Bibliographies |  |
ADA513271
CRS Issue Statement on U.S. Diplomacy
Descriptive Note: Congressional research rept.
Personal Author(s): Nakamura, Kennon H
Report Date: 13 Jan 2010
Media Count: 5 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *FOREIGN POLICY, *UNITED STATES, *INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, POLITICAL SCIENCE, COMMERCE, FOREIGN, LEADERSHIP, INTERNATIONAL, AGREEMENTS, CULTURE, TERRORISM, POLICIES, DIPLOMATS, WEAPONS, DEVELOPING NATIONS
Identifiers: (U) *DIPLOMACY
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The United States conducts diplomacy to promote and protect U.S. national interests in the international arena. To advance U.S. interests abroad, the Department of State utilizes both the traditional tools of diplomacy and the use of new tools in its bilateral and international relations. These traditional tools include U.S. diplomats applying their skills in analyzing and reporting on events to U.S. policy makers, as well as advocating the U.S. position to counterparts in foreign ministries in order to develop agreements and form alliances addressing common concerns from nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction to trade agreements. Traditional diplomacy also encompasses using various tools to achieve strategic objectives such as training foreign military and security forces to help fight international crime and terrorism; providing grants and sales of military weapons on favorable terms; or using foreign assistance for other than development or humanitarian reasons. But diplomacy today also requires new skills and new emphasis. The need for public diplomacy is being re-emphasized, and a new appreciation for public diplomacy has developed with its use of academic, cultural, and leadership exchanges; America Center multi-media facilities; Internet social networking; and international broadcasting, to reach beyond governments and speak to a nation's citizens to establish new relationships. Many believe today's diplomacy requires a new relationship between traditional diplomacy and development assistance where the goals are no longer viewed solely to achieve strategic ends but serve to provide both humanitarian aid and an investment in the growth of developing countries.
ADA513328
CRS Issue Statement on R&D to Enhance Homeland Security
Descriptive Note: Congressional rept.
Personal Author(s): Gottron, Frank
Report Date: 12 Jan 2010
Media Count: 4 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, *SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH, *CORPORATIONS, *INVESTMENTS, *HOMELAND SECURITY, ATTACK, RESPONSE, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, PREVENTION, RECOVERY, THREATS, BIOLOGICAL LABORATORIES, FEDERAL BUDGETS, TERRORISM, LEGISLATION
Identifiers: (U) *RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002, *DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, DHS(DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY), *PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENTSS, MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The Federal Government invests in research and development (R&D) to improve the government's ability to prevent, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks. Given the diverse nature of current and future terrorist threats, homeland security R&D involves nearly every scientific and technical discipline. In addition to conducting and sponsoring much of this R&D, the government is leveraging its investment by encouraging the private sector to similarly invest. Congress continues to face difficult decisions regarding funding, prioritizing, coordinating, and executing the Federal Government homeland security R&D agenda. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) gave the Directorate of Science and Technology within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) responsibility for most DHS R&D-related activities. This Directorate has been reorganized multiple times since its inception and has received intense congressional scrutiny. How DHS prioritizes, coordinates, and executes its R&D agenda remains an oversight issue for Congress.
ADA513732
CRS Issue Statement on WMD and Missile Proliferation
Descriptive Note: Congressional rept.
Personal Author(s): Nikitin, Mary Beth, Kerr, Paul K, Woolf, Amy F, Kan, Shirley A, Hildreth, Steven A, Chanlett-Avery, Emma, Niksch, Lary A
Report Date: 08 Jan 2010
Media Count: 4 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, *NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, NATIONAL SECURITY, CHEMICAL ORDNANCE, FISSIONABLE MATERIALS, RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS, POLICIES, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: U) The possible proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons (known collectively as Weapons of Mass Destruction-WMD) and their delivery systems to additional nations or subnational groups poses significant challenges for U.S. national security policy. The complex challenges presented by the threat of WMD proliferation have diplomatic, technological, and economic aspects. The United States is a signatory to several international agreements, including the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons Convention, that seek to contain the spread of these weapons to other nations. Washington also pursues policies that seek to slow or prevent the proliferation of weapons or materials from specific countries, such as Russia, Pakistan, and China, and to dissuade or prevent the acquisition of these weapons and related technologies by specific countries, such as Iran and North Korea, and subnational or terrorist groups. In its second session, the 111th Congress is expected to continue its oversight of the full range of programs that address WMD proliferation challenges. For example, the United States provides approximately $1 billion annually in assistance to Russia and other former states of the Soviet Union to help them secure WMD sites and to prevent the export of WMD technical expertise. Under the Proliferation Security Initiative, the United States and more than 90 countries have agreed to strengthen efforts to interdict shipments of WMD or related cargo. The Department of Energy's Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) works to secure and remove nuclear and radiological materials worldwide. Congress may renew its deliberation over the funding for these efforts, the amounts allocated to specific projects and programs, and whether additional funding should be provided to allow expansion of these programs to other countries of concern.
ADA513786
Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, Report Card: An Assessment of the U.S. Government's Progress in Protecting the United States from Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism
Report Date: Jan 2010
Media Count: 25 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *TERRORISM, *PREVENTION, *MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, ASYMMETRY, THREAT EVALUATION, BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, PROTECTION, FISSIONABLE MATERIALS, RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, CHEMICAL ORDNANCE, RECRUITS, VULNERABILITY, DESTRUCTION, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, AIRCRAFT
Identifiers: (U) *WMD(WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) OVERVIEW: In December 2008, the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism released a unanimous threat assessment: Unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013. Less than a month after this assessment, then Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell publicly endorsed it. That weapon is more likely to be biological than nuclear. The assessment was based on four factors. First, there is direct evidence that terrorists are trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Second, acquiring WMD fits the tactical profile of terrorists. They understand the unique vulnerability of first-world countries to asymmetric weapons. The airplanes that al Qaeda flew into the World Trade Center were asymmetric weapons. Third, terrorists have demonstrated global reach and the organizational sophistication to obtain and use WMD. As the Commission's report, World at Risk, found, if al Qaeda recruits skilled bioscientists, it will acquire the capability to develop and use biological weapons. Fourth, the opportunity to acquire and use such weapons is growing exponentially because of the global proliferation of nuclear material and biological technologies.
ADA510467
An All-Hazards Training Center for a Catastrophic Emergency
Descriptive Note: Monograph
Personal Author(s): Stewart, Xavier
Report Date: Dec 2009
Media Count: 36 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, *EPIDEMICS, *HOMELAND SECURITY, *FIRST RESPONDERS, *SITES, *TRAINING, *EMERGENCIES, EXPLOSIVES, NUCLEAR WARFARE, CHEMICAL WARFARE, CYBERTERRORISM, CONTINUITY, PUBLIC HEALTH, HAZARDOUS MATERIALS, PUBLIC SAFETY, TEAMS(PERSONNEL), RADIOLOGICAL WARFARE, THREATS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT, STATE GOVERNMENT, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
Identifiers: (U) *ALL-HAZARD TRAINING CENTERS, *CIVIL SUPPORT TEAMS, CST(CIVIL SUPPORT TEAMS), CYBERWARFARE, CLIMATE CHANGE, FEMA(FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY), EMERGENCY RESPONDERS, CYBERSPACE THREATS, PANDEMICS, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, COOP(CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS), COG(CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Since assuming command in 1998 of the first Civil Support Team (CST) Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Colonel Stewart witnessed and experienced dramatic changes in homeland security theory, policy, and practice. Understandably, the most significant changes have occurred since the horrific attacks on September 11, 2001, which violently demonstrated how turbulent today's world strategic environment is. Widely available chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, high yield explosive, and cyberspace security (CBRNE-C) materials, technologies, and equipment often have dual uses. Preventing rogue states and terrorist organizations from acquiring these materials is a necessary but formidable challenge. Additionally, the cyber domain has grown tremendously and may be used to target key infrastructure and resources. In addition to these threats, dramatic weather changes have caused unusual and devastating shifts in weather patterns, which in turn have triggered catastrophic events. This paper proposes the establishment of All-Hazard Training Centers (AHTC) in the 10 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions to train CST WMD and emergency responders for CBRNE-C events or natural catastrophes.
ADA514142
Who's on First: Unraveling the Complexity of the United States' Food and Agricultural Regulatory System in the Realm of Homeland Security
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Elliott, Gary W
Report Date: Dec 2009
Media Count: 166 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *INTEGRATED SYSTEMS, *HOMELAND SECURITY, *UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, *ORGANIZATIONAL REALIGNMENT, *AGRICULTURE, *REGULATIONS, *FOOD, *PROTECTION, GERMANY, THREATS, BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS, PUBLIC HEALTH, FOOD PROCESSING, RADIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS, UNITED KINGDOM, TERRORISM, CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS, PUBLIC SAFETY, INSPECTION, THESES, CANADA, VULNERABILITY, CONTAMINATION
Identifiers: (U) *FOOD SAFETY, *AGRICULTURAL SAFETY, *REGULATORY SYSTEMS, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, REGULATORY OVERSIGHT, FDA(FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION), USDA(US DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE), DHHS(DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES), DHS(DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY), EPA(ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY), DOS(DEPARTMENT OF STATE), FOOD SECURITY, PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The food and agricultural sector received the designation of critical infrastructure important to national security after the events of September 11, 2001. With an increase of food-borne illnesses at the national level since the new designation, there has been increased concern about the current regulatory approach to the sector, in the paradigm of homeland defense and security. A continuing reliance on a complex web of regulatory oversight from multiple agencies from both unintentional and intentional contamination of the food supply sets the premise for the overarching research question and argument for the thesis. Is it time to restructure the food safety regulatory system into one federal governmental agency to provide a more effective agency and better regulatory oversight; greater collaboration among federal, state, and local agencies; and a smarter focus to a globally expanding and vulnerable sector? Chapter II provides an overview of the U.S. food safety regulatory structure, including the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Homeland Security, and Environmental Protection Agency. Chapter III explores the challenges and gaps in this food and agricultural regulatory structure. Chapter IV looks into threats to the food/agricultural infrastructure and discusses the importance of the infrastructure. Chapter V includes a comparison of changes made to the regulatory systems of three developed countries (United Kingdom, Germany, and Canada). These changes consolidated their food/agricultural regulatory structures into a single, modernized regulatory footprint. Chapter VI examines proposals by others to improve our regulatory structure. Chapter VII presents a conceptual framework (organizational structure) for a consolidated food and agricultural safety oversight administration based on the best proposals for change. Chapter VIII is intended to stimulate ideas among those interested in food safety/defense.
ADA514230
A Whole of Government Approach for National Security
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Percy, Jason L, Fellows, Jr, Terry A
Report Date: Dec 2009
Media Count: 70 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NATIONAL SECURITY, *UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, NATURAL DISASTERS, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, BUDGETS, CULTURE, ADDRESSING, SECURITY, THREATS, SHARING
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The national security system the President uses today allows little flexibility and agility to protect this nation from ever changing national threats. The lack of a common national government culture that facilitates a shared vision is evident. Additionally, the lack of inter-agency coordination and cooperation forces departments to focus on their own objectives and goals. However, with today's challenges, the demand for inter-agency collaboration has grown, and it has been identified as a necessity to achieve an adequate level of national security for the nation. The national security structure needs to operate as a system rather than a collection of separate components. A whole of government approach to planning, and programming and budgeting national security is a concept that could establish a unified effort between inter-governmental agencies to maximize all available resources in a collaborative effort. ?Addressing new security challenges is less about an objective of dominance and more about predicting, preventing, and managing disruptions, such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorist acts, global contagions, and natural disasters. This has led to the call for a whole of government approach to national security? (Gockel, 2008, p. 6). This project investigates how this approach could be developed and implemented across the federal government.
ADA514348
Deterring Terrorism: A Framework for Making Retaliatory Threats Credible
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Tippet, Douglas F
Report Date: Dec 2009
Media Count: 107 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *COUNTERTERRORISM, *TERRORISM, STRATEGY, THREATS, THESES, DOCUMENTS, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, NUCLEAR WARFARE, DESTRUCTION
Identifiers: (U) *TERRORIST ATTACK, DETERRENCE, NON-STATE ACTOR, RETALIATION, RETRIBUTION, PUNITIVE DETERRENCE, DETERRING TERRORISM, REPRISAL, NUCLEAR TERRORISM, CYBER TERRORISM, TERRORIST VULNERABILITIES
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) To deter terrorism, U.S. deterrence strategy must threaten retaliatory responses that are appropriate to the actions by non-state actors the United States wishes to prevent. The effectiveness of those threats depends on the perceived credibility that America possesses the capability and willingness to execute them. Although U.S. policy focuses on preventive and preemptive counterterrorism strategies, this thesis argues that it contains relevant targets for retaliation but lacks credibility because its threats do not distinguish between types of attack. Instead of correlating threats to undesirable actions, it declares the same punishment for all terrorism, which is unrealistic ex post. On the contrary, the level of response should be proportionally related to the type and destructive effects of an attack and in tune with the level of public outrage the attack would generate. This thesis first provides theoretical support for the claim that recent U.S. policy documents contain valid threats for influencing non-state actors. Then, credibility is evaluated by comparing those threats to the expected U.S. response for two dissimilar scenarios: cyber and nuclear terrorism. The analysis suggests that policy threats lack credibility because the signaled response for terrorism holds constant across varying degrees of attack severity. Because the likely responses to these attacks differ in practice, the undifferentiated signals sent by recent policy weaken deterrence. As a result, the thesis recommends establishing a retaliation framework based on type of attack.
ADA514153
Deterrence of Nuclear Terrorism via Post-Detonation Attribution: Is the United States on Target?
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Geelhood, Philip
Report Date: Dec 2009
Media Count: 110 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NUCLEAR WEAPONS, *IDENTIFICATION, *SOURCES, *FORENSIC ANALYSIS, *DETERRENCE, *TERRORISM, *ATTACK, *RESPONSE, ACCOUNTABILITY, POSTATTACK OPERATIONS, RISK ANALYSIS, HOMELAND SECURITY, FISSIONABLE MATERIALS, RELIABILITY, THESES, ACCURACY, THREATS, GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, INTELLIGENCE, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
Identifiers: (U) *NUCLEAR TERRORISM, *NUCLEAR FORENSICS, *POST-DETONATION ATTRIBUTION, *ATTRIBUTION CAPABILITY, SOURCE IDENTIFICATION, POST-ATTACK RESPONSE, DETERRENCE THEORY, DETERRENCE FAILURE, RDD(RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL DEVICES), DIRTY BOMBS, IMPROVISED NUCLEAR DEVICES
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) As nuclear terrorism has a risk of low probability and high consequences, the United States is right to address it as a significant -- but not the utmost -- national security priority. The science of nuclear forensics makes possible the characterization of nuclear materials used in a nuclear attack, and, as such, provides the backbone of an attribution program. Nuclear forensics-based attribution serves the dual purpose of helping to prevent nuclear terrorism by enabling deterrence, as well as guiding and enabling post-attack response options in the event of deterrence failure. The deterrence that an attribution capability alone enables is fairly narrow in its effective scope, though this deterrence does cover what would otherwise be a critical gap in U.S. strategy for preventing nuclear terrorism. The U.S. attribution capability is currently lacking in several important regards, the most significant of which is a future dearth of highly qualified personnel. Since an attribution capability is a critical enabler, the United States must do more to efficiently develop its attribution program. This can be done most cost-effectively in the short term by focusing on unilateral program needs while building an enduring domestic political will to improve and then maintain the nation's attribution capability.
ADA514138
Nuclear Terrorism: Calibrating Funding for Defensive Programs in Response to the Threat
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Haglund, Sean W
Report Date: Dec 2009
Media Count: 124 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NUCLEAR WARFARE, *TERRORISTS, *THREATS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, RISK, DEFENSE SYSTEMS, PLUTONIUM, SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, RUSSIA, DOMESTIC, CROSSINGS, TERRORISM, SOURCES, DESTRUCTION
Identifiers: (U) WMD(WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION), GLOBAL NUCLEAR DETECTION ARCHITECTURE, COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION, DOE(DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY), DHS(DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY), HIGHLY-ENRICHED URANIUM
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The risk of a nuclear attack by terrorists is one of the most urgent and threatening dangers facing the U.S. The U.S. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction depicts a layered system of preventive measures ranging from securing materials at foreign sources to interdicting weapons or nuclear materials at ports, border crossings, and within the U.S. Several departments within the U.S. government manage these preventive programs with little cross departmental integration to determine where additional funds could provide the greatest impact. Furthermore, no governmental office with budgetary or staffing authority exists to direct the overarching effects of these programs and expenditures as a whole. This study examines the fiscal prioritization and relative effectiveness of the primary U.S. programs to prevent acts of nuclear terrorism contrasted against the threat of a terrorist nuclear attack within the U.S. This effort seeks to bridge departmental lanes of responsibility, provide a holistic perspective, and identify programs in need of additional resources and emphasis, as well as efforts that offer comparatively little added security. This research concludes that while proactive domestic and overseas source security measures receive appropriate fiscal emphasis, border and cargo security measures and the supporting research and development efforts do not.
ADA510561
The Clock is Ticking
Report Date: 21 Oct 2009
Media Count: 28 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *TERRORISM, *PREVENTION, *MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, *NUCLEAR WARFARE, INTELLIGENCE, RISK, COMMUNITIES, ECONOMICS, THREATS, COSTS, BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, CHEMICAL ORDNANCE, ANTHRAX, UNITED STATES, GLOBAL, TERRORISTS, ANTIPERSONNEL WEAPONS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This was the somber conclusion of the bipartisan, congressionally mandated Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism in its report, World at Risk, released in December 2008. On December 2, 2008, the Director of National Intelligence publicly agreed with this assessment. Today, 323 days since the release of that report, the clock continues ticking and we are now closer to a possible attack. The U.S. government has taken some of the decisive and urgent actions needed, but these actions have not kept pace with the increasing capabilities and agility of those who would do harm to the United States and the world community. The threat of bioterrorism is real. In December 2008, the Commission concluded that terrorists are more likely to be able to obtain and use a biological weapon than a nuclear weapon. This finding is not singular: In recent years, the United States has received strategic warnings of biological weapons use from dozens of government reports and expert panels. The consequences of ignoring these warnings could be dire. For example, one recent study from the intelligence community projected that a one- to two-kilogram release of anthrax spores from a crop duster plane could kill more Americans than died in World War II. Clean-up and other economic costs could exceed $1.8 trillion. Yet the nation's level of preparedness for dealing with the threat of bioterrorism remains far lower than that of the nuclear threat. Central to U.S. biosecurity strategy should be the recognition that biological weapons are distinct from nuclear weapons and require a unique approach. Unlike nuclear weapons, which require highly advanced technology, massive infrastructure, and rare materials that can be closely monitored and secured, biological weapons materials occur naturally, require no significant infrastructure to produce, and can be found in nearly every part of the world.
ADA511063
Development of a Versatile Conditioning Wind Tunnel for Evaporative Fate Studies
Descriptive Note: Final rept. Aug 2005-May 2007
Personal Author(s): Weber, Daniel J, Waysbort, Daniel Moury, Clayton S, Durst, H D, Danberg, James E
Report Date: Oct 2009
Media Count: 63 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *WIND TUNNELS, *BOUNDARY LAYER, CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION, THREATS, CHEMICALS, VAPORS, TURBULENCE, TEST EQUIPMENT, FLOW FIELDS, VOLATILITY, EVAPORATION, ITERATIONS, DETERMINATION, MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS, CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS, VELOCITY, TERRORISTS
Identifiers: (U) *EVAPORATIVE FATE STUDIES, AGENT FATE, COLES LAW, HOT WIRE ANEMOMETRY, LAMINAR, LAW OF THE WAKE, LAW OF THE WALL, DROPLETS, MILITARY TARGETS, TOXIC INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS, PE6R27CZ
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This report documents the development of a conditioning wind tunnel that allows multiple test samples to be conditioned at identical environmental settings that are used in smaller vapor sampling wind tunnels. The conditioning of multiple samples, especially those involving persistent chemicals, allows for the efficient use of a limited number of instrumented vapor sampling tunnels. Up to nine samples can be sequentially and quickly cycled through the instrumented vapor wind tunnels for a relatively short period of time to take vapor samples. The development of the conditioning wind tunnel progress through several iterations, starting as a smaller test cell and ultimately ending as a more conventional wind tunnel design. The tunnel was fabricated and the boundary-layer profile in the test section was measured at several locations. Analysis of the boundary-layer indicated that the profiles were in good agreement with the stipulated operational wind profiles. Recommendations for possible future improvements are also provided. The conditioning wind tunnel's versatility allows multiple droplet experiments with minor modifications enabling determination of volatilization of tens of milligrams of chemicals from 20 x 10 cm surfaces.
ADA514526
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction: Looking Back, Looking Ahead (Occasional Paper, Number 7)
Descriptive Note: Monograph
Personal Author(s): Bernstein, Paul I, Caves, Jr , John P, Carus, W S
Report Date: Oct 2009
Media Count: 64 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *EVOLUTION(GENERAL), *POLICIES, *PERCEPTION(PSYCHOLOGY), *NUCLEAR WEAPONS, *PRESIDENT(UNITED STATES), *COUNTERMEASURES, *MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, IRAN, TERRORISM, NATIONAL DEFENSE, DETERRENCE, DEMOCRACY, DISARMAMENT, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, TREATIES, CHEMICAL WARFARE, BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, RESPONSE, PREPARATION, SYMPOSIA, DIPLOMACY, NORTH KOREA
Identifiers: (U) *CLINTON WILLIAM J, *BUSH GEORGE W, *OBAMA BARACK, WMD NONPROLIFERATION, WEAPONS PROLIFERATION, WEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION, WMD COUNTERPROLIFERATION, NUCLEAR LATENCY, NUCLEAR TERRORISM
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This occasional paper from the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction examines the evolution of U.S. perceptions of the WMD threat and major responses to that threat from the Clinton administration through the first few months of the Obama administration. It also considers why our worst fears for WMD use and proliferation have not been realized and anticipates some of the major WMD challenges that lie ahead. An important basis for the paper are the presentations and discussions conducted during the WMD Center's eighth annual symposium, WMD Proliferation and Use: Have We Been Effective, Lucky, or Overly Concerned? held at NDU on May 7-8, 2008. Nearly 20 years have passed since the United States began worrying in earnest about the risks of regional weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation. In the run-up to Operation Desert Storm in 1990, the Department of Defense (DoD) had no systematic understanding of or approach to prosecuting a regional war against an adversary armed with and prepared to use nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. The improvisational efforts to prepare for possible Iraqi WMD use gave way after the war to a concerted effort during the Bill Clinton administration to prepare the Armed Forces to confront WMD-armed regional adversaries, while working to defuse such threats through diplomacy -- coercive and otherwise. The George W. Bush administration brought to the WMD problem a different set of assumptions and beliefs that led to new areas of emphasis and new approaches, many of them shaped by the need, after the attacks of 2001, to confront more directly the threat of WMD use by violent nonstate actors. The Obama administration's principal departures from the Bush administration's approach to WMD issues are its greater emphasis on traditional, treaty-based disarmament and nonproliferation, its reorientation of BMD programs, and how it will ensure the reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent for as long as it is needed.
ADA507056
Homeland Defense. Greater Focus on Analysis of Alternatives and Threats Needed to Improve DOD's Strategic Nuclear Weapons Security
Descriptive Note: Congressional rept.
Report Date: Sep 2009
Media Count: 50 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NATIONAL SECURITY, *NUCLEAR WEAPONS, STRATEGIC WEAPONS, TERRORISM, COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS, HOMELAND DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, THREATS
Identifiers: (U) GAO REPORTS, DOE(DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) A successful terrorist attack on a facility containing nuclear weapons could have devastating consequences. GAO was asked to compare the Department of Defense's (DOD) and Department of Energy's (DOE) efforts to protect the nation's nuclear weapons where they are stored, maintained, or transported. This report (1) compares the nuclear weapons security policies and procedures at DOD and DOE, and the extent to which cost-benefit analyses are required; (2) compares DOD and DOE efforts to assess threats to nuclear weapons; and (3) identifies total current and projected funding requirements for securing nuclear weapons, including military construction costs. GAO analyzed DOD and DOE nuclear weapons security policies and procedures; visited sites that store, maintain, or transport nuclear weapons; and analyzed funding data for fiscal years 2006 through 2013. This report is an unclassified version of a classified report issued in May 2009.
ADA506830
An Extended Deterrence Regime to Counter Iranian Nuclear Weapons: Issues and Options
Descriptive Note: Research paper
Personal Author(s): Kugler, Richard L
Report Date: Sep 2009
Media Count: 60 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NUCLEAR WEAPONS, *DIPLOMACY, *DETERRENCE, *COOPERATION, *IRAN, *PROTECTION, *MIDDLE EAST, *UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, *FOREIGN POLICY, RISK, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, HOMELAND SECURITY, GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), THREATS, POLITICAL ALLIANCES, TERRORISM, EUROPE, NATO, ISRAEL, GUIDED MISSILES, TARGETS, MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES), ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS
Identifiers: (U) *EXTENDED DETERRENCE REGIME, NUCLEAR MISSILE ATTACK, NUCLEAR TERRORISM, CONVENTIONAL MILITARY ATTACK, POLITICAL COERCION, NUCLEAR RETALIATION CAPABILITIES, DIPLOMATIC COLLABORATION, FRIENDLY ARAB COUNTRIES, MULTILATERAL COOPERATION, CONUS(CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES), SECURITY ASSISTANCE, COLLECTIVE SECURITY
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This paper examines the idea of creating an American-led extended deterrence regime in the Middle East to address potential Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons and missiles. It does not focus on how to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear-armed power; instead, it addresses how the U.S. Government can act to deter Iran in a future setting where it already possesses these weapons and is trying to employ them to geopolitical advantage. Developing a coherent strategy can lessen the risk that the United States will be surprised, compelled to improvise, and unable to lead effectively in the Middle East and elsewhere. Even as the Administration employs diplomacy, sanctions, and multilateral cooperation to derail Iran from the nuclear path, it should also develop a clear sense of how it will react if, as is possible, Iran emerges as a nuclear power, led by a radical government with a menacing foreign policy. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently stated that Iran should consider the consequences of a U.S. defense umbrella over the region. This paper explores many of the issues related to such an umbrella. Key questions arise regarding an extended deterrence regime. What Iranian threats would this regime try to deter? Who would it protect, and how would it protect them? How much deterrence is possible, and how much is enough? What shape would a deterrence regime take, how would it operate, and would it be effective? What options are available? The paper puts forth six options of varying political feasibility and strategic performance for creating an extended deterrence regime and evaluates them comparatively. Its intent is to illuminate issues and options, not to advocate any single approach. At the end, it offers summary conclusions and recommendations.
ADA510238
Detection of Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Science, Technologies, Observations
Descriptive Note: Congressional rept.
Personal Author(s): Medalia, Jonathan
Report Date: 04 Aug 2009
Media Count: 103 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NUCLEAR WEAPONS, CONGRESS, DETECTION, ACQUISITION, X RAYS, HIGH ENERGY, PLUTONIUM, FISSIONABLE MATERIALS, GAMMA RAYS, RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS, PHOTONS, TERRORISM, URANIUM, NEUTRONS, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, BRIGHTNESS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Detection of nuclear weapons and special nuclear material (SNM, certain types of uranium and plutonium) is crucial to thwarting nuclear proliferation and terrorism and to securing weapons and materials worldwide. Congress has funded a portfolio of detection R&D and acquisition programs, and has mandated inspection at foreign ports of all U.S.-bound cargo containers using two types of detection equipment. Nuclear weapons contain SNM, which produces unique or suspect signatures that can be detected. It emits radiation, notably gamma rays (high-energy photons) and neutrons. SNM is very dense, so it produces a bright image on a radiograph (a picture like a medical x-ray) when xrays or gamma rays are beamed through a container in which it is hidden. Using lead or other shielding to attenuate gamma rays would make this image larger. Nuclear weapons produce detectable signatures, such as radiation generated by or a noticeable image on a radiograph. Other detection techniques are also available.
ADA500722
Military and Dual-Use Technology. Covert Testing Shows Continuing Vulnerabilities of Domestic Sales for Illegal Export
Personal Author(s): Kutz, Gregory D
Report Date: 04 Jun 2009
Media Count: 27 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *EXPORTS, *TERRORISTS, *COVERT OPERATIONS, *MILITARY CRITICAL TECHNOLOGY, *MILITARY EQUIPMENT, DETECTION, DETECTORS, MILITARY AIRCRAFT, GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), ARMY PERSONNEL, VULNERABILITY, EXPLOSIVE CHARGES, ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT, CHIPS(ELECTRONICS), SENSITIVITY, PROCUREMENT, NIGHT VISION DEVICES, DOMESTIC, DUAL MODE, POSTAL SERVICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT, TERRORISM, MULTIPURPOSE, GYROSCOPES, AFGHANISTAN, OVERSEAS, SPARK GAPS, ORGANIZATIONS, UNITED STATES, IRAQ, GUIDED MISSILES, TEST AND EVALUATION, NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Identifiers: (U) *MILITARY CRITICAL TECHNOLOGY, GAO REPORTS, ILLEGAL EXPORT, DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGY, UNDERCOVER TESTING
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) GAO found that sensitive dual-use and military technology can be easily and legally purchased from manufacturers and distributors within the United States and illegally exported without detection. Using a bogus front company and fictitious identities, GAO purchased sensitive items including night-vision scopes currently used by U.S. soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan to identify targets, triggered spark gaps used to detonate nuclear weapons, electronic sensors used in improvised explosive devices, and gyro chips used in guided missiles and military aircraft. Interviews with cognizant officials at State and Commerce and a review of laws governing the sale of the types of items GAO purchased showed there are few restrictions on domestic sales of these items. GAO was also able to export a number of dummy versions of these items using the mail to a country that is a known transshipment point for terrorist organizations and foreign governments attempting to acquire sensitive technology. Due to the large volume of packages being shipped overseas, and large volume of people traveling overseas, enforcement officials within the United States said it is impossible to search every package and person leaving the United States to ensure sensitive technologies are not being exported illegally. As a result, terrorists and foreign governments that are able to complete domestic purchases of sensitive military and dual-use technologies face few obstacles and risks when exporting these items.
ADA500983
France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and Issues in U.S.-French Relations
Descriptive Note: Congressional rept.
Personal Author(s): Belkin, Paul
Report Date: 20 May 2009
Media Count: 28 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), *EUROPEAN UNION, *INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, *MIDDLE EAST, *NATO, *FOREIGN POLICY, *FRANCE, *UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, IRAN, RELIGION, DEMOCRACY, JEWS, SECTARIAN VIOLENCE, PRIVATIZATION, NATO FORCES, AFGHANISTAN CONFLICT, COUNTERTERRORISM, UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), CORPORATIONS, INVESTMENTS, IRAQI WAR, LEBANON, SYRIA
Identifiers: (U) SARKOZY NICOLAS, ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, ANTISEMITISM, MUSLIMS, ESDP(EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY), POST-COLD WAR ERA, MULTILATERALISM, LE FOULARD, HEAD SCARVES, PUBLIC SCHOOLS, AL QAEDA, AGRICULTURAL TRADE, RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The factors that shape French foreign policy have changed since the end of the Cold War. The perspectives of France and the United States have diverged in some cases, although their core interests remain similar. Both countries' governments have embraced the opportunity to build stability in Europe through an expanded European Union and NATO. Each has recognized that terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are the most important threats to their security today. Several factors shape French foreign policy. France has a self-identity that calls for efforts to spread French values and views, many rooted in democracy and human rights. France prefers to engage international issues in a multilateral framework, above all through the European Union (EU). European efforts to form an EU security policy potentially independent of NATO emerged in this context. However, more recently, policy makers in France, Europe, and the United States have come to view a stronger European defense arm as a complement to, rather than a substitute for, NATO. From the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States through the Iraq war of 2003 until today, France has pressed the United States to confront emerging crises within a multilateral framework. France normally wishes to legitimize actions ranging from economic sanctions to military action in the United Nations. The election of Nicolas Sarkozy to the French presidency in May 2007 appears to have contributed to improved U.S.-French relations. Sarkozy has taken a more practical approach to issues in U.S.-French relations than his predecessor, Jacques Chirac. Perhaps most notably, in April 2009, Sarkozy announced France's full reintegration into NATO's military command structure, more than 40 years after former President Charles de Gaulle withdrew his country from the integrated command structure and ordered U.S. military personnel to leave the country.
ADA508292
Interagency Coordination in the Case of an Intentional Agroterrorist Incident
Descriptive Note: Research paper
Personal Author(s): King, Robin K
Report Date: 11 May 2009
Media Count: 27 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *AGRICULTURE, *BIOTERRORISM, *INTERAGENCY COORDINATION, AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, EMERGENCIES, NATIONAL SECURITY
Identifiers: (U) AGROTERRORISM, EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Agriculture in the United States has a tremendous importance in the economic well being of the country. Agroterrorism is defined as an attack against livestock or crops. Though an agroterrorist incident doesn't make the same statement as an attack against human targets, it would be fairly easy to perform. United States agriculture is particularly susceptible in an intentional terrorist event. Though there are many directives and plans in place to protect the country in case of an agroterrorist event, there are still some areas of concern. Communication and coordination are the primary concerns. In an emergency response in agriculture there are many organizations and governmental agencies responding. In past natural incidents, such as food borne illness, there was much confusion about what roles each group should play. This manuscript will evaluate the steps that have been taken to ensure a more coordinated response in the event of an agricultural incident, and why the lessons learned are repeated. In addition, recommendations for reducing repeated errors in coordination are proposed.
ADA500994
Oversight of High-Containment Biological Laboratories: Issues for Congress
Personal Author(s): Gottron, Frank, Shea, Dana A
Report Date: 04 May 2009
Media Count: 34 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *RISK ANALYSIS, *BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, *LABORATORIES, RISK, COMMUNITIES, RESISTANCE, SECURITY, ATTACK, RESEARCH FACILITIES, SAFETY, ANTHRAX, TERRORISM, ACCIDENTS, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, HOMELAND SECURITY, CONGRESS, POLICIES
Identifiers: (U) *BIOCONTAINMENT, BIOSECURITY, BIOSAFETY, *BIOCONTAINMENT TECHNOLOGY, CONTAINMENT
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
ADA504592
Chemical Modifications of Antisense Morpholino Oligomers Enhance Their Efficacy against Ebola Virus Infection
Descriptive Note: Journal article
Personal Author(s): Swenson, Dana L, Warfield, Kelly L, Warren, Travis K, Lovejoy, Candace, Hassinger, Jed N, Ruthel, Gordon, Blouch, Robert E, Moulton, Hong M, Weller, Dwight D, Iversen, Patrick L, Bavari, Sina
Report Date: May 2009
Media Count: 12 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *INFECTIOUS DISEASES, *EBOLA VIRUS, *RIBONUCLEIC ACIDS, *VIRUS DISEASES, CLINICAL MEDICINE, BIOTERRORISM, CLINICAL TRIALS, REPORTS, MOLECULES, REPRINTS, TEST AND EVALUATION, LETHALITY
Identifiers: (U) *ANTISENSE, *FILOVIRUS, *PHOSPHORODIAMIDATE MORPHOLINO OLIGOMERS, *MARBURG VIRUS, VP24, PMO(PHOSPHORODIAMIDATE MORPHOLINO OLIGOMERS), MARV(MARBURG VIRUS)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Phosphorodiamidate morpholino oligomers (PMO) are uncharged nucleic acid-like molecules designed to inactivate specific gene expression through antisense-based steric hindrance of mRNA translation. PMOs have been well-tolerated and effective in both preclinical testing and human clinical trials. PMOs have been highly successful in knockdown of viral gene expression and replication of acute viral infections. Thus, antisense PMOs represent a promising class of therapeutic agents to combat filoviral infections. Previously, we showed that mice treated with a PMO complementary to a region spanning the start codon of VP24 mRNA were nearly completely protected after lethal Ebola virus challenge. In the present study, we report on the ability of two additional VP24-specific PMOs to reduce cell-free translation of a VP24 reporter, to inhibit replication of EBOV in cultured cells, and to protect mice after lethal challenge. Additionally, chemical modifications of the PMOs, including charge modifications of the backbone and addition of arginine-rich peptide tags, increased the potency and efficacy of the molecules. This work provides a strong foundation for the development and use of novel antisense-based strategies for treating known, emerging, and genetically engineered bioterrorism threats.
ADA505135
The Potential for Normal Political Relations between the United States and Iran Following Presidential Elections in Each Country
Descriptive Note: Monograph
Personal Author(s): Jerabek, Scott B
Report Date: May 2009
Media Count: 63 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *ELECTIONS, *HISTORY, *UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, *IRAN, *INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, *LEADERSHIP, PRESIDENT(UNITED STATES), POLITICAL PARTIES, TERRORISM, GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), IRAQ, ISRAEL, FOREIGN POLICY, DIPLOMACY, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Identifiers: (U) OBAMA BARACK, POLITICAL CANDIDATES, AMERICAN POLITICS, IRANIAN POLITICS, MASLOW'S HIERARCHY OF NEEDS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) With Presidential elections in both the United States and Iran occurring within 8 months of each other, one might expect major changes in the global political environment. This monograph addresses different aspects of and eras in the relationship between the United States and Iran. The major foci will be the political history of each country, current conditions, and the potential for a normalized relationship between the two countries. The model for a normalized relationship will be the relationship the United States and Iran relished during the 1970s. Though not a perfect relationship, it was a workable relationship for each country and was a potential basis for peace in other parts of the Middle East. The monograph addresses one specific area of interest: whether there are any roadblocks in diplomacy that would prevent these new personalities from establishing a normal bilateral relationship. The author believes that once both leaders are in place, the political landscape will change, but the unilateral relationship between the United States and Iran will not change substantially.
ADA499921
A Human-Centered Approach to Sense and Respond Logistics
Descriptive Note: Final rept. Aug 2005-Dec 2008
Personal Author(s): Buyurgan, Nebil, Cassady, Richard, Chimka, Justin, Gripper, Misty, Hill, Raymond, Mason, Scott, Meller, Russ, Militello, Laura, Nachtmann, Heather, Nam, Chang, Pohl, Edward, Rossetti, Manuel
Report Date: 10 Apr 2009
Media Count: 167 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *LOGISTICS SUPPORT, *OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS, *MANPOWER UTILIZATION, *LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT, DISASTERS, MAINTENANCE, NETWORKS, MEDICAL SERVICES, OPERATIONAL READINESS, MARKOV PROCESSES, TEAMS(PERSONNEL), FORECASTING, VIRTUAL REALITY, SCHEDULING, ALLOCATIONS, POLICIES, INTEGRATED SYSTEMS, BIOTERRORISM, MILITARY ASSISTANCE
Identifiers: (U) ROBUST FORECASTING, TRUST, VIRTUAL TEAMS, TEAMWORK, AUCTION-BASED RESOURCE ALLOCATION, OUTBREAK DETECTION, DISASTER RELIEF, DISTRIBUTED LOGISTICS NETWORKS, TRUST, MEDICAL LOGISTICS, RESOURCE ALLOCATION
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract:
(U) The goal of this research effort was to develop quantitative and scientific methods that capable of assisting researchers and military logisticians in the analysis of the effectiveness of logistics technology and processes in a Sense & Respond Logistics (S&RL) environment that incorporated both a human-centered and a system-based perspective. The specific research efforts summarized in the report include: (1) Effective Scheduling and Coordination of Disaster Relief Operations, (2) Experimental Evidence on Team Coordination and Collaboration Within a Distributed Logistics Network, (3) A New Paradigm For Studying Trust In Virtual Teams, (4) Developing and Evaluating Operationally Robust Forecasting Techniques in Military Logistics, (5) Integrated Distribution Planning and Forecasting for Medical Logistics, (6) An Auction-Based Framework for Resource Allocation in Disaster Relief Operations, (7) Comparing Maintenance Policies for Single-Unit, Markovian Systems, and (8) Improved Outbreak Detection for Bio Terror Response Logistics.
ADA499532
Characterization of Reaerosolization From Impingers in an Effort to Improve Airborne Virus Sampling
Descriptive Note: Journal Article
Personal Author(s): Riemenschnelder, Lindsey M, Wu, Chang-Yu, Lundgren, Dale A, Lee, Jin-Hwa, Li, Hsing-Wang, Wander, Joseph D, Heimbuch, Brian K
Report Date: Apr 2009
Media Count: 35 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *SAMPLING, *BACTERIOPHAGES, *IMPINGEMENT, *INFLUENZA VIRUS, *VIRUSES, INERTIA, AIRBORNE, BIOTERRORISM, CONCENTRATION(COMPOSITION), STERILIZATION, SCANNING, MOBILITY, PARTICLE SIZE, METHODOLOGY, REPRINTS, COLLECTION
Identifiers: (U) *REAEROSOLIZATION, IMPINGER, AGGREGATION, AGI-30 IMPINGER, PSL(POLYSTYRENE LATEX), BIOAEROSOL SAMPLING, PE99999F, WUAFRLDODTL008
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) An AGI-30 impinger containing particles (MS2 bacteriophage or 30-nm polystyrene latex (PSL)) of known concentration was operated with sterile air. Reaerosolized particles as a function of sampling flow rate and impinge collection liquid concentration were characterized using a Scanning Mobility Particle Sizer. Reaerosolization from the impinge was also compared to that from a BioSampler. Results show that the reaerosolization increases as flow rate increases. While the increased particle concentration in the impinge collection liquid leads to an increase in the reaerosolization of PSL particles, it does not necessarily lead to an increase in the reaerosolization of virus particles. Reaerosolization of virus particles begins to decrease as the particle concentration in the impinge collection liquid rises above 106 PFU/mL. This phenomenon likely results from the aggregation of viral particles at high concentrations. Compared with micron-sized particles, nanosized virus particles are easier to aerosolize due to reduced inertia. Reaerosolization from the BioSampler is demonstrated to be significantly less than that from the impinge. Reaerosolization from impingement sampling methods is a mode of loss in airborne virus sampling, although it is not as significant a limitation as the; primary particle size of the aerosol. Utilizing a BioSampler coupled with shorter sampling periods to prevent high accumulative concentrations can minimize the impact of reaerosolization. This study confirms reaerosolization of virus particles to be a mode of loss in impingement sampling and identified methods to minimize the loss.
ADA500406
Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues
Descriptive Note: Congressional rept.
Personal Author(s): Kerr, Paul K, Nikitin, Mary B
Report Date: 01 Apr 2009
Media Count: 16 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *SECURITY, *PAKISTAN, *INSTABILITY, *THREATS, *NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, *GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), *COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, STORAGE, PREVENTION, WEAPON DELIVERY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, FISSIONABLE MATERIALS, PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, MONITORING, PRODUCTION, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, TERRORISTS, COOPERATION, NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Identifiers: (U) *NUCLEAR WEAPONS SECURITY, *PROLIFERATION THREATS, *NUCLEAR SECURITY, NUCLEAR DOCTRINE, FISSILE MATERIAL PRODUCTION, DELIVERY VEHICLES, EXPORT CONTROLS, PERSONNEL SECURITY, SECURITY REFORMS, POLITICAL INSTABILITY, STATE FAILURE, KHAN ABDUL QADEER, AL QAEDA
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Pakistan's nuclear arsenal consists of approximately 60 nuclear warheads. Pakistan continues fissile material production for weapons, and is adding to its weapons production facilities and delivery vehicles. Pakistan reportedly stores its warheads unassembled with the fissile core separate from non-nuclear explosives, and these are stored separately from their delivery vehicles. Pakistan does not have a stated nuclear policy, but its minimum credible deterrent is thought to be primarily a deterrent to Indian military action. Command and control structures have been dramatically overhauled since September 11, 2001, and export controls and personnel security programs have been put in place since the 2004 revelations about Pakistan's top nuclear scientists, A. Q. Khan's international proliferation network. Pakistani and some U.S. officials argue that Islamabad has taken a number of steps to prevent further proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials and improve its nuclear security. A number of important initiatives such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs have improved the security situation in recent years. Instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of a government that possesses a nuclear bomb, or proliferation by radical sympathizers within Pakistan's nuclear complex in case of a breakdown of controls. While U.S. and Pakistani officials express confidence in controls over Pakistan's nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country could impact these safeguards. For a broader discussion, see CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt. This report will be updated.
ADA508073
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps: Instability in the Middle East
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Cunningham, Brian H
Report Date: 31 Mar 2009
Media Count: 47 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NUCLEAR WEAPONS, *IRAQ, *IRAN, *MILITARY CAPABILITIES, *RESPONSE, *MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), *UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, THESES, INSTABILITY, TERRORISM, HISTORY, PARAMILITARY FORCES, MILITARY TACTICS, GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), MOTIVATION, MILITARY STRATEGY, THREATS
Identifiers: (U) *ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS, IRGC(ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS), QODS FORCE, IRANIAN INFLUENCE, POLITICAL INFLUENCE, IRANIAN REVOLUTION, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, HEZBOLLAH, JAYSH AL-MAHDI, HAMAS, TERRORIST SUPPORT, TERRORISM SPONSORS, MILITANT ISLAMIC GROUPS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps threatens the United States' national interests and stability within the Middle East because the IRGC controls Iran's nuclear program and sponsors terrorism. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini formed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in 1979 to protect his regime against external and domestic threats. The IRGC has opposed U.S. policies in the Middle East since the IRGC's founding in 1979. The IRGC controls the Iranian nuclear weapons program and their quest for nuclear weapons is a long-term challenge to U.S. interests. Iran's pursuit of nuclear technology and enrichment capabilities also poses a serious challenge to the United States' strategic partners: Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan. The Revolutionary Guard has sponsored insurgent groups such as Hezbollah, Muqtada Sadr's Jaysh al-Mahdi, and Hamas because the IRGC has a goal to spread a Shi'i version of totalitarian Islam. This paper is an analysis of the IRGC's nuclear weapons program and the IRGC's sponsorship of militant Islamic groups. This paper also assesses possible U.S. Government responses: multilateral sanctions, regional alliances, covert action, and overt military action. The United States must address the impacts of Iran's missile arsenal, the concern for Israel's safety, the integrity of the Persian Gulf shipping lanes within the Strait of Hormuz, and the possibility of Iranian coordination of terrorist attacks around the globe. The United States Government must respond to the IRGC's sponsorship of terrorism and control of the Iranian nuclear program to reduce Iranian aggression, control nuclear weapons proliferation, contain totalitarian Islamism, and reduce terrorism.
ADA500353
North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy
Descriptive Note: Congressional rept.
Personal Author(s): Niksch, Larry A
Report Date: 30 Mar 2009
Media Count: 23 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *DIPLOMACY, *NUCLEAR WEAPONS, *INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, BATTLEFIELDS, ENERGY, THESES, FEASIBILITY STUDIES, AGREEMENTS, COLLECTING METHODS, CHINA, NEGOTIATIONS, FUEL OIL, HEAVY FUELS, DETECTORS, OPTIMIZATION, DEPLOYMENT, NORTH KOREA
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Since August 2003, negotiations over North Korea's nuclear weapons programs have involved six governments: the United States, North Korea, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia. Since the talks began, North Korea has operated nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and apparently has produced weapons-grade plutonium. Various estimates place North Korea's plutonium production at between 30 and 50 kilograms, enough for five to eight atomic weapons. After North Korea tested a nuclear device in October 2006, the six party talks served as a framework for bilateral negotiations between the Bush Administration and North Korea, with significant Chinese influence on these bilateral talks. The Bush Administration negotiated four agreements with North Korea between February 2007 and October 2008; two were issued as six party accords. The agreements produced the initiation of a disablement of North Korean nuclear installations at Yongbyon, including a nuclear reactor and plutonium reprocessing plant; Bush Administration lifting of Trading With the Enemy Act sanctions against North Korea and removal of North Korea from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism; a North Korean declaration of nuclear programs limited to known nuclear installations at Yongbyon and reportedly a plutonium stockpile of 31 kilograms; and a commitment by the five non-North Korean governments in the six party talks to provide North Korea with one million tons of heavy fuel oil or equivalent forms of energy assistance. The fourth of these agreements, negotiated in October 2008, established a system of verification and inspections but limited to the declared facilities at Yongbyon and not including the taking of samples by inspectors. The Bush Administration and North Korea disputed the contents of this agreement, especially over sampling.
ADA497760
Oversight of High-Containment Biological Laboratories: Issues for Congress
Descriptive Note: Congressional rept.
Personal Author(s): Gottron, Frank, Shea, Dana A
Report Date: 27 Mar 2009
Media Count: 34 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, *LABORATORIES, RISK, INVESTMENTS, CAPACITY(QUANTITY), ATTACK, CONTAINMENT(NUCLEAR REACTORS), ANTHRAX, SHORTAGES, TERRORISM, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, POLICIES, RESEARCH FACILITIES
Identifiers: (U) BIODEFENSE
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The federal government responded to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the subsequent anthrax attacks with increased focus on and funding for biodefense. A key consideration in this response was addressing shortages in diagnostic, clinical, and research laboratory capacity. Several departments and agencies have increased or are in the process of increasing their laboratory capacity. High-containment laboratories play a critical role in the biodefense effort, offering the hope of better responses to an attack and a better understanding of the threat posed by bioterrorism. However, they also could increase the risk of a biological attack by serving as a potential source of materials or training. Indeed, the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism recommends tightening government oversight of high-containment laboratories. Policymakers have become increasingly interested in the oversight of these facilities following reports of accidents, regulatory noncompliance, and community resistance. The increase in high-containment laboratory capacity has raised new policy questions and emphasized existing ones. How much laboratory capacity is enough? What is the necessary federal investment? Should laboratories be consolidated or dispersed? What plans exist to coordinate multiple agency efforts to expand high-containment laboratory capacity? Does increasing laboratory capacity increase the risk of accidents and the opportunity for purposeful misuse? What is an acceptable balance between the benefits these laboratories provide and the risks they pose?
ADA501213
Israel: A Strategy for the 21st Century
Descriptive Note: Research paper
Personal Author(s): Tapia, Salvador S
Report Date: 26 Mar 2009
Media Count: 49 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *ISRAEL, *NATIONAL SECURITY, *WARFARE, *MILITARY HISTORY, *FOREIGN POLICY, *STRATEGY, *THREATS, EGYPT, GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), ISLAM, MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), NATURAL RESOURCES, DEMOGRAPHY, GEOPOLITICS, CONFLICT, IRAN, WATER SUPPLIES, ARABS, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, JORDAN, TERRORISTS, SYRIA, JEWS, LEBANON, NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Identifiers: (U) IDF(ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCES), GAZA STRIP, WEST BANK, HAMAS, HEZBOLLAH, LAND FOR PEACE, TERRITORIAL DISPUTES, TERRITORIAL LOSSES, WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, SUEZ WAR, SIX DAY WAR, WAR OF ATTRITION, OCTOBER WAR, FIRST LEBANON WAR, FIRST INTIFADA, SECOND INTIFADA, SECOND LEBANON WAR, CAST LEAD OPERATION
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The security environment in the Middle East is presenting new challenges to the state of Israel. To the traditional threats coming from unfriendly, though not openly hostile, states, Israel should now add the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran. Other emerging threats are the possible collusion of Hamas and Hezbollah, supported by Iran and Syria and bent on the destruction of Israel; the growing influence of the Shi'a branch of Islam in the region and its potential influence on Lebanon and other countries; and the actions of other international terrorist groups with Islamic origins. Israel will have to confront these challenges in the face of a growing demographic imbalance between Israeli Jews and Arabs and a growing dispute over scarce natural resources in the region, water being the most important. This paper reviews the evolution of the Israeli security environment since Independence, identifies its permanent principles, examines the current security challenges Israel faces, and proposes a possible Grand Strategy to guide Israel into the future.
ADA498210
A Moral Framework for War in the 21st Century
Descriptive Note: Strategy Research Project
Personal Author(s): Leaphart, John R
Report Date: 26 Mar 2009
Media Count: 40 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, *THREAT EVALUATION, *NUCLEAR WEAPONS, TERRORISM, NATIONAL SECURITY, THEORY
Identifiers: (U) JUST WAR THEORY, STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT, PREVENTATIVE WAR
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Just War Theory is the predominant moral framework used today to talk about the justness or morality of war. It has its roots firmly embedded in the Westphalian state system. For the strategic operating environment that existed during the Westphalian era, Just War theory was more than adequate to the task. However, in the post WWII era the strategic operating environment has changed dramatically. The most significant indicator of this change is the rise of transnational terrorism and the advent of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The nexus of these two factors constitutes a threat that could not be imagined in the Westphalian era and that Just War theory does not adequately address. A new moral framework for war is necessary to adequately address the justness and morality of war in the 21st century.
ADA498270
The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture: Issues for Congress
Descriptive Note: Congressional rept.
Personal Author(s): Shea, Dana A
Report Date: 25 Mar 2009
Media Count: 23 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *RADIOLOGICAL WARFARE, *NUCLEAR WARFARE, *HOMELAND SECURITY, *NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, *NUCLEAR WEAPONS, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TERRORISM, RADIOLOGY, ARCHITECTURE, HISTORIC SITES, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, GLOBAL, CONGRESS, ACQUISITION
Identifiers: (U) DNDO(DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The U.S. government has implemented a series of programs to protect the nation against terrorist nuclear attack. Some of these programs predate September 11, 2001, while others were established since then. Most programs are within the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State; and agencies that became part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) upon its creation, and they are focused on detecting the illicit acquisition and shipment of nuclear and radiological materials and protecting and securing nuclear weapons. These disparate programs have historically been viewed as lacking coordination and centralized oversight. In 2005, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) was established within the Department of Homeland Security to centralize coordination of the federal response to an unconventional nuclear threat. The office was codified in 2006 through the passage of the SAFE Port Act (P.L. 109-347) and given specific statutory responsibilities to protect the United States against radiological and nuclear attack, including the responsibility to develop a global nuclear detection architecture. Determining the range of existing federal efforts protecting against nuclear attack, coordinating the outcomes of these efforts, identifying overlaps and gaps between them, and integrating the results into a single architecture are likely to be evolving, ongoing tasks. The global nuclear detection architecture is a multi-layered system of detection technologies, programs, and guidelines designed to enhance the nation's ability to detect and prevent a radiological or nuclear attack. Among its components are existing programs in nuclear detection operated by other federal agencies and new programs put into place by DNDO. The global nuclear detection architecture is developed by DNDO in coordination with other federal agencies implementing nuclear detection efforts and this coordination is essential to the success of the architecture.
ADA499317
COOP: National Guard's Role During a Catastrophic Emergency
Descriptive Note: Strategy research project
Personal Author(s): Stewart, Xavier
Report Date: 24 Mar 2009
Media Count: 32 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *CRISIS MANAGEMENT, *NATIONAL GUARD, HOMELAND SECURITY, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, CATASTROPHIC CONDITIONS, TERRORISM, COLLECTIVE PROTECTION, EMERGENCIES, MILITARY OPERATIONS, CLIMATE
Identifiers: (U) CBRN-C(CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL RADIOLOGICAL NUCLEAR AND CYBERSPACE), COOP(CONTINUITY OF OPERATION), EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, CYBERSPACE SECURITY
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Today's world climate remains volatile. Since the attacks on September 11, 2001, Americans have awakened to the on-going threat of terrorism. Widely dispersed chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and cyberspace security (CBRN-C) materials, technologies and equipment often have dual uses. Preventing rogue states and terrorist organizations (state or non-state supported) from acquiring these materials is a formidable challenge. Furthermore, the world is experiencing dramatic weather changes. Global climate change has caused unusual and devastating shifts in weather patterns, which in turn have triggered catastrophic events. This SRP proposes establishment of a network of National Guard (NG) Continuity of Operation (COOP) sites to strengthen the U.S Government's response to catastrophic events. This SRP provides a strategic methodology and standardized template for using the NG as a force multiplier to support the federal government through dedicated COOP sites.
ADA496575
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Descriptive Note: Congressional rept.
Personal Author(s): Katzman, Kenneth
Report Date: 13 Mar 2009
Media Count: 67 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *IRAN, *GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), MILITARY STRATEGY, NATIONAL SECURITY, TERRORISM, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, LEGISLATION, FOREIGN POLICY, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The Bush Administration characterized Iran as a profound threat to U.S. national security interests, a perception generated primarily by Iran's nuclear program and its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. The Bush Administration's approach was to try to prevent a nuclear breakout by Iran by applying multilateral economic pressure on Iran while also offering it potential cooperation should it comply with the international demands to suspend its enrichment of uranium. The incorporation of diplomacy and engagement into the overall U.S. strategy led the Administration to approve the participation of a high-level State Department official at multilateral nuclear talks with Iran on July 19, 2008. To strengthen its approach, the Bush Administration maintained a substantial naval presence in the Persian Gulf, which U.S. commanders insist would prevent any Iranian attempts to close the crucial Strait of Hormuz for any extended period.
ADA496178
The Use of Spider Webs as Passive Bioaerosol Collectors
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Mattei, Daniel I
Report Date: Mar 2009
Media Count: 96 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *BACTERIAL AEROSOLS, *SPORES, *FUNGI, *BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, *COLLECTIVE PROTECTION, SATURATION, VARIABLES, WATER TREATMENT, SAMPLING, LAUNCHING, INSTRUMENTATION, ACCUMULATORS, DISCRIMINATION, BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS, AVOIDANCE, WASTE TREATMENT, CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS, MICROORGANISMS, STERILIZATION, GROWTH(PHYSIOLOGY), THESES, PASSIVE SYSTEMS, FIELD TESTS, BIOTERRORISM, WASTE WATER, FACILITIES
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) In this experiment, spider webs demonstrated their suitability as passive bioaerosol collectors. For spider webs to be considered suitable passive collectors webs had to satisfy three basic conditions; (1) collection of microorganisms without discrimination based on species or size, (2) collection under variable environmental conditions, and (3) saturation avoidance in the presence of strong microbial launching sources. Four field sampling locations were used, a waste water treatment facility, a commercial garden center, a secluded state park area, and a parking garage. Microscopy cover glass slides were used as the collection instrument. The methodology assured sterility during collection and promoted in situ microbial growth and observation which were important aspects in this study. All collected spider webs revealed microbial growth from both bacteria and fungi species. This experiment paved the way for future use of webs as passive collectors of biological warfare agents and chemical warfare agents.
ADA513004
Creating and Sustaining Meta-organizational Memory: A Case Study
Personal Author(s): McIntyre, Susan G
Report Date: Mar 2009
Media Count: 28 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *ORGANIZATIONS, CANADA, KNOWLEDGE BASED SYSTEMS, KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT, COUNTERTERRORISM, ORGANIZATION THEORY, COLLECTIVE PROTECTION, STRATEGY, LEARNING
Identifiers: (U) FOREIGN REPORTS, CBRNE(CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL RADIOLOGICAL-NUCLEAR AND EXPLOSIVES), META-ORGANIZATIONS, ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The case study of the Chemical, Biological, Radiological-Nuclear and Explosives (CBRNE) Research and Technology Initiative (CRTI), a Canadian government meta-organizational collaborative initiative, is presented. Multiple federal departments and agencies have a joint responsibility for creating a knowledge base and a national memory for the purposes of protecting the country against CBRNE threats posed by terrorists. The conditions of a meta-organization present particular opportunities and challenges for organizational learning and organizational memory. Organizational learning and knowledge management theory provide the premises for addressing these issues. An intentional knowledge management strategy has been instrumental in organizational learning, resulting in a knowledge base for a collective organizational memory. Ongoing challenges are being addressed by the strategy.
ADA498468
The Impact of Culture: Communicating with Iran
Descriptive Note: Strategy research project
Personal Author(s): Winkie, Eric J
Report Date: Mar 2009
Media Count: 32 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *IRAN, *CULTURAL DIFFERENCES, *ADAPTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, *UNITED STATES, POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, CULTURE, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AWARENESS, TERRORISM, NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Identifiers: (U) GEOPOLITICAL, SHIITES, WORLD VIEW, HIGH CONTEXT, LOW CONTEXT, *INFORMED CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Within the past decade United States involvement in the Middle East increased along with our interaction with Iran, a country that seeks to play a dominate role within the region and whose interests at times conflict with U.S. interests. The United States struggled in its attempt to engage Iran through a number of venues and players with limited success. This paper examines ways to engage Iran from a cultural appreciation of both nations. To provide a recent historical context, this paper briefly examines the relationship between Iran and the U.S. over the last fifty years, focusing on some of the successes and failures. It then addresses Iranian involvement in support of terrorism and the drive to acquire nuclear weapons, two key issues that dominate today's geopolitical agenda. To provide a cultural foundation for later recommendations on how best to engage Iran, it discusses how Iranians communicate and negotiate. After briefly identifying key cultural aspects of how Americans communicate and negotiate, this paper offers four broad recommendations on ways to strategically negotiate and communicate with Iranians through a more informed cultural understanding.
ADA497162
Strengthening Hospital Surge Capacity in the Event of Explosive or Chemical Terrorist Attacks
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): McInerney, Joan
Report Date: Mar 2009
Media Count: 271 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *TERRORISM, *CAPACITY(QUANTITY), *PREPARATION, *HOSPITALS, *EMERGENCIES, ATTACK, TEAMS(PERSONNEL), EXPLOSIONS, CLINICAL MEDICINE, THESES, MODULAR CONSTRUCTION, MEDICINE, RESPONSE, CHEMICAL AGENTS, CASUALTIES, RESOURCES, PERSONNEL, MEDICAL SERVICES, MEDICAL PERSONNEL, SURGES, CRISIS MANAGEMENT, DISASTERS, UNITED STATES, LIFE SAVING, WEAPONS, WARFARE
Identifiers: (U) TERRORIST ATTACKS, HOSPITAL PREPAREDNESS, EMERGENCY MEDICINE PREPAREDNESS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Medical Care is a Public Trust. Americans expect that hospitals and healthcare providers will be available and prepared to care for their every medical need. Yet the medical community is severely challenged daily to care for the influx of patients to its Emergency Departments with current resources. Healthcare is ill-prepared to meet community needs in the event of a mass casualty event from a terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction. This research explores the premise that clinicians have skills either current or remote that can be renewed and enhanced to provide an immediate life-saving response team in the event of explosive or chemical events. The research identified that the medical community has the building blocks available awaiting the guidance, organization and direction to orient them into a disaster medical capability that will improve preparedness and response. This thesis proposes a strategy to leverage the clinician personnel assets already in place to improve preparedness. A transformational approach is necessary to insure healthcare preparedness. Government planners must understand the challenges and current limitations of emergency medical response and partner with the healthcare to enhance preparedness. The United States medical community must understand the realities of terrorism and war at home.
ADA498403
Time Critical Conventional Strike from Strategic Standoff
Report Date: Mar 2009
Media Count: 102 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NUCLEAR WEAPONS, *TERRORISM, *STRIKE WARFARE, *STRATEGIC WARFARE, UNITED STATES, ENVIRONMENTS, LEADERSHIP, TASK FORCES, DESTRUCTION, WEAPONS, TARGETING, MILITARY TACTICS, GLOBAL, TERRORISTS, DETERRENCE, ASYMMETRY
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This Executive Summary and the attached appendices provide an unclassified overview of the Task Force analysis, findings and recommendations. For a more detailed understanding of this material, we refer the reader to the classified version of the full report. The U.S. strategic deterrence and strike environment has changed as our adversaries and their tactics have changed. Terrorists and rogue nations as well as future potential peers are well aware that asymmetric tactics are proving very effective against our forces. In the past, a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) was a weapon of last resort for virtually all of the Nation's primary adversaries it now may be moving closer to the weapon of choice, at least for some. Terrorist leaders are more willing to take risks, tend to place much less value on the life of individuals, have much less to lose, and are somewhat protected by statelessness. Avowed tactics included massive targeting of innocents, martyrdom of soldiers, and operating within a civilian environment. Operational fuzziness makes Indications and Warnings (I&W) much more difficult and/or fleeting. WMD technology is broadly available, and the cost of entry is much lower than for traditional, indigenously developed, nuclear weapons. At the same time rogue nations are aggressively pursuing nuclear weapon capability. Deterrence has become more elusive in terms of identifying and locating adversaries, understanding adversary values, and understanding what of the adversaries the United States (U.S.) can hold at risk. Our future global strategic strike capability must recognize today's realities, be highly effective, quickly and easily usable, yet in many situations inflict minimal collateral damage while maintaining the threshold for nuclear weapons use at the high level we observe today. This all gives rise to the need for a prompt, conventional strike capability, deliverable to almost anyplace on the globe.
ADA500571
U.S. Grand Strategy for the Future
Descriptive Note: Strategy research project
Personal Author(s): Edmonds, Brenda
Report Date: 23 Feb 2009
Media Count: 30 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *BALANCE OF POWER, *MILITARY STRATEGY, *FOREIGN POLICY, TERRORISM, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, NATIONAL SECURITY, WARFARE, UNITED STATES
Identifiers: (U) SOFT POWER, HARD POWER, UNILATERALISM, MULTILATERALISM, WAR ON TERROR
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) In today's changing international environment, U.S. military power remains unparalleled. But, if the United States makes going it alone its predominate foreign policy; we may suffer a consequence with an aggressive adversary trying to shift the balance of power. The right approach to grand strategy is vital to winning the War on Terror. In defending against aggressors targeted at the United States, a question is raised as to how can we best mix hard and soft power within a coherent strategic framework? U.S. grand strategy should retain unilateral intervention and preemption as options. Preemption is in question because of disagreement about the resolve of states that could participate in or use dangerous WMD. On the other hand, dissuading rogue states or non-state actors early may be the best approach. Soft power alone offers little certainty for protecting and defending against national security threats. This paper will analyze the limits and benefits of using soft power and hard power in crafting an effective multilateral or unilateral intervention against terrorism within a coherent strategic framework.
ADA511264
Preventing Iranian Nuclear Proliferation: A New U.S. Policy Towards Iran
Descriptive Note: Research paper
Personal Author(s): Shorr, G M
Report Date: 20 Feb 2009
Media Count: 14 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, *REACTOR FUEL ENRICHMENT, *UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, *URANIUM, *IRAN, *FOREIGN POLICY, MILITARY CAPABILITIES, PREVENTION, CRUDE OIL, DIPLOMACY, ISOLATION, GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), EXPORTS, STABILITY, MILITARY OPERATIONS, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Identifiers: (U) *MILITARY FORCE, GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION, MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) A cache of Iranian-made explosives is found in Iraq. Iranian speed boats harass U.S. Naval ships in the Straight of Hormuz and threaten violence. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad threatens to wipe Israel off the map. The terrorist organizations Hezbollah and Hamas receive Iranian support. In recent years, Iran has been a thorn in the side of the United States' foreign interests. Iranian military actions and political posturing have been bold, yet with the prospect of gaining a nuclear weapon, Iran will certainly become bolder and eventually possess a catastrophic capability. A nuclear-capable Iran in an already unstable Middle East must be prevented. Because global attempts to curb Iran's nuclear proliferation have failed, the United States must immediately develop a bold policy to end Iran's uranium enrichment and stabilize the Middle East. A new comprehensive policy toward Iran should include diplomacy, economic sanctions, and the use of force as a last resort. Iran's nuclear proliferation must be prevented, even if it means a military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. Direct diplomacy with Iran, along with stronger economic sanctions by the international community, will bring Iran to the bargaining table. Most importantly, oil is Iran's greatest source of economic security and its greatest vulnerability. Thus, economic sanctions must include a ban on Iran's oil exports.
ADA500599
Attaining Stability: A Case for Accepting a Nuclearized Iran
Descriptive Note: Research paper
Personal Author(s): Kayani, Naushad
Report Date: 11 Feb 2009
Media Count: 36 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *INSTABILITY, *GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), *DETERRENCE, *NUCLEAR WEAPONS, *UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, *FOREIGN POLICY, *IRAN, UNITED KINGDOM, GEOPOLITICS, RUSSIA, TERRORISM, NEGOTIATIONS, BALANCE OF POWER, DEMOCRACY, CRUDE OIL, ISLAM, MIDDLE EAST, IRAQ, USSR, ISRAEL, PAKISTAN, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, SECURITY
Identifiers: (U) COUNTERPROLIFERATION ACTIONS, NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES, *REGIONAL STABILITY, *REGIONAL SECURITY, PREEMPTIVE ACTIONS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Iran is currently viewed by the United States as a source of instability within the Middle East. The recent emergence of a more strident Iranian government, apparently pursuing the acquisition of nuclear weapons, has further destabilized the fragile regional environment. The prospect of a nuclear-capable Iran poses a profound threat for both the balance of power in the region and the security of Israel. This paper examines the social-economic-political context driving Iran towards nuclear armament and objectively examines corresponding policy alternatives for the United States, Pakistan, and other regional actors. It specifically assesses the regional implications of aggressive counterproliferation actions by the United States or Israel and contrasts those with the near- and long-term consequences of accepting a nuclear-capable Iran. The paper concludes by recommending that the United States focus its efforts on regional development and deterrence vice military counterproliferation measures by establishing democratic and liberalized governments in the region. The goals of the strategy would be to surround Iran with successful liberal governments that would influence it towards moderation, deter Iran's use of acquired nuclear weapons, reduce and contain its support of terrorism, and limit the regional impact of its nuclear capabilities.
ADA500797
Effects of Vaporized Decontamination Systems on Selected Building Interior Materials: Chlorine Dioxide
Descriptive Note: Final rept. Nov 2003-Oct 2006
Personal Author(s): Brickhouse, Mark D, Lalain, Teri, Bartram, Philip W, Hall, Monicia, Hess, Zoe, Mantooth, Brent, Reiff, Louis, Zander, Zach, Stark, David, Humphreys, Pamela, Ryan, Shawn, Martin, Blair
Report Date: Feb 2009
Media Count: 57 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS, *DECONTAMINATION MATERIALS, *CHEMICAL ATTACK(DEGRADATION), *CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS, OFFICE BUILDINGS, PUBLIC SAFETY, TERRORISM, BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS, AGREEMENTS, SURFACES
Identifiers: (U) *CIO2(CHLORINE DIOXIDE), VHP(VAPORIZED HYDROGEN PEROXIDE)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The National Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC) of the EPA established an Interagency Agreement with the U.S. Army Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (ECBC) to take advantage of ECBC's extensive expertise and specialized research facilities for the decontamination of surfaces contaminated with chemical and biological (CB) warfare agents. The National Homeland Security Research Center formed a collaboration with ECBC in a mutual leveraging of resources, expanding upon ECBC's on-going programs in CB decontamination to more completely address the parameters of particular concern for decontamination of indoor surfaces in buildings following a terrorist attack. Vaporized hydrogen peroxide (VHP) and chlorine dioxide (CIO2) have been used to decontaminate indoor surfaces contaminated with anthrax and show potential for use in decontaminating indoor surfaces contaminated by chemical agents. This program is specifically focused on the decontamination of the building environment for purposes of restoring a public building to a usable state after a terrorist chemical warfare attack. As building interiors typically contain large surfaces composed of concrete cinder block, wood, steel, carpet, suspension ceiling tile, and painted wallboard, the effort was designed to determine how building materials are affected by the decontaminants. The focus of this technical report is the evaluation of the building interior materials and the fumigant CIO2. The work discussed in this report was conducted from November 2003 to October 2006. under EPA IAG DW 939917-01-0.
ADA494163
NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance
Descriptive Note: Congressional rept.
Personal Author(s): Morelli, Vincent, Belkin, Paul
Report Date: 23 Jan 2009
Media Count: 35 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *STABILIZATION, *AFGHANISTAN, *NATO FORCES, MISSIONS, OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, DRUG INTERDICTION, POPPY PLANTS, SECURITY, NATO
Identifiers: (U) *ISAF(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE), *RECONSTRUCTION, *PRT(PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS), TALIBAN, COUNTER-NARCOTICS, OPIUM TRADE
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The mission of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Afghanistan is a test of the alliance's political will and military capabilities. Since the Washington Summit in 1999, the allies have sought to create a new NATO, capable of operating beyond the European theater to combat emerging threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Afghanistan is NATO's first out-of-area mission beyond Europe. The purpose of the mission is the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan. The mission has proven difficult because it must take place while combat operations against Taliban insurgents continue. Recent assessments of the situation in Afghanistan point to a rise in the overall level of violence due to increased Taliban military operations and an increase in terrorist-related activities. ISAF has proceeded in four stages to extend its area of responsibility over the whole of Afghanistan. Although the allies agree on ISAF's mission, they continue to differ on how to accomplish it. Some allies do not want their forces to engage in counter-insurgency operations and have placed operational restrictions on their troops. The principal mechanism to rebuild Afghanistan are the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) composed of military and civilian officials and charged with extending the reach of the Afghan government by improving governance and rebuilding the economy. However, there are significant differences in how individual NATO governments run their PRTs. Until recently, only the United States wanted to engage directly in the destruction of poppy fields and drug facilities in countering the drug trade. Finally, continued turmoil in parts of Pakistan has complicated the effort to prevent the Taliban from infiltrating Afghanistan. The 111th Congress will likely support the new Administration's policies in Afghanistan, but may seek a more coherent plan for integration, stabilization, and reconstruction operations.
ADA493971
Nuclear Heuristics: Selected Writings of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter
Personal Author(s): Zarate, Robert, Sokolski, Henry
Report Date: Jan 2009
Media Count: 684 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, *LITERATURE SURVEYS, *ARMY RESEARCH, *NATIONAL SECURITY, *POLICIES, NATO, MILITARY HISTORY, MILITARY STRATEGY, DEFENSE SYSTEMS, ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, ECONOMICS, PERSIAN GULF, POLITICAL ALLIANCES, COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, COLD WAR, STRATEGIC WEAPONS, SAFETY, ARMS CONTROL, SYSTEMS ANALYSIS, STRATEGIC WARFARE, TREATIES, CIVILIAN POPULATION, NUCLEAR ENERGY, MILITARY PLANNING, COMBAT FORCES, INTERVENTION, IRAN, TERRORISM, BALANCE OF POWER, DETERRENCE, STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS, FOREIGN AID, PEACEKEEPING, INDIA, GUIDED MISSILES, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, NUCLEAR WARFARE
Identifiers: (U) *SELECTED WRITINGS, *ALBERT WOHLSTETTER, *ROBERTA WOHLSTETTER, ESSAYS, COMMENTARIES, NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, BALANCE OF TERROR, WARNINGS, ARMS RACE, DISCRIMINATE DETERRENCE, NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, NPEC(NONPROLIFERATION POLICY EDUCATION CENTER)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This publication is an edited volume of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetters' key writings relating to nuclear proliferation and national security affairs, with commentaries by the Wohlstetters' colleagues and students. It also serves as a testament to the continuing relevance of the work of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter in the fields of nuclear and security policy analysis. Albert and Roberta wrote hundreds of articles and studies on U.S. policy on the Balkans, as well as the Persian Gulf; strategic command and control; intelligence and warning; NATO nuclear planning; U.S.-Russian arms control; strategic and theater missile defenses; the economics and military dangers of civilian nuclear energy; nuclear safeguards and nuclear nonproliferation; and military nuclear strategy and methods of policy analysis and design. Increased concern about the spread of nuclear weapons in the Far and Middle East, the controversy surrounding civilian nuclear cooperation with India, the global revival of nuclear power and debate over its economics and security implications, the controversies surrounding how the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty's obligations and rights are being cynically read by Iran and other states - all of these issues have prompted Washington pundits and national security analysts to cite the Wohlstetters' work. The same can also be said of the security concerns recently raised by Islamic fundamentalism, the continued instability of the Balkans, the questions surrounding NATO's future and America's alliances in the Far East, the relevance of nuclear deterrence after the Cold War, and the emergence of ballistic missile defense as a key ingredient in strategic forces and alliance relations. This volume can hardly cover all the insights that the Wohlstetters' work might shed on these topics. Instead, it is designed to make some of the most significant of Albert and Roberta's writings many of which were previously unpublished much more accessible.
ADA492479
After Iraq: The Search for a Sustainable National Security Strategy
Descriptive Note: Monograph
Personal Author(s): Gray, Colin S
Report Date: Jan 2009
Media Count: 98 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *STRATEGY, *NATIONAL SECURITY, HISTORY, DEMOCRACY, THREATS, POLICIES, IRAQ
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) What should be the U.S. national security strategy after Iraq? An answer cannot be given unless a logically and politically prior question is posed: What should be the purpose and character of a sustainable U.S. national security policy after Iraq? Thus to answer the first question, one has to identify both the policy that strategy must serve as well as the components of that Unfortunately for the convenience and self-confidence of defense planners, although the 21st century presents no great difficulty to America over its choice of national security policy, the selection of a suitable strategy is a far more difficult task. The challenge is cultural and material. U.S. national culture favors both a somewhat disengaged stance towards the world beyond North America, as well as the active promotion of such leading American values as freedom, democracy, and open markets. On the material side, the country faces an exceptionally wide range of actual and potential threats to its vital interests by historical standards. On the one hand, there are nonstate terrorists and other insurgents of an Islamist Jihadist persuasion who could threaten the stability of the global economy by menacing commercial access to oil, and who may well acquire a few weapons of mass destruction (WMD). On the other hand, the new century appears certain to see the rise of some current regional powers to a yet greater category, China and India specifically. When we add in current uncertainty about the future course of Russian policy, the European Union as a possible super state, as well as the future roles of Japan and Iran, it becomes readily apparent that the years ahead offer few certainties regarding U.S. threat priorities.
ADA508752
Policy and Purpose: The Economy of Deterrence
Descriptive Note: Journal article
Personal Author(s): Schwartz, Norton A, Kirk, Timothy R
Report Date: Jan 2009
Media Count: 21 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *DETERRENCE, *NATIONAL DEFENSE, *UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, *NATIONAL SECURITY, *MILITARY CAPABILITIES, *AIR FORCE, *FOREIGN POLICY, TERRORISM, AIR FORCE OPERATIONS, ENEMY, CONVENTIONAL WARFARE, POLITICAL ALLIANCES, MILITARY STRATEGY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, REPRINTS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THEORY
Identifiers: (U) DEFENSE POLICY, *DETERRENCE POLICIES, FIXED POLICIES, FLEXIBLE POLICIES, LEGITIMACY, DISSUASION, ASSURANCE
Distribution Statement:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The 2008 Air Force Association convention chief of staff keynote speech addressed the subject of deterrence, asserting that it is not a fading construct in national security. On the contrary, deterrence is reemerging and growing in importance as an aspect of U.S. defense policy. The keynote speech invited the audience to think about deterrence in a broader sense and how the U.S. Air Force can contribute in a fashion relevant to 21st-century national defense. The purpose of this article is to add to the growing body of literature that seeks a broader understanding of deterrence and how it fits with other forms of policy such as dissuasion, assurance, and insurance. Identifying and understanding the distinctions among these concepts and how they relate to U.S. policy are fundamental to explaining the relevance of deterrence to our collective security. This task is certainly ambitious, but the need demands consideration. Deterrence policy has shown itself an exquisitely beneficial tool in obtaining national security objectives. On the other hand, deterrence -- either misunderstood or misapplied -- can form the basis for incomplete or ill-advised U.S. policy, especially in terms of how and when to use military power to achieve high-stakes national security objectives. A variety of recent and historical examples attests to a vital requirement for understanding how disconnects between military capabilities, national policy, and the value of national purpose can cause unfavorable if not disastrous consequences.
ADA501604
America's Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. Advance Copy
Descriptive Note: Final rept.
Personal Author(s): Perry, William J, Schlesinger, James R, Cartland, Harry, Ikle, Fred, Foster, John, Payne, Ketih, Glenn, John, Tarter, Bruce, Halperin, Morton
Williams, Ellen, Hamilton, Lee, Woolsey, James
Report Date: Jan 2009
Media Count: 181 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, *INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, *NATIONAL SECURITY, *FOREIGN POLICY, CONGRESS, TERRORISM, DETERRENCE, ARMS CONTROL, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, PREVENTION, WESTERN SECURITY(INTERNATIONAL), INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TERRORISTS, TREATIES
Identifiers: (U) COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY, STRATEGIC POSTURE
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Congress authorized the formation of a commission to conduct a review of the strategic posture of the United States and to make recommendations on how to move forward. Congress then appointed a 12-person bipartisan group to conduct this review. The report proceeds as follows. It begins with a review of the security environment. Chapter 1 describes how that environment has evolved over recent decades and highlights the key factors in the current environment that should inform U.S. policy and strategy. A key argument developed here is that this environment has evolved in distinct phases, each with its own set of challenges and opportunities. U.S. policy and strategy must be tailored to the specific challenges and opportunities of the current period. A balanced approach is needed, one that integrates military and political instruments of national power in a comprehensive approach to meet and reduce nuclear dangers. The remainder of the report elaborates how this should be accomplished in the years ahead. Chapters 2 through 6 address different aspects of the U.S. strategic posture, including the nuclear force structure, missile defense, declaratory policy, the stockpile of nuclear weapons, and the weapons complex. Chapters 7 through 9 address different aspects of the political strategy supporting U.S. national objectives, including arms control and nonproliferation. This section includes a separate discussion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Chapter 10 addresses additional preventive and protection measures. The report closes with some observations about the nature of the consensus achieved by the Commission. Appendices provide supplemental information about the work of the Commission.
ADA511235
The Logic of the Nuclear Arsenal
Descriptive Note: Journal article
Personal Author(s): Lowther, Adam
Report Date: Jan 2009
Media Count: 15 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NUCLEAR WEAPONS, *DISARMAMENT, *DETERRENCE, *STOCKPILES, *MILITARY MODERNIZATION, *UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, *POLICIES, AGING(MATERIALS), NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, REDUCTION, VIABILITY, FISSIONABLE MATERIALS, RUSSIA, TREATIES, BOMBER AIRCRAFT, LOGIC, WEAPON DELIVERY, IRAN, TERRORISM, CHINA, NATIONAL SECURITY, BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES, REPRINTS, NORTH KOREA, INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES, GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN)
Identifiers: (U) *NUCLEAR ARSENAL, *NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION, *NUCLEAR ABOLITION, NPT(NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY), NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW, START(STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY), SORT(STRATEGIC OFFENSE REDUCTION TREATY), CRITICISMS, NUCLEAR-CAPABLE BOMBERS, B-52H AIRCRAFT, B-2 AIRCRAFT, DELIVERY PLATFORMS, ACCIDENTAL DETONATION
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) With the historic election of Barack Obama, the United States is likely to see an equally historic review of nuclear weapons policy. In 2009 alone, the new administration will undertake a nuclear posture review (NPR), expected in early 2010, and oversee the expiration or renegotiation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which expires 5 Dec 2009. Mr. Obama also will be responsible for ensuring compliance with obligations in the Strategic Offense Reduction Treaty (SORT), which requires that the United States reduce its deployed strategic warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by 2012. During Obama's first week in office, the White House revealed the policies he will pursue regarding the nuclear arsenal. Three foci in Mr. Obama's nuclear agenda are apparent: securing loose nuclear material from terrorists, strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and moving toward a nuclear-free world. Attempting to influence the administration's nuclear policy are a number of individuals and organizations with very different views of the nuclear arsenal and national security. While imperfect, it is possible to organize this diversity of thought on nuclear issues into two broad groups. On the one hand are the modernizers, led by a number of prominent military leaders who have outlined what it will take to maintain and modernize the most advanced and secure nuclear arsenal in the world. Their views shaped recent reports published by such groups as the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, the Defense Science Board, and the U.S. Air Force. On the other hand, there are the abolitionists, whose visible members include think tank analysts, former U.S. senators, and a substantial number of senior faculty at leading universities. This article attempts to illustrate errors in fact and reasoning that are often made when advocating nuclear abolition, and to provide a better explanation of the position held by nuclear modernizers.
ADA508634
Waging Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century
Descriptive Note: Journal article
Personal Author(s): Chilton, Kevin, Weaver, Greg
Report Date: Jan 2009
Media Count: 13 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *DETERRENCE, NUCLEAR FORCES(MILITARY), MILITARY STRATEGY, POLICIES, ASYMMETRIC WARFARE, THREATS, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, TERRORISTS, NATIONAL SECURITY
Identifiers: (U) WMD(WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) In recent years many national security policy scholars and practitioners have questioned whether deterrence remains a relevant, reliable, and realistic national security concept in the twenty-first century. That is a fair question. New threats to American security posed by transnational terrorists, asymmetric military strategies and capabilities, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by adversaries who see the world in profoundly different ways than do we have called into question America's reliance on deterrence as a central tenet of our national security strategy. Some experts advocate a move away from deterrence -- and particularly the nuclear element of our deterrent -- toward greater reliance on other approaches to provide for our security in a complex and dangerous environment.
ADA502695
National Infrastructure Protection Plan: Partnering to Enhance Protection and Resiliency
Report Date: Jan 2009
Media Count: 189 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *TERRORISM, *INFRASTRUCTURE, *HOMELAND SECURITY, ECONOMICS, SECURITY, ATTACK, DESTRUCTION, MORALE, PROTECTION, CASUALTIES, RESOURCES, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, CATASTROPHIC CONDITIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH, RESILIENCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, DAMAGE, ORGANIZATIONS, UNITED STATES, NATIONAL SECURITY
Identifiers: (U) CIKR(CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND KEY RESOURCES)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Protecting and ensuring the resiliency of the critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) of the United States is essential to the Nation's security, public health and safety, economic vitality, and way of life. Attacks on CIKR could significantly disrupt the functioning of government and business alike and produce cascading effects far beyond the targeted sector and physical location of the incident. Direct terrorist attacks and natural, manmade, or technological hazards could produce catastrophic losses in terms of human casualties, property destruction, and economic effects, as well as profound damage to public morale and confidence. Attacks using components of the Nation's CIKR as weapons of mass destruction could have even more devastating physical and psychological consequences.
ADA496258
Effects of Vaporized Decontamination Systems on Selected Building Interior Materials: Vaporized Hydrogen Peroxide
Descriptive Note: Final rept. Nov 2003-Jun 2006
Personal Author(s): Brickhouse, Mark D, Lalain, Teri, Bartram, Philip W, Hall, Monicia, Hess, Zoe, Reiff, Louis, Mantooth, Brent, Zander, Zach, Stark, David, Humphreys, Pamela, Williams, Barry, Ryan, Shawn, Martin, Blair
Report Date: Jan 2009
Media Count: 57 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *HYDROGEN PEROXIDE, *VAPORIZATION, *CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS, *BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS, *DECONTAMINATION, HOMELAND SECURITY, COMPATIBILITY, BUILDINGS, MATERIALS, ANTHRAX
Identifiers: (U) *VHP(VAPORIZED HYDROGEN PEROXIDE), MATERIAL COMPATIBILITY
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) To address Homeland Security needs for decontamination, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) established an Interagency Agreement with the U.S. Army Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (ECBC) to take advantage of ECBC's extensive expertise and specialized research facilities for the decontamination of surfaces contaminated with chemical and biological (CB) warfare agents. The National Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC) formed collaboration with ECBC in a mutual leveraging of resources expanding upon ECBC's on-going programs in CB decontamination to more completely address the parameters of particular concern for decontamination of indoor surfaces in buildings following a terrorist attack using CB agents. Vaporized hydrogen peroxide (VHP) and Cl02 are decontamination technologies that have been used to decontaminate indoor surfaces contaminated with anthrax and show potential for use in decontaminating indoor surfaces contaminated by chemical agents. This program is specifically focused on decontamination of the building environment for purposes of restoring a public building to a usable state after a terrorist contamination episode. Since building interiors may contain a large surface composed of concrete cinder block, wood, steel, carpet, ceiling suspension tile, and painted wallboard, the effort was designed to determine how building materials are affected by the decontaminant. The focus of this technical report is the evaluation of the building interior materials and the Steris VHP technology.
ADA508642
Strategic Studies Quarterly. Volume 3, Number 1, Spring 2009
Report Date: Jan 2009
Media Count: 153 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *DETERRENCE, *MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, *MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), *STRATEGY, AIR FORCE, POLICIES, RISK, MIDDLE EAST, KOREA, AFRICA, TERRORISM, BOOKS, DEMOCRACY, SOUTH VIETNAM, MILITARY ART, WARFARE, USSR, PEACEKEEPING, NUCLEAR WARFARE, NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Identifiers: (U) NATION BUILDING
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The Strategic Studies Quarterly is an Air Force-sponsored strategic forum for military, government, and academic professionals. Featured articles in this publication include: Policy and Purpose: The Economy of Deterrence; Waging Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century; On Nuclear Deterrence and Assurance; Stabilization, Peacebuilding and Sustainability in the Horn of Africa; Resurrecting the Icon: The Enduring Relevance of Clausewitz's On War and various book reviews.
ADA506768
Nuclear Terrorism: Assessing the Threat, Developing a Response
Descriptive Note: Research rept.
Personal Author(s): Montgomery, Evan B
Report Date: Jan 2009
Media Count: 115 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *TERRORISTS, *THREAT EVALUATION, *RISK ANALYSIS, *ACQUISITION, *PREVENTION, *NUCLEAR WEAPONS, *NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, WEAPONS EFFECTS, IRAN, TERRORISM, STOCKPILES, AFGHANISTAN, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, FISSIONABLE MATERIALS, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, NATIONAL SECURITY, PAKISTAN, NORTH KOREA, FOREIGN POLICY, RESPONSE
Identifiers: (U) ISLAMIST EXTREMISTS, AL QAEDA, SAFE HAVENS, SANCTUARIES, TREND ANALYSIS, FATA(FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Over the past several years, the prospect of a terrorist group armed with a nuclear weapon has frequently been cited as a genuine and overriding threat to the security of the United States. Although the likelihood of a nuclear terrorist attack may be relatively low, the consequences of such an attack would obviously be enormous. There is, therefore, widespread agreement regarding the severity of this threat. Despite this consensus, a number of important questions remain open to debate. How real is the risk that a terrorist group could acquire or construct a functional nuclear device, and how might it attempt to do so? Which group poses the greatest threat in this regard, how has that threat changed over time, and is it currently growing or abating? What existing and prospective measures will prove most effective in preventing terrorists from obtaining a nuclear weapon, stopping them from delivering and detonating a weapon if prevention fails, and responding both at home and abroad in the event that an attack succeeds? The purpose of this report is to examine these critical issues.
ADA492994
Nuclear Weapons in U.S. National Security Policy: Past, Present, and Prospects
Descriptive Note: Congressional rept.
Personal Author(s): Woolf, Amy F
Report Date: 30 Dec 2008
Media Count: 25 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NUCLEAR WEAPONS, *NUCLEAR FORCES(MILITARY), *DETERRENCE, *UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, *NATIONAL SECURITY, *POLICIES, *MILITARY STRATEGY, TERRORISM, THREATS, THEORY, COLD WAR, HISTORY, DOCTRINE, DEFENSE PLANNING, UTILIZATION, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, CONGRESS, USSR, RUSSIA
Identifiers: (U) *TAILORED DETERRENCE, *STRATEGIC DETERRENCE, NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, POST-COLD WAR ERA, NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, NUCLEAR ARSENALS, CLINTON BILL, CLINTON WILLIAM J, BUSH GEORGE W, NONSTATE ACTORS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The Bush Administration has outlined a strategy of tailored deterrence to define the role that nuclear weapons play in U.S. national security policy. There has been little discussion of this concept, either in Congress or in the public at large. This leaves unanswered questions about how this strategy differs from U.S. nuclear strategy during the Cold War and how it might advise decisions about the size and structure of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Throughout the Cold War, the United States relied on nuclear weapons to deter an attack by the Soviet Union and its allies and to forestall the outbreak of a global war between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, the broad Cold War-era agreement about the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy began to dissolve during the 1990s, after the demise of the Soviet Union. Further, in response to emerging threats to U.S. national security, the Bush Administration has argued that the United States must alter its deterrence strategy from one size fits all' deterrence to tailored deterrence for rogue powers, terrorist networks, and near-peer competitors. During the Cold War, the United States often modified, or tailored, its nuclear targeting doctrine, its nuclear weapons employment policy, and its nuclear force structure to enhance or maintain the credibility of its nuclear deterrent posture. In some ways, the Bush Administration's concept of tailored deterrence follows the same pattern, using assessments of an adversary's society and values to identify a range of targets that might be threatened, and adjusting U.S. war plans and force structure to enhance the credibility of U.S. threats to destroy these targets. However, tailored deterrence differs from Cold War deterrence in that it explicitly notes that U.S. nuclear weapons could be used in attacks against a number of nations that might have developed and deployed chemical and biological weapons, even if they did not possess nuclear weapons.
ADA495353
Challenges to Military Operations in Support of U.S. National Interests. Volume 1: Executive Summary (Defense Science Board 2007 Summer Study)
Descriptive Note: Final rept.
Personal Author(s): Fields, Craig, Haver, Richard
Report Date: 09 Dec 2008
Media Count: 108 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS, *MILITARY OPERATIONS, *WEAPONS, WARFARE, INSURGENCY, BATTLEFIELDS, REGIONS, MILITARY CAPABILITIES, NATIONAL DEFENSE, TERRORISTS, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, UNITED STATES
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) U.S. conventional military capability remains unmatched by any state. As a result, no adversary--peer, near peer, or powerful non-state actor--with objectives in conflict with U.S. interests will oppose our nation with conventional military means. The United States is too strong and capable. Yet, this strength in the conventional arena does not mean that the nation is unmatched across the spectrum of conflict. The proliferation of technology, technical information, and technical skills facilitates access to a range of weaponry, other than conventional, that can be used to attack the United States both at home and abroad. These include weapons of mass destruction (WMD), such as biological, chemical, nuclear, radiological, electromagnetic pulse, directed energy, and high explosives, as well as cyber warfare. No longer are adversaries limited to nation states. Technology proliferation has afforded access to the tools of warfare to non-state actors, such as terrorists, insurgents, and groups not bound by geography and the traditional trappings and vulnerabilities of statehood. These asymmetric tools of war may well be employed using non-traditional concepts of operation. Moreover, the battlefield may no longer be limited to regions afar, but may include the U.S. homeland. The United States could well confront the possibility of going to war abroad in the face of significant devastation in the homeland?dividing forces between homeland catastrophe relief operations and combat abroad, or even facing the possibility that deploy and supply of U.S. military forces could be delayed and disrupted. How to contemplate this future over the next two decades was the focus of the Defense Science Board 2007 Summer Study. The question asked by the study was this: Is the United States maintaining its capability to deter and defeat a nation or non-state actor who might employ unconventional or conventional means, in non-traditional as well as traditional ways to thwart U.S. interests?
ADA503634
Synthesis and Mass Spectral Analysis of HD Degradation Products: A Computational Elucidation Of The Results
Descriptive Note: Conference paper
Personal Author(s): Bae, Sue Y, Winemiller, Mark D, Hsu, Fu-Lian, Rohrbaugh, Dennis K, Banks, Harold D
Report Date: Dec 2008
Media Count: 8 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *SYNTHESIS, *MASS SPECTRA, *CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS, *STOCKPILES, *MUSTARD AGENTS, *DEGRADATION, *SPECTRUM ANALYSIS, *COMPUTATIONAL CHEMISTRY, STORAGE, SULFIDES, GAS CHROMATOGRAPHY, SULFONES, SULFUR, LABORATORIES, CONTAINERS, SULFOXIDES, FRAGMENTATION, PRODUCTION, SYMPOSIA, TERRORISTS, REPRINTS
Identifiers: (U) *SULFUR MUSTARD, DEGRADATION PRODUCTS, DFT(DISCRETE FOURIER TRANSFORM), EI(ELECTRON IONIZATION), CID(COLLISION INDUCED DISSOCIATION)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Degradation products that could reasonably form upon storage of sulfur mustard have been synthesized and analyzed by GC/MS. Elucidation of the fragmentation pathways was accomplished by means of B3LYP/6-31+G(d) calculations. Sulfur mustard, HD or bis(2- chloroethyl)sulfide [1] was first introduced as a chemical warfare agent in WW1. Its production has continued to the present, most horrifically against civilians in the 1980s Iran-Iraq war. Due to its ease of synthesis and stockpiling by several countries, its exploitation by terrorists remains an alarming possibility. Numerous publications exist concerning the pathways and products of sulfur mustard degradation under both field and laboratory conditions. One compound, [2], has been identified spectroscopically in ton containers in quantities approaching 3%; however, direct confirmation of its presence has not been determined using an authentic synthetic sample. In order to thoroughly study the degradation products of [1], [2]and ten related sulfides, sulfoxides and sulfones that could reasonably form in the degradation and manufacture of [1] were prepared.
ADA493902
Nuclear Challenges and Policy Options for the Next U.S. Administration
Descriptive Note: Occasional paper no. 14
Personal Author(s): Preez, Jean du
Report Date: Dec 2008
Media Count: 115 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, *NUCLEAR WEAPONS, *TREATIES, *ARMS CONTROL, *UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, *POLICIES, DOCTRINE, GEORGIA(REPUBLIC), NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, RUSSIA, EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS, POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, UNITED NATIONS, COUNTERTERRORISM, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, IRAN, COOPERATION, CHINA, SYMPOSIA, NORTH KOREA, SYRIA, THREATS
Identifiers: (U) NPT(NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY), NUCLEAR TERRORISM, GEORGIA-RUSSIA WAR, STRATEGIC DOCTRINE, COOPERATIVE SECURITY, NONSTATE ACTORS, UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, OBAMA BARACK, COUNTERPROLIFERATION
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Three months before the November 2008 U.S. presidential election, the Monterey Nonproliferation Strategy Group (MNSG), an international body of approximately two dozen experienced policy makers and prominent analysts, convened to consider nuclear challenges and policy options for the next U.S. administration. This session was part of an ongoing series of MNSG meetings aimed at identifying realistic and achievable options as groundwork for building consensus or near-consensus on critical issues threatening the NPT. This Occasional Paper comprises a selection of papers presented by participants at the August 2008 meeting: North Korea: Are We on the Right Path?, by Charles L. Pritchard; Iran: Options for the Next Presidency, by Therese Delpech; The Syrian Proliferation Threat, by Leonard S. Spector; Dealing with the Outliers, by Sverre Lodgaard; Preventing further Defections: Early Warning Indicators and Disincentives, by Paul Meyer; Countering the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism, by William C. Potter; Building P-5 Cooperation on Nonproliferation, by Robert Einhorn; U.S.-Russian Relations on Nonproliferation after the Georgia Crisis: A Skeptical (Re-) Engagement or an (Un-) Happy Divorce?, by Vladimir Orlov; U.S.-Russia Cooperation on Iran: Aftermath of the Summer War in Georgia, by Rose Gottemoeller; Sino-U.S. Relations: Dealing with a Rising Power, by Jing-dong Yuan; Progressive and Systemic Steps: Short- and Medium-Term Goals, by Harald Mueller; Taking Disarmament Seriously: Prospects for Changing Strategic Doctrines, by Linton F. Brooks; Prospects for Changing Strategic Doctrines, by Nikolai N. Sokov; Cooperative Security: The Importance of Regional and Other Security Arrangements -- Pointers for a New Administration, by Nabil Fahmy; The NPT Strengthened Review Process: Avoiding a Perfect Storm Fifteen Years Later, by Jean du Preez; Strengthening the NPT, 2010 and Beyond: Restoring Trust and Cooperation -- What Will It Take?, by John Simpson.
ADA510559
World at Risk: The Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism
Personal Author(s): Graham, Bob, Talent, Jim, Cleveland, Graham Allison ;Robin, Rademaker, Steve, Roemer, Tim, Shewrman, Wendy, Sokolski, Henry, Verma, Rich
Report Date: Dec 2008
Media Count: 160 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, *TERRORISM, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, TERRORISTS, PAKISTAN, MILITARY OPERATIONS, USSR, WARFARE, CONGRESS, GLOBAL, EMERGENCIES, RISK, COMMUNITIES, THREATS, ATTACK, DESTRUCTION, ARMY FACILITIES, RESPONSE, BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, CHEMICAL ORDNANCE, ORDNANCE, CATASTROPHIC CONDITIONS, MARGIN OF SAFETY, ANTIPERSONNEL WEAPONS, WEAPONS, NUCLEAR WARFARE
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The Commission believes that unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013. The Commission further believes that terrorists are more likely to be able to obtain and use a biological weapon than a nuclear weapon. The Commission believes that the U.S. government needs to move more aggressively to limit the proliferation of biological weapons and reduce the prospect of a bioterror attack. Further compounding the nuclear threat is the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities to new states and the decision by several existing nuclear states to build up their arsenals. Such proliferation is a concern in its own right because it may increase the prospect of military crises that could lead to war and catastrophic use of these weapons. As former Senator Sam Nunn testified to our Commission: The risk of a nuclear weapon being used today is growing, not receding. This Commission was chartered by Congress to assess our nation's progress in preventing weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism--and to provide the next President and Congress with concrete, actionable recommendations that can serve as their road map to a safer homeland and world. No mission could be timelier. The simple reality is that the risks that confront us today are evolving faster than our multilayered responses. Many thousands of dedicated people across all agencies of our government are working hard to protect this country, and their efforts have had a positive impact. But the terrorists have been active, too--and in our judgment America's margin of safety is shrinking, not growing.
ADA494195
Exploring First Responder Tactics in a Terrorist Chemical Attack
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Foo, Kong Pin G
Report Date: Dec 2008
Media Count: 230 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *CHEMICAL WARFARE, *MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS, *RESPONSE, IMPROVISED WEAPONS, FIRST RESPONDERS, COUNTERTERRORISM, GB AGENT, THESES, EMERGENCIES, COMPUTERIZED SIMULATION
Identifiers: (U) *ABS(AGENT BASED SIMULATION), MAS(MULTI-AGENT SIMULATION), CLUSTER ANALYSIS, DATA FARMING, EMERGENCY RESPONSE, IED(IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES), NEARLY-ORTHOGONAL LATIN HYPERCUBE (NOLH), PYTHAGORAS, REGRESSION TREE, SARIN
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The use of agent-based simulation (ABS) allows government emergency planners to analyze urban counterterrorist operations and observe environmental behaviors that may not obviously demonstrate themselves in live simulation. This study demonstrates a framework in which future counterterrorism response procedures can be analyzed for training and development. The study analyzes the acute phase of an emergency response to a terrorist bomb and chemical attack in an urban commercial setting. Using the ABS platform Pythagoras, explosive and chemical agent effects, civilian behavior, and responder tactics were represented in the simulation. Using a Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH) design to analyze four attack scenarios rendered in simulation, data farming techniques identified the most significant controllable and uncontrollable factors related to estimating percentage injury and death. Statistical comparisons indicate that a marginal increase in the percentage of injured civilians is associated with an emergency response. Specific emergency response elements may have a direct or inverse relationship to civilian survivorship. Given the independent, emergent behavior of the civilian population, functions supporting containment and evacuation may conflict with each other. This suggests the need to improve crowd management at the perimeter of the security cordon; particularly, the need to differentiate between those who were affected by the bomb or chemical gas and those who were not affected.
ADA490427
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Descriptive Note: Congressional rept.
Personal Author(s): Katzman, Kenneth
Report Date: 24 Nov 2008
Media Count: 69 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *IRAN, *IRAQ, *ECONOMIC IMPACT, *FOREIGN POLICY, *NATIONAL SECURITY, GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, ARMS CONTROL, LEGISLATION, URANIUM, PALESTINIANS, DEMOCRACY, AFGHANISTAN, ELECTIONS, MILITARY ASSISTANCE, CARGO VEHICLES, MILITARY OPERATIONS, CENTRAL ASIA, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, TERRORISTS
Identifiers: (U) *NUCLEAR PROGRAM, AHMADINEJAD'S POLICIES, PMOI(PEOPLE'S MOJAHEDIN ORGANIZATION OF IRAN), LEBANESE HEZBOLLAH, AL QAEDA, HUMAN RIGHTS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The Bush Administration has characterized Iran as a profound threat to U.S. national security interests, a perception generated primarily by Iran's nuclear program and its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. The Bush Administration's approach has been to try to prevent a nuclear breakout by Iran by applying coordinated international economic pressure on Iran while also offering it potential cooperation should it comply with the international demands to suspend its enrichment of uranium. The incorporation of diplomacy and engagement into the overall U.S. strategy led the Administration to approve the participation of a high-level State Department official at multilateral nuclear talks with Iran on July 19, 2008, although that meeting, and subsequent discussions, have not resulted in Iran's acceptance of the international offer of incentives. Based on statements during the campaign and since, the incoming Obama Administration is likely to focus more on consistent engagement with Iran and to de-emphasize the potential for U.S. military action or efforts to promote democracy in Iran. During 2006 and 2007, three U.N. Security Council resolutions (1737, 1747, and 1803) imposed sanctions that ban weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related trade with Iran; freeze the assets of Iran's nuclear and related entities and personalities; prevent Iran from transferring arms outside Iran; ban or require reporting on international travel by named Iranians; call for inspections of some Iranian sea and airborne cargo shipments; and call for restrictions on dealings with some Iranian banks. Further U.N. Security Council sanctions have been considered, although progress was slowed by U.S.-Russia tensions over Georgia in August 2008.
ADA496410
Border Security: The Role of the U.S. Border Patrol
Descriptive Note: Congressional rept.
Personal Author(s): Nunez-Neto, Blas
Report Date: 20 Nov 2008
Media Count: 42 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *BORDER SECURITY, *LAW ENFORCEMENT, HOMELAND SECURITY, ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, UNITED STATES, TERRORISM
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The United States Border Patrol (USBP) has a long and storied history as our nation's first line of defense against unauthorized migration. Today, the USBP's primary mission is to detect and prevent the entry of terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, and illegal aliens into the country, and to interdict drug smugglers and other criminals along the border. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 dissolved the Immigration and Naturalization Service and placed the USBP within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Within DHS, the USBP forms a part of the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection under the Directorate of Border and Transportation Security. During the last decade, the USBP has seen its budget and manpower more than triple. This expansion was the direct result of Congressional concerns about illegal immigration and the agency's adoption of Prevention Through Deterrence as its chief operational strategy in 1994. The strategy called for placing USBP resources and manpower directly at the areas of greatest illegal immigration in order to detect, deter, and apprehend aliens attempting to cross the border between official points of entry. Post 9/11, the USBP refocused its strategy on preventing the entry of terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, as laid out in its recently released National Strategy. In addition to a workforce of over 17,000 agents, the USBP deploys vehicles, aircraft, watercraft, and many different technologies to defend the border.
ADA490419
Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests
Descriptive Note: Congressional rept.
Personal Author(s): Nichol, Jim
Report Date: 13 Nov 2008
Media Count: 49 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, *GEOPOLITICS, *GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), *COUNTERTERRORISM, *FOREIGN AID, *CENTRAL ASIA, *FOREIGN POLICY, LEGISLATION, DEMOCRACY, NATURAL GAS, OVERFLIGHT, CRUDE OIL, ELECTIONS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, SECTARIAN VIOLENCE, AFGHANISTAN CONFLICT, CONFLICT, ARMS CONTROL, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, RUSSIA, ACCESS, PIPELINES, INVESTMENTS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Identifiers: (U) *REGIONAL SECURITY, DEMOCRATIZATION, FREE MARKETS, HUMAN RIGHTS, BASE ACCESS, BASING RIGHTS, MILITARY COOPERATION, REGIONAL CONFLICTS, CIVIL WAR, IJG(ISLAMIC JIHAD GROUP OF UZBEKISTAN), IMU(ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF UZBEKISTAN), KARSHI-KHANABAD AIR BASE, MANAS AIR BASE, ANDIJON(UZBEKISTAN)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States recognized the independence of all the former Central Asian republics, supported their admission into Western organizations, and elicited regional support to counter Iranian influence in the region. Congress was at the forefront in urging the formation of coherent U.S. policies for aiding these and other Eurasian states of the former Soviet Union. Soon after the terrorist attacks on America on September 11, 2001, all the Central Asian states offered overflight and other support for coalition anti-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan hosted coalition troops and provided access to air bases. In 2003, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also endorsed coalition military action in Iraq, and Kazakhstan provided about two dozen troops for rebuilding. U.S. policy has emphasized bolstering the security of the Central Asian front-line states to help them combat terrorism, proliferation, and arms and drug trafficking. Other U.S. objectives have included promoting free markets, democratization, human rights, energy development, and the forging of east-west and Central Asia-South Asia trade links. Such policies aim to help the states become what the Administration considers to be responsible members of the international community rather than to degenerate into xenophobic, extremist, and anti-Western regimes that threaten international peace and stability. The Administration's diverse goals in Central Asia have reflected the differing characteristics of these states. U.S. interests in Kazakhstan have included securing and eliminating Soviet-era nuclear and biological weapons materials and facilities. U.S. energy firms have invested in oil and natural gas development in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and the Administration backs diverse export routes to the West for these resources. Economic and democratic reforms have been among U.S. concerns in Kyrgyzstan.
ADA494333
Detection of Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Science, Technologies, Observations
Descriptive Note: Congressional rept.
Personal Author(s): Medalia, Jonathan
Report Date: 06 Nov 2008
Media Count: 104 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NUCLEAR WEAPONS, X RAYS, IMAGES, PLUTONIUM, RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS, RADIOGRAPHY, URANIUM, DETECTION, GAMMA RAYS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Detection of nuclear weapons and special nuclear material (SNM, certain types of uranium and plutonium) is crucial to thwarting nuclear proliferation and terrorism and to securing weapons and materials worldwide. Congress has funded a portfolio of detection R&D and acquisition programs, and has mandated inspection at foreign ports of all U.S.-bound cargo containers using two types of detection equipment. Nuclear weapons contain SNM, which produces unique or suspect signatures that can be detected. It emits radiation, notably gamma rays (high-energy photons) and neutrons. SNM is very dense, so it produces a bright image on a radiograph (a picture like a medical x-ray) when x-rays or gamma rays are beamed through a container in which it is hidden. Using lead or other shielding to attenuate gamma rays would make this image larger. Nuclear weapons produce detectable signatures, such as radiation generated by or a noticeable image on a radiograph. Other detection techniques are also available.
ADA490430
Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World
Report Date: Nov 2008
Media Count: 120 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *SCENARIOS, *GLOBALIZATION, *INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LEADERSHIP, SUBSAHARAN AFRICA, DEMOGRAPHY, POPULATION, GEOPOLITICS, RUSSIA, CONFLICT, IRAN, TERRORISM, LATIN AMERICA, MULTIPOLARITY, TECHNOLOGY FORECASTING, CHINA, BALANCE OF POWER, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, CAPITALISM, UNITED STATES, INDIA, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Identifiers: (U) CLIMATE CHANGE, DEMOCRATIZATION, ECONOMIC POWER, ENERGY POLICIES, FOOD DEMAND, GLOBAL WEALTH, IDEOLOGY, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM, NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, POPULATION GROWTH, REGIONALISM, STATE CAPITALISM, STRATEGIC RESOURCES, TERRORIST GROUPS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The National Intelligence Council prepared Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World to stimulate strategic thinking about the future by identifying key trends, the factors that drive them, where they seem to be headed, and how they might interact. It uses scenarios to illustrate some of the many ways in which the drivers examined in the study (e.g., globalization, demography, the rise of new powers, the decay of international institutions, climate change, and the geopolitics of energy) may interact to generate challenges and opportunities for future decisionmakers. The study as a whole is more a description of the factors likely to shape events than a prediction of what will actually happen. By examining a small number of variables that we judge probably will have a disproportionate influence on future events and possibilities, the study seeks to help readers to recognize signposts indicating where events are headed and to identify opportunities for policy intervention to change or lock in the trajectories of specific developments. Among the messages we hope to convey are: If you like where events seem to be headed, you may want to take timely action to preserve their positive trajectory. If you do not like where they appear to be going, you will have to develop and implement policies to change their trajectory. For example, the report's examination of the transition out of dependence on fossil fuels illustrates how different trajectories will entail different consequences for specific countries. An even more important message is that leadership matters, no trends are immutable, and that timely and well-informed intervention can decrease the likelihood and severity of negative developments and increase the likelihood of positive ones.
ADA488239
Feasibility and Top Level Design of a Scalable Emergency Response System for Oceangoing Assets
Descriptive Note: Final rept. Apr 2007-Sep 2008
Personal Author(s): Dougherty, Edmond J
Report Date: 20 Oct 2008
Media Count: 205 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NAVY, *DECONTAMINATION EQUIPMENT, *CRISIS MANAGEMENT, *FIRST RESPONDERS, SEA BASED, SHIPPING CONTAINERS, TERRORISM, NAVAL TRAINING, CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS, HAZARDOUS MATERIALS, RADIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS, BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS, MODULAR CONSTRUCTION, RISK, SHIPS, OFFSHORE STRUCTURES
Identifiers: (U) *MARITIME INCIDENTS, *FAST RESPONSE, CBRNE(CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL RADIOLOGICAL NUCLEAR AND HIGH YIELD EXPLOSIVE), SCALABLE EMERGENCY RESPONSE SYSTEMS, OFFSHORE INFRASTRUCTURE, PRE-EVENT PREPARATIONS, ON-BOARD PERSONNEL, TEU(TWENTY-FOOT EQUIVALENT UNIT), CBRN PERSONNEL TRAINING
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The scalable emergency system is intended to cover the full scale of possible at-sea incidents from the routine to the rare; from the detection and decontamination of a single piece of equipment before it is loaded on a vessel, to the response, rescue, containment and rehabilitation of a vessel in open waters. The system will be able to safely and quickly decontaminate cargo and personnel, as well as entire vessels at sea and in port. This report finalizes the top level design of the four (4) primary concepts selected for the program.
ADA489377
Reform of the National Security Science and Technology Enterprise
Personal Author(s): Berry, William, Coffey, Timothy, DeYoung, Donald, Kadtke, James, Loeb, Cheryl
Report Date: Oct 2008
Media Count: 38 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *TECHNOLOGY FORECASTING, *NATIONAL SECURITY, *CLIMATE, ORGANIZATIONS, ECONOMICS, THREATS, RADAR COUNTERMEASURES, COLD WAR, USER NEEDS, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, RANGE(EXTREMES), SMOKE GENERATORS, TERRORISM, MINE DETECTORS, PROXIMITY FUZES, SECOND WORLD WAR, POLICIES, SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH, GLOBAL, UNITED STATES
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) A strong science and technology (S&T) program has been vitally important to American national security since World War II and has to date given the United States a strategic advantage over competitors. During World War II and throughout the Cold War, highly specific and large-scale technology needs led to the concentration of national security S&T (NSST) programs in a few agencies, with little cross-agency coordination. Since the end of the Cold War, circumstances have changed greatly. Meeting new and emerging threats to national security from global climate change to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and global terrorism requires an effective mechanism for direction, funding, and integration of the highly fragmented and very wide range of Federally supported S&T. Science and technology underlie the elements of national power (diplomacy, intelligence, military, economics), but they are only rarely named as elements of national power, and the priorities, policies, and personnel for S&T are often neglected. Specific S&T capabilities have been particularly isolated in direct applications to traditional security capabilities, and fragmented even more in addressing the new and broad challenges to our security. Thus, the structure and integration of S&T in the Executive Branch agencies, integration of congressional S&T committees, and the roles and responsibilities of Government scientists and engineers, are key issues that must be considered when evaluating how we can significantly improve our nation s security. With the onset of World War II, President Franklin Roosevelt, convinced of the importance of S&T to winning the war effort, created the wartime Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) in 1941. Led by the visionary Vannevar Bush, the goal of the OSRD was to develop a strategic enterprise for national research supporting the military.
ADA496253
Joint Force Quarterly. Issue 51, 4th Quarter, October 2008
Report Date: Oct 2008
Media Count: 169 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NATIONAL SECURITY, *JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, *DEFENSE SYSTEMS, *MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, INTEGRATED SYSTEMS, POLICIES, EDUCATION, DECONTAMINATION, THREATS, SECURITY, BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE, TERRORISM, NATIONAL DEFENSE, WARFARE, NATO, HOMELAND SECURITY, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, GUIDED MISSILES
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National Defense University Press for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFQ is the Chairman's flagship joint military and security studies journal designed to inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and other partners on joint and integrated operations; national security policy and strategy; efforts to combat terrorism, homeland security and developments in training and joint professional military education to transform America's military and security apparatus to meet tomorrow's challenges better while protecting freedom today. Articles in this issue concern topics on biological threats, weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons, NATO security, missile defense, decontamination, and unconventional warfare.
ADA495871
Chemical Biological Defense Program Strategic Plan
Report Date: 30 Sep 2008
Media Count: 29 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *CHEMICAL WARFARE, *MILITARY PLANNING, *BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, CHEMICAL AGENT TERRORISM, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, BIOTERRORISM, DEFENSE SYSTEMS, STRATEGY
Identifiers: (U) *CBDP(CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM), *STRATEGIC PLANS, GOALS, CBRN(CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR)
Distribution Statement:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The purpose of this strategic plan is to focus and guide our actions in the Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP). Our immediate responsibility is to develop, deliver, and support the systems that provide strategic resilience - systems flexible enough to detect, protect, and remediate attacks by terrorists or hostile forces using a variety of Weapons of Mass Destruction devices. Our future responsibility is to provide the direction the CBDP must take for the far-term. This plan is grounded in our National Strategies and reflects our Strategic vision, mission, and goals. The CBDP vision is to ensure DoD operations are unconstrained by Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) effects. The CBDP mission is to provide CBRN defense capabilities in support of our national military strategies. We undertake this vision and mission in partnership with Congress, other federal agencies, academia, international partners, and the private sector. Central to the success of the CBDP is how we measure and report progress toward achieving the four overarching, interrelated strategic goals addressing our operational, future, institutional, and management program challenges. To this end, as a team we must remain forward thinking, responsive to warfighter and national security needs, and empowered with the accountability and authority vested in specific executives.
ADA506796
Campaign 2008: Innovative Ideas for Securing America. A Guide for Candidates
Descriptive Note: Monograph
Report Date: 03 Sep 2008
Media Count: 35 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NATIONAL SECURITY, TERRORISTS, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, MILITARY PROCUREMENT, CYBERTERRORISM, ENERGY CONSUMPTION, NATIONAL DEFENSE, CRUDE OIL, IMPORTS, GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, ELECTRONIC SECURITY
Identifiers: (U) TERRORIST FINANCING, CYBER ATTACKS, GLOBAL SECURITY, BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIPS, ENERGY SECURITY
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This election, voters are demanding creative, new approaches to the urgent national security challenges facing the United States. With the record-high cost of oil and gas, how can our nation?and our military?reduce its dependence on imported foreign oil? With American servicemen and women serving in Iraq and Afghanistan, how can we equip our troops with the most advanced tools and technologies so they can survive and succeed on the battlefield? With our country engaged in a global fight against terrorism, how can we prevent future attacks by strengthening U.S. intelligence operations, tracking terrorist financing and preventing weapons of mass destruction from falling into the hands of terrorists? With terrorists still seeking to strike U.S. soil, how can we protect and defend the American homeland?our ports, our critical computer networks and our local communities? The Business Executives for National Security (BENS) - a national, nonpartisan group of business leaders - invites [the candidates] to consider the innovative approaches offered in this guidebook. For more than 25 years, BENS has worked with administrations from both political parties to help build a more secure America by tapping the insights, expertise and best practices of the private sector. Our information and policy recommendations have been embraced by Democrats and Republicans alike.
ADA488735
U.S. Democratization Strategy: Origins and Obstacles
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Wahlin, Chad G
Report Date: Sep 2008
Media Count: 115 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *FOREIGN POLICY, *IRAQ, *DEMOCRACY, *PRESIDENT(UNITED STATES), *HISTORY, *BARRIERS, *STRATEGY, THESES, LIMITATIONS, RESPONSE, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, IRAQI WAR, GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), MIDDLE EAST, INSTABILITY, NATIONAL SECURITY, THREATS
Identifiers: (U) *DEMOCRATIZATION STRATEGY, WILSONIANISM, KANT IMMANUEL, BUSH GEORGE W, WILSON WOODROW, WILSONIAN IDEALISM, LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM, *DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY, AMERICAN ISOLATIONISM, ADAMS JOHN QUINCY, LIBERAL IDEALISM, IDEOLOGICAL INCONGRUENCE, JEFFERSON THOMAS, WASHINGTON GEORGE, HAMILTON ALEXANDER
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The George W. Bush administration offered two rationales for the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003. First and foremost, the invasion would eliminate the threat that the Iraqi regime headed by Saddam Hussein might transfer weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to terrorist organizations. Second, the invasion would depose the brutal dictatorship in Baghdad and deliver the oppressed people of Iraq from tyranny. After the invasion, in the absence of any Iraqi WMD stockpiles, only one of these original justifications for war remained viable. As a result, the Bush administration realigned U.S. national security strategy and set forth a vision of peace and security through the democratization of the Middle East and the world. This thesis examines the historical antecedents of this vision. It also analyzes the transition in the Bush administration's foreign policy from a position of pragmatic restraint and America-first principles to a Wilsonian vision of global pacification through the spread of democratic principles of governance. Finally, the thesis reviews the various obstacles that could prevent the fulfillment of this vision, which has met with significant resistance in Afghanistan as well as Iraq.
ADA486309
Chemical Terrorism: US Policies to Reduce the Chemical Terror Threat
Personal Author(s): Kosal, Margaret E
Report Date: Sep 2008
Media Count: 31 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *CHEMICAL AGENT TERRORISM, *UNITED STATES, THREATS, RESPONSE, INTERNATIONAL, INDUSTRIAL PLANTS, CHEMICAL ORDNANCE, ELIMINATION, PREVENTION, STOCKPILES, CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS, INFRASTRUCTURE, RISK, INTERAGENCY COORDINATION, POLICIES
Identifiers: (U) CHEMICAL WEAPONS, CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This study recognizes significant US government progress in detecting and mitigating chemical terror threats, including enhancements in interagency coordination. It finds similarly noteworthy progress in elimination of military chemical stockpiles, though the pace could be faster and much remains to be done. Challenges remain, however, in the need for stronger multilateral cooperation to prevent proliferation, and for a more serious and comprehensive effort to secure chemical facilities and transportation infrastructure against theft or attack. Future progress will depend first and foremost on recognition by government and industry of the full range of chemical terror threats, so that policy responses may be effectively prioritized. US efforts to prevent terrorist acquisition and use of chemical weapons can be grouped into four broad policy pillars: 1) Recognition and Prevention; 2) Response: Improved Detection, Resilience, and Mitigation; 3) Critical Infrastructure; 4) Elimination
ADA486313
Biological Terrorism: US Policies to Reduce Global Biothreats
Personal Author(s): Kellman, Barry
Report Date: Sep 2008
Media Count: 30 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *BIOTERRORISM, *UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, INFORMATION EXCHANGE, THREATS, INTERDICTION, TRACKING, INTERNATIONAL, BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS, PUBLIC HEALTH, COOPERATION, NATIONAL DEFENSE, VACCINES, DETECTION, POLICIES, RESPONSE
Identifiers: (U) BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM, CONFIDENCE BUILDING, DENIAL, BIODEFENSE RESEARCH, BWC(BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This report finds progress in US government bioterrorism interdiction and response programs, and in cooperative efforts to track infectious diseases internationally, including creation of a new office charged with strengthening cooperative non-proliferation of bioweapons and related knowledge. However, inadequate multilateral coordination and cooperation remains the single largest stumbling block to effective bioterror prevention. Despite increases in overall biothreat response funding, global threat reduction programs are still under-funded, and US disengagement from the Biological Weapons Convention has undercut the confidence necessary for effective multilateral cooperation.
ADA487983
Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Deterrence Skills
Descriptive Note: Final rept.
Report Date: Sep 2008
Media Count: 149 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *DETERRENCE, *NUCLEAR WEAPONS, POLICIES, EMERGENCIES, INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES, SKILLS, THREATS, ATTACK, PERSONNEL, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, NUCLEAR WARFARE, RISK
Identifiers: (U) *NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Deterrence Skills was chartered to assess all aspects of nuclear deterrent skills military, federal, and contractor and to recommended methods and strategies to maintain a right-sized, properly trained, and experienced work force to ensure the viability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent through 2020. As long as anyone in the world has or can acquire nuclear weapons, America must have nuclear deterrence expertise competent to avoid strategic surprise and respond to present and future challenges. There are many kinds of threats that demand national leadership, but no threat can put the nation's existence at risk as quickly and as chillingly as nuclear weapons. To say this is not to dismiss the seriousness of other threats. It simply acknowledges that since the dawn of the nuclear age, security from nuclear attack has been in a class of its own, and major national decisions on nuclear deterrence issues have been reserved for the President of the United States. Nuclear deterrence expertise is uniquely demanding. It cannot be acquired overnight or on the fly. It resides in a highly classified environment mandated by law, it crosses a number of disciplines and skills, and it involves implicit as well as explicit knowledge. Nuclear weapons expertise is necessary to design and build nuclear weapons, to plan and operate nuclear forces, and to design defense against nuclear attack. It is also necessary to analyze and understand foreign nuclear weapons programs, devise nuclear policies and strategies, deal with allies who depend on the American nuclear umbrella, prevent and counter nuclear proliferation, defeat nuclear terrorism, and in the event that a nuclear detonation takes place by accident or cold, hostile intent cope with the catastrophic consequences.
ADA486354
Nuclear Terrorism: US Policies to Reduce the Threat of Nuclear Terror
Personal Author(s): Finlay, Brian D
Report Date: Sep 2008
Media Count: 29 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *TERRORISM, *UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, *POLICIES, *NUCLEAR WEAPONS, RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS, ARMS CONTROL, INTERNATIONAL, INTEGRATION, INTERAGENCY COORDINATION, DETECTION, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, INTERDICTION
Identifiers: (U) *NUCLEAR TERRORISM, *NONPROLIFERATION, COUNTERPROLIFERATION
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The study below acknowledges that the US government has taken important steps to prevent nuclear proliferation and to detect and interdict the international transfer of potentially dangerous nuclear materials. Yet it also finds that US government money and authority remains overly stovepiped within agencies, and poor interagency coordination hampers overall policy effectiveness. At the other end of the policy process, foreign government partners often do not share US goals and expectations, while investments in sustainable and transparent civilian opportunities for WMD experts are inadequate, undermining long-term US goals.
ADA487405
Surface Sampling-Based Decontamination Studies and Protocol for Determining Sporicidal Efficacy of Gaseous Fumigants on Military-Relevant Surfaces
Descriptive Note: Final rept. Oct 2006-Mar 2008
Personal Author(s): Rastogi, Vipin K, Wallace, Lalena, Smith, Lisa S, Pfarr, Jerry
Report Date: Sep 2008
Media Count: 41 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MILITARY FACILITIES, *FUMIGANTS, *DECONTAMINATION, *BIOTERRORISM, PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT, GERMICIDES, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE, BACILLUS ANTHRACIS, ANTIMICROBIAL AGENTS, INDANTHRENES, SAMPLING, BIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION, BACILLUS SUBTILIS, SPORES, CHLORINE COMPOUNDS
Identifiers: (U) SURFACE SAMPLING, CHLORINE DIOXIDE GAS, SPORICIDAL, VAPOROUS HYDROGEN PEROXIDE
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) A major consequence of biological terrorism in a military setting is the wide degree of contamination of combat/protective equipment used by war-fighters and first responders. Appropriate selection of a decon technology, successful implementation, and re-use of assets following decontamination rely principally on extensive pre- and post-decontamination sampling. One of the challenges related to the Test & Evaluation demonstration of decon products has been poor recovery of biological contaminants from complex surfaces. Here, we report the optimization of surface sampling for quantifying biological contaminants. An optimized surface sampling protocol was devised and used in decontamination studies for determining sporicidal efficacy of two fumigants on contaminated military-relevant surfaces.
ADA485721
The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture: Issues for Congress
Descriptive Note: Congressional rept.
Personal Author(s): Shea, Dana A
Report Date: 16 Jul 2008
Media Count: 25 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *INTERAGENCY COORDINATION, CONGRESS, DETECTION, COST ANALYSIS, TERRORISM, NUCLEAR RADIATION PROTECTION, RADIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS, RISK ANALYSIS, HOMELAND SECURITY, BORDER SECURITY, METHODOLOGY, DETERRENCE
Identifiers: (U) GLOBAL NUCLEAR DETECTION ARCHITECTURE, DNDO(DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE), DIRTY BOMBS, RADIATION DETECTORS, OVERSIGHT
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The U.S. government has implemented a series of programs to protect the nation against terrorist nuclear attack. These programs have historically been viewed as lacking coordination and centralized oversight. In 2006, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) was established within the Department of Homeland Security to centralize coordination of the federal response to an unconventional nuclear threat. The office was given specific statutory responsibilities to protect the United States against radiological and nuclear attack, including the responsibility to develop a global nuclear detection architecture. Determining the range of existing federal efforts protecting against nuclear attack, coordinating the outcomes of these efforts, identifying overlaps and gaps between them, and integrating the results into a single architecture are likely to be evolving, ongoing tasks. The global nuclear detection architecture is a multi-layered system of detection technologies, programs, and guidelines. Among its components are existing programs in other federal agencies and new programs put into place by DNDO. The global nuclear detection architecture is developed by DNDO in coordination with other federal agencies; this coordination is essential to the success of the architecture. The DNDO is developing risk and cost methodologies to be applied to the architecture in order to understand and prioritize the various nuclear detection programs and activities in multiple federal agencies. Congress, in its oversight capacity, has shown interest in the development and implementation of the global nuclear detection architecture. Other issues that may be foci of attention include the balance between investment in near- and long-term solutions, the degree and efficacy of federal agency coordination, the mechanism for setting investment priorities in the architecture, and the efforts DNDO has undertaken to retain institutional knowledge regarding this sustained architecture effort.
ADA487251
Defeating 802.11 Wireless Networks
Descriptive Note: Graduate Research Project, Jun 2007-Jun 2008
Personal Author(s): Cosnowski, Charles R
Report Date: Jun 2008
Media Count: 56 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *RADIO LINKS, *DRONES, *HOMELAND SECURITY, *COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS, THREATS, DECEPTION, TERRORISM, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, UNITED STATES, RADIO SIGNALS, NETWORKS, ORGANIZATIONS, CONTROL SYSTEMS, AREA DENIAL
Identifiers: (U) WIRELESS COMPUTER NETWORK, LOCAL AREA NETWORKS, LAN, DATA LINKS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Homeland Security of the United States is constantly under threat of attack from terrorist organizations. A variable and current terrorist threat is the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as weapons of mass destruction. These UAVs can be built simply and cheaply from commercial off the shelf (COTS) parts and are typically controlled using standard radio control (RC) technology. An emerging technology that is being implemented to control and communicate with UAVs is the 802.11 wireless network protocol or Wi-Fi. This project discusses various portions of the Wi-Fi protocol and analyzes the protocol to determine techniques for first detecting and then defeating wireless networks utilizing the protocol through denial or deception. The first set of techniques presented defeats a network through denial. These denial techniques are divided into two categories: broad area denial techniques and specific network denial techniques. After denial techniques are discussed a process for decieving an 802.11 wireless network is presented.
ADA483633
The Deterrence of Nuclear Terrorism through an Attribution Capability
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Arbuckle, Larry J
Report Date: Jun 2008
Media Count: 65 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NUCLEAR WEAPONS, *DETERRENCE, *FISSIONABLE MATERIALS, *IDENTIFICATION, *ACQUISITION, *SOURCES, *TERRORISTS, *FORENSIC ANALYSIS, THESES, PLUTONIUM, THEFT, RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, THREATS, DATA BASES, POLICIES, SMUGGLING, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, URANIUM, TERRORISM, FOREIGN MILITARY SALES
Identifiers: (U) *NUCLEAR FORENSICS, *NUCLEAR ATTRIBUTION CAPABILITY, *STATE SPONSORSHIP, NUCLEAR TERRORISM, NONSTATE ACTORS, HEU(HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM), AL QAEDA, IAEA(INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY), INTD(ILLICIT NUCLEAR TRAFFICKING DATABASE), ILLEGAL NUCLEAR TRAFFICKING, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, NUCLEAR EXPLOSION ANALYSIS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The state of the world is such that the pace of nuclear weapons proliferation appears to be increasing. The growing number of nuclear states and amount of nuclear material available poses a great challenge to those who would attempt to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists and other nonstate actors. This study examines how the development of a nuclear attribution capability using the tools and methods of nuclear forensics can address that challenge. The prevention of nuclear terrorism is a multi-front battle. One of these fronts is preventing state sponsorship of nuclear terrorism. This can best be accomplished through deterrence policies that threaten severe and credible military action against would-be nuclear sponsors. However, such threats only have meaning if the sponsors are convinced that their participation could be detected. Therefore, there is a need for a credible means to determine the source of nuclear materials from the debris of a nuclear explosion. At present a national nuclear forensics capability is lacking. There is a need for a more robust database of known nuclear materials, as well as for organizational restructuring and equipment development.
ADA483913
France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and Issues in U.S.-French Relations
Descriptive Note: Congressional rept.
Personal Author(s): Gallis, Paul
Report Date: 21 May 2008
Media Count: 33 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *FOREIGN POLICY, *MILITARY OPERATIONS, *DEMOCRACY, *INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, POLICIES, EMERGENCIES, INVESTMENTS, SECURITY, FRANCE, COLD WAR, EUROPEAN UNION, EXPANSION, UNITED NATIONS, TERRORISM, UNITED STATES, NATO, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The factors that shape French foreign policy have changed since the end of the Cold War. The perspectives of France and the United States have diverged in some cases. More core interests remain similar. Both countries governments have embraced the opportunity to build stability in Europe through an expanded European Union and NATO. Each has recognized that terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are the most important threats to their security today. Several factors shape French foreign policy. France has a self-identity that calls for efforts to spread French values and views, many rooted in democracy and human rights. France prefers to engage international issues in a multilateral framework, above all through the European Union. European efforts to form an EU security policy potentially independent of NATO emerged in this context. From the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States through the Iraq war of 2003 until today, France has pressed the United States to confront emerging crises within a multilateral framework. France normally wishes to legitimize actions ranging from economic sanctions to military action in the United Nations. The election to the French presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy in May 2007 may improve U.S.-French relations. Sarkozy has taken a more practical approach to issues in U.S.-French relations than his predecessor, Jacques Chirac. Trade and investment ties between the United States and France are extensive, and provide each government a large stake in the vitality and openness of their respective economies. Through trade in goods and services, and, most importantly, through foreign direct investment, the economies of France and the United States have become increasingly integrated.
ADA485464
Force of No Choice: The Role of the Military in Interagency Operations
Descriptive Note: Monograph Sep 2007-May 2008
Personal Author(s): Cantwell, Damian M
Report Date: 19 May 2008
Media Count: 65 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MILITARY OPERATIONS, MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), THREATS, BATTLEFIELDS, CRIMES, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, CONFLICT, LETHALITY, TERRORISM, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, MILITARY CAPABILITIES
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This paper examines how the nature of the contemporary conflict environment shapes the military contribution to interagency operations. Modern conflict is increasingly centered on a changed manifestation of war from a contest between state based massed armies to also include a range of non state actors in dynamic tension, within a complex operational environment. The nature of conflict remains essentially political, resting on a contest of wills to shape and influence popular perceptions, but has been made increasingly difficult through the four interrelated trends of complexity, diversity, diffusion and lethality. Within this arena, control of populations and perceptions is the decisive and central event, with battle being a means to an end. Battlefields are now more often social structures than terrain, with ideas as weapons, human minds the targets and the will of the people the prize. Success in this new contest of wills requires more than application of conventional military force alone, but rather a comprehensive interagency approach to operations. However, this paper finds that in reality the United States will continue to depend on the military to shoulder the operational burden normally carried by other agencies. Whilst recognizing the desire to involve other agencies in seeking to resolve contemporary conflict, institutional circumstances and operational imperatives offer little other choice. These essential actions by the military reflect the broader interpretation of contemporary security and the need to provide such assistance quickly in the absence of other agencies. To not do so reduces the initial degree of influence able to be established by occupying forces over indigenous populations. In an era of globalised communications and continuous media coverage, these gaps of influence are able to be readily exploited by adversaries, with the attend
ADA482803
Homeland Security: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Border Surveillance
Descriptive Note: Congressional rept.
Personal Author(s): Bolkcom, Christopher
Nunez-Neto, Blas Report Date: 13 May 2008
Media Count: 7 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *LIMITATIONS, *REMOTELY PILOTED VEHICLES, *SURVEILLANCE DRONES, *OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS, *COST EFFECTIVENESS, *BORDER SECURITY, LEGISLATION, FEDERAL BUDGETS, MEXICO, DRUG SMUGGLING, LOITERING, ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS, AVIATION SAFETY, RANGE(DISTANCE), AVIATION ACCIDENTS, CANADA, PATROLLING, CONGRESS, WEATHER
Identifiers: (U) UAV(UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES), ADVANTAGES, DISADVANTAGES, INCLEMENT WEATHER, NATIONAL AIR SPACE, CIVILIAN AIRSPACE
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the lead agency charged with securing our nation's borders. While CBP is charged with overall border enforcement, within the bureau a distinction is made concerning border enforcement at and between ports of entry (POE). At POE, CBP officers are responsible for conducting immigrations, customs, and agricultural inspections on individuals presenting themselves for entry into the United States. Between POE, the United States Border Patrol (USBP) is charged with detecting and preventing the entry of terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, and unauthorized aliens into the country, and interdicting drug smugglers and other criminals. Congress has expressed a great deal of interest in using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to surveil the United States' international land border. This report examines the strengths and limitations of deploying UAVs along the borders and related issues for Congress. This report will be updated as events warrant.
ADA482656
International Partnerships to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction
Descriptive Note: Occasional paper
Personal Author(s): Bernstein, Paul I
Report Date: May 2008
Media Count: 61 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, TERRORISTS, GLOBAL, NETWORKS, EROSION, UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, FOUNDATIONS(STRUCTURES), INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, CRIMINOLOGY, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, FUELS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Building international partnerships is a central element of U.S. strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction (WMD). U.S. policy recognizes that the proliferation problem is far too large, complex, and important for any one nation to tackle alone. Meaningful and sustained progress in combating WMD requires active collaboration among all states that have a stake in managing the problem and the will and capacity to contribute. Current policies build on a foundation of global cooperation that dates back decades, even as they reflect significant changes in emphasis to adapt to contemporary proliferation challenges. These challenges result in large part from the ongoing and in some respects intensifying impact of globalization. As many have observed, the phenomenon is twofold technological and political and both dimensions are making the WMD proliferation problem more complex and difficult to manage. Technologies with broad legitimate uses that could be applied to unconventional weapons continue to spread globally at a rapid rate, and the growing demand (and competition) for energy, in particular, has the potential to fuel nuclear proliferation pressures in strategically important and sometimes unstable parts of the world. Politically, globalization has contributed to the erosion of traditional state power and boundaries and served to empower both smaller states that are seeking to challenge the status quo and nonstate actors ranging from individuals to transnational networks with independent and often extremist agendas. The results are clear enough: significant proliferation challenges from states whose WMD programs confer on them disproportionate strategic importance; growing interest on the part of terrorists to acquire WMD; and weak states and poorly governed spaces where illicit radical and criminal networks flourish. As these phenomena converge, new proliferation pathways are likely to emerge.
ADA482054
Reconsidering the Rules for Space Security
Personal Author(s): Gallagher, Nancy, Steinbruner, John D
Report Date: Apr 2008
Media Count: 99 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NATIONAL SECURITY, *SPACE WARFARE, *SPACE SYSTEMS, GUIDED MISSILES, USSR, ORBITS, DEPLOYMENT, UNITED STATES, POLICIES, STRATEGY, ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, ATTACK, ARTIFICIAL SATELLITES, MILITARY APPLICATIONS, PROTECTION, PREVENTION, RECONNAISSANCE, SPACE OBJECTS, MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES), TERRORISM, WEAPONS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Identifiers: (U) *SPACE SECURITY
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The rules that currently govern the use of space were codified in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty less than a decade after the first satellites were flown. They were designed to protect the common interest of all societies while regulating the competition for military advantage that dominated the pioneering programs of the United States and the Soviet Union. The rules assured universal rights of access and precluded sovereign jurisdiction over orbital transit. They permitted military support services, including reconnaissance, as long as the activity was peaceful, not aggressive. Orbiting weapons of mass destruction and using celestial bodies for military purposes were categorically prohibited, but sending nuclear missiles through space or placing conventional weapons there were not. The United States was the principal sponsor of the original rules but has become the principal obstacle to their legal elaboration. In order to protect efforts to develop ballistic missile defense, the United States has refused since the 1980s to consider explicit rules prohibiting deliberate attack on space objects and the deployment of weapons in space. It has assertively blocked formal attempts to organize negotiations on those topics and has stood virtually alone against the rest of the world in doing so. The 2006 U.S. National Space Policy and supporting documents formulate the intention to dominate space for national military advantage and to control access by all other countries. The United States is spending tens of billions of dollars each year far more than all other countries combined to acquire advanced military space capabilities. The U.S. national security strategy outlines an intention to use these capabilities to eliminate emerging threats before hostile states or terrorist groups acquire dangerous technology a standard of preventive protection that it does not propose to cede to any other country.
ADA482437
A US Strategy for Iran (Walker Paper, Number 11)
Descriptive Note: Monograph
Personal Author(s): Douglass, Charles A, Hays, Michael D
Report Date: Apr 2008
Media Count: 130 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *FOREIGN POLICY, *IRAN, *PERCEPTION(PSYCHOLOGY), *HISTORY, *THREATS, *GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), *UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, LONG RANGE(TIME), SHORT RANGE(TIME), DEMOGRAPHY, ECONOMICS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, STRATEGY, VULNERABILITY, CENTER OF GRAVITY, DIPLOMACY, LEADERSHIP
Identifiers: (U) ANCIENT PERSIA, PERSIAN SHIITES, PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This study uses the lens of history to elucidate barriers that have confounded a successful U.S. strategy for Iran. This strategy blends pressure and engagement to overcome these barriers. Iran's perceptions and patterns have historical roots in a sense of Persian greatness, resentment of foreign influence, strategic Persian-Shiite loneliness, and the emergence of pragmatic national interests replacing revolutionary ideology. Analysis further demonstrates how Iran's unique characteristics, such as the populace and nature of the government, portend strategic vulnerabilities that can be used by U.S. strategic planners. Recent U.S. policies for Iran are evaluated to understand U.S. perceptions and how they have contributed to an inability to deter Iran from developing nuclear weapons, proliferating terrorism, and destabilizing the region. A proposed strategy framework expounds upon key assumptions and identification of Iranian centers of gravity. A novel planning construct is created to develop the short- and long-term strategy for U.S. relations with Iran. This study outlines a strategy based on potential vulnerabilities of Iran created by its history and the nature of the country itself. The short-term recommended strategy consists of a prioritized list of six components for creating pressure on Iran. The result of this pressure portends changes in Iran's behavior. Public diplomacy and a strategic communications effort are cross-cutting elements that tie together the components of the short-term strategy. Despite the proposed use of pressure, there are engagement aspects that allow exploitation of positive opportunities created by changes in Iran's behavior. The long-term strategy is comprised of a blend of changed assumptions and tailored goals implemented at a rate tied to improvements in U.S. and Iranian relations. The strategy proposal outlined in this study should be implemented immediately to take advantage of current opportunities.
ADA479746
UCLA High Speed, High Volume Laboratory Network for Infectious Diseases
Descriptive Note: Final rept. 16 Mar 2007-15 Mar 2008
Personal Author(s): Layne, Scott P
Report Date: Apr 2008
Media Count: 102 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NETWORKS, *LABORATORIES, *INFECTIOUS DISEASES, AUTOMATION, HIGH RATE, QUALITY CONTROL, PUBLIC HEALTH, INFLUENZA, BIOTERRORISM, SURVEILLANCE, PATHOLOGY, HYPOTHESES, LABORATORY PROCEDURES, REAL TIME, BIOLOGY
Identifiers: (U) *STANDARDIZED LABORATORY NETWORKS, *BIOSECURITY, ACTIONABLE INFORMATION, PATHOMICS, SELECT AGENTS, SURGE CAPACITY, HIGH THROUGHPUT AUTOMATION
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Background. Government agencies and expert panels have recognized the need for laboratories capable of analyzing tens of thousands of biological samples per day that have hundreds of times more capability than at present. Objectives/Hypothesis. This project aims to develop a new high speed high volume (high-throughput) laboratory capability that will be linked in a network and operated by several premier institutions. The automated networked capability will make us stronger against natural diseases and bioterrorist attacks. Specific Aims. With FY06 (initial year) Congressional appropriations high-throughput bioagent screening and genotyping systems (with quality controls) will be implemented first. These systems will be housed in laboratory space upgraded to BSL3-enhanced (BSL3e) containment that enables the flow of numerous samples containing highly pathologic avian influenza and other select agents (dual-use). With FY07 (available) FY08 (available) and FY 09 (anticipated) Congressional appropriations automated culturing and phenotyping systems will be implemented next. Study Design. Because of current public health and national security threats influenza surveillance and analysis will be the initial focus. Over three years the project will be expanded to include other biothreat agents bacterial and/or viral. Relevance. The combination of high-throughput and automated systems will enable processing of tens of thousands of samples and provide critical laboratory capacity. The overall project will facilitate rapid expansion to multiple networked sites.
ADA488337
Characterization of Clinically Attenuated Burkholderia mallei by Whole-Genome Sequencing: Candidate Strain for Exclusion from Select Agent Lists
Descriptive Note: Journal article
Personal Author(s): Schutzer, Steven E, Schiater, Linda R, Ronning, Catherine M, DeShazer, David, Luft, Benjamin J, Dunn, John J, Ravel, Jacques, Fraser-Liggett, Claire M, Nierman, William C
Report Date: Apr 2008
Media Count: 7 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *ACTINOBACILLUS MALLEI, *GENES, *BIOTERRORISM, PATHOGENIC MICROORGANISMS, HAMSTERS, HORSES, VIRULENCE, ANTIBODIES, REPRINTS, TERRORISM
Identifiers: (U) *BURKHOLDERIA MALLEI, *AVIRULENCE, *BIOTHREAT AGENTS, GLANDERS, WGS(WHOLE-GENOME SEQUENCING), SAVP STRAIN, NO REVERSION TO PHENOTYPE, TTSS(TYPE III SECRETORY SYSTEM)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Background: Burkholderia mallei is an understudied biothreat agent responsible for glanders which can be lethal in humans and animals. Research with this pathogen has been hampered in part by constraints of Select Agent regulations for safety reasons. Whole genomic sequencing (WGS) is an apt approach to characterize newly discovered or poorly understood microbial pathogens. Methodology/Principal Findings: We performed WGS on a strain of B. mallei, SAVP1, previously pathogenic, that was experimentally infected in 6 equids (4 ponies, 1 mule, 1 donkey), natural hosts, for purposes of producing antibodies. Multiple high inocula were used in some cases. Unexpectedly SAVP1 appeared to be avirulent in the ponies and mule, and attenuated in the donkey, but induced antibodies. We determined the genome sequence of SAVP1 and compared it to a strain that was virulent in horses and a human. In comparison, this phenoytpic avirulent SAVP1 strain was missing multiple genes including all the animal type III secretory system (TTSS) complex of genes demonstrated to be essential for virulence in mice and hamster models. The loss of these genes in the SAVP1 strain appears to be the consequence of a multiple gene deletion across insertion sequence (IS) elements in the B. mallei genome. Therefore, the strain by itself is unlikely to revert naturally to its virulent phenotype. Conclusion/Significance: The discovery that this strain of B. mallei was both avirulent in the natural host ponies, and did not possess TTSS associated genes may be fortuitous to advance biodefense research. The deleted virulence-essential TTSS is not likely to be re-acquired naturally. These findings may provide a basis for exclusion of SAVP1 from the Select Agent regulation or at least discussion of what else would be required for exclusion.
ADA481903
Characterization of Reaerosolization in an Effort to Improve Sampling of Airborne Viruses
Descriptive Note: Interim technical rept. 1 Mar 2007-30 Apr 2008
Personal Author(s): Riemenschneider, Lindsey
Report Date: Apr 2008
Media Count: 107 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *SAMPLING, *STERILIZATION, *VIRUSES, *AIRBORNE, FLOW RATE, BIOTERRORISM, CONCENTRATION(COMPOSITION), LATEX, PARTICLES, POLYSTYRENE, VISCOSITY, MOBILITY
Identifiers: (U) *BIOAEROSOLS, BAU(BIOAEROSOL AMPLIFICATION UNIT), COLLECTION EFFICIENCY, IMPINGER, MS2 BACTERIOPHAGE, *REAEROSOLIZATION, PE63384D, WUAFRLDODT0049
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Airborne virus outbreaks, including the influenza pandemic of 1918, the recent SARS pandemic and the anticipated H5N1 outbreak, plus the perceived threat of bioterrorism warrant concern about the prevalence and potential effects of airborne viruses. However, current bioaerosol sampling methods do not effectively sample airborne viruses (typically 20 - 300 nm). To address this problem, a novel Bioaerosol Amplification Unit (BAU) has been designed and constructed to increase the size of the virus particles by condensational growth, thereby enhancing sample recovery. In this study reaerosolization of viral particles from the impinger was investigated to assess its impact on the capability of the BAU. Reaerosolization was characterized as a function of flow rate and concentration of the collection liquid in the impinger. An impinger containing a known concentration of particles (MS2 bacteriophage or polystyrene latex) was operated at various flow rates with sterile air, and a scanning mobility particle sizer was used to determine the reaerosolization rates. Results indicate that reaerosolization increased with increasing flow rate due to the additional energy added to the system. However, reaerosolization increased with concentration up to 10e4 PFU/mL and then decreased at progressively higher concentrations. This phenomenon likely resulted from aggregation of viral particles or increased surface tension or viscosity at higher concentration. Adjusting surface tension by adding soap and increasing viscosity by adding a layer of heavy white mineral oil decreased reaerosolization. Thus, reaerosolization from an impinger could compromise the improved collection capability of the BAU
ADA481521
U.S. Nuclear Deterrence Policy: Do We Have it Right?
Descriptive Note: Research paper
Personal Author(s): Brown, Paul D
Report Date: 28 Mar 2008
Media Count: 33 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, *NUCLEAR WEAPONS, *DETERRENCE, *STRATEGY, *UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, *NATIONAL SECURITY, *POLICIES, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, TREATIES, IRAN, THREATS, EVOLUTION(GENERAL), RISK ANALYSIS, ISRAEL, PAKISTAN, NORTH KOREA, TERRORISTS, RUSSIA
Identifiers: (U) NPR(NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW), *POST-COLD WAR ERA, NSS(NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY), NMS(NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY), NPT(NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY), ABM(ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY), RRW(RELIABLE REPLACEMENT WARHEAD)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The Cold War is over and the Soviet Union is gone. Africa, the South Pacific, and Latin America are nuclear weapon-free zones. China is a most favored trading partner. The United States and Russia have dismantled hundreds of nuclear weapons and decommissioned scores of bombers and submarines. There are numerous international treaties designed to create a world without the threat of nuclear holocaust. So why do states and other actors continue to seek nuclear weapons? Iran is in the media with its thinly veiled efforts to establish itself as a nuclear power. On 6 September 2007, Israel bombed a facility in Syria they believed to be a nuclear threat. North Korea is fattening its international bargaining power with its nuclear program. Pakistan, a nation teetering on the edge of political upheaval, has nuclear missiles. Transnational terrorist organizations relish the thought of acquiring an atomic device. Today's nuclear world is not the one our parent's knew. The main purpose of this paper is to assess U.S. strategy for nuclear deterrence and determine if it is appropriate for application in the post-Cold War world. The analysis examines five strategy documents: the U.S. National Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) submitted to Congress in December 2001, and a July 2007 statement by the Secretary of Defense, titled National Security and Nuclear Weapons: Maintaining Deterrence in the 21st Century. The author compares and contrasts U.S. strategy with alternative points of view from various sources to answer the following questions: What is our nuclear deterrence strategy?; What are the ends, ways, and means of our nuclear deterrence strategy?; Is the U.S. nuclear strategy feasible, acceptable, and suitable?; What are the counterpoints to our nuclear deterrence strategy?; and Does our strategy balance the risk it forces the world and us to assume?
ADA479790
A Uniform Approach to National Suicide Bomber Incident Response and Recovery
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Day, Dwayne C
Report Date: Mar 2008
Media Count: 141 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *TERRORISTS, *PREPARATION, *HUMANS, *BOMBS, *RESPONSE, *HOMELAND SECURITY, *FIRST RESPONDERS, UNITED STATES, RECOVERY, DEMOGRAPHY, PROTECTION, MOTIVATION, PUBLIC SAFETY, FEMALES, COUNTERTERRORISM, INDICATORS, MEDICAL SERVICES, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, PLANNING, THESES, THREATS, TRAINING, CRISIS MANAGEMENT, EMERGENCIES
Identifiers: (U) *SUICIDE BOMBERS, *SUICIDE BOMBER RESPONSE FRAMEWORK, HOMELAND SECURITY EXERCISES, IED(IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES), CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES, SHOOT TO KILL, INCIDENT COMMAND, EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, ISLAMIC EXTREMISM, RISK MITIGATION, AL QAEDA, TAMIL TIGERS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) First responders in the United States are not adequately prepared to respond to a suicide bomber attack. Police, fire, and Emergency Medical Services (EMS) are using protocols that do not anticipate the unique needs of a suicide bomber response. There is an urgent need to develop and implement a consistent approach for responding to suicide bombers. This thesis developed a Suicide Bomber Response Framework using International Association of Chiefs of Police training documents as the primary source, along with Technical Support Working Group training materials and recommendations from relevant national training institutions. A Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) full-scale exercise was then conducted for this thesis based on the newly written Framework to identify gaps between current standard operating procedures and operating procedures recommended by the Suicide Bomber Response Framework. Exercise evaluators identified a significant gap between standard operating procedures of first responders and the recommended response procedures in the Suicide Bomber Response Framework. The thesis argues that a unified suicide bomber response approach should be instituted nation-wide. Responding agencies would use the Suicide Bomber Response Framework as a tool to develop consistent response plans for this critical public safety concern.
ADA482267
Retooling Deterrence for the Long War
Descriptive Note: Research paper
Personal Author(s): Worthen, Norman M
Report Date: Mar 2008
Media Count: 35 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *ORGANIZATIONS, *DETERRENCE, *TERRORISM, *NATIONAL SECURITY, *STRATEGY, *HISTORY, LONG RANGE(TIME), COLD WAR, MOTIVATION, PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE, RADIATION HARDENING, POLICIES, RECOVERY, UNCERTAINTY, USSR, DOCTRINE, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, TERRORISTS
Identifiers: (U) AL QAEDA, *NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 2006, PREEMPTIVE ACTION, *PREEMPTION, ROGUE STATES, STATE SPONSORS, CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE, NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The 2006 National Security Strategy solicited new approaches to deterrence that will affect terrorists who are not deterrable through traditional means. Recent national strategy and doctrine documents have answered the call by redefining deterrence so that the traditional defensive, reactive concept is conflated with offensive preemptive action. This re-imagining of deterrence was misguided. Theory suggests that the new approach weakened deterrence instead of strengthening it and exchanged long-term progress for short-term risk avoidance. This project examines deterrence in history, exposes the divergence between traditional deterrence and current strategy, and proposes a new model of deterrence that illustrates the limitations of a strategy based on the physical effects generated by preemptive conventional weapons in a war against terrorists. The paper then recommends changes in policy that unlink preemption from deterrence, emphasize psychological effects and influence, and set realistic expectations.
ADA480812
United States Intelligence Community: Information Sharing Strategy
Report Date: 22 Feb 2008
Media Count: 25 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *INTELLIGENCE, *STRATEGY, *INFORMATION EXCHANGE, THREATS, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, COUNTERTERRORISM, TERRORISM, COLLABORATIVE TECHNIQUES
Identifiers: (U) *INFORMATION SHARING
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The need to share information became an imperative to protect our Nation in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on our homeland. The Intelligence Community's need-to-know culture, a necessity during the Cold War, is now a handicap that threatens our ability to uncover, respond, and protect against terrorism and other asymmetric threats. Each intelligence agency has its own networks and data repositories that make it very difficult to piece together facts and suppositions that, in the aggregate, could provide warning of the intentions of our adversaries. The inability or unwillingness to share information was recognized as an Intelligence community weakness by both the 9/11 Commission and the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Commission. The President and the Congress have mandated that the Intelligence Community create a more integrated enterprise where information is routinely shared. Since these mandates were issued, progress has been made in information sharing, realized through the stand up of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the Information Sharing Environment (ISE), and related partnership efforts. These endeavors, though proving to be excellent in facilitating greater information sharing, are the tip of the iceberg and continued focus on accelerating information sharing is needed. Simultaneously, consumers must protect the information made available to them.
ADA477531
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: Status and Trends
Descriptive Note: Congressional rept.
Personal Author(s): Kerr, Paul K
Report Date: 20 Feb 2008
Media Count: 32 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NUCLEAR WEAPONS, *FOREIGN POLICY, *GUIDED MISSILES, *THREATS, *CHEMICAL WARFARE, *MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, *BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, *UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, TERRORISTS, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, UNITED KINGDOM, INTERMEDIATE RANGE(DISTANCE), CHINA, IRAN, TREATIES, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, SHORT RANGE(DISTANCE), ARMS CONTROL, RUSSIA, FRANCE, LONG RANGE(DISTANCE), RISK, NORTH KOREA, INDIA, PAKISTAN, ISRAEL
Identifiers: (U) NONPROLIFERATION REGIMES, NUCLEAR WEAPON ARSENALS, BIOLOGICAL WEAPON ARSENALS, CHEMICAL WEAPON ARSENALS, NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES, SLBM(SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES), *WEAPONS PROLIFERATION, TREND ANALYSIS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The United States has long recognized the dangers inherent in the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, and missiles. This report, which analyzes NBC weapons programs potential threat patterns around the globe, is updated as needed. The total number of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in the world is shrinking as the major powers scale back their inventories through unilateral reductions and arms control, but other countries and groups still try to acquire these weapons. There are five established nuclear weapon states (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). India and Pakistan declared their nuclear weapons capability with nuclear tests in 1998, as did North Korea in 2006. Israel is also widely believed to have a nuclear weapon arsenal. About a dozen countries have offensive biological weapons (BW) programs, and the same number have chemical weapons (CW) programs. That number could grow as new technologies are developed and the international flow of information, goods, expertise, and technology continues. While the United States and Russia eliminated intermediate-range missiles and are reducing their intercontinental missile inventories, China is modernizing and expanding its missile force. North Korea, Iran, Israel, India, and Pakistan are building short- and medium-range missiles and are developing longer-range missiles. Dozens of countries have or are developing short-range ballistic missiles and more are likely to buy them. Over 80 countries have cruise missiles; about 40 manufacture or have the ability to manufacture them. And terrorists continue their efforts to acquire NBC capabilities. Elements in North Korea, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and other countries continue to export weapons technology. The number of countries or groups that will acquire or produce NBC weapons may decrease if diplomacy, arms control treaties, nonproliferation regimes, and security and assistance strategies are effective.
ADA489222
Radiological Dispersal Device Primer: From A Terrorists Perspective
Descriptive Note: Research rept.
Personal Author(s): Hanson, Joel T
Report Date: 15 Feb 2008
Media Count: 62 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *RADIOLOGICAL WARFARE, *RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS, *RADIATION EFFECTS, DISPERSING, EXPLOSIVES, COVERT OPERATIONS, BOMBS, TERRORISM, CURRENTS, RADIOLOGY, RADIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS, DETECTORS, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, WEAPONS, TERRORISTS
Identifiers: (U) *BIOLOGICAL IMPACT, *PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT, RDD(RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL DEVICE), VULNERABILTY, RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, DIRTY BOMBS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Radiological weapons are a growing threat within the United States. Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs), or more commonly referred to as dirty bombs , offer terrorists a potential means to inflict major damage to the American economy and psyche. A RDD is defined as a weapon designed to disperse radioactive material over an area using either conventional explosives or more covert dispersion methods such as air currents. A RDD is considered by many experts to be a weapon of choice in that it offers the potential for 9/11-type returns for the relatively low-tech knowledge required to construct and deploy the weapon. It is clear the American public agrees the RDD threat is real based on the massive growth in information dedicated to the subject on the Internet. A simple Google search conducted in December 2007 incorporating the search term dirty bomb coupled with the year 1987 identified 26,200 hits. Ten years later, using the year 1997, identified twice as many hits - 56,600. Another search for 2005 and then 2006 identified 309,000 and 326,000 hits, respectively. In 2007, the number of hits jumps to 620,000. Clearly, a one year doubling of Internet information related to dirty bombs reveals a heightened awareness of the issue among the public. U.S. local, state and federal governments appear to agree based on efforts to fund and deploy radiation detection equipment, develop/implement consequence management plans and conduct large scale RDD exercises - all in 2007.
ADA476703
Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Descriptive Note: Annual rept.
Personal Author(s): McConnell, J M
Report Date: 05 Feb 2008
Media Count: 48 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *TERRORISTS, *NATIONAL SECURITY, *THREAT EVALUATION, *MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, CONGRESS, PANEL(COMMITTEE), SENATE
Identifiers: (U) *THREAT ASSESSMENT
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Chairman Rockefeller, Vice-Chairman Bond, Members of the Committee, thank you for the invitation to offer my assessment of threats to US national security. ... In addition to this unclassified Statement for the Record, I will submit a classified Statement and make an oral presentation to the Committee. Before I talk about specific threats, I want to raise an issue of immediate importance for the functioning of the Intelligence Community and protection of the nation. The authorities granted by the Protect America Act (PAA) which temporarily closed gaps in our intelligence collection and allowed the Intelligence Community to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance are critical to our intelligence efforts to protect the Nation from current threats. Briefly, some of the most important benefits include: * Better understanding of international al-Qa'ida networks; * Greater insight into future terrorist plans that have allowed us to disrupt attacks; * More extensive knowledge of instructions to foreign terrorist associates about entering the United States * Information on efforts to obtain guns and ammunition * Knowledge on terrorist money transfers. Expiration of the Act would lead to the loss of important tools the Intelligence Community relies on to discover the plans of our enemies. As reflected in your Committee report, merely extending the PAA without addressing retroactive liability protection for the private sector will likely have far reaching consequences for the Intelligence Community. At the request of members of Congress, I have provided letters discussing these matters in greater depth.
ADA493795
CTC Sentinel. Volume 1, Issue 3, Feb 2008. Counter-Terrorism Issues for the Next President
Descriptive Note: Journal
Personal Author(s): Clarke, Richard, Knake, Rob
Report Date: Feb 2008
Media Count: 33 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *COUNTERTERRORISM, *HOMELAND SECURITY, *PRESIDENT(UNITED STATES), *MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, PERIODICALS, PHILIPPINES, AFGHANISTAN, TERRORISM, SECURITY, IRAQ, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, MILITARY PUBLICATIONS
Identifiers: (U) CTC(COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The next president will inherit from the current administration a dysfunctional counter-terrorism apparatus. The U.S. military has been stretched thin by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the intelligence community has been discredited by the lack of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the ongoing failed hunt for Usama bin Ladin, and the Department of Homeland Security has so many missions and so many disparate agencies that it is ineffective. An even more challenging task will be to restore to the United States credibility in the world and to reduce the number of people who bear us ill will. Every new president has about a year when they can better achieve goals and changes because of their fresh mandate from the people. Without a clear agenda, however, the first year can be easily squandered and political capital spent on other, less important matters. In an effort to prevent this from occurring, the authors propose a three-part framework for combating terrorism that involves drying up support for terrorism, improving our intelligence capabilities and rethinking our approach to homeland security.
ADA487294
National Infrastructure Advisory Council: Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Events and the Critical Infrastructure Workforce. Final Report and Recommendations
Descriptive Note: Final rept.
Personal Author(s): Denlinger, Rebecca F, Marsh, Martha H, Rhode, Bruce A, Gallegos, Gilbert G ,Nicholson, James B ,Nye, Erle A ,Thompson, John W
Report Date: 08 Jan 2008
Media Count: 89 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *RECOVERY, *INFRASTRUCTURE, *ATTACK, *TERRORISM, BIOLOGICAL AGENTS, TRAINING, RESPONSE, PLANNING, THREAT EVALUATION, CHEMICAL AGENTS, CASUALTIES, RADIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS, FIRST RESPONDERS, CIVIL DEFENSE, DISASTERS, INTERAGENCY COORDINATION, SCENARIOS, METHODOLOGY
Identifiers: (U) CBR(CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL RADIOLOGICAL), MASS CASUALTIES, RESPONSE, RECOMMENDATIONS, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, NIMS(NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM), TIME CRITICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS, PANDEMICS, DISSEMINATION, CRITICAL EMPLOYEES
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) convened a Working Group to study the impact of chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) events on the critical infrastructure worker, and to make recommendations. NIAC designed this report to identify attributes of different chemical, biological, or radiological event scenarios, identify key elements necessary to sustain critical infrastructure operations, and to make recommendations that will improve our ability to contain the impact, recover from its consequences, and restore the nation's critical infrastructure to a pre-event state. The NIAC formed an approach to the CBR study that focused on six key questions. These questions were: 1) Do organizations have programs focused on CBR event planning, preparedness, response or training? 2) Is there a market or other financial incentive to invest in CBR planning, preparedness, response or training capabilities? 3) Is there a sufficient communications infrastructure in place to support CBR event response and recovery? 4) What tools and technologies are available, or should be made available in the future, to support CBR event planning, preparedness, response or training programs? 5) Is there sufficient coordination between Federal, state, local, and private sector entities in support of CBR planning, preparedness, response, or training programs? and 6) What can the Federal government do to encourage or enhance planning, preparedness, response, and training capabilities across the public and private sectors? This Report addresses the rationale behind these questions. The Executive Summary highlights key themes found throughout the document, and identifies a number of findings and recommendations that are common across CBR events. Included in subsequent sections are appendices that identify specific findings and recommendations unique to chemical, biological, or radiological events.
ADA486310
Dangerous Thresholds. Managing Escalation in the 21st Century
Personal Author(s): Morgan, Forrest E ,Mueller, Karl P, Medeiros, Evan S ,Pollpeter, Kevin L ,Cliff, Roger
Report Date: Jan 2008
Media Count: 276 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *STRATEGIC ANALYSIS, *UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE, *COMBAT AREAS, SECURITY, ATTACK, ENEMY, STRATEGIC WARFARE, MILITARY COMMANDERS, MILITARY PLANNING, TERRORISM, MILITARY DOCTRINE, UNITED STATES, NUCLEAR WARFARE, COLD WAR
Identifiers: (U) AIR FORCE PROJECT, ESCALATION, GLOBAL JIHAD
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The subject of escalation has received little attention in U.S. strategic thought since the end of the Cold War. With prospects of conflict between nuclear-armed superpowers receding in memory, few policymakers, security analysts, or military leaders have worried about the danger of wars spinning out of control or considered how to manage these risks. Yet there are important reasons to examine the dynamics of escalation in the current security environment. Although the United States retains its nuclear superiority and has demonstrated the ability to pro- project overwhelming force in most conventional conflicts, strategic conditions have changed considerably in the past 15 years, and new adversaries have emerged. These developments could find the United States in escalatory situations that its leaders, schooled in ideas developed during the Cold War, are ill equipped to anticipate or manage. Understanding escalation is particularly important to the U.S. Air Force because of its unique ability to strike deep within enemy territory and the emphasis in Air Force doctrine on rapid strategic attack to achieve shock, paralysis, and escalation dominance. The Air Force recognizes the importance of understanding and managing the risks of escalation. In 2004, Director of Air Force Strategic Planning Major General Ronald J. Bath sponsored a war game in which uncontrolled escalation occurred, surprising players and controllers alike. Because this experience was just one in a series of escalatory events occurring in major war games over the past several years, General Bath recommended to Air Force Chief of Staff General John P. Jumper that the RAND Corporation be tasked to examine the risks of escalation in the current security environment and offer recommendations on how the Air Force can best anticipate and manage those risks.
ADA509509
US Foreign Policy toward North Korea: A Way Ahead
Descriptive Note: Journal article
Personal Author(s): Ogden, II, Robert F, Anderson, David A
Report Date: Jan 2008
Media Count: 49 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), *UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, *NATIONAL SECURITY, *FOREIGN POLICY, *NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, *NORTH KOREA, *INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, AGREEMENTS, TERRORISM, COOPERATION, SOUTH KOREA, CHINA, NEGOTIATIONS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, RUSSIA, JAPAN, THREATS, MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), STABILITY, REPRINTS, DIPLOMACY, NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Identifiers: (U) *NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS, *GROUP OF FOUR, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, BUSH GEORGE W, CLINTON WILLIAM J, SIX-PARTY TALKS, DEMILITARIZED ZONES, WMD PROLIFERATION, REGIONAL STABILITY, HUMAN DIGNITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, CURRENCY COUNTERFEITING, NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) It is clear that while both the Clinton and Bush administrations have taken different approaches, in both cases U.S. policy has narrowly focused on the nuclear issue, tended to ignore or otherwise not meet the interests of North Korea, and ineffectively leveraged other regional players. Not surprisingly, the results have been the same. North Korea remains an adversarial country with nuclear ambitions, and comprehensive U.S. interests have not been met. The solution to the problem is not to drum up old policies but to develop a new policy -- a way ahead that addresses the shortcomings of past policies. More precisely, substantial and enduring results can only be realized when the United States develops a policy based on a comprehensive analysis of its own national security strategy and other supporting policy documents, as well as those of the Group of Four (four key regional players -- Japan, China, South Korea, and Russia) and North Korea. This analysis must include identifying and acknowledging the legitimate interests of North Korea, comparing them to U.S. security interests, and defining the challenges and incorporating opportunities the United States has in working with regional parties in addressing U.S. interests. The article is divided into the following sections: A History of Policy Failure; National Security Interests of the United States; National Security Interests of China; National Security Interests of Japan; National Security Interests of South Korea; National Security Interests of Russia; National Security Interests of the DPRK, including its conventional military, nuclear weapons, and economic development; Comparing U.S. Interests to the Group of Four with regard to terrorism, WMD proliferation, regional stability, human dignity/human rights, and economic development; and Comparing U.S. Interests to North Korean Interests.
ADA488333
Nosocomial Infection of Serratia marcescens May Induce a Protective Effect of Monkeys Exposed to Bacillus anthracis
Descriptive Note: Journal article
Personal Author(s): Leffel, Elizabeth K, Twenhafel, Nancy A, Whitehouse, Chris A
Report Date: Jan 2008
Media Count: 4 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *ANTHRAX, *SERRATIA MARCESCENS, *BACILLUS ANTHRACIS, *BACTEREMIA, ILLNESS, PRIMATES, RESPONSE(BIOLOGY), AFRICA, IMMUNITY, GENETICS, LETHAL DOSAGE, COLONIES(BIOLOGY), TOXINS AND ANTITOXINS, VEINS, NATURAL HISTORY, CATHETERS, MONKEYS, LABORATORY ANIMALS, BLOOD CELLS, STREPTOCOCCUS PYOGENES, SPORES, SIGNS AND SYMPTOMS, BIOTERRORISM, REPRINTS, CLINICAL MEDICINE
Identifiers: (U) PROTECTIVE EFFECT, COLEY'S TOXIN, EFFICACY, NONHUMAN PRIMATES
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This study was originally designed to collect data on the natural history of inhalational anthrax in a new nonhuman primate model. An uncontrollable event created a new experimental condition which allowed us to retrospectively evaluate the power of the innate immune system to protect from an aerosol exposure of B. anthracis. Five African green monkeys (AGMs) had intravenous catheters implanted. One catheter was accidentally pulled out, leaving four AGMs with catheters and one without. All were exposed, to multiple lethal doses of B. anthracis Ames strain. Blood was collected twice daily to evaluate bacteremia. The AGM with no catheter had blood drawn from a femoral vein and became bacteremic on Day 9; succumbed to inhalational anthrax on Day 10. The other four AGMs had S. marcescens contamination in the catheter; indicated by pure colonies grown from the blood. None of these AGMs showed clinical signs of illness, had B. anthracis or a detectable level of protective antigen in the bloodstream. It appears that the presence of S. marcescens may have induced a Coley's toxin effect in this experiment. The innate immune response may have protected the AGMs from a lethal inhalational dose of B. anthracis spores.
ADA489540
Deterrence from Cold War to Long War: Lessons from Six Decades of RAND Research
Descriptive Note: Monograph
Personal Author(s): Long, Austin
Report Date: Jan 2008
Media Count: 124 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *FOREIGN POLICY, *DETERRENCE, *THEORY, *STRATEGY, *LESSONS LEARNED, *UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, *NATIONAL SECURITY, CHINA, COUNTERFORCES(MILITARY), TAIWAN, BIBLIOGRAPHIES, COLD WAR, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, TERRORISM, RUSSIA, MILITARY HISTORY, NORTH KOREA, VIETNAM WAR, NATIONAL DEFENSE
Identifiers: (U) NONSTATE ACTORS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) A decade after the end of the Cold War, many viewed the attacks of September 11, 2001, as confirming the end of deterrence. Despite overwhelming nuclear and conventional superiority, the United States suffered a major attack on its own soil for the first time since World War II. In response to this atrocity, the 2002 United States national security strategy proclaimed the irrelevance of deterrence to many important challenges from both state and nonstate actors. Yet reports of the demise of deterrence were greatly exaggerated. The 2006 version of the national security strategy returned deterrence to the lexicon of U.S. national defense. More importantly, it provides the framework from which this revival of deterrence springs. This framework is that of a long struggle, similar to what our country faced in the early years of the Cold War. Deterrence, the unpalatable but indispensable strategy of the old Cold War, will be an equally indispensable part of the strategy of the new long war. This book consists of seven main sections. The first presents a brief history of RAND's role in the development of deterrence theory and policy. The second provides an assessment of the relevance of Cold War era deterrence research to the challenges of the long war. The next section discusses the theoretical basis of deterrence and its components as well as some generic policy considerations that are derived from the theory. The fourth section describes why deterrence was the strategy the United States adopted for the Cold War and the benefits that accrued from this choice. The fifth section describes in more detail various technical and doctrinal approaches to making deterrence effective that RAND studied. The next section describes RAND efforts to study the psychological and organizational elements of deterrence. The final section presents three contexts and scenarios related to the long war in which RAND deterrence research might be relevant.
ADA500447
Select Agent Recovery and Identification Using Aptamer-Linked Immoblized Sorbent Assay
Descriptive Note: Conference proceedings
Personal Author(s): Kiel, Johnathan L, Holwitt, Eric A, Sorola, Veronica K
Report Date: Jan 2008
Media Count: 8 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, *IDENTIFICATION, *BIOTERRORISM, DIAGNOSIS(MEDICINE), ASSAYING, MICROBIOLOGICAL TESTS, SWITZERLAND, TULAREMIA, QUANTUM DOTS, DEOXYRIBONUCLEIC ACIDS, CHELATION, SYMPOSIA, CASUALTIES
Identifiers: (U) FOREIGN REPORTS, APTAMERS, SHIGA TOXIN, ALISA(APTAMER-LINKED IMMOBILIZED SORBENT ASSAYS), NANOCRYSTALS, PE62202F, WUAFRL7757P401
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Environmental recovery and identification technology for Select Agents (potential biological warfare or terrorism agents) requires the capability of a flexible and rapid response, whose rapidity and flexibility exceed the current capability of immunodiagnostic assays. These new assays also need to be brought as far forward in the Area of Responsibility as possible to facilitate the appropriate sequestration of exposed areas, handling of exposed individuals and expected casualties. Therefore, any such new assays must be extremely robust and require a minimal logistic tail. We present here examples of such a new technology, Aptamer-Linked Immobilized Sorbent Assays (ALISA). A form of this aptamer-linked assay was used recently in Houston, Texas, to address a tularemia alarm of Biowatch. It compared favorably to a number of standard microbiological techniques and immunoassays. We present here formats for this assay that go further to meet the robustness requirement than the standard ELISA-like format.
ADA475702
Pakistan's Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War
Personal Author(s): Sokolski, Henry D
Report Date: Jan 2008
Media Count: 386 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NUCLEAR WEAPONS, *PAKISTAN, *TERRORISM, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, WARFARE, NATIONAL SECURITY, GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), AFGHANISTAN, SOUTH ASIA, RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS, FISSIONABLE MATERIALS, LESSONS LEARNED, POLICIES, TERRORISTS, INDIA
Identifiers: (U) SOUTHWEST ASIAN DETERRENCE, TALIBAN
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Raise the issue of Pakistan's nuclear program before almost any group of Western security analysts, and they are likely to throw up their hands. What might happen if the current Pakistani government is taken over by radicalized political forces sympathetic to the Taliban? Such a government, they fear, might share Pakistan's nuclear weapons materials and know-how with others, including terrorist organizations. Then there is the possibility that a more radical government might pick a war again with India. Could Pakistan prevail against India s superior conventional forces without threatening to resort to nuclear arms? If not, what, if anything, might persuade Pakistan to stand its nuclear forces down? There are no good answers to these questions and even fewer near or mid-term fixes against such contingencies. This, in turn, encourages a kind of policy fatalism with regard to Pakistan. This book, which reflects research that the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center commissioned over the last 2 years, takes a different tack. Instead of asking questions that have few or no good answers, this volume tries to characterize specific nuclear problems that the ruling Pakistani government faces with the aim of establishing a base line set of challenges for remedial action. Its point of departure is to consider what nuclear challenges Pakistan will face if moderate forces remain in control of the government and no hot war breaks out against India. A second volume of commissioned research planned for publication in 2008 will consider how best to address these challenges.
ADA475044
Intelligence Estimates: How Useful to Congress?
Descriptive Note: Congressional rept.
Personal Author(s): Best, Jr, Richard A
Report Date: 14 Dec 2007
Media Count: 19 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *IRAQ, *INTELLIGENCE, *ESTIMATES, *LIMITATIONS, *TERRORISM, *IRAN, *RELIABILITY, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ANALYSTS, CONSUMER PROBLEMS, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, JUDGEMENT(PSYCHOLOGY), MILITARY CAPABILITIES, POLICIES, NATIONAL SECURITY, STABILITY, CONGRESS
Identifiers: (U) *NIE(NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES), GLOBAL TERRORISM, NIC(NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL), DNI(DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE), INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS, INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are often of considerable interest to Members of Congress. They represent the most formal assessment of a given issue by the U.S. Intelligence Community and address issues of major national security importance that may require congressional action. The intelligence process, however, is not an exact science and some NIEs have proved unreliable because they were based on insufficient evidence or contained faulty analysis. This was demonstrated in the NIE produced in 2002 on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction, parts of which were significantly inaccurate. NIEs can provide insights into the likely effects of certain policy approaches, but they are not made to take into account the details of planned U.S. diplomatic, economic, military, or legislative initiatives. In the past, Congress was not a principal consumer of NIEs but now appears increasingly interested in obtaining NIEs on crucial security issues despite or perhaps because of the experience with the 2002 Iraq NIE. The FY2007 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 109-364, section 1213) specifically requested a comprehensive NIE on Iran. In Feb 2007 the Intelligence Community also released an NIE on Prospects for Iraq's Stability in response to a congressional request. In early Dec 2007 the Director of National Intelligence released the Key Judgments of a National Intelligence Estimate, Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities. The new NIE judged with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program. Even though the NIE did recognize that with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons, this dramatic release of the Key Judgments on Iran heightened interest in the NIE process and its relevance to policy making. Some observers assert, however, that public discussion on specific NIEs may not adequately reflect the process by which they are prepared or their inherent limitations.
ADA475516
Countering Maritime Terrorism in the Caribbean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean: Implications of Possible Maritime Terrorism in the Caribbean
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Mitchell, Colin L
Report Date: 14 Dec 2007
Media Count: 87 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *THREATS, *SECURITY, *PORTS(FACILITIES), *CARGO SHIPS, *TERRORISM, *TANKER SHIPS, *CARIBBEAN SEA, *WEST INDIES, UNITED STATES, VULNERABILITY, AMMONIA, TREATIES, SHIPPING, HOMELAND SECURITY, LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS, CRUDE OIL, HAZARDOUS MATERIALS, COUNTERTERRORISM, ATLANTIC OCEAN, PROTECTION, THESES, GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN)
Identifiers: (U) *MARITIME SECURITY, *TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO, *PORT SECURITY, MARITIME PIRACY, MARITIME SAFETY, MARITIME TERRORISM, HARBOR DEFENSE, COASTAL CONTROL, MARITIME OPERATIONS, CARICOM(CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY AND COMMON MARKET TREATY), DANGEROUS CARGO, COMBUSTIBLE GASES
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The United States is a major trading partner with Trinidad and Tobago, and many ships transport dangerous cargoes like liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the port of Point Fortin to Eastern seaboard ports in the United States. Despite the potential danger these cargoes pose, they were not viewed as a particular threat to the United States until the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, when aircraft were used as weapons of mass destruction. Since the 11 September attacks, the United States has taken measures that will make it very difficult for terrorists to initiate a similar attack. A determined terrorist will now have to be more imaginative and look further afield to find targets to strike. Many terrorists may look to the sea for such targets of opportunity. One possibility is that terrorists could capture an inbound tanker loaded with LNG, blow it up, and in doing so cause a number of casualties and serious infrastructure damage. The author attempts to answer the following question: Given the potentially dangerous cargoes that sail the sea from Trinidad and Tobago to ports in the United States, what measures should be adopted to increase maritime security to deter potential terrorists from following this course of action?
ADA474950
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Descriptive Note: Congressional rept.
Personal Author(s): Katzman, Kenneth
Report Date: 05 Dec 2007
Media Count: 65 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NUCLEAR WEAPONS, *FOREIGN POLICY, *UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, *THREATS, *GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), *TERRORISM, *IRAN, LEBANON, MILITARY ASSISTANCE, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, ELECTIONS, WAR POTENTIAL, NEGOTIATIONS, PALESTINIANS, URANIUM, POLITICAL PARTIES, LEGISLATION, UNITED NATIONS, DISCRIMINATION, DIPLOMACY, REACTOR FUEL ENRICHMENT, ETHNIC GROUPS, GEOPOLITICS, MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), BANKING, GUIDED MISSILES, ISRAEL, IRAQ
Identifiers: (U) *SANCTIONS, MAHMOUD AHMADINEJAD, PMOI(PEOPLES MOJAHEDIN ORGANIZATION OF IRAN), DISSIDENTS, REVOLUTIONARY GUARD, QODS FORCE, REGIME CHANGE, ENGAGEMENT, TERRORISM SUPPORT, LEBANESE HEZBOLLAH, HAMAS, SHIITE MILITIAS, GEORGE W BUSH ADMINISTRATION, IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN IRAQ, HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, AL QAEDA, TRADE BANS, BANKING BANS, LOAN POLICIES, ISA(IRAN SANCTIONS ACT), UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) According to the Administration's National Security Strategy document released on March 16, 2006, the United States may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran. That Administration perception continues, generated primarily by Iran's nuclear program but intensified by Iran's military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan and to Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah. However, the threat perception of other governments might change following the December 3, 2007 release of key judgements from a new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that indicates that Iran is likely not on a drive to develop an actual nuclear weapon. The Bush Administration argues that the NIE at least partly validates its approaches to containing the potential threat posed by Iran -- strengthening international economic and political isolation of Iran to compel it to comply with international demands that it curb its program. Still, the NIE does not claim that Iran has complied with U.N. Security Council demands that it cease uranium enrichment. Two U.N. resolutions (1737 and 1747) ban weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related trade with Iran, freeze the assets of Iran's nuclear and related entities and personalities, prevent Iran from transferring arms outside Iran, and require reporting on international travel by named Iranians. With Iran still refusing to comply on enrichment but apparently mostly cooperating with an August 2007 offer to reveal to the International Atomic Energy Agency additional information on its past nuclear program, further sanctions, possibly including on civilian trade or financing, have been under discussion at the U.N. Security Council. Separate U.S. efforts, showing some success, have included trying to persuade European governments to curb trade, investment, and credits to Iran; and pressuring foreign banks not to do business with Iran.
ADA480735
Libya: Background and U.S. Relations
Descriptive Note: Congressional rept.
Personal Author(s): Blanchard, Christopher M
Report Date: 03 Dec 2007
Media Count: 39 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, LIBYA, GUIDED MISSILES, CONGRESS, UNITED STATES, POLITICAL SCIENCE, ECONOMICS, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, COUNTERTERRORISM
Identifiers: (U) DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) On May 15, 2006, the Bush Administration announced its intention to restore full diplomatic relations with Libya and to rescind Libya's listing as a state sponsor of terrorism and a country not fully cooperating with U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Presidential Determination No. 2006-14 certified that the government of Libya had not provided any support for international terrorism during the preceding six months and had provided assurances that it would not support acts of international terrorism in the future. Full diplomatic relations were restored on May 31 when the United States upgraded its Liaison Office in Tripoli to an Embassy. A 45-day congressional notification period ended on June 29, and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice removed Libya's listings and ended the associated trade restrictions on June 30, without immediate public announcement. President Bush nominated a career diplomat, Gene Cretz, for the U.S. ambassadorship to Libya on July 11, 2007. The changes mark the culmination of an initial period of improvement and rapprochement in U.S.-Libyan relations that began in December 2003, when the Libyan government announced its decision to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction and long-range missile programs. Administration officials have stated that normalization of U.S.-Libyan relations will provide opportunities for the United States to address specific issues of potential concern to Congress such as political and economic reform, the development of energy resources, and human rights.
ADA476772
Paramilitary Terrorism: A Neglected Threat
Descriptive Note: Research paper
Personal Author(s): Tallen, Jr, George W
Report Date: 06 Nov 2007
Media Count: 27 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *PLANNING, *TERRORISM, *PARAMILITARY FORCES, *HOMELAND SECURITY, TERRORISTS, CRISIS MANAGEMENT, COUNTERTERRORISM, ATTACK, RESPONSE
Identifiers: (U) SOFT TARGETS, HARD TARGETS, NIMS(NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM), LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, SWAT(SPECIAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS) TEAMS, HOSTAGE RESCUE, REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE, ANTITERRORISM
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Fixation upon WMD terrorism, reinforced by the recurring need to manage the consequences of other manmade or natural disasters, has conditioned the homeland security community to focus upon prevention and consequence management, with scant attention paid to resolving an ongoing terrorist incident of a paramilitary nature. The seizure of national assets by an armed paramilitary group is a possibility that should not be ignored. Terrorist seizure of either a soft target, like Russia's Beslan No. 1 school in 2004, or a hard target such as nuclear materials or facilities, could have enormous strategic consequences. It would demand swift, decisive response probably beyond the capability of local agencies. Domestic counterterrorist capabilities are poorly postured for response to such an incident. Standing, regionally based, swiftly responding federal forces with a streamlined command and control structure are needed, along with a reorientation of homeland security guidance, training and exercises to include response to threats of this nature.
ADA477049
Dismantling Terrorism: Developing Actionable Solutions for Today's Plague of Violence
Descriptive Note: Bibliography
Personal Author(s): Scott, Frances K
Report Date: Nov 2007
Media Count: 43 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *COUNTERTERRORISM, *TERRORISM, GROUP DYNAMICS, MIDDLE EAST, ISLAM, NETWORKS, THREATS, VULNERABILITY, BIBLIOGRAPHIES, REPORTS, CRIMES, DEMOCRACY, BOOKS, MASS MEDIA, GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION, FINANCE, PERIODICALS, CULTURE, PERCEPTION(PSYCHOLOGY), GLOBALIZATION, HOMELAND SECURITY, INSURGENCY, HISTORY, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, ETHICS, BEHAVIOR, MOTIVATION, WOMEN, PREVENTION
Identifiers: (U) ORIGINS, DEFINITIONS, TERRORIST IDEOLOGIES, TERRORIST VIOLENCE, PUBLIC SUPPORT, STATE SUPPORT, STATE SPONSORS, SUICIDE BOMBERS, AL QAEDA, HEZBOLLAH, HAMAS, JIHAD, POVERTY, FAILED STATES, TERRORIST FINANCING
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This bibliography presents books, government documents, reports, and journal articles on various aspects of terrorism. The bibliography is divided into the following sections: causes and origins of terrorism, geographical distribution of terrorist groups, terrorist financing, terrorist groups and networks, the psychology of terrorism, prevention of terrorism, remedies for terrorism, terrorist violence, and bibliographies and reference works.
ADA474480
Regional Threats and Security Strategy: The Troubling Case of Today's Middle East
Descriptive Note: Monograph
Personal Author(s): Russell, James A
Report Date: Nov 2007
Media Count: 57 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *FOREIGN POLICY, *STRATEGY, *SECURITY, *INSTABILITY, *IRAQI WAR, *GEOPOLITICS, *MIDDLE EAST, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ASYMMETRIC WARFARE, BALANCE OF POWER, TERRORISM, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, STRATEGIC ANALYSIS, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, DEFENSE PLANNING, THREATS
Identifiers: (U) *REGIONAL SECURITY, REGIONAL STABILITY, SECURITY STRATEGY, IRAQ INVASION, REGIONAL THREATS, GEOPOLITICAL INSTABILITY, REGIONAL NET ASSESSMENT, INTERSTATE THREATS, INTRASTATE THREATS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Like the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War of 1967, the U.S. invasion of Iraq is fundamentally reordering regional politics and security in ways that will be felt for a generation, if not longer. The Pandora's Box opened by the United States in Iraq adds a new level of unwelcome complexity to an already strained regional fabric. Threats to regional security stem from global, interstate, and intrastate sources. The complicated, multidimensional, and interrelated natures of these threats suggest that the United States must reassess strategy and policy if it is to protect and further its regional interests. The objective of this monograph is threefold: (1) deconstruct the threats to regional security and stability in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion, (2) determine whether U.S. strategy is tailored to the threat environment, and (3) suggest steps that can be taken to bring strategy and the environment into closer alignment. Such a process runs counter to the current defense planning methodology paradigm used by the Defense Department. Both the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and its predecessor released just after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks called for the divorce of U.S. strategy and defense planning from specific regional threats and contingencies. Instead, the planning documents called for the development of capabilities portfolios to enable U.S. military forces to fight in a series of different operational environments: irregular warfare against nonstate actors, traditional interstate warfare, catastrophic attacks using weapons of mass destruction, and disruptive attacks from adversaries using cyber-warfare or other advanced technologies. This monograph argues that the United States needs to reconnect its strategy, policy, and defense planning to regional environments if it is to have any hope of mitigating threats to its interests, not just in the Middle East, but around the world.
ADA473792
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism: Background and Issues for Congress
Descriptive Note: Congressional rept.
Personal Author(s): Perl, Raphael F
Report Date: 01 Nov 2007
Media Count: 20 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NATIONAL SECURITY, *STRATEGY, *COUNTERTERRORISM, CONGRESS, ATTACK, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, IRAQ, POLICIES
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) On September 5, 2006, the White House released the 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. This report examines the Strategy in the context of its predecessor, released in 2003, and identifies issues and options for consideration by Congress. The 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism provides a framework for protecting the United States and its allies from terrorist attacks. Core components of the Strategy are to disrupt and disable terrorist networks across the globe, and foster international cooperation in these efforts, Creating a global intolerance of terrorism is central as well.
ADA473785
Nuclear Weapons in U.S. National Security Policy: Past, Present, and Prospects
Descriptive Note: Congressional rept.
Personal Author(s): Woolf, AMy F
Report Date: 29 Oct 2007
Media Count: 26 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NUCLEAR WEAPONS, *NATIONAL SECURITY, USSR, MILITARY STRATEGY, DETERRENCE, COLD WAR, UNITED STATES, POLICIES
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The Bush Administration has outlined a strategy of tailored deterrence to define the role that nuclear weapons play in U.S. national security policy. There has been little discussion of this concept, either in Congress or in the public at large. This leaves unanswered questions about how this strategy differs from U.S. nuclear strategy during the Cold War and how it might advise decisions about the size and structure of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Throughout the Cold War, the United States relied on nuclear weapons to deter an attack by the Soviet Union and its allies and to forestall the outbreak of a global war between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, the broad Cold Warera agreement about the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy began to dissolve during the 1990s, after the demise of the Soviet Union. Further, in response to emerging threats to U.S. national security, the Bush Administration has argued that the United States must alter its deterrence strategy from one size fits all deterrence to tailored deterrence for rogue powers, terrorist networks, and near-peer competitors.
ADA475066
Full Text (pdf) Availability:
Intelligence Issues for Congress
Descriptive Note: Congressional rept.
Personal Author(s): Best, Jr, Richard A
Report Date: 19 Oct 2007
Media Count: 26 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *CONGRESS, *INTELLIGENCE, NATIONAL SECURITY, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, COUNTERTERRORISM, LEGISLATION, TERRORISM
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) To address the challenges facing the U.S. Intelligence Community in the 21st century, congressional and executive branch initiatives have sought to improve coordination among the different agencies and to encourage better analysis. In December 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108- 458) was signed, providing for a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with substantial authorities to manage the national intelligence effort. The legislation also established a separate Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
ADA474597
The National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress
Descriptive Note: Congressional rept.
Personal Author(s): Shea, Dana A, Monke, Jim, Gottron, Frank
Report Date: 04 Oct 2007
Media Count: 19 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *RESEARCH FACILITIES, *AGRICULTURE, *PATHOGENIC MICROORGANISMS, *ZOONOTIC DISEASES, *BIOTERRORISM, *SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH, *ANIMAL DISEASES, POLICIES, CONTAINMENT(GENERAL), HOMELAND SECURITY, PLANTS(BOTANY), VETERINARY MEDICINE, PUBLIC SAFETY, COUNTERMEASURES, LEGISLATION, CONSTRUCTION, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Identifiers: (U) *BIOLOGICAL PATHOGENS, *BIODEFENSE, *AGRODEFENSE, *AGROTERRORISM, PLANT DISEASES, USDA(US DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE), DHS(DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY), PIADC(PLUM ISLAND ANIMAL DISEASE CENTER), NBAF(NATIONAL BIO- AND AGRO-DEFENSE FACILITY), FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE, SITE SELECTION, BIOCONTAINMENT LABORATORIES, PROSPECTIVE SITES
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States is potentially susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the impacts of such an attack on the economy, some animal diseases could potentially be transmitted to humans. These diseases are known as zoonotic diseases. Scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases may lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostics and countermeasures, reducing the risk and impact of a successful terrorist attack. To safeguard the United States against animal disease, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) engages in research on animal diseases not native to the United States at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) off the coast of New York. With the formation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003, the PIADC facility was transferred from USDA to DHS, though USDA continues its research program at the facility. DHS has established a foreign animal disease research program in cooperation with USDA at PIADC. DHS has identified the facility as outdated and too limited to continue to be the primary research facility. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 tasks the Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland Security to develop a plan to provide safe, secure, and state-of-the-art agriculture biocontainment laboratories for research and development of diagnostic capabilities and medical countermeasures for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases. To partially meet these obligations, DHS has announced plans to construct a new facility, the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). This facility would house high-containment laboratories able to handle the pathogens currently under investigation at PIADC, as well as other pathogens of interest. The DHS plans to select the site in 2008 and open NBAF in 2014. The final construction costs will depend on the site location and may exceed the $451 million projected cost.
ADA471827
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Descriptive Note: Congressional rept.
Personal Author(s): Katzman, Kenneth
Report Date: 05 Sep 2007
Media Count: 62 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *FOREIGN POLICY, *GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), *INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, *IRAN, TERRORISTS, DIPLOMACY, UNITED NATIONS, LEGISLATION, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Identifiers: (U) *SANCTIONS, NUCLEAR PROGRAM
Distribution Statement:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) According to the Administration's National Security Strategy document released on March 16, 2006, the United States may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran. That perception continues, generated primarily by Iran's nuclear program and intensified by Iran's military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan and to Lebanese Hezbollah. In part to direct regional attention to that view but also to engage Iran on an Iraq solution, the Administration attended regional conferences on Iraq on March 10, 2007, and May 3-4, 2007, both attended by Iran (and Syria), and subsequently held bilateral meetings with Iran in Baghdad on May 28 and July 24, agreeing in the latter meeting to form a working group on Iraq security issues, which met for the first time on August 6. The Bush Administration is pursuing several approaches to attempt to contain the potential threat posed by Iran, but the U.S. emphasis is now on multilateral economic sanctions on Iran. Iran has not complied with repeated U.N. Security Council deadlines since August 2006 to cease uranium enrichment. That demand is encapsulated in two U.N. resolutions (1737 and 1747) that ban trade with and freeze the assets of Iran's nuclear and related entities and personalities, prevent Iran from transferring arms outside Iran, and require reporting on international travel by named Iranians. To strengthen its diplomacy, the Administration has added components to efforts to contain Iran, including a consistent large naval presence in the Persian Gulf; arrests of Iranian agents in Iraq. The Administration strongly denies it is planning on military action against Iran, but has refused to rule it out. Some legislation introduced in the 110th Congress, including H.R. 1400, S. 970, and H.R. 2880, would increase U.S. sanctions on Iran.
ADA471949
United States Intelligence Community (IC) 100 Day Plan for Integration and Collaboration
Report Date: Sep 2007
Media Count: 12 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *INTELLIGENCE, *INFORMATION EXCHANGE, *INTEGRATION, *COLLABORATIVE TECHNIQUES, *PLANNING, TERRORISTS, THREATS, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, GLOBALIZATION, TERRORISM
Identifiers: (U) *INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS, INFORMATION SHARING, MODERNIZATION, BEST PRACTICES, DNI(DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Today the United States and our allies face dangerous challenges to our security, freedom, and way of life. The current global environment is more interconnected, complex, and dynamic than the bipolar world of the Cold War. The advance of globalization has enabled, amplified, and accelerated threats stemming from international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, failed states, and illegal drug trafficking. These threats, among others, move at increasing speeds due to technology and across geographic and organizational boundaries, blurring the distinction between foreign and domestic threats, and between strategic and tactical events. To confront today's threats, the United States has made many changes in the way we conduct intelligence, law enforcement, homeland security, diplomatic, and defense activities. Drawing on in-depth studies such as the 9/11 Commission Report, the WMD Commission Report, internal Executive Branch reviews and reports by both houses of Congress the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) was enacted to improve our effectiveness alongside several Executive Orders aimed at providing specific Administration direction. This 100 Day Plan builds on the foundation established by the National Intelligence Strategy (NIS). The initiatives contained herein map to the strategic objectives both mission and enterprise addressed in the NIS. The 100 Day Plan represents specific initiatives and tasks to be accomplished according to the priorities of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The goal of the 100 Day Plan is to demonstrate short-term progress and build momentum for integration and transformation across the Community. This plan will be followed by the drafting of a 500 Day Implementation Plan that aligns and synchronizes on-going and planned activities not included in the initial 100 Day Plan.
ADA472105
Kuwaiti National Security and the U.S.-Kuwaiti Strategic Relationship after Saddam
Descriptive Note: Monograph
Personal Author(s): Terrill, W A
Report Date: Sep 2007
Media Count: 117 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *IRAQ, *KUWAIT, *UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, *POLITICAL ALLIANCES, *IRAN, *INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, *THREATS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, TENSION, DIPLOMACY, SECTARIAN VIOLENCE, PERSIAN GULF WAR, INSURGENCY, DEMOCRACY, COOPERATION, TERRORISM, INSTABILITY, HISTORY, GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), MILITARY ASSISTANCE, NATIONAL SECURITY, UNCERTAINTY
Identifiers: (U) *POST-SADDAM ERA, *SECURITY THREATS, POST-SADDAM IRAQ, SADDAM HUSSEIN, KUWAITI SHIITES, IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM, POLITICAL REFORM, DEMOCRATIZATION, MONARCHIES, SPREAD OF SECTARIAN WARFARE, IRAQI CIVIL WAR, REGIONAL SECURITY, PENINSULA LIONS, MILITARY-TO-MILITARY RELATIONS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The U.S.-Kuwait military relationship has been of considerable value to both countries since at least 1990. This alliance was formed in the aftermath of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's brutal invasion of Kuwait and the U.S. decision to free Kuwait with military force in 1991. Saddam's later defeat and removal from power in 2003 eliminated an important rationale for the alliance, but a close look at current strategic realities in the Gulf suggests that Kuwait remains an important U.S. ally. It is also an ally that faces a number of serious national security concerns in the turbulent post-Saddam era. Since its independence in 1961, Kuwait has struggled to manage a number of difficult challenges related to protecting its citizens and its territory from the predatory designs of large and dangerous neighbors. The most menacing neighbors have been Iraq and Iran. While Iran has proven a threatening and subversive enemy on key occasions, Iraq is even more problematic. Kuwait has maintained a long and often extremely difficult relationship with Iraq, and a series of Iraqi governments have either pressured Kuwait for territorial concessions or suggested that Kuwait is a lost province of Iraq. Kuwait also must cope with a newly empowered Iran which has at least partially filled the Gulf power vacuum created by Iraq's political crisis. Good Kuwaiti relations with Iran are often viewed with favor by significant elements of Kuwait's Shiite community. Nevertheless, the Kuwaiti leadership fears Iranian interest in domination of the Gulf and is especially opposed to Iranian efforts to compel the United States to withdraw its military forces from the region. The United States also has a vested interest in regional political reform and ongoing democratization in Kuwait. Beyond being a valuable strategic ally, Kuwait also has shown a commitment to expanding democracy in an evolutionary way that supports U.S. aspirations for both stability and more inclusive government within the region.
ADA474055
A New Role for Local Police in Radiological Security
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Lee, Thomas
Report Date: Sep 2007
Media Count: 87 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NUCLEAR WEAPONS, *POLICE, *HOMELAND SECURITY, TERRORISTS, UNITED STATES, RADIOLOGICAL WARFARE, POLICIES, NATIONAL SECURITY, THESES
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Since the 9/11 attacks, the possibility of another attack on America using radiological weapons has been a subject of much discussion both in the press, in national security and homeland security circles and in the academic literature. While much of the federal government's focus has been on preventing radiological material from being smuggled into the United States, this thesis examines the possibility of terrorists using materials that are readily available in medical, research and industrial locations. A dirty bomb or radiological dispersal device could have a devastating impact on the economy and greatly raise public fears. Local police agencies have previously not had a formal role in radiological security. This thesis explores policy initiatives, based on community policing principles conducted at the local police level, which will enhance security at locations where radiological materials are kept.
ADA477108
Strategic Change and the Joint Terrorism Task Force: Ideas and Recommendations
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): D'Angelo, Anthony P
Report Date: Sep 2007
Media Count: 149 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *INFORMATION EXCHANGE, *COUNTERTERRORISM, *TERRORISM, DATA BASES, TERRORISTS, TASK FORCES, THESES, JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, LAW ENFORCEMENT, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, CATALYSTS, DEFICIENCIES, ATTACK, THREATS, POLICIES
Identifiers: (U) *INFORMATION SHARING, *JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE, *STRATIGIC CHANGE, BEST PRACTICES, INTERAGENCY COLABORATION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, MULTIDISCIPLINARY, FISA(FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT), WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION TRAINING, DOMESTIC TERRORISM TRAINING, MUSLIM-ARAB CULTURE TRAINING
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks were a watershed event in this country's history that significantly affected law enforcement agencies and organizations at all levels, including the FBI and the multidisciplinary Joint Terrorism Task Forces. The terrorist attacks served as a catalyst for evaluating cultural, psychological and organizational processes, policies and procedures that influenced the FBI and impacted the JTTF program. In 2006 a comprehensive study was conducted to investigate whether FBI provided JTTF members with the necessary tools to support their investigations. The study identified a number of deficiencies. In order to adapt and combat an emergent asymmetric threat, the JTTF must identify and analyze specific actions and best practices necessary to prepare, execute, and support strategic change and innovation and overcome obstacles that impede the process. It is also necessary to identify and implement best and/or smart practices, especially those plans, policies, and procedures that ensure the skills, experience, and expertise of task force participants are maximized and seamlessly integrated into the JTTF program. The implementation of standardized written procedures that detail roles, responsibilities, training, orientation, and access to databases and information sharing will better enable participants to efficiently contribute to the JTTF mission. Institutionalizing an innovative culture and framework that provides the flexibility to evaluate and develop necessary skills and competencies in participant stakeholders is essential for the future success of the JTTF program.
ADA477127
Understanding Public Responses to Domestic Threats
Descriptive Note: Contract rept.
Personal Author(s): Bruine de Bruin, Wandi, Florig, H K, Fischhoff, Baruch, Downs, Julie S, Stone, Eric
Report Date: Sep 2007
Media Count: 102 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, *CIVILIAN POPULATION, *INFLUENZA, *EMOTIONS, *EPIDEMICS, *REACTION(PSYCHOLOGY), *FALLOUT, SCENARIOS, UNITED STATES, RISK, DECISION MAKING, THREATS, DEATH, PERCEPTION(PSYCHOLOGY), DOMESTIC TERRORISM, ABSENTEEISM, MORBIDITY, RADIATION EFFECTS, CANCER, EVACUATION, BOMBS, EXPOSURE(PHYSIOLOGY), COGNITION, CANADA, NUCLEAR RADIATION, SURVEYS, FEAR
Identifiers: (U) *PUBLIC RESPONSES, DIRTY BOMBS, PANDEMIC INFLUENZA, AVIAN FLU, BIRD FLU, RDD(RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSION DEVICES), CANCER RISK, RISK MODELS, DOMESTIC THREATS, MITIGATION STRATEGIES, MORBIDITY RISK, MORTALITY RISK, CANADIANS, AMERICANS, COMPLIANCE, EMOTIONAL RESPONSE, RELOCATION DECISIONS, ANGER, EMOTIONAL VARIABLES, COGNITIVE VARIABLES
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The overall goal of this report is to improve understanding of public responses to domestic threats. Project 1 focuses on pandemic influenza and dirty bomb threats, aiming to understand the role of emotions in anticipated behavioral responses. Project 2 examines a situation in which people are evacuated from a community to avoid exposure to radioactive fallout from an upwind nuclear explosion. This project aims to understand the factors that affect people's decisions about how long to wait until returning to their homes, given the gradual decline in radiation levels resulting from radioactive decay. First, the authors present an overview of each problem using models that summarize scientific knowledge. The models use logic of influence diagrams with nodes that reflect relevant variables affecting risk, and mitigating it, and links showing how they are connected. The models differ from traditional risk models because they include emotional and behavioral components that affect how a risk event unfolds. The Project 1 models focus on the interplay between emotional and behavioral responses to domestic threats, particularly fear and anger. The model for Project 2 focuses on the health, social, and economic factors that may affect people's decision to return to a community with residual radiation levels that elevate cancer risk. Second, they report on surveys of Canadian and U.S. participants based on these models. For Project 1, they found that, independent of anger and trait emotions, fear was related to seeing more risk of morbidity and mortality, and predicting less resilience, more compliance with mitigation strategies, and higher likelihood of being absent from work in the case of pandemic influenza. For Project 2, they found that people's decision to return were affected by the cancer risk of radioactive fallout as well as the availability of free housing in the evacuation zone.
ADA472712
Terrorism and WMD in the Contemporary Operational Environment
Descriptive Note: Monograph
Report Date: 20 Aug 2007
Media Count: 163 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *TERRORISTS, *UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS, HOMELAND SECURITY, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS, RADIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS
Identifiers: (U) COE(CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT), CBRN(CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL RADIOLOGICAL NUCLEAR), WAR ON TERROR
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Terrorism and WMD in the Contemporary Operational Environment is a supplemental handbook to the U.S. Army TRADOC G2 Handbook No. 1, A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century. The capstone reference guide describes terrorism and its potential impacts on U.S. military forces in the conduct of mission operations. This supplemental handbook highlights the nature of terrorism present in a full spectrum contemporary operational environment (COE) and terrorist intentions to use weapons of mass destruction. This handbook serves as an unclassified resource to inform U.S. military members on the nature of terrorism threats and weapons of mass destruction. Situational awareness studies terrorist intentions, characteristics and capabilities or limitations of WMD, and demonstrated or possible examples of WMD attack. These aspects complement the deliberate processes of U.S. military forces risk management, protection of the force, mission orders conduct, and leader decision-making. This handbook presents a definition of terrorism, scopes a presentation to the general nature of terrorism threats and weapons of mass destruction, and relates this means of terrorism to the contemporary operational environment (COE).
ADA473239
The Influence of Politics, Technology, and Asia on the Future of US Missile Defense (Walker Paper, Number 7)
Descriptive Note: Monograph
Personal Author(s): Butler, Jeffrey T
Report Date: Aug 2007
Media Count: 101 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *UNITED STATES, *ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, *ASIA, *INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TREATIES, DETERRENCE, THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE, DIPLOMACY, THREATS, DEPLOYMENT, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS
Identifiers: (U) *BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES, FOREIGN RELATIONS, STRATEGIC DEFENSE, TECHNICAL MATURITY, POLITICAL COSTS, GMD(GROUND BASED MIDCOURSE DEFENSE), THAAD(TERMINAL HIGH ALTITUDE AREA DEFENSE), MDA(MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY), ABM(ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE) TREATY, NPT(NONPROLIFERATION TREATY), BALLISTIC MISSILES, COUNTERPROLIFERATION
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This paper discusses the United States need for a limited missile-defense system and the political, technical, and diplomatic forces which define the requirements. The end of the Cold War, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, and rise of terrorism challenge the utility of mutually assured destruction. This new context demands renewed consideration of strategic defense with emphasis on the true technical maturity and political costs. Like nuclear weapons, ballistic missile defenses have high political and psychological value that must be evaluated as intensely as the technology. Thus, the US engagement strategy toward Asia must also be informed by an understanding of security relationships, technology, and the unique role of domestic US politics. In the near term, the United States should only pursue a limited ballistic missile-defense system with emphasis on theater systems and countering long-range missiles from the handful of rogue states that are pursuing them. Concurrently, the United States must improve threat definition, demand increased technical maturity and testing, and pursue flexible systems that can perform militarily significant missions in addition to missile defense. Furthermore, engagement with friends and foes is essential to developing an effective missile-defense system, maximizing deterrence value and supporting other critical efforts such as WMD counterproliferation and intelligence gathering. This strategy will reduce the technical risk of missile defense, increase the United States freedom of action against a rising cadre of WMD-capable actors, and avoid unnecessary escalation in tension between the United States and Asia.
ADA470007
Libya: Background and U.S. Relations
Descriptive Note: Congressional rept.
Personal Author(s): Blanchard, Christopher M
Report Date: 19 Jun 2007
Media Count: 38 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *LIBYA, *FOREIGN POLICY, *UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, *INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, *GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), *DISARMAMENT, *FOREIGN AID, LEADERSHIP, COOPERATION, PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, CRIMES, DIPLOMACY, NATURAL GAS, FEDERAL BUDGETS, MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), HISTORY, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, COMPENSATION, COUNTERTERRORISM
Identifiers: (U) IMET(INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING), IVLP(INTERNATIONAL VISITORS LEADERSHIP PROGRAM), MUAMMAR AL QADHAFI, PAN AM FLIGHT 103, LABELLE NIGHTCLUB, VICTIMS COMPENSATION, BULGARIAN NURSES, EMBASSY CONSTRUCTION, US OIL COMPANIES, MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, LIFG(LIBYAN ISLAMIC FIGHTING GROUP), HUMAN RIGHTS, FATHI AL JAHMI, ECONOMIC REFORM, POLITICAL REFORM
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) On May 15, 2006, the Bush Administration announced its intention to restore full diplomatic relations with Libya and to rescind Libya's listing as a state sponsor of terrorism and a country not fully cooperating with U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Presidential Determination No. 2006-14 certified that the government of Libya had not provided any support for international terrorism during the preceding 6 months and had provided assurances that it would not support acts of international terrorism in the future. Full diplomatic relations were restored on May 31 when the United States upgraded its Liaison Office in Tripoli to an Embassy. A 45-day congressional notification period ended on June 29, and the Secretary of State removed Libya's listings and ended the associated trade restrictions on June 30, without immediate public announcement. The Administration has not named an ambassador nominee. The changes mark the culmination of an initial period of improvement and rapprochement in U.S.-Libyan relations that began in December 2003, when the Libyan government announced its decision to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction and long-range missile programs. Administration officials have stated that normalization of U.S.-Libyan relations will provide opportunities for the United States to address specific issues of potential concern to Congress, such as political and economic reform, the development of energy resources, and human rights. Since the May 2006 announcement, some Members of Congress and family members of U.S. citizens killed and injured in Libyan-sponsored or supported terrorist attacks have expressed their opposition to changes in U.S. policy. Lawyers for the Libyan government and some victims' families have held talks regarding financial claims arising from the bombings of Pan Am Flight 103, the LaBelle nightclub in Berlin, and other incidents.
ADA469555
Port Security Strategy 2012
Descriptive Note: Technical rept.
Personal Author(s): Ames, Morgan, Cole, Andrew, Lim, Horng, Liu, Yilei, Marsh, Alan, Nguyen, Henry, Okruhlik, Laura, Torian, Joseph, Chan, Chun Man, Chng, Kim Chuan
Report Date: 15 Jun 2007
Media Count: 497 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *SECURITY, *PORTS(FACILITIES), SCENARIOS, SHIPS, SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, SINGAPORE, IMPROVISED WEAPONS, SABOTAGE, TERRORISM, COSTS, MODELS, THREATS
Identifiers: (U) *PORT SECURITY, MARITIME DOMAIN PROTECTION, EXTEND MODELS, ARENA MODELS, MANA MODELS, FORCE PROTECTION, PORT OF OAKLAND, PORT OF SINGAPORE, CONTAINER SCREENING, SENSOR PERFORMANCE, INTRUSIVE CARGO INSPECTION, COMMERCIAL PORT, VEHICLE BORNE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES, SMALL BOAT SWARM TACTICS, IMPORTATION OF CONTRABAND OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) U.S. Navy and commercial ships have been lucrative targets for terrorist organizations. Realizing that ships are most vulnerable while in-port, adequate measures must be employed by port facilities to ensure vessel security. Commercial and naval ports have been set as a national priority in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13. A successful terrorist strike against a port could produce long-term economic impact. In an attempt to develop a system of systems to prevent and defeat terrorist attacks against foreign and domestic ports, this study approached the threat from three different aspects: terrestrial, seaborne, and internal. This report uses the Systems Engineering Design Process to define the problem, generate alternatives, model scenarios, and analyze results to produce feasible and cost-effective solutions. No single system can address all issues prevalent in the port security problem. The recommended solutions individually address specific threats, namely vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, small boat swarm tactics, importation of contraband or weapons of mass destruction, and employee sabotage. Although each solution effectively increased port security, improved port security measures resulted in greater cost. Some solutions yielded only marginal gain in effectiveness with drastic increases in cost.
ADA471596
United States National Security Interests and North Korea: Leveraging Common Interests
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Ogden, III, Robert F
Report Date: 15 Jun 2007
Media Count: 127 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *NORTH KOREA, *NATIONAL SECURITY, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THREATS, MILITARY APPLICATIONS, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, TERRORISM, CHINA, PENINSULAS, SOUTH KOREA, KOREA, RUSSIA, JAPAN, STRATEGY, UNITED STATES
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) United States (US) policy towards North Korea has struggled to adequately address the US national security interests. Contrary to interests delineated in the US National Security Strategy, North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, demonstrates the propensity to proliferate weapons of mass destruction (WMD), destabilizes the Korean Peninsula with its military threat, violates the human rights and dignity of its citizens, and is listed as a state sponsor of terrorism,. This work identifies opportunities for cooperation with China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia to meet US security interests while exposing the challenges for the same. With the exception of terrorism, all countries share US interests related to North Korea. However, a significant divergence in ways and means complicates a coordinated approach. In general, the US and Japan support hard power, favoring all instruments of national power, while China, Russia, and South Korea favor a diplomatic approach to issues. In considering the positions of each country, the US should encourage a regional country to lead efforts in addressing common security interests through attractive diplomatic and economic means generally favored by China, Russia, and South Korea.
ADA468623
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Descriptive Note: Congressional rept.
Personal Author(s): Katzman, Kenneth
Report Date: 04 Jun 2007
Media Count: 59 Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *POLICIES, *NATIONAL SECURITY, *IRAN, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SYRIA, TERRORISTS, ECONOMIC IMPACT, MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), PERSIAN GULF, MILITARY PLANNING, URANIUM, PERCEPTION, TRAVEL, THREATS, GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, MILITARY OPERATIONS, EUROPE, IRAQ
Identifiers: (U) LEBANESE HEZBOLLAH, AL QAEDA ACTIVISTS, MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) According to the Administration's National Security Strategy document released on March 16, 2006, the United States may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran. That perception continues, generated primarily by Iran's developing nuclear program and intensified by Iran's military assistance to Shiite armed groups in Iraq and to Lebanese Hezbollah. U.S. officials also accuse Iran of refusing to bring to justice several senior Al Qaeda activists in Iran. In part to direct regional attention to that view but also to engage Iran on an Iraq solution, the Administration attended regional conferences on Iraq on March 10, 2007, and May 3-4, 2007, both attended by Iran (and Syria), and subsequently held a bilateral meeting with Iran in Baghdad on May 28. The Bush Administration is pursuing several avenues to attempt to contain the potential threat posed by Iran, but the U.S. focus is now on multilateral sanctions and diplomatic pressure on Iran. Iran has not complied with repeated U.N. Security Council deadlines since August 2006 to cease uranium enrichment. That demand is encapsulated in two U.N. resolutions (1737 and 1747) to date that ban trade with and freeze the assets of Iran's nuclear and related entities and personalities, prevent Iran from transferring arms outside Iran, and require reporting on international travel by named Iranians. The economic pressure has included trying to persuade European governments to curb trade, investment, and credits to Iran; and pressuring foreign banks not to do business with Iran. To strengthen its diplomacy, the Administration has added components to efforts to contain Iran, including a naval buildup in the Persian Gulf, arrests of Iranian agents in Iraq. The Administration strongly denies it is planning on military action against Iran, but has refused to rule it out.
