Bibliographies Counterinsurgency (COIN) ADM002209, Fall 2009

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ADA502305
Establishing a Suitable Tactical Design Model for Clear-Hold-Build Counterinsurgency Operations
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Phillips, Stephen C
Report Date: 12 Jun 2009
Media Count: 121   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *TACTICAL ANALYSIS, *TACTICAL WARFARE, *ARMY OPERATIONS, *MODELS, LAW ENFORCEMENT, DECENTRALIZATION, MAPPING, THESES, SECURITY, BATTALION LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS, TEST AND EVALUATION, MANEUVERS
Identifiers: (U) *COIN(COUNTERINSURGENCY), SECURITY ENVIRONMENT, INTERNAL SECURITY, SECURITY FORCES
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The execution of the Baghdad Security Plan in 2007 to 2008 marked a turning point in United States (U.S.) Army counterinsurgency (COIN) methodology. It highlighted decentralized execution utilizing the maneuver battalion as the prime unit of employment. The plan incorporated the tenets of COIN operations--particularly the Clear-Hold-Build (C-H-B) approach outlined in Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, released in December of 2006. As battalions began execution of C-H-B operations, a critical issue emerged: how to design such operations for execution at the tactical (battalion) level. FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency (still in draft form as of early 2009), was commissioned to establish the design principles for tactical echelons to utilize in the development of COIN operations. Despite having a section dedicated to the design of tactical level counterinsurgency operations, no suitable design model is presented in the draft. This thesis attempts to fill that void by analyzing the suitability of applying the elements of operational design to the tactical level of counterinsurgency. Chapter 6 offers the results of this analysis. It offers a method for tactical units to shape counterinsurgency operations by framing a military end state, mapping key tasks and counterinsurgency lines of effort, and arranging operations in time and space with the aid of continual assessments of performance and effectiveness.

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ADA502050
U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine: Is It Adequate to Defeat Hezbollah as a Threat Model of Future Insurgencies?
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Rourke, Kellie S
Report Date: 12 Jun 2009
Media Count: 83   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *WAR GAMES, *PARAMILITARY FORCES, *MILITARY CAPABILITIES, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *TERRORISTS, *MILITARY DOCTRINE, *MILITARY TACTICS, THESES, AIR STRIKES, IRAN, PUBLIC OPINION, GUERRILLA WARFARE, KIDNAPPINGS, WEAPON SYSTEMS, GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), ORGANIZATIONS, LESSONS LEARNED, ISRAEL, INFORMATION WARFARE, LEBANON, SYRIA
Identifiers: (U) *HEZBOLLAH, *HYBRID WARFARE, *SECOND LEBANON WAR, SHIITE MUSLIMS, RADICAL ISLAMISTS, INFORMATION OPERATIONS, FINANCIAL SUPPORT, PUBLIC SUPPORT, IDF(ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCE)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Hezbollah has emerged as the most dangerous terrorist group in the world. It has about 25,000 active armed members and it can muster a million more in the streets. These terrorists are disciplined, highly trained, and have incredibly lethal equipment and unprecedented information operations and counterintelligence networks. This thesis will answer the primary question of whether U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine is adequate to defeat Hezbollah as a threat model of future insurgencies. Key components of this are Hezbollah and its capabilities, lessons learned by Israel as Hezbollah's most frequent opponent, and U.S. COIN doctrine itself. In the 2006 Lebanon War, Israel was defeated by Hezbollah in most of the world's eyes. Studying the failures of Israel's doctrine as it applies to Hezbollah provides a strong foundation for reviewing U.S. doctrine and can serve as a basis for evaluating whether U.S. doctrine is adequate. To evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. COIN doctrine against Hezbollah, the thesis will examine six key events from the 2006 Lebanon War. Using these six events, the author will conduct a war game in which six evaluation criteria are used to determine if U.S. COIN doctrine is adequate to defeat Hezbollah as a model of insurgent threat. The evaluation criteria were selected based on widely accepted ingredients critical to successful counterinsurgency operations and U.S. lessons learned in Iraq. If the Israeli response was effective, the author will examine whether the U.S. response is similar enough or what it is lacking to have the same effect. If Israel's response was ineffective, the author will determine what their short-comings were and whether U.S. COIN doctrine differs enough to be effective.

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ADA501136
Role of Airpower for Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas)
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s):Ahmad, Irfan
Report Date: Jun 2009
Media Count: 131   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *PAKISTAN, *COLLATERAL DAMAGE, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *AIR POWER, *CIVILIAN POPULATION, *CASUALTIES, *MILITARY HISTORY, *AFGHANISTAN CONFLICT, AIR STRIKES, MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES), ETHNIC GROUPS, INSURGENCY, DRONES, MALAYA, PERCEPTION(PSYCHOLOGY), CULTURE, PUBLIC OPINION, CASE STUDIES, THESES, RECRUITING, MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), VIETNAM WAR, PHILIPPINES, GREECE
Identifiers: (U) FATA(FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS), CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, INSURGENT RECRUITING, KINETIC OPERATIONS, ANTIAMERICANISM, MILITANCY, RADICALIZATION, WEAK GOVERNANCE, PAKISTAN AIR FORCE, NORTH WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE, SAFE HAVENS, TALIBAN, AL QAEDA, TRIBES, WARLORDS, RADICAL ISLAM, GREEK CIVIL WAR, PHILIPPINE INSURGENCY, SOVIET-AFGHAN WAR
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This thesis examines the role of air power in Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The direct use of air power is a kinetic application whose aim is to physically destroy the insurgents. The indirect use of air power involves support roles such as transportation, logistics, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The former requires near-perfect intelligence and precision strikes to minimize unintended damage; the latter complements information warfare and supports ground mobility. This thesis focuses on how the direct application of air power affects COIN in Afghanistan and in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Excessive use of sophisticated U.S. air power and predator strikes has produced undesirable collateral damage and civilian deaths in the FATA region, and has caused an increase in anti-American sentiment throughout Pakistan, even though it also has caused significant damage to the insurgent' safe havens and degraded their ability to coerce the local population. The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) operates under operational, technological, and cultural constraints. The use of drones in FATA by the United States, conducted without adequate coordination, planning, and political sensitivity, has added to the trust deficit between crucial allies, making the use of air power controversial and counterproductive. The thesis concludes that air power produced tactical gains, but was strategically costly; it destroyed enemies, but it also lost friends in the process. An appendix to the thesis describes the social structure of tribal societies and its role in the evolution of insurgency in Afghanistan from 1747 to the present.

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ADA502966
A Cognitive Approach to COIN: Countering Dangerous Beliefs
Descriptive Note: Final rept.
Personal Author(s): McNeil, Jeffrey A
Report Date: 13 May 2009
Media Count: 31   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, *MILITARY DOCTRINE, POPULATION, ATTITUDE(INCLINATION), TARGETING, MILITARY PLANNING, COGNITION, MODELS, NATIONS, HISTORY
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Counterinsurgency doctrine for targeting host nation popular support lacks a coherent underlying theoretical structure, and this void can result in unfocused and ineffective counterinsurgency planning. The dangerous beliefs model for counterinsurgency can provide a flexible framework to augment current counterinsurgency doctrine. The proposed model can serve as a guide for educating counterinsurgency forces to plan and conduct operations and understand the implications of their actions to gain popular support. While the model is not all inclusive, it does provide a way to conceptualize the underlying beliefs and perceptions that need to be targeted for effective counterinsurgency. Social engagement of the host nation population is also crucial for effective counterinsurgency, thus elements of social psychology and attitude change are integrated into the proposed model. A current and an historic case of counterinsurgency are presented to illustrate the importance of deliberately targeting underlying beliefs in the host nation population. Through proper and early targeting of these underlying beliefs and continuous reassessment of the relevant parameters, the belief targeting model can enhance operations to garner host nation support.

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ADA503164
Time, Space, and Force Considerations for a Joint Force Commander's Air Operations in a Counterinsurgency
Descriptive Note: Final rept.
Personal Author(s): Lewis, Jr, Frederick L
Report Date: 04 May 2009
Media Count: 26   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *AERIAL WARFARE, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, *LAND WARFARE, MODELS, LIMITED WARFARE, LENSES, MANEUVERS, PREPARATION, ORGANIZATIONS, COMBAT FORCES, GROUND LEVEL
Identifiers: (U) JFC(JOINT FORCE COMMANDER), COIN(COUNTER-INSURGENCY)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The recent addition of the counterinsurgency operations being placed on par with preparations for major combat operations ushers in a new era of military thinking and doctrine. No longer will irregular warfare or small wars be regulated to the missions that the US military has to do, but doesn't want to. When a Joint Force Commander is establishing his force structure for COIN operations he will have many options in how to set up his air operations and for what purpose. The current model of the CAOC in CENTCOM does not meet the needs of the ground commander to utilize his air assets most effectively. This paper seeks to examine the tools available to the JFC seen through the lens of force, space, and time. With the proper mix of force, the correct command organization, the right allocation of forces throughout the AO, the JFC can ensure his air assets are in the right place at the right time to support his ground scheme of maneuver.

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ADA503005
Counterinsurgency and Robots: Will the means Undermine the Ends?
Descriptive Note: Final rept.
Personal Author(s): Deputy, Samuel N
Report Date: 04 May 2009
Media Count: 28   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *ROBOTS, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *MILITARY DOCTRINE, POPULATION, UNMANNED, TACTICAL WARFARE, RISK, ROBOTICS, MILITARY OPERATIONS, BATTLEFIELDS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The recent introduction of unmanned and robotic systems into counterinsurgency (COIN) operations has created marked advantages at the tactical level of operations. Despite tactical advantages created by increasing capabilities and presence on the battlefield, unmanned and robotic systems produce a collective operational impact that increases risk. The operational risk assumed by commanders charged with conducting COIN is a result of unknown variables and side effects generated by the interaction of unmanned and robotic systems with the populace. The significance of the risk incurred is its impact on the information operations logical line of operations (LOO) that is considered the decisive LOO in current doctrine. This paper defines the forces that are driving the trend towards more capable and autonomous systems and their potential impact to COIN operations. It explains the importance of doctrine to COIN and offers long term and short term solutions that can mitigate the risks associated with unmanned and robotic systems employment in COIN.

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ADA503220
Mexico at the Precipice: Are Lessons from Plan Colombia Operationally Relevant to United States Northern Command?
Descriptive Note: Final rept.
Personal Author(s): Dolby, John E
Report Date: 04 May 2009
Media Count: 37   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *DRUG SMUGGLING, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *MEXICO, *COLOMBIA, LAW ENFORCEMENT, NARCOTICS, BOUNDARIES, THREATS, NATIONAL SECURITY, UNITED STATES, COOPERATION
Identifiers: (U) DRUG WARS, DRUG CARTELS, MERIDA INITIATIVE, *DRUG TRAFFICKING
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The violence from Mexico's ongoing fight against narcotraffickers has reached astounding proportions and poses a national security threat to the United States. There is currently a lack of a unified coarse of action for United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) with respect to Mexico. United States Southern Command's (SOUTHCOM) experience during Plan Colombia can provide insight into how NORTHCOM might proceed through an integrated approach to counterinsurgency (COIN)training, border security and increased military to military cooperation. This paper will examine the history of the drug conflicts in both Mexico and Colombia and will look specifically at the Merida Initiative and Plan Colombia. It will discuss similarities and differences between the situations in Mexico and Colombia and discuss some possible scenarios for NORTHCOM to engage Mexico. Finally, it will make recommendations for NORTHCOM to move forward.

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ADA497119
Testing Galula in Ameriyah: The People Are the Key
Descriptive Note: Journal article
Personal Author(s): Kuehl, Dale
Report Date: Apr 2009
Media Count: 10   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *IRAQI WAR, *MILITARY TACTICS, *CIVILIAN POPULATION, *PARAMILITARY FORCES, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *COMMUNITY RELATIONS, *INFANTRY, INSURGENCY, SECTARIAN VIOLENCE, URBAN WARFARE, PUBLIC OPINION, LAW ENFORCEMENT, BARRIERS, PATROLLING, MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), TERRORISTS, REPRINTS
Identifiers: (U) *MILITARY SURGES, *AQI(AL-QAEDA IN IRAQ), *POPULAR SUPPORT, CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS, GALULA DAVID, BAGHDAD(IRAQ), SRO(STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS), IRAQI SUNNIS, IRAQI SHIA, GALULA DAVID, ISF(IRAQI SECURITY FORCES), IED(IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES), CURFEWS, IRAQI ARMY, JAYSH AL-MAHDI, POPULATION CONTROL, SONS OF IRAQ
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Critics of the Army's focus on counterinsurgency operations (COIN) have argued recently that the Army has developed a dogmatic approach to COIN. In particular, they question the assertion in Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, that the insurgents' ability to sustain popular support [for their cause] or at least acquiescence [to it] is essential for an effective insurgency in the long term and is usually one of the insurgent's centers of gravity. However, based on 14 months of COIN operations in northwest Baghdad, including in the Sunni neighborhood of Ameriyah, I think the authors of FM 3-24 got it right. While some have argued that the Army is approaching COIN in a dogmatic fashion, I disagree. I, for one, had not completely read the new FM, since it came out after we deployed. However, based on my previous study of COIN, I saw that gaining the trust of the local populace was essential to our operations. At least for our unit, it worked. When we returned stateside, I had time to reflect and further study COIN, this time with a level of personal experience. Recently, I read David Galula's Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice for the first time and found that, while his essay focuses on communist and colonial insurgencies, much is relevant to our current fight in Iraq. Like the authors of FM 3-24, Galula sees the support of the population as essential to defeating an insurgency. He sets forth four laws for conducting a counterinsurgency campaign: (1) the support of the population is as necessary for the counterinsurgent as for the insurgent, (2) support is gained through an active minority, (3) support from the population is conditional, and (4) intensity of effort and vastness of means are essential.

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ADA495701
Center-of-Gravity Analysis in COIN: A New Way to Problem-Solve
Descriptive Note: Research paper
Personal Author(s): Sun, Holly
Report Date: 20 Mar 2009
Media Count: 11   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, *CENTER OF GRAVITY, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *COMMUNITY RELATIONS, *CIVILIAN POPULATION, *ENEMY, *ARMY PERSONNEL, INSURGENCY, INFORMATION WARFARE, OFFICER PERSONNEL, ETIOLOGY, SECTARIAN VIOLENCE, MILITARY DOCTRINE, ARMY, THREATS, PROBLEM SOLVING
Identifiers: (U) IPB(INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD), INFORMATION OPERATIONS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) A poor understanding throughout the Army on how to define and exploit the enemy's center of gravity (COG) is driven by an outdated analytical framework still rooted in conventional thinking. This problem is two-fold in nature; first to blame is the failure of U.S. military doctrine to relate the links and nodes of COG to intelligence activities from the bottom up. The result is a gap between what is studied and what is practiced in today's counterinsurgency environment. The second part of the problem is an institutional failure by the Military Intelligence (MI) branch to refocus analytical methods to meet the demands of a complex, multi-dimensional battle space. The intelligence community writ large is slowly beginning to realize that the term national security has taken on a new meaning, one that requires a fundamental change to how we conduct war. Central to this change is the complete understanding of enemy COG. Perhaps one of the most contentious terms in the military today, center of gravity is the focal point upon which all U.S. military power converges. It represents the basic level of understanding in warfare, but remains a nebulous concept for many junior MI officers because the military branches cannot come to a consensus on what COG actually means. Much debate has centered on the proper role of the military in an evolving threat landscape. As conventional boundaries between war and peace, offense and defense, lethal and non-lethal, domestic and foreign, and other dichotomous concepts continue to blur, MI officers are under increasing pressure to find, fix, finish, exploit, assess, and disseminate the requisite information to defeat the enemy. Equipped with outdated guidance and an incomplete tool-kit, the junior MI officer must rely more on her wits and critical thinking skills to succeed. Herein lies a golden opportunity for improvement.

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ADA495697
Consequence Management in COIN
Descriptive Note: Research paper
Personal Author(s): Baila, Brandon
Report Date: 16 Mar 2009
Media Count: 10   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *STABILITY, *COLLATERAL DAMAGE, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *COMMUNITY RELATIONS, *CIVILIAN POPULATION, *ARMY PERSONNEL, *CRISIS MANAGEMENT, OVERSEAS, ARMY, JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, LOCAL GOVERNMENT, STABILIZATION, LEADERSHIP, PUBLIC OPINION, INTERAGENCY COORDINATION, GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN)
Identifiers: (U) *CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT, POPULAR SUPPORT, PUBLIC SUPPORT, LEGITIMACY, GOVERNANCE, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES, *INFORMATION OPERATIONS, SOLATIA PAYMENTS, EMPATHY, COMPASSION
Distribution Statement:Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The contemporary operating environment often throws soldiers into situations where they must quickly establish working relationships with complete strangers: soldiers from other tactical units, law enforcement personnel from federal agencies, and relief coordinators from nongovernmental organizations. Although this quote may seem obvious, it highlights the coordination and interaction among soldiers and different organizations that is necessary for success in the contemporary operating environment. More than ever, Army leaders are being challenged to fulfill a variety of duties as the United States conducts counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. One of these obligations, the role of a mediator and peacemaker, is of utmost importance in winning the hearts and minds of the local populace and completing the mission in a COIN operational setting. Success in a COIN environment is especially important as the U.S. military looks into the future and sees no other military force capable of defeating them in conventional combat. This idea of the United States as the only hyper power, called fourth generation warfare (4GW), was first defined in 1989 by American analysts who used it to describe warfare's return to a decentralized form. While COIN operations may differ regionally because of distinct environments, ideologies, objectives, and cultures, maintaining legitimacy, governance, and popular support continue to be a resounding objective of Coalition Forces (CF) in a COIN. However, even when all of these conditions are met by CF, unavoidable events that result in collateral damage to civilians may take place. It is the role of the Army leader to take these circumstances into consideration, and plan for them ahead of time through exercises and training in consequence management (CM). In a 4GW conflict where both sides' primary objective is to sway popular support, the need for CM is absolutely necessary to maintain legitimacy and stability with the host nation.

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ADA494865
Revisiting COIN Theory and Instruction
Descriptive Note: Research paper
Personal Author(s): Pan, Allison Y
Report Date: 13 Mar 2009
Media Count: 8   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *TEACHING METHODS, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *THEORY, *ANALYSTS, *MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, *COURSES(EDUCATION), *INSURGENCY, ROLES(BEHAVIOR), READING, OFFICER PERSONNEL, ETIOLOGY, MODIFICATION, ARMY TRAINING, ARMY PERSONNEL, SCENARIOS
Identifiers: (U) *INSURGENCY THEORY, *MIOBC(MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OFFICER BASIC COURSE), *COURSE RESTRUCTURING, POINTS OF INSTRUCTION, MARGINALIZED PEOPLES, OPPRESSION, ROOT CAUSES, ROOT INEQUALITIES, READING COURSES, CAPSTONE EXERCISES, MOCK INSURGENCIES, INSURGENCY SCENARIOS, ROLE PLAYING EXERCISES, SCORPION TACTICAL DECISION GAME, VAN DEMAN PROGRAM
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The Van Deman Program in the Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course (MIOBC) has as its pinnacle goal the production of premier analysts for today's Army. I propose that the focus of the MIOBC program at large should be what the Van Deman Program aims for, and that all graduates of MIOBC, not simply that handful in every class, are the best analysts they can be. To achieve this goal, I believe certain fundamental changes must be made to the MIOBC points of instruction (POI). I focus my changes on the counterinsurgency component of instruction because not only is it the new focus of the Army as a whole, but it also has been the hardest area to teach, understand, and apply to the tactical environment. We have within the Army a strategic bias towards understanding one side of the insurgency/COIN equation. When David Galula wrote Counterinsurgency Warfare, he did so because he believed that there was plenty of research on insurgencies, but not nearly enough on how to fight insurgencies, the COIN side. I would argue that, today, we have overdeveloped the COIN side and virtually abandoned the core reason for needing COIN in the first place -- the insurgency side. For these reasons, I have placed my focus on revisiting COIN POI within MIOBC.

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ADA497827
The Business of War: How Criminal Organizations Perpetuate Conflict and What To Do about It (Colloquium, Volume 2, Number 1, March 2009)
Descriptive Note: Monograph
Personal Author(s): Dahl, Brock
Report Date: Mar 2009
Media Count: 19   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *LAW ENFORCEMENT, *CRIMINAL CORRUPTION, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *CRIMINALS, *INSTABILITY, *GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), *ORGANIZATIONS, *MILITARY ASSISTANCE, THEFT, SMUGGLING, AFGHANISTAN CONFLICT, POLICE, COOPERATION, ECONOMICS, STABILIZATION, OVERSEAS, POLICIES, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, STABILITY, MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES), IRAQI WAR
Identifiers: (U) *CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS, *CRIMINAL ECONOMIES, *SRO(STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS), NATION BUILDING, SASO(STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS), DRUG TRAFFICKING, CRIMINAL NETWORKS, STATE INSTITUTIONS, ORGANIZED CRIME, EXTORTION RACKETS, PROTECTION RACKETS, LEGAL ISSUES, POSSE COMITATUS ACT
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) It is now a mantra that building local institutions is essential to winning the counterinsurgency (COIN) fight. The host nation must exercise sovereignty and provide necessary security and services to its citizens. However, institution building requires more than a focus on governance and capacity development programs. The criminal structures that commonly arise during war economies inhibit the proper growth of state institutions, limiting the state's ability to defeat insurgencies. The military should provide support for law enforcement activities that attack such organizations and tip the balance in favor of honest officials and more productive institutional development. This article first explores the nature and type of criminal activities found in transitional states, then discusses options for addressing such activities in the midst of conflict and stability operations, and closes by addressing the legal and policy considerations shaping the Defense Department's current position on the issue. Attacking criminal organizations is an essential element of the COIN fight; the prevailing policy restricting military support for law enforcement operations should be reconsidered.

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ADA495487
Tactics in Counterinsurgency
Descriptive Note: Interim field manual
Report Date: Mar 2009
Media Count: 305   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *MILITARY OPERATIONS, ECONOMICS, MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), MILITARY DOCTRINE, COMPANY LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS, MILITARY TACTICS, MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS, VIETNAM, LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT, GUERRILLA WARFARE, UNEMPLOYMENT, PARAMILITARY FORCES, COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, SECOND WORLD WAR, LEADERSHIP
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This manual gives the US Army a common language, concept, and purpose to fight and achieve success in a counterinsurgency. COIN is a complex subset of warfare that encompasses all military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency at the company, battalion, and brigade levels. To do this, the manual merges traditional approaches to COIN with the realities of the current operational environment. The US Army thinking and doctrine on COIN tactics since the end of World War II have focused on the conduct of counterguerrilla operations in the later stages of insurgency. The Army has seen itself as defeating guerrilla forces-usually communist forces-rather than defeating an entire insurgency. It saw success as something it could achieve by using the force of arms directly against guerrilla forces. This doctrine of COIN began to take shape shortly after World War II in manuals such as FM 31-20, Operations against Guerrilla Forces (1951) and later in FM 31-15, Operations against Irregular Forces (1961). The Army refined its counterinsurgency doctrine during Vietnam in FM 31-22, US Counterinsurgency Force, FM 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations (both published in 1963) and in FM 31-23, Stability and Support Operations (1972). After Vietnam, the Army split COIN doctrine off from conventional high intensity operations in FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (1990) in which the light forces owned counterinsurgency, and FM 90-8, Counterguerrilla Operations (1986), where the focus remained on defeating the guerrilla force. This manual is the historical successor to FM 90-8. In addition, parts of FM 100-20 have been integrated into this FM, As have the Army's concept of full-spectrum operations and all elements of COIN operations. At its heart, a counterinsurgency is an armed struggle for the support of the population.

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ADA494761
Counterinsurgency and the Surge in Iraq: Balancing Doctrine and Strategy
Descriptive Note:Strategy research project
Personal Author(s): McLaughlin, Robert F
Report Date: 17 Feb 2009
Media Count: 43   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MILITARY DOCTRINE, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *MILITARY STRATEGY, LEADERSHIP, HISTORY, SURGES, TACTICAL WARFARE, LESSONS LEARNED, IRAQ, MILITARY PERSONNEL, THREATS
Identifiers: (U) LINES OF OPERATION, 21ST CENTURY THREAT, ASYMMETRIC, CIVIL MILITARY, TTP(TACTICS TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The Surge strategy employed in Iraq in 2007 was effective not only because of the increased troop strength but also because lessons learned since the initial invasion in March 2003 were employed and emerging Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine published in FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency was implemented simultaneously. Doctrine captured in FM 3-24 is important because it is grounded in historical lessons as well as recent experiences. It provides a flexible framework for leaders at every level to adopt in conducting COIN operations. As the asymmetric threat of the 21st century evolves, it is especially important that the doctrine is understood, and that leaders at all levels rapidly share effective tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) as they apply to the specific environment. This must be done with an emphasis on linking the strategic to the tactical level of war to defeat the threat. As the Army transforms and looks to the future, it must implement cultural changes based on the lessons learned in Iraq, especially within the framework of junior leader training and education. We must also maintain the Army's core competencies as well as improve civil / military cooperation to defeat the 21st century threat along the full spectrum of conflict.

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ADA495324
Policing and Law Enforcement in COIN -- The Thick Blue Line
Descriptive Note:Monograph
Personal Author(s): Celeski, Joseph D
Report Date: Feb 2009
Media Count: 111   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *PUBLIC RELATIONS, *SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES, *POLICE, *LAW ENFORCEMENT, *SECURITY, *CIVILIAN POPULATION, COUNTERTERRORISM, PUBLIC OPINION, CRIMES, PARAMILITARY FORCES, MALAYA, NEPAL, AFGHANISTAN CONFLICT, IRAQI WAR, THREATS, GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), LESSONS LEARNED, PAKISTAN, INDIA, ASYMMETRIC WARFARE, TERRORISTS, ALGERIA
Identifiers: (U) *COUNTERINSURGENCY POLICING, *PUBLIC SUPPORT, INTERNAL SECURITY, GOVERNANCE, USSOCOM(UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND), OFFENSIVE POLICING, CRIMINALS, AL QAEDA, NORTHERN IRELAND
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This work on the role of policing in confronting security threats highlights the need to shift resources and emphasis towards policing, law enforcement, and internal security. Law enforcement and internal security are key pillars in a comprehensive national security strategy and are often underemphasized. As the campaign against terrorist networks shifts out of a combat phase, the competition between governments and terrorist groups for the public's support, a key element in irregular warfare, will occur in noncombat zones. It is in these noncombat zones that the police and other internal security elements of governmental power will be critical in negating terrorist network access to populations. The military's role in these operational environments will be significantly reduced, but select support will be required and this effort will fall heavily on the Special Operations Forces. This monograph explores the complexity and challenges a government faces in organizing and training multiple levels of a nation's various police institutions. Through a thorough and excellent analysis, the author highlights the differences of policing in a counterinsurgency environment versus traditional, peaceful societies. He further amplifies his discussion of counterinsurgency policing through a series of vignettes. The true danger of failure in the current campaign is that a successful irregular warfare campaign in one region may spur additional challenges across the globe, and the author argues persuasively that the police are the thick blue line in this type of campaign.

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ADA496345
Underkill. Scalable Capabilities for Military Operations Amid Populations
Personal Author(s): Gompert, David C, Johnson, Stuart E, Libicki, Martin C, Frelinger, David R, Gordon, IV, John, Smith, Raymond, Sawak, Camille A
Report Date: Jan 2009
Media Count: 170   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *INSURGENCY, *MILITARY OPERATIONS, *LETHALITY, *IRAQ, POLITICAL SCIENCE, ENVIRONMENTS, DAMAGE, SECURITY, POPULATION, ENEMY, CIVILIAN POPULATION, AFGHANISTAN, COUNTERINSURGENCY, POLICIES, WARFARE, REQUIREMENTS, NONLETHAL WEAPONS, NATO
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) During the first few years of their occupation of Iraq, U.S. military forces proved to be better at killing insurgents than at defeating the insurgents by convincing the Iraqi people to turn against them. As a consequence, the insurgency grew despite its losses, the population's tolerance for the U.S. occupation shrank, and U.S. casualties mounted. At a certain point, a majority of all Iraqis believed that the use of force against U.S. troops was a legitimate form of resistance. This belief was reinforced by a number of incidents in which Iraqi noncombatants were killed or gravely hurt--cases heavily exploited by anti-U.S. propagandists. While this problem has eased in Iraq as a result of vastly improved U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy, it has called attention to the fact that U.S. forces are not well equipped to carry out operations and defend themselves amid populations except through the use of lethal force. The persistence of civilian casualties and the resulting political backlash against U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in Afghanistan confirms that this deficit is a serious problem. Against this background, a 2007 RAND Corporation report on comprehensive capabilities for COIN entitled War by Other Means cited, among other deficiencies, the inadequacy of U.S. nonlethal capabilities and the resultant human and political damage that comes from killing, hurting, or terrifying persons who are not enemy fighters. Prompted by this findings, and with the sponsorship of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, RAND embarked on a study of the requirements for and desired characteristics of nonlethal capabilities in the current and foreseeable security environments.

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ADA494660
U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide
Descriptive Note: Monograph
Personal Author(s): Kilcullen, David, Porter, Matt, Burgos, Carlos
Report Date: Jan 2009
Media Count: 68   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *DOCTRINE, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERAGENCY COORDINATION, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, POLITICAL SCIENCE, POLICIES
Identifiers: (U) DOMESTIC SECURITY, JUDICIAL SYSTEM, RULE OF LAW, INTEGRATED PLANNING
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) In recent years the United States has engaged in prolonged counterinsurgency campaigns. Counterinsurgency (COIN) is the blend of comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously contain insurgency and address its root causes. This Guide distills the best of contemporary thought, historical knowledge, and hard-won practice. This guide employs a COIN model that comprises four main functional components: The political function is the key function, providing a framework of political reconciliation, and reform of governance around which all other COIN activities are organized. In general, a COIN strategy is only as good as the political plan. The economic function seeks to provide essential services and stimulate long term economic growth, thereby generating confidence in the government while at the same time reducing the pool from which insurgents can readily recruit. The security function is an enabler for the other functions and involves development not just of the affected nation's military force, but its whole security sector. Establishing security is not a precursor to economic and governance activity: rather security, economic and governance activity must be developed in parallel. The information function comprises intelligence (required to gain understanding), and influence (to promote the affected government's cause). It is essential that the influence campaign is in tune with the strategic narrative, resonates with the relevant audiences, is based on genuine resolve by the affected government and that physical actions match. What makes COIN different is that both elements of the information function will be conducted in stark competition with the insurgents own information functions. These four functions contribute to the overall objective of enabling the affected government to establish control, consolidating and then transitioning it from intervening forces to national forces and from military to civil institutions.

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ADA494181
Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan. Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181)
Descriptive Note: Semiannual rept. no. 2
Report Date: Jan 2009
Media Count: 104   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, *AFGHANISTAN, *SECURITY, TERRORISM, AFGHANISTAN CONFLICT, CRIMINAL CORRUPTION, DRUG INTERDICTION, MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES), LOCAL GOVERNMENT, MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), STRATEGY, NARCOTICS
Identifiers: (U) CONGRESSIONAL REPORTS, ISAF(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE), TALIBAN, AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES, CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, DRUG TRADE, PUBLIC SERVICES, NATION BUILDING, HUMAN RIGHTS, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, RECONSTRUCTION
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Against a backdrop of reinstated safe havens in Pakistan for al-Qaida, and increasing violence, the U.S. continues to work with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and our international partners towards building an Afghanistan that is 1) never again a safe haven for terrorists and is a reliable, stable ally in the War on Terror; 2) moderate and democratic, with a thriving private sector economy; 3) capable of governing its territory and borders; and 4) respectful of the rights of all its citizens. The U.S. continues to pursue a comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign which utilizes the military, government, and economic expertise of the U.S. and the international community to diminish insurgent capacity, maintain security, and build the infrastructure and human capital necessary to achieve the Afghanistan envisioned in the strategic goals listed above. The current COIN strategy is often referred to as clear, hold, and build.

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ADA495399
Keeping COIN Simple: The Outhouse Strategy for Security Development
Personal Author(s): Daniels, Herb
Report Date: Jan 2009
Media Count: 10   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *ARMY, *PHILIPPINES, *MILITARY ADVISORS, *VILLAGES, *MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *CIVIC ACTION, *COMMUNITY RELATIONS, SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES, INSURGENCY, INDIGENOUS POPULATION, URBAN AREAS, PUBLIC OPINION, CONSTRUCTION, GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, LESSONS LEARNED, SCHOOLS
Identifiers: (U) *ABU SAYYAF GROUP, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, ARMY ADVISORS, ASG(ABU SAYYAF GROUP), JI(JEMAAH ISLAMIAH), JOLO(PHILIPPINES), PUBLIC SUPPORT, JSOTF-P(JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE-PHILIPPINES), SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION, CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS, HEARTS AND MINDS, OUTHOUSE CONSTRUCTION
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) As U.S. Armed Forces execute the Global War on Terrorism, varying strategies are required to facilitate victory within those sovereign states that are hesitant to permit a significant number of U.S. personnel on their soil. The Philippines is an excellent example of how the U.S. military can still achieve victory while under severe operational constraints imposed by a host government. U.S. Army advisors working with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) are developing creative and unconventional counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies to win the support of the local population and to sever their links to the indigenous Abu Sayyaf Group. The outhouse strategy discussed herein is indicative of the peculiarities of unconventional warfare. While a project to build modern schools in densely populated areas on the island of Jolo did nothing to bind the U.S. advisors and AFP to the local population, building outhouses in rural villages fostered civilian-military relations and was successful in destroying the links between the local population and the insurgents: Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah Islamiah. The outhouse was a simple tool that was appropriate for the jungle villages of Jolo where the insurgents thrived. The outhouse is not the answer to every insurgency, nor will it win the fight on Jolo by itself, but it demonstrates the theory that hearts and minds can be won with small projects and at a very minimal cost. Ironically, the reality of highly constrained resources encouraged ingenuity on the part of AFP/U.S. personnel to develop a project which opened doors for continued military engagement. As the civil-military bonds strengthened, insurgent support diminished in a zero sum relationship -- as the government got stronger, the insurgency got weaker.

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ADA494756
Training America's Strategic Corporals
Descriptive Note: Strategy research project
Personal Author(s): Bolgiano, David G
Report Date: 10 Dec 2008
Media Count: 33   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MILITARY TRAINING, RISK, DECISION MAKING, ASYMMETRY, JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, INSTRUCTORS, MILITARY PERSONNEL, STRATEGIC ANALYSIS
Identifiers: (U) USE OF DEADLY FORCES, ASYMMETRIC DECISION MAKING, CORPORALS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) In the asymmetric environment - from traditional peacekeeping to counterinsurgency (COIN) - American service members are thrust into situations where they must make use of deadly force decisions that are analogous to civilian law enforcement operations. Despite mandatory guidance from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff that commanders, at all levels, shall ensure that individuals within their respective units understand and are trained on when and how to use force in self-defense1, the dangerous, and sometimes tragic, reality is that the Services are not fulfilling this mandate. This creates a heightened risk for friendly forces and a greater likelihood of legally inappropriate uses of force that might undermine strategic successes. This article proposes that U.S. Joint Forces Command develop, manage and sustain a use of deadly force instructor certification program that would ensure joint standards for master trainers from the diverse services on well-defined yet routinely ignored universal truths concerning not only the law, but also the tactical realities surrounding deadly force encounters. America's Strategic Corporals trained to the right legal and tactical standard will more likely win and survive in today's deadly force encounters.

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ADA493812
The Strategy-Legitimacy Paradigm: Getting it Right in the Philippines
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Hastings, Jonathan P, Mortela, Krishnamurti A
Report Date: Dec 2008
Media Count: 201   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MILITARY OPERATIONS, THESES, INSURGENCY, DEPRIVATION, COUNTERINSURGENCY, STRATEGY, PHILIPPINES
Identifiers: (U) LEGITIMACY
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Political legitimacy is at the heart of any conflict or war. Based on the idea that wars cannot be won without establishing and maintaining political legitimacy, this thesis examines how the COIN strategies developed in Basilan, Bohol, and Sulu address the legitimacy problem. It also offers recommendations for developing a COIN strategy for Mindanao. The thesis uses Ted Gurr's theory of relative deprivation as a framework to explain the factors that lead a society to revolt. It also underscores the importance of providing a long-term solution to the insurgent problems by correcting the underlying issues of poverty, deprivation, and lawlessness. In Basilan, Bohol, and Sulu, the Philippine government and its U.S. allies successfully engineered what Borer describes as the strategy-legitimacy nexus. By promoting the legitimacy of the Philippine government, the insurgent capabilities and influence were substantially reduced by isolating them from the population. Using the same framework, the three case studies demonstrate that while conditions in Mindanao are very different, the case studies offer valuable lessons. These are applied to conducting COIN in the region utilizing an Indirect Approach strategy and are based on McCormick's Diamond Counterinsurgency model that promotes legitimacy through good governance, improved security, and socioeconomic conditions.

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ADA493895
Conducting the Softer Side of Counterinsurgency
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Ransone, Bart D
Report Date: Dec 2008
Media Count: 81   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *COUNTERINSURGENCY, LEADERSHIP, NETWORKS, BATTALION LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS, THESES, POPULATION, SIDES, CULTURE, AWARENESS, FIELD EQUIPMENT, INSTRUCTION MANUALS, CENTER OF GRAVITY, KINETICS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) In a counterinsurgency (COIN) the local population becomes the center of gravity. Over the last three years, the U.S. military has rewritten many field manuals that focus on COIN, to include a significant change to FM 3-0, Operations, and a complete revision of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. These changes in doctrine have forced the US military s conventional force to reconsider its use of the kinetic force and begin to understand the use of more non-kinetic means, or the softer side of COIN, in order to reach sustainable peace. If non-kinetic actions are the way forward, how should units (battalion and below) be applying the softer side of COIN? This thesis considers through context and assessment the goals that are needed to achieve the right mix of kinetic and non-kinetic actions. Practitioners suggest that information operations, situational awareness, cultural awareness and empathy are key components of effective counterinsurgency. This thesis argues further that network development and command influence have vital multiplier effects on these components. Without command influence, none are likely to take hold. Therefore, the thesis argues that command influence is the key aspect in achieving a balance between kinetic and non-kinetic actions, in order to conduct effective COIN.

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ADA494006
Counterinsurgency Meets Soft Power: An Alternative Approach to Deterring Terrorist Recruitment in Mindanao
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Smith, Jason, Stroh, Rieka, Williams, John
Report Date: Dec 2008
Media Count: 101   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *TERRORISTS, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, STRATEGY, EDUCATION, THESES, INSTABILITY, SOUTHEAST ASIA, PHILIPPINES, SOCIAL WELFARE, NATIONAL SECURITY, UNITED STATES, ECONOMICS
Identifiers: (U) MINDANAO, TERRORIST RECRUITMENT, MILITANT ISLAM, IDEOLOGY, *SOFT POWER
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Terrorist activity in Southeast Asia remains a challenge to U.S. national security. In particular, terrorist organizations in the Philippines continue to conduct deadly attacks and attract more recruits despite U.S. and Philippine government counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts. Within the last seven years following the 9/11 terrorist attack, the Philippine and U.S. governments have combined efforts to address insurgency as a threat that hinders peace and security within the Philippines as well as Southeast Asia. Despite the ongoing counterinsurgency operations in Mindanao, the southern region of the Philippines continues to exist as a hub for terrorist recruitment, training, and operations. A key aspect of hindering insurgency growth within the Philippines is deterring terrorist recruitment by first identifying the underlying conditions that promote discontent among the people of Mindanao that make them susceptible to the ideology of militant Islam and then implementing a strategy that includes a full range of activities from kinetic to non-kinetic methods. It is clear that economic conditions, poor governance, lack of adequate social and educational programs are all contributing factors to the instability of Mindanao. What's not so clear is how to disrupt the cycle that sustains the terrorists while gaining the affection of the Muslim minority who have been in opposition with the predominantly Christian government. This thesis examines the counterinsurgency strategy by recognizing effective practices and identifying shortfalls in the approach. Our findings suggest that by applying a mix of soft power, as defined by Professor Joseph Nye, as well as no politik as defined by Professor John Arquilla and Dave Ronfeldt, in relation to hard power practices, an alternative approach to counterinsurgency can offer the U.S. and Philippine governments a long-term sustainable strategy that will diminish future radical Islamic threats and stabilize Mindanao.

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ADA494013
Population Analysis: A Methodology for Understanding Populations in COIN Environments
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Burke, Mark C, Self, Eric C
Report Date: Dec 2008
Media Count: 93   Page(s)
Descriptors:(U) *POPULATION, *MODELS, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, HUMAN INTELLIGENCE, TERRORISM, COMMUNITY RELATIONS, GUERRILLA WARFARE, INSURGENCY, POWER, THESES, GROUP DYNAMICS, MILITARY TACTICS
Identifiers: (U) COIN(COUNTERINSURGENCY), GROUP AFFILIATION, HUMINT(HUMAN INTELLIGENCE), PEOPLES WAR, POPULATION NEEDS AND MOTIVATION, POPULATION SUBGROUPS, TACTICAL
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This thesis outlines a methodology for use by tactical operators to better understand the dynamics of the population whose support they are attempting to gain. In turn, these operators (Army soldiers, Marines, Special Forces, SEALs, Civil Affairs, etc.) can use this information to more effectively develop strategy, plan operations, and conduct tactical missions. Our methodology provides a heuristic model, called the 3 x 5 P.I.G.S.P.E.E.R. Model, that can be applied in any environment and will help bridge the gap between strategic theory and tactical implementation. We believe that our methodology can be utilized to increase the operator's understanding of the environment, and improve both non-kinetic and kinetic combat operations. As a counterinsurgency (COIN) force progresses from kinetic combat operations (those attempting to gain a security foothold in a non-permissive environment) to operations focused on gaining the support of the population, our methodology will aid in collecting human intelligence (HUMINT). Our methodology shows that by providing security, working through locals, building trust and cooperation, and identifying opportunities to leverage the local populace's needs, COIN forces will be able to separate the populace from the insurgents, precisely target the insurgents, and empower the locals to handle their own security.

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ADA499691
Vietnam and CORDS: Interagency Lessons for Iraq
Descriptive Note: Monograph
Personal Author(s): Brown, Donald M
Report Date: 24 Nov 2008
Media Count: 69   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *COMMUNITY RELATIONS, *IRAQI WAR, *VIETNAM WAR, *STABILIZATION, *INTERAGENCY COORDINATION, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *CIVIC ACTION, LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SOUTH VIETNAM, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, RURAL AREAS, CIVIL AFFAIRS, CONSTRUCTION, GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), LEADERSHIP, LESSONS LEARNED, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, MILITARY HISTORY
Identifiers: (U) *CORDS(CIVIL OPERATIONS AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT PROGRAM), *SRO(STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS), *PRT(PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS), STABILITY OPERATIONS, UNITY OF EFFORT, CHAIN OF COMMAND, JOHNSON LYNDON B
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine emphasizes the importance of unity of effort among all agencies involved in a COIN fight. That doctrine stresses that unity of effort is best achieved by consolidating all efforts under a single chain of command or leader. When multiple agencies pursue differing agendas, unity of effort suffers. Interagency coordination and synchronization issues at the highest levels of the U.S. Government continue to affect the war in Iraq. The Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of State (DoS) have overlapping responsibilities for Iraq. The President has issued various National Security Directives regarding Stability and Reconstruction Operations (SRO) in Iraq and which department is responsible for what, but the issue is far from being resolved. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are the tool this monograph will use to use to explore the issues hampering the interagency process in Iraq. The mission of PRTs in Iraq is to act as a U.S.-led, civil-military effort to help Iraq's provincial and local governments govern effectively and deliver essential services. The U.S. Government faced a similar problem during the Vietnam War. As the Vietnam War grew in scope and scale, the U.S. Government faced the challenge of coordinating the efforts of all of the agencies involved in the war. After a number of unsuccessful attempts by several Presidents, President Johnson established the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) program. CORDS consolidated all efforts, civilian and military, conventional and COIN, under a single chain of command and a single leader. CORDS is generally regarded as a successful program in spite of the Vietnam War's final outcome. The lessons learned in the development of CORDS can be applied to the current situation in Iraq. The author recommends that the U.S. Government adopt a CORDS-like approach to Iraq and consolidate SRO under the DoD rather than the DoS to achieve true unity of effort.

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ADA500796
Bureaucracies at War: Organizing for Strategic Success in Afghanistan
Descriptive Note: Strategy research project
Personal Author(s): Bolduc, Donald C
Report Date: 13 Nov 2008
Media Count: 44   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS, POLITICAL SCIENCE, NATIONAL SECURITY, STRATEGIC ANALYSIS, MISSIONS, GUERRILLA WARFARE, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AFGHANISTAN, LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT, COUNTERINSURGENCY, NATO, UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
Identifiers: (U) ISAF(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE), IRREGULAR WARFARE, GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM, SRP(STRATEGY RESEARCH PAPER)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The collapse of the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2001 led to the challenges of creating and then maintaining a stable, safe, and secure environment for the people of that nation. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) and the International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF) failure to organize and establish the unity of command and unity of purpose needed to implement under an effective counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy has resulted in the ISAFs inability to gain and maintain security, prevent a resurgence of the Taliban, and develop an effective infrastructure development plan. This strategy research paper (SRP) examines how poor administration and organization of the political and military effort in Afghanistan has resulted in a lack of unity of command and unity of purpose, which has created an unstable political and military environment and an ineffective Afghan government. This SRP concludes with eleven recommendations to better organize NATOs political and military effort in order for the NATO mission to succeed in Afghanistan.

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ADA494924
Integrating Language and Cultural Knowledge into the Army Officer Corps
Descriptive Note: Research paper
Personal Author(s): Purser, Jennifer L
Report Date: 12 Nov 2008
Media Count: 8   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *SKILLS, *RESERVE OFFICER TRAINING CORPS, *FOREIGN LANGUAGES, *CADETS, *AWARENESS, *CULTURE, *ARMY PERSONNEL, LEARNING, COMPENSATION, ARMY, UNIVERSITIES, RECRUITING, COUNTERINSURGENCY, UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY, MILITARY REQUIREMENTS
Identifiers: (U) *LANGUAGE SKILLS, *CULTURAL AWARENESS, *OMS(ORDER OF MERIT SCORE), *STUDY ABROAD, LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY, STRATEGIC LANGUAGES, FINANCIAL INCENTIVES, NATIONAL ORDER OF MERIT LIST, DLPT(DEFENSE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST), LANGUAGE AND STUDY ABROAD PROGRAMS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) As the Contemporary Operating Environment (COE) has shifted away from a necessity to apply conventional tactics towards a counterinsurgency fight, culture has become increasingly important to the U.S. Army. In the wake of such a tremendous tactical policy change, the U.S. Army must find a way to increase the cultural knowledge and strategic language capabilities within its Officer Corps. The Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) recognizes this need and is seeking innovative ways to tackle such a challenge. By promoting the acquisition of culture and language comprehension before individuals become commissioned, the Army can save both time and money in training officers to prepare for the COIN fight. The author proposes implementing Order of Merit Score (OMS) and financial incentives for ROTC cadets who study abroad and/or demonstrate a proficiency in a strategic language. General William S. Wallace, the current TRADOC Commander, hosted a media roundtable in October of 2007 in which he discussed his plan to improve language skills within the Army through doctrinal changes. GEN Wallace said, I, for example, think that every one of our ROTC scholarship recipients ought to be required to take a strategic language for some period of time. Such a change in the ROTC curriculum would certainly benefit both the COIN fight and diplomatic relations with other nations. Compared to today, significantly more officers would speak a strategic language proficiently. Furthermore, this requirement would enable the Army to conserve training time and DoD funding, as cadets would learn the languages while still in college before they become commissioned.

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ADA494310
How Does This All End? Campaign Planning, Phase Transitions, and Conflict Termination in Iraq
Descriptive Note: Research paper
Personal Author(s): Goss, Thomas
Report Date: 31 Oct 2008
Media Count: 29   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *TRANSITIONS, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *COUNTERTERRORISM, *MILITARY PLANNING, *IRAQI WAR, *MILITARY ASSISTANCE, *CENTER OF GRAVITY, CIVIL AFFAIRS, JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), SECURITY PERSONNEL, MILITARY COMMANDERS, MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES), STABILIZATION
Identifiers: (U) *CAMPAIGN PLANNING, *PHASE TRANSITIONS, *CONFLICT TERMINATION, *FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE, IRAQI FREEDOM OPERATION, CENTCOM(US CENTRAL COMMAND), MNF-I(MULTINATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ HEADQUARTERS), PHASE 0, SHAPING CAMPAIGNS, SECURITY COOPERATION, FID(FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE), STABILIZATION OPERATIONS AND ENABLING CIVIL AUTHORITIES, AL QAEDA
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) For the military commanders and staff planners at U.S. Central Command and Multinational Force-Iraq Headquarters in Baghdad, the question of how and when Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) will end has lately become urgent due to events on the ground and political pressures. The political issue of how OIF ends is inherently wrapped up in the military issues of campaign planning, desired end-states, centers of gravity, and operational phase transitions in the Iraqi War over the next 12-24 months. The answer to this complex question is that OIF will end when the OIF operational commanders formally transition from the current Counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign to a sustained shaping campaign of Security Cooperation that includes the two pillars of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and Counterterrorism (CT) operations. This change in operational focus can be most effectively done and signaled to U.S. tactical units by removing the enemy's Center of Gravity from the commander's operational vision and direction. Therefore, the conceptual key to ending the current OIF campaign is to integrate into commanders' vision and operational planning the flexible use of the operational Centers of Gravity depicted here to design a successful transition to long-term shaping activities outside the current OIF campaign.

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ADA495872
Improving the Performance of Collectors in the Reserve Components
Personal Author(s): Hoar, Richard
Report Date: 14 Sep 2008
Media Count: 10   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *ARMY PERSONNEL, *MILITARY TRAINING, *MILITARY RESERVES, *MILITARY OPERATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS, COUNTERINSURGENCY, MISSIONS, DRILLS, LEARNING, REQUIREMENTS, BATTLES, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) As exemplified by military operations conducted since 11 September 2001, Reserve component Soldiers are an integral and important part of the forces of the United States Army. Soldiers from the Reserve components have been Each month, Reservists and Guard members typically meet over the course of a weekend for their two-day Battle Assembly. During monthly Battle Assemblies, Reserve Component Soldiers predominantly focus on the practice and completion of Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills (WTBDs). These Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills are conducted along with other training elemental to a unit's mission and specialty. Resulting from limited training time and particular training requirements, Reservists are not adequately prepared to be effective collectors of intelligence for the units with which they will deploy down range. Therefore, it is imperative that Reserve component Soldiers train for intelligence collection during monthly Battle Assemblies. As noted in the Army's Counterinsurgency manual, In [a counterinsurgency], the side with the better learning organization usually wins. Soldiers cannot wait until they are alerted to deploy to prepare for a COIN mission.

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ADA482990
Women in the United States Marine Corps CI/HUMINT Community
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Reese, Jackson L
Report Date: 13 Jun 2008
Media Count: 60   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *WOMEN, *COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, *HUMAN INTELLIGENCE, *MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL, COHESION, COUNTERINSURGENCY, MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, THESES, IRAQ, COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS, MILITARY OPERATIONS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The purpose of the researchers Masters of Military Arts and Science thesis is to explore the possibility of including women in the Marine Corps CI/HUMINT community without diminishing the overall unit cohesion and combat effectiveness of combat arms units currently conduction counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Iraq. The subject warrants further study and analysis as the United States Marine Corps currently excludes women from serving in the CI/HUMINT military occupational specialty (MOS).

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ADA486221
Examining the Capacity of the Philippine Army's Enlished Corps to Accomplish the Government's Counterinsurgency Strategy: Sharpening the Tool
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Espuelas, Jr, Adolfo B
Report Date: 13 Jun 2008
Media Count: 175   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *PHILIPPINES, *ARMY PERSONNEL, *ENLISTED PERSONNEL, *MILITARY STRATEGY, *MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), CONVENTIONAL WARFARE, SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES, ARMY TRAINING, LEADERSHIP, MILITARY DOCTRINE
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The Philippines faces a 39-year old communist insurgency. For years, it tried in vain to solve the problem by kinetic means. Deeply rooted in poverty, resolving this insurgency calls for non-kinetic approaches. This led to the creation of the Special Operations Team (SOT) concept which supports the Philippines? Strategy of Holistic Approach (SHA) which is comparable to the interagency process. A product of military innovation, SOT becomes the main COIN tool. The most salient point is the troops' immersion into communist-influenced communities to conduct wide-ranging activities designed to address people's grievances while achieving military objectives to dismantle enemy politico-military structure, set up counter organizations, and introduce developmental projects. The Army's enlisted corps is the backbone of the SOT program. The object of this study is to examine the capacity of this force based on the five critical areas of training, doctrine, leadership, resources and interagency support. It turns out that the enlisted corps is severely handicapped to accomplish the SOT mission due to substantial deficiencies based on each of the five criteria. To empower the enlisted force, the AFP must institutionalize SOT training, refine its COIN doctrine, re-educate its officer corps, boost SOT-intended resources and strengthen its interagency capability.

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ADA490505
Making Revolutionary Change: Airpower in COIN Today
Personal Author(s): Dunlap, Jr, Charles J
Report Date: Jun 2008
Media Count: 16   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *AIR POWER, IRAQ, MILITARY DOCTRINE, COUNTERINSURGENCY, MANUALS, AFGHANISTAN, REPRINTS
Identifiers: (U) REVOLUTIONARY
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) What a difference a year makes. The idea that airpower would be playing a critical role in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars would hardly have been predicted in December 2006, when the Army and Marine Corps issued a completely revised - but airpower lite - counterinsurgency (COIN) manual commonly known as Field Manual (FM) 3-24.2 Complimentary reviews appeared in unlikely venues such as The New York Times Book Review.3 What seems to have captured the imagination of many who might otherwise be hostile to any military doctrine were the manual's much-discussed Zen-like characteristics, particularly its popular Paradoxes section.4 This part of the manual contained such trendy (if ultimately opaque) dictums as sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is and some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot.5

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ADA485612
Protracted Counterinsurgency Chinese COIN Strategy in Xinjiang
Descriptive Note: Monograph rept. Jul 2007-May 2008
Personal Author(s): LaRonde, J S
Report Date: 22 May 2008
Media Count: 95   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *CHINA, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, MILITARY DOCTRINE, CONFLICT, INSURGENCY, GUERRILLA WARFARE, LEADERSHIP, MILITARY STRATEGY, COMMUNISM
Identifiers: (U) XINJIANG, UYGUR, CHINESE ARMED FORCES, SEPARATIST MOVEMENT, PLA(PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) In 1949, following the conclusion of its revolutionary war against the Chinese Nationalist forces, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) peacefully occupied China's western most province of Xinjiang. For nearly sixty years, the PLA has conducted a counterinsurgency against several, mostly Uyghur-led, separatist movements. Despite periods of significant violence, particularly in the early 1950s and again in the 1990s, the separatist forces have not gained momentum and remained at a level one insurgency. Mao ZeDeng is revered as a master insurgent and the father of Fourth Generation Warfare. Strategists in armies worldwide study his writings on revolutionary and guerilla warfare. This monograph concludes that Mao, as well as the communist leaders who followed him, was also successful at waging protracted counterinsurgency. For nearly sixty years, separatist movements in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Taiwan have all failed. This monograph analyzes the conflict in Xinjiang and concludes that the Chinese continue to defeat the separatist movement in Xinjiang through a strategy that counters Mao's seven fundamentals of revolutionary warfare.

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ADA485700
Global Counterinsurgency: A Way Out of the Global War on Terrorism Quagmire?
Descriptive Note: Monograph
Personal Author(s): Lee, Michael J
Report Date: 22 May 2008
Media Count: 66   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *INSURGENCY, *MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS, *STRATEGY, *GLOBAL, *OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS, *TERRORISTS, COUNTERINSURGENCY, TERRORISM, COUNTERTERRORISM, THREATS, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, NATIONAL SECURITY, FOREIGN POLICY, NETWORKS
Identifiers: (U) *AL QAEDA, *GLOBAL INSURGENCY, *GLOBAL COUNTERINSURGENCY, GWOT(GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM), MILITARY THEORY
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) With the attacks of September 11th, by a transnational, global, terrorist network, the full danger of this new security threat was revealed. The initial response of the U.S. Government to this threat resulted in the birth of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Since its birth, the GWOT has taken center stage as the default Foreign Policy and National Security Strategy of the United States. In the execution of this strategic construct the United States has deployed its military instrument of power to two regional conflicts -- Afghanistan and Iraq -- and numerous other low-level, special operations throughout the globe. This monograph examines the effectiveness of the GWOT and its current relevancy as a strategic concept after more than 6 years of implementation. The monograph addresses the background and origins of GWOT to include the arguments for and against its use and its strengths and weaknesses as a strategic construct. It specifically examines the current security environment in which the GWOT is being applied and finds it to be insufficient. The author proposes that the security environment is more accurately defined as a global insurgency conducted by a transnational terrorist network with global reach. Further, the best way to address this security environment is to replace the construct of GWOT with a global counterinsurgency (COIN) strategic framework. In doing so, the author replaces the primacy of terror or terrorism as the overarching threat with a clear identification of the enemy -- al Qaeda and associated groups and movements. The research delves into the strategic goals and operational objectives of al Qaeda, and assesses its effectiveness as a global insurgency using the criteria established by contemporary and historical insurgency theorists, such as David Galula, Bard O'Neill, Steven Metz, Raymond Millen, Bruce Hoffman, and others.

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ADA485482
Thinking Beyond Counterinsurgency: The Utility of a Balanced Approach to Amnesty, Reconciliation and Reintegration
Descriptive Note: Monograph
Personal Author(s): Clark, John L
Report Date: 22 May 2008
Media Count: 47   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, *MEDIATION, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, UNITED KINGDOM, CONFLICT, STABILITY
Identifiers: (U) *AMNESTY, *RECONCILIATION, *REINTEGRATION, *CONFLICT RESOLUTION, NORTHERN IRELAND, SECURITY OPERATIONS, POLITICAL STABILITY
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This paper explores the military's role in the processes of amnesty, reconciliation and reintegration (AR2). Its premise is that while the US and UK have devoted considerable intellectual energy and treasure to dealing with the current counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, little thought appears to have gone in to what happens once stability and a legitimate government have been restored. In fact, it is clear that in the long term, counter insurgency (COIN) operations are usually just the first step toward conflict resolution which is concluded with the culmination of the amnesty, reconciliation and reintegration processes. This study examines the relationship between COIN operations and AR2 processes and assesses the military's role in both. The primary vehicle it uses to do this is a case study of conflict resolution in Northern Ireland since 1969.

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ADA494409
The War of Ideas and the Role of Information Operations in Counterinsurgency
Descriptive Note: Monograph
Personal Author(s): Hunton, Collin T
Report Date: 27 Apr 2008
Media Count: 65   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *ARMY, *INFORMATION WARFARE, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, *INTEGRATION, *THEORY, *MILITARY DOCTRINE, ASYMMETRIC WARFARE, IRAQI WAR, AFGHANISTAN CONFLICT, TRANSFORMATIONS, MILITARY COMMANDERS, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
Identifiers: (U) *INFORMATION OPERATIONS, *ARMY DOCTRINE, *JOINT DOCTRINE, ISLAMIST EXTREMISM, IRAQI FREEDOM OPERATION, ENDURING FREEDOM OPERATION, WESTERN IDEOLOGY, CLAUSEWITZ CARL VON, DARLEY WILLIAM, ARMY FIELD MANUAL 3-24
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This monograph analyzes the historical development of U.S. Information Operations (IO) doctrine and provides a discussion of the way ahead for a common understanding of IO among the services. The role of IO relative to kinetic operations has been greatly misunderstood and has not adapted to the complexities of our current operations. Given the influence of policy at home and abroad within the asymmetric nature of COIN operations, a review of Clausewitz's theory of political conflict will help us understand the role of information operations as a more political activity with a significantly greater responsibility in COIN operations. The monograph makes a number of recommendations to improve the services' overall understanding of IO so that it can be properly integrated into COIN operational planning and execution in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). First, U.S. Army IO doctrine must nest within the framework of the new Joint doctrine to gain and maintain momentum in this increasingly joint and interagency effort. Second, U.S. Army IO and COIN doctrine should provide better methodology to the force for the application of all IO elements. Third, the U.S. Army must improve the general education of IO across all branches and at every echelon of the service so that IO expertise does not rest solely within the IO career field. Fourth, the means for assessment and analysis between IO and military intelligence should work towards more complete integration to improve comprehensiveness and timeliness of understanding. Finally, commanders must establish a proactive posture for their IO campaigns if they are to maintain the legitimacy of their overall COIN effort. The analysis, assessments, and recommendations in this monograph provide a bridge of understanding between IO and COIN operations and highlight the importance of the proper integration of IO within the current conflict.

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ADA484256
The Application of Operational Design at the Tactical Level of War: Implications and Recommendations
Descriptive Note: Final rept.
Personal Author(s): Altavilla, Christopher T
Report Date: 23 Apr 2008
Media Count: 24   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *TACTICAL WARFARE, *MILITARY ART, PLANNING, MILITARY DOCTRINE, ENVIRONMENTS, MILITARY COMMANDERS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Operational Art and Operational Design must be understood and applied at both the operational and tactical levels of war during counterinsurgency operations. While doctrine prescribes the tactical commander must understand operational art, it also retains its application within the purview of the operational level commander. Additionally, while current and evolving counterinsurgency doctrine reinforce the need for a specific view of operational design when applied specifically to a counterinsurgency campaign, it still retains that campaign planning and design exist at the operational level and above. This paper will assert the need for tactical level commanders' sound application of operational design when planning for protracted counterinsurgency operations within the context of a higher strategic and operational campaign plan. While doctrine states that there is only one campaign plan, current operations clearly show the need for tactical commanders to think with a campaign plan mindset when approaching their tactical planning. In conclusion, it will provide a way for tactical commanders to think about and apply the elements of operational design to better focus their efforts upon assumption of an area of responsibility within a COIN environment.

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ADA484357
A Comparison of Operation Iraqi Freedom and The Algerian War
Descriptive Note: Research paper
Personal Author(s): Hawkins, Robert C
Report Date: 23 Apr 2008
Media Count: 27   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), *ALGERIA, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES), *MILITARY HISTORY, *FRANCE, *IRAQI WAR, INSURGENCY, INDIGENOUS POPULATION, PUBLIC OPINION, BATTLES, GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), LESSONS LEARNED, CASE STUDIES
Identifiers: (U) *FRENCH ALGERIAN WAR, RESTRAINT, PERSEVERANCE, LEGITIMACY, COLONIALISM, PIED NIOR, FLN(FRONT DE LIBERATION NATIONALE), MORICE LINE, AQI(AL QAEDA IN IRAQ), ISF(IRAQI SECURITY FORCES), PHILLIPPEVILLE MASSACRE, BATTLE OF ALGIERS, CHALLE OFFENSIVE, ABU GHRAIB PRISONER ABUSE SCANDAL
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Both the Algerian War and the war in Iraq offer numerous lessons for conducting Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Shortly after the invasion of Iraq in the spring of 2003, the United States found itself embroiled in a bitter insurgency. Since then, the U.S. military skillfully adapted to the rigors of combating the insurgency. As a result, a solid foundation has been laid for the fulfillment of long-term strategic success. History is replete with examples of failed attempts at combating insurgencies. For instance, in Algeria from 1954 to 1962, the French did not link their impressive tactical accomplishments on the battlefield to strategic success against a nationalist insurgency. Conversely, the U.S. military in Iraq has demonstrated a more thorough grasp of the operational art. This paper focuses on how the United States, in Iraq, more effectively applied certain principles of war to COIN operations at the operational level than the French were able to in Algeria. Specifically, the paper compares the principles of security, restraint, perseverance and finally legitimacy. Examples are given, drawn from numerous sources on both case studies, which paint a detailed picture of how both sides either successfully or unsuccessfully applied those principles at the operational level of war.

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ADA487163
Planning in a Counterinsurgency: How We Use the Process
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Brown, Michael H
Report Date: 03 Apr 2008
Media Count: 75   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *IRAQ, *MILITARY OPERATIONS, *MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES), *COUNTERINSURGENCY, MILITARY PLANNING, THESES, MILITARY DOCTRINE, LESSONS LEARNED
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The United States is immersed in a counterinsurgency struggle in Iraq that has challenged its military in a realm of warfare it has not fought on such a large scale since the war in Viet Nam. This type of warfare is not new to our country or it's military but there have been many lessons re-learned and, as a result, our counterinsurgency doctrine was in dire need of being re-written to meet the current setting. Characteristic of this operating environment is our ability to conduct planning in a dynamic atmosphere against a highly adaptive enemy. The purpose of this paper is to examine these counterinsurgency characteristics and the way in which we utilize the current planning process at the operational-level of war to develop lines of operation. The thesis of this research is that the planning process, in its current construct, needs to adapt in order to allow planners to develop lines of operation in a COIN environment that are alternatives to our traditional kinetic approach to warfare and enable us to gain greater efficiencies in our operational objectives. This paper will analyze the planning cycle, not from a scientific point of view, but rather under the lens of the art of war and how we need to expand our thinking to adapt a planning process to fight a long or protracted counterinsurgency war.

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ADA491510
Military Police Operations and Counterinsurgency
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Modarelli, Matthew R
Report Date: Mar 2008
Media Count: 62   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, *LAW ENFORCEMENT, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *MILITARY DOCTRINE, *COMMUNITY RELATIONS, *SECURITY, *MILITARY POLICE, PHILIPPINES, MILITARY GOVERNMENT, CRIMES, RHODESIA, KENYA, INSURGENCY, PEACEKEEPING, VIETNAM WAR, IRAQI WAR, CIVILIAN POPULATION, CASE STUDIES, THESES, THEORY, LEADERSHIP, ASYMMETRIC WARFARE, MILITARY HISTORY, LESSONS LEARNED
Identifiers: (U) *SECURITY OPERATIONS, SPECIAL INVESTIGATORS, SPECIAL AGENTS, CRIMINALS, INSURGENTS, INSURGENT LEADERS, CIVILIAN MILITARY RELATIONS, IRREGULAR WARFARE, MANHUNT OPERATIONS, COUNTERINSURGENCY THEORISTS, SMALL WARS, PSEUDO-GANGS, PROVINCIAL RECONNAISSANCE UNITS, SELOUS SCOUTS, JTFB(JOINT TASK FORCE BALAD), INDIGENOUS SCOUTS, INFORMANTS, PHILIPPINE INSURRECTION, HUKBALAHAP REBELLION, MAU MAU INSURGENCY, KIMATHI DEDAN
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Within the Department of Defense (DoD), each service is assigned military police officers, special investigators, and special agents charged with countering every kind of criminal activity. These personnel are highly skilled in obtaining evidence to disrupt and neutralize criminals and their illicit networks. It is precisely this skill set that when applied to an insurgency simplifies the process of targeting and neutralizing insurgent leaders, subsequently leading to more effective security operations. Using current cultural training and linguistic support, this DoD capability could be organized immediately and assigned to jurisdictions in a given occupied country. By adopting a military government and law enforcement command and control structure, military forces would be able to focus on restoring security and justice to occupied areas using police techniques. Organized within a proper military government C2 structure, security operations could be kept in lock-step with local, provincial and theater-level counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns. With no interagency support available for the foreseeable future, the DoD must turn to its own organic capabilities immediately and organize appropriately to support the functions needed to maintain security while properly identifying and neutralizing insurgent leaders and groups. Throughout history, several organizations have been designed to identify and neutralize insurgent leaders in COIN campaigns. The following manhunt programs and their organizations will be analyzed and compared: (1) Pseudo-gangs operations in Kenya (1955-1956), (2) Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) operations in Vietnam, (3) Selous Scouts operations in Rhodesia (1978), and (4) Joint Task Force Balad (JTFB) operations in Iraq (2006-2007). The programs employed in these irregular warfare campaigns can provide insight into the proper employment of indigenous scouts and informants, and the appropriate organization of forces for future conflicts.

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ADA499463
Expanding the Role of a Company Commander in a COIN Environment
Personal Author(s): Colibaba, Cristinel
Report Date: 19 Feb 2008
Media Count: 13   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MILITARY COMMANDERS, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, ROLES(BEHAVIOR), COMPANY LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS, LEADERSHIP
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Counterinsurgency operations (COIN) require leaders to be pentathletes: warfighters, info gatherers, infrastructure builders, humanitarians. This is the reason for which the current manifestation of counterinsurgency (COIN) warfighting is a combination of military, intelligence, and government agencies. In Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, maneuver units, special operations forces, civil affairs specialists, psychological operations detachments, international development agencies, and intelligence and advisory elements all operate simultaneously along the same lines without synchronizing effects among parallel units or commands. In a COIN environment, in order to obtain support among the population and build trust the company commander must expand his role beyond the military to include civilian operations.

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ADA499473
Thinks Like a Cop, Fights Like a Marine
Personal Author(s): Draa, R M
Report Date: 19 Feb 2008
Media Count: 20   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS, AREA DEFENSE, LAW ENFORCEMENT, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, COUNTERINSURGENCY, CRIMES, INSURGENCY, LESSONS LEARNED
Identifiers: (U) GANGS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) In the post Cold War era, the world has seen a dramatic shift in who makes war, why it is made, and upon whom war is made. The trend in the last half century has been a crescendo in conflict of a more fragmented nature, Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW). War is increasingly less the pastime of the state, but rather, a tool for the disenfranchised, disaffected, and dissatisfied. While the United States enters the seventh year of warfare with various non-state entities it continues to search for a tidy little box in which to classify counterinsurgency operations (COIN). Since patterns of violence and structure in organized crime and gangs share characteristics with the twenty-first century insurgency, tactical successes of law enforcement provide insight into useful thought processes for COIN. In order to succeed in COIN environments, the Marine Corps must move beyond force protection, capitalize on similarities between insurgents and transnational gangs, and adopt lessons learned by domestic law enforcement.

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ADA478292
Contemporary Counterinsurgency (COIN) Insights from the French-Algerian War (1954-1962)
Descriptive Note: Strategy Research Project
Personal Author(s): DeTreux, Kenneth M
Report Date: 03 Feb 2008
Media Count: 33   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *ALGERIA, *FRANCE, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *IRAQI WAR, MILITARY HISTORY, LESSONS LEARNED, INSURGENCY, PUBLIC OPINION, TERRORISM, STRATEGY, MILITARY DOCTRINE
Identifiers: (U) *FRENCH ALGERIAN WAR, POLITICAL DIMENSIONS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Following the successful major combat operations that ousted Saddam Hussein and liberated Iraq from his dictatorial regime, the U.S. finds itself embroiled in a very complex, challenging, and inherently dangerous counterinsurgency environment in Iraq. History is replete with illustrative examples of past counterinsurgencies and the study of these campaigns can provide relevant insight and perspective of the complexities and challenges confronting the counterinsurgency force. Through research and analysis, these examples can provide relevant insight into various types of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, as well as the successes and failures experienced in operating in these unconventional environments. The French Algerian War (1954-1962) provides one such illustrative case study. This project researches and examines three main elements from the French Algerian experience: the Algerian insurgency, the French counterinsurgency, and the political dimensions of the conflict. Citing both similarities and differences of the like elements in our current conflict in Iraq, e.g. Iraqi insurgency, U.S. counterinsurgency, and political dimensions, the selected elements for this project are intended to provide relevant insights and provide military leaders and planners a better understanding, perspective, and critical lens to view counterinsurgency campaigns in order to plan and execute more effectively in future conflicts.

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ADA480994
Rethinking Counterinsurgency
Personal Author(s): Mackinlay, John, Al-Baddawy, Alison
Report Date: Jan 2008
Media Count: 82   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, ENVIRONMENTS, INSURGENCY, LOCAL GOVERNMENT, MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN)
Identifiers: (U) RETHINKING
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The contemporary international security environment has become a frustrating place for Western powers. Even with great technological and military advances, British and U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) operations have been slow to respond and adapt to the rise of the global jihadist insurgency. Operational failures in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the need for the West to rethink and retool its current COIN strategy. By analyzing past British COIN experiences and comparing them to the evolving nature of modern jihadist insurgencies, this document suggests a new outlook for future COIN operations. This strategic framework considers the political, social, and military aspects of an insurgency and likewise looks for a political, social, and military solution. Historically, the United Kingdom has been successful in countering insurgencies faced at home and abroad. During the period of decolonization in Asia and Africa, the British government and military were faced with more insurgent activity than any other Western power. During this time, British forces proved proficient in defeating, or at least controlling, the rebellions rising throughout their empire. Most notable were the British successes in Malaya and Northern Ireland. However, these protoinsurgencies were far less complex and sophisticated than the jihadist insurgency faced today. Past insurgencies were primarily monolithic or national in form. Although the popularity of these past insurgent movements may have spread globally, the insurgencies were working for very specific local goals (like overthrowing a local government), and they derived most of their power from the local

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ADA475806
Shortchanging the Joint Fight? An Airman's Assessment of FM 3-24 and the Case for Developing Truly Joint COIN Doctrine
Descriptive Note: Monograph
Personal Author(s): Dunlap, Jr, Charles J
Report Date: Jan 2008
Media Count: 125   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MARINE CORPS, *MILITARY DOCTRINE, *DEFICIENCIES, *AIR POWER, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *MANUALS, *ARMY, AIR FORCE, INSURGENCY, ASYMMETRIC WARFARE, IRAQI WAR, HUMAN INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION WARFARE, MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS, ARMY OPERATIONS, WOMEN, MILITARY TRAINING, JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, OBSERVATION, LIMITATIONS
Identifiers: (U) ARMY DOCTRINE, MARINE CORPS DOCTRINE, *FIELD MANUAL 3-24, *JOINT COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE, WARFIGHTING PUBLICATION 3-33.5, SERVICE PAROCHIALISM, INCOMPLETE DOCTRINE, GROUND FORCE CONVENTIONALITY, AIRPOWER MYTHS, HOLD BUILD POPULATE, INFORMATION OPERATIONS, CRITICISMS, DOCTRINE ASSESSMENT
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Is America's counterinsurgency (COIN) effort being shortchanged? Does a one-dimensional doctrine fail to exploit America's full COIN potential? Would a genuinely joint approach provide better options to decision makers confronted with the harsh realities of 21st century insurgencies? This study insists the answers are unequivocally yes. It analyzes the pitfalls of accepting Army/Marine tactical doctrine as the joint solution. It also offers insights and ideas from an Airman's perspective for strengthening joint COIN doctrine development to deliver fresh alternatives to national decision makers and combatant commanders. Of central importance to this assessment is the Army's December 2006 Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency (designated by the Marine Corps as Warfighting Publication 3-33.5). This impressive and influential 282-page document skillfully addresses many difficult COIN issues, but regrettably reflects a one-dimensional, ground-centric perspective almost exclusively, as evidenced by the fact that considerations of airpower are confined to a short, 5-page annex. By failing to reconcile the full potential of today's airpower capabilities and by focusing almost exclusively on the surface dimension, FM 3-24 -- despite its many virtues and remarkable insights -- nevertheless falls short of offering U.S. decision makers a pragmatic, overall solution for the challenge of counterinsurgency. Yet, despite FM 3-24's limitations, it has become viewed as the overall plan for COIN operations in Iraq. Of further concern are reports that FM 3-24 appears poised to become the centerpiece of new joint COIN doctrine whose development has just begun. This paper argues that winning COIN fights requires exploiting the potential of the entire joint team.

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ADA475709
COIN of the Realm: U.S. Counterinsurgency Strategy
Descriptive Note: Colloquium brief
Personal Author(s): Wipfli, Ralph, Metz, Steven
Report Date: Jan 2008
Media Count: 5   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES), *UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, *MILITARY DOCTRINE, *STRATEGY, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, SYMPOSIA, JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, COOPERATION, AFGHANISTAN CONFLICT, IRAQI WAR, COMMUNITY RELATIONS, TRANSFORMATIONS, CIVILIAN POPULATION, MISSIONS, GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), CONVENTIONAL WARFARE, MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN)
Identifiers: (U) SRO(STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS), INTERAGENCY COOPERATION, INTERAGENCY COORDINATION, CIVILIAN MILITARY RELATIONS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The Future Defense Dilemmas seminar series is a new partnership between the 21st Century Defense Initiative at the Brookings Institution and the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. Its goal is to bring together defense experts and policy leaders from academia, the military and defense community, other governmental organizations, and nongovernmental institutions for discussions on looming defense questions and dilemmas. On October, 22, 2007, the 21st Century Defense Initiative and the Strategic Studies Institute launched the Future Defense Dilemma series with a day-long seminar entitled COIN of the Realm: U.S. Counterinsurgency Strategy. This was inspired by the recent U.S. military experience in Afghanistan and Iraq and the subsequent renewed interest in COIN. This has far-reaching effects on military doctrine, education, training, knowledge management, force structure planning, and personnel management, as research, development, and acquisition priorities. In a very real sense, the U.S. military of the future will be shaped by efforts to become more effective at counterinsurgency. Given this wide-ranging and deep impact, the seminar explored two key questions: (1) Is the United States pursuing and executing the right strategy?, and (2) Does the military's focus on counterinsurgency detract from other defense and security needs? To address these issues, the seminar organizers assembled experts from the military, government, and academia to present their assessment of the current effort, lay out the challenges, and offer options for further increasing U.S. effectiveness at counterinsurgency. This brief summarizes the presentations, arguments, and discussions at the general level without attribution to any particular speaker or participant.

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ADA486252
Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence: The U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1960-1970 and 2003-2006 (RAND Counterinsurgency Study, Paper 6)
Descriptive Note: Occasional paper
Personal Author(s): Long, Austin
Report Date: Jan 2008
Media Count: 49   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MILITARY DOCTRINE, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, PREPARATION, IRAQI WAR, VIETNAM WAR, MILITARY HISTORY, MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES)
Identifiers: (U) COIN(COUNTERINSURGENCY)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The publication of a new COIN doctrine manual in late 2006 was widely heralded as an indication that the U.S. military was finally coming to understand the problems it has recently faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. This interpretation assumes a tight linkage between doctrine as written and operations conducted. As one way to test this proposition, this paper compares modern COIN doctrine and operations with those of the 1960s. In the 1960s, COIN doctrine as written by both the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps emphasized the role of the population (so-called hearts and minds), civil-military relations, small-unit operations, intelligence gathering, and related concepts. Yet operations seldom matched this written doctrine; instead, the military attempted to attrite the insurgency through large-scale operations and heavy reliance on firepower. In short, doctrine as written and operations conducted were not tightly linked. As at least a partial explanation for this weak linkage, this paper posits a deeper set of organizational concepts and beliefs that has a much greater influence on operations than written doctrine. While a set of beliefs can often be helpful to organizations in conducting their preferred missions, it can be detrimental in other contexts. Much of the U.S. military prefers high-intensity warfare, a mission for which the organization is mentally and materially well prepared. However, mental preparation for this mission makes the military poorly suited to COIN. Altering the set of beliefs oriented toward high-intensity warfare will require more than just new doctrine and some additional professional education. It will require significant reorientation of the services both mentally and materially. If correct, this paper casts doubt on the military's ability to truly be a full-spectrum force, because attempting to optimize for the full spectrum of conflict may produce a force that is not particularly good at any one aspect of that spectrum.

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ADA490792
The Brown Water Navy in the Mekong Delta: COIN in the Littorals and Inland Waters
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Sessoms, Richard E
Report Date: Jan 2008
Media Count: 53   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *VIETNAM WAR, *RIVERINE WARFARE, *NAVY, *MEKONG DELTA, *NAVAL OPERATIONS, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, SOUTH VIETNAM, INSURGENCY, INLAND WATERWAYS, RIVERS, THESES, NAVAL PERSONNEL, MILITARY HISTORY, LITTORAL ZONES
Identifiers: (U) *BROWN WATER NAVY, VIET CONG, VIETNAMIZATION, MARKET TIME OPERATION, GAME WARDEN OPERATION, MOBILE RIVERINE FORCE, SEALORDS OPERATION, MEKONG RIVER, BUCKLEW REPORT
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The Brown Water Navy, created in less than one year, conducted successful counterinsurgency operations against the Viet Cong only to be marginalized by its own government's policy of Vietnamization. In 1964 the Viet Cong were firmly entrenched in the Mekong Delta region. Using fear and terror tactics, the insurgency gained control of the population, creating a safe haven for the movement to thrive and expand. The United States and the Government of South Vietnam recognized the infiltration problem in the Mekong Delta but their military organizations were either unable or incapable to deal with the problem. The geography of the region made it impossible for a U.S. Army or Marine Corps division to operate effectively and the South Vietnamese Army and Navy lacked the training and equipment to operate successfully. In response to these obstacles, Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, commissioned the U.S. Navy to develop a fighting force capable of operating in the delta and ridding the region of the Viet Cong influence. The Navy used for main Operations MARKET TIME, GAME WARDEN, The Mobile Riverine Force, and SEALORDS to achieve these goals. In four short years the Brown Water Sailors experienced marked success with Viet Cong influence minimized and resupply efforts rerouted to the tortuous Ho Chi Minh Trail. However, by the end of 1968, American resolve to fight a war in South Vietnam had deteriorated and the Government needed a way out. President Nixon's Vietnamization program provided the exit for American forces and in turn mitigated the Brown Water Navy's successes of the previous four years. The Brown Water Navy overcame tremendous obstacles in less than one year to create and deploy a formidable fighting force to the Mekong Delta. In four years aggressive strides against the Viet Cong insurgency were achieved only to be mitigated by the effects of Vietnamization.

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ADA491119
From Nicaragua to the 21st Century: Marine Corps Aviation's Role in Counterinsurgency Operations
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Finneran, Robert B
Report Date: Jan 2008
Media Count: 33   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MARINE CORPS AVIATION, THESES, COUNTERINSURGENCY, MILITARY COMMANDERS, NICARAGUA, MILITARY OPERATIONS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The Marines of the Second Nicaraguan Campaign rapidly adapted the role of aviation in order to support the ground commander's requirements to defeat an insurgency. Marine Corps aviators of the 21st century must maintain the same flexible support for the ground commander that was demonstrated by the Marines in Nicaragua since ultimately, ground forces will be the deciding factor in the success or failure of COIN operations.

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ADA494917
Improving Non-Lethal Targeting in COIN
Descriptive Note: Research paper
Personal Author(s): Strebel, Ian
Report Date: Jan 2008
Media Count: 7   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *INTELLIGENCE, *COLLECTION, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *COMMUNITY RELATIONS, *INFORMATION WARFARE, *CIVILIAN POPULATION, *DATA ACQUISITION, BOOKS, NEWSPAPERS, TRANSLATORS, PERIODICALS, MANUALS, PATROLLING, TARGETING, MAPS, PHOTOGRAPHS, ISOLATION, RECORDS
Identifiers: (U) *INFORMATION OPERATIONS, *NONLETHAL TARGETING, OSINT(OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE), SIGINT(SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE), PUBLIC DOCUMENTS, LOCAL INTELLIGENCE, LINGUISTS, LOCAL POPULATION
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The control of information is strategically decisive in counterinsurgency, according to John Nagl in Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Information is the main weapon that insurgents use to gain the vital support of the populations in which they operate. In many cases information control is nothing more than portraying certain events in a calculated way. It may include spreading propaganda, twisting facts, or blatantly spreading untruths. While this type of information control is necessary and is employed by both insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, it is reactive in nature. Winning a counterinsurgency requires a proactive approach to information control. This is achieved by knowing and understanding what the local populations are thinking and feeling, and then using nonlethal targeting to exploit that information. As the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan continue, it becomes more and more apparent that nonlethal targeting is often more effective than lethal targeting in COIN operations. Killing every insurgent is normally impossible. Attempting to do so can also be counterproductive in some cases... Dynamic insurgencies can replace losses quickly. Skillful counterinsurgents must thus cut off the sources of that recuperative power. Some sources can be reduced by redressing the social, political and economic grievances that fuel the insurgency. There are two relatively untapped sources of intelligence collection that if used correctly can help achieve the goal of isolating the insurgents from the local population: open source intelligence (OSINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT).

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ADA494914
IPB for Counterinsurgency
Descriptive Note: COIN paper
Personal Author(s): Groves, Kimberly
Report Date: Jan 2008
Media Count: 8   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *BATTLEFIELDS, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, URBAN WARFARE, SOFTWARE TOOLS, METHODOLOGY, MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS
Identifiers: (U) *COIN(COUNTERINSURGENCY), *IPB(INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Throughout the course of military history, intelligence has had to adapt to changes in the methodology of warfare. The intelligence cycle, with all of its analytical tools, informs the friendly commander of the course of a battle and potentially, the outcome of a war. With changes in tactics and settings, intelligence tools should be updated and revised in order to produce maximum effects during different kinds of conflict. The Army adopted the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process in order to organize intelligence tools and ensure that all aspects of warfare are analyzed and contingencies examined. FM 34-130 provides tools to be used by analysts that prepare intelligence for aspects of the battlefield to include terrain, weather, enemy capabilities and order of battle. These are basic tools that are crucial to warfare of any type.

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ADA475595
British Military Intervention into Sierra Leone: A Case Study
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Roberson, Walter G
Report Date: 14 Dec 2007
Media Count: 110   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *FOREIGN POLICY, *MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), *INTERVENTION, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *MILITARY DOCTRINE, *WEST AFRICA, *UNITED KINGDOM, STABILIZATION, MILITARY HISTORY, THESES, AIRLIFT OPERATIONS, EVACUATION, DIPLOMACY, PEACEKEEPING, INSURGENCY, DISARMAMENT, PARATROOPERS, NONCOMBATANT, LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT, DEMOCRACY, POSTWAR OPERATIONS, UNITED NATIONS, CASE STUDIES, AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS, MILITARY STRATEGY, LESSONS LEARNED, GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN)
Identifiers: (U) *SIERRA LEONE, *BRITISH ARMED FORCES, FAILED STATES, SLA(SIERRA LEONE ARMY), RSLA(REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE ARMY), RUF(REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT), PALLISER OPERATION, BARRAS OPERATION, BASILICA OPERATION, PARACHUTE REGIMENT, UNAMSIL(UNITED NATIONS MISSION TO SIERRA LEONE), HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, BLOOD DIAMONDS, ECOWAS(ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES), JRRF(JOINT RAPID REACTION FORCE), NEO(NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS), INFORMATION OPERATIONS, SRO(STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS), CHRONOLOGIES
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This paper is a case study of the British military intervention into Sierra Leone in 2000. The successful British intervention led to the defeat of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and final peace accords, restored order to a failed state, and allowed the democratic restoration of the government of Sierra Leone. The paper will explore the following points: What was British foreign policy at the time and what impact did it have in the decision to intervene?; What was British counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine at the time and was it useful for the forces in Sierra Leone?; Did the British forces use their own doctrine or was the situation in Sierra Leone unique?; and Why was the intervention successful and what lessons can be drawn from it? The author analyzes the United Kingdom's actions against its own doctrine, rather than against the doctrine of the United States or another country. There is one major assumption for this case study. The author categorizes the intervention into Sierra Leone as successful. The justification for this assumption is current-day Sierra Leone. Instead of a war-torn failed state, Sierra Leone now has lasting peace, has disarmed its insurgent forces, has ended the large-scale human rights abuses of the past, and has democratic elections -- not coups -- determining the leadership of the country.

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ADA475477
Defeating Cross Border Insurgencies
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Jorgensen, Thorsten L
Report Date: 14 Dec 2007
Media Count: 151   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *INSURGENCY, *OMAN, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *MILITARY STRATEGY, *AFGHANISTAN, ETHNIC GROUPS, CULTURE, AWARENESS, COMMUNITY RELATIONS, GUERRILLA WARFARE, THESES, SECURITY, MODELS, ECONOMICS, PAKISTAN, NATO
Identifiers: (U) *CROSS BORDER INSURGENCY, *KASHMIR, BORDER SECURITY, CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION, DEMOGRAPHICS, ETHNICITY, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, ISAF(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE), CULTURAL AWARENESS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This thesis assesses whether COIN efforts can be successful when the insurgents are operating from safe havens in neighboring states. The assessment is carried out through case studies of the insurgencies in Oman, Kashmir and Afghanistan. The methodology applied in this thesis is a combination of the structurally focused Collier-Hoeffler model and Bard O'Neil's process oriented model on insurgencies. A variety of factors ranging from the status of the economy to cross border ethnicity are discussed in order to determine if, and how, a COIN effort can achieve success. This thesis concludes that in order to be successful against a cross border insurgency, the international community must assume a strategic approach encompassing all the instruments of national power. Prior to the application of the elements of the DIME, the counterinsurgent should conduct a thorough historical and cultural analysis in order to fully comprehend the region in which operations are going to be executed. Once counterinsurgency operations have commenced, progress must appear immediately, especially with regards to issues such as: security, poverty, medical care and unemployment. Finally, cohesion and persistence on the COIN part are crucial. Once engaged in the COIN fight, the international community must stay the course. Incessant political debates regarding extraction, limitation of forces and national caveats only serve the purpose of the insurgency.

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ADA475521
The French-Algerian War and FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency: A Comparison
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Norton, Jason M
Report Date: 14 Dec 2007
Media Count: 134   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *ALGERIA, *MILITARY HISTORY, *MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), *FRANCE, *MILITARY DOCTRINE, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *LESSONS LEARNED, MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES), MILITARY TACTICS, PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS, INSURGENCY, GUERRILLA WARFARE, COMMUNITY RELATIONS, AIR POWER, CIVILIAN POPULATION, LEADERSHIP, MILITARY STRATEGY, ETHICS, THESES, INTELLIGENCE
Identifiers: (U) *FRENCH-ALGERIAN WAR, *FRENCH COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE, *FIELD MANUAL 3-24, ARMY FIELD MANUALS, ARMY DOCTRINE, FRENCH ARMED FORCES, FLN(NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT), ALN(NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY), CROSS-CULTURAL RELATIONS, INDOCHINA, CIVILIAN MILITARY RELATIONS, SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS, RULE OF LAW, UNITY OF EFFORT, INFORMATION OPERATIONS, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Many aspects of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in today's contemporary operating environment suggest that historical reviews of previous COIN experiences can provide critical insight. However, the results of such reviews tended to fail to be incorporated into military doctrine as the passage of time reduced the perceived relevance of previous experiences. In reality, detailed study of past insurgency experiences is necessary if the U.S. military is to apply the crucial principles of COIN to current threat models. An example of an army that struggled to develop COIN doctrine as it combated an insurgency is the French Army in their conflict in Algeria from 1954 to 1962. French experiences in Algeria provide information on COIN operations that achieved great success at the tactical level, but failed at the strategic level. From this perspective, it is important to examine current U.S. Army doctrine, recently published in FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, in light of French efforts in Algeria. French COIN experiences, which were centered on influencing the civilian population, provide examples that should be compared to current U.S. doctrine. This thesis investigates whether the lessons learned in the French-Algerian War have been incorporated into current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. Its main focus is differences and similarities in FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, and France's counterinsurgency methods of 1954-1962.

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ADA475931
Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: The Foundation and Implications of the New U.S. Doctrine
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Mattox, Raymond M, Rodgers, Peter S
Report Date: Dec 2007
Media Count: 141   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *COUNTERINSURGENCY, FOREIGN POLICY, UNITED STATES, STRATEGY, THESES, INSURGENCY, HISTORY, DOCTRINE, SOCIAL SCIENCES
Identifiers: (U) LLOS(LOGICAL LINES OF OPERATIONS), FM 3-24, SOCIAL MOVEMENT
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) In December 2006, the U.S. Army published its new counterinsurgency (COIN) Field Manual (FM 3-24) FM 3-24 is the much-anticipated capstone doctrinal COIN guide for the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. Its intent is 'to fill a doctrinal gap,' for fighting COIN by delivering 'a manual that provides principles and guidelines for counterinsurgency operations. The importance of developing a coherent, interdisciplinary approach that helps to fill the 'doctrinal' and capability gaps facing the U.S. military in the asymmetrical warfare spectrum, including COIN, cannot be overstated. In light of this, how well do the new guidelines in FM 3-24 for conducting a COIN campaign align with historical and social science lessons on counterinsurgency? FM 3-24 outlines U.S. COIN doctrine in the form of strategies called Logical Lines of Operation (LLOs) With this in mind, are there cases in the Middle East where FM 3-24's LLOs have been applied and produced their intended effects? If they were not used and the state power's desired 'endstate' was achieved, what strategies were used to achieve the COIN campaign objectives? This thesis assesses the extent to which the field manual aligns with insights and practices from historical COIN campaigns in the Middle East as well as the new doctrine's ability to supply the United States with a COIN strategy that incorporates insights and conclusions from academia. Our findings indicate that FM 3-24 is a necessary step in developing an effective and coherent U.S. approach to COIN. However, it fails to incorporate some more contemporary social movement theory explanations into its strategies. For example, it fails to recognize the relative importance political inclusion in counterinsurgency strategies versus other variables, such as security, as a primary means of success in counterinsurgency campaigns.

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ADA475905
The Need for Intelligence Reform in Thailand's Counterinsurgency
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Ampunan, Tibordee
Report Date: Dec 2007
Media Count: 105   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *LEADERSHIP, *COMMUNITIES, *INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *THAILAND, INTELLIGENCE, THESES, INSURGENCY, POLICE, CASE STUDIES, POLICIES, ORGANIZATIONS, STRATEGY
Identifiers: (U) THAILAND'S INTELLIGENCE, NETWORK ORGANIZATION.
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) In Thailand, post January 2004, the Islamic insurgency in the south has surged constantly. During this time, the insurgency has not refrained from attacking and intimidating innocent people; government officials are also targeted especially the military, the police, and the local community leaders. The Thai government has developed its policies and ad hoc organization to confront this problem, and improved related laws in hopes of improving the situation, but so far, little the government has done has been successful. This thesis examines the Thai government's counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy post-2004 to cope with the Muslim insurgency in that country, and focuses on the ad-hoc organization of Thai officials charged with executing the COIN strategy, with emphasis placed on the intelligence system, in particular, in order to recommend the appropriate ways to reform the intelligence system. The purpose of this case study is first to suggest improvements to the Thai Intelligence Community that will enable it to become more effective in fighting the insurgency. The second goal of this thesis is to suggest modifications to the Thai government s strategy and its organization that could enable the government to pursue more effective counter-insurgency activities.

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ADA476729
Adapting Airpower in Counterinsurgency: A Roadmap for the Operational Planner
Descriptive Note: Research paper
Personal Author(s): McCall, James
Report Date: 06 Nov 2007
Media Count: 26   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MILITARY HISTORY, *LESSONS LEARNED, *MILITARY DOCTRINE, *AIR POWER, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *MILITARY PLANNING, AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE, GUERRILLA WARFARE, INSURGENCY, IRAQI WAR, INFORMATION WARFARE, UNITED KINGDOM, MALAYA, PROPAGANDA, AFGHANISTAN, AIRLIFT OPERATIONS, THEORY, MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES), USSR
Identifiers: (U) *OPERATIONAL PLANNING, AIR FORCE DOCTRINE, SOMALILAND, RAF(ROYAL AIR FORCE), INFORMATION OPERATIONS, CAS(CLOSE AIR SUPPORT), JOINT DOCTRINE, AIR CONTROL, BRITISH COLONIES
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Over its first 100 years, the airplane has become an integral part of American combat power and a difference maker on the battlefield. Yet when applied to counterinsurgency, many struggle to draw conclusions regarding its effectiveness and utility. Today, the operational commander faces new and irregular enemies operating in diverse environments. American combat forces will be forced to evolve in response to adversaries who respect its conventional advantages and instead search to exploit seams in its capabilities. Historically, airpower has been invaluable in counterinsurgency efforts, although it has largely been ignored doctrinally. Without suitable doctrine, the joint planner is left to wonder how to best apply airpower in these counterinsurgencies. This paper offers the planner a starting point. It explores the historical application of airpower in COIN and analyzes selected historical examples to identify best practices and crucial mistakes. The paper concludes with some critical guidelines for the future employment of this capable arm of American power.

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ADA486842
Linking Doctrine to Action: A New Coin Center-of-Gravity Analysis
Descriptive Note: Journal article
Personal Author(s): Mansoor, Peter R, Ulrich, Mark S, Hayward, Edward
Report Date: Oct 2007
Media Count: 8   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *CENTER OF GRAVITY, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *COMMUNITY RELATIONS, *PUBLIC OPINION, *THREAT EVALUATION, *CIVILIAN POPULATION, *INTELLIGENCE, INSURGENCY, COOPERATION, ENEMY, CONFLICT, VULNERABILITY, LEADERSHIP, IRAQI WAR, MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES), REPRINTS
Identifiers: (U) *COUNTERINSURGENCY CENTER OF GRAVITY ANALYSIS, *COUNTERINSURGENCY INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD, *ROOT CAUSES, COIN COG, COIN IPB, VULNERABLE POPULATION, POOR GOVERNANCE, IDEOLOGY, EXTERNAL SUPPORT, INSURGENT STRATEGY, COA(COURSE OF ACTION)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Just as there is no one weapon that guarantees superiority in conventional warfare, there is no silver bullet when it comes to counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, provides a firm doctrinal foundation, as corroborated in Battle Command Knowledge System chat rooms, training at the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center and the Taji Counterinsurgency Center for Excellence, and field experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even so, there is still a gap between doctrine and tactical results in COIN warfare. This article seeks to fill that gap by introducing what the authors believe is a useful planning tool: the COIN center of gravity (COG) analysis, integrated as the culminating step of COIN intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). COIN COG analysis translates theory into practice from the bottom up, exposing insurgent lines of operation (LOOs) and suggesting possible counters to them. Rather than thrusting objectives from the top down that may or may not apply to a given situation, it balances counterinsurgent efforts and provides metrics. Links between COIN IPB and the root causes of a conflict, and between COIN COG analysis and tactical actions, are analyzed to figure out how to preempt insurgent activity instead of merely reacting to it. The process approaches COIN from the dual perspective of the nature of the population and the nature of the insurgent, not from the perspective of the counterinsurgent. The authors' aim is to understand the enemy's specific strategy, get inside his decision cycle, and predict his likely actions. To accomplish this, they use the four steps of COIN IPB: (1) Understand the environment, (2) Determine how the enemy is using the root causes of conflict to generate or heighten popular discontent and thereby manipulate the population, (3) Discern the insurgent's strategy and his likely actions, and (4) Culminate steps 1-3 with an analysis of the COIN COG.

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ADA450481
Winning the Counterinsurgency Fight in Iraq: The Role of Political Culture in Counterinsurgency Warfare 2003-2006 in Iraq
Descriptive Note: Monograph rept. Sep 2005-Mar 2006
Personal Author(s): Pepper, Jr, Joseph
Report Date: 26 May 2006
Media Count: 65   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, MILITARY OPERATIONS, CENTER OF GRAVITY, IRAQ, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, STRATEGY, LEADERSHIP
Identifiers: (U) IRAQI WAR, POLITICAL CULTURE, CULTURAL AWARENESS, ISLAMIC CULTURE, COUNTERINSURGENCY THEORY, COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS, LOO(LINES OF OPERATION), COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This monograph provides insight into the importance of political culture in relation to developing a counterinsurgency strategy. This study answers the research question; how does the political culture of Iraq impact the U.S. ability to combat insurgency operations and establish an acceptable form of governance in Iraq? The framework of this monograph originated from the work of David Galula; the author of Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice. The purpose of this monograph is to assess the importance of political culture in COIN. I submit that our counterinsurgency strategy is not as effective or efficient due to the lack of focus placed on understanding the political culture of Iraq and more importantly the religious connotations associated with it. It is critical for the United States Government (U.S.G.) to alter their counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq to address the center of gravity (COG) which is the support of the counterinsurgency. The U.S.G. should operate along lines of operation (LOOs) to attack the COG. The LOOs are security, governance/ government, economy, cultural awareness, and leadership. The political culture of Iraq remains in a state of transition the U.S.G. must demonstrate progress to the people of Iraq who are growing restless with the instability of the country. Interagency cooperation is critical to the success of the U.S.G. in this counterinsurgency fight.

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ADA449943
Using BATs, CATs, and RATs to Defeat Transnational Terrorist and Control Ungoverned Space
Descriptive Note: Monograph
Personal Author(s): Csicsila, Michael A
Report Date: 25 May 2006
Media Count: 59   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *CROSS CULTURE(SOCIOLOGY), *TEAMS(PERSONNEL), *REMOTE AREAS, *COUNTERTERRORISM, *INDIGENOUS POPULATION, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *COMMUNITY RELATIONS, CASE STUDIES, FOREIGN LANGUAGES, IRAQI WAR, VIETNAM WAR, INFORMATION WARFARE, MALAYA, EL SALVADOR, PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS, ADVISORY ACTIVITIES, PERCEPTION(PSYCHOLOGY), SPECIAL FORCES, HISTORY, EMBEDDING, CIVILIAN POPULATION
Identifiers: (U) SANCTUARIES, *UNGOVERNED SPACES, FID(FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE), OPE(OPERATIONAL PREPARATION OF THE ENVIRONMENT), CROSS CULTURAL AWARENESS, SOCIAL MARKETING, MILITARY ADVISORS, BAT(BATTALION-LEVEL ADVISORY TEAMS), CAT(COUNTRY-LEVEL ADVISORY TEAMS), RAT(REGIONAL-LEVEL ADVISORY TEAMS), PARTNER NATIONS, LOCAL COMMUNITIES, TRIBAL COMMUNITIES, *TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISTS, FOREIGN POPULATIONS, BEHAVIOR CHANGE, US EMBASSIES, INTERAGENCY COORDINATION
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Lawrence of Arabia was a man whose government sent him to a remote area of the world to learn about the culture and people of that foreign nation. His and other governments found that deploying individuals for extended periods was an economical way to gain an in-depth understanding of a remote area and develop a relationship with the local power brokers. The United States needs to reintroduce this practice to wage its Global War on Terrorism more effectively. Small groups of specially selected and trained advisory teams that live in remote regions of the world will enhance its Partner Nations' ability to control ungoverned spaces and defeat transnational terrorists. This monograph begins by examining Counterinsurgency (COIN) theory to demonstrate that successful COIN operations require a detailed understanding of the local population and its culture. The paper then looks at historical examples of the how these tenets were either upheld or violated by the British in Malay, and the United States in Vietnam and El Salvador, and what the consequences were for them. The monograph then delves deeper into methods for gaining an understanding of foreign peoples and cultures, not only how governments have historically attempted to gain an understanding of foreign populations, but also how business and humanitarian organizations use Social Marketing to learn about a population's wants and needs. Next, the monograph shows how the U.S. Government has traditionally tried to enhance Partner Nations' ability to protect their people from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency through its embassies, Regional Combatant Commands, and Security Assistance programs. While this approach has been somewhat successful, deficiencies in manpower and information can be surmounted by using specially selected and trained advisory teams who are embedded at the battalion, country, and regional levels to help control ungoverned spaces and defeat transnational terrorists.

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ADA449976
Leveraging Logical Lines of Operation in COIN
Descriptive Note: Monograph
Personal Author(s): Cody, Matthew J
Report Date: 25 May 2006
Media Count: 76   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MILITARY HISTORY, *MILITARY DOCTRINE, *MILITARY PLANNING, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *IRAQI WAR, *MALAYA, STABILIZATION, IRAQ, THEORY, UNITED KINGDOM, INSURGENCY, JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, CASE STUDIES, MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), LESSONS LEARNED, MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES)
Identifiers: (U) COMPLEX OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS, *LOGICAL LINES OF OPERATION, CAMPAIGN PLANNING, ARMY DOCTRINE, BRITISH ARMY, BRITISH DOCTRINE, IRAQI FREEDOM OPERATION, JOINT DOCTRINE, EBO(EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS), FID(FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE), STABILITY OPERATIONS, MALAYAN EMERGENCY, INTERVIEWS
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Historically, the U.S. Army has faced numerous challenges when planning for counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Insurgencies by their very nature occur within the context of a complex operating environment and typically last years, if not decades. The insurgency that erupted at the conclusion of major combat operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom represents an example of the complex operating environment that planners will continue to face in the future. The best available planning method for operational planners to frame operations over the duration of a protracted campaign is called Logical Lines of Operation. Logical Lines of Operation allows commanders to visualize and adjust operations over time, space, and purpose to contribute to operational objectives and strategic end-state(s). This monograph analyzes the theoretical and historical underpinnings of Lines of Operation (physical and logical) and counterinsurgency operations (COIN). An analysis of U.S. and British planning and counterinsurgency doctrine provides a look at the effectiveness of current doctrine in addressing the use of Logical Lines of Operation in the complex operating environment. Case studies are analyzed to examine the practical application of Logical Lines of Operation in COIN operations and to determine whether the concept informs current doctrine. The author argues that a void exists in both U.S. Army and Joint doctrine with respect to the use of Logical Lines of Operation, particularly with respect to planning COIN operations within protracted campaigns. He presents recommendations to improve the description and depiction of Logical Lines of Operation in U.S. Joint and Army planning and counterinsurgency doctrine.

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ADA449945
The Importance of Ethics in Counterinsurgency Operations
Descriptive Note: Monograph
Personal Author(s): Archer, Tony
Report Date: 25 May 2006
Media Count: 73   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *CROSS CULTURE(SOCIOLOGY), *OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS, *COMMUNITY RELATIONS, *ETHICS, *INDIGENOUS POPULATION, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES), ALGERIA, INSURGENCY, IRAQI WAR, AFGHANISTAN CONFLICT, MALAYA, CIVILIAN POPULATION, PERCEPTION(PSYCHOLOGY), QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS, CASE STUDIES, UNITED STATES, MIDDLE EAST, ISLAM
Identifiers: (U) *MILITARY ETHICS, UNIVERSAL MORALS, CROSS CULTURAL AWARENESS, MUSLIMS, ISLAMIC CULTURE, WESTERN CULTURE, ALGERIAN INSURGENCY, MALAYAN INSURGENCY, IMMANUAL KANT, WESTERN MORALS, ISLAMIC MORALS, NONWESTERN MORALS, CIVILIAN MILITARY RELATIONS, TRIBAL COMMUNITIES, LOCAL COMMUNITIES, TRIBAL CULTURE
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The purpose of this research was to develop a set of key principles that would support both planners and operators in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. This set of principles would also be morally acceptable on an international level, which would not only support the conduct of operations but would also lead to enhanced legitimacy and acceptance. The development of these principles is important because the current methods the Coalition is employing in Iraq and Afghanistan are not only ineffective, but they are increasing the rift in relations between the West and the Middle East. The method of analysis that was employed was a qualitative analysis of ethics/morality and counterinsurgency. After developing a set of ethical principles and analyzing them against Kant's categorical imperative to confirm universality, the principles were combined with the proposed COIN principles to develop a set of ethically sound principles for COIN. These principles were then applied to two case studies to confirm their employability. The result of the analysis was a set of morally sound COIN principles that provided positive results when applied to the case studies of counterinsurgencies in Algeria and Malaya. These ethically sound COIN principles were then used to construct several recommendations for the conduct of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The major inconsistency between the hypothesis and the outcome of the analysis was that the West and Islamic cultures have significant ethical beliefs in common. The research has provided an ethically inclusive model that planners they can employ during COIN to enhance the conduct of the operation and also drastically improve the perception and legitimacy of the counterinsurgent force.

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ADA449966
Defining the Information within Military Information Operations: Utilizing a Case Study of the Jammu and Kashmir Conflict
Descriptive Note: Monograph
Personal Author(s): Bookard, Joe D
Report Date: 25 May 2006
Media Count: 69   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *INDIA, *GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *INFORMATION WARFARE, *MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), TERRORISTS, MILITARY DOCTRINE, CASE STUDIES, INFORMATION THEORY, INSURGENCY, PERCEPTION(PSYCHOLOGY), PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS, HISTORY, CONTAINMENT(GENERAL), THREATS, PAKISTAN, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Identifiers: (U) *INFORMATION OPERATIONS, *JAMMU, *KASHMIR, INFORMATION FLOW, INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT, CIVILIAN MILITARY RELATIONS, PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, PAKISTANI INSURGENTS, PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION OPERATIONS, SECESSION, MUSLIMS, US ARMY DOCTRINE
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) The current operating environment requires the United States military to conduct military information operations throughout the conflict spectrum, during all phases, and across various military operations. A function of the U.S. military is to deter adversaries who oppose the will of the United States, and if unsuccessful, render them incapable of physical resistance, thus ultimately altering their behavior. In essence, the U.S. military wishes to alter tangible and intangible variables in any system to gain an advantage. As the U.S. military increases its reliance on information and its supporting infrastructures, the threat will continue to become more sophisticated, clandestine, and complex. Therefore, military commanders and their staffs should develop sophisticated approaches to describe, classify, and explain essential elements within the information environment, particularly when conducting counterinsurgency operations (COIN). The commander's analysis of the information environment is critical. It will be challenged by anonymous adversaries in their remote geographic locations using inexpensive off the shelf technology. Because of this threat, there is a significant demand for accurate and reliable information for mission planning and execution for combat operations forces. The research presented in this work examines the Indian government's response to counterinsurgency through the categories of information defined by the author. The author's definition of information focuses on how decision makers, mainly military commanders, assign value to information within, and extracted from, the information environment. The definition is an attempt to add clarity to the broad meanings found in the FM and JP 3-13 doctrine for Information Operations. A bibliography of U.S. Government publications, books, monographs, reports, journal articles, and internet sites is included.

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ADA463728
Resurrecting Phoenix: Lessons in COIN Operations
Descriptive Note: Final rept.
Personal Author(s): Weidman, Steven J
Report Date: 16 May 2006
Media Count: 21   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *LESSONS LEARNED, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, MILITARY OPERATIONS, IRAQ, SOUTH VIETNAM, ASIA, AFRICA, POLITICAL SCIENCE
Identifiers: (U) *PHOENIX PROGRAM, VCI(VIET CONG INFRASTRUCTURE)
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) This paper examines the concept of resurrecting a modified version of the Phoenix Program for possible use in counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts in Iraq. Phoenix was a successful COIN program which lasted in South Vietnam from 1967-1973. Examination of the Phoenix Program is done in this paper, and particular emphasis is given to interagency cooperation on the operational level. This paper also examines modern-day examples of both successful and unsuccessful COIN operations in Africa and Asia and the lessons learned from these efforts. Specific operational level recommendations are given, as well as consideration to the limitations such a program would have in the current political and social climate.

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ADA486811
Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency
Descriptive Note: Journal article
Personal Author(s): Cohen, Eliot, Crane, Conrad, Horvath, Jan, Nagl, John
Report Date: Apr 2006
Media Count: 6   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *INTERAGENCY COORDINATION, *ADAPTATION, *INFORMATION WARFARE, *GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *COMMUNITY RELATIONS, *DECENTRALIZATION, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, BIOMETRIC SECURITY, BORDER SECURITY, LAW ENFORCEMENT, CIVILIAN PERSONNEL, ISOLATION, LEADERSHIP, INTELLIGENCE, STABILITY, MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES), REPRINTS
Identifiers: (U) LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, REGIME SUPPORT, UNITY OF EFFORT, POLITICAL PRIMACY, INSURGENT ISOLATION, MEASURED FORCE, PARADOXES, PRINCIPLES, IMPERATIVES
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) America began the 20th century with military forces engaged in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in the Philippines. Today, it is conducting similar operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and a number of other countries around the globe. During the past century, Soldiers and Marines gained considerable experience fighting insurgents in Southeast Asia, Latin America, Africa, and now in Southwest Asia and the Middle East. Conducting a successful counterinsurgency requires an adaptive force led by agile leaders. While every insurgency is different because of distinct environments, root causes, and cultures, all successful COIN campaigns are based on common principles. All insurgencies use variations of standard frameworks and doctrine and generally adhere to elements of a definable revolutionary campaign plan. In the information age, insurgencies have become especially dynamic. Their leaders study and learn, exchange information, employ seemingly leaderless networks, and establish relationships of convenience with criminal gangs. Insurgencies present a more complex problem than conventional operations, and the new variants have a velocity that previous historical insurgencies never possessed.

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ADA454788
On Other War Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research
Descriptive Note: Monograph
Personal Author(s): Long, Austin
Report Date: Jan 2006
Media Count: 115   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MILITARY HISTORY, *MILITARY STRATEGY, *THEORY, *LESSONS LEARNED, *COLD WAR, *INSURGENCY, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES), BIBLIOGRAPHIES, MOTIVATION, PUBLIC OPINION, CYPRUS, BURMA, PROPAGANDA, EL SALVADOR, KENYA, RHODESIA, THAILAND, COLOMBIA, PHILIPPINES, IRAQI WAR, AFGHANISTAN CONFLICT, VIETNAM WAR, UNITED KINGDOM, MALAYA, LAOS, CIVILIAN POPULATION, CASE STUDIES, MORALE, RECRUITING, ALGERIA, GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN)
Identifiers: (U) COIN(COUNTERINSURGENCY), HEARTS AND MINDS THEORY, COST-BENEFIT THEORY, COERCION, INSURGENT ORGANIZATION, AMNESTY PROGRAMS, REWARD PROGRAMS, BORDER SECURITY, PACIFICATION, VIET CONG, CHIEU HOI PROGRAM, MORICE LINE, PRT(PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS), CIVILIAN MILITARY RELATIONS, CRITIQUES, KHALILZAD LINES, DEFECTION, NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY, VIET MINH WAR
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) As part of the global war on terror, Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom showcased the dazzling technological capability and professional prowess of the U.S. military in conventional operations. Yet the subsequent challenges posed by insurgency and instability in both Afghanistan and Iraq have proved much more difficult to surmount for both military and civilian agencies. Further, this difficulty in coping with insurgency may embolden future opponents to embrace insurgency as the only viable means of combating the United States. Thus, both the current and future conduct of the war on terror demand that the United States improve its ability to conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. This study seeks to summarize much of what is known about prior COIN and to make recommendations for improving it based on RAND Corporation's decades-long study of the subject. The body of work generated from this study covers many aspects of COIN, from the most abstract theories of why insurgency takes place to tactical operations. It also covers a wide array of cases, varied in both geography and time, from the British experience in Malaya to the French in Algeria to the United States in El Salvador. However, the research is limited in that almost all of it is based on cases that occurred in the context of the Cold War. Some might question the continuing relevance of studies centered on conflicts that took place in such a radically different geopolitical context. This study is based on the premise that, while many specific details do vary greatly, insurgency and counterinsurgency is a more general phenomenon that is not a product of Cold War peculiarities. Further, many of the alleged differences between past and current COIN are overstated. For example, the fragmented nature of the insurgency in Iraq is often remarked on as almost without precedent. Yet many insurgencies during the Cold War were also highly fragmented. A RAND counterinsurgency bibliography is included.

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ADA442198
Going to War with the Allies You Have: Allies, Counterinsurgency, and the War on Terrorism
Descriptive Note: Monograph
Personal Author(s): Byman, Daniel
Report Date: Nov 2005
Media Count: 44   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *DEVELOPING NATIONS, *UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, *POLITICAL ALLIANCES, *MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), *DEFICIENCIES, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, ALGERIA, INDIA, LEADERSHIP, COUNTERTERRORISM, UZBEKISTAN, INSURGENCY, INDONESIA, PARAMILITARY FORCES, AFGHANISTAN, SAUDI ARABIA, PHILIPPINES, TERRORISM, LIMITATIONS, GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), ISLAM, EGYPT, MILITARY ASSISTANCE, PAKISTAN, IRAQ
Identifiers: (U) *AL QAIDA, *ALLIES, ALLIED SECURITY FORCES, HOST NATIONS, MILITARY MILITARY RELATIONS, COIN(COUNTERINSURGENCY), STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES, ISLAMIST INSURGENTS, RADICAL ISLAM, MILITARY CULTURE, AL QAEDA, CIVILIAN MILITARY RELATIONS, ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS, ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, SOCIAL PROBLEMS, POLITICAL PROBLEMS, AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Potential U.S. allies in counterinsurgencies linked to al-Qaida frequently suffer from four types of problems: illegitimate and repressive regimes; civilian-military tension manifested by fears of a coup; economic backwardness; and discriminatory societies. Because of these problems, allies often stray far from the counterinsurgency (COIN) ideal, both militarily and politically. Their security service culture often is characterized by poor intelligence; a lack of initiative; little integration of forces across units; soldiers who do not want to fight; bad leadership; and problems with training, learning, and creativity. In addition, the structural weaknesses have a direct political effect that can aid an insurgency by hindering the development and implementation of a national strategy, fostering poor relations with outside powers that might otherwise assist the COIN effort, encouraging widespread corruption, alienating the security forces from the overall population, and offering the insurgents opportunities to penetrate the security forces. Washington must recognize that its allies, including these security forces, are often the source of the problem as well as the solution. The author argues that the ally's structural problems and distinct interests have daunting implications for successful U.S. counterinsurgency efforts. The nature of regimes and of societies feeds an insurgency, but the United States is often hostage to its narrow goals with regard to counterinsurgency and thus becomes complicit in the host-nation's self-defeating behavior. Unfortunately, U.S. influence often is limited as the allies recognize that America's vital interests with regard to fighting al-Qaida-linked groups are likely to outweigh any temporary anger at an ally's brutality or failure to institute reforms. Training, military-to-military contacts, education programs, and other efforts to shape their COIN capabilities are beneficial, but the effects are likely to be limited at best.

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ADA436240
A Counterinsurgency Campaign Plan Concept: The Galula Compass
Descriptive Note: Monograph
Personal Author(s): Vrooman, Stephen
Report Date: 26 May 2005
Media Count: 56   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MILITARY HISTORY, *MILITARY DOCTRINE, *THEORY, *JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, *MILITARY PLANNING, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, LESSONS LEARNED, CASE STUDIES, SOUTH AFRICA, INSURGENCY, MILITARY COMMANDERS
Identifiers: (U) COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGNS, CAMPAIGN PLANNING, DAVID GALULA, BOER WAR, JOINT DOCTRINE, COUNTERINSURGENCY THEORY, HISTORICAL ANALYSIS, COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. This document is not available from DTIC in microfiche.
Abstract: (U) This monograph describes the nature and dynamics of insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations citing David Galula's theory. In his book, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, Galula sets a clear mark for planning future COIN operations against the increased likelihood of insurgencies following an Orthodox Pattern in semi-authoritarian countries. This monograph extrapolates Galula's theory and frames it in contemporary campaign planning doctrine to demonstrate its applicability to COIN warfare. Joint doctrine serves as the common lexicon for commanders and planners to conceptualize COIN plans. But the application of doctrine alone does not address how to put the plan into context. David Galula's COIN theory and the Boer War serve as examples of theory and history to contextualize the plan. The Contemporary COIN Campaign Plan Concept, proposed by the author, illustrates how commanders may effectively synchronize the available resources and required capabilities. It attempts to be predictive, but not mistaken, as the definitive COIN campaign design concept. Instead, it aims to serve as a compass by pointing in a direction supported by history, theory, and doctrine.

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ADA436114
Winning the Minds in 'Hearts and Minds': A Systems Approach to Information Operations as Part of Counterinsurgency Warfare
Descriptive Note: Monograph
Personal Author(s): Molinari, Robert J
Report Date: 26 May 2005
Media Count: 63   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *INFORMATION THEORY, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *INFORMATION WARFARE, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, MILITARY DOCTRINE, UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE, INSURGENCY
Identifiers: (U) IRAQI FREEDOM OPERATION
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) Do Information Operations (IO) contribute to success in counterinsurgency campaigns? What IO measures of excellence exist to demonstrate achievement of success in counterinsurgencies? These questions currently challenge U.S. military forces deployed to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. This monograph develops a systems framework to better analyze and understand the interactions of IO subsystems as part of counterinsurgency operations. In addition to developing an adaptive systems framework to understand the importance of IO as part of COIN, this document explains the importance of system's aims to identify centers of gravity and feedback loops through existing doctrinal typology of situation-specific considerations. Feedback loops are developed into measures of excellence that allow synchronization and synergy of IO subsystems to be translated through cultural barriers and adjusted as necessary to affect the perception management of all targeted audiences in a counterinsurgency campaign. The historical case study analysis of the Malayan counterinsurgency (1948-1960) is utilized to describe IO as part of COIN systems approach.

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ADA437597
The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict - A Case Study for the United States Military in Foreign Internal Defense
Descriptive Note: Monograph
Personal Author(s): Goodwyn, Reid M
Report Date: 26 May 2005
Media Count: 52   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *ARMY OPERATIONS, LESSONS LEARNED, DEFENSE SYSTEMS, MILITARY PUBLICATIONS, PALESTINIANS, ISRAELIS, COUNTERINSURGENCY, MILITARY TACTICS, ARMY PLANNING, MILITARY DOCTRINE
Identifiers: (U) FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE, STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS, COIN(COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS), ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT
Distribution Statement: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Abstract: (U) From the end of the Vietnam War until Operation Enduring Freedom, the United States military did not engage in significant counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. The decline in the U.S military's experience in this area is evident in the fidelity of the joint doctrine and service manuals such as Joint Publication 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense and U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency Operations, contains some detail for planning COIN operations, but is a reprint of Fleet Marine Field Manual 8-2, and is somewhat dated from its original publishing in 1980. Operation Iraqi Freedom has required the U.S. military to relearn the COIN lessons forgotten from campaigns in Central America, the Philippines, and Vietnam. However, as mentioned above, a corps planner will find little guidance in military literature. This monograph seeks to provide that guidance by providing an analysis framework, the theoretical knowledge, and sources of additional guidance. Drawing primarily from academia, this monograph analyzes insurgencies using the familiar METT-TC format to understand an insurgency's motivations, strategies, tactics, targets, and means. It then uses the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a case study against which the reader may test the theoretical knowledge presented on insurgencies.

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ADA429690
An Alternate Military Strategy for the War on Terrorism
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Canonico, Peter J
Report Date: Dec 2004
Media Count: 89   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *IRAQ, *MILITARY STRATEGY, *POLICIES, *UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, *STRATEGIC ANALYSIS, *COUNTERTERRORISM, *TERRORISM, MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES), MILITARY HISTORY, WARFARE, LESSONS LEARNED, COLD WAR, DEMOCRACY, INSURGENCY
Identifiers: (U) IRAQI FREEDOM OPERATION, ENDURING FREEDOM OPERATION, GWOT(GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM), POST COLD WAR ERA, GEORGE W BUSH ADMINISTRATION, MILITARY OCCUPATIONS, GLOBAL INSURGENCY, COIN MODEL, COIN(COUNTERINSURGENCY), UNMNF(UNITED NATIONS MULTINATIONAL FORCE)
Distribution Statement: Availability: This document is not available from DTIC in microfiche.
Abstract: (U) Alternate Military Strategy for the War on Terrorism calls for addressing the war as a global insurgency. Addressing the war on terrorism as a Global Insurgency provides an alternative strategic framework for prosecuting the campaign. This study is intended to determine the utility of analyzing the war on terrorism using an insurgency/counterinsurgency conceptual framework. Additionally, the recommendations can be applied to the strategic campaign, even if it is politically unfeasible to address the war as an insurgency. The first half of the study is intended to provide a thorough understanding of Dr. McCormick's COIN model. This is done by, first, providing an overview of the model and, second, applying the model to a historical case. The second half of the study addresses the war on terrorism. The COIN model is applied to the war on terrorism based on the al Qaeda Network and the United States vision and mission for the conflict. Conclusions from the analysis are broken down into ten recommendations for the U.S. strategic framework for approaching the war. The final chapter addresses the utility provided by the insurgency/counterinsurgency framework as applied to the war on terrorism.

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ADA428901
United States Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Implementation in Iraq
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Graff, Jonathan K , Jr
Report Date: 18 Jun 2004
Media Count: 95   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES), *MILITARY HISTORY, *IRAQ, *MILITARY DOCTRINE, *ARMY OPERATIONS, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, LESSONS LEARNED, STRATEGIC ANALYSIS, LITERATURE SURVEYS, THESES, PHILIPPINES, GUERRILLA WARFARE, INTERVIEWING, EL SALVADOR, INSURGENCY, VIETNAM WAR
Identifiers: (U) *IRAQI FREEDOM OPERATION
Distribution Statement: Availability: This document is not available from DTIC in microfiche.
Abstract: (U) This thesis examines the conduct of the U.S. Army's counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq from the end of March 2003 through March 2004. While examining how the U.S. Army is implementing existing counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine, the thesis also addresses the topics of what the doctrine is and where it came from. Chapter 1 provides an introduction to U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine implementation in Iraq. Chapter 2 is a literature review of the nature and background of insurgencies, the U.S. Army's response to them, the background of the Iraqi region, and the doctrine the U.S. Army developed to defeat insurgencies. Chapter 3 examines the history of U.S. Army experiences in counterinsurgency operations with regard to the Moro Rebellion in the Philippines between 1898 and 1905, the Hukbalahap Insurrection in the Philippines from 1946 to 1951, the Vietnam War from 1961 to 1975, and the El Salvador Uprising between 1971 and 1988. Chapter 4 focuses on current U.S. Army counterinsurgency operations in Iraq based on interviews with participants, news reports, and reports from the Center for Army Lessons Learned. The last chapter examines how doctrine fails to adequately address the role of U.S. forces as an occupation authority and makes recommendations. The author concludes that basic principles outlined in U.S. doctrine are still applicable in Iraq, but U.S. and coalition forces are not applying them as intended. They should be unifying their military efforts with a comprehensive economic, social, and political reform plan. A list of 44 sources that were consulted but not cited also is included. (52 refs.)

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ADA424849
The Tao of Special Forces: An Analysis of Counterinsurgency Doctrine
Descriptive Note: Master's thesis
Personal Author(s): Reed, D T , Jr, Donahoe, Adrian A
Report Date: Jun 2004
Media Count: 109   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MILITARY OPERATIONS, *MILITARY DOCTRINE, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, STRATEGIC ANALYSIS, SPECIAL FORCES, UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
Distribution Statement: Availability: This document is not available from DTIC in microfiche.
Abstract: (U) The unwillingness to correct deficiencies in current COIN doctrine or to adhere to the effective methods outlined by count doctrine will lead to continued instability and possible failure of counterinsurgency operations and government in states with large Islamic populations. The conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq is insurgent in nature, requiring a counterinsurgent strategy. Current US Army Doctrine focuses entirely on the counterguerilla aspect of an insurgency, rather than viewing the insurgency in its entirety. Existing COIN doctrine is inadequate, as it lacks an overall governing strategy, which must include engaging of both the populace, and the infrastructure of the insurgency, going well beyond just counterforce operations against the guerrillas. But the entire hierarchy of COIN doctrine is skewed in favor of the conventional units who write it. Currently all COIN operations fall under support and stability operations, as do counterguerillas operations in a doctrinal hierarchy that is written by the US Army Infantry Branch. However, US Army Special Forces Branch writes insurgency and foreign internal defense doctrine (COIN falls under FID for all Internal Defense and Development IDAD programs). The unique qualifications of Special Forces units make them ideal for creating, developing, instituting, and commanding these operations. Special Forces soldiers are language and culturally trained to operate within these nations, and normally have habitual associations previously developed with the people and militaries of these nations.

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ADA422704
The Global War on Terrorism: War or Counterinsurgency?
Descriptive Note: Final rept.
Personal Author(s): Brigham, David E
Report Date: 06 Feb 2004
Media Count: 22   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MILITARY PLANNING, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, CENTER OF GRAVITY, WARFARE, GLOBAL, STRATEGIC ANALYSIS, FEASIBILITY STUDIES, TERRORISM
Abstract: (U) Paper examines the strategy of today's Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of executing the GWOT as a Counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign vice a generalized war against terrorism and its sponsors. This paper will argue that current GWOT strategy, instead of weakening, may actually be strengthening the enemy's center of gravity at the strategic level. Discussion includes the imperatives of strategic and operational COIN planning as well as the criticality of integrating a multinational and representational coalition into fighting what is essentially an Islamic militant insurgency. Further, paper looks at the feasibility of America's role as the lead military element in today's COIN effort and why American military effort may be better suited, and ultimately more successful, in a supporting role.

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ADA404031
Kosovo: Peace Support Operation or Counterinsurgency?
Descriptive Note: Student research paper
Personal Author(s): Litster, Alan
Report Date: Jan 2002
Media Count: 60   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *PEACETIME, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, NATO, NATIONAL SECURITY, COMMUNITIES, BRIGADE LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS, MISSIONS, ETHNIC GROUPS, UNITED NATIONS, INTERVENTION, INSTABILITY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, ALBANIA, ELECTIONS, MUNICIPALITIES, INSURGENCY
Distribution Statement: Availability: Hard copy only.
Abstract: (U) 3 Commando Brigade's tour in Kosovo was defined as a Peace Enforcement operation despite evidence prior to deployment that ethnic Albanian dissidents were unwilling to conform to the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244. Ethnic Albanians had conducted an effective insurgency against Serb forces in the region until NATO's intervention in 1999. The aim of the insurgency was to establish Kosovo as an independent sovereign state. However, the international community was unwilling to give any firm commitment to independence for Kosovo in 1999. This fact, combined with the municipal election results in October 2000, further radicalized those ethnic Albanians who had fought the Serbs for independence. The insurgency that had been directed against the Serbs was then redirected towards both the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The end state was still independence. Two proxy insurgencies were conducted by the Albanian population, one in the Presevo Valley and one in Macedonia. This insurgency became a new source of instability for the Balkan region. NATO and UNMIK must treat ethnic Albanian nationalism as an insurgent dynamic and deal with it accordingly. In that light, Kosovo's status must be redefined along with UNSCR 1244. Moreover, NATO PSO doctrine must be updated to include COIN techniques. Finally, the NATO and UN agencies in Kosovo must be resourced to effectively fight an insurgency.

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ADA393508
United States Military Doctrine and the Conduct of Counter-Insurgency Operations: Fixing the Disconnect
Descriptive Note: Final rept.
Personal Author(s): Manthe, Brian
Report Date: 18 May 2001
Media Count: 35   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *MILITARY STRATEGY, *MILITARY DOCTRINE, *GUERRILLA WARFARE, FOREIGN POLICY, ALGERIA, MILITARY OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES, LESSONS LEARNED, STRATEGY, HISTORY, POWER, MALAYA
Identifiers: (U) COUNTER-INSURGENCY
Abstract: (U) Counter-insurgency operations have been and will remain part of the United States' foreign policy. In the past fifty years counter-insurgencies have been fought on every continent. As the world's sole super power with a National Military Strategy of Shape, Respond and Prepare Now, direct involvement in counter-insurgency operations is very likely. Unfortunately, while there is ample proof that such operations will be part of the future, there is a lack of doctrine to guide successful preparation, planning and execution. To support the national strategy, doctrine is needed that will prepare the United States for success. The United States lacks a complete and coherent military doctrine for conducting counter-insurgency operations. As a result, leaders, planners and individual servicemen are not training for the full spectrum of tasks necessary to be successful. This is the case jointly and among our service branches. This paper will showcase historical examples and scholarly studies to identity what essentials should be addressed, and provide lessons learned upon which future counter-insurgency doctrine can be formed. Specific proposals will be made to reshape doctrine. The pitfalls of failing to collect deficiencies will be explained.

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ADA316729
The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan
Personal Author(s): Grau, Lester W
Report Date: Aug 1996
Media Count: 247   Page(s)
Descriptors: (U) *USSR, *LESSONS LEARNED, *MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), *TACTICAL WARFARE, *AFGHANISTAN, MILITARY HISTORY, LEADERSHIP, TERRAIN, SURVIVAL(GENERAL), CASUALTIES, MILITARY TRAINING, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, ADAPTATION, MILITARY TACTICS, GUERRILLA WARFARE, EAST GERMANY, HUNGARY
Abstract: (U) When the Soviet Union decided to invade Afghanistan, they evaluated their chances for success upon their experiences in East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Unfortunately for their soldiers, as well as the people of Afghanistan, they ignored not only the experiences of the British in the same region, but also their own experience with the Basmachi resistance fighters in Central Asia from 1918-1933. Consequently, in Afghanistan the Soviet army found its tactics inadequate to meet the challenges posed by the difficult terrain and the highly motivated mujahideen freedom fighters. To capture the lessons their tactical leaders learned in Afghanistan and to explain the change in tactics that followed, the Frunze Military Academy compiled this book for their command and general staff combat arms officers. The lessons are valuable not just for Russian officers, but for the tactical training of platoon, company and battalion leaders of any nation likely to engage in conflicts involving civil war, guerrilla forces and rough terrain. This is a book dealing with the starkest features of the unforgiving landscape of tactical combat: casualties and death, adaptation, and survival.

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