

Literature Review

COSTS OF INCARCERATION POLICIES

by

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## COSTS OF INCARCERATION POLICIES

ABSTRACT: All costs of incarceration are normally underestimated. The single, most expensive incarceration policy is new; prison construction, which can run as high as 4-5 times the frequently estimated cost of \$73,000 per cell. Maintenance costs of incarceration--which run from \$15,000 to \$25,000 per inmate--are relatively fixed costs, and remain unaffected by minor shifts in the numbers of prisoners. Thus, the major costs in incarceration policy stem from the decision to operate a facility; reductions in the numbers of prisoners housed will have a negligible impact on costs. A large percentage of these costs is "hidden" --covered in non-correctional budgets--and can amount to as much as one-third the total correctional costs of incarceration. Because incarceration policy costs are not subject to easy manipulation, opportunity costs are substantial and intractable--incarceration policy commits public funds to corrections that cannot be used for other purposes. Constitutional operating standards have the effect of making incarceration increasingly more expensive.

## The Costs of Incarceration Policies

Published estimates of the cost of constructing new facilities frequently range from \$40,000 to \$70,000 per cell. Estimates of operating costs per inmate often range from \$10,000 to \$25,000 per year. Figures such as these are used as a basis for the public debate on prison policy economics.

In this package, we explore the true, full costs of incarceration policy. We find that most previously stated incarceration cost estimates are misleading. For example, the construction costs are actually much more than is normally estimated, while costs per inmate actually expand as populations are reduced, since most of these costs are fixed and do not fluctuate greatly in actual dollars with changes in numbers of prisoners. "based on our review of studies of prison costs, we conclude that: 1) Policy makers consistently underestimate the costs of incarceration; 2) the most expensive imprisonment policy is one of new facility construction; and 3) correctional and constitutional standards serve to increase costs of correctional facilities.

### TYPES OF INCARCERATION COSTS

Although the practice of incarceration in this country has spanned centuries, only in recent years has its use been subject to serious financial scrutiny. The combination of current trends toward fiscal austerity and the, failure of prison construction to keep apace of burgeoning inmate populations [1] has prompted both citizen's groups and private organizations [2]to take a closer look at the costs of imprisonment. An emphasis on professionalism in corrections, encouraged by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals [3]and the American Correctional Association[4], among others [5] has led to the abandonment of traditional accounting methods in favor of the objective evaluation of costs. The surprisingly consistent results of analyses such as these indicate that incarceration is a substantially more expensive punishment option than most cost portrayals have suggested.

One of the reasons these costs are understated is that one or more of the four general costs of incarceration policy is frequently ignored. Capital costs refer to the value of land, buildings or equipment which are used over a period of years. Operating costs are those expenditures for supplies(e.g., food, clothing and small equipment) and services (e.g., administrative, medical, security and program personnel) consumed during a one year period. Some of the financial support for incarceration (such as finance charges and fees which accompany new construction) are stated in budgets other than those reported by Department of Correction. These additional dollars comprise the hidden costs of incarceration. An opportunity cost is the difference

in value (worth) between an activity foregone and the activity undertaken under conditions of limited funds.

### The Capital Costs of Incarceration

A number of generalizations may be made regarding capital costs. [6] For one thing, costs differ depending upon the geographic region in which an institution is to be located. According to the 1978 Census of Jails, the costs of materials and labor involved in construction were found to be cheapest in the South, and most expensive in the West.[7] Within regions, capital costs can vary according to whether the site chosen is urban, suburban or rural. The typical state institution, placed in a remote area, may demand the construction of a complete physical plant, with special provisions for water and utilities.[8] A metropolitan site may preclude such considerations, but higher land costs are inevitable [9]

Capital costs vary among types of institutions, depending upon security classification. Two samples of new construction costs for institutions of different security levels taken in 1974 and 1978 provide evidence to suggest that costs radically increase as security requirements are upgraded.[10] A proposal for an alternative cell construction design recommended by the National Clearing House for Criminal Justice Planning and Architecture indicates however, that the choice of nontraditional building materials may provide intended levels of security at less than half the original costs.[11]

Hidden capital costs. Construction estimates are usually made public without the inclusion of several substantial costs. Among the omissions turned up in one examination of a proposed Connecticut facility were architectural fees (an additional 8%); the cost of construction supervision (2.3%); agency fees (3.5%); equipment costs (10%); the costs of insurance and bid (1%) and finance charges (10-15%). The inclusion of these hidden costs raised original Department of Corrections estimates from \$50,000 per bed, to \$75,000.[12] The costs of furnishing were excluded from the original estimate of a proposed New York facility, even though they equalled 10% of that figure.[13] This study of the cost of corrections in New York[14] points out that precursory costs are frequently underestimated to encourage project approval. In this analysis the projected amortization of the construction debt over 40 years was found to have a quadrupling effect on the original cost estimate.[15] Such failure to include debt amortization costs in construction calculations is not uncommon, and it serves to dramatically understate these costs, since amortization commits capital expenditures for years to come.

Delays, predominantly associated with site acquisition, are also an integral part of the prison construction process and play no less important a role in an assessment of capital costs than do the prices of tangible goods and visible services. which lapses between the approval of a new prison and the date of its first admission can be as long as five years, according to

one estimate.[16] Given that construction costs in recent years have risen at the rate of 13% annually, the bed which cost \$75,000 in 1981 will cost \$118,000 in 1985.[17] Capital projects which may not commence until years following their approval require a planning for costs which takes inflation figures such as this one into account.

### The Operating Costs of Incarceration

Operating costs include both "fixed" expenditures, such as plant maintenance, which remain relatively unaffected by changes in inmate population, and costs which do fluctuate according to these variations. Costs which are independent of, capacity chances typically include the support of the physical plant, security force and some programs. [18] Fixed expenditures do not denote stable operating costs per inmate however: the per inmate operating costs of a facility which is running below capacity will be higher simply because a basic network of services must be provided, no matter how few inmates are housed. [19] The recent survey of prisons and jails completed by Abt Associates[20] found a consistent relationship between lower operating costs and higher inmate staff ratios, with-lower costs per inmate whenever a facility experienced overcrowding. Simple reductions in the number of prisoners will net necessarily affect these operating costs.

Operating costs also vary, as do capital costs! according to level of security: although here, the relationship is reversed. Operating costs per inmate for prisons in New York in 1978 averaged \$10,856 for maximum security institutions; \$16,386 for median security facilities and \$17,244 for minimum security temporary release facilities, although minimum security "camps" averaged only \$11,614. [21] This variation was attributed largely to different staffing practices, especially security levels among all facilities. In maximum security institutions, the construction materials perform the work that officers carry out in less secure facilities. Using New York as an example, where staff salaries and benefits account for 80% of prison operating costs, it is easy to see how dependant these costs are upon staffing practices. The results of a cost analysis of the community-based corrections facility in Indiana, in which little disparity was found between the per diem costs of the community facility and either the state prison or reformatory, partially supports these findings. [22]

Like capital costs, operating costs are vulnerable to differences in site location. The location of an institution in a rural area may reduce land costs, but increase service costs when urban resources (vocational, treatment, etc.) cannot be employed[23] A relationship was found between the operating costs of county jails in New York and the socio-economic character of its counties' resident populations, particularly per-capita income! the size of the county tax base; and the complexity of the individual county

correctional systems.[24] Although it may seem intuitively promising, there is little evidence at this time to support a suggestion that there are "economies of scale" associated with the use of larger facilities.[25]

Hidden operating costs. An evaluation of hidden operating costs not only indicates costs which have clearly been omitted from corrections budgets, but those which are so buried or misplaced in the accounts of other public agencies that their fiscal significance is notably understated.

The 1978 study of the cost of incarceration in New York State revealed that state operating expenditures of the Department of Correctional Services, at that time \$218.9 million, comprised only 77 percent of the actual total cost of \$285.5 million. Twenty-one percent, or 60.2 million of the remaining cost -- designated for fringe benefits and retirement funds -- was found in the state's "miscellaneous" budget. Federal grant monies, including LEAA, CETA, ESSA and Action grants, contributed an additional 1.7 percent, or \$4.7 million, to the total. The Department of Mental Hygiene spent \$1.5 million on forensic psychiatry services, or .5 percent of the total cost of corrections. A final .03 percent -- \$75,000 -- was spent by a private organization, for inmate drug therapy programs.[26]

Other financial disclosures revealed by this report which affect the total cost of corrections, and which are normally excluded from cost analyses, include the cost of transporting inmates to and from hospitals, the cost of requisite security whenever an inmate made these trips,[27] and the annual cost of treatment at state psychiatric hospitals for those inmates who became disturbed while serving their sentences.[28] Similar hidden costs were found in an evaluation of the New York; City correctional system.[29]

An examination of the cost of a county detention center[30] indicated several inadequacies in figures reported under the "personnel services" category of the corrections budget for that facility, including the failure to report staff who were working at the center but funded by the jail; the failure to financially account for personnel who divided their time between both facilities; and the absence of fringe benefit payments.[31] It was discovered that costs of phone use, utility services and heating oil were understated estimates of actual use.[32]

As was the case in New York, federal program monies were not reflected in the county budget, either. Aside from the fact that their omission distorts the true picture of incarceration costs, the recognition of these funds helps to fully identify the financial obligations of the receiving jurisdiction in later years when the subsidies are withdrawn.[33] Consideration of these hidden costs produced figures 28 percent greater than those reflected in the detention center budget-[34] These results are

not inconsistent with those furnished by a study of the costs of the Indiana Department of Corrections, which placed actual expenditures at one-third more than department estimates. [35]

One problem facing anyone wishing to assess the true costs of incarceration is the failure of public accounting to acknowledge the use of capital stock over time. Quite legitimately, a pro rata share of the value of capital goods used in a given year should be included in the operating budgets of corrections facilities. [36] If the value of capital stock is included in the costs only for the year in which the item is purchased, costs can be misleading. Similarly, when such stock is used over a period of years without accounting for the appropriate percentage of that stock's value, costs will be substantially underestimated for the years that the particular purchase is in use.

The values of operating costs can be hard to assess, especially when there is no budget category for the operating costs of equipment, plant and land. These figures may be found instead under contractual services, supplies and materials, where ordinarily no depreciation is included. The operating capital costs in the county study were estimated at \$45,166, but even this figure did not include the operating capital costs of buildings and land, for which data were not available. [37]

An inquiry into the true costs of imprisonment reveals other hidden costs which, although even further removed from corrections budgets than those described above, contribute to the support of a system of incarceration and are nonetheless relevant in this discussion. These include the loss of unpaid taxes and welfare costs for the dependants of inmates. A 1977 Study Of persons incarcerated in Indiana estimated such hidden costs to approach the figure given for inmate maintenance in that year [38]

Considered together, these hidden costs point not only to substantially higher corrections costs but to the draining of community resources. As one economist notes:

These figures demonstrate the tendency of public agencies to view certain goods and services as "free", a practice which results in an unreasonable "deflation" of operating costs and biased figures in comparing alternatives.. .Until such deficiencies are remedied, criminal justice system planners will find themselves in the unenviable position of functioning in a vacuum... [39]

### The Opportunity Costs of Incarceration

Opportunity costs are incurred whenever policies are followed which are less profitable than alternative choices of action. These costs include both the inappropriate and the inadequate utilization of resources. For example, the land controlled, but not used by one facility incurred an opportunity cost of \$200,000 -- its market value if sold. (40) A halfway-house accumulated opportunity costs of \$468,000 through the mismanagement of employee

time, which could have been better spent in activities geared toward compliance with corrections standards. [41]

Of all the opportunity costs of incarceration, there may be none so glaring as inmate labor in prison industries. During fiscal 1978, New York state lost approximately four million dollars on its prison industry program, spending \$13.6 million on industries and returning only \$9.6 million from the sale of inmate-made goods to public agencies. Payments to inmate, which ranged from \$8.75 cents to \$28.75 cents an hour, could hardly be blamed for the loss. [42] More likely causes of inefficiency in inmate labor are mismanagement and outdated technology.

Current experimentation with prison industries in seven states provides strong indication that feasible and profitable alternatives exist. In July 1981, LEAA certified prison industry programs in Arizona, Kansas and Minnesota to sell goods in interstate commerce. [43] These programs, developed by Econ, Inc. and the American Foundation [44], allow inmates to be employed in private industries, with deductions in pay for Federal Income Tax, family support and restitution (up to 50 percent of pay), and room and board (up to 25 percent of pay). In 1980, inmates in the Kansas State Penitentiary who volunteered to work at a nearby metal parts industry returned \$60,000 to that state in payment for room and board. [45]

The most troublesome opportunity costs are difficult to quantify, though they may be easily stated: public monies spent on prisons cannot be used toward other social ends such as schools, transportation and related social programs. This is a particular problem for states that have spending caps preventing deficit budgeting; for these, incarceration policies often force a rearrangement of public priorities. Since prison maintenance is a relatively fixed cost, regardless of the number of prisoners housed, the commitment of monies to a policy of incarceration guarantees long term opportunity costs with few cost control options.

#### The Fiscal Impact of Overcrowding

In recent years virtually every state has experienced the pressures of rapid and substantial prison population increases, a trend which shows no signs of abating. According to one recent report [46], most states are housing prison populations which number twice the rated capacity of their correctional institutions.

In an assessment of the impact of revisions in Connecticut's Sentencing Laws, the Institute for Economic and Policy Studies (IEPS) [47] has identified four potential strategies for addressing the population crunch. These include, in order from the least to the most expensive: the utilization of existing capacity; the renovation and enlargement of existing correctional facilities; the conversion of existing, non-correctional facilities to correctional use; and the construction of new prisons. [48]



A contingency model illustrating additional cost considerations implied by successive options is provided by IEPS. If the utilization of an existing correctional facility is the alternative chosen, the costs of the following items, generally speaking, will not be "duplicated": perimeter security, such as fences and towers; administration; inmate processing services; records and bookkeeping; armory and emergency services; building and grounds maintenance; utility lines; special custody areas (e.g. for segregation); vehicles; program equipment; and recreation facilities. [49] Further costs incurred by an "addition" project include the expense of renovation, security hardware, and other security personnel. A conversion effort, the third option, entails all these costs plus the costs of the site and requisite acquisition fees, and the cost of a central office staff. In addition to the above costs, a new facility necessitates the construction of its own physical plant. [50]

Costs increase steadily from the first to the fourth option. However, cost projections of any option are normally less than the final price-tag. For example, projected costs of one planned renovation effort in New York were greater than those anticipated for a proposed new facility. The add-on project -- the state takeover of the New York City owned and operated Rikers Island facilities -- involved payments of \$200 million for state use; \$100 million for renovation; and the provision of other buildings for the city to use. Total cost, before financing, was \$65,000 per bed. [51] Other proposed expansion efforts in that state projected more modest costs of \$30,000 per bed [52], an estimate in the range of IEPS projected expenses for the renovation of three Connecticut facilities at \$16,000, \$35,000 and \$49,000. [53]

### Cost Implications of Standards Compliance

Although the costs involved in compliance with correctional standards are dependent on institution and program characteristics, some generalizations are permitted.

Total compliance with standards is likely to incur substantial costs. A project completed by IEPS estimated implementation costs to be \$2.0 million in Connecticut; \$28.6 million in Iowa; between \$14.5 and \$17.8 million in Colorado; \$18.1 million in Maine; and between \$17.5 and \$19.1 million in New Jersey. [54] These costs, which are stated in 1979 dollars, represent first year expenses only and do not include the continuing expense of standards maintenance. The total for Connecticut is exceptionally low only because the Department of Corrections in that state has a plan which potentially offsets what would otherwise have been higher compliance costs. [55]

The costs of compliance depend upon the specific standard violated. While the violation of capital-related standards may lead to significant expenditures in compliance, some standards, such as a change in institutional procedures, may incur no costs. In Iowa, for example, three standards -- cell enlargement, the construction of recreation facilities and the expansion of inmate work programs -- contributed \$26.3 million to the entire compliance

cost of 28.6 million.[56] A survey of 45 jails in Washington State found a high overall rate of compliance, but projected significant capital costs for the few standards with which there was low compliance.[57]

When a standard is not being met, often more than one cost option exists to handle the problem. Overtime payments, the hiring of additional staff and staff reassignment are three different ways of addressing a training need, for example. In its evaluation of one New Jersey facility, IEPS noted that the reduction in time spent by inmates in their cells would eliminate the need for cell expansion.[58] Careful consideration of options such as these can help control the costs of meeting standards.

### Discussion

Undeniably, imprisonment is an expensive penal policy. our literature summary has shown how these costs are substantially greater than most estimates would indicate, especially because a large portion of imprisonment costs -- comprised of items such as finance charges, pensions and fringe benefits, architectural and construction fees, and grant monies -- fail to be reported in corrections budgets. when all these cost figures are taken into account, prison policies which call for new facility construction are dramatically more expensive than most estimates suggest (see Table 1). To build and operate a 500-cell facility for one year commits almost 200 million dollars of a state's resources, based on the results of our review. This is more than 5 times the typical, per-cell construction estimate. Of this amount, the greatest portion goes to construction; less to maintenance and operation. The fact that most of these dollars will be spent through bonds and not operating revenues does not change the fact that these costs are extreme.

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In summary, even though cost accounting in corrections is in a primitive stage, we would suggest that the following is true, based on current information:

The single, most expensive incarceration cost is the construction of a new traditional facility. This cost is far and away more than the cost of any other penal policy. Some reductions in these costs can be achieved by building non-traditional facilities.

Many costs of construction are "hidden"; Only a small percentage of true costs is reflected in the normal, per-cell architects' estimates.

Table 1: A Demonstration of the Distribution of  
Incarceration Costs

| Type of Cost   | Estimate per cell   |                     | Estimated cost for new 500-<br>Cell facility to open<br>and run for one year |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|--|
|  | Maximum<br>Security | Minimum<br>Security |  |
| Original cost per cell                                     | 70,000              | 25,000              | 35,000,000   |
| Hidden capital costs<br>fees, insurance, etc. <sup>1</sup> | 24,000              | 8,000               | 12,000,000   |
| delay (inflation) <sup>2</sup>                             | 43,000              | 15,000              | 21,000,000   |
| amortization (over<br>original cost) <sup>3</sup>          | 210,000             | 75,000              | 105,000,000  |
| Operating costs  |                     |                     |  |
| Maintenance <sup>4</sup>                                   | 17,000              | 28,115              | 8,350,000  |
| Hidden staff costs <sup>5</sup>                            | 7,585               | 12,049              | 3,792,500  |
| Hidden social costs <sup>6</sup>                           | 15,000              | 15,000              | 7,500,000  |
| Opportunity Costs <sup>7</sup>                             |                     |                     |  |
| Industry   | 200                 | 200                 | 100,000  |
| Land use   | 500                 | 500                 | 250,000  |
| Compliance with<br>standards <sup>8</sup>                  | N/A*                | N/A                 | N/A  |
| <b>TOTAL</b>   | <b>\$387,985</b>    | <b>\$179,864</b>    | <b>\$193,992,500</b>   |

<sup>1</sup>See note 12 for estimate

<sup>2</sup>See note 16 for estimate

<sup>3</sup>See note 15 for estimate

<sup>4</sup>See note 21 for estimate

<sup>5</sup>See note 26 for estimate

<sup>6</sup>See note 38 for estimate

<sup>7</sup>See note 45 for estimate

<sup>8</sup>Compliance with standards will not be a fiscal issue during the first year of operation.

Once a new facility is built, cost savings cannot be easily achieved simply by reducing the incarceration of inmates, should rates of imprisonment fluctuate downward. The opportunity costs will be difficult to eradicate.

The time lag of completing prisons can be as much as five years, resulting in greater costs of delay together with continuing population crises.

PACKET 2: NOTES

[1] Changes in correctional populations are recorded annually by the Bureau of Justice Statistics in the form of National Prisoner Statistics Bulletins. See, for example, U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prisoners in State and Federal Institutions on December 31, 1979, National Prisoner Statistics Bulletin NPS-PSF-7, February 1981. Recently, given sharp increases in prison populations and the need to closely monitor their effects in individual states, the Bureau has begun to publish statistics at midyear. See, for example, Prisoners at Midyear 1981, September 1981.

[2] These include the efforts of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, the National Clearinghouse for Criminal Justice Planning and Architecture, the National Moratorium on Prison Construction, the Institute for Economic and Policy Studies, the Correctional Association of New York and the Citizens' Inquiry on Parole and Criminal Justice, Inc. See, for example, Prisons: The Price We Pay (Hackensack, N.J.: National Council on Crime and Delinquency, 1977); National Clearinghouse on Criminal Justice Planning and Architecture, The High Cost of Building Unconstitutional Jails (Champaign, Ill.: University of Illinois, 1977); Jail and Prison Costs (Washington, D.C.: National Moratorium on Prison Construction, 1975); G.P. Falkin et al., Revising Connecticut's Sentencing Laws: An Impact Assessment (Alexandria, Va.: Institute for Economic and Policy Studies, Inc., 1981); and D. McDonald, The Price of Punishment: Public Spending for Corrections in New York (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1980).

[3] National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Corrections (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973).

[4] Revised Manual of Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions, Second Draft (College Park, Md.: American Correctional Association, 1979).

[5] See for example, Jail Standards: Minimum Standards for Local Criminal Detention Facilities (Nebraska: The Nebraska State Bar Association Committee on Correctional Law and Practice, 1977) and the U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Standards for Corrections, Draft (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978).

[6] Capital costs include both the costs of capital outlays and existing capital stock. Capital stock, or operating capital, refers to the costs involved in the use of land, buildings or equipment in a specific period such as one year. Our discussion centers around the costs of capital outlays, or one time expenditures necessary for new construction.

[7] J. Mullen and B. Smith, American Prisons and Jails Volume

III: Conditions and Costs of Confinement (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980) p. 123.

[8] N.M. Singer and V.B. Wright, Cost Analysis of Correctional Standards: Institutional-Based Programs and Parole Volume II (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976) p. 14.

[9] Ibid. p. 15.

[10] Ibid., p. 20; Mullen and Smith, supra note 7, p. 122.

[11] National Clearinghouse on Criminal Justice Planning and Architecture, supra note 2, pp. 19-21.

[12] Falkin et al., supra note 2, pp. A34-37.

[13] McDonald, supra note 2, p. 52.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid., p. 54.

[16] K. Carlson et al., American Prisons and Jails Volume II: Population Trends and Projections (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980) p. 2.

[17] Falkin et al., supra note 2, pp. A34-37.

[18] Ibid., p. A1.

[19] B.L. Wayson et al., Local Jails (Lexington, Ma.: Lexington Books, 1977).

[20] Mullen and Smith, supra note 7, p. 117.

[21] Start-up costs are not included in these figures. McDonald, supra note 2, pp. 19-21.

[22] G.S.F. Monkman, Cost Analysis of Community Correctional Centers: A Case Study: Indiana (Washington, D.C.: Correctional Economics Center, 1975) p. 27.

[23] Singer and Wright, supra note 8, p. 15.

[24] McDonald, supra note 2, p. 95.

[25] Wayson et al., supra note 19, p. 16.

[26] McDonald, supra note 2, p. 15.

[27] Ibid., p. 31.

[28] Ibid., p. 37.

[29] Ibid., p. 113.

[30] G.S. Funke and B.L. Wayson, Comparative Costs of State and Local Facilities (Washington, D.C.: Correctional Economics Center, 1975).

[31] Ibid., p. 9.

[32] Ibid., pp. 15-16.

[33] Ibid., p. 32.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid., p. 33.

[36] Monkman. supra note 22, pp. 38-39.

[37] Funke and Wayson, supra note 30.

[38] V.B. Clear et al., The Hidden Costs of Incarceration (Anderson, Indiana: Anderson College Press, 1977).

[39] Monkman, supra note 22, pp. 40, 42.

[40] Funke and Wayson, supra note 30, p. 38.

[41] R.C. Grieser, ed., Correctional Policy and Standards: Implementation Costs of Correctional Standards (Washington, D.C.: Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 1980) p. 76.

[42] McDonald, supra note 2, pp. 44-46.

[43] Department of Justice, Advance for Release at 6:30 P.M. EDT Sunday, July 26, 1981 LEAA 202-724-7782. (Hereafter cited as Justice Department Newsletter.)

[44] See Study of the Economic and Rehabilitative Aspects of Prison Industry Volume 5, Analysis of Prison Industries and Recommendation for Change (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978).

[45] Justice Department Newsletter.

[46] Prisoners at Midyear, supra note 1.

[47] Falkin et al., supra note 2.

[48] Ibid., p. A1.

[49] Ibid., p. A2.

[50] Ibid., pp. A2-3.

[51] McDonald, supra note 2, p. 51.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Falkin et al., supra note 2, p. A38.

[54] See Grieser, supra note 41.

[55] Ibid., p. 26.

[56] Ibid., p. 44.

[57] Wayson et al., supra note 19.

[58] Grieser, supra note 41, p. 75.