U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY U.S. COAST GUARD CG-4229 (Rev. 6-04)	**DIGEST**	APPROVAL ☐
		SIGNATURE ☐
		INFORMATION ☒

From: RADM J. T. Riker *Very respectfully,*
Chair, Doctrine Study Group

To: VCG

APR 0 1 2009

Subj: DOCTRINE STUDY GROUP FINAL REPORT

Ref: (a) Your memo 3510 dtd 23 Jun 2008
(b) Doctrine Study Group Report: Preliminary Final Report dtd 19 Dec 2008

1. Attached is the Final Report of the Doctrine Study Group (DSG). It is submitted in accordance with references (a) and (b).

2. Also attached is a draft decision memo for your consideration. The decision memo urges the Coast Guard to commit to a formal doctrine system, establish the Office of Doctrine, and place the office under the Director of Coast Guard Enterprise Strategy and Management.

3. I look forward to scheduling a meeting with you to discuss enclosures (1) and (2).

Encl: (1) Doctrine Study Group Report: Final Report dtd 01 Apr 2009
(2) Draft Decision Memo 5400: Coast Guard Doctrine

SIGNER'S COMMENTS

**U.S. Department of
Homeland Security**

**United States
Coast Guard**

Commandant
United States Coast Guard

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5400

MEMORANDUM

From: J. T. Riker, RADM
      Chair, Doctrine Study Group

Reply to S. J. Bosau, LCDR
Attn of: (202) 372-2686

To: CCG
Thru: VCG

Subj: COAST GUARD DOCTRINE

Ref: (a) VCG memo 3510 dtd 23 Jun 2008: Doctrine Study Group Charter
     (b) COMDT (CG-01T) memo 5000 dtd 25 Feb 2008: Leadership Council Direction – Coast
         Guard Organizational Architecture For Modernization
     (c) Modernization Effort Role and Responsibilities Work Group memo 5000 dtd 21 Apr
         2008: Coast Guard Doctrine and TTP: Key Definitions and Roles and Responsibilities
         For Doctrine/TTP Development Lifecycle
     (d) Doctrine Study Group Report: Preliminary Final Report dtd 19 Dec 2008
     (e) Doctrine Study Group Report: Final Report dtd 01 Apr 2009

1. <u>ISSUE</u>: This memo recommends the establishment of the Coast Guard's doctrine development system. Further, this memo recommends the establishment of the Office of Doctrine (ODOC) to administer the system.

2. <u>BACKGROUND</u>: VCG chartered the Doctrine Study Group (DSG) to examine Service-wide doctrine (reference (a)). The charter referenced roles, responsibilities, and definitions developed as part of the Modernization Effort (references (b) and (c)). The DSG delivered its Preliminary Final Report (reference (d)) on 19 Dec 2008 and circulated it widely for comment. The DSG revised or clarified material as appropriate and delivered its Final Report on 01 Apr 2009
(reference (e)).

The DSG determined that although the Coast Guard currently has doctrine, no formal system exists to ensure its methodical development, uniform editorial standards, consistent use of terms, or timely revisions. Doctrine is developed informally or as a collateral duty. Doctrinal guidance is not easily identifiable because it is intertwined with policy prescription. The DSG reviewed previous Coast Guard studies, benchmarked partner agencies, and developed recommendations for the establishment of the Coast Guard doctrine development system.

3. <u>RECOMMENDATIONS</u>: I recommend you approve the following actions:

a. The Coast Guard shall adopt a formal approach to doctrine development. As initial guidance, the DSG Final Report should be considered authoritative, specifically regarding definitions, hierarchy, architecture, development process, and editorial standards.

APPROVE: _____   DISAPPROVE: _____

b. The Coast Guard shall establish the Office of Doctrine (ODOC) to administer the doctrine development system.

APPROVE: _____   DISAPPROVE: _____

c. ODOC shall report to VCG through Director of Coast Guard Enterprise Strategy and Management.

APPROVE: _____   DISAPPROVE: _____

d. CG-8 shall identify appropriate billet offsets where possible to fully staff ODOC in assignment year 2012. Interim staffing shall be accomplished in assignment year 2009. As a starting point, the recommendations in the DSG report are valid options which should be considered.

APPROVE: _____   DISAPPROVE: _____

e. Within 75 days of ODOC's establishment, the Coast Guard Doctrine Review Board shall convene. It shall plan and prioritize the development of all Organizational Doctrine and assign resources.

APPROVE: _____   DISAPPROVE: _____

#

U.S. Department of
Homeland Security

**United States
Coast Guard**

DOCTRINE STUDY GROUP
REPORT

Final Report

01 APRIL 2009

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Charter

This doctrine study was chartered by the Vice Commandant of the United States Coast Guard. The complete text of the charter may be reviewed at tab (1) of this report.

Doctrine Study Group (DSG) Membership

The following personnel participated in this study:

Study Group:

- LT Jeff Bray (CG-0942) Judge Advocate General & Chief Counsel
- CDR Daniel Schifsky (CG-1B1) Office of Coast Guard Future Forces
- LCDR Alexis Tune (CG-1B1) Office of Coast Guard Future Forces
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- LCDR Steven Bosau (CG-513) Office of Policy Integration
- Mr. Dom DiIulio (CG-532) Office of Counterterrorism & Defense Operations
- Mr. Robert Pond (CG-533) Office of Incident Management & Cross Contingency Planning
- LCDR Connie Ruckstuhl (CG-533) Office of Incident Management & Cross Contingency Planning
- Mr. Robert Sniffen (CG-535) Office of Contingency Exercises
- CDR Keith Bradford (CG-546) Office of Quality Assurance & Traveling Inspections
- LCDR Alan Moore (CG-543) Office of Vessel Activities
- Ms. Jeanine Shipley (CG-6B) Enterprise Architecture & Planning Staff
- Ms. Margaret (James) Sarro (CG-66) Office of Research, Development, & Technical Management
- CDR Joseph Sundland (CG-66) Office of Research, Development, & Technical Management
- CDR Bion Stewart (CG-821) Office of Budget & Programs
- CMC Marvin Wells Command Master Chief, PACAREA
- CDR David Hartt Training Center Yorktown, Performance Technology Center
- Mr. Peter Stoll (LANT(Ax)) Atlantic Area Exercise Branch
- Mr. Robert Goetz (PAC (Px)) Pacific Area Exercise Branch & Deployable Operations Group (DOG)
- Mr. Alvin Cunningham Force Readiness Command (FORCECOM) Implementation Team
- LT Taquita Winn Operations Command (OPCOM) Implementation Team
- CAPT (sel) Sean Burke (CO) CGC ACTIVE

- YNCS Sean McDonald (CG-09T) Strategic Modernization Transition Team
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Steering Group:
- CAPT F. J. Kenney (CG-094 E&8) Judge Advocate General & Chief Counsel
- Dr. S. B. Wehrenberg (CG-1B) Assistant Comdt for Human Resources
- Mr. T. D. Chaleki (CG-434) Shore Facilities Capital Asset Management Division
- CAPT S. M. Neill (CG-511) Office of Strategic Analysis
- CAPT J. J. Fisher (CG-513) Office of Policy Integration
- CAPT M. A. Giglio (CG-531) Office of Law Enforcement
- CAPT E. Gray (CG-532) Office of Counterterrorism & Defense Operations
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- CAPT F. J. Sturm (CG-54D) Director of Prevention Policy
- Ms. S. A. Richardson (CG-61) Office of Information Management
- CAPT M. A. Tekesky (CG-771) Office of Requirements and Analysis
- CAPT A. T. Ewalt (CO TRACEN) Training Center Yorktown
- CAPT M. N. Parks (ACS) Atlantic Area
- CAPT B. J. Marvin (Team Lead) FORCECOM Integration Team
- Mr. J. E. Milligan (DCMS) DCMS Integration Team
- CAPT M. L. Austin (DG-5) Deployable Operations Group
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- CDR James M. Kelly (LETSGO III Team)

Principal Staff:
- LCDR Steven Bosau (CG-513)

Chair:
- RADM J. T. Riker (CG-09)

Purpose

The purpose of this doctrine study has been to examine **Service-wide doctrine** as follows:

- What should be the process through which the U.S. Coast Guard develops doctrine?
- Who should be responsible for which steps in the development process?
- What should be the hierarchy of doctrinal publications?
- What should be the content of doctrinal publications?
- What should be the format of these publications?

Executive Summary

Formal Doctrine System

This report urges the establishment of a formal doctrine system for the U.S. Coast Guard.

Coordinated Leadership and Effective Processing

A Coast Guard Office of Doctrine (ODOC) should be responsible for administering the process. ODOC should consist of a thirteen member staff directed by a GS-15 or O-6. Billets would largely be civilian to assure the institutional continuity necessary for the efficient administration of the doctrine system. The office should report to the proposed Director of Coast Guard Enterprise Strategy and Management.

Policy, Doctrine, and TTP

This report discusses doctrine in relationship to the concepts of policy and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). Policy encompasses rules for action or inaction. By comparison, doctrine is written guidance of an enduring nature. TTP are detailed procedures that should fuse policy and doctrine in practical ways to achieve mission success. Refined to their essence, it may be said:

> Policy prescribes.
> Doctrine guides.
> TTP instructs.

Doctrine Hierarchy

The hierarchy of doctrine should include publications at four levels:

1. **Principles and Culture**, i.e., Coast Guard Publication 1 (Pub 1), at CG-00 level.

2. **Organizational Doctrine**, i.e., staff element publications 1-0 (Human Resources), 2-0 (Intelligence), etc., at Headquarters staff level.

3. **Operational Doctrine** and **Support Doctrine** at Force Readiness Command (FORCECOM) and Deputy Commandant for Mission Support (DCMS) level, respectively.

4. **Operational TTP** and **Support TTP** at FORCECOM and DCMS, respectively, or subordinates as determined by them.

Phases and Steps

The Coast Guard should codify its doctrine process in the four phases and twelve steps identified by the DSG as follows:

PHASES	STEPS
1. Requirements	1. Validation
	2. Tasking
2. Development	3. Drafting
	4. Routing
	5. Approval
3. Execution	6. Publication
	7. Distribution
	8. Training
	9. Usage
4. Maintenance	10. Evaluation
	11. Review
	12. Update

These phases and steps apply regardless of doctrine level or type. However, the cycle process time for lower level doctrine – especially evaluation, review, and update – should proceed more quickly than cycle process time for higher level doctrine. The higher the level of doctrine, the more enduring its guidance will likely be. Thus, more program input is required, leading to longer cycle process times. Meanwhile, lower level publications are tied to lessons learned in the field so they can be promptly revised and redeployed.

Core Doctrine Attributes

<u>Doctrine must be readable</u>. Publications must speak to all personnel within the Coast Guard workforce. Likewise, publications must be readily understandable by external partners.

The purpose of doctrine is to guide – not direct. Therefore, doctrine publications should contain enduring fundamental principles that pertain to the way policy and plans are developed; forces are organized, trained, and employed; and equipment is procured and maintained.

Since doctrine requires judgment in application, it should provide personnel with a standard frame of reference.

Strict editorial guidelines should be observed, chief among them being:

> First, as to verbs – active voice.
> Second, as to pronouns – first person.
> Third, as to structure – simple or compound sentences instead of complex or compound-complex sentences.
> Fourth, as to language – citing Mark Twain – "…plain, simple language, short words and brief sentences…"

<u>Doctrine must be usable</u>. For publications to be valuable, they must include information and ideas that encourage personnel to return to them for practical reasons. Adding practicality will move a publication past a state where the practitioner might view and then simply shelve it, to where the reader might naturally return to the publication from time to time for review and alignment with its guidance.

It is important to craft doctrine to meet the needs of intended end-users. The concept of end-users is not limited to Coast Guard personnel actively conducting operational missions. In addition to serving field personnel, doctrine must simultaneously serve executive leadership in and beyond the Coast Guard, and speak to partner agencies. Thus, doctrine must be aligned to tactical, operational, and strategic audiences. Usable doctrine helps end-users at all levels anticipate actions, set performance expectations, develop appropriate tasking, and execute missions.

<u>Doctrine must be taught</u>. When doctrine is taught or referenced, it is revalidated and strengthened as a guide to common reference and understanding. But teaching does not have to be formal. There are an abundance of opportunities to teach doctrine informally by reference, especially by senior leaders at all organizational levels.

Previous Studies

This current doctrine effort is not the first the Coast Guard has conducted. In fact, the DSG identified five formal studies going back to Mar 1995. This report summarizes the previous studies (and an additional article). For record purposes, the complete texts of their deliverables are attached as tabs (2-6).

No decision memos have been located that document any intentional action regarding the previous doctrine studies. Only in the case of the Training Center (TRACEN) Yorktown Doctrine Study were functional statements changed by proper authority in response to study recommendations.

The previous studies are listed below in chronological order.

1.	Mar 1995	Report of Field Commanders' Concept of Doctrine	RADM Appelbaum RADM Lockwood RADM Peschel
2.	Fall 1996	Presentation: "Coast Guard Doctrine: Analysis & Proposal"	RADM Larrabee CAPT Clay
3.	Oct 1999	Coast Guard Chartered Study: U.S. Coast Guard: A Systems Proposal Charted by ALDIST 222/99 (22 Jun 1999)	CAPT Keith Coddington OC Incorporated
4.	Mar 2004	TRACEN Yorktown Doctrine Study	CAPT Scott Burhoe
5.	Feb 2008	Draft – "Coast Guard Doctrine Development System (COMDTINST 5120.3)" and accompanying "Doctrine Development Process and Procedures"	CAPT J. J. Fisher (CG-513)

1. The Report of Field Commanders' Concept of Doctrine was chartered in Dec 1994 and tasked to report on the following:

- Strength[s] and downsides of a formalized doctrine program.
- Inventory of existing doctrine in the field.
- Significant gaps in field doctrine.
- Linkages of doctrine with Strategic Goals, National Security Strategy, Executive Business Plan, Capital Investment Plan (CIP), Multi-year Budget Strategy (MBS), mission analysis, etc.
- Recommended future courses of action for the development of a formalized doctrine program.

The Field Commanders' study developed a number of opinion papers relating to doctrine. The team also performed case studies on the other four U.S. armed forces, the Royal Australian Air Force, and the Hewlett-Packard Company.

Pages 45-47 of the Field Commanders' report (found in tab (2)) offer a number of conclusions and "…recommends that the Coast Guard implement a doctrine system." But it appears the group was concerned with the timing of implementation. The final recommendation states:

> "As decisions resulting from the training and streamlining team studies are made, and the form of the emergent Coast Guard becomes clearer, a focus group should be assigned to develop specific options to implement a doctrine system within the Coast Guard."

2. In the fall of 1996, RADM Larrabee and CAPT Clay led a focus group and developed the slide presentation attached at tab (3). Although no text report is attached to the slides, CAPT Clay authored an article in the winter 1996-1997 issue of *Joint Forces Quarterly*. The article, "The Fifth Service Looks at Doctrine," is attached at tab (4) and seems to mirror the slide presentation. The focus group agreed with the Field Commanders' recommendation that the Coast Guard should organize its library consistent with the Joint Staff model. The report presents additional recommendations concerning the use of the World Wide Web for publication and distribution of doctrine. A major focus of the report was the development and sharing of unit level TTP. It appears the intention was to allow units the freedom to establish their own TTP and to facilitate sharing of their best practices and lessons learned through computer resources.

3. The Coast Guard chartered another study in ALDIST 222/99 (22 Jun 1999): U.S. Coast Guard: A Systems Proposal. OC Incorporated conducted this effort. Its report referenced both previous efforts and reinforced their recommendations by remarking:

> "The organizational conditions existing at the time of the 1995 Doctrine Study may have changed, the Streamlining and Training Studies recommendations having been implemented. But, the conclusions and recommendations from the 1995 Study are still valid. The Coast Guard is still in need of a doctrinal system and needs to link training and doctrine."

The OC Incorporated report drew additional conclusions and recommendations which can be found on pages 4-1 and 4-2 of the report located at tab (5).

4. The TRACEN Yorktown Doctrine Study was chartered in the fall of 2003 and this team published a white paper in Mar 2004. The focus of the study was the linkage between doctrine and training. The study group reviewed and supported the 1995 report referenced above and recommended:

> "As the fledgling DHS [Department of Homeland Security] gains greater national recognition, it will require a Center of Excellence for linking doctrine and training to bring overlapping interests together for optimizing mission effectiveness. The Coast Guard should lead the way by standing up a single-point command for developing doctrine, driving training and budget requirements, linking doctrine with training, and capturing lessons learned."

The charter and white paper are included at tab (6).

5. Most recently, CG-513 developed a draft Commandant Instruction for the following stated purposes:

> "This instruction establishes a system for articulating Doctrine in a library of publications which capture the fundamental principles that guide the Coast Guard in supporting national objectives. It establishes roles, responsibilities, and standards for the development and administration of the Coast Guard Doctrine System."

In addition, CG-513 developed a draft document titled "Doctrine Development Process and Procedures." This document was an effort to supply the detail needed to begin drafting doctrine. Both of these documents were developed in coordination with CG-512's effort to publish "Coast Guard Pub 5-0: Policy and Planning." The Pub 5 effort included a series of doctrinal publications discussing planning and articulating the process for delivering "Strategic Intent."

The draft Commandant Instruction (with its associated process guide) and the draft Pub 5 series were set aside in the spring of 2008 to await the results of this DSG report. The most current drafts are included at tabs (7) and (8).

Much of what is included in this doctrine study is based upon or taken directly from these previous studies. What distinguishes this study is the level of detail offered with regard to formalizing oversight of the doctrine process, the resources necessary to establish the process, and a plan to implement the process.

The Modernization Effort and This Doctrine Study

This study has been conducted in conjunction with the Coast Guard's ongoing Modernization Effort, which is led by CG-09T, formally CG-01T.

Two of the eight Modernization Critical Success Factors published on 12 Sep 2007 are especially relevant to doctrine. First, "Authority and Responsibility" provides: "The Coast Guard must have clear lines of authority and responsibility [as to]…Doctrine and TTP."

Second, "Policies, Processes, and Procedures" provides:

> "The Coast Guard must have a system that continuously addresses process management Coast Guard-wide to include review, revision, and documentation of Coast Guard processes…[and]… must have supporting organizational policies and procedures (e.g. Standard Operating Procedures, Organization Manuals, Instructions, etc.) and a process to ensure this documentation is maintained and updated in a timely manner."

A complete text of the eight published Modernization Critical Success Factors is attached at tab (9).

Care has been taken to reference and use the key definitions of policy, doctrine, types of doctrine, and TTP approved by CG-01T. Additionally, approved Modernization Effort decisions that identify responsible entities for doctrine and TTP have been used.

Finally, the DSG worked with FORCECOM planners to ensure alignment between the system proposed by this study and FORCECOM approved responsibilities.

Authoritative References in This Study's Charter

The Doctrine Study Group charter included three references, two of which are relevant to this study. Both were directly sourced from the Modernization Effort. The charter and its references are attached at tab (1).

Reference (a) is COMDT (CG-01T) memo 5000 to CG-00 dated 25 Feb 2008. Among other things, this memo establishes the baseline for Modernization Effort organizational architecture as it relates to doctrine. Specifically, FORCECOM essential capabilities include responsibility for legacy Operational Doctrine and TTP, and the development of new Operational Doctrine and TTP. However, it is important to note that FORCECOM alone will not be responsible for the development, drafting, and maintenance of doctrine. DCMS – not FORCECOM – will be responsible for mission Support Doctrine at the organizational, mission support operations, and TTP levels. Meanwhile, elements of the Vice Commandant's staff, DCO, and OPCOM will also have some doctrine responsibilities within their bailiwicks.

Reference (b) is Modernization Effort Roles and Responsibilities Work Group memo 5000 dated 21 Apr 2008. Endorsed by CG-01T, the memo defines the terms "policy," "doctrine," and "TTP" for the Coast Guard as follows (including full discussion text as quoted):

> **"Policy:** *Restrictive or prescriptive direction issued by an accountable person in authority to accomplish a planned outcome.*
>
> *Discussion:*
> * *Going forward, use of the words "shall" and "will" are recommended when stating policy.**
>
>   (*NOTE: The DSG recommends discontinuing the use of "will" as a substitute for "shall" as further explained at page 17 of this report. Additionally, the DSG opines that "must" can be a suitable term when expressing policy.)
>
> * *Legacy CG directives do not necessarily employ the words "shall," "will," and "may" to discriminate between policy, doctrine, and TTP.*
> * *A person in authority includes a properly designated commander over subordinate forces involving the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives, and the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission.*
> * *Policy can exist at all organizational levels.*

- *Policy comes in two types: that which can be waived by higher authority (internal Coast Guard-generated policy) and that which cannot (established by law and other regulatory agencies).*
- *Policy that endures for an extended period of time can become Doctrine.*
- *Policy influences Doctrine.*

*"**Doctrine:** Fundamental principles and officially sanctioned beliefs which guide the Coast Guard in support of national objectives. Doctrine is authoritative but not directive, requires judgment in application, and provides decision makers and personnel a standard frame of reference.*

Discussion:
- *Going forward, the terms "shall" or "will" are inappropriate for doctrine, except in the context of historical policy that becomes doctrine over time. This concept does not apply when determining whether pre-existing directives are properly classified as policy, doctrine or TTP.*
- *Legacy CG directives do not necessarily employ the words "shall," "will," and "may" to discriminate between policy, doctrine, and TTP.*
- *Doctrine embodies enduring fundamental principles that promote unity of purpose, guide professional judgment, and enable our people to best fulfill national objectives.*
- *Doctrine pertains to the way in which policy and plans are developed; forces are organized, trained, and employed; and equipment is procured and maintained.*
- *Doctrine provides the principles to achieve organizational intent, performance, operations, readiness, support, and resource management.*
- *Coast Guard Doctrine addresses both internal (Coast Guard) and external (Joint/DoD, international, interagency) principles.*
- *Doctrine defines how we work with multiple organizations or units. Provides a shared way of "how" to think, not "what" to think.*
- *Doctrine guides TTP and influences Policy.*

*"**Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP):** Codified, specific, and measurable actions and methods that implement doctrine or policy.*

***Tactics:** The employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other.*
***Techniques:** Non-prescriptive ways or methods used to perform missions, functions, or tasks.*
***Procedures:** Standard, detailed steps that prescribe how to perform specific tasks.*

Discussion:
- *TTP is the content [sic] and is published in a variety of ways.*
- *"Forces" includes capability, resources, personnel, funding, etc., to accomplish the mission.*
- *Duties and responsibilities are delineated within TTP.*

- *TTP provides the specific "What," "When," "How," "Where," "Who," and "Why;" the "Why" is provided for insight into proper selection of tactics and techniques."*

Refined to their essence, the DSG summarizes the above definitions as follows:

<div align="center">

Policy **prescribes.**
Doctrine **guides.**
TTP **instructs.**

</div>

Reference (b) also identifies four types of Coast Guard doctrine:

*"**Principles and Culture:** The overarching guidance communicating the intent, purpose, history, ethos, values, and reason for the existence of the Coast Guard, its missions, and its workforce. For example, principles and culture that drive Coast Guard activities and align them with national objectives are communicated within Pub 1: U.S. Coast Guard America's Maritime Guardian.*

*"**Organizational:** A series of publications promulgated to communicate unity of effort and guide professional judgment. Organizational doctrine is authoritative but requires judgment in application and influences how forces are organized and trained, as well as how systems and equipment are procured and maintained.*

*"**Operational:** Guidance on developing and performing mission execution processes and meeting operational standards. It provides operational guidance for subordinate commanders to follow in carrying out routine Coast Guard missions. It is intended to assist subordinate commanders in making resource apportionment decisions.*

*"**Support:** Guidance on developing and performing mission support activities; delivering required capability; and meeting support standards informed by readiness, operational, and resource priorities. Guides the delivery of full life-cycle support to Coast Guard forces to enable and sustain mission execution."*

Finally, reference (b) assigns primary and secondary responsibility for different phases of the doctrine development process to different staffs based on the type of doctrine. This assignment of responsibility may be reviewed in matrix format by reviewing the Doctrine Study Group Charter reference (b) located in tab (1).

The Relationship of Coast Guard Doctrine to Departments of Defense (DoD) and Homeland Security (DHS)

As to DoD, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, is responsible for "…[d]eveloping doctrine for the joint employment of the armed forces." (10 USC 153(a)(5)(A)). United States Code Title

10, Section 101 statutorily defines the Coast Guard as an "Armed Force." Likewise, United States Code Title 14, Section 1 states that the Coast Guard is a member of the armed forces at all times. Thus, the Coast Guard has obligations to the Joint Doctrine process.

Additionally, other DoD and Allied doctrine influences Coast Guard doctrine.

As to the DHS, it would appear individual department components are responsible for their own doctrine. DHS has not drafted comprehensive interagency doctrine or a process for developing such doctrine. However, DHS is now circulating a comprehensive joint planning process document that includes a chapter on joint planning doctrine. The text of the proposed "Integrated Planning System (IPS) for Homeland Security (26 Nov 2008), Chapter 2 – Planning Doctrine" is attached as tab (10). Also, DHS has established the Doctrine and Concept Development Division within the Office of Operations Coordination and Planning. A Senior Executive Service (SES) member directs this office. It is currently billeted only for an SES and a GS-12, but has leveraged contractor support.

By virtue of the fact that the Coast Guard has always existed within both the military and civil authority worlds, it is one of the primary "linguists" of the federal government, i.e., it speaks several agency languages. So long as federal agencies and departments lack a truly common language – and there is no reason to expect that this current reality will change anytime soon – inconsistent or contradictory terminology will appear as a vexing problem from time to time. The Coast Guard should actively continue to support use of common reference terms. This means it must remain attentive to DHS doctrine efforts so as to encourage common terms and approaches between DoD and DHS, the two federal departments most directly assigned the mission of defending the Nation.

The Common Language Imperative

Common terms of reference are essential to developing, writing, deploying, and understanding doctrine. Doctrine is language based; without a common language spread throughout the Service, meaningful Service-wide doctrine cannot be effectively developed, and what is more important, understood.

By definition, doctrine is guidance intended to be applied with judgment. If words are used without the requisite degree of intellectual rigor, the value of the guidance is considerably diminished. And while the common usage and the meaning of terms can change over time, it is important to explicitly acknowledge and validate such changes.

Toward this end, the following terms and definitions have been used throughout the research, deliberation, and preparation of this doctrine study in addition to those Modernization Effort-related terms discussed above. These terms are all relevant to the worlds of policy, doctrine, and TTP. They provide context for understanding and interpreting them.

When available, definitions have been taken or adapted from the "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms" (Joint Pub 1-02), and the "DHS Lexicon: Terms

and Definitions." When not established by these sources, definitions have been adapted by the DSG from common dictionaries.

The terms are listed in the order used below.

Goals: Achievements toward which effort is directed. As between goals and objectives, an "achievement" is a higher level of accomplishment than an "outcome." (See "**Objectives**.")

Objectives: Outcomes that one's actions are intended to accomplish. (See "**Goals**.")

Strategies: Prudent ideas for employing instruments of power to achieve objectives.

Plans: Detailed schemes, worked out beforehand, to accomplish a purpose.

Roles: Functions or activities for which one is specially fitted.

Missions: Specific tasks or responsibilities that one is called upon to undertake.

By way of example, to appreciate further the relevancy of these terms to the worlds of policy, doctrine, and TTP, consider the following discussion in which all are used.

*The essence of our national **goals** is stated in the Declaration of Independence, as follows:*

> *"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain Unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed…"*

*Thus, our national **goals** – the achievements toward which our efforts are directed – are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.*

*To achieve these **goals**, a government was formed under the Constitution of 1787, the Preamble to which states its **objectives** as follows:*

> *"We, the People of the United States, in Order to*
> > *Form a more perfect Union,*
> > *Establish Justice,*
> > *Insure domestic Tranquility,*
> > *Provide for the Common defense,*
> > *Promote the general Welfare, and*
> > *Secure the Blessings of Liberty*
> > > *to ourselves and our Posterity*
> *Do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."*

*So, if the government accomplishes its **objectives**, our national **goals** will be achieved.*

*Strategies** come next in line. They are prudent ideas by which the government employs instruments of national power to accomplish **objectives**. Examples of national strategies currently include the National Security Strategy, the National Strategy for Homeland Security, and the National Strategy for Maritime Security.*

As a statutorily created military service and a branch of the armed forces, the Coast Guard is an instrument of national power.

*Next come **plans**. These are the detailed schemes worked out beforehand to accomplish a purpose. The purpose of national **plans** is to accomplish the national **strategies** for which each has been written.*

*To accomplish **plans**, one turns to those instruments of national power that are capable of fulfilling relevant **roles**. The Coast Guard currently fulfills three **roles**. It is specially fitted for the functions of:*

> *Maritime Safety*
> *Maritime Security*
> *Maritime Stewardship*

*The next term in the line of analysis is **mission**, i.e., tasks or responsibilities that one is specifically called upon to undertake. Consistent with its three **roles**, the Coast Guard has been specifically called upon to undertake eleven **missions**:*

Maritime Safety	*Marine Safety*
	Search and Rescue
Maritime Security	*Drug Interdiction*
	Migrant Interdiction
	Defense Readiness
	Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security
Maritime Stewardship	*Living Marine Resources*
	Marine Environmental Protection
	Other Law Enforcement
	Aids to Navigation
	Ice Operations

*To execute its **missions**, the Coast Guard:*

> *Establishes **policy** that prescribes;*
> *Uses **doctrine** that guides; and*
> *Develops supporting **TTP** that instruct.*

*In other words, **policy**, **doctrine**, and **TTP** must link **mission** execution with national **plans** and **strategies** to meet national **objectives** that secure national **goals**.*

To return to the beginning point of this discussion: Terms of common reference are essential to an organization's development of policy, doctrine, and TTP, and the context in which they must be interpreted and used.

Doctrine in the Coast Guard

I. An Early Heritage of Doctrine

Doctrine is not new to the Coast Guard. Among federal agencies, the Coast Guard was one of the first to possess doctrine. As noted in Pub 1,

> "No other service or agency of the federal government ever received clearer sailing directions than the Coast Guard did from its founder, Alexander Hamilton. It is known that Hamilton had a deep and abiding concern as to the conduct of his crews. This is evidenced by his superbly crafted 04 June 1791 'Letter of Instruction'."

It is interesting that while the letter itself is referred to as one of "instruction," this was not Hamilton's term. He did not title his letter, and actually introduced its text to revenue cutter commanders as follows:

> "…I send you a copy of the Act under which you have been appointed…and I…add *such observations* as appear to me requisite *to guide* you in fulfilling the intent of that act." (Emphasis supplied)

Consistent with the concept of doctrine, the letter was authoritative, required judgment in application, and was intended to provide revenue cutter personnel with a standard frame of reference. Thus, the letter is more akin to doctrine than policy.

The letter also provided some authority regarding the necessity to maintain current doctrine. Consider the following remarks written by Captain-Commandant Horatio Davis Smith in his manuscript of the Early History of the United States Revenue Marine Service:

> "…the [04 Jun] Circular embodied the views of the Secretary concerning the Service he had created…[H]e was ever ready to listen to *suggestions* of officers tending *to improve* the Corps, and stood ready *to aid the evaluation and improvement* of the Service…" (Emphasis supplied)

II. A Brief Discussion on the Current Picture

The following discussion is largely an adaptation and synthesis of two documents: (1) the problem statement from the Report of Field Commanders' Concept of Doctrine, Mar 1995; and (2) the Modernization Effort Roles and Responsibilities Work Group Memo dated 21 Apr 2008: Key Definitions and Roles and Responsibilities for Doctrine/TTP Development Lifecycle (tab (1) reference (b)). Despite the fact these two documents were prepared thirteen years apart, they relate to each other remarkably well. The Field Commanders' 1995 observations remain current.

A. Doctrine as a Concept

- Doctrine consists of those officially sanctioned beliefs and fundamental principles that guide the Coast Guard in support of national objectives.
- Doctrine is authoritative, but it is not directive.
- It requires judgment in application.
- Good doctrine provides decision makers and personnel with a common frame of reference for effective action.
- Good doctrine simplifies procedures.
- Good doctrine provides organizational continuity.
- Good doctrine is useful.
- To endure, doctrine must be taught methodically and reviewed periodically.

B. Present State of Coast Guard Doctrine

- The Coast Guard does not have a formalized program for the development and deployment of doctrine, and there are no formal connections among doctrine, training, and resources in our Service.
- Doctrine exists in myriad forms in the Coast Guard.
- There is no standardized approach and doctrine is by no means universal.
- There is no mechanism for readily updating doctrine to meet the changes in the operational environment; the doctrine written into otherwise valid Commandant Instructions may not reflect current equipment, conditions, or circumstances.
- The Coast Guard intertwines policy, doctrine, and TTP in directives published as Commandant Instructions, Manuals, and Notices.
- Contemporary media allows prescription and guidance to be disseminated in other than historic modes. This phenomenon makes it easier to distribute but hard to reconcile such information.

C. Impact of Present State

- The most serious impact of the lack of a formalized doctrine program is the disconnect between doctrine and training – there is no established mechanism to cycle the valuable knowledge accrued through operational experience and experimentation back into academia and training centers.
- Benefits of operational experience and experimentation tend to remain within local circles as opposed to becoming updates in the Service as a whole, hence sub-optimizing operational procedure and preventing unity of effort.
- As currently written, intertwining policy, doctrine, and TTP requires the reader to evaluate specific lines of text to judge whether the statements are policy directives or doctrinal guidance.
- This injects an element of uncertainty into a system designed to provide clear direction and guidance.

D. Doctrine and Resources

- The absence of a formalized doctrine program precludes use of key factors in making resource decisions.

III. The Relationship Between Policy and Doctrine

The concepts of "policy" and "doctrine" – their definitions and who is responsible for their development and maintenance – have been debated within the Service for years. This is no small issue, and it is certainly not an academic one as the Coast Guard embarks on its Modernization Effort. The Coast Guard must arrive at a common understanding of the difference between the two concepts. This clarity would insure everyone within the organization understands who is responsible for each in the modernized Coast Guard.

To restate the essence of their definitions, "Policy **prescribes**. Doctrine **guides**."

The hallmark of policy is the use of the terms "must" and "shall." These are mandatory terms. They require compliance or action. The term "prescribe" encompasses the term "restricts." Thus, other hallmarks of policy are the terms "must not" and "shall not."

By comparison, the hallmark of doctrine is the use of the terms "can" and "may." These are permissive terms. The term "should" is a mandatory term **unless justifiable reason** exists for not complying. Since there is a significant degree of judgment included within its use, the term "should" is more associated with doctrine than policy.

The term "will" is sometimes used in place of "shall." This is incorrect in the context of both doctrine and policy. "Will" applies only to a statement of future condition and should not to be used in place of "shall."

It is generally agreed that in its informal approach to doctrine, the Coast Guard has not rigorously adhered to the above editorial standards regarding hallmark terms. For the time being, Coast Guard elements must consider these terms in the context presented. Meanwhile, the doctrine system established by the modernized Coast Guard must embark on a methodical review of its documents and publications to reconcile possible conflicts in interpretation.

The origin of policy *vis-à-vis* doctrine – which comes first? – has been the subject of energetic discussions for a long while. With a healthy respect for the intellect and convictions of those on both sides of the point, this current study concludes: (1) Policy and doctrine inform and influence each other. (2) Each can precede the other as to a particular matter. (3) But where policy and doctrine conflict, policy trumps doctrine unless policy is specifically revised to match the doctrine (optional). Otherwise, doctrine must be revised to match the policy (mandatory).

A formal doctrine process is preferable to an informal one. Three chief reasons support this. First, an informal process is an uncertain one, especially as to review and revision. It admits to no timeline. Second, an informal process minimizes accountability for development and timely update. Its link to training is haphazard. Third, the Coast Guard formal directives system – which is the making of policy – and the informal doctrine process – which deals with the understanding of policy through guidance – do not adequately complement each other. Doctrine and policy development are two different efforts that require intellectual discipline. Each effort should check or validate the other. But informal doctrine cannot be relied upon consistently to do either.

Policymakers should have an abiding interest in knowing whether a policy makes sense, is complete, and is understood. Doctrine can inform them of the answer. If the answer to all three questions is "yes," then policymakers should see the intent of their policy reflected in the guidance provided by doctrine. If the answer is "no" to any of the three questions, it is likely that doctrine writers will produce inconsistent, incomplete, or unclear guidance. Then perhaps, the policymakers need to rethink or revise their policy.

As between policy and doctrine, policy is generally the more detailed of the two. After all, if one is prescribing or restricting certain actions, one must account for the specifics of the action. Meanwhile, guidance is more general since the professional judgment of the reader or actor is supposed to fill in more of the details.

Reference to hallmark terms does not end the discussion. No definition is entirely "pure." Circumstances experienced in the field can blur the practical distinction between prescription and guidance. But if the Modernization Effort is to succeed, each individual in the enterprise must have a clear sense of where policy and doctrine originate, how they fit together, and how they **must be fused** to conduct successful operations. Fundamentally, the success of policy and doctrine is determined at the point where mission theory comes in direct contact with field reality.

Therefore, some additional thoughts regarding the concepts of policy and doctrine are warranted.

Policy in the Coast Guard is developed according to the Directives System, COMDTINST M5215.6E. Policy is most often generated from Headquarters elements via Commandant Instructions. Consistent with these instructions, policy may also be prescribed at the area, district, sector, or unit levels. This will remain the case in a modernized Coast Guard. Headquarters – especially the DCO and DCMS organizations – will continue to reside in the policy and resource world. Such guidance as Headquarters elements may choose to provide should link the broadest of principles and purposes to national goals, objectives, strategies, and plans.

Therefore, any guidance, i.e., doctrine, which focuses on national goals, objectives, strategies, broad principles of interagency, or interdepartmental relations, and broad principles of military organization, equipage, and training, should originate at Headquarters. This is the meaning of "Organizational Doctrine."

Meanwhile, a specially new feature in the Coast Guard Modernization Effort will be the creation of FORCECOM. While DCMS and OPCOM each are essentially the consolidation of existing operations and support elements, the Coast Guard does not currently have a command devoted solely to the organizing, equipping, and training of forces. Proper training of forces requires more detailed guidance and instruction. Modernization Effort foundation documents clearly establish FORCECOM as responsible for legacy and new "Operational Doctrine and TTP."

Therefore, the more detailed guidance relating to operational considerations should originate at FORCECOM as Operational Doctrine and TTP. This would include organization specific relationships between Coast Guard mission areas, other agencies or departments, and specific instructions on how to conduct tasks and missions.

Considering the field perspective, one would expect that front line personnel likely do not care who is responsible for providing the policy or doctrine. They want prescription and guidance that is timely and clear. They want convenient access to both, especially at the moment of mission execution and, perhaps, peril. Therefore, when possible, the field should possess materials that combine guidance and prescription in a **clearly delineated fashion**.

This is especially true taking into account the Coast Guard's rich and proud tradition of delegating authority to the most junior level. The seeds of disaster can be sown through misunderstood, inconsistent, or inaccessible guidance.

IV. The Concept of Operational Doctrine as It Relates to Mission Support

In view of the Modernization Effort, two other doctrinal concepts need to be reconciled with clarity. These concepts are "Operational" and "Support" Doctrine. As noted earlier, FORCECOM will become the steward of Operational Doctrine and TTP. This tasking specifically appears in FORCECOM's CG-00 approved Essential Capability statements. (See reference (a) to the Doctrine Study Group Charter.) Meanwhile, DCMS will be responsible for

Support Doctrine. Although this responsibility does not appear in its Essential Capability statements, it does appear in Modernization Effort approved materials. (See reference (b) to the Doctrine Study Group Charter, slide 6.)

The question thus arises as to how broadly one defines "Support Doctrine." Some aspects of mission support are actually conducted by performing tasks that are operational in nature. Doctrine for these tasks should be FORCECOM's responsibility. Other mission support tasks focus on maintenance. Doctrine for these tasks should be DCMS's responsibility.

Operational support tasks are activities that deliver personnel, equipment, and sustaining supplies to the frontline of an underway operational mission. Maintenance support tasks are activities that keep personnel, equipment, systems, and facilities in proper condition for future use. Maintenance support tasks also include activities that procure and stockpile sustainment supplies for future use.

The following three examples will help clarify the difference:

Underway replenishment (UNREP) is a mission support activity with an obvious and immediate connection to conducting operations. UNREP is not a maintenance function but an activity needed to keep an operating unit on scene and able to conduct its missions. If the Coast Guard were to write doctrine for UNREP, FORCECOM would have lead responsibility.

By comparison, although aircraft maintenance is certainly essential to conducting safe operations, the activity concerns itself with keeping the asset in proper condition for future use. The term "future" is used here to include the concept "immediate" as well as "long term." Regardless, doctrine related to aircraft maintenance systems or procedure cards would be the responsibility of DCMS.

Some mission support doctrinal publications will include both operational and maintenance guidance. Consider the Ordnance Manual (COMDTINST M8000.2D). It discusses ordnance administration, accountability, and weapons maintenance, which are within the purview of DCMS. But the manual also discusses training, qualification, methods of carry, and standard operating procedures for weapons, which are arguably FORCECOM's responsibility. In these circumstances, the Coast Guard will need a mechanism to determine ownership of the publication section by section. Detailed below (page 33) is a recommendation to establish of the Office of Doctrine. Amongst other responsibilities, ODOC would identify these situations, bring the appropriate entities together, and determine ownership of the mission support doctrine.

V. Doctrine and TTP

As identified early in this text, the term TTP stands for Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. The Modernization Effort approved definition of each bears repeating:

Tactics are the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other.

Techniques are non-prescriptive ways or methods used to perform missions, functions, or tasks. In other environments they might be referred to as best practices.

Procedures are standard, detailed steps that prescribe how to perform specific tasks.

TTP usually reside as a subset of doctrine. They are intended to take policy informed by doctrine, and translate both into operational reality and mission execution. Since no TTP can truly anticipate every situation in which they may be used, TTP require judgment in application.

VI. Doctrine and Coast Guard Pub 1

Coast Guard Pub 1, first published in 2002, fits the definition of one type of Coast Guard doctrine, namely Principles and Culture. Several aspects of its development are instructive.

Many hands played significant roles in the development of this document. In 1998, one group explained the need for such a document as follows:

> "…to communicate a clearly articulated definition of who we are and what we are about [both internally and externally]…[K]ey to any relationship is the need for a shared understanding of identity, culture, and heritage…We in the Coast Guard need some…organizational bench marking…This agreement is especially difficult to reach in an agency with so many missions, and where our people are so diverse and broadly dispersed."

It is worth reviewing the final statement of purpose offered for the proposed text of Pub 1 in a 14 Jun 2000 letter to the Commandant. The letter can be found at tab (11).

- To provide terms of common reference for our Service regarding what we do, who we are, whence we came, and how we do things.
- To provide a common meeting ground of beliefs about our Service – especially its nature.
- To provide context for other major documents critical to our Service.

Pub 1 is usable doctrine. One significant reason for its utility is Chapter 4 – Principles of Coast Guard Operations. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on the Coast Guard's effective response to Hurricane Katrina referenced this practical doctrine as follows:

> "Of the estimated 60,000 people left stranded by Hurricane Katrina, over 33,500 were saved by the Coast Guard. Precisely identifying why the Coast Guard was able to respond as it did may be difficult, but underpinning these efforts were factors such as the agency's operational principles. These principles promote leadership, accountability, and enable personnel to take responsibility and

action, based upon relevant authorities and guidance." (GAO-06-903, Jul 2006 located at tab (12))

The drafters of Pub 1 took care to limit the number of operating principles. As noted in the Jun 2000 correspondence directed to the Commandant:

> "[The drafters] deliberately sought to limit the number of principles to between 6 and 8. A number greater than that would fairly open the door to a much more lengthy [sic] – and thus unwieldy – list."

In the end, Pub 1 drafters concluded that seven operational principles were the outside limit if personnel in the field were expected to recall and refer to the principles on a routine basis.

The principles were selected based upon specific criteria. As identified in the Jun 2000 correspondence:

> "[Principles of operations must be concepts:]
>
> 1. …ingrained in our operations and considered a part of our unwritten culture.
> 2. …applicable across all Coast Guard roles and missions.
> 3. …capable of succinct title and description."

Pub 1 is expected to continue as our Service's capstone doctrinal publication. True, it is a pre-September 11th, 2001 document, and significant history has been experienced since then. But while the document needs review and updating to account for these past eight years – a process already commenced and well underway – no comprehensive rewrite is needed or recommended.

VII. Existing Doctrine Development Resources in the Coast Guard

As previously discussed, the Coast Guard has informally developed and written doctrine concurrently with policy directives. Commandant Instructions are most often authored by Headquarters staff as a collateral duty or as one of many *ad hoc* assignments.

The DSG was able to identify only a single billet in Headquarters that is assigned Coast Guard doctrine development as a **primary** duty. This billet resides within CG-5132. CG-5132, the Division of Processes and Doctrine Integration, has the following functional statements:

> 1. Under the direction and supervision of the Chief, Office of Policy Integration (CG-513), CG-5132:
>
>   a. Integrates and coordinates internal and external processes and doctrine.
>   b. Leads the development and provides oversight for Coast Guard cross-directorate processes as required and transfers implementation to the designated offices.
>   c. Develops and manages an enterprise-wide doctrinal architecture.

      d. Integrates and coordinates internal and external doctrine.
      e. Serves as the Coast Guard's point of contact for national, DHS, and interagency, as appropriate, for coordination and integration of nascent and cross-directorate processes and doctrine.

CG-5132 has five billets serving under the Division Chief. But four are currently dedicated to other initiatives.

Meanwhile, CG-532 has specific responsibilities which relate to joint, allied, and naval doctrine. CG-532 is an active participant in the Joint Doctrine Development Community (JDDC) and serves as the Coast Guard's voting member. As such, it reviews all joint doctrine and ensures Coast Guard equities are properly represented. CG-532 serves as the conduit for joint doctrine concepts introduced into the Service. While the full functional statements for CG-532 may be reviewed at tab (13), the specific references to responsibilities are listed below.

- "Coordinate the review and approval of Coast Guard inputs to joint, allied, and naval doctrine including governing policy guidance and directives. Oversee distribution of joint, allied and naval doctrine publications to appropriate operational and supporting commanders. Serve as the Coast Guard's voting member in the Joint Doctrine Development Community. Represent Coast Guard interests in doctrine community conferences, working groups and other events."

- "Develop, coordinate and apply U.S. Coast Guard operational level concepts for joint DoD, DHS, and service war gaming use, and recommend new programs, doctrine and procedures derived from concept development and associated war gaming. Coordinate service participation and represent the Coast Guard in U.S. Joint Forces Command and service concept development programs. Represent and advance U.S. Coast Guard concepts and doctrine in relevant joint and service programs and documents."

Outside Headquarters, TRACEN Yorktown has assigned functional statements regarding doctrine development:

"…Align doctrine and training/performance support by assisting program managers with the development and update of tactical and operations level Coast Guard doctrine. Provide ad hoc support as resources allow."

Chief of Staff memo 5400 of 18 Sep 2006, that reorganized TRACEN Yorktown's Performance Technology Division, is included in tab (14). It lists seven billets in the "Doctrine, Acquisition, and Evaluation Branch." Discussions with the branch chief revealed that personnel in the branch focus primarily on acquisition. Relevant to doctrine, the branch's functional statements are below:

"1. Doctrine Assistance: Develop a standardized process for doctrine
      development. Serve as an organizational focal point working with
      programs on the development of tactical and operational level doctrine.

    a. Assist and consult with programs to better define program goals (i.e. mission
         analysis).
    b. Assist and consult with programs regarding developing performance-centric
         tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) level doctrine.
    c. Assist programs and schools in designing technology tools for capturing
         operational lessons learned and best practices for quick insertion in training,
         performance support, and doctrine.
    d. Develop electronic tracking tools which [sic] capture best practices and/or lessons
         learned.
    e. Assist TRACEN residents [sic] training programs in identifying best practice
         processes for infusing operational lessons learned into TTP."

In addition, TRACEN Yorktown's Boat Forces and Cutter Operations Branch, Doctrine
and Standardization Section has the following relevant functional statements:

"5. Create, standardize, align, update and manage Boat Forces doctrine, and
      provide input to other policies that impact the boat forces community.

    5.1. Provide detailed input/feedback for CG-731, CG-751 and the DOG during the
         clearance process.
    5.2. Consolidate feedback from other staff elements within the Branch and from the
         field regarding policy deficiencies and provide recommendations to
         headquarters on such feedback.
    5.3. Provide detailed feedback on AOPS/TMT to CG-731 to ensure the tool supports
         and aligns with existing doctrine."

Methodology Used for This Study

Methodology for this study was announced by the Chair's memorandum to the DSG dated
03 Jul 2008. The complete text of this memorandum may be reviewed at tab (15).

Essentially, the study proceeded in five phases as follows:

Phase	Lead	Due
1. Comparative Analysis	CAPT (sel) Burke	07 Aug
2. Requirements and Functions	CDR Hatch	04 Sep
3. Form	CAPT (sel) Burke	09 Oct
4. Responsibilities	LCDR Bosau	19 Dec
5. Style and Detail	YNCS McDonald	19 Dec

Phase 1 – Comparative Analysis of Other Doctrine Systems

Phase 1 was a comparative analysis of doctrine approaches by twelve entities, eleven of which are federal agencies. The twelfth organization examined was the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS). The ABS approach was examined to provide a non-governmental organization perspective of doctrine and because of the Coast Guard's major mission focus on Marine Safety.

Regarding the other branches of the military, the U.S. Air Force was not examined. The Air Force, of course, devotes much time and attention to doctrine. Its system was considered similar enough to the Army's that the DSG decided to study either the Army or the Air Force, but not both. The complete text of the Phase 1 Comparative Analysis Report may be reviewed at tab (16).

The following are the main observations made by the Phase 1 part of the doctrine study. They are common characteristics of doctrinal systems developed by those organizations that appear to have the strongest commitment to the development, deployment, and maintenance of doctrine:

1. Centralized doctrine oversight function with dedicated resources and senior leadership support.
2. A doctrinal hierarchy directly responsible to specific elements at each level.
3. Adhere to established clear review cycles.
4. Direct linkage to training and standardization systems.
5. Capable of resolving potential conflicts with other pubs.
6. Capable of capturing lessons learned and executing emergent updates between doctrine review cycles.

Other relevant observations were:

- The model followed by military and ABS (systems approach) provides the clearest strategic to tactical linkage.
- Most systems contained strategic, operational, and tactical (and sometimes reference) components, but there appeared to be significant overlap between adjacent areas (based on a very cursory inspection).
- Most systems parsed operational and tactical doctrine along functional lines.
- Naming and numbering systems varied widely.
- Both centralized and distributed systems shared the "proponent" model of collaborating or drawing subject matter experts and writers from field commands and training centers.
- All systems identified a process for reviewing doctrine, resolving disagreements, and moving product forward.
- A best practice identified at U.S. Secret Service was the simultaneous review and identification of required updates across the doctrine system as a result of approved changes to a particular doctrine.

Phase 2 – Requirements and Functions of a Coast Guard Doctrine System

The objective of Phase 2 was to establish requirements that would serve as the foundation for developing a Coast Guard doctrine process, and to articulate the functions doctrine should serve. Having studied other organizations, the DSG reviewed a number of the previous doctrine studies listed earlier. In addition, group members reviewed a small sample of current Coast Guard manuals to confirm the intertwining of policy, doctrine, and TTP. With this foundation, the DSG brainstormed desirable functions and characteristics of a doctrine process. The full list of characteristics may be reviewed at tab (17), pages 17 and 18 of the PowerPoint slides.

Refined and consolidated, the following are considered the most essential requirements and functions of a future doctrine process.

1. Oversight function to coordinate, adjudicate, and enforce.
2. Senior leadership chartered and backed (O-9 and above).
3. Feedback loop and lessons learned system.
4. Doctrine development group.
5. Direct link to training system.
6. Useful.

Phase 3 – Form: Alternative Architecture for the Doctrine Library

Phase 3 considered the form and organization of a doctrinal library of publications. The DSG developed four potential architectures. The perceived strengths and weaknesses of each may be reviewed in tab (18), pages 5-22.

Course of Action (COA) 1, titled "Originator Oriented," is the current state of doctrine development. Although this construct is informal as to doctrine, the Service does have a significant amount of written guidance. In general, offices identify a topic that needs to be addressed. They develop policies and guidance that they route through a concurrent clearance process **of their own design**. When approved, the result is published as a Commandant Instruction. The directives are organized by Standard Subject Identification Codes (SSIC) (COMDTINST M5210.5D).

COA 2, "Mission Oriented," considered developing eleven mission area publications that would address all guidance related to that mission. The architecture noted that there would be doctrine and policy outside of the mission areas, but did not force them into the construct. The entire doctrinal library was based on the bedrock of Pub 1.

COA 3, "Staff Function Oriented," organized the doctrinal library according to the Joint Staff model. Publications would be numbered and placed in a hierarchy according to the staff function intended to be addressed. In this COA, Pub 1 would be considered the capstone document of the library.

COA 4, "Latticed Frame," was an attempt to merge COAs 2 and 3. Upon further reflection, COA 4 did not appear to improve the organization of the doctrinal library. But it appears to be a useful tool that could be used during concurrent clearance to ensure appropriate routing of publications.

Although all of the courses of action had appealing attributes, the DSG found the Staff Function Oriented architecture (COA 3) the best general model for understanding the hierarchy of publications. It is discussed in more detail below in the section titled "Doctrine Library Architecture."

Phase 4 – Assignment of Responsibilities: The Proposed Doctrine Process

I. Proposed Phases and Steps

To establish a logical, manageable, and workable system of doctrine, it is important to consider each individual step in a proposed doctrine process. Only in this way can specific responsibilities be determined and assignment of those responsibilities be made. The Phase 4 work product is titled "The Long Deck." It can be reviewed at tab (19).

The doctrine process should be considered as having four phases and twelve steps.

PHASES	STEPS
1. Requirements	1. Validation
	2. Tasking
2. Development	3. Drafting
	4. Routing
	5. Approval
3. Execution	6. Publication
	7. Distribution
	8. Training
	9. Usage
4. Maintenance	10. Evaluation
	11. Review
	12. Update

The steps in the process would apply to the development of doctrine regardless of type or level. But as a loud caveat, it is important to note the following: The assignment of responsibilities and timelines established would vary based on the level and the urgency of the publication. Thus, higher level doctrine would be expected to follow a longer timeline. Higher level doctrine will have more significant implications across the enterprise and, therefore, will need to be studied by more programs and staffs. Cycle process time for review and possible revision of these publications would be extended ones. This is because the higher the level of doctrine, the more enduring the guidance is expected to be, thus more program input is necessary.

Conversely, lower level doctrine would be expected to follow much shorter timelines. Frequency of their review would be more often. This would be true especially in the case of TTP revised as the result of lessons learned. Nonetheless, if doctrine is to be deliberately developed, the DSG opines that each of the phases and steps listed must be satisfied along the way in some manner.

The following diagram illustrates the flow of these phases and steps:

Phases and Steps Flow Chart

Phase One, Step 1a: In the requirements phase, ideas would be received from any source. The DSG recommends that a system be established which allows doctrine proposals to be submitted through formal chain of command procedures, and also through more direct, but informal routes. Potentially there could be a database established to collect good ideas that can be researched, evaluated, and prioritized.

It should be pointed out that the proposed library of doctrine publications discussed starting on page 38 already contains a series of publication ideas, especially regarding organizational doctrine. These ideas anticipate a doctrine publication for each of the numbered staff elements, e.g., a Pub 1-0 (Workforce), a Pub 2-0 (Intelligence), etc.

Phase One, Step 1b: Once a Service-wide doctrine idea is submitted, some entity needs to insure that the idea matures through the doctrine process, bounded only by its merits. For doctrine (with the exception of TTP), the DSG recommends the establishment of the Office of Doctrine. This office is discussed in more detail beginning on page 33. For TTP proposals, FORCECOM and DCMS would each be responsible for designating the principal vetting agents. These agents would serve functions similar to ODOC and insure TTP proposals mature to their potential.

Amongst other functions, ODOC would review proposals for understanding and to determine whether the issue is addressed elsewhere. ODOC would also refine the proposal into a standard format for decision whether to proceed.

This step would also be the first of three formal opportunities to consider the proposed doctrine in context with DoD and DHS current or planned guidance. The other two opportunities would be during the drafting and concurrent clearance steps.

Phase One, Step 1c: ODOC conclusions would then be presented to a review board. This board would formally decide whether or not the ODOC conclusion merits further study. If it determines there is a need, the board would invest additional resources and issue a doctrine directive prepared by ODOC.

Review boards would be composed of different parties depending upon the type and level of doctrine. The following are proposed board memberships for the highest levels of each of the four types of doctrine:

Coast Guard Doctrine Review Board
(For *Principles & Culture* and *Organizational* Doctrine)

	Coast Guard Doctrine Review Board	
Principal Members	DCO DCMS FORCECOM OPCOM	VCG (Chair)
Standing Advisory Members	CG-2, CG-8, CG-094, MCPO-CG	
By Invitation	DoD (Doctrine leads) DHS DHS Agency reps	

FORCECOM Doctrine Review Board
(For *Operational* Doctrine)

	FORCECOM Doctrine Review Board	
Principal Members	**FC 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7** **DCO (Rep)** **DCMS (Rep)** **OPCOM (Rep)**	**FC (Executive Director) (Chair)**
Standing Advisory Members	**FC-094, FC-CMC** **All DISTRICT COMMANDERS (Reps)**	
By Invitation	**DoD (Doctrine leads)** **DHS (Operations Coordination)** **DHS Agency reps** **CG Training Centers**	

DCMS Doctrine Review Board
(For *Support* Doctrine)

	DCMS Doctrine Review Board	
Principal Members	**CG 1, 4, 6, 9** **DCMS 34, 5, 8** **DCO (Rep)** **FC (Rep)** **OPCOM (Rep)**	**DCMS (Executive Director) (Chair)**
Standing Advisory Members	**CG-094, DCMS-CMC** **All DISTRICT COMMANDERS (Reps)**	
By Invitation	**DoD (Doctrine leads)** **DHS (Operations Coordination)** **DHS Agency reps** **CG Training Centers**	

It is appropriate here to note OPCOM's critical role in the development and deployment of doctrine. It will be observed in the diagrams above, that OPCOM is a member of all Doctrine Review Boards. This is consistent with its roles and responsibilities established by the Modernization Effort in Roles and Responsibility Work Group memo 5000 dated 21 Apr 2008. (The text of this memo is reference (b) to the DSG Charter located at tab (1) of this report.)

As envisioned by the Modernization Effort, OPCOM does not have **primary** responsibility for **any** doctrine. It does not chair any Doctrine Review Board. OPCOM's focus is on immediate and underway operations. But OPCOM has **secondary** responsibility for **all** doctrine. Thus, it is a member of all review boards. As a member, OPCOM is expected to be the experienced, practical, and outspoken voice from the field that ensures doctrinal guidance is usable, consistent, and current for the end-users who actually conduct Coast Guard missions.

Phase One, Step 2: The doctrine directive would formally task the project, assign drafting and routing responsibilities, establish milestones and due dates, and specify the approval authority.

Phase Two, Step 3a: The author, identified by prearrangement in the doctrine directive, would undertake the process of detailed research and writing. The DSG intends that individuals so selected would be released from their regular assignments and drafting the doctrine would become their primary duty for the duration of the draft.

Phase Two, Step 3b: The author would work closely with an ODOC editor. The editor would ensure the document is written consistent with appropriate standards as to grammar, punctuation, syntax, and format. The editor would not be responsible for content, but rather for accuracy, clarity, and consistency of writing.

Phase Two, Step 3c: The collaboration between author and editor would result in the author's draft. At this point the draft publication would enter into the concurrent clearance routing process shepherded by the clearance agent.

The author and clearance agent may not necessarily be the same individual. A "hand-off" would allow the author to return to normal duties and assignments as quickly as possible.

Phase Two, Step 4a: The concurrent clearance process will afford the Coast Guard establishment the opportunity to review and comment on the proposed doctrine.

Of particular importance in this step is an accurate analysis of the risk, return, and resources necessary to implement the doctrine. The practicality of doctrine cannot be divorced from its affordability. If the guidance a particular item of doctrine seeks to offer is not affordable, either the policy needs to be reconsidered or resources need to be identified.

The DSG opines that two fundamental principles should be honored in the routing process for publications above the TTP level. First, draft publications should be reviewed by each numbered staff element. Second, draft publications should be reviewed by each of the Coast Guard's eleven mission programs and CG-094 (legal). Depending upon the proposed doctrine, such review may be short and comments minimal. Regardless, staff elements and mission programs

both need formal visibility of proposed Service-wide doctrine to ascertain how it might affect their areas of responsibility. TTP will be concurrently cleared in appropriate processes established by FORCECOM and DCMS.

Phase Two, Step 4b: The result of the concurrent routing would be the clearance draft. This document would be revised based upon agreed or adjudicated changes. Adjudications would be the author's decision in consultation with the editor, except in the case of an unresolved "non-concur" between the author and staff and program elements. In such case, the author and non-concurring staff element or program would present their competing text recommendations to the approval authority for decision.

Phase Two, Step 5: The clearance draft would then be presented to the approval authority for final decision. The approval authority would be designated in the doctrine directive. It must include a representative from the staff element or mission program that is most closely associated with policy making relevant to the subject matter of the doctrine publication.

Phase Three, Steps 6 and 7: Once approved, the doctrine would proceed to publication and distribution.

Phase Three, Step 8: Once published and distributed, training must occur. The doctrine would be taught by appropriate sources and methods.

Phase Three, Step 9: At this point the publication would be used in exercises and operational missions.

Phase Four, Steps 10-12: After the publication is exercised and used, and at appropriate times and opportunities, the publication would be subject to evaluation, review, and updating. Higher level publications, i.e., doctrine in the nature of Principles and Culture and Organizational Doctrine, would have longer periods between assessments and revisions. Lower level publications, i.e., Operational or Support Doctrine, could expect shorter time periods between assessment and review. TTP level publications could expect the shortest and most frequent assessments and reviews. If the system is truly linked to operational experiences and lessons learned, each operation that invokes specific doctrine may offer validation or reasons to reassess and revise.

Adjudication and Alignment of Doctrine within the Process

From time to time, professional doctrinal disagreements may develop among the primary elements of the Coast Guard's modernized architecture, namely DCO, DCMS, OPCOM, and FORCECOM. Additionally, in a fiscal environment of competing and constrained resources, review boards for Operational Doctrine and Support Doctrine will have to prioritize development efforts. When these situations arise, the review board in which the disagreement is identified will attempt to resolve the matter. This includes consultation with another review board as appropriate. If genuine consensus cannot be achieved, the principals of the differing elements will discuss the issue directly. If disagreement persists, the Coast Guard Doctrine Review Board chaired by VCG will resolve the issue.

II. Administration of the Doctrine Process:
The Coast Guard Office of Doctrine

A. Organization

The doctrine system adopted by the Coast Guard will not enact itself; it will not enforce itself. If any conclusion reached by the DSG stands above all others, it is that the Coast Guard must establish an entity to provide – as a primary duty – oversight and administration of the system.

Therefore, chief among the recommendations of this study is the establishment of an Office of Doctrine (ODOC). This office would not write doctrine. Its sole purpose would be to administer and enforce the Service-wide doctrine process in a timely, consistent, and standardized manner. This would include enforcement of editorial standards and precise use of terms. Precise use of terms would include the establishment and maintenance of a standard reference source for Coast Guard terms, i.e., a Coast Guard Lexicon.

Additionally, ODOC would be the portal through which other agencies or government departments would reach the Coast Guard regarding matters of doctrine. ODOC would insure inquiries are properly tracked and resolved consistent with other doctrine in place or under development.

ODOC would report to the Modernization Effort proposed position of the Director of Coast Guard Enterprise Strategy and Management. Administration of the doctrine process would thus reside within VCG's functions as the Coast Guard's Chief Operating Officer (COO) and Chair of the Leadership Council. These functions were approved by CG-01T's memo 5400 to CCG dated 29 Jan 2009 (CCG inscription undated). As COO, VCG is responsible for "…the efficient and effective daily functioning of the service (sic)." This includes "…general responsibility for initiation, development, and review of basic [Service] policies" and adjudication of matters "…that may be entered by DCMS, DCO, O[P]C[OM], F[OR]C[EOM], CG-8, CG-2, and other Headquarters Special Staffs." In context, the DSG interprets the term "basic [Service] policies" to include Service-wide guidance, i.e., doctrine.

It is important to emphasize that ODOC would be responsible for the process – not the substance – of doctrine. As approved by Modernization Effort Roles and Responsibility Work Group memo 5000 dated 21 Apr 2008 (tab 1, reference (b)) DCO, DCMS, CG-2, CG-8 are primarily responsible for the substance of Organizational Doctrine within their bailiwicks. Meanwhile, FORCECOM and DCMS are responsible for the substance of Operational Doctrine and Support Doctrine respectively.

But if the substance of doctrinal guidance is spoken in different formats using different terms with inconsistent definitions, it will be neither efficient nor effective. Thus, it is entirely appropriate for ODOC to be placed with the officer charged with the daily efficiency and effectiveness of the Service.

ODOC staffing would be as follows:

- Chief (GS-15 or O-6)
- Deputy (O-5 or GS-14)
- (3) Editor (GS-12, GS-13, GS-14)
- (2) Terminologist and Symbologist (GS-13)
- (4) Staff Officer (O-4)
- (2) Clerical (GS-9, GS-11)

Chief
The Doctrine Study Group proposes a GS-15 serve as Chief, ODOC. Depending upon resources available, an O-6 would also be appropriate. This grade would equal other offices that may report to the Director of Coast Guard Enterprise Strategy and Management if this position is created. By combination of grade and direct access to the Director – the directorship position proposed is an SES directly reporting to VCG – ODOC should have the backing, access to, and visibility amongst senior leadership necessary to manage the Service-wide doctrine system. Also, Chief, ODOC would represent the Coast Guard at DHS or DoD doctrine planning conferences.

Note to reader:

If the position of the Director of Coast Guard Enterprise Strategy and Management is not approved, the DSG recommends that a Senior Executive Service or Senior Level (SL) member direct ODOC. Current criteria for establishing SES and SL positions manifestly justify this level of leadership for the office charged with administering a Service-wide doctrine system. Criteria for SES and SL positions are found at pages 1-8 through 13 of the Jan 2009 SES Desk Guide (Working Draft). The pages may be reviewed at tab (20) of this report. The Desk Guide clearly contemplates use of SLs "…for positions that meet SES executive criterial…" although this is generally anticipated for agencies that are excluded from the SES.

Deputy
The DSG recommends an O-5 serve as deputy. If an SES or SL were to direct ODOC, then the deputy position should be designated as an O-6. Beyond the assumed duties of supporting the Chief, ODOC, the deputy would be specifically responsible for management of the staff and workload.

Other Options (to establish the system in a timely way): Chief and Deputy
If neither of the preferred options stated above are available, the DSG nonetheless recommends establishing ODOC as a direct report to VCG, but with an O-6 Chief and GS-14 Deputy.

Note to reader:

Other options were mentioned in the Preliminary Final Report of the DSG. They are not included here only because at least one of the three options listed above should be reasonably possible as other details relating to the Modernization Effort continue to be refined. However, they remain in the Preliminary Final Report text which has been included as the final tab.

Editors (3)
The DSG recommends editors be assigned at three pay grades: GS-12, GS-13, and GS-14. They should be responsible for enforcing editorial standards, ensuring consistency in writing style, and ensuring the doctrine is understandable. In addition, because of their unique position editing all doctrinal publications, they can help ensure doctrinal publications – developed by different staffs – remain consistent throughout the Service.

Terminologist and Symbolist (2)
The common language imperative has been addressed in this report. The DSG recommends two GS-13s assigned to ODOC as terminologist and symbolist. They are expected to have expertise in language and visual models. They should ensure the consistent use of words, terms, acronyms, symbols, and models. They should also maintain the Coast Guard Lexicon and coordinate definitions with DoD, DHS, and other partners.

Staff Officers (4)
The military staff officers' primary duty should be to research doctrine proposals and prepare them for presentation to the appropriate Review Board. This should include ensuring the issue is clearly understood and locating any extant policies or doctrine associated with the topic. Furthermore, they should identify appropriate subject matter experts who could serve as authors. Finally, they should make recommendations as to the appropriate approval authority, required concurrent clearance signatories, and the prioritization of the doctrine proposals.

The DSG discussed the option of detailing these four staff officers from DCO, DCMS, FORCECOM, and OPCOM. Although this initially seemed to be an appealing concept, it was eventually agreed that these officers should have a clear chain of command through ODOC.

Clerical (2)
The clerical positions should be GS-9 and GS-11. These positions should be responsible for general office management. This would include file maintenance, paperwork flow, office supplies, and minor computer technical support.

B. Resources Necessary

According to the "2008 Worksheet for calculating Standard Rates for Personnel," establishing the thirteen member ODOC would cost $1,678,130 recurring and $47,831 non-recurring funds. Further explanation of how those numbers were established can be found in the "Coast Guard Standard Personnel Costs Methodology," COMDT (CG-83) memorandum 7100 dated 28 Jun 2007. It is included as tab (21).

Naturally, doctrine must compete with other initiatives. During the course of the study, the DSG briefly developed resource-neutral courses of action. As defined by CG-82, a resource-neutral proposal means a proposal requiring no additional funding or personnel above appropriated levels for the current fiscal year.

There are two resource-neutral courses of action. The first would be to continue to develop doctrine as a collateral duty. In this model, the Coast Guard would add necessary functional statements to existing offices and provide a process map to assist in the development of doctrinal publications. This option offers little improvement over the current state. It lacks an enforcement mechanism and the disciplined approach to doctrine envisioned by the DSG.

The second option would be to reallocate base resources to establish the ODOC. This would require the Coast Guard to make priority decisions that shift resources from existing programs. CG-8 and the proposed Director of Coast Guard Strategy and Management should identify the resources. Where shifting resources are not available, resource proposals will have to be developed.

While awaiting permanent solutions, initial ODOC staffing might be as follows:

- The single billet assigned primary doctrine responsibilities in CG-5132,
- One person each (military O-3 or O-4, or civilian) detailed in place from DCO, DCMS, OPCOM, and FORCECOM,
- Reserve Officers (One senior O-5, and two O-3 or O-4) on Active Duty Special Work,
- One Selected Reserve Officer on Inactive Duty for Training, from DCO, DCMS, OPCOM, and FORCECOM each,
- Contractors, and
- Administrative assistance provided by existing offices.

The doctrine system recommended in this report would increase the workload in CG-6 program areas. The CG-6 organization has enterprise-wide responsibilities for command, control, communications, computer, and information technology (C4IT). CG-61 is currently responsible for directive analysis, creation, review, directives format, maintenance, publishing, printing, archiving, and all associated information management. Doctrine publications would need to be reviewed by CG-61 in an efficient and timely manner to insure compliance with Coast Guard, DHS, and other federal government C4IT policies and procedures. These review requirements are mandated by law and will also be required for doctrine.

CG-61 estimates all this would require an additional $491,424 in recurring and $8,782 in non-recurring funds. This represents (1) CWO, (2) GS-13s, and (1) GS-11. The worksheets reflecting these personnel costs are also included at tab (21).

Thus, the total ODOC *and* CG-61 personnel related costs necessary to execute the fully functioning formal doctrine process would be $2,169,554 recurring and $56,613 non-recurring funds.

Additionally, posting and publishing doctrine will require software enhancements to the script that is used to perform the automated updates. The requirement to modify the directives database remains a significant, separate effort requiring additional funding for contractor support services. These enhancements are discussed at page 48 of this report.

C. Chain of Command

Various chains of command were considered for ODOC. The most logistical alternatives are as follows:

- Vice Commandant direct report (through Director of Coast Guard Enterprise Strategy and Management); or
- DCO direct report; or
- FORCECOM direct report

The DSG opines that a direct reporting relationship between the Office of Doctrine and the Vice Commandant is the preferred approach for the following reasons:

1. Direct report of ODOC to VCG would be consistent with a Chief Operating Officer's responsibility to insure the smooth functioning of Service-wide systems and processes. It is important to remember that ODOC's purpose would be to administer the doctrine system, not to write the doctrine.

2. Service-wide doctrine – the baseline guidance we give to our personnel on the front line of operations – must be seen as a crucial link between policy making and mission execution. Its deliberate development, deployment, and proper maintenance should be visible to our Chief Operating Officer, i.e., VCG.

3. DCO resides primarily in the Operational Policy-making world and should not be tasked with reconciling policy with doctrine it does not own or control. Reconciling policy and doctrine in these areas would not be consistent with the culture shift envisioned by the Modernization Effort.

4. Likewise, FORCECOM resides in the Operational Doctrine-making world and the world of TTP, and should not be tasked with reconciling doctrine with policy it does not own or control.

D. Location

Assigning ODOC as a direct report to VCG would not necessarily mean placing the office in Washington, D.C. It could also be located at Training Center Yorktown or the Leadership Development Center, New London, Conn.

An old adage argues in favor of a Washington, D.C. location: Proximity means visibility. Visibility means the opportunity for spontaneous interaction. VCG would be the root of ODOC's authority to administer the doctrine process. The establishment of the doctrine system would be assisted by ease of direct contact between Chief, ODOC and VCG through the Director of Coast Guard Enterprise Strategy and Management.

However, placing the office at a major training center away from Washington, D.C., but in the same time zone, might allow the work of ODOC to proceed in an atmosphere somewhat detached from the distractions of Headquarters. Otherwise the disruptions might intrude on the focus necessary to concentrate full-time on the administration of process and system.

This topic should be studied further when the decision is made to establish the system, an Office of Doctrine to administer the system, and the chain of command for the office.


III. Doctrine Library Architecture

Those familiar with the Joint Doctrine library will immediately recognize the basic organizational model. This model has been recommended by each of the previous doctrine studies dating back to 1995.

The library should be organized in four levels. At the highest level, Principles and Culture are discussed in Coast Guard Pub 1. The next level down is Organizational doctrine. As a starting place, one should assume there would be a high level publication addressing each of the major staff functions. One could also envision the eventual addition of other organizational level publications (e.g.: legal affairs, policy development, etc.) The top two levels of doctrine are depicted below.

Pub 1 U.S. Coast Guard America's Maritime Guardian								
Pub 1-0 Workforce	Pub 2-0 Intelligence	Pub 3-0 Operations	Pub 4-0 Logistics	Pub 5-0 Planning	Pub 6-0 C4&IT	Pub 7-0 Capabilities Management	Pub 8-0 Resources	Pub 9-0 Acquisitions

The third level should contain Operational and Support Doctrine. This level of the library would eventually contain significantly more publications than the first two levels. ODOC would assign numbers to publications. In general they would place the publication under the general staff number from which the topic logically flows. Therefore, a publication addressing the Coast Guard's personnel assignment process would be placed under CG Pub 1-0 as CG Pub 1-XX. Similarly, as a Coast Guard operational mission, Maritime Law Enforcement would be assigned a number CG Pub 3-XX. If a TTP publication were developed to address the use of canine (K-9) units in law enforcement, the publication would be numbered CG TTP 3-XX.X. The following diagram is for visual reference only. The numbers and titles of the publications present are merely a sample for discussion. Again, the actual numbering would be established by ODOC when the drafting of the publication was formally tasked. If a topic could logically be placed under multiple higher level pubs, ODOC would use its judgment and determine the best placement for the document.

```
                    ┌──────────────────┐
                    │    CG Pub 1       │
                    └────────┬─────────┘
                             │
                    ┌────────┴─────────┐
                    │   CG Pub 3-0      │
                    │  CG Operations    │
                    └────────┬─────────┘
              ┌──────────────┴──────────────┐
     ┌────────┴────────┐          ┌──────────┴──────────┐
     │   CG Pub 3-1     │          │    CG Pub 3-8        │
     │ Drug Interdiction│          │ Marine Environmental │
     └────────┬────────┘          │     Protection       │
              │                    └──────────┬──────────┘
     ┌────────┴────────┐          ┌──────────┴──────────┐
     │  CG TTP 3-1.1    │          │   CG TTP 3-8.1       │
     │   K-9 unit TTP   │          │  Maritime Pollution  │
     └────────┬────────┘          │  Enforcement TTP     │
              │                    └──────────┬──────────┘
     ┌────────┴────────┐          ┌──────────┴──────────┐
     │  CG TTP 3-1.2    │          │   CG TTP 3-8.2       │
     │   Ionscan TTP    │          │  Recovery Boom TTP   │
     └────────┬────────┘          └─────────────────────┘
              │
     ┌────────┴────────┐
     │  CG TTP 3-1.3    │
     │ Space Accountability TTP │
     └─────────────────┘
```

As is well known, the Coast Guard currently has been assigned eleven missions. For ease of review these missions are as follows:

- Marine Safety
- Search and Rescue
- Drug Interdiction
- Migrant Interdiction
- Defense Readiness
- Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security
- Living Marine Resources
- Marine Environmental Protection
- Other Law Enforcement
- Aids to Navigation
- Ice Operations

It seems logical to think that each area is worthy of doctrinal guidance for those performing the missions. In fact, it is considered certain that such guidance already exists in some form. After all, in addition to enduring principles that exist across all operational mission areas, one must consider that each mission area is a mixture of policy and guidance unique to the subject matter area. Thus, the DSG opines that as the Coast Guard modernizes and comes to recognize the value of formal doctrine, it is likely to identify the need for mission oriented doctrine publications.

The question, therefore, is, "Should mission area doctrine publications originate at the Headquarters level or at the FORCECOM level?" The answer lies largely in how one interprets the definitions of "Organizational Doctrine" and "Operational Doctrine."

Approved Modernization Effort materials define "Organizational Doctrine" as:

> "…a series of publications promulgated to communicate unity of effort and guide professional judgment…[as to] how forces are organized and trained as well as how systems and equipment are procured and maintained."

Meanwhile, the definition of "Operational Doctrine" is:

> "…guidance on developing and performing **mission execution processes** and meeting operational standards. [It] provides…operational guidance for subordinate commanders to follow in carrying out routine Coast Guard missions. It is intended to assist subordinate commanders in making resource apportionment decisions."

Two options are illustrated on the following pages.

Option 1: Doctrine Pyramid

COMDT
————

Headquarters
Staffs
————

FORCECOM
& DCMS

Principles &
Culture
————

Organizational
Doctrine
————

Operational
Doctrine & Support
Doctrine
————

Operational
TTP &
Support TTP

CG Pub 1

| 1-0 | 2-0 | 3-0 | 4-0 |

| 5-0 | 6-0 | 7-0 | 8-0 | 9-0 |

| Drug | Migrant | Other LE | Marine Safety | SAR |

| PWCS | LMR | MEP | ATON | Ice Ops | Def Ready |

Tactics, Techniques & Procedures

Option 1 depicts a **broader interpretation of Organizational Doctrine** to include doctrine by Headquarters staff elements and by mission areas within DCO. Reasons in favor of this approach relate to the fact that all program mission areas are represented within the DCO organization. It would be easier to develop mission area doctrine in a situation that:

1. Permits close collaboration of all mission areas at the same time so as to resolve cross-mission doctrine issues.

2. Permits convenient resolution of mission-area doctrine issues among other federal agencies, which perform similar missions and are predominantly located in the Washington, D.C. area.

Option 2: Doctrine Pyramid

COMDT
—

Headquarters
Staffs
—

FORCECOM
& DCMS

Principles &
Culture
—

Organizational
Doctrine

—

Operational
Doctrine & Support
Doctrine

—

Operational
TTP &
Support TTP

Pyramid labels:

CG Pub 1

Pub 1-0 DCMS	Pub 2-0 CG-2	Pub 3-0 DCO
Pub 4-0 DCMS	Pub 5-0 DCO	Pub 6-0 DCMS	Pub 7-0 DCO
Pub 8-0 CG-8	Pub 9-0 DCMS	Others as needed

| Drug Interdiction | Migrant Interdiction | Other LE | Marine Safety | Search & Rescue |
| PWCS | Living Marine Resources | Marine Environ Protect | Aids to Nav. | Ice Ops | Defense Readiness |

Other Doctrinal Pubs – as needed

Tactics, Techniques & Procedures

Option 2 depicts a **broader interpretation of Operational Doctrine** so as to locate the writing of mission-area doctrine at FORCECOM. Several reasons are offered for this approach:

1. The term "mission" specifically is included in the definition of Operational Doctrine that FORCECOM is expected to work under.

2. Guidance relating to "mission execution processes" should not be divorced from guidance on "meeting operational standards." The two are intertwined.

3. Having FORCECOM write mission-area doctrine – including joint agency guidance – more clearly establishes DCO's primary responsibility as creating joint interagency policy.

4. Having FORCECOM write mission-area doctrine places the guidance closer to the writing of TTP that are supposed to provide more detailed information regarding how to use the guidance.

The DSG opines that Option 2 is closer to the overall vision of a modernized Coast Guard. It would especially help FORCECOM achieve its full promise as the policies developed by the Headquarters establishment are interpreted into guidance and TTP for field use.

IV. Reconciling 3 Systems: Directives, Doctrine, Mission Management

The DSG charter specifically stated its expectation that this study would consider the impact of a doctrine system on The Coast Guard Directives System. Once begun, however, it was determined that the study also would have to consider the impact of a doctrine system on the Coast Guard Mission Management System (proposed COMDTINST 5200.4). For ease of reference, the foundation documents for these two systems may be reviewed at tabs (22) and (23).

A. The Directives System

As defined in Joint Pub 1-02, a directive is "a military communication [1] in which policy is established; [2] a plan [is] issued; [3]…any communication which initiates or governs action, conduct, or procedure."

The Coast Guard also defines a directive by what it does. Thus, according to COMDTINST M5215.6E (The Coast Guard Directives System), a directive:

- Establishes policy.
- Prescribes a method or procedure.
- Establishes standards of operation.
- Establishes or changes organizational structure.
- Delegates authority.
- Assigns responsibility.
- Establishes a form or report.
- Revises, supplements, or cancels a directive.

A directive exists four square in the policy world of restrictive or prescriptive direction, and not in the authoritative guidance world of doctrine. That is why a directive uses – or should use – the terms "shall" and "must" somewhere within its four corners.

The Coast Guard Directives System is administered by CG-61, which performs largely ministerial and technical functions in this regard. Its duties admit of no personal discretion or preference by personnel. Directives must be compliant with security requirements, applicable laws, and formatted to include specific parts and signatures. CG-61 does not concern itself with the substance of the policy restriction or prescription. At the Headquarters level, this concern is left to the Assistant Commandants and some special staff offices.

The interface between doctrine and directives systems will occur when deciding whether current policy exists that reasonably relates to doctrine under consideration. Some entity must be responsible for determining this. Between CG-61 and the proposed ODOC, this study concludes that ODOC should manage the determination process. Much of ODOC's work will occur when assisting in the refinement and formulation of doctrine proposals. It will also be actively engaged in the editorial process of drafting and revising as doctrine passes through the

concurrent clearance process. Thus, it will be of great interest to ODOC whether policy directives are current.

One can, perhaps, foresee a time when the directives system and doctrine system staffs might merge. But this is not necessary now, if at any time. The preferred course is for ODOC to stand up, and in the process of so doing, receive certification from directive coordinators that directives under their control are indeed current. If they are current, then doctrine efforts can proceed with knowledge certain of policies that affect the effort. Where policies and doctrine might collide, policy can be reconsidered, or proposed doctrine revised. If directives cannot be certified as current, then ODOC may need to bring this to the attention of the chain of command above the directives coordinator level.

B. The Mission Management System

The Mission Management System (MMS) provides a comprehensive structure that organizes Coast Guard policies, guidance, procedures, processes, and data. It is intended for use by Service members and will benefit external stakeholders who need to understand or work with the Coast Guard.

MMS is the Coast Guard's equivalent of a quality management system. Thus, it also provides a methodical approach for achieving continual improvement. It complies with International Organization of Standardization (ISO) 9001:2008. The Coast Guard is required to employ a quality management system to comply with various international marine safety mission obligations. Moreover, a quality management system is required by the Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) for merchant marine credentialing. It is also required to meet various international mandatory instruments within the scope of the International Maritime Organization's Voluntary Member State Audit Scheme (VMSAS). Finally, the Coast Guard Modernization – Critical Success Factors identified the need for a "system that continuously addresses process management Coast Guard-wide to include review, revision, and documentation of Coast Guard processes." (Tab 9) The MMS meets all of these obligations and goals.

MMS currently documents processes for three different elements of the Marine Safety mission:

1. Merchant Marine Licensing and Documentation (MLD)
2. Marine Inspection, Investigation, and Port Safety and Security (MPS)
3. Regulatory Development Program (RDP)

Additional Marine Safety mission elements may be documented within MMS.

Four levels of documentation make up the MMS. Level 1 identifies mission objectives and states the quality policy for the mission. It also outlines a core process that supports the achievement of mission objectives. A core process is a high-level document that analyzes statutory mission and stakeholder requirements in order to identify and develop documented procedures. It shows how those requirements are turned into action. In the modernized Coast Guard, all of these core process responsibilities will reside within FORCECOM.

In turn, lower level processes and work instructions which support the core process make up Levels 2 and 3. Level 4 documents provide specific, detailed instruction on mission execution. Forms and job aids are common examples of Level 4 documents.

LEVEL	DOCUMENTS	INCLUDES	TYPE
1	MMS COMDTINST 5200.4	Quality policy, Mission statement	Policy
	Mission Performance Plan	Quality objectives	Policy
	MMS Quality Manual	Administration of MMS, Core processes	Doctrine
2	Procedures	Key processes	TTP
3	Work Instructions	Specific job tasks, Work instructions, SOPs	TTP
4	Forms	Job aids, Forms, Source of records	TTP

The flexibility of the Mission Management System makes it worthwhile to consider its application for other Coast Guard missions.

Reconciliation between MMS and the doctrine system should not be difficult to accomplish if the following revisions are made to the proposed MMS instruction:

1. A provision should be added to proposed COMDTINST 5200.4 that states MMS terms and definitions must be consistent with those approved by ODOC.

2. The COMDTINST should clearly point out that while Headquarters is the source of the Level 1 policy and objectives publication for each program using MMS, FORCECOM is the source for the lower level publications. Under the Modernization Effort, FORCECOM-54 (Prevention Doctrine Branch) is responsible not only for developing doctrine, but also for developing "…tactics, techniques, and procedures for Prevention mission areas…"

This study takes no position on the formatting of MMS lower level documents that FORCECOM-54 should produce *vis-à-vis* documents that FORCECOM-53 (response doctrine and TTP) and others will author. Because of the relationships between the Coast Guard prevention mission and the civilian community, and between other mission areas and DoD, some differences in TTP formatting may be necessary or desirable. But this is for DCO (as to policy) and FORCECOM (as to doctrine and TTP) to sort.

C. The Intertwining of Policy, Doctrine, and TTP

As has been fully discussed by other studies and sources, current Coast Guard policy, doctrine, and TTP are intertwined throughout a myriad number of publications. **This is not altogether unsatisfactory if the user of the publication can clearly interpret whether a particular passage is prescription, guidance, or a tactic, technique, or procedure.** Having policy, doctrine, and TTP together in field publications may be a useful way for personnel to understand the relationship of each to the other when planning or executing missions.

But to reemphasize a key point: Policy and doctrine must speak with such clarity as to identify themselves as such at the very moment they are read.

Beyond issues of clarity, intertwined documents may also become unnecessarily burdensome to revise. As discussed above, higher-level documents will likely be more enduring, while TTP may require more frequent changes. It is necessary to avoid intertwining to the point TTP revisions become unreasonably delayed in the concurrent clearance process. TTP must be responsive to new threats, lessons learned, or safety concerns.

This is an age of electronic document preparation, editing, publishing, and distribution. The Coast Guard should execute a vision for its publications library that may be unique in the U.S. Government: First, it should separate its policy, doctrine, and TTP libraries into stand alone entities. This will facilitate end-users who seek to study what each individual library can provide. Second, it should fuse relevant parts of each library into publications – with policy, doctrine, and TTP properly marked – that are easily accessible and usable from even the remotest locations operating under the harshest conditions.

The initial separation of policy, doctrine, and TTP will serve to ensure each can be easily identified. This separation will also help establish ownership of the concept. Clearly defined ownership should ensure revisions are not delayed in an unnecessary concurrent clearance processes.

To reemphasize another key point: The fundamental tests of whether the doctrine system is successful are its accessibility, its usefulness to end-user personnel, and its currency.

Phase 5 – Style and Detail

This report concerns itself with the world of written doctrine. The importance of style and detail in written doctrine cannot be over emphasized. A wise soul once said, "There can be no substance without form. Form holds and preserves substance."

To be useful, to be usable, to be teachable, and to be used, doctrine must be:

Clear – It must authoritatively announce itself as guidance and its meaning upon first reading.

Concise – It should not use one word more than is necessary to convey its message.

Crisp – The text should have some bite or punch.

Clarity can be achieved only by rigorous attention to style and detail. Doctrine will be written by many authors, but it must read as though written by one.

Doctrine is not written to entertain, but with effort it can be interesting nonetheless.

Above all, doctrine must be practical. The publications in which it appears must encourage the professional mind to return to them from time to time for renewed guidance throughout the course of a career.

To accomplish the above, the following are some of the items recommended as to style and detail of doctrine publications:

I. Style

1. Active voice verbs.
2. First person plural pronouns.
3. Simple or compound sentences, avoiding complex or compound-complex sentences.
4. Average sentence length restricted to 20 words.
5. Plain language using terminology that can be understood by the lay reader.
6. Acronyms and initialisms avoided.
7. Vogue, and therefore, hackneyed terms – e.g., robust, seamless, famously, optimized, etc. – scrupulously avoided.

II. Detail

1. Photographs generally avoided to reduce band width necessary to transmit electronically. Also, unless placed in a document for specific historic reference, photos can become quickly dated.
2. Illustrations in the nature of graphs or diagrams encouraged, but, as in the case of photographs, created with an eye toward band width.
3. Sidebar quotations avoided. The doctrine must be clear enough to speak on its own.
4. Times New Roman font with 12-point pitch until such time as this current Service-wide standard is changed.
5. Table of contents for all doctrine publications regardless of length.

Additional recommendations regarding style and detail can be found in the Phase 5 PowerPoint slides located at tab (24).

Distribution and Access

Once written, doctrine must be readily accessible.

In addition to other duties, CG-61 ensures access to the following categories of documents through a variety of media. CG-61 uses an automated database to populate CG Central, CG Portal, CG Web, CG Standard Work Station, and other internet sites. For units without connectivity, CG-61 generates and distributes Digital Video Discs.

- Commandant FOUO Manuals, Instructions, and Notices
- Commandant Instructions
- Commandant Manuals
- Commandant Notices
- Cancelled Directives

Until the DSG recommended numbering convention (discussed beginning on page 38) can be adopted, the existing Coast Guard Directives System should be used.

Under this system, CG-61 advises that another category, entitled "Coast Guard Doctrine," can possibly be added to the site. To conform to the current configuration, doctrine could only be added to the existing system if it follows the naming and numbering conventions specified in The Coast Guard Directives System, COMDTINST M5215.6E. Because doctrine is non-directive, the authorized abbreviation "PUB" and the letter "P" would be used to identify the document. The directives system would also require assignment of a number per the Standard Subject Identification Codes Manual, COMDTINST M5210.5D. Because the SSIC Manual has no specific code for "doctrine," the number "5401," which specifies "Organizational Concepts and Principles," should be used. Thus, Coast Guard doctrine should be numbered "COMDTPUB P5401.XX."

The digits after the decimal should be used to identify doctrine by subject in accordance the hierarchy outlined starting at page 38 of this report. For example, Pub 1 should be P5401.1; Intelligence Organizational Doctrine, P5401.2-0; Drug Interdiction Doctrine, P5401.3-1; and K-9 Drug Interdiction TTP, P5401.3-1.1.

Longer term, to establish the DSG recommended doctrine numbering convention, the directives system database needs to be upgraded. CG-61 estimates the cost of writing this custom computer code as between $275,000 and $500,000. Once upgraded, Pub 1 would be CG Pub 1; Intelligence Organizational Doctrine, CG Pub 2-0; Drug Interdiction Doctrine, CG Pub 3-1; and K-9 Drug Interdiction TTP, CG TTP 3-1.1, etc.

A Plan to Establish the Coast Guard Doctrine System:
Next Immediate Steps (Preliminary Final Report)

In its Preliminary Final Report, dated 19 Dec 2008, the DSG proposed the following practical steps to establish the Coast Guard Doctrine System. Bold faced text appearing below the original text will inform the reader of the status of each proposal.

1. This report is styled as a Preliminary Final Report. It should be circulated freely among all elements of the Headquarters organization, and with FORCECOM and OPCOM planners with an invitation to comment no later than 10 Feb 2009. This includes comments on a proposed codifying document to establish this system (COMDTINST 5120.3 (now 5215.XX) to be inserted as tab (25) on 08 Jan 2009).

   The Preliminary Final Report and codifying document were delivered as specified. Feedback has been incorporated throughout the report.

2. Thereupon, the DSG should reconvene, revise as prudent, and present its final report on 01 Apr 2009, with decision memo.

   The report has been revised and delivered. The decision memo is attached to the original report presented to VCG.

3. CG-01T (now CG-09T) should review and revise Modernization Effort terminology to delete use of the term "will" and substitute with "shall."

   The Modernization Effort agrees with the proposed change in definition. Modernization Effort Role and Responsibilities Work Group memo 5000 dtd 21 Apr 2008: Coast Guard Doctrine and TTP: Key Definitions and Roles and Responsibilities For Doctrine/TTP Development Lifecycle will be amended to use the term "shall" to indicate prescription and "will" to indicate a future state of being. Page 17 of this report reflects this change.

4. Senior members from DSG, DCMS, and FORCECOM should meet as soon as possible to deliberate and come to a common understanding of how the term Operational Doctrine is defined. The question must be asked: "Does it, or does it not include mission support tasks that are operational in nature?" If it does, then the next question is, "Precisely who will be responsible for drafting this doctrine?"

   Senior members met. Mission Support Doctrine language on pages 19-20 of this report has been further refined to reflect the substance discussed and understanding reached in those conversations.

5. Designated members of the DSG, MMS, and FORCECOM should meet as soon as possible to deliberate and decide such details as are necessary to reconcile the MMS with the proposed Coast Guard Doctrine System. Thereupon, pending COMDTINST 5200.4 revised should be returned to the concurrent routing process.

Designated members met. The Mission Management System addressed on pages 44-45 of this report has been further refined to reflect the substance discussed and understanding reached in those conversations. Draft COMDTINST 5200.4, U.S. Coast Guard Mission Management System, will be revised and returned to the concurrent routing process.

6. Designated members of the DSG and representatives of CG-61 should meet as soon as possible to deliberate and decide such details as are necessary to align the proposed doctrine and the current Directives systems.

   Designated members met. The relationship between doctrine and the directives system, addressed on page 48 of this report, has been further refined to reflect the substance discussed and understanding reached in those conversations.

7. Further action on the proposed Doctrine Development Process and Procedures publication (see tab (7)) should be held in abeyance until the DSG Final Report is revised, presented, and approved with decision memo signed, including proposed COMDTINST 5120.3. However, in the meantime, doctrine elements should be urged to review it for informal guidance consistent with this DSG report.

   Per this recommendation, further action has been held in abeyance.

8. Training Center Yorktown should be tasked to conduct a front-end analysis for the purpose of developing a course for doctrine writers.

   Training Center Yorktown contacted CG-132 to initiate a front-end analysis. CG-132 assisted the DSG in the development of the Request For Analysis form. The analysis will be conducted in the normal course of business. The DSG will keep CG-132 informed as to the status of this report and the associated decision memo.

Recommendations to Establish the Coast Guard Doctrine System: Next Immediate Steps

The DSG recommends the following actions:

1. The draft decision memo attached to this report should be approved. It commits the Coast Guard to a formal doctrine system, establishes the ODOC, and places the office under the Director of Coast Guard Enterprise Strategy and Management.

2. ODOC should be staffed as soon as possible. Initial staffing and location should be consistent with ideas proposed at pages 36-38.

3. ODOC staff should revise draft Coast Guard Doctrine Development System, COMDTINST 5215.XX (tab (25)) and the associated "Doctrine Development Process

and Procedures Manual" (tab (7)) to meet the recommendations in this report. They should be routed through concurrent clearance.

4. The Coast Guard should commit to producing an Author's Draft for each Organizational Doctrine level publication no later that 20 May 2010. To that end, each staff function (CG-1, CG-2, CG-4, CG-5, CG-6, CG-7, CG-8, and CG-9) should coordinate efforts with ODOC staff. DCO should produce the Author's Draft for CG Pub 3-0.

5. Before resource proposals are submitted, CG-8 and CG-09T should consider reprogramming billets to staff ODOC. As a starting point, the single billet in CG-5132 should be evaluated for transfer. CG-532 and TRACEN Yorktown should also be evaluated. If billets are identified for transfer to ODOC, appropriate functional statements should be appropriately amended for the transferring organization.

6. CG-61 should test The Coast Guard Directives System to confirm the feasibility of adding Coast Guard Doctrine to the current database. CG-61 should report the results to ODOC by 01 Jun 2009. (If ODOC has not been established by that date, the findings should be reported to CG-513.)

7. The ODOC staff should draft the memo aligning definitions of "shall" and "will," used in the Modernization Effort Role and Responsibilities Work Group memo 5000 (dtd 21 Apr 2008), with the definitions established in this report. This memo should be routed to CG-09T for concurrence.

Copies:

- VCG (Original)
- DCO
- DCMS
- FORCECOM
- OPCOM
- CG-09T
- Chair, DSG

- Principal Staff, DSG
- MCPO-CG
- USCG Historian
- DHS Office of Operations Coordination and Planning, Division of Doctrine and Concept Development
- Three in reserve