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Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)
ADM002315, Winter 2010

Click on AD Number to retrieve full text PDF version of document)

ADA524661
The Systems Integration of Autonomous Behavior Analysis to Create a Maritime Smart Environment for the Enhancement of Maritime Domain Awareness
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Davis, Cledo L
Report Date: Jun 2010
Media Count: 241 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS, *OCEAN SURVEILLANCE, *ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE, AUTOMATION, SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, ANOMALIES, THESES
Identifiers: (U) ANOMALY DETECTION, BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS, ISR(INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE RECONNAISSANCE), MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, MARITIME FORCE PROTECTION, NETWORK-CENTRIC SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, SMART SENSOR NETWORKS, SOS(SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS), SYSTEMS INTEGRATION
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is a very challenging mission area in an ever-increasing net-centric environment, which is inundated with data from many highly advanced, capable sensors and communication suites. With all these technological data collection and dissemination advances, the information available is just too voluminous for humans alone to process and react to manually, sifting the wheat from the chaff, and be expected to accomplish effective operational decision making regarding maritime threats to national security, as well as to international peace and trade on the high seas. This thesis addresses MDA Joint Integrating Concept capability gaps, MDA-003C and MDA-004C, for aggregating, analyzing and displaying maritime information in order to understand the maritime environment to identify threats and predicting activity within the maritime domain. Applying the Systems Engineering process, the concept, requirements analysis, architectures, and system design and validation description for a systems integration solution is presented. The proposed implementation entails integrating autonomous behavior analysis capability that utilizes syntactical grammar-based spatial-temporal behavior classifications within existing Net-Centric MDA environments. In attestation to this implementation, this thesis describes the research conducted on a demonstrable proof-of-concept laboratory system, the Watchman Maritime Smart Environment System, whose representative architecture for specific autonomous behavior analysis implementation is provided.

ADA525093
China's Anti-Piracy Mission: Turning Blue-Water Theory into Practice and the Implications for the U.S. Navy
Descriptive Note: Final rept.
Personal Author(s): Pendergast, James M
Report Date: 11 May 2010
Media Count: 28 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NAVAL OPERATIONS, DEFENSE SYSTEMS, CHINA, MISSIONS, UNITED STATES, PEACETIME
Identifiers: (U) ANTI-PIRACY, PLA(N)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) China's People's Liberation Army Navy Gulf of Aden anti-piracy mission is now well into its second year and fifth rotation of warships. The anti-piracy mission has provided the PLA(N) an opportunity to exercise a range of blue-water navy competencies in a relatively benign environment. China is quickly turning blue-water navy theory into practice in the Gulf of Aden. As the PLA(N) incorporates the experience it builds in the Horn of Africa, the nature of its operations will change, with the potential for a significant impact on the U.S. Navy. The U.S. Navy has conceptualized and planned toward a China whose navy is capable of a strong defense of the littorals. The PLA(N) is rapidly building a blue-water naval capability due to its commitment to the anti-piracy operation. A PLA(N) capability to extend and sustain operations at greater distances will challenge the U.S. Navy in the following areas: 1) planning for an adversary capable of operating in multiple theaters 2) response time to Western Pacific contingencies; 3) maritime domain awareness; and 4) protection of sea lines of communication. The U.S. Navy needs to move quickly to recognize that the PLA(N) will have a capacity to sail well beyond their own shores and conduct operations. Now is the time for the U.S. Navy to take action to ensure success across the range of peacetime and conflict scenarios.

ADA518533
Heuristics in Global Combat Logistics Force Operational Planning
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Diaz, Andres
Report Date: Mar 2010
Media Count: 74 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *FORWARD AREAS, *BATTLE GROUP LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS, *LOGISTICS PLANNING, *LOGISTICS SUPPORT, *REPLENISHMENT AT SEA, *NAVAL VESSELS(SUPPORT), *SCHEDULING, NAVAL OPERATIONS, CONSUMPTION, INVENTORY CONTROL, DECISION AIDS, NAVAL VESSELS(COMBATANT), COMMODITIES, HEURISTIC METHODS, AVAILABILITY, THESES, OPTIMIZATION, REQUIREMENTS, SCENARIOS, COMPUTER PROGRAMS, ALGORITHMS
Identifiers: (U) NAVY LOGISTICS, *UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENTS, *NAVAL BATTLE GROUPS, *COMBAT LOGISTICS FORCE PLANNING TOOL, OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS, NAVY MISSION PLANNER, SHIP SCHEDULING, OPTIMIZATION DECISION AID, CLF(COMBAT LOGISTICS FORCE), SHUTTLE SHIPS, CARRIER STRIKE GROUPS, EXPEDITIONARY STRIKE GROUPS, SURFACE STRIKE GROUPS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The United States Navy (USN) globally deploys to protect and sustain a peaceful international system of interdependent trade, information, and social networks through a spectrum of capabilities, including humanitarian aid missions, multinational engagement, maritime domain awareness, and combat operations. To sustain maritime forces at sea, the Combat Logistics Force (CLF) provides logistical support via Underway Replenishments (UNREP) that maximizes deployed battle group on-station-time and endurance. The author presents a heuristic algorithm extension to the legacy CLF planning tool to plan Combat Logistics Force shuttle ship schedules to support forward deployed U.S. Navy battle groups operating globally. This algorithm prioritizes each battle group's replenishment requirements based on supply and determines an effective Combat Logistics Force shuttle ship pairing to execute at-sea replenishment. This determination is based on a variety of factors including range between shuttle ship and battle group, on hand commodity levels, and shuttle availability. The Replenishment-At-Sea schedules provided by the heuristic are face-valid, and can be used as initial feasible solutions for more complex and time-consuming algorithms. The legacy CLF model relies on the CPLEX solver engine and integer linear programming algorithms to determine optimal scheduling solutions. However, each solve run is time-consuming, with a processing time for larger scenarios requiring between 2-10 hours for completion, and can require 5 minutes to an hour just to find an initial feasible solution. On the contrary, a heuristic algorithm can provide initial feasible solutions in a matter of seconds.

ADA518529
Establishment of the National Maritime Intelligence Center: Understanding the Foundations of Trust to Support a Collaborative Environment in Homeland Security
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Caswell, Jr., Kenneth L
Report Date: Mar 2010
Media Count: 82 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *HOMELAND SECURITY, *COLLABORATIVE TECHNIQUES, *NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, *INFORMATION EXCHANGE, *INTERAGENCY COORDINATION, *INFORMATION CENTERS, *THREAT EVALUATION, STATE GOVERNMENT, LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, TRANSFORMATIONS, COOPERATION, TERRORISM, NAVAL OPERATIONS, THESES, GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), INDIA, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Identifiers: (U) *NATIONAL MARITIME INTELLIGENCE CENTER, NMIC(NATIONAL MARITIME INTELLIGENCE CENTER), INTELLIGENCE REFORM, MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, MARITIME SECURITY, ONI(OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE), COLLABORATIVE NETWORKS, MUMBAI(INDIA), MUMBAI ATTACKS, JIATF-S(JOINT INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE-SOUTH), TRUST BUILDING
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) On January 14, 2009, the former Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Admiral Mike McConnell (ret.), established The National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC). The NMIC was created to serve as the national focal point for maritime intelligence, ensuring a unified national effort to execute the Maritime Strategy and the National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) at all levels of government. The establishment of the NMIC is part of the Navy's response to an Intelligence Community Directive through which the DNI challenged all intelligence community (IC) elements to establish an analytic outreach initiative to engage with individuals outside the intelligence community to explore ideas and alternate perspectives, gain new insights, generate new knowledge, or obtain new information. That directive had been a response to recommendations from the 2005 Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction Report, which recommended that IC analysts broaden their information horizons by collaborating with... expertise wherever it resides... This thesis will examine the following question: Can the NMIC design and create a culture of trust and collaboration that collectively draws input from analyst, collector, and customer to effectively support maritime domain awareness intelligence support regarding homeland security?

ADA518045
Countering 21st Century Piracy in the Horn of Africa
Descriptive Note: Strategy research project
Personal Author(s): Apgar Jr., Bruce A
Report Date: Feb 2010
Media Count: 29 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *CRIMES, *NATIONAL SECURITY, ECONOMICS, EAST AFRICA, SOMALIA, SOCIOLOGY, INVESTMENTS, THEATER LEVEL OPERATIONS, GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN)
Identifiers: (U) PIRACY, MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The recent resurgence of high seas piracy reflects a variety of socio-economic factors in the regions of highest occurrence. While the underlying causes of piracy require long-term global investment in governance and infrastructure, the maritime nations of the world share a common responsibility to provide security in the maritime domain as outlined in the 1982 United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The unique challenges of countering 21st century pirates can be overcome through enhanced cooperation between security forces and the maritime shipping community and the application of 21st century information sharing technology. This paper proposes a multinational strategy at the theater/operational level designed to reduce and eliminate the incidence of successful pirate attacks in the Horn of Africa.

ADA520745
Maritime Information-Sharing Strategy: A Realistic Approach for the American Continent and the Caribbean
Descriptive Note: Journal article
Personal Author(s): Soto, Alberto A
Report Date: Jan 2010
Media Count: 15 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *INFORMATION EXCHANGE, *INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, NATIONAL SECURITY, STRATEGY, WEST INDIES, THREATS, OCEAN ENVIRONMENTS, UNITED STATES, REPRINTS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Information sharing is a fundamental requirement for meeting most of the current challenges of international maritime security. During the gathering of naval and maritime authorities at the nineteenth International Sea Power Symposium, held during October 2009 at the U.S. Naval War College, this topic captured the attention of most of the international representatives. It has become obvious that, together with globalization, the multiple threats and challenges of the maritime environment have assumed a transnational nature and require a coordinated effort to address them. It is difficult to argue against the ideas that these problems cannot be faced by any single state and that multinational collaboration is mandatory if adequate maritime domain awareness (MDA) is to be achieved. The U.S. Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower recognizes these facts and consequently is rapidly gaining worldwide currency. The American continent and Caribbean region do not seem to be an exception. In this context the notion of a regional maritime partnership in the American continent and Caribbean demands effective information-sharing capabilities in order to become a reality. The objective of this article is to demonstrate that such an idea, although reasonable, seems to be too ambitious to implement in the regional context. Some of the potential partners have differing or conflicting interests, in addition to the traditional challenges that any complex network faces. First, the article describes the concepts related to information sharing and discusses how the need is reflected in various levels of doctrine of the United States, the main actor and promoter of this initiative.

ADA522675
Maritime Domain Awareness: Command, Control, Computers, Communications and Intelligence for the Thousand Ship Navy
Personal Author(s): Agnello, M; Astudillo, J; Jauregui, M; Brown, J; Krikorian, B
Report Date: Jan 2010
Media Count: 12 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, *NAVY, MISSIONS, COST ESTIMATES, INTELLIGENCE, COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS, INFORMATION EXCHANGE
Identifiers: (U) *GFS(GLOBAL FLEET STATION), CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The purpose of this paper is to present results of applying structured systems engineering methods, domain patterns, and tools to develop architectures, an information exchange standard, and a cost estimate of hosted mission applications for the Thousand Ship Navy Command, Control Computers, Communications, and Intelligence system concept in support of the Global Maritime Partnership enterprise.

ADA512231
Maritime Domain Awareness: C4I for the 1000 Ship Navy
Descriptive Note: Technical rept.
Personal Author(s): Agnello, M; Astudillo, J; Brown, J; Jauregui, M; Krikorian, B
Report Date: 04 Dec 2009
Media Count: 253 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *SHIPS, *COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS, INFORMATION EXCHANGE, COST ESTIMATES, MISSIONS, SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, INTELLIGENCE
Identifiers: (U) C4I(COMMAND CONTROL COMPUTERS COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE), TSN(THOUSAND SHIP NAVY), GMP(GLOBAL MARITIME PARTNERSHIP)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The study applies structured systems engineering methods, domain patterns, and tools to develop architectures, an information exchange standard, and a cost estimate of hosted mission applications for the Thousand Ship Navy (TSN) Command, Control, Computers, Communications, and Intelligence (C4I) system concept for the Global Maritime Partnership (GMP) enterprise.

ADA516825
Augmenting Naval Capabilities in Remote Locations
Personal Author(s): Bostwick, Shawn; Perez-Luna, Carlos; Buenviaje, Ben; Pilling, Keri; Fotouhi, Ali; Umeres, Jose C
Report Date: Dec 2009
Media Count: 189 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MILITARY CAPABILITIES, *REMOTELY PILOTED VEHICLES, *AUGMENTATION, *DRONES, TASK FORCES, TOOLS, COSTS, GROUND VEHICLES, STANDARDIZATION, SYSTEMS APPROACH, ENEMY, REMOTE AREAS, COUNTERMEASURES, BATTLEFIELDS, SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, COAST GUARD, REQUIREMENTS, MARINE CORPS
Identifiers: (U) SYSTEMS ENGINEERING. MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS. PIRACY. MARITIME SECURITY
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The objective of this project was to apply a systems engineering approach to explore concepts for augmenting naval capabilities in remote sea locations using a standard Systems Engineering methodology coupled with Design for Lean Six Sigma tools. Because of increased challenges related to complexity, cost, and timing, our engineering approach focused on finding failure modes early and implementing effective countermeasures. Following requirements analysis and identification of needed functions, the project team synthesized candidate solutions that introduced new concepts and also exploited known programs of record within the Navy, the Coast Guard, and the Marine Corps. These included Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs), Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs), the aerostat Multi-Function Phased Array Radar, automation, and a Remote Sea Station. Results from analysis and simulations showed that an Automated Super-Highway Concept (ASHC) addressed the immediate need. The proposed approach combines the capabilities of the systems above to control the battle space in an effort to divert or destroy all non-friendly entities in the areas of interest. This approach also allows for persistent presence and analysis of the enemy movement while reducing the naval task force already assigned to patrol these areas.

ADA513921
Facilitating Decision Making, Re-Use and Collaboration: A Knowledge Management Approach for System Self-Awareness
Descriptive Note: Conference paper
Personal Author(s): Gallup, Shelley P; MacKinnon, Douglas J; Zhao, Ying;
Robey, John; Odell, Chris
Report Date: Oct 2009
Media Count: 7 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT, *DECISION MAKING, *MILITARY PROCUREMENT, COLLABORATIVE TECHNIQUES, INFORMATION PROCESSING, CLUSTERING, SYMPOSIA, SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
Identifiers: (U) *PROGRAM SELF-AWARENESS, ASSOCIATION, DATA MINING, SEARCH, TEXT MINING, VISUALIZATION, MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Decades of reform have been largely ineffective at improving the efficiency of the DoD Acquisition System, due in part to the complex processes and stovepipe activities that result in duplication of effort, lack of re-use and limited collaboration on related development efforts. This research applies Knowledge Management (KM) concepts and methodologies to the DoD acquisition enterprise to increase Program Self Awareness. This research supports the implementation of reform initiatives such as Capability Portfolio Management and Open Systems Architecture which share the common objectives of reducing duplication of effort, promoting collaboration and re-use of components. The DoD Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) Program will be used as a test case to develop prototype data schemas and apply text and data mining tools to identify duplication and/or gaps in the features of select MDA technologies. This paper will also provide the foundation for future development of the System Self-awareness concept and KM tools to support decision making and collaboration in diversified commercial and military applications.

ADA513715
Industry and Public Sector Cooperation for Information Sharing: Ports of the Puget Sound
Descriptive Note: Research rept.
Personal Author(s): Salem, Anita; Walsh, Wendy; Englehorn, Lyla
Report Date: Jul 2009
Media Count: 47 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *POLICIES, *INFORMATION EXCHANGE, LESSONS LEARNED, DECISION MAKING, ECONOMICS, CASE STUDIES, BARRIERS, SAFETY, OCEAN ENVIRONMENTS, SECURITY PERSONNEL, WORKSHOPS, OCEAN SURVEILLANCE, PORTS(FACILITIES), UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, PUGET SOUND, COMMERCE
Identifiers: (U) *MARITIME INFORMATION SHARING TASKFORCE, *MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, MIST(MARITIME INFORMATION SHARING TASKFORCE), MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS), GMAII(GLOBAL MARITIME AND AIR INTELLIGENCE INTEGRATION), CBP(CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION), NGAGS(NAVAL COOPERATION AND GUIDANCE FOR SHIPPING), FEDERAL POLICIES, PORT PERSONNEL, RESOURCE SHARING
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This report presents the findings of the Maritime Information Sharing Taskforce (MIST) research effort for the Washington State Puget Sound ports. Using a participatory design approach, the researchers partnered with federal and commercial stakeholders to assess the information sharing needs of security personnel in this port region. The research design included an issues workshop, field studies of port personnel, and local networking events. The findings indicate the need for increased interagency collaboration in maritime domain awareness (MDA) and highlight local recommended practices and incentives for information sharing with the private sector. In addition, we gathered usability data on two federal policies/programs.

ADA501329
Navy Role in Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism: Background and Issues for Congress
Descriptive Note: Congressional rept.
Personal Author(s): O'Rourke, Ronald
Report Date: 04 Jun 2009
Media Count: 14 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NAVAL BUDGETS, *NAVAL OPERATIONS, *OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, *COUNTERTERRORISM, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS, *MILITARY CAPABILITIES, COAST GUARD, RIVERINE WARFARE, HOMELAND SECURITY, AFGHANISTAN CONFLICT, COOPERATION, NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, CIVIL AFFAIRS, MISSIONS, NAVY, IRAQI WAR, MARINE CORPS, MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN)
Identifiers: (U) *IRREGULAR WARFARE, *MARITIME SECURITY, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT, NAVY IRREGULAR WARFARE OFFICE, GLOBAL MARITIME PARTNERSHIP, NECC(NAVY EXPEDITIONARY COMBAT COMMAND), RIVERINE FORCE, GFS(GLOBAL FLEET STATIONS), SEABASING, MIO(MARITIME INTERCEPT OPERATIONS), MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS), FOREIGN NAVIES, PSI(PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE), QDR(QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Statements from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and other Department of Defense (DoD) officials suggest that the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that is currently in progress may lead to an increased emphasis in future U.S. defense budgets on capabilities for conducting irregular warfare (IW) operations, such as counterinsurgency operations. In addition, counterterrorism (CT) operations have received an increased emphasis since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The Navy for several years has carried out a variety of IW and CT activities, and has taken some steps in recent years to strengthen its ability to conduct such activities. The overall issue for Congress is how much emphasis to place on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets, and whether decisions reached by DoD on this issue in the QDR are appropriate. In addition to this overarching issue, the Navy's IW and CT activities pose some specific potential oversight issues for Congress. This report will be updated as events warrant.

ADA510697
Global Maritime Awareness
Descriptive Note: Briefing charts
Personal Author(s): Thomas, Guy
Report Date: Jun 2009
Media Count: 40 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, *COAST GUARD, *MARITIME INDUSTRY, *NATIONAL SECURITY, SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS, CHARTS, MISSIONS, INFORMATION EXCHANGE, ORGANIZATIONS, GLOBAL, SAFETY
Identifiers: (U) CONTAINS BRIEFING CHARTS ONLY, MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, NMATS(NATIONAL MARTITIME AWARENESS TECHNOLOGY)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This briefing charts discuss a comprehensive national effort to promote global economic stability and maritime safety and security.

ADA503174
Maritime Domain Awareness: Assessment of Current Status
Descriptive Note: Conference paper
Personal Author(s): Hutchins, Susan G; MacKinnon, Douglas J; Freeman, Jared; Gallup, Shelley P
Report Date: Jun 2009
Media Count: 49 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, *NAVAL VESSELS, *MERCHANT VESSELS, *MARITIME INDUSTRY, *MARINE TRANSPORTATION, SHIPPING CONTAINERS, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AWARENESS, COAST GUARD, PETROCHEMISTRY, AGREEMENTS, SHARING, SECURITY, HIGH RATE, MILITARY PERSONNEL, SYMPOSIA
Identifiers: (U) BRIEFING CHARTS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is viewed as predominately a security issue, however the economic ramifications of an attack against a high-value target such as a container vessel, cruise ship, or petro-chemical facility elevate the problem from a national level to cause for global concern. A significant attack could cause the port to shut down and spread anxiety through the global marketplace. To mitigate the danger posed by maritime vessels, the United States (US) Navy, Coast Guard, and law enforcement agencies need greater maritime domain awareness, appropriate legal agreements, and partnerships. A large effort is underway to develop technologies to help maintain MDA, legal arrangements for sharing formation, and guidance for military and law enforcement personnel on procedures to deal with this multi-faceted problem. In this paper, we report on the progress made in 2008 to improve the effectiveness of systems provided to the warfighter in MDA missions.

ADA506369
MDA DS COI Spiral 3 - NOA, SILO and ABAC
Descriptive Note: Final technical rept.
Personal Author(s): Spalding, Jay; Harmon, Jim; Nicol, Alistair; MacKinnon, Mark
Report Date: Jun 2009
Media Count: 82 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MARITIME INDUSTRY, *COAST GUARD, *SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, SHARING, INFORMATION RETRIEVAL, PROTECTION, NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE, ARRIVAL, INTERNET, COLLABORATIVE TECHNIQUES, SENSITIVITY, INFORMATION EXCHANGE, DATA MANAGEMENT, TRANSITIONS
Identifiers: (U) *USCG(UNITED STATES COAST GUARD), *MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS), DS(DATA SHARING), SILO(SINGLE INTEGRATED LOOKOUT), ANOA(ADVANCE NOTICE OF ARRIVAL), NCES(NET-CENTRIC ENTERPRISE SERVICES)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The purpose of this report is to document United States Coast Guard (USCG) Research and Development (R&D) efforts in support of the Maritime Domain Awareness Data Sharing Community of Interest (MDA DS COI) Spiral 3 Project. The project focuses on sharing the sensitive data associated with Notice of Arrival (NOA) messages and the Single Integrated LookOut (SILO) list in a net-centric Web-services environment. It documents the background of the efforts leading up to the project, the technological hurdles faced in achieving a solution, and the policy and collaborative challenges experienced during the project. The COI, which included the Coast Guard and other Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agencies, laid the foundation for a complete paradigm shift in the protection of sensitive data, and enabled its exposure in an enterprise network environment without compromising the information. This report summarizes the end result of Spiral 3 and describes the transition to a new framework for future development.

ADA501688
Facilitating Decision Making, Re-Use and Collaboration: A Knowledge Management Approach to Acquisition Program Self-Awareness
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Robey, John L; Odell, Christopher W
Report Date: Jun 2009
Media Count: 105 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MILITARY PROCUREMENT, *COLLABORATIVE TECHNIQUES, *PROJECT MANAGEMENT, *OPEN SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE, *ORGANIZATIONAL REALIGNMENT, *KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT, *DECISION MAKING, COST REDUCTION, AWARENESS, TIMELINESS, SCHEDULING, THESES, INTEROPERABILITY, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Identifiers: (U) *OPEN ARCHITECTURE, *CAPABILITY PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT, *PROGRAM SELF-AWARENESS, ACQUISITION REFORM, BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE, MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS), DATA MINING, TEXT MINING, DATA VISUALIZATION, SYSTEMS THEORY, CONGRUENCE MODEL, DUPLICATION OF EFFORT, CAPABILITY GAPS, *REUSE, BEST PRACTICES, CIFE(CENTER FOR INTEGRATED FACILITY ENGINEERING), LEAVITT DIAMOND
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Decades of reform have been largely ineffective at improving the efficiency of the Department of Defense's (DoD) Acquisition System. Such inefficiency is, in part, due to complex processes and stovepipe activities that result in duplication of effort, lack of re-use, and limited collaboration on related development efforts. This research applies Knowledge Management (KM) concepts and methodologies to the DoD acquisition enterprise to increase Program Self-awareness. This research supports the implementation of reform initiatives such as Capability Portfolio Management and Open Systems Architecture, which share the common objectives of reducing duplication of effort and promoting collaboration and re-use of components. The DoD Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) Program will be used as a test case to apply KM tools to identify duplication and/or gaps in the features of select MDA technologies. This paper also may provide the foundation for future development of the Program Self-Awareness concept and KM tools to support decision making and to improve the effectiveness of the DoD Acquisition System.

ADA503096
A Good Investment: United States and Nigeria Security Cooperation
Descriptive Note: Final rept.
Personal Author(s): Rogers, William S
Report Date: 04 May 2009
Media Count: 27 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NIGERIA, *THEATER LEVEL OPERATIONS, *COOPERATION, *UNITED STATES, *SECURITY, ACCESS, NAVAL OPERATIONS, RESOURCES, MILITARY TRAINING, AFRICA, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TERRORISM, CHINA, THREATS, EDUCATION, MANAGEMENT, WEST AFRICA, TERRORISTS, STABILITY
Identifiers: (U) SECURITY COOPERATION
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The United States and Nigeria share common objectives based on security and resources. Theater security cooperation efforts between the nations ensures a stable and secure Nigeria, assists access to resources for the U.S., and facilitates U.S. presence in western Africa despite the influence of other nations such as China and the European Union. In return, Nigeria gains assistance preventing and eliminating threats aimed to undermine good governance, security, and stability. Current security cooperation efforts by AFRICOM, DoS, and USAID are making progress, but more needs to be done. Programs such as Maritime Domain Awareness, military education and training, and FMF/FMS have strengthened Nigerian defense. However, making Nigeria an anchor state for West Africa and improving security cooperation for air domain awareness, brown water navy operations, and fisheries management and enforcement will enable AFRICOM to have an immediate impact on not only Nigeria's security, but the security of U.S. interests as well.

ADA502932
Optimizing the Naval Force for the Horn of Africa Anti-Piracy Mission
Descriptive Note: Final rept.
Personal Author(s): Jarrett, Jr., Michael R
Report Date: 04 May 2009
Media Count: 23 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NAVAL OPERATIONS, *AFRICA, NAVY, JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, MILITARY DOCTRINE, MILITARY OPERATIONS, POLITICAL ALLIANCES
Identifiers: (U) *HORN OF AFRICA, *PIRATES, *PIRACY, COALITIION OPERATIONS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Coalition forces have patrolled the waters of the Horn of Africa (HOA) in a concerted effort to maintain maritime domain awareness in the region for nearly a decade. In spite of this presence, piracy actions rose to a record level in 2008 and increased at an alarming rate. In the context of a continued naval presence in the waters of the HOA, this paper analyzes how our navies are being employed in the region and if there are more effective measures to achieve positive results from our U.S. and Coalition partners. This paper discusses past efforts at combating the pirate threat in the HOA, background on difficulties encountered in the pursuit of pirates, and focuses on the Coalition command and control structures that direct naval forces and the manner in which military assets are allocated to achieve mission objectives. Improvements in the manner that forces are employed are then considered as a means to recommend a more effective approach to decrease the pirate threat.

ADA501330
Navy Role in Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism: Background and Issues for Congress
Descriptive Note: Congressional rept.
Personal Author(s): O'Rourke, Ronald
Report Date: 29 Apr 2009
Media Count: 12 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NAVAL BUDGETS, *NAVAL OPERATIONS, *OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, *COUNTERTERRORISM, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS, *MILITARY CAPABILITIES, COAST GUARD, RIVERINE WARFARE, HOMELAND SECURITY, AFGHANISTAN CONFLICT, COOPERATION, NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, CIVIL AFFAIRS, MISSIONS, NAVY, IRAQI WAR, MARINE CORPS, MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN)
Identifiers: (U) *IRREGULAR WARFARE, *MARITIME SECURITY, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT, NAVY IRREGULAR WARFARE OFFICE, GLOBAL MARITIME PARTNERSHIP, NECC(NAVY EXPEDITIONARY COMBAT COMMAND), RIVERINE FORCE, GFS(GLOBAL FLEET STATIONS), SEABASING, MIO(MARITIME INTERCEPT OPERATIONS), MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS), FOREIGN NAVIES, PSI(PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE), QDR(QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Statements from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and other Department of Defense (DoD) officials suggest that the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that is currently in progress may lead to an increased emphasis in future U.S. defense budgets on capabilities for conducting irregular warfare (IW) operations, such as counterinsurgency operations. In addition, counterterrorism (CT) operations have received an increased emphasis since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The Navy for several years has carried out a variety of IW and CT activities, and has taken some steps in recent years to strengthen its ability to conduct such activities. The overall issue for Congress is how much emphasis to place on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets, and whether decisions reached by DoD on this issue in the QDR are appropriate. In addition to this overarching issue, the Navy's IW and CT activities pose some specific potential oversight issues for Congress. This report will be updated as events warrant.

ADA499287
U.S. Seaport Security: Critical Challenge for Department of Homeland Security
Descriptive Note: Research paper
Personal Author(s): Lane, Sr., Drefus
Report Date: 02 Apr 2009
Media Count: 30 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *HOMELAND SECURITY, *UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, *LOCAL GOVERNMENT, *THREATS, *STATE GOVERNMENT, *PORTS(FACILITIES), *PREPARATION, TERRORISM, SHIPPING, COAST GUARD, CRIMES, RISK ANALYSIS, LEGISLATION, SURVEILLANCE, ACCESS, VULNERABILITY, ATTACK, INTERAGENCY COORDINATION, POLICIES, NATIONAL SECURITY
Identifiers: (U) *PORT SECURITY, MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, MTS(MARITIME TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) There are an estimated 360 seaports in the U.S. These seaports annually handle roughly 1.5 billion tons of cargo worth over $1 trillion, arriving in at least 11 million containers. These seaports require deep-water access, sufficient land for staging and storage, and unrestricted access to highway, rail, inland waterway, and pipeline networks. The Department of Defense (DoD) maintains only an informal business relationship with U.S. ports. However, it plays a considerable role in the security plan to prevent attacks on seaports, prepare to respond to possible attacks, and to restore their services. The 9/11 terrorist attacks instantly created a new American consciousness of the homeland's vulnerability to terrorism. Political will rose to an unprecedented level to address the nation's new priority of protecting the homeland. In the aftermath of 9/11, the President created the Department of Homeland Security to develop and implement a comprehensive national strategy for homeland security. The 2004 Presidential Directive for Maritime Security Policy mandated that the collaboration among state, local, and private sector entities be conducted at the federal level to achieve complete and unified maritime security programs and initiatives. Thus, U.S. seaports have been designated vital to the U.S. economy and national security strategy. The maritime transportation system was identified as an easy target as a result of the 9/11 commissions investigations. Seaports were considered to be the most vulnerable sectors that could affect U.S. economy. This paper focuses on the following: (1) the security threats and vulnerabilities of U.S. seaports; (2) the roles, responsibilities, and strategies taken across the full spectrum of government to improve the security of U.S. seaports; and (3) port security issues and challenges that remain.

ADA496821
Maritime Terrorism and the Small Boat Threat to the United States: A Proposed Response
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Hill, Brian P
Report Date: Mar 2009
Media Count: 139 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *HOMELAND SECURITY, *TERRORISTS, *TERRORISM, SECURITY, ATTACK, THESES, BOATS, OCEAN ENVIRONMENTS, COUNTERTERRORISM, LAW ENFORCEMENT, COAST GUARD, COAST GUARD PERSONNEL, THREATS, MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), UNITED STATES
Identifiers: (U) *MARITIME TERRORISM, *MARITIME TERRORISTS, *PIRACY, AMERICA'S WATERWAYS WATCH, MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, SEMI-SUBMERSIBLES, SMALL BOATS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This thesis examines the history and current trends of international maritime terrorism to show that terrorists may soon determine that small boat attacks may be the most cost-effective and successful terrorism strategy. This review determined that increasingly successful worldwide piracy attacks and the effective use of detection-evading drug vessels, may increase the risk of a terrorist attack in United States' waters. These reviews and lessons learned from other nations' successful responses to the maritime threat, in coordination with the goals outlined in the DHS Small Vessel Security Strategy, led to this author's recommendations that (1) the local U.S. maritime community members must be better encouraged by Coast Guard members to become involved in observing and reporting suspicious activities; (2) the Coast Guard and other local law enforcement agencies must investigate and prioritize those areas that might be used as a staging area for a small boat attack and increase their presence activities in those locations; (3) the use of up-to-date technology must be a part of any small boat terrorist deterrence plan; and (4) the U.S. must be prepared with a plan to respond to a successful small boat attack, including possible increased regulations and restrictions on the maritime community.

ADA496758
Increasing Naval Security Cooperation between the U.S., Chile and Peru
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Guttman, Eric A
Report Date: Mar 2009
Media Count: 87 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, *COOPERATION, *NAVAL OPERATIONS, *SECURITY, PACIFIC OCEAN, THESES, CHILE, PERU, FOREIGN POLICY, MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), INFORMATION SYSTEMS, UNITED STATES, INTERNATIONAL
Identifiers: (U) *MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, *NAVAL SECURITY COOPERATION, THOUSAND SHIP NAVY
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Naval Security Cooperation can take many forms from joint exercises to bilateral and multilateral agreements. In response to the challenges of providing stability and security for the world's oceans the Thousand-Ship-Navy was born. In the Thousand-Ship-Navy, partner-nation-navies would voluntarily participate in common maritime goals in a come as you are manner. One possible vehicle for implementing the Thousand-Ship-Navy concept is Maritime Domain Awareness, which seeks to create a Common Operating Picture from Naval, Federal, State, Private and International partners. These partners would be able to feed into the system any information they gather and would be able to access the combined information from all sources in the Common Operating Picture. This thesis examines the probability of using Maritime Domain Awareness to pursue a Thousand Ship Navy style of Naval Security Cooperation in the Eastern Pacific between navies of the United States, Chile and Peru.

ADA497865
Maritime Security: Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key Information, but the Need for Duplicate Data Should Be Reviewed
Descriptive Note: Congressional rept.
Personal Author(s): Caldwell, Stephen L; Canjar, R E; Cuero, Odilon; Henderson, Erin; Kaneshiro, Daniel; Kostyla, Stanley; Stenersen, Stan; Vogt, Adam; Ormond, Josh
Report Date: Mar 2009
Media Count: 59 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *SHIPS, *HOMELAND SECURITY, *COASTAL REGIONS, *PORTS(FACILITIES), *COAST GUARD, *OCEANS, *IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS, *TRACKING, MISSIONS, VIDEO RECORDING, TRACKING CAMERAS, REDUNDANCY, AUTOMATIC, AWARENESS, DETECTION, LONG RANGE(DISTANCE), POSITION FINDING, WATERWAYS, RADAR TRACKING, THREATS, SHIPPING
Identifiers: (U) *VESSEL TRACKING SYSTEMS, *MARITIME SECURITY, *DUPLICATE DATA, VIDEO CAMERAS, LRIT(LONG-RANGE IDENTIFICATION AND TRACKING SYSTEM), AIS(AUTOMATIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) U.S. ports, waterways, and coastal approaches are part of a system handling more than $700 billion in merchandise annually. With the many possible threats -- including transportation and detonation of weapons of mass destruction, suicide attacks against vessels, and others -- in the maritime domain, awareness of such threats could give the Coast Guard advance notice to help detect, deter, interdict, and defeat them and protect the U.S. homeland and economy. GAO was asked to review the Coast Guard's efforts to achieve awareness about activity in the maritime domain. This report addresses the extent to which the Coast Guard has done the following: (1) put vessel tracking systems in place, (2) used these systems to track vessels that may be threats, and (3) coordinated the development and implementation of these systems. To answer these questions, GAO analyzed relevant statutes, regulations, and plans for vessel tracking systems, compared the roles of the planned systems, and interviewed appropriate officials. To ensure efficient use of resources, GAO recommends that the Commandant of the Coast Guard determine the extent to which duplicate vessel tracking information from the long-range identification and tracking system (LRIT) and the commercially provided long-range automatic identification system (AIS) is needed to accomplish Coast Guard missions, particularly in light of information already available through national technical means. DHS agreed with this recommendation.

ADA519318
Maritime Domain Awareness: Myths and Realities
Descriptive Note: Journal article
Personal Author(s): Boraz, Steven C
Report Date: Jan 2009
Media Count: 11 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *OCEAN ENVIRONMENTS, *TERRORISTS, *INTERAGENCY COORDINATION, *NATIONAL SECURITY, SAFETY, PERSONNEL, MILITARY PUBLICATIONS, CARGO, POLICIES, UNITED STATES, REPRINTS, STRATEGY
Identifiers: (U) *MARITIME SECURITY POLICY COORDINATING COMMITTEE, *MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) It was not long after the attacks of September 11th that government officials began discussing other avenues that terrorists might use to attack American citizens, particularly in the maritime domain. In a speech delivered in January 2002, President George W. Bush noted, The heart of the Maritime Domain Awareness program is accurate information, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of all vessels, cargo, and people extending well beyond our traditional maritime boundaries. By November 2002 Congress had passed the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. The National Security Council and the president continued to explore issues surrounding the safety and security of the U.S. maritime environs. In December 2004, the president signed National Security Presidential Directive 41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13, which established policy guidelines. It also directed the secretaries of Homeland Security and Defense to lead the federal effort in developing a comprehensive national strategy that would better integrate and synchronize existing department-level strategies and ensure their effective and efficient implementation. The interagency Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Committee was established to serve as the primary forum for coordinating government maritime security policies; it delivered a National Strategy for Maritime Security in September 2005. Eight additional plans, including the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness, buttress the national strategy.

ADA519371
Grasping The Influence of Law on Sea Power
Descriptive Note: Journal article
Personal Author(s): Kraska, James
Report Date: Jan 2009
Media Count: 24 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NAVAL OPERATIONS, NATIONAL SECURITY, COOPERATION, NAVAL WARFARE, LAW ENFORCEMENT, REPRINTS
Identifiers: (U) *SEA POWER
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Over the past two decades international maritime law has evolved from a set of rules designed to avoid naval warfare, by keeping maritime powers apart, toward a new global framework designed to facilitate maritime security cooperation, by bringing naval forces together to collaborate toward achieving common goals. The effects of this change are far-reaching-for the first time, law is a force multiplier for pursuing shared responsibilities in the maritime domain. In a departure from the past hundred years of state practice, the contemporary focus of international maritime law now is constructive and prospective, broadening partnerships for enhancing port security, as well as coastal and inshore safety, extending maritime domain awareness, and countering threats at sea. In contrast, the predominant influence of law on sea power from the first Hague conference in 1899, through two world wars, and continuing until the end of the Cold War, was focused on developing naval arms-control regimes, refining the laws of naval warfare, and prescribing conduct at sea to erect firewalls that separated opposing fleets. The maritime treaties were designed to maintain the peace or prevent the expansion of war at sea by controlling the types and numbers of warships and their weapons systems and by reducing provocative or risky behavior.

ADA501546
Maritime Domain Awareness Architecture Management Hub Plan, Version 1.2
Report Date: Jan 2009
Media Count: 30 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MARITIME INDUSTRY, *STRATEGY, *NETWORK ARCHITECTURE, STANDARDS, NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, INFORMATION ASSURANCE, MILITARY CAPABILITIES, INFORMATION EXCHANGE, MANAGEMENT, HUBS
Identifiers: (U) *MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This document provides an initial high-level plan for carrying out the responsibilities of the national Maritime Domain Awareness Architecture Management Hub to deliver a standards-based service oriented architecture that will align MDA capabilities. It outlines key goals of the MDA Architecture Management Hub and how the hub will build on previous, current, and emerging information sharing initiatives. A discussion of necessary governance in the context of the MDA Architecture Management Hub follows. Subsequently, high-level strategies for the overall MDA enterprise architecture, as well as strategies for key tenets of net-centric information sharing (data standards and information assurance) are included. Finally, this document will address the resource implications for development and implementation of the architecture.

ADA494217
Maritime Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems (TUAS) in Navy Strike Groups Can Improve Maritime Domain Awareness for the Operational Commander
Descriptive Note: Final rept.
Personal Author(s): Wolstenholme, Jeffrey S
Report Date: 31 Oct 2008
Media Count: 27 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MILITARY COMMANDERS, *OCEAN SURVEILLANCE, THREATS, TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE, UNMANNED, VOLATILITY, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, NAVAL VESSELS(COMBATANT), RECONNAISSANCE, TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE, MILITARY REQUIREMENTS, STABILITY, NAVAL WARFARE
Identifiers: (U) *MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, *OPERATIONAL COMMANDERS, TUAS(TACTICAL UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM), MARITIME THREATS, UAV(UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The U.S. Navy needs to overcome tactical ISR asset shortfalls resident in deploying strike groups so they are better able to support the Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) picture for the operational commander. MDA is the key to providing combatant commanders the necessary information to make effective decisions against maritime threats to help maintain political and economic stability in volatile regions around the world. The solution to this tactical ISR shortfall is Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems (TUAS). The capabilities of TUAS to fulfill tactical ISR requirements have been demonstrated repeatedly, on multiple Navy combatants over the past several years. Naval Strike Groups are routinely deployed without these requisite organic tools to achieve persistent maritime surveillance and the addition of TUAS can correct that deficiency and help achieve knowledge and information superiority for Maritime Domain Awareness at the tactical and operational level.

ADA491952
Maritime Domain Awareness FY08 Assessment Report
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): MacKinnon, Douglas J; Hutchins, Susan G; Schacher, Gordon E; Freeman, Jared
Report Date: 30 Oct 2008
Media Count: 205 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTERS, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS, COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE, TEST AND EVALUATION, THESES
Identifiers: (U) MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS), C4I(COMMAND CONTROL COMPUTERS COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The U.S. Navy has been given the responsibility to develop a comprehensive, worldwide Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) capability. PEO C4I has specified and assessed an initial set of systems, designated Spiral-1, to support MDS. Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy (DUSN) has appointed the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) to assess the overall capabilities and needs of MDA. This document reports the progress made in developing MDA capabilities during FY08. It summarizes information from PEO C4I system tests conducted by OPTEVFOR and from information gathered by NPS.

ADA494515
Evaluation of New Visualization Approaches for Representing Uncertainty in the Recognized Maritime Picture
Personal Author(s): Matthews, Michael; Rehak, Lisa; Famewo, Julie; Taylor, Tamsen; Robson, Jeremy
Report Date: Oct 2008
Media Count: 120 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *OCEAN SURVEILLANCE, *DISPLAY SYSTEMS, *UNCERTAINTY, *SYMBOLS, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, USER NEEDS, DATA DISPLAYS, INFORMATION THEORY, CANADA, EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN, LITERATURE SURVEYS, SHIPS, IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS
Identifiers: (U) FOREIGN REPORTS, VISUALIZATION OPTIONS, MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS), RMP(RECOGNIZED MARITIME PICTURE), DISPLAY SYMBOLOGY
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This report documents the literature review and experimentation used to develop and assess visualization options to represent uncertainty in the Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP), which is the visual representation of the surface vessel picture for the Canadian maritime Area of Interest (AOI). Specifically, visualization options for the uncertainty with regards to the identity, spatial position and time lateness of surface contacts and the quality and time lateness of the sensor coverage were developed and assessed using computer-based experiments at the Humansystems (HSI ) Test Lab. Two icons (Rectangle design and Lego design) were developed to display uncertainty related to the surface contacts, in addition to background swaths with two features (fill and border) to display sensor coverage uncertainty. Search times and accuracy were explored through 6 experimentation sessions with 11 participants. The results showed a small search time advantage for the Rectangle design and small performance differences among the different designs for sensor coverage. Participants rated the workload associated with using the designs as low. All of the design options evaluated are considered to be suitable candidates for future evaluation by the operational community. This work was conducted as part of the Information Visualization and Management for Enhanced Domain Awareness in Maritime Security Applied Research Project within the Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) research thrust.

ADA490664
Maritime Domain Awareness Architecture Management Hub Strategy
Report Date: Oct 2008
Media Count: 38 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *HOMELAND SECURITY, *INFORMATION EXCHANGE, INTEROPERABILITY, INFORMATION ASSURANCE, SHORES, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, RISK MANAGEMENT, STRATEGY, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, STANDARDS
Identifiers: (U) *MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, GLOBAL MARITIME COMMUNITY OF INTEREST, SERVICE ORIENTED ARCHITECTURE, ARCHITECTURE MANAGEMENT, DATA EXCHANGE, INFORMATION SHARING
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This document provides an initial high level strategy for carrying out the responsibilities of the national Maritime Domain Awareness Architecture Management Hub to deliver a standards based service oriented architecture that will align MDA capabilities. It outlines key goals of the MDA Architecture Management Hub and how the hub will build on previous, current, and emerging initiatives across the Federal Government. A discussion of necessary governance in the context of the MDA Architecture Management Hub follows. Subsequently, high level strategies for the overall MDA enterprise architecture, as well as strategies for key tenets of net-centric information sharing (data standards and information assurance) are included. Finally, this document will address the resource implications for development and implementation of the architecture.

ADA486330
Hierarchical High Level Information Fusion (H2LIFT)
Descriptive Note: Final rept. 4 May 2006-31 Aug 2008
Personal Author(s): Sudit, Moises; Stotz, Adam; Crassidis, John; Crassidis, Aggamemnon;
Nagi, Rakesh; VonGonten, Tracy
Report Date: 15 Sep 2008
Media Count: 44 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, *SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, *DATA FUSION, *DECISION MAKING, NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE, SENSOR FUSION, INTEGRATION, TRACKING, INFORMATION PROCESSING, COMPUTERIZED SIMULATION
Identifiers: (U) ANOMALY VISUALIZATION, CONTEXTUAL DATA SIMULATION, *DISTRIBUTED INFORMATION FUSION, *SITUATION ASSESSMENT, GWOT(GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM), MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS), *INFORMATION INTEGRATION, H2LIFT(HIERARCHICAL HIGH LEVEL INFORMATION FUSION)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The primary objective of this effort was the progression of Level 2/3 fusion of informational content to obtain an advanced multi-intelligent system for hierarchical high-level decision making processes. The goal was to develop an information integration mechanism to simplify human decision making solving operational problems. As technology continues to advance and the proliferation of sensors in all platform increases, human decision makers are being overwhelmed with data. In this research, the CUBRC proposed a cost effective two-year program of a novel approach in the near real-time ranking/formulation of hypotheses in asymmetric warfare scenarios. In particular, CUBRC introduced the Hierarchical High Level Information Fusion Technologies (H2LIFT) architecture with the following objectives: develop H2LIFT Architecture and algorithms for GWOT/MDA threats; develop prototype software that implements H2LIFT architecture and algorithms; and develop a simulation based tool for performance evaluation and analysis.

ADA488875
Architecting a Net-Centric Operations System of Systems for Multi-Domain Awareness
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Ruegger, Keith L
Report Date: Sep 2008
Media Count: 103 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NETWORK ARCHITECTURE, *WATERWAYS, *AWARENESS, *NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE, *INFORMATION SYSTEMS, *SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, *OCEANS, THESES, AUSTRALIA, SURVEILLANCE, RECONNAISSANCE, CANADA, NAVY, DISTRIBUTED DATA PROCESSING, DETECTORS, INTELLIGENCE, INTEGRATED SYSTEMS, DATA BASES, COMPUTERIZED SIMULATION
Identifiers: (U) *MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, *SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS, *COMMON OPERATING PICTURE, NETWORK CENTRIC OPERATIONS, SOS(SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS), NET-CENTRIC OPERATIONS, MULTIDOMAIN AWARENESS, COP(COMMON OPERATIONAL PICTURE), SYSML(SYSTEMS MODELING LANGUAGE)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Maritime domain awareness (MDA) entails knowing what is happening in the oceans and waterways that could affect the security or environment of the United States. With a focus on potential attack vessels (PAV) as threats in the maritime domain, a multidomain system of systems (SoS) is needed to exploit and integrate information from multiple sources, including sensors, databases, and intelligence, to provide reconnaissance, surveillance, and information used in the formulation of a common operational picture (COP), which is a tool to effect maritime domain awareness. In this thesis, the best architecture of net-centric operations (NCO) multidomain SoS for MDA is determined, employing an integrated systems engineering methodology for analyzing and ranking system of systems architectures. This methodology involves the use of process modeling, modeling of an SoS with the systems modeling language (SysML), and subsequent conversion of the resulting SysML diagrams into an Extend (trademark) executable simulation model used in a simulative study conducted to evaluate three multidomain awareness SoS architecture alternatives in terms of the time to establish a COP and the probability of COP accuracy. Of the three architecture alternatives, a conceptual SoS whose constituent systems are connected in a distributed network with a high degree of connectivity is found to take the least amount of time to establish a COP and to have a high probability of COP accuracy. It can thus be considered to be the best of the three MDA SoS architecture alternatives. The results indicate that, in a distributed network, which is the backbone of net-centric operations, direct links between the sensors and the coalition C2 center reduce the time to establish a COP. The integrated systems engineering methodology for analyzing SoS architectures provides an effective framework and tool for designing and analyzing complex SoS in general and NCO MDA SoS in particular.

ADA490002
Maritime Domain Awareness Risk Reduction Limited Objective Experiment
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Schacher, Gordon; MacKinnon, Doug; Hutchins, Susan; Gallup, Shelley; Rousseau, David
Report Date: 01 Jul 2008
Media Count: 44 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *INFORMATION EXCHANGE, *MARITIME INDUSTRY, *RISK, MAN MACHINE SYSTEMS, TEAMS(PERSONNEL), NAVAL WARFARE, DATA BASES, COMPUTER PROGRAMS
Identifiers: (U) *MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS), CMA(COMPREHENSIVE MARITIME AWARENESS), RISK REDUCTION, RRLOE(RISK REDUCTION LIMITED OBJECTIVE EXPERIMENT), TRRLOE(TECHNICAL RISK REDUCTION LIMITED OBJECTIVE EXPERIMENT), FAIRGAME EVENT
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) A risk reduction experiment was performed to identify and alleviate any risks to successful completion of the FAIRGAME test of MDA Spiral-1 systems. Identified risks and mitigation actions are reported.

ADA483649
Transforming Data and Metadata into Actionable Intelligence and Information within the Maritime Domain
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Sundland, Joseph ; Carroll, Christopher J
Report Date: Jun 2008
Media Count: 116 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *BUSINESS PROCESS REENGINEERING, INTERDICTION, THESES, COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, METADATA, NAVAL OPERATIONS, TRANSFORMATIONS, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, INTELLIGENCE, DATA ACQUISITION
Identifiers: (U) EMIO(EXTENDED MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATIONS), BPR(BUSINESS PROCESS REENGINEERING), MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATIONS, MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) At present, the Navy is unable to provide a robust, routable network that provides real-time actionable intelligence between boarding operations and intelligence analysts. Actionable intelligence is the means of obtaining concrete knowledge that permits an individual to take action based on known information. The lack of a robust routable network creates a lag in operational responsiveness to potential threats identified within the Maritime Environment. In response to current shortfalls, improved Extended Maritime Interdiction Operations (EMIO) seeks to support the Secretary of the Navy's vision to streamline and improve operations and exploitation of boarding data. However, there has been no clear indication as to how the implementation of these technologies will affect command and control or current operations. This thesis examines the impact of improved EMIO technology designed to bridge together data with intelligence collected during EMIO and improve maritime domain decision making in terms of speed and quality and thus improve end user's situational awareness. We follow the construct of Business Process Reengineering (BPR) to frame our analysis and to provide focus in our data collection. We also examine the changes to the present EMIO process by developing and implementing an organizational simulation using POWER 2.0. Our results indicate that when improved Spiral-1 EMIO technologies, which significantly decrease the amount of time it takes to fuse collected boarding data into intelligence systems, are combined with a redesign of the EMIO organization, a qualitative improvement toward accomplishing the overall process can be achieved. The current process requires 35 hours. Yet, with the revised technological and proposed organizational changes, the same process can be achieved in 5 hours, thus achieving the Navy Secretary's vision to streamline and improve maritime operations.

ADA483559
Security Challenges in the Gulf of Guinea Sub-Region: Strategy for Nigeria
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Iheme, Chuks O
Report Date: Jun 2008
Media Count: 89 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NATIONAL SECURITY, *MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), *STRATEGY, *NAVY, *NIGERIA, ORDER OF BATTLE, MILITARY CAPABILITIES, THESES, THREATS, INTEROPERABILITY
Identifiers: (U) ECOWAS(ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICA STATES), ECOMOG(ECOWAS MONITORING GROUP), GGC(GULF OF GUINEA COMMISSION), *COLLECTIVE SECURITY, DEFENSE POLICY, *GULF OF GUINEA, MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, MARITIME ENVIRONMENT, *MARITIME SECURITY, NATIONAL INTERESTS, NAVAL FORCES, POLICING, SEA POWER, TERRITORIAL WATERS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The Gulf of Guinea (GoG) sub-region has large deposits of hydrocarbons and other natural resources. There is now a stiff international competition among industrialized nations including the United States, some European countries, China, Japan, and India that are looking for new, safer, and more reliable sources of energy as a result of the Middle East crisis. Extra-regional competitions for oil, while boosting the economy of the sub-region have also exposed the area to increased security risks. Subregional resources and potential are presently being undermined by multifaceted domestic, sub-regional and international threats and vulnerabilities. These challenge the sub-regional states, including Nigeria, with limited capacity for maritime security. Assessment of sub-regional naval forces based on their Order of Battle, shows that most of the navies cannot police beyond their territorial waters. This study presents an integrated collective maritime security strategy for the sub-region. The strategy proposes measures to protect the maritime environment from unauthorized use and to develop member states' capabilities to deal with the emerging security threats. Additionally, it would encourage collaboration with extra-regional powers and oil majors in efforts to transform naval capabilities and improve interoperability to meet the challenges of the changing security threats within the sub-regional maritime domain.

ADA483646
Optimal Employment of Port Radar and Picket Ships to Detect Attacker Speedboats - A Defender-Attacker Optimization Model to Enhance Maritime Domain Awareness
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Abdul-Ghaffar, Ahmad M
Report Date: Jun 2008
Media Count: 85 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *PICKET SHIPS, *SEARCH RADAR, PATROLLING, ATTACK, THESES, NAVIGATION, HOMELAND SECURITY, REMOTE DETECTION, PATROL CRAFT, COAST GUARD, NAVAL VESSELS, OPTIMIZATION, CREWS
Identifiers: (U) SPEEDBOATS, MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, DEFENSE-ATTACKER, ATTACKERS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The U.S. Coast Guard has deployed several hundred port patrol vessels to protect U.S. Navy ships and other high-value assets in ports world-wide. Each vessel has an armed crew of four, is relatively fast, and features a simple surface search radar, radios, and a machine gun. These vessels coordinate surveillance patrols in groups of two or four, perhaps working with shorebased radar. We seek to advantageously position these vessels, and perhaps shore-based radar too, to minimize the probability that an intelligent adversary in one or more speed-boats will evade detection while mounting an attack. Attackers can use elevated obstructions to our radar detection in their attack paths, and ports feature many such restrictions to navigation and observation. We make a key, but realistic assumption that complicates planning: we assume the attackers will see or be told of our defensive positions and capabilities in advance of mounting their attack. We demonstrate our defender-attacker optimization with a fictitious port, and with Los Angeles-Long Beach, Hong Kong, U.S. Navy 5-th Fleet in Bahrain, and the Al Basra oil terminal. In cases we analyze, we can almost certainly detect any attack, even though the attacker, observing our pre-positions, plans clever, evasive attack tracks.

ADA483454
Data Strategies to Support Automated Multi-Sensor Data Fusion in a Service Oriented Architecture
Descriptive Note: Doctoral thesis
Personal Author(s): Rothenhaus, Kurt J
Report Date: Jun 2008
Media Count: 240 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *STRATEGY, *MULTISENSORS, *COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE, *DATA FUSION, DECISION MAKING, MONITORING, INTEROPERABILITY, QUANTITY, THESES, SOLUTIONS(GENERAL), CASE STUDIES, COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, PATTERNS, RANGE(EXTREMES), INTERNET, AUTOMATION, CONTROL SYSTEMS, JAVA PROGRAMMING LANGUAGE, COMPUTER PROGRAMS, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING
Identifiers: (U) MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS), SOA(SERVICE ORIENTED ARCHITECTURES), FORCENET
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The quantity of data available to decision makers of various types is rapidly expanding beyond the pace of manual interpretation techniques (Hobbins, 1). Introducing a Service Oriented Architectures (SOA) based web service framework that exposes even more data without sufficient guidance will exacerbate the situation. Ontology's, data descriptions and discovery methods alone are not enough to create the end-to-end solutions promised by SOA technologies. Software architectural patterns in conjunction with broad data strategies are required to harness and employ vast quantities of content. This dissertation provides two software architectural patterns and an auto-fusion process that guide the development of a distributed, accountable and scalable SOA framework to support improved control and monitoring software. Although applicable to a wide range of software control system challenges, the dissertation will focus on a Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) interoperability challenges. Using the U.S. Navy's MDA project as a case study, this dissertation will design, build and test a prototype automated data fusion framework employing the trickle-up and Command and Control Zone pattern that automates the discovery, pedigree assessment and ultimate fusion of dissimilar data types in a SOA web-service supported framework.

ADA486844
Collaborative Learning Agent (CLA) for Trident Warrior
Descriptive Note: Conference paper
Personal Author(s): Zhao, Ying; Kotak, Chetan; Zhou, Charles
Report Date: Jun 2008
Media Count:10 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *ANOMALIES, *LEARNING MACHINES, *NAVAL OPERATIONS, *SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, MILITARY EXERCISES, PATTERNS, OCEANS, SECURITY, PREDICTIONS, SYMPOSIA
Identifiers: (U) *CLA(COLLABORATIVE LEARNING AGENTS), *MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS), *TRIDENT WARRIOR EXERCISE, SBIR(SMALL BUSINESS INNOVATION RESEARCH), SBIR REPORTS, UNSTRUCTURED DATA
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Collaborative Learning Agent (CLA) is a technology selected for Navy on Trident Warrior '08, which is an annual FORCEnet SEA Trial. The theme for '08 is Maritime Domain Awareness. The objective is to demonstrate a set of CLAs in a distributed network to learn behavior patterns from historical MDA data and then apply them for search, prediction, and identification of anomalies and reasons that might cause the anomalies, e.g. weather or potential terrorist activities. We will show collaborating with three MDA participants (Navy, Coast Guard and Police) using unstructured data sources as the bases for normal behavior profiles. A new real-time observation is compared with the normal profiles. An anomaly meter reports and shows if the new observation is an anomaly and why. The TW08 effective attributes include capable, accurate, usable and relevant to evaluate CLA as follows: * capable: agent learning and prediction from unstructured data * accurate: compare with predictions with the ones from human analysts * usable: ease-of-use in interface, visualization and display * relevant: does CLA predict anomaly or interesting MDA behavior. We will summarize the evaluation results in terms of these attributes.

ADA486840
Enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness
Descriptive Note: Conference paper
Personal Author(s): Hutchins, Susan G; Gallup, Shelley P; MacKinnon, Doug; Schacher, Gordon; Miller, Scot; Freeman, Jared; Dunaway, Dan; Poeltler, Brad
Report Date: Jun 2008
Media Count: 22 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NATIONAL SECURITY, *OCEANS, *SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, *COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS, *NAVAL OPERATIONS, OPERATIONS RESEARCH, NAVAL PLANNING, WESTERN SECURITY(INTERNATIONAL), RISK ANALYSIS, TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, SOFTWARE TOOLS, SYMPOSIA, METHODOLOGY, SCENARIOS, RISK MANAGEMENT, COMPUTERIZED SIMULATION, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
Identifiers: (U) *MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS), *COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENTS, MARITIME SECURITY, WORKFLOW MODELS, CMA(COMPREHENSIVE MARITIME AWARENESS), ANOMALY DETECTION
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) A complex mosaic of forces will affect maritime security through 2020. These include economic forces such as (i) illegal international migration-fueled by tremendous population increases in developing countries, (ii) drug smuggling, and (iii) weapons proliferation, as well as (iv) military threats posed by hostile states, failed states, and transnational organizations engaged in intelligence gathering or terrorist activities. The President's National Security Strategy indicates that diverse threats such as these must be countered through an integrated approach: Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). MDA will engage and shape this dynamic and expansive environment by detecting anomalies and deviations from established trends and patterns in commercial and military traffic, and enabling commanders to take appropriate action before security is compromised or crises erupt. In line with the theme for this year's symposium, C2 for complex endeavors, MDA encompasses a diverse set of organizations, complex processes, and a variety of analytic and collaborative tools. This research reported here will advance organizational structures, procedures and C2 technologies to enhance global MDA. Our approach is to document current MDA capabilities, compare them with the next phase of expected capabilities based on integrating new technologies, and document the gains.

ADA486738
Defend the Approaches!
Descriptive Note: Research paper
Personal Author(s): Patterson, Mark A
Report Date: 09 May 2008
Media Count: 27 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, *HOMELAND DEFENSE, *NAVAL OPERATIONS, *COOPERATION, *MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), *INTERDICTION, *LITTORAL ZONES, TERRORISM, CRIMES, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, LAW ENFORCEMENT, POLITICAL ALLIANCES, NAVY, THREATS, TRAINING, INTERAGENCY COORDINATION, FORWARD AREAS, GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN)
Identifiers: (U) *MARITIME SECURITY, *TSCP(THEATRE SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAMS), *FORWARD PRESENCE, MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, PERSONNEL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS, MIO(MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATIONS), FOREIGN NAVIES, GFS(GLOBAL FLEET STATION), APS(AFRICA PARTNERSHIP STATION), COOPERATIVE EXCHANGE PROGRAMS, NGO(NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS), FAO(FOREIGN AREA OFFICER PROGRAM), CAPACITY BUILDING, CULTURAL AWARENESS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) A large number of embarkation sites where Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) could be loaded on vessels bound for the United States exist. Unfortunately, there are insufficient U.S. Navy assets to interdict such vessels unless extremely reliable and highly detailed intelligence were available. Consequently, effective defense against ocean-borne WMD requires U.S. Navy assets operating closer to the mainland and U.S. territories to provide for better discrimination by Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO). This paper argues that given the nature of the WMD threat, the United States will be better defended by forces operating closer to U.S. shores than by traditionally deployed forward forces. A brief overview of naval strategy since the Cold War and a description of the current threat environment and adversaries are presented. Recommendations for effectively responding to the WMD threat are offered as are recommendations for maintaining a viable U.S. presence around the world through maritime alliances and Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCPs).

ADA484509
Maritime Homeland Security and Defense: Developing a Baseline Concept of Operations
Descriptive Note: Research paper
Personal Author(s): Steffen, James W
Report Date: 23 Apr 2008
Media Count: 24 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *HOMELAND SECURITY, *HOMELAND DEFENSE, *PORTS(FACILITIES), *DOCTRINE, *THREATS, *COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS, *OCEANS, LITTORAL ZONES, TERRORISM, MARINE TRANSPORTATION, MISSIONS, VULNERABILITY, INTERDICTION, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, COASTAL REGIONS, INTERAGENCY COORDINATION, MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES)
Identifiers: (U) *MARITIME HOMELAND SECURITY, *MARITIME HOMELAND DEFENSE, *MARITIME THREATS, FOREIGN PORTS, FOREIGN LITTORALS, MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS), FOREIGN LITTORAL TRANSIT, OPEN OCEAN TRANSIT, FEDERAL AGENCIES
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The missions of Maritime Homeland Security/Defense are hardly defined beyond the simple meanings of the words. Since 9/11, the danger of a maritime terrorist attack on the United States has become very real, yet little doctrine exists specifying the roles and responsibilities of services and agencies participating in the effort. This paper explains the difference between Maritime Homeland Security and Maritime Homeland Defense and how the different missions should be viewed. The paper outlines how a maritime threat evolves and examines the maritime domain to understand how best to use assets to accomplish the mission. Finally, the paper emphasizes the necessity for established command and communication networks.

ADA487243
Securing the High Seas: America's Global Maritime Constabulatory Power
Descriptive Note: Special rept.
Personal Author(s): Eaglen, Mackenzie M; Dolbow, James; Andersen, Martin E; Carafano, James J
Report Date: 12 Mar 2008
Media Count: 26 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *WESTERN SECURITY(INTERNATIONAL), *MARITIME INDUSTRY, *LAW ENFORCEMENT, MARINE TRANSPORTATION, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, COMMERCIAL FISHING, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, COUNTERTERRORISM, DOCTRINE, COAST GUARD, GLOBALIZATION, MILITARY CAPABILITIES, INTERAGENCY COORDINATION, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, NAVY
Identifiers: (U) MARITIME SHIPPING CHOKE POINTS, MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, LAW OF THE SEA, NATIONAL FLEET POLICY
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This is the third in a series of reports on maritime security prepared by The Heritage Foundation's Maritime Security Working Group. This report addresses how to provide operational recommendations to the group's previous proposals while making the case that the United States, with its regional allies, must develop the capacity to exercise global maritime constabulary power. Specifically, this report: 1) Defines global maritime constabulary power; 2) Identifies the roles and missions that are related to global maritime constabulary power; 3) Describes the role of friendly and allied nations; 4) Suggests how the private sector can and should contribute; 5) Recommends a division of responsibilities for maritime constabulary duties between the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard; and 6) Identifies the budgetary, regulatory, and legislative implications of the recommendations.

ADA480045
MDA Development: By Design or by Policy
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Wagenborg, David
Report Date: Mar 2008
Media Count: 77 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NATIONAL SECURITY, *OCEAN ENVIRONMENTS, *AWARENESS, *HOMELAND SECURITY, *MARITIME INDUSTRY, DATA BASES, LAYERS, NAVY, MULTIPURPOSE, SECURITY, THESES, THREAT EVALUATION, LINKAGES
Identifiers: (U) *MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, SPIRAL 1 TECHNOLOGIES, HOMELAND DEFENSE, MARITIME SECURITY, SITUATION AWARENESS, ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE, PROCESS ENGINEERING
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Maritime Domain Awareness may require reach across Federal, State, local and private agency maritime security systems to create an accurate, timely, and reliable common operating view. The view will provide the user with an in-depth, multi layer linkage of situational awareness and threat assessment developed from many databases, to support different needs at different levels of the national maritime security system. Implementing new and emerging technologies into the U.S. Navy system may enhance the Maritime Commander's ability to achieve situational awareness in a more timely, efficient, and accurate manner than what occurs now. Recognizing the advantage of new and emerging technologies, the SECNAV and CNO have tasked PEO C4I to develop a system, which will aid the U.S. Navy in meeting the MDA mission; this system is known as MDA Spiral-1. This thesis examines the effects of placing new and emerging technologies developed in Spiral-1 onto legacy systems and how the U.S. Navy as an organization will either absorb these technologies or make multi-dimensional changes to enhance the process of achieving MDA.

ADA491959
MDA Program Test Structure and FIRE Implementation
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Schacher, Gordon; Freeman, Jared
Report Date: 01 Mar 2008
Media Count: 51 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MANAGEMENT PLANNING AND CONTROL, *KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT, *METRICS, ORGANIZATIONS, TEST AND EVALUATION
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) An objectives and metrics structure has been designed for Maritime Domain Awareness tests. This structure has been installed in the NPS FIRE knowledge management system. This report describes the structure and its use for MDA test planning and reporting.

ADA480025
Monitoring the Performance of IWS Processes in an Open Architecture Environment
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Simmons, Alexander L
Report Date: Mar 2008
Media Count: 115 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *COMPUTER PROGRAMS, *ARCHITECTURE, INTEGRATED SYSTEMS, COMMERCE, ENVIRONMENTS, ORGANIZATIONS, ACQUISITION, MANAGEMENT, TOOL KITS, SOFTWARE TOOLS, EXECUTIVES, SKILLS, MONITORING, PERFORMANCE TESTS, WEAPON SYSTEMS, REPORTS, THESES
Identifiers: (U) *KNOWLEDGE VALUE ADDED, *OPEN ARCHITECTURE, MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, MDA, IWS(INTEGRATED WEAPONS SYSTEM ), KVA(KNOWLEDGE VALUE ADDED), OA(OPEN ARCHITECTURE), RETURN ON INVESTMENT, ROI(RETURN ON INVESTMENT)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This thesis focuses on a trial implementation of Knowledge Value Added (KVA) software supporting the management of an Open Architecture (OA) process performance monitoring analysis. During this research Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) business processes establish the baseline Return On Investment (ROI) analysis. Trial implementation of KVA software tools focus on the assessing and monitoring performance of OA. Installation of KVA software tools are used to support ongoing assessment and performance monitoring for Integrated Weapons System (IWS) OA management. This work illustrates the capability to perform ongoing ROI analysis on OA processes for development and acquisition processes enabled through the use of the OA approach. Included in management reports derived from the GaussSoft KVA software, a crucial output of this thesis is the ability of the organization to extend the use of the method and toolset over time to meet ongoing needs of Program Executive Office (PEO) - IWS from MDA into other programs/systems. All data gathered was conducted in the UNCLASSIFIED environment for use in this research.

ADA491962
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) Workflow Model Status Report
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): MacKinnon, Douglas J; Hutchins, Susan G; Gallup, Shelley P
Report Date: 01 Mar 2008
Media Count: 68 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *AWARENESS, *LEADERSHIP, *EDUCATION, MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS, QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS, WORKSHOPS, ACQUISITION, TEAMS(PERSONNEL)
Identifiers: (U) MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS), SPIRAL 1 TECHNOLOGY, WORKFLOW
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The Naval Postgraduate School was contracted by OPNAV N3/N5 to define identify and help to fill gaps in the MDA capability, especially with respect to MDA Spiral 1 systems. This status report presents: (1) The sources and methods we used to identify the current (as is) concerns and processes of a sample of organizations that execute Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) activities. (2) The products of that study: a list of issues of concern to MDA stakeholders, and a set of MDA workflow diagrams. (3) Initial recommendations to enhance MDA capability given likely impact of Spiral 1 technologies on the current processes.

ADA478411
Strategic Maritime Domain Awareness: Supporting the National Strategy for Maritime Security
Descriptive Note: Strategy research project
Personal Author(s): Campion, Francis J
Report Date: 29 Jan 2008
Media Count: 35 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NATIONAL SECURITY, *STRATEGY, GLOBAL, SECURITY, TRANSPARENCE, INTERNATIONAL, COOPERATION, COAST GUARD, LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AWARENESS, OCEAN ENVIRONMENTS, MARINE TRANSPORTATION, DESTRUCTION, THREATS, COMMERCE
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The National Strategy for Maritime Security seeks to protect U.S. national and global maritime security interests by preventing attracks and safeguarding the ocean and its resources through maximum threat and situational awareness across the vast maritime domain The purpose of this project is to present a model for Strategic Maritime Domain Awareness that will enhance U.S. maritime security by linking the national and global maritime domains using the capabilities of the U.S. Navy; U.S. Coast Guard; national state and local government agencies; and multi-national partners Strategic Maritime Domain Awareness will provide continuously seamless and transparent awareness of the entire maritime realm to support The National Strategy for Maritime Security by deterring disrupting or destroying threats; and enhancing international cooperation bolstering commercial security and ensuring the continuity of the marine transportation system

ADA491955
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) Process Engineering Workshop, 15-17 January 2008
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Freeman, Jared; Heacox, Nancy; MacKinnon, Douglas J
Report Date: 18 Jan 2008
Media Count: 48 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, INFORMATION PROCESSING, THESES, WORKSHOPS
Identifiers: (U) MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS), PEW(PROCESS ENGINEERING WORKSHOP), *PROCESS ENGINEERING
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This document reports findings from an MDA Process Engineering Workshop (PEW) hosted by the Naval Postgraduate School 15-17 January 2008. The objectives of the PEW were to: * Refine, extend, and validate a process model of Maritime Domain Awareness * Define attributes of the activities that constitute MDA, specifically information requirements, processing activities, products, and resource (time, manning) requirements * Specify which MDA activities may benefit from Spiral 1 technologies, and develop concepts for assessing that utility * Identify barriers to fielding MDA Spiral 1 technologies Representatives of the following organizations participated in the PEW: ASN RDA, C3F, COTF, Dept. of the Under Secretary of the Navy, DISA, HFE LLC, JITIC, METRON, MIFCLANT, MIFCPAC, NAVCENT, NAVNETWARCOM, NCIS, NORTHCOM, NPS, NRL, NWDC, ONI, OPNAV, PMW 120, and SPAWAR. Also participating were subject matter experts (SMEs) from several of the MDA Spiral 1 technologies, domain experts ( gray beards ), representatives from the Trident Warrior 2008 (TW08) operational experiment where many of the MDA Spiral 1 technologies will be assessed, and members of the assessment team (NPS, Aptima, Pacific Sciences & Engineering, WBB Inc.).

ADA517992
NRL Global Vessel Tracking Project (VTP)
Descriptive Note: Journal article
Personal Author(s): Bielecki, D J
Report Date: Jan 2008
Media Count: 3 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *GLOBAL, *NAVAL VESSELS, *TRACKING, INTELLIGENCE, AUTOMATION, DETECTORS, ACQUISITION, DEFENSE SYSTEMS, SPACE SYSTEMS, LAYERS, ESTIMATES, INFORMATION RETRIEVAL, MODULES(ELECTRONICS), NAVAL RESEARCH, RESOURCES, EXTRACTION, ATLANTIC OCEAN, ARCHITECTURE, SOURCES, INFRASTRUCTURE, DATA BASES, REQUIREMENTS
Identifiers: (U) *MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS), *VTP(VESSEL TRACKING PROJECT), MSS(MODULAR SENSOR SYSTEMS), NTM(NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) In 2003, a call for Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) architectures was issued by the Honorable John Young, then Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition (ASN RD&A). The Naval Research Laboratory's Space Systems Development Department (SSDD) responded with a global architecture and estimates of resource requirements. The response featured a layered defense approach, incorporating support from sensors, databases, and information feeds ranging from National Technical Means (NTM) to Open Source Intelligence (OSINT). Essential elements of the system were funded. A Modular Sensor System (MSS) provided protection for a port, harbor, or key infrastructure element. A highly automated virtual database and information extraction capability was provided at the GENSER level. At the NTM level, a fully automated vessel tracking system provided tracks and updates for the Atlantic Ocean.

ADA519830
GLADIS: GLobal AIS & Data-X International Satellite Constellation
Descriptive Note: Briefing charts
Personal Author(s): Graham, Jeff; Middour, Jay
Report Date: Jan 2008
Media Count: 29 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *SATELLITE CONSTELLATIONS, *IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS, *OCEAN SURVEILLANCE, TRACKING, INTERNATIONAL, FISHERIES, TERRORISM, SPACE BASED, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, DEGRADATION, SYMPOSIA, SHIPS, ARCHITECTURE
Identifiers: (U) *MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, *GLADIS(GLOBAL AIS AND DATA-X INTERNATIONAL SATELLITE), BRIEFING CHARTS, INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS, AIS(AUTOMATED IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM), CRIMINAL ACTIVITY, ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION, FISHERIES VIOLATIONS, GLADIS ARCHITECTURE, HUMAN TRAFFICKING, ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY, NANOSATELLITES, OIL THEFT
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ADA519355
Closing the Capability Gap: Developing New Solutions to Counter Maritime Threats
Descriptive Note: Journal article
Personal Author(s): Renuart, Jr., Victor E; Egli, Dane S
Report Date: Jan 2008
Media Count: 12 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MILITARY CAPABILITIES, *OCEAN ENVIRONMENTS, *MARITIME INDUSTRY, *THREATS, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, NAVAL OPERATIONS, VULNERABILITY, HOMELAND DEFENSE, NATIONAL SECURITY, REPRINTS
Identifiers: (U) *MARITIME SECURITY, MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, USNORTHCOM(UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND), GAPS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) America is engaged in a fight against violent extremism, an asymmetric war that differs from any other war our nation has fought. The nature of the enemy has changed dramatically during the past two decades, compelling leaders to reexamine our nation's vulnerabilities in the air, land, and maritime domains. Significant strides have been made nationally to protect the air and land domains against enemy attacks; nonetheless, this article argues, efforts to secure the maritime domain--although improving--are inadequate, and we need to sharpen our focus on maritime threats, domestically and internationally. This article draws from the perspective of U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), whose mission is to anticipate and conduct homeland defense and civil support operations within the assigned area of responsibility to defend, protect, and secure the United States and its interests. The article will summarize national-level maritime doctrine, examine the current maritime threat, and introduce new capabilities being developed to counter terrorism on the maritime front--an enduring national security challenge gaining increased attention at all levels.

ADA521938
Status of Ship Wakes in SAR Imagery
Descriptive Note: Briefing charts
Personal Author(s): Tunaley, J K
Report Date: Jan 2008
Media Count: 22 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *SYNTHETIC APERTURE RADAR, *WAKE, SHIPS, DAMAGE, CANADA, DEEP WATER, VELOCITY, PROPULSION SYSTEMS, SHALLOW WATER, SEA STATES, SIMULATION, VORTICES
Identifiers: (U) BRIEFING CHARTS, MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, BRAGG WAVES, BRAGG SCATTER, INTERNAL WAVE WAKES, KELVIN TRANSVERSE WAVELENGTH, OPTICAL WAKES, PROPELLER WAKES, RADAR WAKES, SHIP VELOCITY, SIMULATED KELVIN WAKES, SLOPE MODULATION, STEADY FLOWS, SURFACE SCATTERING, T WAKES, TURBULANT WAKES, UNSTEADY GRAVITY WAKES, WAKE THEORY, WAVE BREAKING
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ADA521935
Radar Satellites And Maritime Domain Awareness
Descriptive Note: Briefing charts
Personal Author(s): Tunaley, J K
Report Date: Jan 2008
Media Count: 26 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *OCEAN SURVEILLANCE, *SATELLITE CONSTELLATIONS, *SEA STATES, *RADAR, TRACKING, ARTIFICIAL SATELLITES, CLASSIFICATION, RADAR EQUIPMENT, CROSSINGS, OCEAN ENVIRONMENTS, CANADA, DETECTION, SHIPS, VELOCITY, SIMULATION
Identifiers: (U) *SATELLITE RADAR SENSORS, *N RADAR SATELLITES, *MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, RADARSAT-2 SATELLITE, ORBCOM SATELLITE, PROBABILITY OF NO DETECTION, BRIEFING CHARTS, LOW PROBABILITY OF FALSE ALARM, OCEAN CROSSINGS, POLAR EPSILON, PROBABILITY OF DETECTION, PROBABILITY OF FALSE ALARM, RANDOM SPEEDS, SHIP DETECTION, SMALL SATELLITES, FOREIGN REPORTS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ADA491331
The U.S. Navy and the Global War on Terrorism: Applying the Lessons of the War on Drugs
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Lasky, Joshua
Report Date: Jan 2008
Media Count: 35 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS, *TERRORISM, *DRUG SMUGGLING, NAVAL OPERATIONS, COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, THESES, INFORMATION EXCHANGE
Identifiers: (U) GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The US Navy must apply the lessons of the War on Drugs and lead a global, multilateral, joint, interagency maritime campaign that achieves Maritime Domain Awareness, provides operational command and control, and shores up the maritime borders of weak coastal states.

ADA481033
SeaSpider: Automated Information Gathering on Vessel Movements in Support of Maritime Domain Awareness
Descriptive Note: Technical memo
Personal Author(s): Tatar, Serhan; Chapman, David M
Report Date: Dec 2007
Media Count: 44 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *INFORMATION PROCESSING, *INTERNET BROWSERS, *MARITIME INDUSTRY, DATA BASES, CANADA, PROTOTYPES, PORTS(FACILITIES), MARINE TRANSPORTATION, INFORMATION RETRIEVAL
Identifiers: (U) MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS), ISR(INTELLIGENCE RECONAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE), CONFUSION MATRIX, GOOGLE, SEASPIDER PROJECT
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) SeaSpider is an R&D tool to investigate the development of a software agent that would aid an operator in gathering information about marine vessels from public sources on the internet. This information would supplement sensor information used for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) to enhance Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and to complete the Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP). Specifically, SeaSpider is fine tuned to search for, organize, and display information about locations (ports), dates and times, and activities (arrival, in berth, departure). One module manages the Google searches and retrieves the html pages; another module extracts relevant ship movement information and populates a database; a third module retrieves information from the database in response to user generated queries. In this memorandum, the SeaSpider concept is introduced, the design details of the prototype are presented, and performance is analysed, with a view to future enhancements.

ADA501470
National Concept of Operations for Maritime Domain Awareness
Report Date: Dec 2007
Media Count: 56 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *COMPUTER NETWORKS, *SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, *NATIONAL SECURITY, HOMELAND SECURITY, OCEAN ENVIRONMENTS, DATA TRANSMISSION SECURITY, LEADERSHIP, STRATEGY, UNITED STATES, SECURITY
Identifiers: (U) MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS), CONOPS(CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This document has two purposes. First, it is intended to execute the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA Plan) in support of the National Strategy for Maritime security and National Security Presidential Directive-41 / Homeland Security Presidential Directive-13 and help create an effective, on-going National MDA Enterprise. Second, it seeks to provide the members and leadership of that enterprise the benefit of understanding gained by inter-departmental work groups over a period of three years. It is intended to be strategic in nature so as to permit flexibility in addressing agency-specific needs. Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is the effective understanding of anything associated with the global maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States. However, this does not mean that knowing everything everywhere in the maritime domain is a requirement to achieving MDA. This CONOPS develops a framework for describing what needs to be known, as well as where or when that information needs to be available in order to guide the systematic development of requisite capabilities. It establishes a construct for categorizing types of information and prioritizing areas in the world where information must be collected.

ADA475178
A Systems Engineering Approach for Global Fleet Station Alternatives in the Gulf of Guinea
Descriptive Note: Technical rept.
Personal Author(s): Axiak, Frank C; Crosby, R B; Delaney, Jennifer M; Hans, Brian E; Hansen, Christian A; Jomoto, Justin R; McKenna, Matthew A; Montonye, John T; Ottersberg, Kathryn J; Rummel, John P
Report Date: Dec 2007
Media Count: 491 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *STABILITY, *SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, *MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), *NAVY, *FLEETS(SHIPS), *WEST AFRICA, *COOPERATION, *INTERACTIONS, STATIONS, PEACETIME, SEA BASED, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, RISK ANALYSIS, COAST GUARD, COUNTERTERRORISM, MISSIONS, SECURITY, COST ANALYSIS, NAVAL VESSELS, GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), ORGANIZATIONS, GULFS
Identifiers: (U) *GFS(GLOBAL FLEET STATION), *GULF OF GUINEA, *MARITIME SECURITY AND INFLUENCE OPERATIONS, JCIDS(JOINT CAPABILITIES INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM), SEA BASING, SHAPING AND STABILITY OPERATIONS, THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION, MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, REGIONAL SECURITY, REGIONAL STABILITY, PEACEFUL ENGAGEMENT, DISASTER RELIEF, INTERAGENCY COORDINATION, NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, FOREIGN NAVAL FORCES, FAA(FUNCTIONAL AREA ANALYSIS), FNA(FUNCTIONAL NEEDS ANALYSIS), FSA(FUNCTIONAL SOLUTIONS ANALYSIS), GLOBAL MARITIME PARTNERSHIPS, SEA-12, DOTMILPF, HSV(HIGH SPEED VESSELS), HSV-CLASS VESSELS, LPD-CLASS VESSELS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This Systems Engineering and Analysis Cohort 12 (SEA-12) report applies a systems engineering process to the largely qualitative Global Fleet Station (GFS) Concept, and its role in ensuring stability in the regions of the world. The authors apply a slightly modified JCIDS process, with a focus on providing value-based results. A regional focus on the Gulf of Guinea is selected. Measures are derived in the form of attributes, or specific capabilities, desired of GFS based on the needs and issues of the region. Vessels from the Navy's current inventory are evaluated for their performance and cost, and two vessels, an LPD and a High Speed Vessel (HSV), are selected as the most cost-effective proposals for employment as a GFS in the Gulf of Guinea in 2012. Other solutions are evaluated as well: a future-concept ship, improvements to existing platform alternatives, and considerations for improving integration and interaction with agencies outside the Department of the Navy.

ADA515318
Assessment of Brazil's Research Literature
Descriptive Note: Research rept.
Personal Author(s): Schoeneck, David J; Porter, Alan L; Kostoff, Ronald N; Berger, Elena M
Report Date: 28 Sep 2007
Media Count: 113 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE, *SCIENTIFIC ORGANIZATIONS, *BRAZIL, *BIOTECHNOLOGY, CHEMICALS, ENERGY, PROBLEM SOLVING, INFECTIOUS DISEASES, AEROSPACE INDUSTRY, TAXONOMY, CHINA, MICROBIOLOGY, IMPORTS, NATIONAL ENERGY CRISIS, NANOTECHNOLOGY, SOFTWARE TOOLS, LOW COSTS, GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT, ASYMMETRIC WARFARE, DEVELOPING NATIONS, MANUFACTURING
Identifiers: (U) *RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, *SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, SCI(SCIENCE CITATION INDEX), EC(EI COMPENDEX), BRAZILIAN RESEARCH, MCT(MINISTRY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY), BRIC(BRAZIL RUSSIA INDIA CHINA), MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS, SPACE TREE BROWSER
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This report analyzes tens of thousands of research papers by Brazilian authors drawn from global databases [Science Citation Index (SCI) and Social Science Citation Index (SSCI), and the EI Compendex (EC)]. The resulting profiles indicate Brazilian R&D strengths. These analyses show trends in Brazilian research and point to the leading research organizations. The Ministry of Science and Technology (MCT) has primary responsibility for R&D and promotion of innovation. It oversees a complex organizational framework, and most Brazilian states have Science and Technology agencies, most notably, Sao Paulo. MCT currently strategically targets seven R&D domains: pharmaceutical, information and communication technologies, biomass and energy, capital goods, aerospace, biotechnology, and nanotechnology. In 2004, 20% of R&D was performed by the government, 40% by universities, and the remaining 40% by firms (private and public - e.g., Petrobras). Government funded 58% of that R&D activity; firms funded 40% (private and public); and universities, 2%. Brazil's public and private R&D accounts for approximately 1% of GDP. The leading industrial R&D sectors are transportation (37%), chemicals (12%), and energy (12%). Universities employ some 90% of the 48,000 PhD scientists. Leading research universities are mainly public, led by the University of Sao Paulo. Brazil's relatively strong R&D effort has not translated to strong rates of innovation. Interaction among the public, academic, and private sectors lags. Brazil actively publishes research results. Its profile in these S&T databases is substantial - some 18000 articles in 2006 in SCI/SSCI and some 6000 in EC.

ADA472532
Extending Comprehensive Maritime Awareness to Disconnected Vessels and Users
Descriptive Note: Technical rept.
Personal Author(s): Clarke, Lynne; Chang, Toufue ; Roderick, Andrea ; Reel, Walter; Alvarez, Kimberly; Kennedy, Galen; Ritchey, Robert; Le, Cop
Report Date: Sep 2007
Media Count: 171 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *INFORMATION EXCHANGE, *INFORMATION TRANSFER, *JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, *COUNTERTERRORISM, *AWARENESS, DEPLOYMENT, MERCHANT VESSELS, COAST GUARD, TERRORISM, LAW ENFORCEMENT, OCEAN ENVIRONMENTS, COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS, INTELLIGENCE, NATIONAL SECURITY
Identifiers: (U) *NATIONAL MARITIME SECURITY, JCTD(JOINT CAPABILITIES TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION), MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS), MARITIME LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS, CMA(COMPREHENSIVE MARITIME AWARENESS), DISCONNECTED VESSELS, HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) After the attacks of 9/11, increasing security became a national priority that has grown steadily since that date. National Maritime Security is one area of focus that has expanded into several new programs. Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is an initiative developed by the Coast Guard, in partnership with the U.S. Navy and other agencies to increase awareness in the maritime domain in support of maritime security. The purpose of MDA is to generate actionable intelligence obtained via the collection, fusion and dissemination of information from U.S. joint forces, U.S. government agencies, international coalition partners and commercial entities. This actionable intelligence is the cornerstone of successful counterterrorist and maritime law enforcement operations and is critical to Maritime Security. The U.S. Navy, as a partner in the development and creation of MDA, has tasked its subordinate commands to identify and define capabilities to support this program. One effort sponsored is the Comprehensive Maritime Awareness (CMA) Joint Capabilities Technology Demonstration (JCTD). This project supports the CMA JCTD efforts by proposing a deployable system to enable a disconnected vessel to connect to the CMA network. A disconnected user is seen as a merchant ship, hospital ship or any vessel not currently connected to the CMA network. This project's proposed deployable system facilitates information sharing for disconnected vessels in support of humanitarian efforts worldwide.

ADA484372
Collaborative Unmanned Systems for Maritime and Port Security Operations
Descriptive Note: Conference paper
Personal Author(s): Healey, Anthony J; Horner, D P; Kragelund, S P; Wring, B; Monarrez, A
Report Date: Sep 2007
Media Count: 7 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *UNMANNED, *SURVEILLANCE DRONES, *UNDERWATER VEHICLES, NETWORKS, INTERDICTION, TRACKING, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, INTEGRATED SYSTEMS, DATA RATE, AUTOMATIC PILOTS, OCEAN SURVEILLANCE, CONTROL SYSTEMS, GUIDANCE
Identifiers: (U) AUV(AUTONOMOUS UNDERWATER VEHICLES), DISTRIBUTED AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS, USV(UNMANNED SURFACE VESSELS), UAV(UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES), COORDINATED AUTONOMY, DATA RANGE, MARITIME INTERDICTION, MARITIME SECURITY, MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS), NETWORKED DISTRIBUTED VEHICLES, PORT SECURITY, RIVERINE OPERATIONS, STANDOFF DETECTION, COASTAL SURVEILLANCE
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This paper deals with some recent work ongoing at NPS, which attempts to show the utility of networked distributed vehicles for Maritime Interdiction, Riverine Operations, and related missions. We believe that these systems will be essential for dealing with the challenges in confronting these important National future needs.

ADA487442
Sharing Information Today: Maritime Domain Awareness
Descriptive Note: Journal article
Personal Author(s): Todd, Michael
Report Date: Jul 2007
Media Count: 3 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *INFORMATION EXCHANGE, *INTERAGENCY COORDINATION, *INTERNET, *SHIPS, *IDENTIFICATION, *TRACKING, *THREATS, AGREEMENTS, PILOT STUDIES, AWARENESS, HOMELAND SECURITY, DATA ACQUISITION, CARGO, MARINE TRANSPORTATION, CREWS, SHARING, DATA MANAGEMENT, REPRINTS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Identifiers: (U) *MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, MARITIME SECURITY, MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS DATA SHARING COMMUNITY OF INTEREST, DHS(DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY), DOT(DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION), NCES(NET-CENTRIC ENTERPRISE SERVICES)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) In a world where unforeseen human or natural disasters (i.e., U.S.S. Cole, September 11, Hurricane Katrina, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, and the possibility of an avian flu pandemic) may occur, interagency information sharing and collaboration is essential to mitigating the effects of these types of catastrophic events. The Maritime Domain Awareness Data Sharing Community of Interest (MDA DS COI) pilot demonstrated a net-centric data-sharing capability as a first step towards addressing the common challenge of global identification and tracking of maritime vessels, cargo, and crew usage of existing information sources to better secure our coasts, ports, and waterways. This Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Department of Transportation (DOT) partnership developed capabilities to expose maritime data as a consumable Web-enabled service to authorized, unanticipated users employing community-based agreements defining a common vocabulary and data-sharing services. This COI pilot also leveraged enterprise services resulting in a repeatable process, an extensible vocabulary, and reusable services available for developing responsive, agile solutions for any number of data-sharing challenges.

ADA481628
Design of an Experiment to Investigate ISR Coordination and Information Presentation Strategies in an Expeditionary Strike Group: Combined A2C2 and CMD-21 Research
Descriptive Note: Conference paper with briefing charts
Personal Author(s): Hutchins, Susan G; Weil, Shawn; Kleinman, David L; Hocevar, Susan P; Kemple, William G; Pfeiffer, Karl; Kennedy, Doug; Oonk, Heather; Averett, Gene; Entin, Elliot
Report Date: Jun 2007
Media Count: 46 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS, *ORGANIZATION THEORY, *INFORMATION THEORY, *NAVAL OPERATIONS, DISASTERS, NAVAL VESSELS, MISSION PROFILES, EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN, ORGANIZATIONAL REALIGNMENT, SOFTWARE TOOLS, COMPUTERIZED SIMULATION, KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT, OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, SYMPOSIA, SCENARIOS, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, ADAPTATION
Identifiers: (U) BRIEFING CHARTS, ESG(EXPEDITIONARY STRIKE GROUPS), MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS), MSO(MARITIME SECURITY OPERATIONS), HA/DR(HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE/DISASTER RELIEF) MISSIONS, ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS, A2C2(ADAPTIVE ARCHITECTURES FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This paper describes the design of an experiment that combines research of the Adaptive Architectures for Command and Control (A2C2) and the Command 21 programs, both sponsored by the Office of Naval Research. The experiment focuses on the nexus of organizational design and information presentation strategies - both of which are undergoing dramatic changes in form and function within the US military. The formation of Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESGs) is one example of the transformational vision provided in the Naval Operating Concept wherein an ESG provides a flexible force package, capable of tailoring itself to a wide variety of mission sets. In this effort, the objective is to examine experimentally how ESGs with alternative structures and processes - here specifically related to the incorporation of an ISR officer and different information presentation strategies - affects performance and information flow in an information rich planning and execution environment. We present the process used to develop the scenario environment in which the team-in-the-loop simulation experiment is conducted. This scenario reflects the new mission areas faced by ESGs that include Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR), Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and Maritime Security Operations (MSO).

ADA470726
AFRICOM: The U.S. Navy's Emergent Missions and Capability Gaps
Descriptive Note: Research paper
Personal Author(s): Sasser Jr , William E
Report Date: 10 May 2007
Media Count: 25 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MILITARY ASSISTANCE, *NAVY, *MISSIONS, *AFRICA, *SECURITY, *ORGANIZATIONAL REALIGNMENT, *MILITARY CAPABILITIES, MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), LITTORAL ZONES, COUNTERTERRORISM, RIVERINE WARFARE, SMUGGLING, CRIMES, PORTS(FACILITIES), OIL FIELDS, PATROL CRAFT, COOPERATION, LAW ENFORCEMENT, HARBORS, CIVIL AFFAIRS, MILITARY COMMANDERS, COMMERCIAL FISHING, PATROLLING, PROTECTION, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, THREATS
Identifiers: (U) *AFRICOM(US AFRICA COMMAND), REGIONAL COMBATANT COMMANDS, NAVAL CAPABILITIES, *CAPABILITY GAPS, MARITIME SECURITY, AFRICAN NAVIES, FORCE COMPOSITION, MARITIME PIRACY, MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, OFFSHORE OIL RESERVES, LCS(LITTORAL COMBAT SHIPS)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The recent creation of AFRICOM provides the United States and the new Combatant Commander the opportunity to create comprehensive security initiatives that meet the specific needs of their African partners. As the U.S. Navy increases its engagements on the continent, it will find that it lacks critical capabilities that are essential to conduct the maritime missions it will be assigned. An analysis of the expected missions and the current capabilities of the U.S. Navy reveals specific areas where the service needs to improve. Specifically, the U.S. Navy lacks capabilities in the maritime regulatory and domestic law enforcement environments. While the service has extended its capabilities with the Littoral Combat Ship and the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, both initiatives have failed to completely bridge the capability gaps. Finally, the paper draws the conclusion that the U.S. Navy should expand its capabilities to include some missions performed domestically by the U.S. Coast Guard. The addition of these new capabilities will enable the U.S. Navy to more effectively engage with African navies and coast guards.

ADA467243
Portfolio Management Decision Support Tools Analysis Relating to Management Value Metrics
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Goodson, Christopher J; Knutson, Richard D
Report Date: Mar 2007
Media Count: 55 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *LEADERSHIP, *MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL, *DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS, *KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT, FUNCTIONS, METHODOLOGY, RISK MANAGEMENT, INTERDICTION, TRACKING, SHIPS, INTEGRATED SYSTEMS
Identifiers: (U) RETURN ON INVESTMENT, REAL OPTIONS, MANAGEMENT VALUE ADDED, INTEGRATED RISK MANAGEMENT, MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, RETURN ON KNOWLEDGE
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. This document is not available from DTIC in microfiche.
Abstract: (U) The general area of research is Maritime Domain Awareness, where we will be looking at the ship tracking process in prevention and interdiction functions. The objective of this research is to demonstrate that the Knowledge Value Added (KVA) and Real Options (RO) methodologies can be used to assess the current performance of core Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) processes. This type of approach will help with identification and valuation of future options for an MDA process. The results of this research will assist MDA managers, and operational leaders, in making portfolio management decisions for allocating resources to create the correct support tools for MDA processes and support systems. The research will provide a proof of concept test of a set of decision support tools to support managers in the MDA ship tracking process. We also explored a new methodology for determining value added of management.

ADA467714
Bridging the Gap in Port Security; Network Centric Theory Applied to Public/Private Collaboration
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Wright, Candice L
Report Date: Mar 2007
Media Count: 80 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *INFORMATION EXCHANGE, *SECURITY, *COMPUTER NETWORKS, THESES, CHAINS, SUPPLIES, OCEAN ENVIRONMENTS, AWARENESS, LOS ANGELES(CALIFORNIA), PORTS(FACILITIES), COLLABORATIVE TECHNIQUES
Identifiers: (U) *MARITIME SECURITY, *PORT SECURITY, NETWORK CENTRIC OPERATIONS, PUBLIC/PRIVATE COLLABORATION
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Achieving awareness in the maritime domain, including intelligence and information sharing at all levels of government is a key to our maritime security. Better awareness of what is out there leads to better unity of effort in maritime planning and operations. We need to have a common operating picture. We also need to integrate our operational capabilities and efforts with our private sector partners to better prepare for, respond to, and recover from incidents. Admiral Thad Allen, 2007 The application of Network Centric Warfare theory enables all port stakeholders to better prepare for a disaster through increased information sharing and collaboration. Currently, a significant gap in connectivity exists among the many entities responsible for securing the intermodal supply chain throughout the port complex. The research conducted in this thesis creates an architecture using the theory of Network Centric Warfare to perpetuate a cycle of preparedness in a seaport, thus enhancing situational awareness for improved security. As a result of the research conducted in this thesis, the architecture is being applied in the Port of Los Angeles/ Long Beach in the form of a public/private virtual maritime fusion center to fill the gap between stakeholders thus improving overall maritime domain awareness.

ADA471342
Posture Statement of General Peter Pace, USMC Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before the 110th Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee
Descriptive Note: Congressional testimony
Personal Author(s): Pace, Peter
Report Date: 06 Feb 2007
Media Count: 14 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES), *MANPOWER UTILIZATION, *MISSIONS, *THREAT EVALUATION, *MILITARY FORCE LEVELS, *TRANSFORMATIONS, *MILITARY CAPABILITIES, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, GUIDED MISSILES, MEDICAL SERVICES, COUNTERINSURGENCY, PHILIPPINES, CHINA, LATIN AMERICA, TERRORISM, IRAN, MILITARY BUDGETS, COUNTERTERRORISM, AFRICA, IRAQI WAR, AFGHANISTAN CONFLICT, HOMELAND SECURITY, NATURAL DISASTERS, INFORMATION WARFARE, INSURGENCY, INDONESIA, CIVILIAN PERSONNEL, JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, NORTH KOREA, PAKISTAN, MILITARY RESERVES, ARMOR, MILITARY ASSISTANCE
Identifiers: (U) AL QAEDA, ABU SAYAF GROUP, JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH, MARITIME SECURITY, NARCO-TERRORISM, GENOCIDE, CIVIL WAR, SAFE HAVENS, BCT(BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS), REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAMS, RECONSTITUTION, REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION, MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, CIVILIAN MILITARY RELATIONS, DISASTER RELIEF, PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY, EXPEDITIONARY CAPABILITIES, INTERAGENCY COORDINATION, FEDERAL AGENCIES, JOINT WARFIGHTING CAPABILITIES, ISR(INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE RECONNAISSANCE), QUALITY OF LIFE, FORCE ROTATION POLICIES
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This document contains the testimony of General Peter Pace, U.S. Marine Corps, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the 110th Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, on 6 Feb 2007. The testimony begins with a brief review of the biennial National Military Strategy Risk Assessment, which depicts the threats the U.S. military faces around the world and how they will overcome them. These threats emanate from Iran, North Korea, China, Pakistan, Al Qaeda and its partners, narco-terrorism in Latin America, the governments of Venezuela and Cuba, and political and humanitarian challenges in Africa. In the next section, General Pace discusses the force structure needed to sustain operations in Iraq and Afghanistan while maintaining readiness to respond to new contingencies around the globe; reconstitution of the Joint Forces; Security Cooperation efforts in Latin America, the Far East, and Africa; expansion of irregular warfare capabilities, including Special Operations Forces; increases in information warfare capabilities; and civilian-military cooperation in Homeland Security and response to natural disasters. In the third section, General Pace focuses on accelerating Transformation, including requiring that the Armed Forces work closely with civilian government personnel and multinational partners; building partnership capacity by helping other countries combat terrorism and instability; expanding the expeditionary capabilities of civilian agencies for stability and reconstruction operations; and enhancing interagency effectiveness. In the fourth section, General Pace advocates strengthening U.S. Joint Warfighting capabilities, including Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance; satellite communications; communications networks; and target engagement. The final section focuses on improving the Quality of Life of Service members and their families through greater deployment predictability, better armor protection, and advances in medical services.

ADA520294
How Many Countries Does It Take to Make a Thousand-Ship Navy
Descriptive Note: Journal article
Personal Author(s): Reveron, Derek S
Report Date: Jan 2007
Media Count: 5 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NAVAL OPERATIONS, *SHIPS, *NAVAL PLANNING, SIZES(DIMENSIONS), LOGISTICS SUPPORT, REPRINTS, LEADERSHIP
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) While senior Navy leaders caution about taking the thousand-ship navy literally (it does not have to be one thousand and will include coast guards, maritime forces, port operators, commercial shippers, and local law enforcement), the importance of maritime cooperation necessitates an understanding of likely contributors. With missions of patrolling choke points, maritime interdiction, and maritime domain awareness, it matters what types of ships are available; draft, endurance, and capabilities dictate what missions can be performed. Of the 18,524 ships listed in the 2007 Jane's Fighting Ships, at least 2,108 can be considered potentially available based on size and sustainability.

ADA518453
Comprehensive Maritime Awareness (CMA) Joint Capabilities Technology Demonstration (JCTD)
Descriptive Note: Journal article
Personal Author(s): Dwyer, C T
Report Date: Jan 2007
Media Count: 4 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *COLLABORATIVE TECHNIQUES, *JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, *SHARING, *COUNTERTERRORISM, *INFORMATION EXCHANGE, SOUTHEAST ASIA, SINGAPORE, TERRORISM, DRUGS, DEMONSTRATIONS, INFORMATION TRANSFER, DATA MANAGEMENT, VISION
Identifiers: (U) *CMA(COMPREHENSIVE MARITIME AWARENESS), JCTD(JOINT CAPABILITIES TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION), MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS), WMD(WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION), NETCENTRIC, CULTURE OF SHARING, *CENTRIXS(COALITION ENTERPRISE REGIONAL INFORMATION EXCHANGE SYSTEM)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The Comprehensive Maritime Awareness (CMA) Joint Capabilities Technology Demonstration (JCTD) is a program to improve Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). The CMA JCTD vision is to share maritime shipping information throughout the world to deter use of commercial maritime shipping for terrorism, WMD proliferation, drugs, piracy, and human trafficking. CMA serves as an exemplar for a culture of sharing of maritime information between the U.S. and international partners. The project takes advantage of ongoing efforts, proven technologies, and current information-sharing agreements. CMA has two main focus areas: (1) demonstrate the importance of interagency and international information-sharing for improved maritime awareness; and (2) demonstrate improved information management techniques - such as application of the U.S. Department of Defense Net-Centric Data Strategy - to enable effective management of large volumes of shared data. CMA is working cooperatively with the Republic of Singapore. Singapore's position as a nexus for shipping in Southeast Asia provides a unique opportunity for sharing information.

ADA472994
The Implications of Self-Reporting Systems for Maritime Domain Awareness
Descriptive Note: Technical memorandum
Personal Author(s): Hammond, Tim; McIntyre, Mark; Chapman, David M; Lapinski, Anna-Liesa S
Report Date: Dec 2006
Media Count: 40 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS, DECISION MAKING, SECURITY, CANADA, GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, FRENCH LANGUAGE, IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS, OCEAN ENVIRONMENTS
Identifiers: (U) FOREIGN REPORTS, MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS), SRS(SELF-REPORTING SYSTEMS), AIS(AUTOMATIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM), RMP(RECOGNIZED MARITIME PICTURE)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Self-reporting systems based on GPS-quality navigation information that is sent using widely-accepted standards and protocols, offer the potential to greatly improve important components of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of some existing and evolving Self-Reporting Systems (SRSs) and to characterize them in order to discuss their relative impact on MDA. We argue that broadcast-based SRSs, such as the Automatic Identification System (AIS), offer significant advantages over traditional sensor-based vessel tracking and that availability of information from SRSs will impact how command decisions related to MDA are made in the future. The social and public policy dimensions of using SRSs information for MDA are explored. Also, we discuss impacts on command decision making and raise the question of how much trust decision-makers should place in self-report information.

ADA460294
Business Case Analysis of Comprehensive Maritime Awareness
Descriptive Note: MBA professional rept.
Personal Author(s): Cornes, Jeffrey B; Ryan, David H; Sego, Jon C
Report Date: Dec 2006
Media Count: 59 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MODELS, *SECURITY, *PORTS(FACILITIES), TERRORISTS, THESES, CONTAINERSHIPS, HYPOTHESES, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, ACCURACY, METHODOLOGY
Identifiers: (U) *BCA(BUSINESS CASE ANALYSIS), *PIRACY, KNOWLEDGE VALUE ADDED, CMA(COMPREHENSIVE MARITIME AWARENESS), MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS), HIJACKING
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This research project develops a business case analysis model to evaluate the costs and benefits of utilizing the Comprehensive Maritime Awareness (CMA) system within the DoD. The business case analysis model was developed to conduct a detailed evaluation of the economic costs and benefits associated with CMA. The initial hypothesis favored CMA as a superior alternative to the existing system, Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). Throughout the course of the research, this opinion was solidified and supported based on a series of factors. These factors are expressed and outlined in the observations, conclusions and recommendations.

ADA463750
Realizing the 1000-Ship Navy
Descriptive Note: Research paper
Personal Author(s): Uhls, Dan
Report Date: 23 Oct 2006
Media Count: 25 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), *THREATS, *SECURITY, *NAVY, *INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, *SHIPPING, *MARITIME INDUSTRY, *COOPERATION, INFORMATION EXCHANGE, PROTECTION, NAVAL OPERATIONS, MERCHANT VESSELS, GLOBALIZATION, ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, SMUGGLING, OCEAN SURVEILLANCE, LAW ENFORCEMENT, COUNTERTERRORISM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, FLEETS(SHIPS), JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, INTERDICTION, INTEROPERABILITY, NAVAL VESSELS
Identifiers: (U) *ONE-THOUSAND-SHIP NAVY, 1000-SHIP NAVY, MARITIME SECURITY THREATS, FOREIGN NAVIES, MARITIME STRATEGY, MERCHANT SHIPPING, GLOBAL FLEET INITIATIVE, *INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, ECONOMIC THREATS, TRANSNATIONAL MARITIME CRIME, MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, NAVAL COALITIONS, CRITICISMS, *MARITIME COOPERATION, SOVEREIGN RIGHTS, TSCP(THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAM)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) While addressing the August 2005 Current Strategy Forum at the Naval War College, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Mike Mullen unveiled what many consider the cornerstone of the United States Navy's new maritime strategy, the formation of a global fleet, or a 1000-Ship Navy. Admiral Mullen did not use this euphemism to describe a thousand ships directly doing the United States' bidding, but rather a global maritime security arrangement, designed to synergize the collective maritime capabilities of its allies to further security in the maritime domain. Admiral Mullen's initiative was born partly out of the globalization-driven need to ensure free, and unfettered access to the global commons by legitimate merchant traffic, and the realities of an ever-shrinking American fleet's inability to conduct global sea-control unilaterally. This paper highlights the genesis of the global fleet initiative, its requirements, and likely roles in international security. It explains the current nature of coalition building and provides a recommended departure from current paradigms required to realize the global fleet.

ADA463483
The Coast Guard Should be the Designated Lead Agency to Manage and Execute Maritime Domain
Descriptive Note: Research paper
Personal Author(s): Dougherty, Chris
Report Date: 23 Oct 2006
Media Count: 25 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *SECURITY, *COAST GUARD, *TERRORISM, *HOMELAND SECURITY, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, PLANNING, THREATS, LESSONS LEARNED, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, TERRORISTS
Identifiers: (U) *NSMS(NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY), *INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC COMMERCE, MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, FEDERAL AGENCIES
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Maritime security is of paramount importance to the United States. The President and the senior leadership of our country have recognized this threat and developed the National Strategy for Maritime Security Plan and its eight supporting plans to counter the threat. However, the National Strategy for Maritime Security Plan and the supporting plans employ a unity of effort concept for their execution, and are ambiguous concerning which agency or agencies should be accountable for their success. The ambiguity has already led to turf battles and confusion as to roles and responsibilities between agencies. Such confusion is unacceptable five years after 9/11. This paper suggests, as an illustrative example, the U. S, Coast Guard should be identified as the lead agency for implementation and execution of the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness. It provides arguments for and against the position. It also provides recommendations that are aimed at improving the U.S. Coast Guard's fulfillment of such a role.

ADA463705
The Way Ahead For Maritime UAVS
Descriptive Note: Final rept.
Personal Author(s): Pearson ,II, F C
Report Date: 23 Oct 2006
Media Count: 34 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MILITARY OPERATIONS, *TOOLS, *DRONES, *MILITARY COMMANDERS, *SURVEILLANCE DRONES, *INFORMATION SURVEILLANCE, KILL PROBABILITIES, NAVY, SHARING, RECONNAISSANCE, AWARENESS, BATTLES, CHAINS, JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, ACCESS, SHORT RANGE(DISTANCE), POWER
Identifiers: (U) UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE, MARITIME UAV CAPABILITY, FUTURE MARITIME UAV INTEGRATION
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have proven to be an integral tool for the operational commander as a provider of persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). UAVs are essential for conducting and executing modern military operations. They address a small force-to-space ratio problem by increasing the speed of the kill chain. UAV technology applications have progressed from ISR to an ever expanding list of uses. There is an overarching USN plan for UAVs, but I propose an emphasis should be placed on the close range or tactical UAVs that will directly complement battle space management, increase situational awareness and will increase the flexibility and capability of the kill chain for operational level commanders. Tactical UAVs will assist with gaining and sharing battle force access for naval and joint forces. They will increase the on-demand capability to gain ISR information and allow the flexibility to project power. The USN needs a better road map for tactical UAVs to exploit emerging capabilities and utilize them in maritime roles which will ensure Maritime Domain Awareness.

ADA463612
Protection of Shipping: A Forgotten Mission with Many New Challenges
Descriptive Note: Research paper
Personal Author(s): Grubb, Michael C
Report Date: 10 Oct 2006
Media Count: 29 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *COMMERCE, *THREATS, *MISSIONS, *PROTECTION, *SHIPPING, *MERCHANT VESSELS, *JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, *NAVY, POLICIES, MARITIME INDUSTRY, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, SECOND WORLD WAR, CARGO SHIPS, EVOLUTION(DEVELOPMENT), HISTORY, OPERATIONAL READINESS, MILITARY DOCTRINE, BOAT AND SHIP SAFETY, TERRORISM, COLD WAR, LESSONS LEARNED
Identifiers: (U) *COMMERCIAL SHIPPING, *MARITIME SECURITY, MERCHANT SHIPPING, MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, PIRACY, CAPTAIN ALFRED THAYER MAHAN, JFC(JOINT FORCE COMMANDERS), ADMIRAL HORATIO NELSON, OFFENSIVE SPIRIT, COMMANDER E CAMERON WILLIAMS, FOUR IRON LAWS, NCAGS(NAVAL COOPERATION AND GUIDANCE FOR SHIPPING)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The protection of shipping mission is a core mission of any navy. Despite this, over the past century, the capital ship primacy of Mahan and offensive ethos of Nelson have repeatedly caused naval leaders to relegate protection of shipping to a lesser included mission status, often leading to devastating losses of shipping when war came. Today, the protection of shipping mission still finds itself behind more high-profile missions such as strike warfare and ballistic missile defense. Naval leaders must recognize that the dynamic range of threats, littoral maneuver challenges, and unique political and ROE limitations found in the limited conflicts the United States now faces will continue to require joint force commanders to provide for the direct defense of shipping in future conflicts. The latest revisions of joint, Navy, and Allied doctrine leverage advances in maritime domain awareness and coordination with the maritime industry to counter low-intensity threats from piracy and terrorism, but do not sufficiently address more complex threats. Only through increases in joint/combined capacity for protection of shipping tasks, and improved levels of awareness, training, and readiness in the protection of shipping mission will operational level commanders have the means to ensure the safety of shipping along all points of the threat spectrum.

ADA484924
Force Protection of Maritime Units: The Decision-Making Process of the Italian Navy - The Holistic Approach
Descriptive Note: Conference paper with briefing charts
Personal Author(s): Veri, Rinaldo
Report Date: 25 Sep 2006
Media Count: 43 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NAVAL OPERATIONS, *DECISION MAKING, ITALY, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, MEDITERRANEAN SEA, ORGANIZATION THEORY, INFORMATION PROCESSING, OCEAN SURVEILLANCE, DECISION THEORY, SYMPOSIA, NAVAL PLANNING
Identifiers: (U) FOREIGN REPORTS, NATO FURNISHED, BRIEFING CHARTS, ITALIAN NAVY, MANAGEMENT THEORY, MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS), COMMERCIAL SHIPS, INFORMATION COLLECTION, INFORMATION SUPERIORITY
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. NATO.
Abstract: (U) Rear Admiral Veri began with two points: (1) force protection as defined as all measures and means to minimise the vulnerabilities of personnel, facilities, equipment and operations to any threat and in all situations, to preserve freedom of action and the operational effectiveness of the force; and (2) the domains of force protection and self defence are dramatically convergent in modern littoral scenarios, since maritime forces are subjected to constant threats that may at any time disrupt the capability to successfully accomplish their missions. There are three core capabilities that maritime forces must have to accomplish their missions: to move, to fight, and to survive. These capabilities have to be constantly exercised and reviewed, in line with the peculiar scenarios of employment, increasingly characterised by factors such as multidimensionality, uncertainty and speed of change. In such complex, uncertain and rapidly evolving scenarios, force protection becomes one of the key elements that add value to the ability to survive. The admiral then looks atone additional element, which I deem essential for the effectiveness of force protection in the years to come: the decision making process. This is a key enabling factor, horizontally related to all the aforementioned elements, aiming to increase the efficiency and timeliness of engagements. Indeed, only an appropriate decision making process allows the kind of prompt reactions that can effectively defend our forces when caught in critical situations. A high standard of decision making requires two key elements: information availability and the capability to timely process that information.

ADA456280
Assessing Resource Requirements for Maritime Domain Awareness and Protection (Security)
Descriptive Note: Technical rept.
Personal Author(s): Gaver, Donald P; Jacobs, Patricia A; Sato, Hiroyuki
Report Date: Sep 2006
Media Count: 103 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *SCENARIOS, *DETECTORS, MATHEMATICAL MODELS, AIRCRAFT, RATES, UNMANNED, LOSSES, DESTROYERS, DETERMINANTS(MATHEMATICS), RESOURCES, ABSTRACTS, MODELS, REQUIREMENTS, STOCHASTIC PROCESSES
Identifiers: (U) MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) A maritime domain or region contains a number w of nonhostile W (White) vessels of interest. Hostile R (Red) vessels enter the domain. The Rs are traveling through the domain toward targets. Overhead, friendly (Blue) sensors ( S) patrol the domain and classify (perhaps incorrectly) detected vessels of interest as R or W. The misclassification of a W as an R is a false positive. An overhead sensor follows (or tracks) any vessel it classifies as R until it is relieved by another platform, perhaps a destroyer pair (DD). The overhead sensor is here assumed unable to detect and classify additional vessels while it is following a suspicious vessel; this may well be a somewhat pessimistic assumption, very possibly richer possibilities based on additional assets (such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)) are available, but loss of track may occur as well as misclassification. Deterministic and stochastic models are formulated and studied to evaluate the probability that Rs are successfully neutralized before reaching their destination. The model results quantify the effect of the resources and time needed to prosecute misclassified Ws (false positives) on the probability of successfully neutralizing R. The results indicate that the probability of neutralizing an R vessel is very sensitive to the false positive rate. Technologies, processes, and procedures that can decrease the false positive rate will increase the effectiveness of the Maritime Intercept Operation (MIO).

ADA457569
Maritime Domain Awareness: The Key to Maritime Security Operational Challenges and Technical Solutions
Descriptive Note: Briefing charts
Personal Author(s): Galdorisi, George; Goshorn, Rebekah
Report Date: Sep 2006
Media Count: 61 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NAVAL VESSELS, *MERCHANT VESSELS, *HOMELAND SECURITY, SYMPOSIA, MARITIME INDUSTRY, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, INTERNATIONAL, INFORMATION EXCHANGE
Identifiers: (U) *MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS), COALITION FORCES, COMPONENT REPORTS, BRIEFING CHARTS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) A Process to Instantiate Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA): (1) The nature of the Maritime Domain Awareness challenge; (2) Maritime Domain Awareness: laws, policies, and operational concepts; (3) Functional and technical approaches to instantiating MDA for the total ship force.

ADA457226
360° PORT MDA - A Strategy to Improve Port Security
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Leary, T P
Report Date: Sep 2006
Media Count: 85 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *PORTS(FACILITIES), *HOMELAND SECURITY, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, NATIONAL SECURITY, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, THESES
Identifiers: (U) MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS), OSINT(OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE), MARITIME SECURITY, PORT SECURITY, INTERMODAL, JOINT OPERATIONS CENTERS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Our national security and prosperity depend in part on secure and competitive ports. Effective public and private sector collaboration is needed in a world with myriad security challenges and fierce global competition. Although steps have been taken in the years since 9/11 to realize these twin goals, much more needs to be done. The current maritime domain awareness (MDA) paradigm needs to be expanded to provide comprehensive awareness of intermodal operations in our ports. An effective Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) program that succeeds in leveraging intermodal data is fundamental to better port-level MDA. Developing effective port level MDA and using it to enhance the security of our ports relies on the effective organization of public and private sector resources. The joint operations centers called for in the SAFE Port Act, once broadened to include key intermodal players, provide an excellent organizational model to pursue enhanced port security.

ADA457416
Methodology for Evaluating the Effectiveness of Collaborative Tools for Coordinating MDA Emergency Response
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Wagreich, Richard J
Report Date: Sep 2006
Media Count: 71 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *EMERGENCIES, *RESPONSE, *STANDARDS, *COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, *COLLABORATIVE TECHNIQUES, TEST AND EVALUATION, SECURITY, THESES
Identifiers: (U) *MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS), *EMERGENCY RESPONSE, *COLLABORATIVE TECHNOLOGY, DISASTER RELIEF, NATO COBP(CODE OF BEST PRACTICE), C4ISR (COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS COMPUTERS INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE RECONNAISSANCE) EVALUATION, MARITIME SECURITY
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. This document is not available from DTIC in microfiche.
Abstract: (U) The Federal Government recognizes that collaboration between the various departments and local, federal, and private sector can best support maritime security. Of course the question is how to get these entities to collaborate? Collaborative technology can provide an answer to Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and Emergency Response collaboration, but the right tool for this mission must be selected. In order for the right tool to be selected, then the right criteria must be used to evaluate the tool for this particular mission. The criteria must not only look at the tool or the network, but the whole picture: cognitive processes, organizational structure, and the doctrine and procedures of the players involved. This thesis will focus on establishing criteria for evaluating collaborative tools in the tactical environment of MDA and Emergency Response collaboration. In this environment, an Incident Commander will need to coordinate military, coalition, federal, state, local entities, as well as non-governmental organizations. A methodology does exist that meets these criteria, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Code of Best Practice for assessing Command and Control Systems.

ADA498738
Self-Positioning Smart Buoys, The Un-Buoy Solution: Logistic Considerations using Autonomous Surface Craft Technology and Improved Communications Infrastructure
Descriptive Note: Conference paper
Personal Author(s): Curcio, Joseph A; McGillivary, Philip A; Fall, Kevin; Maffei, Andy; Schwehr, Kurt; Twiggs, Bob; Kitts, Chris; Ballou, Phil
Report Date: Sep 2006
Media Count: 6 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *REMOTE DETECTORS, *BUOYS, *BOATS, *AUTONOMOUS NAVIGATION, GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM, WIRELESS LINKS, TECHNOLOGY FORECASTING, DRIFT, PROTOTYPES, ROBOTICS, SYMPOSIA
Identifiers: (U) *SELF-POSITIONING BUOYS, *AUTONOMOUS SURFACE CRAFT, *STATION KEEPING, AIS(AUTOMATED IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Moored buoys have long served national interests, but incur high development, construction, installation, and maintenance costs. Buoys which drift off-location can pose hazards to mariners, and in coastal waters may cause environmental damage. Moreover, retrieval, repair and replacement of drifting buoys may be delayed when data would be most useful. Such gaps in coastal buoy data can pose a threat to national security by reducing maritime domain awareness. The concept of self-positioning buoys has been advanced to reduce installation cost by eliminating mooring hardware. We here describe technology for operation of reduced cost self-positioning buoys which can be used in coastal or oceanic waters. The ASC SCOUT model is based on a self propelled, GPS-positioned, autonomous surface craft that can be pre-programmed, autonomous, or directed in real time. Each vessel can communicate wirelessly with deployment vessels and other similar buoys directly or via satellite. Engineering options for short or longer term power requirements are considered, in addition to future options for improved energy delivery systems. Methods of reducing buoy drift and position maintaining energy requirements for self-locating buoys are also discussed, based on the potential of incorporating traditional maritime solutions to these problems. We here include discussion of the advanced Delay Tolerant Networking (DTN) communications draft protocol which offers improved wireless communication capabilities underwater, to adjacent vessels, and to satellites. DTN is particularly adapted for noisy or loss-prone environments, thus it improves reliability. In addition to existing buoy communication via commercial satellites, a growing network of small satellites known as PICOSATs can be readily adapted to provide low-cost communications nodes for buoys. Coordination with planned vessel Automated Identification Systems (AIS) and International Maritime Organization standards for buoy and vessel notification and International Maritime Organization standards for buoy and vessel notification systems are reviewed and the legal framework for deployment of autonomous surface vessels is considered.

ADA498844
Use of the Automatic Identification System (AIS) on Autonomous Weather Buoys for Maritime Domain Awareness Applications
Descriptive Note: Conference paper
Personal Author(s): Lessing, P A; Bernard, L J; Tetreault, B J; Chaffin, J N
Report Date: Sep 2006
Media Count: 7 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *SHIPS, *AUTOMATIC TRACKING, *BUOYS, *IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS, COAST GUARD RESEARCH, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, HOMELAND SECURITY, PROTOTYPES, FIELD TESTS, SYMPOSIA, BOAT AND SHIP SAFETY
Identifiers: (U) AIS(AUTOMATIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM), AUTONOMOUS WEATHER BUOYS, MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The United States Coast Guard (USCG) is responsible for a wide variety of missions. In order to support the accomplishment of these missions, the USCG needs to collect as much information as possible on activities occurring in the maritime domain. A large part of maritime activity relates to the movement of vessels. Therefore, detection, classification, identification and monitoring of vessels are a key component of what is known as Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). The Automatic Identification System (AIS) is a technology that is used primarily as a tool for maritime safety. AIS equipment aboard vessels continuously and autonomously transmits information about the vessel including its identity, position, course, and speed. This paper discusses system design of a prototype, autonomous, buoy-based, embedded system for AIS-equipped vessel detection using an AIS receiver and satellite transmitter for near real-time relay of vessel identification data. This paper also describes follow-on enhancements to the system to further extend AIS coverage and field testing of the system.

ADA472951
Information Visualization: The State of the Art for Maritime Domain Awareness
Descriptive Note: Contract rept.
Personal Author(s): Davenport, Michael; Risley, Chris
Report Date: Aug 2006
Media Count: 180 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, *SURVEILLANCE, *RECONNAISSANCE, *MARITIME INDUSTRY, ALGORITHMS, LITERATURE SURVEYS, INFORMATION PROCESSING, SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH, HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING, VISUAL PERCEPTION, BIBLIOGRAPHIES, COMPUTERIZED SIMULATION
Identifiers: (U) *INFORMATION VISUALIZATION, MISR(MARITIME INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE), SPACE-TIME VISUALIZATION, VISUALIZATION TOOLS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This Final Report provides an analysis of the current state of the art for Information Visualization, as it applies to Maritime Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (MISR). It comprises a Literature Survey, an Annotated Bibliography, a Product Review, and recommendations for further research. The Literature Survey focuses on visualization algorithms and strategies, human factors for visualization, and emerging display hardware, and includes a list of foundational books and papers, an introduction to major research leaders, and a list of current pressing research questions. The Annotated Bibliography provides about 240 references to texts, conferences, journals, and institutional websites. The Product Review gives one-page descriptions of sixty eight MISR-related visualization products, ranging from public-domain code for a specific visualization task, to commercial multipurpose toolkits. The report concludes by recommending specific research tasks for visualizing sensor coverage and ignorance, ship tracks in time and space, ship tracks versus normal tracks, and attribute data such as cargo and crew.

ADA463128
Maritime Domain Awareness: The Key to Maritime Security Operational Challenges and Technical Solutions
Descriptive Note: Conference paper
Personal Author(s): Galdorisi, George; Goshorn, Rebekah
Report Date: Jun 2006
Media Count: 26 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *INFORMATION RETRIEVAL, *DATA FUSION, *INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, WARFARE, SYMPOSIA, TERRORISM, POLICIES, INTEROPERABILITY, SECURITY
Identifiers: (U) *GWOT(GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM), MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS), COMPOSEABLE FORCENET, COMPONET REPORTS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) We will not win the Global War on Terrorism if we cannot tell the bad guys from the good guys. We have to develop the capability to do that. This statement, made by former CNO Admiral Vern Clark in December 2004, sums up the essence of where maritime domain awareness (MDA) fits in the continuum of the quest for international maritime security. Simply put, without adequate MDA, the ability to enhance maritime security and win the global war on terrorism (GWOT) will remain elusive. This challenge has been addressed at the international policy level by the United Nations and by the International Maritime Organization. At the national level, the United States Government has addressed this challenge in a number of policy documents, most importantly, the National Strategy for Maritime Security and The National Plan to Improve Maritime Domain Awareness. While the policy imperatives of achieving MDA are strong and straightforward and while the concept of operations to put this into effect is already evolving, the technical challenges to achieving the requisite degree of MDA to pursue the GWOT and defend the U.S. Homeland are significant, primarily because MDA is such a broad and comprehensive subject. Compounding the challenge is the fact that operator's typically view MDA through the lens of collection, fusion/analysis, display/dissemination, and action, or, put another way, with specific attention to data; data mining, data fusion, and data display. While this operational paradigm is useful from a practitioner's point of view, these requirements don't easily map to technical capabilities.

ADA507370
The Challenge of Scalable and Distributed Fusion of Disparate Sources of Information
Descriptive Note: Conference paper
Personal Author(s): Julier, Simon J; Uhlmann, Jeffrey K; Walters, Joshua; Mittu, Ranjeev; Palaniappan, Kannappan
Report Date: Apr 2006
Media Count: 13 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *SCALING FACTOR, *DISTRIBUTED DATA PROCESSING, *NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE, *DATA FUSION, *ALGORITHMS, *USER NEEDS, BANDWIDTH, MILITARY COMMANDERS, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, KNOWLEDGE BASED SYSTEMS, COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS, CORRELATION, TIME, DETECTORS, SYMPOSIA, UNCERTAINTY
Identifiers: (U) *MANET(MOBILE ADHOC NETWORKS), MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, GENERALIZED COVARIANCE INTERSECTION
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) A key enabler for Network Centric Warfare (NCW) is a sensor network that can collect and fuse vast amounts of disparate and complementary information from sensors that are geographically dispersed throughout the battlespace. This information will lead to better situation awareness so that commanders will be able to act faster and more effectively. However, these benefits are possible only if the sensor data can be fused and synthesized for distribution to the right user in the right form at the right time within the constraints of available bandwidth. In this paper we consider the problem of developing Level 1 data fusion algorithms for disparate fusion in NCW. These algorithms must be capable of operating in a fully distributed (or decentralized) manner; must be able to scale to extremely large numbers of entities; and must be able to combine many disparate types of data. To meet these needs we propose a framework that consists of three main components: an attribute-based state representation that treats an entity state as a collection of attributes, new methods or interpretations of uncertainty, and robust algorithms for distributed data fusion. We illustrate the discussion in the context of maritime domain awareness, mobile adhoc networks, and multispectral image fusion.

ADA449371
Maritime Domain Awareness: A Western Hemisphere Imperative
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Minta, James L
Report Date: 15 Mar 2006
Media Count: 17 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, *TERRORISM, STRATEGY, SECURITY, MEXICO, MARITIME INDUSTRY, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, AGREEMENTS, CANADA, THESES
Identifiers: (U) *MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The National Strategy for Maritime Security states terrorists will most likely transport weapons of mass destruction into the United States via the maritime domain. Maritime domain awareness (MDA) is the understanding of the situation at sea to enable maritime security. Development of a comprehensive maritime domain awareness program is critical in preventing another terrorist attack on the United States. The focus of this project is to research a question posed by U.S. Northern Command concerning whether Canada and the United States should enter into a bi-national agreement for maritime domain awareness. My research lead me to the conclusion that to truly develop maritime domain awareness that will protect America a Western Hemisphere multinational treaty organization of willing states needs to be established to develop a common operational picture of the maritime domain. The project lays out a three-phase approach to establishing this organization beginning with establishing a bi-national agreement with Canada. Phase 2 is bringing Mexico into the organization which would include the transformation of Joint Interagency Task Force South into the Western Hemisphere Maritime Domain Awareness Center. The final phase develops the organization fully with willing nations in the Western Hemisphere contributing what they can to develop a complete regional common operational picture.

ADA445419
Implementing Maritime Domain Awareness
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Watts, R B
Report Date: Mar 2006
Media Count: 81 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *METHODOLOGY, *SECURITY, *OCEAN ENVIRONMENTS, *HOMELAND DEFENSE, *INFRASTRUCTURE, GLOBAL, HOMELAND SECURITY, THESES, LAW ENFORCEMENT, DATA ACQUISITION, MODELS, INTEROPERABILITY
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) As an attempt to gain understanding of everything in the global maritime environment that can impact the security of the United States, the Maritime Domain Awareness initiative is one of the most ambitious projects ever undertaken by the U.S. government. Information that falls under the prevue of MDA is tremendously diverse and complex, having application in the regulatory, law enforcement, and military arenas. As such, MDA is a multi-agency effort that encompasses 16 respective departments, agencies, and organizations working toward one common goal of shared information. Given that each of these organizations operates under policies and procedures that are radically different, effective MDA requires the design of a construct that fuses multi-agency information in such a way that it can be effectively shared among all agencies. This thesis argues that current infrastructure in the Coast Guard and Navy can be used to obtain MDA through a formal linking process that fuses multi-agency information on the tactical, regional, and strategic levels for sharing and dissemination to appropriate forces for action.

ADA463335
Maritime Security Operations: A New Global View and Whispers of Mahan
Descriptive Note: Research paper
Personal Author(s): Carelli, Paul A
Report Date: 13 Feb 2006
Media Count: 28 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NATIONAL SECURITY, *THREATS, *NAVAL OPERATIONS, *VULNERABILITY, *AREA SECURITY, *TERRORISM, *OCEANS, IRAQ, PANAMA CANAL, GLOBALIZATION, INFRASTRUCTURE, INSURGENCY, SUEZ CANAL, STRAITS, ATTACK, SHIPPING, PORTS(FACILITIES), SMUGGLING, AWARENESS, MIDDLE EAST
Identifiers: (U) *MARITIME SECURITY OPERATIONS, MSO(MARITIME SECURITY OPERATIONS), FAILED STATES, FAILED MARITIME DOMAINS, CRITICAL MARITIME DOMAINS, MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, PIRACY, MARITIME TERRORISM, NSS(NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The attacks on 9/11 highlighted critical vulnerabilities in U.S. national security and economic infrastructures that have resulted in increased security measures at the nation's airports, seaports, and borders. In spite of the numerous directives and measures to increase Americans' safety, no greater vulnerability exists than through the vastness, complexity, and ambiguity of the maritime domain. The intended focus of this paper is to examine current maritime security operations (MSO) and the specific challenges that U.S. maritime security forces face combating terrorism within the vast and evolving maritime domain. The paper challenges the current approach to maritime domain awareness, suggesting that the reader focus on failed states and their proximity to maritime domains and critical maritime infrastructure, rather than on the maritime domain as a subset of a failed state. This would provide a better focus for effective maritime security operations, and further the development of domain awareness.

ADA522656
Multi-Source Maritime Vessel Tracking
Descriptive Note: Journal article
Personal Author(s): Bell, M D; Elliott, S M; Yang, T Y; You, P
Report Date: Jan 2006
Media Count: 4 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *TRACKING, *SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, *SHIPS, INTELLIGENCE, WARNING SYSTEMS, DATA FUSION, COAST GUARD, REPRINTS, COMPUTER PROGRAMS
Identifiers: (U) MULTILEVEL SECURITY, DATA AGGREGATION, MARITIME INTELLIGENCE
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) NRL Code 8100 is developing the Common Distributed Virtual Database/Information Extraction (CDVD/IE) System for the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center (MIFC) in Dam Neck, Virginia. The CDVD/IE semiautomatically identifies vessels via multisource data. This provides the USCG with maritime domain awareness of vessels operating in an area of responsibility (AOR) encompassing the Atlantic Ocean, north of the equator, and the Gulf of Mexico/Caribbean Sea. NRL system and software engineers have designed an architecture that implements a multilevel data aggregation and semiautomated tracking system. The CDVD/IE enables the MIFC to monitor potential vessels of interest (VOIs) and automatically generates alerts when behaviors meeting user-defined parameters are detected. The CDVD/IE Program is sponsored by the U.S. Navy (USN) Office of Naval Research (ONR) and is scheduled for delivery to the MIFC during summer 2006. During fiscal year 2007, NRL and the USCG will exercise the system and assess suitability to support an upgradable path using multiple CDVD/IE installations to form a distributed maritime community grid. The CDVD/IE System uses a suite of commercial and NRL developed computing technologies and resources to address two main areas: (1) Multilevel Security Architecture and (2) Data Aggregation and Semiautomated Tracking Capability.

ADA449123
Leveraging America's Aircraft Carrier Capabilities. Exploring New Combat and Noncombat Roles and Missions for the U.S. Carrier Fleet
Descriptive Note: Monograph
Personal Author(s): Gordon, IV , John; Wilson, Peter A; Birkler, John; Boraz, Steven; Lee, Gordon T
Report Date: Jan 2006
Media Count: 113 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MISSIONS, *AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, SCENARIOS, SURVEILLANCE, COUNTERTERRORISM, HOMELAND DEFENSE, HOMELAND SECURITY, NATURAL DISASTERS, RECONNAISSANCE, NAVAL OPERATIONS, MILITARY CAPABILITIES
Identifiers: (U) COMBAT OPERATIONS, NONCOMBAT OPERATIONS, MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, CARRIER AIR OPERATIONS, HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) On numerous occasions over the past 50 years, U.S. military and civilian defense leaders have relied on aircraft carriers and their air assets, not only as key forward-based elements of the nation's deterrent and warfighting force but also when the United States has needed to project military power, engage in hostile operations, provide humanitarian relief, or fulfill a range of other hostile and nonhostile missions. Because they offer unparalleled mobility, provide sustained military presence, can send signals of U.S. concern and possible action, and free the United States from having to conduct flight operations from foreign bases or obtain permission from foreign powers to fly over territory, aircraft carriers likely will continue to be an asset of choice for years to come. Indeed, it is entirely possible that, as the United States seeks ways to stretch its defense dollars, pursue the Global War on Terrorism, and meet other national-security challenges, policymakers will increase their reliance on aircraft carriers, using them more often and in more situations, than they have in the past, especially if the vessels have the additional capabilities to respond appropriately. The current and expected use of aircraft carriers led the U.S. Navy in fall 2004 to commission the RAND Corporation to explore new and nontraditional ways that the U.S. might be able to employ aircraft carriers in pursuit of traditional and emerging military and homeland defense missions. Over six months, RAND created and convened two Concept Options Groups (COGs)-small groups of experienced military and civilian experts, defense analysts, and potential users who work together to identify promising ways to employ military might in nontraditional ways-to explore possible nontraditional roles for aircraft carriers. One COG explored and identified new ways that aircraft carriers could be used in combat operations the second COG examined ways that the vessels could be used in noncombat missions.

ADA439482
Collaborative Unmanned Vehicles for Maritime Domain Awareness
Descriptive Note: Conference paper
Personal Author(s): Healey, A J; Horner, D P; Kragelund, S P
Report Date: Nov 2005
Media Count: 16 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MILITARY VEHICLES, *UNMANNED, MILITARY OPERATIONS, NAVAL OPERATIONS, NETWORK TOPOLOGY, SELF OPERATION, SYMPOSIA
Identifiers: (U) TNT(TACTICAL NETWORK TOPOLOGY), M
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. This document is not available from DTIC in microfiche.
Abstract: (U) Unmanned vehicles are becoming a critical component of military operations. As the vehicles develop in capability, there will be a trend for heterogeneous classes of unmanned vehicles to be able to work in a more collaborative fashion. This paper discusses the research initiatives by the Naval Postgraduate School Center for Autonomous Unmanned Vehicle Research for achieving greater effectiveness in naval operations through collaborative behavior. it focuses on three separate initiatives and discusses results from recent Tactical Network Topology (TNT) experiments.

ADA492703
Maritime Commerce Security Plan for The National Strategy for Maritime Security
Report Date: Oct 2005
Media Count: 26 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MERCHANT VESSELS, *PORTS(FACILITIES), *NATIONAL SECURITY, *MARINE TRANSPORTATION, RISK, STRATEGY, ECONOMIC IMPACT, SECURITY, RELIABILITY, HOMELAND SECURITY, PLANNING, CARGO, INTERNATIONAL, SUPPLIES, OCEAN ENVIRONMENTS, TERRORISM, RISK MANAGEMENT, MANAGEMENT PLANNING AND CONTROL, EMERGENCIES, ORGANIZATIONS, POLICIES, RESPONSE
Identifiers: (U) *MARITIME COMMERCE SECURITY PLAN
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The Maritime Commerce Security Plan contains recommendations to promote international supply chain security. The Maritime Commerce Security Plan is a component of the National Strategy for Maritime Security. The National Strategy for Maritime Security was produced in response to National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-13 (Maritime Security Policy December 21, 2004). This plan also supports the National Security Strategy, the National Strategy for Homeland Security, and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. The Maritime Commerce Security Plan was developed in conjunction with the other component plans of the National Strategy for Maritime Security. In particular, the development of the Maritime Transportation System Security Plan and the Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan was closely coordinated with this plan. The Maritime Transportation System Security Plan addresses the security of the maritime transportation system as a system including vessels, facilities and ports that contribute so greatly to cargo security and, in this way, complements this plan. The Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan also supports this plan because it enhances our ability to minimize the economic impact of an attack or other disruption of the maritime transportation system. This includes effective communication so that private sector organizations have the appropriate information to implement their contingency plans quickly. This is a risk management plan. As such, it is dependent on reliable information and intelligence to evaluate threats and assess risk. For this reason, the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness and the Global Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan are very important to the success of the Maritime Commerce Security Plan.

ADA474576
National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness for the National Strategy for Maritime Security
Report Date: Oct 2005
Media Count: 34 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *INFORMATION EXCHANGE, *AWARENESS, *LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, *HOMELAND SECURITY, ALGORITHMS, UNITED STATES, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, AUTOMATION, DETECTION, HUMANS, BOUNDARIES, COLD WAR, HAND HELD, COLLECTION, OCEAN ENVIRONMENTS, MILITARY COMMANDERS, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, DATA ACQUISITION, CLASSIFICATION, CARGO, INSPECTION, ACOUSTIC DETECTORS, INTELLIGENCE(HUMANS), UNMANNED, SECURITY, REAL TIME, DETECTORS, STANDOFF, AIRCRAFT, STRATEGY
Identifiers: (U) MARITIME SECURITY, NSMS(NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY), *NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is the effective understanding of anything associated with the global maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States. MDA is a key component of an active, layered maritime defense in depth. It will be achieved by improving our ability to collect, fuse, analyze, display, and disseminate actionable information and intelligence to operational commanders. MDA is supported by the Global Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan and is the enabler for the Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan. This plan advocates enhanced and innovative collection of intelligence, the integration of correlated open source information, and the incorporation of automated algorithms to assist human analytic efforts. The National Maritime Intelligence Center will be the central point of connectivity to fuse, analyze, and disseminate information and intelligence for shared situational awareness across classification boundaries. To achieve persistent awareness in the maritime domain, Cold War legacy collection capabilities alone are no longer sufficient. We must reorient and integrate these legacy systems with current and emerging capabilities, such as unmanned aerial vehicles and acoustic sensors, fused in a common operating picture available to maritime operational commanders and accessible throughout the United States Government. Employment of these collection capabilities will maximize near-real time awareness of maritime threats. Stand-off detection capabilities for weapons of mass destruction in the maritime domain must be developed to complement existing and emerging cargo inspection systems and hand-held detection devices. Most significantly, human intelligence collection and the investigative actions of law enforcement officers can provide crucial insights about maritime threats.

ADA483981
Fight Them Forward (Strategic Insights, Volume 4, Issue 7, July 2005)
Descriptive Note: Journal
Personal Author(s): Watts, Robert B
Report Date: Jul 2005
Media Count: 8 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *UNITED STATES, *HOMELAND DEFENSE, *TERRORISM, *DEFENSE PLANNING, *THREAT EVALUATION, *VULNERABILITY, *COASTAL REGIONS, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, MERCHANT VESSELS, MILITARY PUBLICATIONS, LITTORAL ZONES, COAST GUARD, MILITARY STRATEGY, CRUISE MISSILES, SHIP LAUNCHED, NAVY, COUNTERTERRORISM, ASYMMETRIC WARFARE, PERIODICALS
Identifiers: (U) *SEA POWER, *MARITIME THREAT, *OFFENSIVE STRATEGY, FORWARD DEPLOYMENT, FORWARD OPERATIONS, SHIPS AS WEAPONS, SHIPS AS WEAPONS PLATFORMS, EXPLOSIVE SHIPS, FORWARD OPERATING DOCTRINE, MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS), MARITIME STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The Global War on Terror (GWOT) and the threat terrorists pose to the homeland present significant challenges to our established military principles and strategies. This is especially true in the sea services, whose very offensive nature in obtaining command of the sea defines traditional forward operating doctrine. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, critics argued that this doctrine has been made obsolete by an asymmetric enemy, and that protection of the homeland against maritime attack requires a complete revision of Navy strategy to focus on the defense. Speculative scenarios such as using ships as weapons, smuggling of enemy terrorists, or attempted employment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are often cited as rationale for keeping the fleet close to home waters. A realistic appraisal of these scenarios, a review of historical lessons learned, and analysis of coastal defense operations and doctrine illustrate that the Navy's continued plan for forward operations is sound, and ultimately the most effective means of employing sea power in GWOT.

ADA435513
Developing a Fly-Away-Kit (FLAK) to Support Hastily Formed Networks (HFN) for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR)
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Lancaster, David D
Report Date: Jun 2005
Media Count: 89 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *CRISIS MANAGEMENT, *COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, *COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS, *BROADBAND, *REMOTE AREAS, *OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, MILITARY ASSISTANCE, THESES, SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTER NETWORKS, KA BAND, L BAND, RAPID DEPLOYMENT, COMMUNICATIONS PROTOCOLS, NETWORK TOPOLOGY, WIRELESS LINKS
Identifiers: (U) *HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, *DISASTER RELIEF, HFN(HASTILY FORMED NETWORKS), CHD(COMPLEX HUMANITARIAN DISASTERS), FLAK(FLY-AWAY-KITS), RAPID DEPLOYABLE NETWORKING, MOBILE COMMAND CENTER, IEEE 802.16, IEEE 802.11, VOIP(VOICE OVER INTERNET PROTOCOL), C2P2, MESH, CIVILIAN MILITARY COOPERATION, VLAN(VIRTUAL LOCAL AREA NETWORKS)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited., Availability: This document is not available from DTIC in microfiche.
Abstract: (U) This research discusses developing a FLy-Away-Kit (FLAK) to support the forming of Hastily Formed Networks (HFNs) in remote areas in support of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations. The initial focus will be on the requirements, situation, area of operations, and mission. Different definitions and perspectives emerge when an individual mentions HFNs, HA/DR and Complex Humanitarian Disasters (CHDs). It is the author's intention to define and describe both a HFN and a CHD to justify the need for the FLAK. This process will also define the requirements for the FLAK as well as facilitate processes for ensuring those requirements are met. The personnel responding to the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the December 26, 2004 Southeast Asia Tsunami suffered Command and Control (C2) and information challenges. Even more challenges are being currently addressed by Homeland Defense, Maritime Domain Awareness, and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) abroad. From the top down, levels of administration are developing new plans, procedures, and organizations that will improve the security and communication processes of our nation. A global, broadband, rapidly deployable network node complete with Internet reach-back, voice, data, and video capability is of the utmost importance to enable C2 and Network Centric Operations (NCO). Undoubtedly, commercial and military organizations, traditional or new, will greatly benefit from this capability. The U.S. DoD is particularly interested in improving interaction, coordination, communications, and operations when DoD and other entities respond simultaneously to natural or man-made CHDs.

ADA435572
Role-Based Access Control for Coalition Partners in Maritime Domain Awareness
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): McDaniel, Christopher R; Tardy, Matthew L
Report Date: Jun 2005
Media Count: 108 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *DATA PROCESSING SECURITY, *INFORMATION RETRIEVAL, *COMPUTER ACCESS CONTROL, THESES, MISSIONS, JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, LAW ENFORCEMENT, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, HOMELAND DEFENSE
Identifiers: (U) RBAC(ROLE BASED ACCESS CONTROL)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited., Availability: This document is not available from DTIC in microfiche.
Abstract: (U) The need for Shared Situational Awareness (SSA) in accomplishing joint missions by coalition militaries, law enforcement, the intelligence community, and the private sector creates a unique challenge to providing access control. In this thesis we investigate the capabilities and limitations of Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) to control the dissemination of SSA in a coalition environment. Our case study is that of controlling access to SSA in the Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) environment. MDA exemplifies both rapid change in membership of coalitions and the roles of coalition participants. We explore the access policy and roles played by the participants in the MDA environment, in addition to the characteristics of those roles. We make use of feasible scenarios to provide us with a base for applying models to the situation. The models that are applied to the scenario provide the formal methods that prove that RBAC policies and derivatives such as Distributed Role Based Access Control (DRBAC), Coalition Based Access Control (CBAC) and Temporal Role Based Access Control (TRBAC) can be used in conjunction with the Information Broker (TB) concept to provide adequate access control policies.

ADA464005
Health Service Support for Detainees in Maritime Security Operations: What Is Required and What Is Right?
Descriptive Note: Research paper
Personal Author(s): McDonald, Brian R
Report Date: 17 May 2005
Media Count: 23 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *SHIPS, *MILITARY DOCTRINE, *INTERDICTION, *MEDICAL SERVICES, *INTERNATIONAL LAW, *PRISONERS, *ETHICS, *NAVAL OPERATIONS, TERRORISTS, COUNTERTERRORISM, IRAQI WAR, AFGHANISTAN CONFLICT, SMUGGLING, CRIMES, AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION, LAW ENFORCEMENT, MEDICAL PERSONNEL, CREWS, SHIP PERSONNEL, HEALTH, POLICIES, LESSONS LEARNED
Identifiers: (U) *HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT, *MSO(MARITIME SECURITY OPERATIONS), *DETAINEES, MIO(MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATIONS), GENEVA CONVENTIONS, VBSS(VISIT BOARD SEARCH AND SEIZURE), CONTRABAND, SHIP BOARDINGS, INTERDICTED VESSELS, DETAINED VESSELS, FOREIGN NATIONALS, IRAQI FREEDOM OPERATION, ENDURING FREEDOM OPERATION, PRIVACY ISSUES, LEGAL ISSUES, EPOW(ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR), PATIENT ELIGIBILITY MATRIX, RULES OF CARE MATRIX, CRIMINALS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The U.S. Navy plays a pivotal role in the ongoing Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) in the provision of Maritime Domain Awareness through the conduct of Maritime Security Operations (MSOs) that control the possible flow of contraband and terrorists across the seas. These operations range from permissive visitations to possible opposed boardings. It is imperative that operational planners ensure that adequate Health Service Support (HSS) is available not only for U.S. and Coalition personnel, but also for potential detainees. The range of HSS may vary from oversight of routine health and sanitation visits to the provision of afloat trauma care in the event of wounding or serious injury. To ensure uniform rules of care are provided, senior personnel provide guidance and oversight for operational commanders and the medical departments of units deployed to their areas of responsibility. Recent sentinel events referable to the provision of HSS for detainees in U.S. custody undermine U.S. instruments of soft power in the pursuit of the National Security Strategy. A review of recent lessons learned indicates that while current guidance and oversight are effective, there is opportunity for process improvement. This paper examines current concerns regarding the provision of HSS for detainees in MSOs to distinguish between what is required according to the Geneva Conventions and what is right. The author concludes that greater focus on the training of deployed medical personnel, especially with regard to ethical issues, will be of benefit to operational commanders in reducing confusion about the applicability of the principles of the Geneva Conventions. The author recommends that standing rules of care address the provision of HSS for detainees in MSOs with as much detail as possible. Specific areas for focus include the provision of aeromedical evacuation to higher levels of care, and the promulgation of a code of conduct for medical personnel involved with detainees.

ADA463254
Department of Defense Responsibility for Maritime Domain Awareness
Descriptive Note: Final rept.
Personal Author(s): Eyler, David E; Luke, Ivan
Report Date: 16 May 2005
Media Count: 30 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MILITARY CAPABILITIES, *HOMELAND SECURITY, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, HOMELAND DEFENSE, NAVAL OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES
Identifiers: (U) MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This paper examines the current drive to establish a comprehensive Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) capability for the United States and the role of the Department of Defense (DoD) in this initiative, with a focus on the specific responsibilities for MDA that should be assigned to DoD. The potential for attack of the United States via the Maritime Domain using a commercial vessel carrying a weapon of mass destruction is very real; when coupled with the current shortfall in U.S. MDA capability, the impetus for improving MDA is made apparent. The MDA capability necessary to provide adequate defense against such threats requires an extensive system of sensors and intelligence collection as well as dedicated fusion and analysis to build a common operational picture with which effective decisions regarding maritime threats can be made. The U.S. Coast Guard has taken the lead in establishing U.S. MDA capability. However, DoD has specific responsibilities for Homeland Security and Homeland Defense that mandate a significant role in establishing MDA for the United States. As a result of its global reach, resources, and specific responsibilities, DoD should be required to provide for information and intelligence collection in the forward regions in support of the MDA process, non-deniable vessel surveillance, detection, and tracking in the maritime approaches to the United States, and dedicated analysis and fusion of data to help build the common operational picture that will be the product of the MDA system.

ADA427286
Effectiveness of Using Red-Teams to Identify Maritime Security Vulnerabilities to Terrorist Attack
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Culpepper, Anna M
Report Date: Sep 2004
Media Count: 87 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *TERRORISTS, *ATTACK, *VULNERABILITY, MILITARY OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES, THREATS, THESES, CASE STUDIES, OPERATIONS RESEARCH, DEFENSE PLANNING, COUNTERTERRORISM, TERRORISM, AWARENESS
Identifiers: (U) *RED TEAM, *MARITIME SECURITY, INFORMATION OPERATIONS, DEFENSE ANALYSIS
Distribution Statement: Availability: This document is not available from DTIC in microfiche.
Abstract: (U) As the United States continues to develop plans and policies to counter the threat of terrorism, it becomes increasingly more vital to understand the entire spectrum of the threat. Realistically assessing the capability of possible and probable terrorist groups helps federal and state agencies to establish potential methods and procedures for defense and maritime domain awareness. Yet, the avenues of attack and the varieties of terrorists far outnumber the available resources of most agencies concerned. Moreover, there have been no attacks on homeland U.S. targets since September 11. The red team concept provides an innovative method to examine these vulnerabilities from the terrorist perspective. The effectiveness of a red team can be measured in various ways and is dependent on key organizational and situational elements. In the end, the determination of effectiveness is based on the original intentions of the host enterprise, whether it is training, research, strategy, or analysis or a combination. We conducted a case study to utilize the red team concept as a tool for bringing a fresh awareness to a critical issue within the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. The red teams identified vulnerabilities of possible targets, raised the awareness on the nature of terrorists, researched potential tactics and tools, and examined existing assumptions about maritime security. In applying the red team concept, the case study used military officers as surrogate terrorists planning a campaign to attack port cities. The case study effectively demonstrated the anticipated functions, while the follow-on actions ensured that the results were distributed to the appropriate agencies. Furthermore, civilian officials and the agencies concerned valued the red team reports as positive insights into the current situation.

ADA467149
Maritime Security: Overview of Issues
Descriptive Note: Congressional rept.
Personal Author(s): Frittelli, John F
Report Date: 05 Dec 2003
Media Count: 7 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MARINE TRANSPORTATION, *PROTECTION, *TERRORISM, *FEDERAL LAW, *CARGO SHIPS, *HOMELAND SECURITY, *PORTS(FACILITIES), CONGRESS, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, SMUGGLING, COUNTERTERRORISM, COAST GUARD, LAW ENFORCEMENT, SHIPPING CONTAINERS, MERCHANT VESSELS, ATTACK, VULNERABILITY
Identifiers: (U) *PORT SECURITY, *MARITIME SECURITY, MARITIME TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACT, CRUISE SHIPS, FOREIGN-FLAG SHIPS, CBP(BUREAU OF CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION), DHS(DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY), TSA(TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION), COMMERCIAL SHIPS, MDS(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS), CSI(CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE), US PORTS, FOREIGN PORTS, C-TPAT(CUSTOMS-TRADE PARTNERSHIP AGAINST TERRORISM), OSC(OPERATION SAFE COMMERCE), POINT OF ORIGIN CARGO SECURITY
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, port security has emerged as a significant part of the overall debate on U.S. homeland security. Many security experts believe ports are vulnerable to terrorist attack because of their size, easy accessibility by water and land, and the tremendous amount of cargo they handle. To raise port security standards, Congress passed the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-295) in November 2002. In the 108th Congress, there is growing debate about whether current efforts to improve port security are proceeding at sufficient pace and whether the nation is devoting enough resources for this purpose. This report will be updated periodically.

ADA420420
Applying Sound Joint Doctrine to Ensure Maritime Homeland Security
Descriptive Note: Final rept.
Personal Author(s): Napolitano, Michael K
Report Date: 16 May 2003
Media Count: 24 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MILITARY DOCTRINE, *JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, *HOMELAND SECURITY, MILITARY OPERATIONS, WARFARE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, TASK FORCES, SECURITY, COSTS, COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, MISSIONS, MARINE TRANSPORTATION, AEROSPACE ENVIRONMENTS, RESOURCES, POWER, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, COOPERATION, INFRASTRUCTURE
Abstract: (U) Ensuring the security of critical national infrastructure from a maritime threat is a daunting challenge that can not fall on the shoulders of one agency or department. The Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense, in cooperation with other pertinent departments, should establish a Joint Interagency Task Force and empower it to control all aspects of Maritime Homeland Security. Adhering to critical joint principles of war and military operations other than war combined with sound operational function execution is the most effective way to obtain the Maritime Domain Awareness necessary to achieve strategic and operational objectives. A Joint Interagency Maritime Component Commander can perform similar functions in the maritime as NORAD does in the aerospace environment. Utilizing forces employed for similar security missions (Drug, migrant interdiction etc) from multiple agencies, combining intelligence efforts and seeking international security cooperation provides the best chance for success. After analyzing the time, space and force factors affecting the mission this paper recommends solutions to best employ the current resources available. Coordination, power sharing and command and control remain the largest hurdles to overcome but the cost, as shown on September 11, is too high to pay for failure.

ADA419389
Use Of The United States National Fleet In Maritime Homeland Security And Defense
Descriptive Note: Final rept.
Personal Author(s): Blackburn, David F
Report Date: 16 May 2003
Media Count: 29 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *FLEETS(SHIPS), *COAST GUARD, *HOMELAND SECURITY, UNITED STATES, DEFENSE SYSTEMS, NAVY, ATTACK, COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, MISSIONS, NAVAL OPERATIONS, RESOURCES, TERRORISM
Distribution Statement: Availability: This document is not available from DTIC in microfiche.
Abstract: (U) The United States should implement a maritime concept that employs the National Fleet to collectively accomplish its maritime homeland security and defense objectives. Freedom of maritime commerce flow is crucial to the economic vitality of the United States. However, the expansiveness and openness of the United States maritime region leaves coastal military installations, and its commercial ports, maritime industries, and shipping vulnerable to potential asymmetric terrorist attack from the sea. Thus, successful maritime security and defense of the United States homeland depends on the effective application of necessary national resources meeting the objectives of a maritime operational commander. Attainment of today's national maritime homeland security and defense goals require an immediate seamless solution that integrates effective command and control of military assets, cooperation with international, interagency and civil authorities, and the coordination of their respective capabilities and existing resources essential to achieve unity of effort. Merging the National Fleet concept along with a joint command and control structure, maritime domain awareness, and combined assets would serve to blur the operational transition from homeland security to defense. Former maritime operational arrangements and current proposals display organizational bias, deficient unity of effort, and do not address all mission objectives. The recommended model provides a joint Navy and Coast Guard command and control structure coupled with and operational concept utilizing current maritime military assets.

ADA420306
Intelligence Support To Maritime Homeland Security
Descriptive Note: Final rept.
Personal Author(s): Nicholson, Brian D
Report Date: 16 May 2003
Media Count: 33 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, *HOMELAND SECURITY, TASK FORCES, COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, LAW ENFORCEMENT, TERRORISM, RISK MANAGEMENT
Identifiers: (U) MARITIME, MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS)
Distribution Statement: Availability: This document is not available from DTIC in microfiche.
Abstract: (U) Intelligence is critical to resolving the competing interests of security and prosperity and is the basis for a risk management approach to security. This essay looks at intelligence and how it is or might be employed to help minimize the risk of a maritime terrorism and how the resources of the intelligence community contribute to reducing the force to space ratio. Integration of law enforcement and intelligence is fundamental to the success of homeland security. Terrorism does not recognize borders, but the U.S. division of responsibilities has created a seam in our defenses. Some aspects of globalization have resulted in blurring of traditional intelligence and law enforcement roles, but some additional fundamental changes are required. The Navy/Coast Guard counter-narcotics mission demonstrates a practical solution to joint military-law enforcement operations. The USA Patriot Act has facilitated greater sharing of law enforcement and intelligence information. Command and control plays an important part in properly using intelligence. The new Terrorist Threat Integration Center has been created at the strategic level; the Joint Interagency Task Force provides an excellent framework at the operational and tactical level. The Coast Guard has developed the Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) concept to reconcile security and prosperity issues in the man time environment. MDA begins overseas. Foreign intelligence operations, regional security cooperation, and leveraging regional relationships are critical to the doctrine of pre-emption and successful maritime homeland defense.

ADA415206
An XML-Based Knowledge Management System of Port Information for U.S. Coast Guard Cutters
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Stewart, Jeffrey D
Report Date: Mar 2003
Media Count: 123 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *INFORMATION SYSTEMS, *INTERNET, *PORTS(FACILITIES), *CLIENT SERVER SYSTEMS, *KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT, DATA BASES, LOGISTICS SUPPORT, DATA TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS, THESES, PROTOTYPES, INFORMATION RETRIEVAL, DATA STORAGE SYSTEMS, NAVAL LOGISTICS, HYPERTEXT, NAVIGATIONAL AIDS, COAST GUARD, CUTTERS(VESSELS), MARINE NAVIGATION
Identifiers: (U) *XML(EXTENSIBLE MARKUP LANGUAGE), DOMAIN MODEL, USE CASE MODEL, XPATH(XML PATH LANGUAGE), XSLT(EXTENSIBLE STYLESHEET LANGUAGE TRANSFORMATION), CSS(CASCADING STYLE SHEETS), PROOF OF CONCEPT CONSTRUCTION, DOM(DOCUMENT OBJECT MODEL), MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS), WPI(WORLD PORT INDEX), COAST PILOT, JAVASCRIPT PROGRAMMING LANGUAGE, W3C TECHNOLOGIES
Abstract: (U) This thesis describes the development of a prototype application that collects, manages, and distributes knowledge gained by Coast Guard cutter crews making port calls throughout the world. The system uses XML technologies in server/client and stand alone environments. With a web browser, the user views and navigates the system's content from a downloaded file collection or from a centralized data source via a network connection. Users add and modify content with Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) forms using their existing network connections. Client-side data access and navigation, as well as data storage, is performed using non-proprietary standards developed by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) and the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). The prototype application's purpose is to fulfill the strategic goal of achieving superiority of maritime domain awareness over the areas in which the Coast Guard operates. The need for this application is based upon the lack of specific information from currently available reference publications, the absence of a system to distribute port call knowledge, and the data bandwidth limitations of cutters at sea. The need for knowledge retention aboard cutters is elevated by shortened crew member assignment lengths due to the stressful and arduous duties of life at sea. (5 tables, 18 figures, 48 refs.)

ADA464457
The Fifth Side of the Pentagon: Moving the Coast Guard to the Department of Defense
Descriptive Note: Research paper
Personal Author(s): Howe, Jim
Report Date: 10 May 2002
Media Count: 37 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, *INTEGRATION, *COAST GUARD, *ORGANIZATIONAL REALIGNMENT, *MULTIMISSION, *HOMELAND SECURITY, COASTAL REGIONS, AGING(MATERIALS), MILITARY CAPABILITIES, LITTORAL ZONES, PORTS(FACILITIES), COAST GUARD OPERATIONS, LAW ENFORCEMENT, MILITARY BUDGETS, DEFICIENCIES, NAVY, EFFICIENCY, MANPOWER
Identifiers: (U) DOT(DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION), PORT SECURITY, FISHERIES PROTECTION, MARITIME DEFENSE ZONES, MANPOWER SHORTAGES, BUDGET REDUCTIONS. MDA(MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS), CRITICISMS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Following the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the United States Coast Guard, the smallest of America's armed forces, was given massive new homeland protection responsibilities. Unfortunately, the service struggles to fulfill these duties due to aged equipment, insufficient personnel strength, and inadequate funding. This paper analyses the Coast Guard's place in government and proposes moving the service to the Department of Defense (DoD). A close examination of the growing Coast Guard mission set shows how the service has gained major new responsibilities in recent years without a corresponding increase in resources. A review of relations between the Coast Guard, the executive branch, and the Congress sheds light on the systemic problems that hamper the Coast Guard's ability to field the forces needed to carry out its mandated missions. Next, the most commonly heard arguments against shifting the service to DoD are evaluated and countered. The paper then highlights the important efficiencies that a move of the Coast Guard to DoD would make to national defense, homeland security, and the service's own operational capabilities.

ADA401132
Maritime Homeland Defense Command and Control: What is the Right Arrangement?
Descriptive Note: Final rept.
Personal Author(s): McGrath, James P , III
Report Date: 01 Feb 2002
Media Count: 32 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, *COAST GUARD OPERATIONS, *HOMELAND DEFENSE, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, INTEGRATED SYSTEMS, COASTAL REGIONS, NATIONAL SECURITY, ATTACK, NAVAL OPERATIONS, TERRORISM
Identifiers: (U) *MARINE HOMELAND DEFENSE
Distribution Statement: Availability: Hard copy only.
Abstract: (U) The terrorist attacks of September 11th proved that American Homeland Defense is inadequate. Many proposals have been offered to solve the Command and Control arrangement for the Maritime portion of Homeland Defense, but each is hampered by organizational prejudices and therefore lack sufficient unity of effort to ensure successful mission accomplishment. In order to successfully deter terrorism and meet the operational goals of Maritime Homeland Defense, an integrated Command and Control structure must be established. The commander must have access to a fused intelligence picture that incorporates all sources of intelligence. Once the commander is provided this Maritime Domain Awareness, the assets must not only be in place to act on the intelligence, but the commander must have sufficient control over those forces for execution of the Maritime Homeland Defense mission.

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Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)
ADM002315, Winter 2010

DEFENSE TECHNICAL INFORMATION CENTER

8725 John J. Kingman Road, Suite 0944, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) ADM002315, Winter 2010

DEFENSE TECHNICAL INFORMATION CENTER

8725 John J. Kingman Road, Suite 0944, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)
ADM002315, Winter 2010