



# MODERNIZATION

RESTRUCTURING OUR ORGANIZATIONAL DNA FOR SUSTAINABLE 21ST CENTURY MISSION EXECUTION

## LETTER FROM



Are you ready for or even aware of the proposed changes ahead for the Coast Guard and Reserve? If you're not familiar with acronyms like DCO, DCMS, OPCOM, FORCECOM and RFRS, you will be by the time you finish with this unprecedented special issue.

First of all, our Commandant, ADM Thad Allen, took time out of his jam-packed schedule to give us his take on the Reserve program, Reserve Forces Readiness System and the way ahead. It's been 11 years since THE RESERVIST published a face-toface interview with a sitting Commandant so this is indeed a rare occasion (the last being July 1997 with then Commandant ADM Robert Kramek).

In addition, six other Coast Guard flag officers, the MCPOCG, and MCPO-CGRF have all written columns for this issue as well. This is a first for this publication; and they're all writing and focusing on one basic thing — Coast Guard Modernization.

Keep in mind as you read about the proposed Modernization, that's exactly what it is proposed. Coast Guard Modernization needs to be approved by Congress before the Coast Guard can finally implement it.

Enjoy and drop me a line and let me know what you think. Semper Paratus!

— ED TheReservist@uscg.mil The U.S. Coast Guard Reservist is published by

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U.S. COAST GUARD





Tacoma, Wash. (March 3, 2006) - The Response Boat-Medium (RB-M) is an all-aluminum, 45-foot boat with twin diesel engines with water jet propulsion launched at in Commencement Bay in Tacoma, Wash. This small boat, which recently completed a successful Builder's Trials on March 3, is expected to be the primary non-heavy weather, multimission capable boat for the U.S. Coast Guard. The RB-M will have increased maneuverability and be capable of speeds in excess of 40 knots (46 miles per hour). A full cabin will provide crew protection from the elements and will be equipped with a robust navigation system, heating and air conditioning, shock mitigating seats, and a communication system capable of communicating with other federal, state and local Homeland Security organizations. The RB-M's misssions will include Search and **Rescue (SAR), Enforcement of Laws** and Treaties (ELT), Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS), Defense **Operations (DO), Marine Environmental Protection (MEP), and Recreational Boating Safety (RBS).** These boats will replace the 41-foot Utility Boats (UTB) which have been the workhorse of the coastal stations for the past 25+ years. U.S. Coast Guard photo by Jeff Curtis



PASCAGOULA, MISS. (Dec. 4, 2007) — Sea trials began this week for the BERTHOLF, the U.S. Coast Guard's first National Security Cutter.

The BERTHOLF, the Coast Guard's largest multi-mission cutter, sailed from Northrop Grumman shipyard docks into the Gulf of Mexico on Tuesday.

BERTHOLF is the first of eight planned ships in the new class of technologically advanced multimission cutters being built at Northrop Grumman, acquired under the Coast Guard's Deepwater Program. Photo courtesy of Northrop Grumman





SEVILLE, SPAIN (June 29, 2006)-- First flight of the Maritime Aircraft (MPA). The EADS CASA CN235-300M was selected platform for the MPA for the Integrated Deepwater System Program, which is aimed at modernizing and replacing its surface and air fleet. It is the perfect complement for the Guard fleet of long-range, heavy-lift HC-130 aircraft. Its h efficiency turbo prop design allows persistent surveillance quick response speeds in the role of a maritime patrol air These, plus other additional features allow the Coast Gua control the movement of high interest vessels and quickly mariners in distress.

Photo courtesy of Lockheed Martin.

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# INTERVIEW WITH THE COMMANDANT

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WITH AN INTRODUCTION FROM RDML DANIEL MAY

PHOTOS BY PA3 VICTORIA BONK, USCG





By RDML Daniel R, May, USCG

Director, Reserve & Training

#### A Commitment to Improving Readiness, Mission Support and Mission Execution

n my very first "View from the Bridge," I outlined what our top priorities would be for this year. The number one item on that list was to modernize the Reserve Force, including implementing the Reserve Force Readiness System (RFRS), repositioning our full-time support (FTS) billets, and right-sizing our SELRES.

Over the past six months, we have made significant progress in this effort. In June 2008, the Leadership Council approved the RFRS model for the future management of our Reserve Force, and we are currently in the middle of a large-scale effort to reposition the FTS billets to support RFRS. Additionally, we have proposed growth of our Reserve Force with two new port security units, along with the FTS to support them. In the future, we are planning to add up to 200 new billets in the field to support our operational commanders.

Below is the interview with the Commandant, and he discusses many of these items as well as a number of other key issues involving reservists. As you'll read, the Commandant is committed to improving the readiness of our Reserve Force and improving everything we do to support you in order to enhance your contributions to mission execution. We are very fortunate to have this opportunity for the Commandant to share his many thoughts and ideas.

Enjoy!

On July 28, 2008, THE RESERVIST interviewed the Coast Guard Commandant, ADM Thad W. Allen. He discusses an array of Reserverelated issues, including Reserve integration of the 1990s, the Reserve Force Readiness System and the way ahead for the Coast Guard Reserve.

**THE RESERVIST**: Was there a particular experience you had, or an event that influenced your decision to include the Reserve component as one of your top priorities for the organization to resolve?

**ADMIRAL ALLEN:** Yes, there are actually a couple. Let me give you a refresher on how I became involved with the Reserve during my career. I had what I would call very little contact with reservists until I became the Group Commander in Atlantic City from 1979 to 1982. Back then it was a group with four stations and I became fully exposed to the reserve unit structure as it was at that time.

Before the mid-1990s, we actually had reserve units, with commanding officers, but most notably, training officers and admin officers. While it was not always visible to the active component, they took care of what I would call the care and feeding of the reservists. They made sure they were being properly trained, qualified and the administrative needs were taken care of. And that's pretty much the way it used to be.

Fast forward many years later, when I was a Group Commander in Long Island — a couple of things happened there. First of all, we went through Reserve integration, and I had to actually take a system of reserve units. The reserve units were done away with and they were moved over and integrated with the active component. I also dealt with a whole bunch of leadership issues associated with what to do with senior enlisted and senior officers who were displaced from command and leadership positions. It was a very difficult time.

About the same time, everybody started to grapple with how big the Coast Guard Reserve should be, who should manage it, and whether the Selected Reserve was the right size? Prior to my tenure in Long Island, I had some exposure to reserve issues related to the work I did as the deputy in G-CPA, now CG-82 (Office of Budget and Programs). While I was at Long Island as an 0-6, I was also assigned one year to the Coast Guard Reserve Policy Board, chaired at that point by Reserve RADM Rick Schneider, prior to his retirement. So I got immersed in issues related to Reserve support as a result of that assignment.

With all this background in Reserve issues, it led me to inquire further how things were structured regarding billets, and how we administered the program and so forth.

From there, I went to the Seventh District, where I was fully involved in Reserve programs, and then the Fifth District. Ditto on 9/11, when I was LANTAREA Commander, and we had to mobilize and put people up in Boston Harbor and New York Harbor. And then finally, with the support for the waterside security at Guantanamo Bay, I really started to see how frayed the system had become between 1995 and 2001, with no replacement for the training suitable and administration that was provided by the reserve units. I am not indicating we should go back to them, but we didn't get it right.

I've made the statement on several occasions why we didn't foresee the events of 9/11 in the mid-1990s. We practiced Reserve integration for all intents and purposes. But when we really needed to mobilize the Reserve after 9/11, we found out we had practiced Reserve disintegration.

### **THE RESERVIST:** What hurdles, if any, do you foresee to implementing Reserve Force Readiness System beginning in 2009?

**ADMIRAL ALLEN:** Well, there are always issues related to organizational change, new business models and so forth. But frankly, the real [challenge] in this thing is going to be the redistribution of the full-time support billets. That's always been a key issue.

When I met with the Reserve folks gathered in Dallas (Reserve Management Conference, September 2007), the one thing I told them — the guidance I gave, frankly, was that however we distribute the full-time support (FTS) billets under the new construct, it should be able to withstand a desk audit by the Inspector General (IG) or anybody else, looking into whether or not they were properly applied to Reserve support. That raises a lot of issues because sometimes we just augment support staff with billets, knowing that a portion of the workload is related to the Reserve.

But you can't go into somebody that's in a support billet always, and say, "All right, tell me what you do every day that's related to the Reserve?" I thought we needed more clarity, less ambiguity and a greater nexus between what those billets were intended to do in national Reserve support. **THE RESERVIST:** You stated at the Reserve Management Conference last fall in Dallas that the Reserve program needed to finish the implementation it started during integration in the 90s. From your review of the Reserve Force Readiness System, do you believe it completes the process?

**ADMIRAL ALLEN:** I believe it will. I haven't seen the finalized implementation plan, but the things we are replacing back into the system are accountability at the field level for the administration, training, and mobilization of reservists. And that would largely be embodied in a new Reserve support structure at the sector level.

What we lost in the mid-1990s was a point of accountability. It was easy to have accountability for training reservists to augment. But if you're looking at trying to train and equip, and make ready for deployment a force whose basic statutory authority is mobilization, we in fact moved away from that. Now that could have been based on assumptions related to post-Cold War threats, and the perceived lessening need to mobilize reservists.

But as we found on 9/11, that is not what happened. We need to make sure we take care of business and create a structure that allows us to adequately train, administer the Reserve program, and then mobilize reservists when we need them.

**THE RESERVIST:** The process of developing a Reserve Force Readiness System in less than a year is a significant lift. What advice would you give to the implementation team as they move forward?

**ADMIRAL ALLEN:** Stay busy.

**THE RESERVIST:** The RFRS model provides a systems approach to our world of work. Resources are placed in the chain where reservists are assigned. The uniqueness of the Reserve force is addressed. In your words, how do you think these strengths will resolve long-standing problems in managing the Reserve force?

**ADMIRAL ALLEN:** Dedicating resources to the problem places a point of accountability at the unit-level. A visible organizational location for that support will be beneficial to everybody who needs it.

**THE RESERVIST:** *RFRS places an emphasis on training and recruiting. Do you see the Reserve force growing?* 



**ADMIRAL ALLEN:** I think we need to look at the size of the Reserve force. I think there's every reason to believe we could use more Reserve capacity. But I have to tell you, going clear back to 1995, when I was a Group Commander on Long Island — we never came up with a single agreed upon methodology by which to size the Reserve force — Contingency Personnel Requirements List, or augmentation or whatever. That was somewhat exacerbated by the fact that both Areas had different methodologies, or ways they would build the Reserve requirements. We would simplify that to some extent because when we establish Coast Guard Force Readiness Command and the Coast Guard Operations Command, there should be no duality, or split methodology used to size the requirements.

I think we'll have an organizational structure in place that will do two things. Number one, we will be able to administer the program better at the field level; and number two, we will have unity of command at the operational level. We will also generate a single set of requirements. I think we can establish what the gaps are. And I am more than happy to go in and seek an increase in Reserve, but I think we need to have that structure in place to support it. **THE RESERVIST:** One of the aspects of the Reserve Force Readiness System is the concept that everything we do impacts Reserve force readiness. This includes our entire world of work from assessing the right person, making the best assignment, paying them promptly and accurately, effectively and efficiently utilizing the RT appropriation to enhance readiness and developing on target policy. A critical success factor is shifting everyone's thinking, from admin support and logistics, to readiness preparedness. Can you assist us in sending this important message?

**ADMIRAL ALLEN:** Well I think to start with [we need to ask], should the social contract with an active-duty member be any different than the social contract with a reservist? And to the extent we are focusing on readiness and human resource systems to support our most valuable commodity — that's our people — should we treat the Reserve component differently than the active-duty component? The answer is no. Over the past few years, it's been somewhat degraded by changes we've tried to make. It's time to restore that.



### **THE RESERVIST:** How does the establishment of a law enforcement and security rating impact the PS rating?

**ADMIRAL ALLEN:** I gave explicit orders as part of the LETSGO (Law Enforcement, Tactical and Security Group Occupation) study team that they were to address the issue of the PS rating, because for a long time, going back to when I was LANTAREA Commander, we'd known it was an orphaned rating. It didn't have an active-duty counterpart.

Because of that, we tended to redefine the PS rating every time we had a new challenge in the Coast Guard they might be able to impact. I remember when we first started this back in the early 1970s, we had a huge influx of firemen and policemen, locally, who populated that rating to do port-security work. But over the years, some folks have drifted more into small-boat operations, while some others have drifted into what I would consider almost a Marine Science Technician type of work. It tended to lose its identity. It didn't have the anchor of a curriculum in a school on the active-duty side to kind of keep it pointed the right way. So, it was a fundamental part of the LETSGO study to address the PS rating as well.

### **THE RESERVIST:** How do you envision policy for dwell time impacting operations?

**ADMIRAL ALLEN:** That's going to be an interesting thing to watch. If you look at addressing the entire Reserve component as a system, then you have to address what I would call parity and equity in application to the requirements of the Coast Guard.

Because of the vagaries of the system, and the fact we didn't have a set system to deal with admin mobilization in support of reservists, we tended to get folks that wanted to volunteer. And most of the time we would ask for and get enough volunteers. It was kind of haphazard on how we did that.

Looking at our [DoD] counterparts across the (Potomac) river, the Reserve components have been involved in what we all agree is an era of persistent conflict. There is going to be an enduring requirement for Reserve support. I know Master Chief [Reserve Force] Jeff Smith has done a lot of work with his Reserve [DoD] counterparts.

But we need to create a system that is very similar to the other services, where there is a predictable rotation we can train our people to establish a readiness cycle, and let them know there will be a period of time where they will be available for deployment. It would be a more equitable burden sharing across the Reserve component to add predictability to the individual members, and also inform the unit on what their responsibilities are to get these people equipped for their mobilization period.

And as I've told people at All Hands lately, you know over a five-year cycle, there will be a year where that's going to be your year, and you're on call. And whether it's for military out load assignment or waterside security at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, you'll know when you are going to go. There will be a cycle associated with it; you'll be able to train to it. There will be a readiness level required for you to be mobilized.

I think in the long run it will create enduring capability for whatever we have to deal with in the Coast Guard. And we'll find out at that point, once we set that cycle up, the support structure that matches it, and whether or not we've got the right size for the Reserve.

**THE RESERVIST:** On that last comment, maybe you could expand — what has been absent since integration — for the training and utilization of employment. And given this era of persistent conflict that we find ourselves in, how do you see the role of say, working, to define that.

**ADMIRAL ALLEN:** Well, it's probably better to describe it in terms of what our DoD counterparts are doing. I think it's a general recognition that you need

some capacity to be able to respond on short notice to contingencies around the world, and for us, it would be all hazards, all threats.

If you look at what's going on in Iraq, what's going in Afghanistan, the horn of Africa, Southern Philippines and elsewhere, it's pretty well recognized, on the defense side of the house, that there needs to be some recurring capacity to deal with a number of different small engagements in an era of persistent conflict.

We know for instance, that we have a long and enduring requirement in the Persian Gulf. We're not even anywhere near the point now where we can shift security for securing the oil platforms. But beyond that, there are issues of development and long-term training requirements for our partner nations over there.

For the foreseeable future, we're going to be doing that. For the foreseeable future, we are going to be in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. For the foreseeable future, we will be doing what I've characterized as incremental out-loads. We don't have the big wars like we had before, where you mobilize troops — and then they come back home. What we have are persistent, periodic outloads to different parts around the country, trying to address all of this through recalls, whether it's voluntary or involuntary, and then source these every year through supplemental funding.

Is it consistent? It doesn't allow you to do longrange planning, and it lacks consistency in application of the force. We need to create that same extra level of capability that DoD has created, and respond to new challenges in our persistent conflict. The only way to do that is with our Reserve component.

**THE RESERVIST:** You mentioned earlier the challenges that we've faced since Reserve integration, especially for senior enlisted. What is your vision for where you see that headed in the future? Also, we haven't really addressed, necessarily, that pre-mobilization piece that resides within integration. Do you have any thoughts about how we continue to develop that and build that into the pre-mobilization piece for the organization?

**ADMIRAL ALLEN:** Well, I think once we define what the staffing and the management constructs are for the sector and the district, and the tier set of resources to help manage the Reserve program, then I would treat that almost as a fixed constant in the equation. Then you have other capacity that is out there in the form of your senior enlisted leaders, and the officers that are assigned to the Selected Reserve.

I think then what we're going to need to do is have a pretty good assessment of the best application of those skill sets. But I'm going to give you a couple of examples. There is every reason to believe we can have some kind of a senior leader development program within sectors and commands, where people come up and they qualify as command-duty officers working in command centers, and become surge capability for those local commands in times of, for instance the recent New Orleans oil spill.

We also have not clarified the role of the Reserve component in the deployable specialized forces. We have the port security units already, which have a command structure. Some of the MSSTs were created with the Reserve components, and some of them were not.

Master Chief [Reserve Force] Smith and I have talked about this several times. We are going to have to decide whether or not we want a Reserve component, and can a Reserve component be adequately supported? And when we move outside the sector construct, what do we think about the Reserve component, particularly for the MSSTs?

The reason I bring that up is there are leadership and command opportunities there as well. So I think we need to kind of lay all that out and look at the officer structure and the senior enlisted structure.

There is another thing too. When we are doing mobilization and deployments, you are still going to have reservists back at home. There's always going to be a piece that won't mobilize. And there will be an enduring requirement for somebody to manage the Reserve programs, like the people who are assigned to full-time support billets.

And what we'll have to figure out is what is our career progression for senior enlisted and senior officers within that? I think there are plenty of opportunities, but I'm not sure it was clarified as well as it should have been.

I had a Reserve Group Commander who was my counterpart at Long Island — but after Reserve integration, he became the Senior Reserve Advisor, or Senior Reserve Officer. And quite frankly, that was pretty tough on these folks. They didn't know what their job description was, and it varied from place to place. Depending on their background, they were employed differently by different commands and became kind of inconsistent. I think we've got to bring that kind of structure back into it.

**THE RESERVIST:** What we hear sometimes is the Team Coast Guard concept in regards to integration doesn't need duplication of effort because we're going to take care of everybody, with respect to the senior leadership, whether it's enlisted or officer positions. But I think what we've found is number one, that there's some unique knowledge that really doesn't reside in the active-duty component. And also, there really is a workload here, it's a workload issue. Can you offer a comment on that?

**ADMIRAL ALLEN:** I have said from the start, our external environment has changed dramatically, and

the requirements on our Reserve component are not the same as they were in 1995. So this is not a referendum on what was done in the past — on whether we did the right thing or not. Rather, it is a referendum on whether or not the current structure created in the mid-1990s is suitable in a post-9/11 world. It clearly needs to be changed — it's not responsive. That doesn't mean that anything was wrong. That was not the intent of what we tried to do.

Now that said, there's lots of talent in the Reserve component that could be utilized to benefit the active duty side. For example, let's look at the things we really need to do on the Human Resources side of the Coast Guard right now, like mentoring. The Reserve chief petty officers can mentor active duty enlisted and help bring them along and develop them. That is also going to help us with diversity.

And having some force multipliers for the senior enlisted at the sector level is good, but you've got to bring them into the fold. Everybody has got to understand what you're trying to do together, whether it's leadership training or dealing with the difficult decisions these young kids have to make right. If you are dealing with it as "a family within the sector," you are going to be much more effective in dealing with your work force.

#### **THE RESERVIST**: Any final comments?

**ADMIRAL ALLEN:** There's an opportunity here in my view. You are never going to have a Commandant sitting where I'm at right now, that's lived this for as many years as I have, who understands the problems we'll be taking on. That's not a value judgment on anybody else, it's just the fact where I happened to have been. I have been tracking this thing for many years.

### **THE RESERVIST:** Well thank you sir. We appreciate you taking time with us today.

**ADMIRAL ALLEN:** No problem, you're welcome.





# RESTRUCTURING OUR C FOR SUSTAINABLE 21ST CEN










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
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"WE ARE MODERNIZING THE COAST GUARD FOR SUSTAINABLE MISSION EXECUTION. POSITIVE CHANGES ARE UNDERWAY, AND TOGETHER, WE ARE SHAPING THE FUTURE OF OUR SERVICE." — RADM JODY BRECKENRIDGE, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC TRANSFORMATION TEAM













### THE PROPOSED ORGANIZAT





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#### Coast Guard Strategic Transformation Team:

# A Look Ahead

#### By RADM Jody A. Breckenridge Assistant Commandant for Human Resources

ur Coast Guard is undergoing a service-wide organizational and cultural shift to become a true change-centric organization. The Coast Guard Modernization, our largest modernization effort since World War II, will make our Service more agile, flexible, and responsive to the rapidly changing world we now operate in. I'd like to take this opportunity as the Director of the Strategic Transformation Team, to tell you where our Coast Guard is going. All strong, high performing organizations must continually take stock of themselves.

"We serve first and foremost the citizens of the United States. And we must ensure that we provide the best return on investment for the dollars our citizens give us to keep them safe. We want Americans to be confident that their tax dollars are sound investments into a relevant organization." Building on studies and analysis, and lessons learned from our responses to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, as well as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Coast Guard Modernization is a holistic look at our Service focused on enhancing our upper level command and control structure, mission support capabilities and overall business processes.

The professional men and women that make up our Coast Guard, regularly develop innovative solutions to the challenges our Service faces today. Unfortunately however, these innovations are far too often never expanded beyond the unit or operational community level. Additionally, our current business processes regularly cause our workforce to develop "work-arounds;" mainly because we do not put the right business processes in place up front. Many of these business processes were past organizational decisions that have accumulated over time, especially in regard to mission support. When we look at how we manage our mission support organization, we have to employ configuration management for every single asset line and a standard business practice across all of our assets. We must look from now to the future, and we must make fundamental organizational changes.

Change is hard. Our workforce takes great pride in our Service, and are personally vested in the parts of our organization that are changing. The tendency is to assume something is being done wrong or that we are somehow failing as an organization; we're not. In fact, we succeed today primarily because of the people who make up our workforce. As an organization, we are extremely fortunate with the people who choose to serve in our Coast Guard. The two basic reasons our people are drawn to us are they like the missions we have, and they like the people they serve beside. With this in mind, we need to make sure, as an organization, that we are doing well by our people, our entire workforce- Coast Guard Active Duty, Reserve, Civilian and Auxiliary alike. We have to ensure we're giving them the right business processes, tools, resources, training, policies, tactics, techniques, and procedures so they can go out and do their jobs safely. If we want to remain relevant, and position our workforce to be able to focus on Mission Execution, and continue to do the tremendous job they do across our 11 mission programs, then we need to change.

We serve first and foremost the citizens of the United States. And we must ensure that we provide the best return on investment for the dollars our citizens give us to keep them safe. We want Americans to be confident that their tax dollars are sound investments into a relevant organization. We are facing significant growth in commercial shipping, expansion in coastal development, new energy exploration, increasing activity in the Arctic, and unpredictable disaster response requirements. These challenges have made change, adaptation and modernization an imperative to ensure we employ the best practices to meet the needs of our Nation. We've started a journey and we are absolutely committed to finishing the changes you'll hear about in this special edition of Reservist Magazine dedicated to the Coast Guard Modernization.

In addition to this opening article, we have compiled views on the Coast Guard Modernization from the senior leaders directly responsible for each of the four main modernization efforts, Operations Command (OPCOM), Force Readiness Command (FORCECOM), Deputy Commandant for Mission Support (DCMS) and the Deputy Commandant for Operations (DCO). VADM Papp, VADM Pekoske, VADM Pearson, and RADM Brice-O'Hara will each offer you their views of modernization from their respective efforts.

The final point I'd like to leave you with for now about our Coast Guard Modernization and the changes underway, is specifics about what we are not changing, because I believe that is just as important as what we are changing. We are not changing our missions. We are not changing our core values. We are not changing our Guardian Ethos, and we are not changing what we want out of our on-scene commanders in the way of on-scene initiative. These enduring characteristics are what make us unique. They make us successful, and they, along with our people are what make us the best Coast Guard in the world.

My hope is that from this edition of the Reservist Magazine you will gain a stronger understanding for the combined efforts currently underway to prepare the world's best Coast Guard, our Coast Guard, for sustainable mission execution and service to our Nation.

#### Emblems of the PROPOSED Coast Guard Commands\*





Deputy Commandant for Mission Support



Commander, Operations Command



Commander, Force Readiness Command

\*NOTE: The above emblems are a component of new Command Logos which have yet to be finalized.



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### ASST. COMMANDANT FOR MARINE SAFETY, SECURITY & STEWARDSHIP (CG-5)

### ATES COAST GUARD DEPUTY DANT FOR OPERATIONS



### DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (CG-DCO-I)



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DCO



The Deputy Commandant for Operations (CG-DCO):

### **A Look Ahead**

By RADM Sally Brice-O'Hara, Deputy Commandant for Operations

e stood up the Deputy Commandant for Operations (CG-DCO) on Oct. 3, 2007; it was the first major Modernization element to achieve what is commonly referred to as "Version 1.0." Being first means CG-DCO is a transitional organization pending the development of

the other Modernization elements. We will make further adjustments as those other organizational elements are implemented, but the current CG-DCO organization is a significant step forward toward a modernized Coast Guard. Over the coming months, we will partner with our Headquarters counterpart, the Deputy Commandant for Mission Support (CG-DCMS), to increase the organizational focus on operations and support while improving span of control by sharing the integration and oversight responsibilities formerly provided by a single Chief of Staff.

One of the most significant attributes of the new CG-DCO organization is that it completes the Headquarters component of a multi-year journey to integrate, align and improve Coast Guard-wide operational command and control. Most of us grew up in a Coast Guard where operational missions were conducted by multiple field units, whose Areas of Responsibility (AORs) overlapped and whose operational command and control was provided by separate chains of command. Operational planning, policies and capabilities for those units were developed by the separate Assistant Commandants for Operations (G-O) and Marine Safety, Security and Environmental Protection (G-M).

While that organization served us well for decades, today's operating environment requires flexibility, responsiveness and a new Coast Guard-wide unity of effort that would be difficult to achieve with our current structure. We have stepped up to meet the challenge. Four years ago, we began merging the organizational and cultural strengths of the different Coast Guard operational field commands into a common structure under a single Sector Command. Today there are 35 Sectors; the former Marine Safety Offices and Groups no longer exist. Three years ago, we aligned Districts, Areas and Headquarters with the Sector Structure, including converting Headquarters G-O and G-M to G-P (Prevention) and G-R (Response).

Two years ago, as part of the Commandant's Intent Action Order (CIAO) #2 initiative to convert CGHQ to numbered staffs, we transitioned G-P and G-R to CG-3P and CG-3R under a single Assistant Commandant for Operations (CG-3). At the same time, a small CG-5 Policy and Planning Assistant Commandant was created from the legacy Headquarters CG-X Integration staff, and International Affairs Coordination was transitioned to a separate CG-00I staff. Last fall we merged all those staffs under a single Assistant Commandant for Operations (CG-ACO). The merger resulted in a more efficient organization and allowed us to reallocate more than 10 percent of our personnel resources to fill high-priority shortfalls at front-line field units. We recently changed our name from CG-ACO to Deputy Commandant for Operations, or CG-DCO.

Today we are much better aligned with the field organization than the former separate O and M or G-P and G-R organizations. The new CG-5 Assistant Commandant has responsibility for policy development for the full spectrum of our 11 operational missions, and the subordinate Directors for Response (CG-53) and Prevention (CG-54) complete the organizational alignment between Headquarters and the Sector field structure.

The developing Force Readiness Command (FORCECOM) and Operations Command (OPCOM) models are reinforcing the concept of organizational alignment, with one important difference. In the past we used to use the term "Vertical Alignment" to describe similar parts of the HQ-Area-District-Sector chain of command. Modernization changes our organization from a hierarchy to a network of peers. Rather than aligning vertically, our new organization must align horizontally among the major Modernization components. Operational Prevention and Response policy developed in Headquarters will be translated into operational doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) in FORCECOM and executed through an aligned OPCOM chain of command down to the Sectors. This clear division of labor, standard organizational architecture, and horizontal alignment, from policy development to field operations, will enhance mission execution - and that's what Coast Guard Modernization is all about.

As our Modernization effort partners begin their journeys, we are working together to establish the critical operational and support processes and linkages that will help make us an effective, change centric organization. Suffice to say, the operations community has been in a state of change for some time and will continue to change and improve as we move forward with Modernization. In addition to partnering with DCMS to help transform Headquarters to its modernized structure, planned CG-DCO changes for 2009 include the transfer of the Deployable Operations Group (DOG), Aviation Training Center Mobile, the CG-535 Exercise Support staff, the Container Inspection and Training Team and the CG-546 Mission Management System staff to FORCECOM. In addition, the CG-DCO organization will transfer the CG-311 command center staff and responsibility for operational situational awareness to OPCOM, a change that will streamline information flow to the Service Chief and reduce the distraction of day-to-day "current operations headlines" from Coast Guard policy development staffs. We are already planning for 2010 as our Modernization journey continues.

When I look back on the changes we made, and look forward to the changes to come, I see a common thread of hard work and superb team effort among our Coast Guard regular, reserve, auxiliary and civilian personnel. I'm proud of all of you who helped get us this far, and I'm confident your talent and ability will help us create a new Coast Guard for a new millennium. Semper Paratus! CG-DCO will be the single Headquarters element to develop regulations and standards as well as reconcile strategic operational plans, policy and capability with budget

and other lawful direction to maximize operational performance consistent with legal authority and the Commandant's strategic intent and priorities. CG-DCO will also assist in exercising the Commandant's operational command authority for the Service when directed by the Commandant.

CG-DCO will be a formal alignment of Headquarters' operational oversight, including the offices of the Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety, Security and Stewardship, the Assistant Commandant for Capability and the Director, International Affairs. CG-DCO strategically integrates operational missions and optimizes policy development and mission execution consistent with the Service's national priorities. CG-DCO formally aligns Headquarters' operations, policy,

planning and capabilities under a single Deputy Commandant, ensuring horizontal integration across the Coast Guard's eleven operational missions and completing organizational vertical alignment between Headquarters and the field.

PROPOSED Emblem of the Deputy Commandant for Operations

#### Cause for Action -

• Consolidates all Coast Guard operating programs under

the leadership of a single Deputy Commandant, increasing operational focus and unity of effort.

• Integrates all operational policy development under a single Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety, Security and Stewardship, eliminating overlap and redundancy and providing clear unambiguous guidance to the field.

• Improves capabilities

requirements generation for all Coast Guard operating programs, centralizing these functions under a single Assistant Commandant for Capability.

• Enhances Headquarters vertical alignment with the new sector field operations organizational structure, clarifying mission ownership and improving the flow of policy, plans and resources from Headquarters to the field.

• Incorporates the International

Affairs Directorate and functions into the new CG-DCO organization, improving the link between operational policy and international engagement.

#### **CG-DCO Outcomes**

- + Mission Performance Plans, policies, strategic analysis and planning, assessments and requirements for all Coast Guard statutory missions.
- + Integrated response and prevention mission policy.
- + Integrated external and international outreach/partnerships for ops policy and regulations.
- + Integrated authorities, capabilities, competencies, capacity and partnership requirements.
- + Situational and policy awareness to inform and enable leadership for Critical Incident Communications, MARSEC level, and MOTR responsibilities in coordination with OPCOM.
- + Commandant's executive agent with the Joint Staff, DHS and Inter-Agency in coordination with OPCOM.



THE ORGANIZATIONAL HIERARCHY SHOWN IS PREDECISIONAL AND IS THE ENVISIONED ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR MISSION SUPPORT PENDING CONGRESSSIONAL APPROVAL.





### TATES COAST GUARD DEPUTY NDANT FOR MISSION SUPPORT



STRUCTURE

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR ACQUISITION (CHIEF ACQUISITION OFFICER/CAO) (CG-9)



#### The Deputy Commandant for Mission Support (CG-DCMS):

DCMS

### A Look Ahead

#### By VADM Clifford I. Pearson, Coast Guard Chief of Staff

Store rooms full of expensive, unused parts; two different processes (and offices) for acquiring major systems; little correlation between funding sources and work; overburdened field personnel conducting maintenance beyond their capabilities; non-standard business processes across our support programs and

geographically dispersed support commands. These are only a few of the important reasons the Commandant determined we needed to establish the position of the Deputy Commandant for Mission Support (DCMS).

As the Chief of Staff of the Coast Guard and the prospective DCMS, I'm grateful to be able to address the readers of THE RESERVIST on the formation of the Coast Guard's Mission Support Organization (MSO) and the progress of the Logistics Transformation Program in establishing our new logistics business model.

I recognize not everyone spends much time thinking about the nuances of Coast Guard Modernization and Logistics Transformation. This is especially true for reservists who also have civilian careers to occupy their time, energy and attention. In light of that reality, some definitions and clarifications are in order. The Coast Guard's Modernization program deals primarily with the creation of new organizational structures aimed at improving and streamlining Coast Guard operations and mission support.

Based on the bi-level support structure seen within our own aviation program, these structures in and of themselves will do little to change the way the Coast Guard operates. We must instill in these new organizations a new way of conducting business. The Commandant's Logistics Transformation Program, started in 2005, is delivering the working business model and information technology architecture to enable our new organizations. Also based on our "best in class" aviation support program, the Coast Guard's new Logistics Business Model will enable our new logistics and service centers to deliver the centralized, bi-level support to power Coast Guard mission execution.

To many, the term "logistics" invokes images of warehouses, store rooms and freight transportation companies. The Coast Guard's definition of logistics, like our military partners in the Department of Defense, is far more expansive and "...encompasses all the activities associated with developing, acquiring, sustaining, and eventually retiring the components of capability: People, Information, and Systems." Since 1993 our concept of logistics has envisioned a unified logistics program, which has "...a uniform look and feel that does not vary by platform, equipment, unit type, or geographic location. This will be accomplished through standard integrated policies, business practices, and information systems."

Though we have long had a sound definition and unifying concept of operations for conducting our logistics support activities, the simple reality is we were not living up to our own words. As a result of longheld traditions that value ingenuity and autonomy, the evolution of our organization and its programs and how we govern ourselves internally, and the unintended consequences of previous decisions and influences by our leaders at all levels, we gradually evolved an organization that was not as functional as we needed it to be.

Despite these challenges, the one constant was Coast Guard

personnel, operators and support personnel, military and civilian, could always be counted upon to get the mission done. Our service motto — Semper Paratus — demanded it of us, and we've always lived up to it. Getting the job done in spite of the difficulties our own organization at times created for us became a hallmark of our Coast Guard culture. Others before me have termed it "The Curse of Semper Paratus." But we've made it harder on ourselves than it needs to be. With the selection of a standard logistics business model and IT architecture under Logistics Transformation, the alignment of CG-1 (Personnel), CG-4 (Engineering and Logistics), CG-6 (C4IT) and CG-9 (Acquisition) under DCMS, and the formation of the necessary logistics and service centers to execute this business model, the Coast Guard is now poised to deliver a unified, fully functioning, fully integrated business architecture to support mission execution efficiently and effectively for the 21st century.

As DCMS, I will develop, coordinate, monitor, and control policies and programs for human resources management; acquisitions; engineering and logistics support of the operating forces and shore infrastructure; and the technical aspects of the information systems and networks to enable Coast Guard operations consistent with the Commandant's strategic intent and priorities. Through the Mission Support Organization and Logistics Transformation, we will achieve a consistent business model for asset management; foster sustainability through standard, repeatable and scaleable processes and apply disciplined configuration management to ensure standardization and consistent capability for mission execution. Specifically, my Assistant Commandants will:

- Establish mission support output levels and performance standards.
- Serve as technical authority for all Coast Guard human resource, aeronautical, naval, shore facility, C4IT, logistics systems and – architectures.
- Manage the life cycle of Human Resources.
- Oversee full life cycle support of people, systems, products and services that meet operational needs.
- Serve as the Coast Guard's Chief Administrative Office, developing policy and programs in accordance with DHS management requirements.
- Create policy for and exercise control over Surface Forces, Aviation, Shore Infrastructure, C4IT and Personnel Centers, as well as the Coast Guard Academy.

Currently, we have three levels of support for the majority of our equipment and platforms. Under our new mission support organization, all support activities will transition to a bi-level structure. All support services not accomplished at the unit level will be coordinated and managed through logistics and service centers. The logistics and service centers being established are as follows:

ARSC Elizabeth City will become the Aviation Logistics Center (ALC) and will retain all of its current functions. It is the "guide on" for our other, newly forming centers.

A new Personnel Service Center (PSC) will unify all personnel and human resource support now provided by the Personnel Command, Personnel Service Center in Topeka, Recruiting Command, and some functions currently carried out by Headquarters, the MLCs, and ISCs, including services such as housing, MWR, CGES, educational services, health and safety, and work-life.

A Surface Forces Logistics Center (SFLC) will be established to consolidate the support for our surface forces currently provided by the Coast Guard Yard, Engineering Logistics Center, MLCs, NESUs and MATs. This center will unify support under a single organization for our surface forces. Like the aviation community, it will be organized along product lines, including patrol boats, small boats, MECs, HECs/NSCs, ATON vessels, floating ATON, and so forth.

The C4IT Service Center will consolidate electronics and IT support. Included will be the C2CEN, the Telecommunication and Information Systems Command (TISCOM), C4IT elements of the MLCs, and the Operations Systems Center (OSC).

The Shore Infrastructure Logistics Center (SILC) will consolidate support provided by our Facility Design and Construction Centers, Civil Engineering Units, and civil engineering elements of the MLCs. This center will provide all depot and intermediate level support for our shore facilities, including our air and small boat stations, integrated support commands (bases), and industrial facilities.

The responsibility of these service centers will be to deliver full life cycle support while adhering to the four cornerstones of the Commandant's support strategy; (1) provide a bi-level support structure with only unit and depot levels of maintenance, (2) provide a single point of contact and accountability for all major asset types through the establishment of product lines and

product line managers, (3) support total asset visibility of all Coast Guard operating assets and supply spares through the use of enterprise processes and information systems, and (4) establish and enforce rigorous configuration management programs to ensure the integrity of Coast Guard assets throughout their life cycle. Service center leaders will report through Assistant Commandants to DCMS. These centers will provide 24-hour customer service, one-stop technical support and assistance for all matters that go beyond the expertise of the unit. Some of these centers will oversee detachments in the field to ensure timely, on-site support where necessary.

As ADM Allen clearly stated in his first SITREP to the men and women of the Coast Guard the day he assumed the duties of the Commandant, our people must have the tools and support they need



#### PROPOSED Emblem of the Deputy Commandant for Mission Support

to do their job. As DCMS, I will do my part to ensure Coast Guard men and women are the best trained and most versatile workforce in government, equipped with the most capable fleet of multi-mission ships, aircraft, boats and command and control systems available. Along with ADM Allen, I am personally committed to implementing our new Coast Guard business architecture during my tenure as DCMS.

#### Semper Paratus!

#### Cause for Action -

• Transforms our logistics support and service delivery to a modern business model responsible for life-cycle management of all Coast Guard assets from acquisition through decommissioning.

• Serves as Technical Authority for all Coast Guard aeronautical, naval, shore facility, C4IT, logistics, human resource systems and architectures.

• Oversees acquisition and sustainment of systems, products, and services that meet operational needs.

• Creates policy concerning the operation of, and exercise control over Surface Forces, Aviation, Shore Infrastructure, and C4IT Logistics Centers; the Personnel Operations Center; Coast Guard Academy; and accession and technical centers.

• Establishes standardized processes, efficient governance and internal efficiencies while eliminating external

regarding who is responsible and accountable at each step in the Coast Guard logistics and acquisition processes.

- Eliminates duplicate business processes which currently yield inconsistent and, often, inefficient logistical support services to Coast Guard operators.
- Establishes coherent and integrated information systems to support logistics processes throughout the organization at the tactical Sector level and the strategic enterprise level.
- Provides a Human Resource system that is flexible and responsive to rapidly changing personnel requirements.

#### **CG-DCMS** Outcomes

- + Full life cycle management for CG people, platforms and systems.
- + Standard, disciplined, repeatable, & scaleable processes.
- + Disciplined configuration management.
- Bi-level maintenance support/services model (pushed support to unit).
- + Single point of accountability for support above unit level.
- + Centralized management of resources for support above unit level.



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## UNITED STATES COAST GUARD OPERATIONS COMMAND



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"Coast Guard **Modernization** efforts as a whole are an unprecedented sea change for the Service. and the **OPCOM** implementation will mirror the bigger picture with a new. more effective way for us to fulfill our operational responsibilities."

Coast Guard Operations Command (CG OPCOM):

# **A Look Ahead**

By VADM Robert J. Papp, Jr. Commander, Coast Guard Atlantic Area

hipmates: OPCOM will be responsible for our Service's number one responsibility to the nation — Mission Execution. Ultimately, OPCOM will oversee all Coast Guard Districts, Sectors, and major assets when deployed to accomplish any of the Coast Guard's missions. By its very design, OPCOM will reach beyond the current Atlantic Area and Pacific Area geographic paradigm and enable a centralized and effective command structure for all Coast Guard operations around the globe.

OPCOM will be responsible for mission execution across all 11 Coast Guard mission areas. This will be accomplished through six functional divisions including: Reserve Force **Operations**, **Operational Intelligence**, Operations (Prevention and Response), Plans and Exercises, Operational Requirements and Analysis, and **Resources Management**. Utilizing these functional divisions, OPCOM will develop and execute operational plans and strategies when responding to routine and emergent maritime operations; conduct the service's Operational Risk Management (ORM); direct all operational intelligence; continue the Coast Guard's work with Department of Defense, interagency, and international partners; maintain and disseminate a global Common Operational Picture (COP) and Common Intelligence Picture (CIP); and strengthen the Service's partnerships with public and private sector entities worldwide in regard to Maritime Relations, Regimes, and Maritime Governance.

To consolidate our efforts regarding this Modernization effort, I have chartered the Operations Command

Implementation Team (OCIT), with RDML Kevin Cook as the Director. The guidance I have given the OCIT is to form and direct diverse workgroups to review existing operational doctrine, plans, and guidance and develop an organization and key processes to execute the Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security and Stewardship. The OCIT has already begun to conduct comprehensive reviews of existing District, Area, and Headquarters policies and processes, with the goal of developing and executing an implementation plan to attain OPCOM's stand-up.


Coast Guard Modernization efforts as a whole are an unprecedented sea change for the Service, and the OPCOM implementation will mirror the bigger picture with a new, more effective way for us to fulfill our operational responsibilities. However, the primary missions of the Coast Guard will remain intact throughout Modernization, and our mission execution units — Districts, Sectors, Cutters, Air Stations, and others — will remain in place, providing the same support to the nation, with no impact on day-to-day missions.

We have been performing as Guardians for more than 218 years. The Coast Guard Modernization effort, with OPCOM implementation and other changes to the Service's organization, will position us to continue to evolve our mission execution in a constantly changing global maritime environment — enabling us to embody our motto of Semper Paratus, Always Ready.

Questions or comments regarding OPCOM implementation can be addressed by contacting the OCIT staff at: OPCOM\_Implementation@uscg.mil. CG OPCOM will be the Coast Guard's operational commander with responsibility for mission execution of the Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship through assigned authorities, competencies, capabilities, capacities, and partnerships. CG OPCOM will have oversight of all Coast

Guard District

Commanders. CG OPCOM will establish the Coast Guard's primary command for directing Coast Guard operations, and will combine the operational oversight duties of the two current Area Commands which presently share these responsibilities. With all nine Coast Guard **District Commanders** reporting to CG OPCOM the Service's operational chain of command will be shorter and more direct, the command and control structure will be more consistent in operational decision-making, and collaboration and



information sharing will improve with all of the other Armed Services, and public and private partners, both in the United States and abroad.

#### **Cause for Action**

• Establishes Coast Guard's primary command charged with operationally translating the Coast Guard Strategy into action; the Service's face to the Nation.

> • Transforms Coast Guard Command and Control structure from a regionally divided, mission-based organization to a centralized, functional construct which optimizes unity of effort across all of the Service's eleven mission areas.

• Leverages Coast Guard's relationships with other Armed Services and Combatant Commanders.

• Integrates Coast Guard capabilities for National Defense Operations.

• Removes inconsistencies in mission execution that are inherent within the Service's bifurcated command and control organizational structure, including eliminating current Area Command boundaries which are irrelevant to drugtrafficking organizations and other transnational threats.

• Improves coordination and interoperability across all Coast Guard operational units worldwide to enhance unity of effort in maritime planning and operations.

• Enables Coast Guard to focus its national maritime awareness and domestic/international engagement activities in order to optimize mission execution.


### CG OPCOM Outcomes -

- + Command & Control construct that unifies efforts across all of the Service's eleven mission areas.
- + Agile & responsive Mission Execution effectively & efficiently meet emergent operational needs consistent with CG & National Command Authority priorities.
- + Enhanced MDA utilizing a robust, fully integrated, real-time CG COP and CG CIP. (Provide daily briefs to COMDT, "Big 4", and operational and other HQ elements).
- Strengthened Maritime Relations, Regimes & Maritime Governance
   Robust public & private sector partnerships, both in the United
  States and abroad.



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## UNITED STATES COAST GUARD FORCE READINESS COMMAND







FC-6

C4IT

FC-5

PERFORMANCE

& DOCTRINE

FC-8 RESOURCES



"FORCECOM.... ...will ensure: **Reserve Force** Readiness, reservists receive timely and high-quality training, and compliance and standardization programs/visits ensure Reserve readiness is an inseparable and integrated part of total force readiness."

#### Coast Guard Force Readiness Command (CG FORCECOM):

# A Look Ahead

#### By VADM David Pekoske Commander, Coast Guard Pacific Area

oast Guard Force Readiness Command's (CG FORCECOM) mission is to provide ready forces to meet the supported Commander's current and future operational requirements. FORCECOM will allocate forces (the scheduling of major cutters, long-range aircraft, and the Deployable Operations Group [DOG] units to OPCOM), and ensure force readiness throughout the Coast Guard under one Commander.

What does this mean, and why is it of immediate value to the Coast Guard? In order to provide ready forces to the Coast Guard, FORCECOM takes policy and develops operational doctrine and the corresponding tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) consistent with that doctrine. This process identifies best practices on how the Coast Guard should conduct operations.

Proceeding from this standardized method of performing operations, FORCECOM then establishes and defines the individual and unit performance systems. Training is guided by standardized TTP to ensure consistent and competent mission execution across the entire Coast Guard. Performance is then systematically and consistently measured through compliance and inspection teams to ensure our Coast Guard forces remain ready. These teams also collect valuable feedback from the field to improve future TTP.

The key divisions in FORCECOM are: FC-1, Reserve Readiness Division; FC-3, Force Management and Allocation; FC-5, Performance and Doctrine; and FC-7, Readiness, Standardization and Capability Analysis. Units assigned to FORCECOM include all the training centers except the Coast Guard Academy, all standardization teams, Training Quota Control, the Afloat Training Groups, all major cutters, longrange aircraft, and the DOG when not deployed, and the former Pacific and Atlantic Area training teams. FC-1, the Reserve Readiness Division, is designed to align with FC-3, FC-5 and FC-7 to ensure the Reserve program is fully represented and aligned to benefit from FORCECOM's values. This will ensure the Reserve component is trained and mobilization ready. When reservists mobilize to different regions of the globe, the training and TTP used will be the same as all Coast Guard forces. How we train will be consistent with how we operate, regardless of where we geographically deploy.

FORCECOM, via FC-1, will ensure: Reserve Force Readiness, reservists receive timely and high-quality training, and compliance and standardization programs/visits ensure Reserve readiness is an inseparable and integrated part of total force readiness.


Under Modernization, the FORCECOM Commander has functional responsibility for Reserve Force Readiness Systems, operational doctrine and TTP, training, standardization, and total force readiness. This will result in easier single-point access for the field when dealing with these important functions.

#### FORCECOM will . . .

- Allocate mobile and deployable forces on a service-wide basis.
- Promulgate doctrine that will align training and standardization to ensure force interoperability and readiness.
- Provide timely and high-quality training.
- Consolidate and standardize inspection visits, resulting in fewer interruptions to unit operations, and establish a standard measurement system to evaluate the readiness of Coast Guard forces.
- Rapidly validate field innovation best practices and incorporate them into Tactics, Techniques and Procedures.

CG FORCECOM will be the Service's supported Commander for Readiness. CG FORCECOM will achieve, maintain, and measure the readiness of forces and resources to execute all Coast Guard missions. CG FORCECOM will

also translate policy into operational doctrine, and provide the required capabilities for the projected operating environment. CG FORCECOM will establish the Coast Guard's primary command responsible for managing operational readiness, force allocation and doctrine for the Service. This will eliminate geographical variances which currently exist with readiness being managed by elements of two separate Area Commands. CG FORCECOM will transform the Service's readiness management into a centralized, functional construct aimed at optimizing unity of effort across three main business lines: (1) readiness and standardization; (2) operational doctrine, to include tactics, techniques and procedures; and



(3) force management and allocation. This will result in a more efficient, effective, and consistent readiness posture designed to best leverage Coast Guard capacities to meet mission execution demands.

#### **Cause for Action**

- Oversee all aspects of fleet and force readiness; manages force allocation by providing scalable and sustainable capabilities to Coast Guard Operations Command (CG OPCOM).
  - Coordinate operational doctrine and exercises though tactics, techniques, and procedures for all operational platforms and assets, including interoperable doctrine with DHS, DoD, private sector, and other domestic and international partners.
  - Improve operational readiness by standardizing evaluations for unit readiness, and by enforcing configuration control, standard procedures, and compliance measures.
  - Deliver all personnel and unit training to reduce capability gaps and enhance readiness.
  - Leverage adaptive force packaging assets to assist interagency DHS components, DoD, and other domestic and international partners. "Right people, right skills, right place, right time."
  - Augment Coast Guard involvement for national operational exercises involving Commandant-level

participation.

• Direct operational and contingency planning to optimally resource field mission requirements pursuant to needs of the Nation.

### **CG FORCECOM Outcomes**

- + Force Management and Allocation. Allocate mobile and deployable forces on a global basis.
- + Doctrine. Promulgate doctrine that will align training and standardization to ensure force interoperability and readiness.
- + Training. Provide timely and high quality training.
- + Readiness and Standardization. Consolidate and standardize inspection visits and establish a standard measurement system to evaluate the readiness of CG Forces.
- + Innovation and Best Practices. Rapidly validate field innovation best practices and incorporate them into Tactics, Techniques and Procedures.



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FC-1

**RESERVE FORCE** 

READINESS



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


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## TATES COAST GUARD FORCE READINESS SYSTEM





#### **Concept of Operations**

Under the Reserve Force Readiness System (RFRS) organizational model, Reserve Force readiness and training will be governed by staffs of Reserve program subject matter experts led by Reserve Program Administrators (RPAs). These staffs will be solely tasked with all Reserve functions at each command level, improving the command's ability to meet its responsibility for training, qualification, and management of the Reserve Force by supplying the organic subject matter expert resources that were not provided at integration. These staffs will vary in size based on the SELRES population within the geographic area. They will receive Reserve program guidance and direction from the next level above in the organization. In order to provide the appropriate level of interaction with Reservists, these staffs will be expected to be available when reservists drill.

#### The RFRS organizational design elements are:

#### Units:

As the first element in the RFRS model, each Coast Guard unit with Reservists assigned will have a Senior Enlisted

Readiness Advisor (SERA) SELRES designated billet on the Personnel Allowance List (PAL). This support billet will be filled by an E-7 to E-9 working directly for the command to provide leadership and support in individual and unit Reserve readiness and training. Duties will include advising the command on Reserve readiness and training actions. Depending on

## RESERVE FORCE READINESS SYSTEM

the individual unit situation, the SERA may also develop and implement formal and informal training plans, monitor accuracy and completeness of TMT and Direct Access data, and coordinate IDT and ADT schedules with unit operations. As a leader and advocate for the Reservists, the SERA will mentor and career counsel Reserve enlisted personnel. The SERA can also assist with Reservist compliance issues such as medical and personnelreadiness requirements.

#### Sectors:

Each sector will have a full time, active duty RFRS staff consisting of Reserve subject matter experts. They will be led by a Reserve Program Administrator O-3/O-4, assigned to the same staff in each Sector and positioned to maximize Reserve readiness. The staff is modeled after the highly effective active duty staffs that support the Coast Guard's eight Port Security Units (PSUs). The PSU active duty staffs' sole focus is the readiness and well-being of those Reservists assigned to them. Therefore, the staff's primary duties will revolve around the training, readiness and administration of the Reserve Force, including tracking and monitoring Sector Reserve readiness and recommending actions to resolve discrepancies. The staff will work in concert with the Sector and unit command cadre, the unit SERA and across Sector staff elements where Reservists are assigned. The Sector's RFRS staff will develop long-range training plans based on input from units; direct actions to meet mobilization training requirements for Sector and sub-sector

Reservists; ensure necessary resources are available for Reserve operational readiness training (platforms, trainers, training quotas); enforce Reserve compliance with Reserve participation standards and policies; and coordinate with Sector and unit command cadre, and unit SERA and the Senior Reserve Officer on Reserve policy and readiness issues.

Assignment of enlisted full time (FTS) billets to the Sector's RFRS staff will be based on the number of Reserve billets assigned to the Sector, its subordinate units and those assigned to Headquarters' new Deputy Commandant for Mission Support units in the geographic area. They will include appropriate ratings and competencies required to ensure Reserve readiness (e.g. personnel administration, training, and medical). In addition, each Sector will have a Reserve Command Senior Enlisted Leader (Silver Badge) to execute the Command Senior Enlisted Leader Program.

#### **Districts:**

The District RFRS staff will be led by a Reserve Program Administrator O-4 or O-5 with primary responsibility for ensuring District-wide Reserve operational readiness. In addition, it will

facilitate intra-district allocation of mobilization resources, execute the AFC-90 (Reserve Training) financial account and serve as the Reserve Program representative for allocating training platforms. The District's RFRS staff will also include three to four junior Reserve Program Administrators who will provide program support to Sectors and units on funding, policy, resources, readiness, management,

and training. RFRS staffing at each District will be based primarily on the SELRES population within that District's AOR. The District Senior Reserve Officer (SRO) and Reserve Command Master Chief (CMC) will work with the RFRS staff in communicating its goals, objectives, progress and successes to the command.

The programmatic reporting chain will be OC-1, ensuring programmatic standardization and accountability for Reserve Program policy and statutes. The District RFRS will be assigned to the same staff in each district, positioned to maximize Reserve readiness and programmatically aligned with both the Sector RFRS staffs below and the OC-1 staff above. Functions will be matrixed with other elements of the organization with similar functionality. At the District, the RFRS staff will be similar to the Director of Auxiliary.

#### **OPCOM (proposed):**

OC-1 Reserve Force Operations Division: The OPCOM RFRS staff (OC-1) will be led by a Reserve Program Administrator O-6. OC-1 will direct Reserve program execution for Reserve Forces across OPCOM commands to ensure full readiness. As the OPCOM Commander's principal Reserve Force advisor and subject matter expert, OC-1 will interpret policy, validate training and mitigate gaps that prevent Reserve Force readiness. In addition, OC-1 will monitor mobilization and de-mobilization actions to ensure the seamless transition of Reservists onto and off of active duty. OC-1 will work closely with the proposed FORCECOM (FC-1) and network across other OPCOM Divisions.

#### FORCECOM (proposed):


FC-1 Reserve Forces Readiness Division: The FORCECOM RFRS staff (FC-1) will be led by a Reserve Program Administrator O-6. As Reserve Force Manager, FC-1 will direct the readiness, force management and allocation of Reserve Forces; manage Reserve positions on the Coast Guard Personnel Allowance List (PAL) as they relate to reprogramming requests, requirements, and capabilities shortfalls, and operational doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures. FC-1 will work within FORCECOM to maximize Reserve training opportunities, manage, and monitor, direct and execute Reserve standardization, inspection and compliance programs, including Reserve Force operational training and readiness improvements. FC-1 will analyze and communicate emergent Reserve Force capability shortfalls and resolutions. FC-1 will work closely with the OPCOM (OC-1) and will network across other FORCECOM Divisions, particularly with FC-3, 5 and 7.

#### DCMS (proposed):

CG-13 (Director of Reserve) will develop Reserve policy and guidance and be responsible and accountable for the Reserve Training Appropriation (AFC-90) in accordance with Titles 10 and 14 of the United States Codes. This position serves as the Reserve Component Chief and Coast Guard Liaison to the Department of Defense and other external entities on Reserve Component issues, including outreach and strategic communications. CG-13 will also be responsible for the integrity and continuity of the RFRS design and execution. PSC-rpm (Reserve Personnel) is responsible for Reserve assignments, accessions, promotions, Officer Evaluation System (OES), centralized Reserve administration, and ADSW.

#### DCO:

CG-533 includes Reserve expertise, experience and presence with a Reserve Program Administrator O-6 who will lead the development of operational policy and capabilities requirements with respect to the Reserve Force.



### An Open Letter to Team Coast Guard



Dear Team Coast Guard,

Everyone has heard about, discussed, and hopefully understands the ongoing Coast Guard Modernization efforts. One of my jobs is to help communicate Coast Guard leadership's intent to the field, and the field's concerns to top leadership. As we rapidly move toward 2009, and start getting nearer the time when actual organizational pieces and even people may start moving, I thought it might be a good time to share how I personally view the reorganization, potential challenges involved, and the role of field leaders as change agents.

Combining the two Areas into one Operations Command, creating a Force Readiness Command, completely reorganizing logistics support into a bi-level system using product line management delivered through a Deputy Commandant for Mission Support, product focused logistics centers, and field detachments, creating a Deputy Commandant for Operations, and the creation of the Deployable Operations Group all taken collectively represent change on a scale not seen in the Coast Guard since World War II. We are completely clearing out the closet, discarding unneeded or outdated practices that sometimes work against us, and then putting resources back together in a way that makes sense in today's world. Further, we are creating an agile system that will automatically keep the closet orderly as it responds to future needs.

In order for Modernization to be successful, the Coast Guard's field leadership must understand what we are doing, why we are doing it, and how it relates to their specific mission and personnel. Change is difficult and any change has the potential to positively or negatively impact our people. A big part of reorganizing successfully involves communication. We need to use every tool in the tool box to communicate where the organization is heading. The Coast Guard Modernization section on CG Central's homepage is updated frequently, and includes an extensive list of Frequently Asked Questions.

The real goal of the Modernization is to create a Coast Guard organization that can sense changes to the external environment and automatically adjust based on current and projected requirements. Small course changes are far better than waiting for multiple major issues to build up and then having to turn the organization 180 degrees. As a former multiple tour Officer-in-Charge ashore and afloat, I feel the single largest factor that will decide the extent of the Coast Guard's success in the Modernization effort will be the extent of active participation from the "deck plate" leaders in the field. We can assist by helping to sense pitfalls, communicate up the chain, and provide senior leadership recommendations for alternate courses as required.

I am honored to be taking part in this with you.

Very Sincerely,

CHARLES W. BOWEN Master Chief Petty Officer of the Coast Guard

### **Modernization and You!**

In this special edition of THE RESERVIST magazine, you will find extensive and detailed information on the progress made to date on the Coast Guard's Modernization efforts, and where as an organization we are headed. As you digest the information contained on these pages, I suspect a number of things will be on your mind, such as, "Where do I fit in? Does this help or hinder my goals? What is my future?"

Those are all fair and pertinent questions, and frankly, I would be less than truthful if I told you I had an answer to each of those questions. As with most things, it will fall upon you, the individual, to do your due diligence like reading and internalizing the articles in the magazine; by going to Modernization Web sites to get additional and updated information; and by reading the articles and message traffic from senior leadership as to the strategic and tactical imperatives that underpin these efforts.

Some might ask, "What impact will I have, I am just a second class petty officer or junior officer?" To that I would offer the following. In the end, a successful Modernization effort will require an All Hands effort. The more knowledgeable you are about where the organization is headed, the better able you are to positively impact the outcome. It is no different than knowing how you contribute to successful mission execution of a high endurance cutter or port security unit whether you are the newest non-rate or a more seasoned sailor.

In short, take personal ownership of the opportunities that have and will continue to present themselves as the Modernization of the Coast Guard moves forward. Ever since Alexander Hamilton first envisioned that fleet of small cutters that would eventually become our modern day Coast Guard, the organization's success has ultimately been measured by the ability of our people to remain always ready to meet today's challenges while keeping a weather eye to the future. In its purest form, the current Modernization effort is ultimately about empowering every individual to have a hand in shaping the future of what has always been a living entity reflective of its ever adaptable and resourceful people.

This is truly a great time to be a member of the United States Coast Guard. And, I am truly honored to serve with such a fine crew.

JEFFREY D. SMITH Master Chief Petty Officer of the Coast Guard Reserve Force



## United States Coast Guard Reserve: Ready, Flexible, Resilient & Strong

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