working Group that is overseeing the process. Other representatives from Coast Guard Headquarters attend meetings of the Coordinating Authorities that are addressing the new operational and enabling concepts of *Joint Vision 2010*.[4] The Coast Guard's vision document, *Coast Guard 2020: Ready Today . . . Preparing for Tomorrow*, published in May 1998, parallels the thrust of *Joint Vision 2010*.

How Could the Coast Guard Be More Purple?

The Coast Guard already does a great deal in the area of military jointness, but will current levels be adequate for the future? If predictions of increased joint operations prove to be true, more jointness will be required of the Coast Guard. Progress is possible in the following areas:

Joint Operations. The single greatest contribution the Coast Guard can make to jointness is perhaps its most difficult to deliver. The demand for Coast Guard assets regularly outstrips available resources. Nonetheless, the Coast Guard must be as responsive as possible to requests from the joint community for personnel, aircraft, and cutters.



ANGEL DEIMLER (USCG DISTRICT 13)

It is likely that Coast Guard cutters—such as the USCGC *Hamilton* (WHEC-715)—will work with many types of Navy ships—tankers to carriers—more frequently to deal with new types of conflict.

Coast Guard leadership must be prepared to address the political questions that often accompany such use of Coast Guard assets. Area commanders should ensure that their force allocation models include appropriate weighting for joint operations and exercise requests. They should be prepared to make directed asset allocations to joint exercises and operations if necessary.

Joint Experimentation. Under a charter from the Secretary of Defense, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command (CinCUSACom), has assumed responsibility for joint experimentation, which includes the *Joint Vision 2010* implementation process. The Coast Guard is being provided the opportunity to participate in joint experimentation, as it was for *Joint Vision 2010*. The Coast Guard should develop concepts of how it could employ its capabilities in support of future joint force commanders. These concepts should be offered to CinCUSACom as candidates for joint experimentation. The Coast Guard also should be prepared to make a commitment of resources to joint experimentation field exercises when the opportunity arises.

Defense of the Homeland. The NDP report places great emphasis on homeland defense as a 21st-century security challenge. If the nation's leadership adopts that strategy, the door effectively will have been opened for the Coast Guard and Navy to revisit the coastal defense role embodied in the maritime defense zone (MDZ) mission. The domestic MDZ role largely has been shelved in favor of an expeditionary harbor-defense command role in support of the warfighting CinCs. The defense-of-the-homeland concept offers the Coast Guard an outstanding opportunity to demonstrate its jointness and interagency interoperability. The Coast Guard should use the Navy/Coast Guard Board to explore the role of the MDZs under the emerging defense-of-the-homeland concept.

Coordination of Efforts. For much of its history, the Coast Guard conducted independent unit operations. However, as the nature of its missions evolved over the past 20 years, the ability of the service to work alone has dissipated. Operations such as drug and alien interdiction must be conducted in concert with DoD and other agencies to be effective. Nonetheless, the Coast Guard sometimes still fails to appreciate the interest that the CinCs have in its operations within their areas of responsibility. Conversely, the CinCs sometimes fail to understand that the Coast Guard may have legitimate missions in its areas of responsibility outside of DoD purview. The Coast Guard should, in accordance with the recommendation of the National Defense Panel report, more closely couple its international activities with the CinCs' regional stability programs.[5]

Joint Liaison Duty. The key to services' mutual understanding—the taproot of jointness—is effective liaison. But within the Coast Guard, liaison duty has a schizophrenic cast: the service trumpets the importance of such duty, but sends entirely different signals when the performance of the officers in liaison billets apparently is discounted by promotion selection boards. Consequently, such assignments often are undertaken with a great deal of trepidation by members of the officer corps. Other oddities of Coast Guard liaison duty are the unrealistic

. . . the Coast Guard must seize the moment to solidify and expand upon its joint role in national security matters.

expectations the service has about what the assigned officers can accomplish. Commanders and below assigned to liaison duty are likely to wind up as staff officers. If the Coast Guard wants true liaison officers—unburdened by action-officer duties—it must assign captains. Conversely, it must accept the idea that a cost of jointness is the assignment of personnel to action-officer status who will do "purple work" that may have no direct connection to day-to-day Coast Guard business. The Coast Guard must leverage joint billets to extract the maximum benefit to the service by assigning officers of the appropriate grade. The Coast Guard needs to understand the differences among action-officer, liaison, and special-program billets and develop memoranda of agreement for each billet to provide a common basis of understanding about the billet's responsibilities. It should increase the attractiveness of joint duty by ensuring that promotional and other selection panels understand the value of the contributions of joint-duty officers.

Joint Education. Understanding joint issues is an appropriate professional development requirement for Coast Guard leaders. Generally, it takes the assignment of a Coast Guard member to a billet that exposes the person to joint issues and operations for that member to realize the value of jointness to the Coast Guard. The service would be well served in having a larger portion of its ranks conversant on joint issues, which would enhance the Coast Guard's ability to function in the joint arena. The fact that the Coast Guard has joint responsibilities is something that should be impressed upon the officer corps at the points of accession. In addition, the Coast Guard Leadership Development Center should include Coast Guard jointness in the assortment of courses that will be taught. The Center should also add *Joint Force Quarterly* magazine to its suggested leadership reading list for middle- and senior-grade officers and senior enlisted. Also, the service is forgoing an opportunity to expand its cadre of joint-trained officers by not availing itself of the Armed Forces Staff College. The Coast Guard should reprogram a billet for the instructor staff at the Armed Forces Staff College, as that apparently is the quid pro quo for the Coast Guard to resume sending students to the school.

Doctrine. The Coast Guard has been reluctant to codify its procedures in doctrine, despite the existence of numerous internal directives and manuals that prescribe how it shall conduct its business. In addition to its internal value, doctrine would help define the capabilities of the Coast Guard for the other services, facilitating joint planning at the operational and tactical levels. The common misconception is that "doctrine is dogma," and that by formalizing doctrine, the flexibility and adaptability for which the service is renowned would be lost. However, doctrine—while authoritative—requires judgment in its application. The Coast Guard apparently has recognized this shortcoming, as a December 1997 message announced that it was developing handbooks for counterdrug and alien migration interdiction operations that would be published concurrently as Commandant Instructions and Naval Warfare Publications (NWPs). The Coast Guard has also begun to address the issue of doctrine with the ongoing development of Coast Guard Pub 1. This document will provide a common understanding of the fundamental principles and values that define its existence. The Coast Guard should undertake a program to systematically capture its operating principles and procedures in a formal body of doctrine. This is not a project that can be undertaken in the spare time of headquarters and area operations staffs. The best approach, in light of staffing and time constraints, would be to contract out the effort.

Flag Officer Visibility. The role of the flag corps is preeminent in firmly establishing the concept of Coast Guard jointness. The Coast Guard flag and senior executive service leadership should seize every photo opportunity to promote publicly the service's commitment to jointness. Recognizing that not every flag selectee may have had exposure to joint issues prior to selection, the Coast Guard should ensure that its new flag officers attend the Capstone Course prior to promotion or frocking.

Jointness can be expanded to the greater future benefit of the Coast Guard. As the Department of Defense studies and begins to shape its 21st-century future, the Coast Guard is in a position to influence those areas that will directly affect it. The value of the Coast Guard lies, in part, in its complementary and nonredundant contribution to national security—a role likely to grow in importance as the term "national security" comes to include matters beyond defense. However, the Coast Guard must seize the moment to solidify and expand upon its joint role in national security matters. Failure to do so will jeopardize the Coast Guard's role as a meaningful contributor to national security—and perhaps the Coast Guard's very existence.

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[1]Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era*, September 1997, pp. 21-22.
[2]Report of the National Defense Panel, *Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century*, available at www.dtic.mil/ndp (downloaded 2 December 1997), p. iii.
[3]"Shaping Coast Guard Forces for Tomorrow's Challenges," presented 20 November 1997, sponsored by the Fletcher School, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Chief of Naval Operations, and Commandant of the Marine Corps.
[4]Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement, Focused Logistics, and Full-Dimensional Protection enabled by Technological Innovations and Information Superiority.
[5]NDP report, p. 32.

Captain Hindle retired in 1997 after nearly 29 years of service. He served in a variety of operational and staff assignments, including three command-at-sea tours, and served a joint tour as U.S. Coast Guard liaison to the U.S. Southern Command, Quarry Heights, Panama. He currently is employed with OC Incorporated as a senior research analyst in the U.S. Atlantic Command Joint Experimentation Directorate (J-9).

Appendix F

Summary of USCG Publications Serving as Doctrine

PUBLICATIONS CONTAINING DOCTRINE

--Partial Listing

MISSION AREA	AUTHORITY	DOCTRINE	TYPE
Marine Environmental Protection	G-M	Marine Safety Manual	Doctrine/TTP
Maritime Law Enforcement	G-OCI	Intelligence Manual	Doctrine/TTP
Maritime Law Enforcement	G-OCS	Boat Crew Seamanship Manual	Doctrine/TTP
Maritime Law Enforcement	G-OPL	Maritime Law Enforcement Manual	Doctrine/TTP
Maritime Law Enforcement	G-O	Cutter Organization Manual	Doctrine/TTP
Maritime Law Enforcement	G-O	Air Operations Manual	Doctrine/TTP
Maritime Law Enforcement	G-OCS	Boat Crew Training Manual	Doctrine/TTP
Maritime Law Enforcement	G-OCU	Cutter Navigation Standards and Procedures	Doctrine/TTP
Maritime Law Enforcement	G-OCU	Cutter Training and Qualification Manual	Doctrine/TTP
Maritime Law Enforcement	G-OIS	Information Security Program	Doctrine/TTP
Maritime Law Enforcement	G-OIS	CG Personnel Security Program	Doctrine/TTP
Maritime Law Enforcement	G-OPF	Cont. Prep Planning	Doctrine/TTP
Maritime Law Enforcement	G-OPL	Maritime Counter Drug and Alien Migrant Interdiction Ops	Doctrine/TTP
Maritime Safety	G-M	MSM: Vol. 1	Doctrine/TTP
Maritime Safety	G-M	MSM: Vol. 6	Doctrine/TTP
Maritime Safety	G-M	MSM: Vol. 7	Doctrine/TTP

Maritime Safety	G-M	MSM: Vol.10	Doctrine/TTP
Maritime Safety	G-M	Waterways Management Manual	Doctrine/TTP
Maritime Safety	G-MOA	MSM: Vol. 5	Doctrine/TTP
Maritime Safety	G-MOC	MSM: Vol. 2	Doctrine/TTP
Maritime Safety	G-MOC	MSM: Vol. 3	Doctrine/TTP
Maritime Safety	G-MOC	MSM: Vol. 4	Doctrine/TTP
Maritime Safety	G-MOR	MSM: Vol. 9	Doctrine/TTP
Maritime Safety	G-MRP	MS Business Plan	Doctrine/TTP
Maritime Safety	G-O	ATON Administration Manual	Doctrine/TTP
Maritime Safety	G-OPR	National SAR Manual & CG Add'm	Doctrine/TTP
Maritime Safety	G-OPR	SAR Manual: CG Addendum	Doctrine/TTP
National Defense	G-CI	International Strategic Plan	Doctrine/TTP
National Defense	G-O	Ops Support for PSU	Doctrine/TTP
National Defense	G-O	CG Capabilities Manual	Doctrine/TTP
National Defense	G-O	Naval Coastal Warfare	Doctrine/TTP
National Defense	G-O	Port Security Manual	Doctrine/TTP
Support	G-A	Acquisition Manual	Doctrine/TTP
Support	G-CCS	Planning Manual	Doctrine/TTP
Support	G-CCS	Supply Operations Manual	TTP
Support	G-I	Public Affairs Manual	Doctrine/TTP
Support	G-KSE	Environmental Health Manual	Doctrine/TTP
Support	G-KSE	Safety and Environmental Health Manual	Doctrine/TTP
Support	G-KSE	Safety and Occupational Health for Oil Spill Response	Doctrine/TTP
Support	G-LMJ	Military Justice Manual	Doctrine/TTP

Support	G-O	USCG Auxiliary Manual	Doctrine/TTP
Support	G-S	Naval Engineering Manual	Doctrine/TTP
Support	G-S	Electronics Manual	Doctrine/TTP
Support	G-S	Civil Engineering Manual	Doctrine/TTP
Support	G-SEC	Civil Engineering Manual	Doctrine/TTP
Support	G-SEC	Hazardous Waste Management	Doctrine/TTP
Support	G-TDS	Automated Information Systems Security Manual	Doctrine/TTP
Support	G-W	Personnel Manual	Doctrine/TTP
Support	G-W	Training and Education Manual	Doctrine/TTP

The publications listed above are not meant to be exhaustive, but to give a sense of how much Doctrine and TTP the Coast Guard already has. The term "support" was used for programs which did not readily fall into a Mission Area.

Appendix G

Summary of Coast Guard Doctrinal Gaps

The following were gaps suggested by field personnel. The list is not all inclusive.

- Define/guide how to balance regulatory enforcement and partnering
- Guidance on parity between OCMI/COTP zones: policy and decisions
- Guidance on Coast Guard Role in Waterways Management
- Define "Compliance" with more specific parameters in regulatory application.
- Guidance to COTP/OCMI on exercising waiver authority
- Guidance on cross-training personnel in the M and O communities.
- Achieving standardization: contingency planning, crisis staffing procedures, exercises, lessons learned (capture and implementation)
- Homeland Security
- Port Security (update needed)
- Disaster Preparedness
- Alignment of Operations and Marine Safety mission areas.

Appendix H

Proposed Coast Guard Doctrine Publication Hierarchy

Capstone Publications

CG 1 **Coast Guard Missions** -- This should be the capstone doctrine publication that provides guidance from the Commandant for Coast Guard missions. It links national directives and strategy to the Coast Guard's contributions to other government agencies and alliances.

Publications 1-Series (Personnel and Administration)

CG 1-0 **Doctrine for Coast Guard Personnel and Administration Support to Operations**--This keystone publication should provide doctrine on personnel support for Coast Guard operations, including authorities, responsibilities, and planning. CG 1-0 should address fundamental guidance for commanders relative to the conduct of such support. It also should establish personnel directorate responsibilities, relationships, and planning considerations. In addition, this publication should addresses considerations for Coast Guard involvement in a joint force and joint force headquarters.

Reference Publications

CG 1-01 **Coast Guard Doctrine System**—This publication should provide guidance and procedures on the nomination, development, coordination, and approval of doctrine and TTP publications. It contains an index of all existing and planned publications and identifies the responsible agent for developing each publication. (An alternative to the development of this publication is inclusion of this guidance and policy in a Commandant Instruction).

CG 1-02 **Coast Guard Dictionary**—This publication supplements standard English-language dictionaries and the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Pub 1-02). It should be promulgated for mandatory use Coast Guard wide. This publication will serve to standardize terminology Coast Guard wide.

Supporting Doctrine Publications

CG 1-04 **Doctrine for Legal Support** -- This publication should provide the guidance for legal support across the range of Coast Guard civil, military, and international operations. More specifically, it should address several related topics, including: policies on disciplinary authority; sources of command authority; legal review of operation plans and targeting; developing rules of engagement; legal issues involving

support to coalition allies; legal aspects of civil affairs and humanitarian operations; and media involvement and public affairs.

CG 1-04.1 Techniques and Procedures for the Conduct of Military Justice This publication should address the techniques and procedures for conducting boards, investigations, and actions required by commanders and other officers in the exercise of military justice.

CG 1-06 Doctrine for Public Affairs -- This publication should provide the fundamental guidance for personnel Coast Guard wide regarding all aspects of public affairs and interaction with the media.

Publications 2-Series (Intelligence)

CG 2-0 Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Coast Guard Operations -- This keystone publication should provide the fundamental principles for worldwide intelligence support to all Coast Guard missions. It defines basic and supporting intelligence principles and includes a description of key national, joint, and other Service intelligence relationships from the perspective of how they support Coast Guard commanders. It should contain a discussion of unique allied and coalition intelligence considerations. It should explain the intelligence cycle and discuss intelligence operations for each of the mission areas.

Supporting Doctrine Publications

CG 2-01 Doctrine for Intelligence Collection and Reporting -- This publication should provide the guidance required by commanders for the collection and reporting of intelligence for all Coast Guard missions. It should address interaction with other government agencies.

CG 2-02.1 Doctrine for Coast Guard Investigative Procedures -- This publication should delineate the guidance for commanders and staffs Coast Guard wide for conducting investigative procedures. It should address special consideration when operating in the international environment.

Publications 3-Series (Operations)

CG 3-0 **Doctrine for Coast Guard Operations.** This keystone publication is the doctrinal foundation for joint operations. It should addresses the translation of national roles and strategy into assigned civil and military missions, objectives, capabilities, and concepts of employment as part of joint or multinational operation. It should also details the principles of command organization for all aspects of Coast Guard operations across all mission areas.

Supporting Cross-Mission Area Doctrine Publications

These publications address doctrine that pertains to more than one mission areas.

CG 3-01 **Doctrine for Cutter Operations** – Discusses all phases of operations including joint, NATO, and international.

CG 3-01.1 **TTP for Cutter Organization (Manual)** – Discusses organization for each class of cutter.

CG 3-01.2 **TTP for Ice Operations** – Procedures for organizing ice operations including scientific and international organization.

CG 3-02 **Doctrine for Small Boat Operations** – Guidance on safety, weather controlling factors, standards for qualification.

CG 3-03 **Doctrine for Air Operations** – Discusses safety factors controlling operations, including weather, personnel and air frame.

CG 3-04 **Doctrine for International Engagements** – Discusses training of foreign nationals both at Coast Guard facilities and overseas; sets parameters for engagement of foreign governments for joint operations or programs.

CG 3-05 **Doctrine for HAZMAT Management** – Deals with internal Coast Guard management of its own HAZMAT; guidance on how to use, maintain and dispose of HAZMAT.

CG 3-06 **Doctrine for Interdiction Operations** – This publication might discuss Alien Migrants, Drug Smuggling and EEZ Fisheries efforts. It could discuss use of force issues, inter-service and inter-agency operations and High Seas Driftnet interventions.

CG 3-07 **Doctrine for Naval Engineering**—Provides doctrine on operation and maintenance of maritime assets.

Supporting National Defense Doctrine Publications

These publications address doctrine that pertains primarily to support for the national defense operations mission area, however they may contain sections/chapters that address specific support to another mission area.

CG 3-20 **Doctrine for Support to National Defense Operations**—The appropriate doctrine exists, it is a question of culling it from several sources. It would include joint operations, NATO operations and international engagement. It might also speak to joint Law Enforcement, even if it is only to reference doctrine in Maritime Law Enforcement.

CG 3-21 **Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War**: This pub would put a Coast Guard interpretation on similar items already examined in the JCS pub of the same name: e.g. terrorism, humanitarian assistance, support to civil authorities, etc. Some of the items in the JCS pub are routine Coast Guard duties and have specific doctrine extant. (e.g. counterdrug or fisheries enforcement assistance).

CG 3-21.1 **TTP for Peace Operations**—This pub gives procedural guidance for the Coast Guard supporting diplomatic efforts to reach long-term political settlements. This might include cutter visits or training overseas

CG 3-22 **Doctrine for Naval Coastal Warfare -- (Same as NWP 3-10)**—This pub was recently completed as a joint Coast Guard—Navy effort.

CG 3-23 **Doctrine for Homeland Security**—This pub needs to be developed. It would deal with the Coast Guard's role in prevention and mitigation of invasion, including harbor defense and coastal patrols, as well as the identification of national assets and the reduction of their vulnerability to damage/destruction.

CG 3-24 **Doctrine for Port Security**--This publication would draw from the current material in the Marine Safety Manual.

CG 3-24.1 **TTP for Port Security Units**—This would provide specific procedures for Port Security Units.

Supporting Maritime Law Enforcement Doctrine Publications

CG 3-40 **Doctrine for the Conduct of Maritime Law Enforcement** --This publication would address various broad elements of the Coast Guard's law enforcement programs. While Alien Migrant Interdiction, Drug Interdiction, and Exclusive Economic Zone Fisheries enforcement may be the major areas, it could also address such issues as pollution, boating safety and other domestic law enforcement activities.

CG 3-41.1 **TTP for Counterdrug Operations**—This publication would address specific procedures for Counterdrug Ops. The source materials currently exist,

see below; it would be a question of either culling the combined information, or keeping it combined with Migrant Ops.

CG 3-41.2 TTP for Alien Migrant Interdiction—This publication is extant as part of a combined drug/migrant pub: M16247.4 and NWP 3-07.4. It was a joint Coast Guard Navy effort.

CG 3-41.3 TTP for Fisheries Enforcement—This publication would discuss enforcement of Laws and Treaties both within the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone and on the High Seas, and the procedures associated with enforcement.

Supporting Marine Environmental Protection Doctrine Publications

These publications address doctrine that pertains primarily to the maritime environmental protection mission area, however they may contain sections/chapters that address specific support to another mission area.

CG 3-60 Doctrine for Marine Environmental Protection—This publication would collate material extant in the Marine Safety Manual.

CG 3-61.1 TTP for Pollution Prevention and Response—This pub discusses Coast Guard's external role in preventing and mitigating oil and chemical spills. It would also delineate Coast Guard interaction in disseminating public information and working with both citizen and industry action groups.

Supporting Maritime Safety Doctrine Publications

These publications address doctrine that pertains primarily to the maritime safety mission area, however they may contain sections/chapters that address specific support to another mission area.

CG 3-80 Doctrine for Maritime Safety -- This publication should address both the common and specific principles of maritime safety that pertain to Coast Guard operations across the mission areas.

CG 3-81.1 TTP for Commercial Vessel Safety—Select from the Marine Safety Manual and Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circulars(NVIC) that information appropriate for Doctrine. An alternate is to reference the NVICs as needed in the TTP.

CG 3-82 Doctrine for Group/SAR Station Operations—Select doctrine from existing publications.

CG 3-82.1 TTP for Recreational Boat Safety—Procedures for enforcing the Boating Safety program.

CG 3-83 **Doctrine for Maritime Mobility**—This would include issues found in Waterways Management, but would be broader. The Coast Guard could combine the two doctrine if desired. This publication might discuss the interconnections between maritime commerce and other transportation forms and how they interact.

CG 3-84 **Doctrine for Waterways Management**—This would deal with the movement of people and goods on waterways: vessel traffic management, bridges, ATON, recreational boating, interaction with population centers, and pollution protection. This material is not meant to duplicate doctrine found in other specific pubs dealing with these topics.

CG 3-85 **Doctrine for Aids To Navigation**—Extract that information from the various current ATON guidance material which deals with the program at its broadest levels.

CG 3-86 **Doctrine for Auxiliary Operations**—This pub would deal with the broader issues of the Auxiliary operations and their support for Coast Guard activities: boating safety, pollution, Coast Guard Group activities, recruiting, etc.

CG 3-87 **Doctrine for CG SAR Addendum**—This pub exists and would deal with Coast Guard specific elements of SAR as distinct from the National (International) SAR Manual.

Publications 4-Series (Logistics)

CG 4-0 **Doctrine for Logistics Support to Operations**—General principles of logistics, specific guidance on supply, transportation, maintenance, acquisition, health services, counterintelligence, and joint operations.

Supporting Logistics Doctrine Publications

These publication support the operational programs of the Coast Guard. Content which might be construed as administrative in nature would more properly be placed outside the Doctrine System

CG 4-01 **Doctrine for Acquisition**—This pub offers guidance on obtaining new assets, developing contract support, project management, and quality control.

CG 4-02 **Doctrine for Health Support**—This pub discusses broad issues of health deliver, both for domestic, joint and foreign operations.

CG 4-03 **Doctrine for Logistics Support for Multinational Operations**—Included would be Coast Guard solo operations overseas, as part of a U.S. joint operation and finally as part of NATO type of joint operation.

Publications 5-Series (Planning):

CG 5-0 **Doctrine for Planning** -- This keystone publication should provide guidance for the conduct of planning to include all Coast Guard mission areas and disaster response.

CG 5-01.1 **TTP for Contingency & Preparedness Planning**—This contains specific guidance in writing plans including concerns for each element of the general staff model (personnel, intelligence, etc).

Publications 6-Series (C4 Systems):

CG 6-0 **Doctrine for C4 Systems** -- This keystone publication should provide guidance for planning and employing C4 Systems in support of all Coast Guard Operations.

Supporting C4 Doctrine Publications

CG 6-01 **Doctrine for Telecommunications**--This publication should address both Coast Guard, Navy, and joint telecommunications.

CG 6-02 **Doctrine for Electronics**—This pub will draw on current doctrine and consolidate the information.

Publications 7-Series (Training):

CG 7-0 **Doctrine for Training** -- This keystone publication should provide guidance for the conduct of training at all levels Coast Guard wide.

Supporting Training Doctrine

CG 7-01.1 **TTP for Cutter Training (Manual)**—This pub and the next serve as procedures manuals and are extant.

CG 7-01.2 **TTP for Boat Crew Training (Manual)**—Extant

CG 7-01.3 **TTP for MSO Training (Manual)**—Extant

CG 7-01.4 **TTP for Air Crew Training (Manual)**—Extant

Publications 8-Series (Force Structure, Resources, and Assessments):

CG 8-0 Doctrine for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessments -- This publication should address personnel organization, fiscal, and materiel resources and the periodic evaluation of each.

Supporting Force Structure, Resources, and Assessments Doctrine Publications

CG 8-01 Doctrine for Financial Management -- This publication should provide guidance for financial management during operations. Specifically, the publication should include responsibilities and organization of the comptroller, principles of joint financial management, and objectives of financial management operations. Resource management operations and finance operations should also be discussed, along with a variety of operations and missions involving the joint force J-8 and/or comptroller.

CG 8-01.1 Techniques and Procedures for Financial Management –This publication provides specific guidance in implementing the doctrine: forms, routing, budgeting, and controls.

NOTES: Coast Guard Doctrine Publication Hierarchy (next page)

1. This slide is available in Power Point, per the Statement of Work

2. In varying degrees, all of the topics listed have written doctrine and TTP distributed throughout a number of publications. The color coding indicates most topics do not have a single pub serving the purpose of Doctrine or TTP.

3. The two exceptions to this are NWP 3-10, Naval Coastal Warfare (CG Pub 3-22) and a recent pub on Alien Migrant Interdiction and Counterdrug Operations, NWP 3-07.4. As this pub fills several gaps, completed doctrine is listed for Coast Guard pubs 3-06 (Interdiction Ops doctrine), CG 3-41.1 (Counterdrug TTP), and 3-41.2 (Alien Migrant Interdiction TTP).

4. When TTP pubs are listed in a column with doctrinal pubs, the TTP pub is indented to note the difference.

5. Where a JCS pub exists, which also meets Coast Guard needs, the pub was left in the JCS System and not carried into the Coast Guard System.

Coast Guard Doctrine Publication Hierarchy



Appendix I

Proposed US Coast Guard Doctrine Working Group (CGDWG) Charter

1. **Purpose**. To provide policy and guidance for the formation and execution of the Coast Guard Doctrine Working Group (CGDWG).

2. **Objectives**. The objectives of the CGDWG are:

2.1 To validate proposals for development of Coast Guard doctrine documents.
2.2 To periodically review the body of Coast Guard doctrine for required revisions.
2.3 To provide a forum to bring Coast Guard organizations together as full partners in the development of Coast Guard doctrine and to discuss current doctrinal issues.
2.4 To inform CGDWG membership of and consolidate COAST GUARD positions on joint service topics and issues to be presented at the subsequent Joint Doctrine Working Party (JDWP).

3. **Meetings**. The CGDWG will be hosted by _____ and will meet semiannually at _____. Normally, the CGDWG will be scheduled to meet for two days and whenever possible at least one week prior to the Joint Doctrine Working Party (JDWP).

4. **Membership**. CGDWG membership will be composed of the chairperson, voting members, observers, advisory members, and a recorder.

4.1 Chairperson. The CGDWG chairperson is the [as appropriate: Chief, Doctrine Implementation Team / Commanding Officer, Doctrine Command / officer appointed by the Chief of Staff]. The chairperson will moderate CGDWG activities and vote in the instance of a tie. He/she will provide administrative support to the CGDWG.

4.2 Representation. Representatives should have full authority to speak for and/or vote on behalf of their organizations on doctrinal issues. Representatives should have direct access to their senior leadership should a contentious issue require resolution. Voting members should be of the rank of Captain/Commander or civilian equivalent.

4.3 Membership Criteria.

4.3.1 Chairperson.

4.3.2 Representatives [from major organizational components, such as Headquarters program managers, the Academy, major training commands, the Area Commanders, Maintenance and Logistics Commanders, a major air station, a major group/activity, and a major cutter. Total membership should not be greater than 15 people. Membership should also be consistent over time, with individuals assigned to the CGDWG for a two-to-three year tour. Field operators should be heavily represented.]

4.3.3 Equity Membership. The CGDWG may invite representatives from Coast Guard organizational elements, not normally directly represented on the board but with a vested interest or equity in an issue before the CGDWG, to participate on an ad hoc basis while the topic is under consideration.

4.3.4 Voting. All permanent members of the CGDWG have one vote. Equity members shall have a vote if agreed upon by the CGDWG at the time of invitation.

4.4 Observers. Any Coast Guard organization may request permission to send an observer to the CGDWG and comment on issues prior to a formal vote. If observers desire to provide a briefing or presentation, prior coordination should be made with the CGDWG. Observers are non-voting.

4.5 Advisory Members (Non-voting). By majority vote of permanent members, the CGDWG may chose to invite a Coast Guard or external organization to participate on an advisory basis. These chartered advisory members receive copies of the CGDWG agenda, read-aheads, and approved meeting minutes. Advisory membership responsibilities include:

- Attending CGDWG meetings as requested by the Group.
- Providing advice on Coast Guard and joint doctrinal issues.
- Clearing/commenting on Coast Guard Doctrine documents as required.

5. CGDWG Procedures.

5.1 Administration. Administrative support for the CGDWG will be provided by the CGDWG chairperson.

5.2 Proposals. Proposals to add, revise, or delete Coast Guard doctrine may come from all of the organizations that have voting members at the CGDWG or from the Chief of Staff [or designated official]. Organizations subordinate to CGDWG members may submit proposals through their respective chains of command. Other units submit to the Chief of Staff via the chain of command. Proposals will be transmitted to the CGDWG chairperson for inclusion in the upcoming CGDWG meeting agenda according to a published schedule.

5.2 Read-Ahead Material. The CGDWG chairperson will provide read-ahead materials no later than ten working days prior to the CGDWG. Read-ahead materials will include descriptions of proposed Coast Guard doctrine issues and joint doctrine issues scheduled for discussion at the subsequent JDWP.

5.3 Validation.

5.3.1 *Front-End Analysis.* The CGDWG chairperson will accomplish a "Front-End Analysis" (FEA) of doctrine proposals and provide a recommendation to CGDWG members. The FEA will be presented at the CGDWG meeting and will include an assessment as to:

- Exclusivity (Appropriateness for inclusion as doctrine)
- Doctrinal Level
- Distinctiveness (Not duplicative of existing doctrine)
- Sufficiency (Amount of material)

The CGDWG chairperson will explore relevant sources including lessons-learned files, extant and emerging joint, combined and Coast Guard doctrine, and other sources as appropriate.

5.3.2: *Presentation.* The proposing organization or their designate is authorized to make a presentation on behalf of the proposed issue

5.3.3 *Debate/Vote.* The chairperson will moderate discussion prior to placing the issue before the CGDWG for a recorded vote. In the event of a tie, the chairperson will cast the tie-breaking vote. A majority vote is required for CGDWG approval of the recommendation.

5.4 Meeting Minutes. The designated CGDWG recorder shall keep a detailed record of CGDWG proceedings.

5.5 Electronic CGDWG Meetings. Doctrine issues that require resolution prior to semi-annual meetings may be handled electronically at the discretion of the chairperson. The CGDWG chairperson will transmit issues/assessments via e-mail, message, website, or telephone / fax required to solicit views and votes of CGDWG members. Normal voting procedures apply. Final resolution of the issue will be transmitted in the same manner.

5.6 Approval of CGDWG Proceedings. The CGDWG shall forward its findings to the Chief of Staff [or designate] in the form of recommendations for final approval. After Chief of Staff action, the CGDWG chairperson will notify all CGDWG members and the submitting organization of the disposition of all proposals.

5.7 Visibility. The effectiveness of the Coast Guard Doctrinal System will be enhanced if the Service at large is able to observe the doctrine development process. To that end, the CGDWG shall make every effort to make its processes visible and to keep the Service informed of its activities.

6. **Doctrinal Publication Revision Process**. Coast Guard doctrinal publications shall be reviewed at least every two years from their published date for needed revisions. The CGDWG chairperson will notify CGDWG members as to which publications will be reviewed at semi-annual meetings. CGDWG members may request an out-of-cycle review if a publication contains a significant doctrinal error. The CGDWG should be sensitive to the cross-flow effect that changes to joint publications may have on the Coast Guard Doctrinal System.

7. **JDWP Representation**. The CGDWG chairperson represents the Coast Guard at Joint Doctrine Working Party meetings. The chairperson will provide a briefing at each CGDWG on joint doctrine issues upcoming at the Joint Doctrine Working Party for the purpose of discussing and consolidating Coast Guard positions.

8. **COAST GUARD Doctrine Working Committee (CGDWC).** Based on CGDWG results, the Chief of Staff may convene doctrine working committees composed of subject matter experts from applicable Coast Guard organizations. The objective of the CGDWC is to ensure interested organizations have the opportunity to participate in the doctrine development process and to resolve issues to the maximum extent possible prior to formal coordination. The CGDWC will also conduct follow-on research and develop an extensive framework for the draft of the approved Coast Guard doctrine projects.

9. **CGDWG Charter Amendment**. Amendments to this charter may be submitted by any CGDWG member or through the Chief of Staff. Proposed amendments will be the first order of business at each CGDWG. A two-thirds majority vote of all members is required to approve a charter amendment. The Chief of Staff is the final approval authority for changes to this charter.

Appendix J

Coast Guard Field Comments on Doctrine

ALDIST 222/99, Appendix B solicited comments on the continuing efforts of the Coast Guard to develop a system which would, "...codify its vast array of operational (includes O and M operations) procedures.... into a logical system or hierarchy of doctrine." The response consisted of messages, telephone conversations and a meeting with key planners on the issue in Headquarters.

All of the messages, phone calls, and meetings, both in response to the ALDIST and as part of the research for this study, supported the need for a system of doctrine in the Coast Guard. There were divergent opinions about how it should be accomplished: organize doctrine by function or process—and which functions and which processes; how much control over doctrine should an internal doctrine organization have; to what extent should a paperless system be implemented; and how quickly and economically could it be done?

Hierarchy: Function or Process?

One of the issues raised by the senior staff at Coast Guard Headquarters was that of how to organize the hierarchy: by process or function. A functional hierarchy refers to organizing by Staff Elements, Mission Areas, Strategic Goals, etc. A process hierarchy approaches the problem through the operational activity conducted: one suggestion was Vessel Safety, Response, Waterways Management, and Interdiction.

The functional proponents ranged from those wanting a hierarchy to reflect the Joint Chiefs model (J-1 through J-6) to those preferring a Coast Guard "Roles" model, with a few variations on those two themes.

Paperless System

One respondent spoke to the issue and indicated that paperless systems were inconvenient to use aboard ship. He suggested retaining both.

Doctrine Development Strategy

One respondent suggested that it would be difficult for the Coast Guard to fund a new system and even more so to significantly change the shape of the organization. A development strategy had to respect both issues: low cost, and relatively little organizational change.

Summary

Over 50 persons were contacted for their comments on doctrine in the Coast Guard. Most were Coast Guard or Navy officers, three were active Coast Guard flag officers, one retired. Several civilians (all retired military) who helped set up the current JCS doctrinal system were included. A number of themes emerged. In some of those listed, there was unanimous concurrence. In others there was some divergence, in particular on the expenditure of resources to establish a doctrinal system.

- The approval process for doctrine is far too slow, as is the methodology (print).
- The best place to revise doctrine is at a school site.
- The best place to write doctrine might be at a school site, but some would prefer HQ.
- The best means of organizing doctrine is in some form of Training and Doctrine command that would directly link training and doctrine....
- It would be highly desirable to make this Training and Doctrine Command a flag position, as it is with the other services. However...
- It is not likely the Coast Guard's resource constraints would enable establishing a flag position.
- Second best solutions are available which will still meet the Coast Guard's needs for a doctrinal system (e.g. a Coast Guard TRADOC with an O-6 Commanding and a junior O-6 in charge of Doctrine, an O-5 as XO).
- Funding and personnel resources are critical constraints and could preclude the establishment of a doctrinal system if not appropriately considered.
- The Coast Guard can establish a doctrinal system which is far less complex, less costly and highly effective using current resources plus a moderate "delta" for permanent staff. The doctrine staff would be leveraged by placing them at a large training site where resources could be borrowed when needed.
- Doctrine development, revision and implementation, at the current personnel resource level, are severely handicapped by computer hardware and software in place. Upgrades are needed at least for those who will do this work. However...
- To fully realize the electronic advantages of doctrine, which includes significant savings of time and costs in storing, maintaining and distributing publications, computer upgrades in the field are needed, particularly CD-ROM. (One "workaround": a mainframe computer similar to the MSIS).
- Doctrine needs to be more user friendly: i.e. more easily searched either in a paper mode or by going to an electronic search engine. Additionally, doctrine should be somewhat exclusive—do not mix doctrine with policy and procedures.

Personnel Contacted

The following personnel were either contacted or interviewed. In varying degrees they all provided valuable information, expertise and comment which affected the analysis of this

report. The final interpretation of that information is solely the responsibility of OC Incorporated and may not reflect the complete position of any one individual contacted.

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These persons, all retired military service members on staff at OC, Inc., have extensive experience in doctrine and contributed to this report.

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Appendix K

Joint Doctrine Publication Hierarchy and Selected Pub Excerpts

JOINT DOCTRINE HIERARCHY



Joint Pub 1

Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

10 January 1995

This, the second edition of Joint Pub 1, "Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States," represents a major milestone in our efforts to improve joint doctrine and exemplifies the evolutionary nature of joint doctrine.

Since its release 3 years ago, the concepts and principles found in Joint Pub 1 have been implemented and validated during major operations and deployments in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and Kuwait each skillfully executed by the Armed Forces of our great Nation. The enduring theme -- **joint warfare is team warfare** -- remains at the heart of this capstone publication; that will not hange. This latest edition though reflects our commitment to regularly evise and refine our joint publications to ensure consistency, applicability, nd readability.

This doctrine establishes the foundation of our ability to fight as a oint team, but now the truly hard part begins -- putting this doctrine to se throughout our Armed Forces. So I ask that you read this edition of oint Pub 1, and reflect upon what it says about joint warfare and, in articular, what it says about **attitude**. Then use these concepts as a basis or discussion and debate within your organization, and ensure it is niversally understood and practiced.

To that end, all commanders must understand, teach, and apply joint octrine as they prepare and train the men and women who wear America's niform to fight our Nation's wars. Accordingly, please ensure the widest stribution of this and other joint publications, and promote their use at very opportunity.

JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Joint Pub 1 guides the joint action of the Armed Forces of the United States, presenting concepts molding those Armed Forces into the most effective joint fighting force. These concepts are broad and require a leader's judgment in application. Since the American military has often fought as part of alliances and coalitions, this publication guides our multinational endeavors as well.

The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a team. This does not mean that all forces will be equally represented in each operation. Joint force commanders choose the capabilities they need from the air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces at their disposal. The resulting team provides joint force commanders the ability to apply overwhelming force from different dimensions and directions to shock, disrupt, and defeat opponents. Effectively integrated joint forces expose no weak points or seams to enemy action, while they rapidly and efficiently find and attack enemy weak points. **Joint warfare is team warfare.**

Accordingly, this publication is written to help ensure members of the Armed Forces of the United States fight successfully together. The joint team of the Armed Forces of the United States comprises the members of each Service, active and reserve, and our supporting civilians. Although the Services organize, train, equip, and sustain forces, these forces are employed under joint force commanders. To help achieve our fullest combat potential, all American military leaders must integrate the concepts and values presented in this publication into the operations of the Armed Forces of the United States.

Service skills form the very core of our combat capability. Joint warfare does not lessen Service traditions, cohesion, or expertise. Successful joint operations are impossible without the capabilities developed and embodied in each Service; Service "cultures," heroes, and professional standards are indispensable.

We must expand our tradition of joint victories, building on our extensive history of joint and multinational operations from as long ago as the Revolutionary War. This publication provides examples of American military leaders who used joint solutions, often despite contemporary impediments to joint action. Over time, the American experience in war increasingly demanded joint action. Today, we are making joint action practiced and routine. Whether we have years to plan and rehearse, as in the case of the Normandy invasion, months as in Operation DESERT STORM, or only a few days as in Operation URGENT FURY, the Armed Forces of the United States must always be ready to operate in smoothly functioning joint teams.

This publication describes how we build such teams. Chapter I discusses why we fight, the nature of modern war, and the consequent impact on joint action. Chapter II develops basic military values as they apply to joint teamwork. Chapter III presents the fundamentals of joint warfare. Chapter IV discusses the unifying focus for US military operations, the joint campaign. The publication concludes with an example of a campaign that illustrates these themes.



French engraving from 1781 showing the decisive joint and coalition campaign of Yorktown.

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Quality people positioned at the appropriate place and time are decisive factors in the success of any mission. Effective personnel support, therefore, is the linchpin for successful joint operations. Joint Pub 1-0, "Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations," represents our commitment to this vital component of operational readiness.

This keystone document provides fundamental guidance and procedures for the combatant commander and other joint commanders relative to the conduct of such support; establishes Manpower and Personnel Directorate responsibilities, relationships, and planning considerations; and assists the Services in preparing their respective plans for supporting joint operations.

urge each of you to read Joint Pub 1-0, use its principles as practitioners of joint rine, and ensure its widest dissemination.

HENRY H. SHELTON
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication is a keystone document within the joint doctrine publication system. It establishes the framework for a hierarchy of subordinate publications that provide amplifying guidance regarding joint personnel planning, policy, and procedures. This publication provides fundamental principles, doctrine, processes, techniques, and procedures for personnel support of joint and multinational operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the joint force commander (JFC) from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP) will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable.

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This second edition of Joint Pub 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," represents yet another major milestone in the ongoing efforts to improve joint doctrine. It reflects our commitment to regularly revise and refine joint publications to ensure consistency, applicability, and readability.

This vital keystone publication forms the very core of joint warfighting doctrine and establishes the framework for our forces' ability to fight as a joint team. It is the linchpin of the joint doctrine publication hierarchy; and for good reason. The fundamental concepts and principles contained in Joint Pub 3-0 provide a common perspective from which to plan and execute joint and national operations. This comprehensive document addresses almost aspect of joint warfighting at each level of war and across the range of ry operations. I cannot overemphasize the critical role Joint Pub 3-0 in how joint operations are conducted.

allenge each commander to not only understand the principles of Joint -0, but also teach them to their subordinates and train their organizations these battle-tested tenets. Otherwise, we will not have real doctrine. at end, I solicit your assistance to ensure the widest distribution of this l joint publications, and to promote their use at every opportunity.



JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Scope

Joint Pub 3-0 is the keystone document of the joint operations series. It provides fundamental principles and doctrine for the conduct of joint and multinational operations.

2. Purpose

This publication sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, as well as the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the joint force commander (JFC) from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable.

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The range of military operations, first established in Joint Pub 3-0, described military operations extending from war to military operations other than war (MOOTW). While we have historically focused on warfighting, our military profession is increasingly changing its focus to a complex array of military operations — other than war.

This publication describes the basic tenets of MOOTW — from a general description of all types of operations to planning considerations necessary for
ctive execution. It serves as the springboard into a series of publications
actics, techniques and procedures that provide additional detail on the
e complex MOOTW.

'articipation in MOOTW is critical in the changing international security
ironment. Although the goals and endstates may not be crystal clear,
should spare no effort in planning and executing MOOTW. Your support
ational security interests in today's challenging environment is as crucial
is in war.

'ou should become familiar with the information contained herein — our
on and its independence may depend upon your knowledge.

JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication explains how military operations other than war (MOOTW) differ from large-scale, sustained combat operations. It addresses purpose, principles, types of operations and planning considerations. A doctrinal basis is provided for related joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) publications which address specific types of MOOTW.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations as well as the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the joint force commander (JFC) from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

JOINT PUB 3-07

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP) will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and guidance ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable.

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This second edition of Joint Pub 3-07.2, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism," represents a significant improvement in the key area of force protection.

Joint Pub 3-07.2 provides tactics, techniques, and procedures for the conduct of US antiterrorism operations in joint operations. It discusses US national policy, explains key responsibilities for antiterrorism actions, and covers key command and control relationships. The guidance contained herein provides joint force commanders with the knowledge needed to organize, plan, train for, and conduct antiterrorism operations.

Experience has shown that force protection must be a high priority for any commander. Antiterrorism is essential to a force protection program. Commanders must understand the content of this publication and bring it to bear during joint and multinational operations. Please ensure the widest distribution of this and other joint publications, and promote their use at every opportunity.

HENRY H. SHELTON
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Scope

This publication sets forth the tactics, techniques, and procedures governing the joint conduct of US antiterrorism operations. It provides a basis for understanding US national policy and general objectives relating to antiterrorism and explains important Department of Defense and US Government agency command and control relationships. In addition, it outlines basic US military antiterrorism capabilities and provides commanders with guidance on how to organize, plan, and train for the employment of US forces in interagency and multinational antiterrorism operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine and selected joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the joint force commander (JFC) from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP) will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- **Discusses US National Policy and General Objectives**
- **Explains Important Department of Defense and US Government Agency Command and Control Relationships**
- **Outlines Basic US Military Antiterrorism Capabilities**
- **Provides Guidance for the Employment of US Forces in Antiterrorism Operations**
- **Explains Legal Considerations Affecting the Implementation of Successful Programs**
- **Describes Sources of Intelligence and Counterintelligence**

Combatting Terrorism

Combatting terrorism involves actions taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum.

Specific tactics, techniques, and procedures govern the joint conduct of US antiterrorism operations. **Combatting terrorism is an element of force protection** — a security program designed to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment in all locations and situations. Combatting terrorism involves actions (including antiterrorism and counterterrorism) taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. Antiterrorism involves **defensive measures** used to reduce the vulnerability to terrorist acts, as opposed to counterterrorism which consists of offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.

Department of Defense Roles and Responsibilities

The Department of Defense is responsible for protecting its own personnel, bases, deployed forces, equipment, and installations.

Every commander, regardless of echelon of command or branch of Service, **has an inherent responsibility for planning, resourcing, training, exercising, and executing antiterrorism measures** to provide for the security of the command. Likewise, every **military Service member, Department of Defense (DOD) employee, DOD independent contractor**, and **local national** hired by the Department of Defense, regardless of rank, has an inherent